Nawat For Group Research Paper

A Study About The Political and Educational Reality and Insights into the Reality Within IDPs Camps in Northern and Eastern Syria

Prepared by:

Hussein Ali Hussein Kassem

www.nawatsyria.com

Introduction

At the outbreak of the Syrian protest movement in March 2011, the predominantly Kurdish areas in the Syrian Jazira and in Afrin and Kobani regions of Aleppo governorate were not excluded from the umbrella of the regime's tyranny and its suppression mechanisms. Rather, these areas were characterized by dual persecution, a Syrian persecution that was manifested by their denial of public freedoms like all citizens, and a national persecution that manifested itself by implementing policies against the , such as the Arab Belt project, and stripping and depriving nearly 200,000 Syrian Kurds of the Syrian nationality. However, what distinguished these regions from other Syrian regions was the presence of an organized political movement that continued for decades, whose activities were sometimes overlooked and often suppressed, depending on the degree to which this movement approached the internal Syrian situation and the degree to which it was employed by the regime in the service of its regional conflicts. The best example of this is the arrest of a large numbers of supporter of the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria (Yekt)) in 1992 (Joint Command) 1 when a poster was distributed in public facilities calling for the restoration of the nationality of the Kurds who were stripped of it, and for the joint struggle for democracy, human rights and building the rule of law, at a time when the regime was condoning and supporting the activity Supporters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party “PKK” and the Kurdish parties loyal to the parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Emergence of the Syrian Kurdish Movement:

Most of the references agree on considering the 14th of June 1957 as the birth of the first Kurdish political organization in Syria, under the name of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria “Al-Party”, where Dr. Noureddine Zaza was elected president and Osman Sabri as the party's secretary. The party was subjected to the first large-scale arrest campaign, and most of the party’s leaders were arrested in 1960, and the party effectively split in prison into two parties against the background of the trials, and the party’s leadership’s adoption of its slogans and political program.

In August 1965 the split took root, and there became what is known as (right and left), and during the attempts of Mullah Mustafa Barzani to unify the two parts of the party that continued until August 1970, which was unsuccessful in the Nauberdan conference (the Nauberdan region in Iraqi Kurdistan), which transformed the reconciliation delegation and some middle leaders in the two parties and those who abstain from organizing work to another party led by Daham Miro, which was recognized by Mullah Mustafa Barzani.

Since the mid-1970s, the Kurdish movement has become divided into three parties: the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (Al-Party), known in Kurdish public circles as Al-Party, led by Daham Miro, the left-wing Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria, known as the left, led by Salah Badruddin, and the Kurdish Progressive Democratic Party in Syria known as the right, led by Hamid Haji Darwish, who kept the name of the main party, "the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria" until 1977, when the suffix "Progressive" was added to it.

The series of splits in the Syrian Kurdish movement continued against the background of three basic issues, the first of which is political related to the position from the left (Marxist) thought, such as: being guided by Marxism or adherence to it, and the second is the influence of the Kurdish parties in Iraq and the polarization that the Syrian Kurdish mass base was witnessing, in particular, the influence of The Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iraq and the Patriotic Union

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of Kurdistan - Iraq, the third of which is the position on the regime and the issues of security penetration that pushed towards the fragmentation and disintegration of the Kurdish movement.

The Reality of the Syrian Kurdish Movement in Early 2011

The Syrian Kurdish movement at the beginning of 2011 was divided into twelve parties:

1. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), which was founded in the Qandil Mountains in September 2003 and is distinguished by its membership relationship with the Kurdistan Workers' Party “PKK”. 2. The Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria “Al-Parti” (Abdul Hakim Bashar). The party has a distinguished relationship with the Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iraq led by Barzani. 3. The Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria “Al-Parti” (Nasreddin Ibrahim). 4. The Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria (Abdul Hamid Darwish). The party has a special relationship with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (YNK) since its establishment, as a result of the charisma of the late Progressive’s Secretary Abdul Hamid Darwish, and his distinguished relationship with the late Jalal Talabani, Secretary General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. 5. The Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in Syria (Aziz Daoud). 6. The Kurdish National Democratic Party (Taher Safouk). 7. Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria-Yekiti (Muhyiddin Sheikh Ali). 8. Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria (Ismail Hami). 9. The Kurdish Azadi Party in Syria (Mustafa Jumaa). 10. Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party (Jamal Al-Sheikh Baqi). 11. The Kurdish Left Party (Muhammad Musa). 12. The Kurdish Future Movement (Mashaal Tammo).

It is useful to say here that the main Kurdish parties that used to share the popular and effective base in the field were only five parties: the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria-Al-Parti (Abdul Hakim Bashar), the Kurdish Progressive Democratic Party in Syria (Abdul Hamid Darwish) and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria- Yekiti (Muhyiddin Sheikh Ali) and the Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria (Ismail Hami).

Political Facts After March 2011

A number of events in northeastern Syria before 2011 formed a source of Kurdish-Arab sensitivity, these events can be summarized in: the international intervention in Iraq and the fall of the regime in the spring of 2003, the formation of a Kurdish federation in Iraq and the revival of the hopes of the , the events of in March 2004 and the killing of dozens over a football match, the murder of the cleric, Ma'shuq al-Khaznawi, in 2005 in mysterious circumstances, informed sources indicated that the security services were involved in his killing.

These events have accumulated special sensitivities and created an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust between the Kurds, and other components in the Kurdish regions. With the start of the Syrian revolution, all the components of the region found themselves facing a new situation that fulfills each of their hopes and dreams, especially by demanding freedom and dignity. The Kurdish youth did not hesitate to engage in the revolution and express

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themselves through mechanisms that bring them together (away from the traditional political parties that took a cautious and watchful stand). They formed a coordinating body (Tansika) following the pattern of the organizations of the revolution, this coordinating body participated in the first demonstration in April 2011 through the Friday of the Martyrs. The youth of the revolution in other Syrian regions met the initiative of the Kurdish youth by announcing the Friday of Azadi in May 2011.

The regime's security services began implementing a policy of neutralizing minorities from the revolution, including the Kurds, so Al-Assad sent an invitation to the Kurdish parties to meet with their leaders, and 12 Kurdish parties decided to reject the invitation through the Qamishli meeting on June 12, 2011. This was followed by the issuance of Republican Decree No. 49 of 2011 to restore citizenship to those who have been stripped of it and who, as mentioned, are approximately 200,000 Kurds.

The meetings of the twelve political parties intensified 2, then soon they were framed in the Kurdish National Council project, where they agreed on a political document that served as an outline to devise a phased program and a bylaw that recognizes equal membership for parties regardless of their organizational size, with the exception of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which demanded four quotas, justifying its request for the existence of institutions independent of the party, such as the Martyrs' Families Foundation, the Star Union (Women’s Organization), and the Revolutionary Youth Union, where the number of families of the PKK martyrs before the outbreak of the Syrian protest movement reached the threshold of 4,000 martyrs. Most of the parties rejected the PYD's request, which led it to announce the People's Assembly for Western Kurdistan on December 16, 2011.

The 250 members of the Kurdish National Congress met in Qamishli on October 26, 2011, including 88 delegates from eleven parties at a rate of eight for each party, and 162 delegates from coordination bodies, federations and independent personalities, and this framework was known as the Kurdish National Council.

On the 16th of December 2011, 335 delegates from the Kurdish regions and the areas of Kurdish and diaspora met in the village of Tal Jamal in the Derek region, announcing the People's Assembly for Western Kurdistan, and the conference adopted the Autonomous Administration as a solution to the Kurdish problem (and regarding the solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria, he emphasized The conference on adopting a democratic solution based on building a common homeland and a democratic nation with essentially constitutional guarantees, based on the model of democratic self-management), the conference also approved the Charter of the Democratic Society of Western Kurdistan Movement (TEV-DEM) * and the Charter of the People's Assembly for Western Kurdistan, which will frame society by building communes in neighborhoods, villages and towns, and accordingly, daily life matters from distributing bread bundles, to fuel, to providing citizens with personal identification documents, residency, transportation ... etc. .... etc will be adopted.

The Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM), in addition to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), included small parties that did not have a popular base, such as the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Peace Party, the Kurdistan Liberal Union Party, the Syriac Union Party and the Kurdistan Communist Party. On the eve of the preparation for the Syrian Democratic Council at the end of 2015, this movement transformed into a civil society organization with an official statement despite the objection of some parties participating in it, but the dominance of the core

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of the movement, which is of course the Democratic Union Party (PYD), has remained until now. The Kurdish Youth Coordination Union, the Kurdish Youth Movement, and most of the youth groups that were fully involved in the Syrian revolution, which formed part of the Syrian revolutionary movement in general, were subjected to a sharp polarization between the two councils that began to restrict them and try to contain them on the other hand, and they succeeded in that to diminish the effectiveness of these youth gatherings to remain the two councils as the only two political parties that represent the Kurds.

In May 2011, the PYD media circulated a letter from the lawyers of Mr. Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) detained in , asking his supporters in Syria for three basic issues, the first is to start organizing society that began with communes and ended with the declaration of the Autonomous Administration, secondly to build an independent military force called the People's Protection Units and the Women’s Protection Units and ended within the framework of what was later known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, and to follow the third line policy between the regime and the opposition, in a clear reference to the need to follow a Kurdish private and independent path, these three axes were built upon later in all steps of building administrations, bodies and institutions, and the project was crowned with credibility and great popular acceptance, with the Syrian regime releasing all Kurdish detainees, including the detainees of the Democratic Union Party (PYD).

In the early stages, the Democratic Union Party began forming small armed groups to protect neighborhoods, and then some vital facilities such as water and electricity institutions, and then attached them to parallel entities such as auxiliary municipal councils as well as official municipal councils.

With the decline of the authority of the Syrian regime and its need to concentrate its power in major cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and others, the regime withdrew from the Kurdish-majority areas at the end of 2012 and handed them over, by understandings agreements which details are still unclear, to the Democratic Union Party, which invested in the emerging situation and proceeded with its project, investing all possibilities and the facts to establish the pillars of its control, including the war of the international coalition against ISIS and jihadist organizations.

On another level, and after it appeared that the PYD's control was taking root and becoming a reality, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani, entered the Kurdish line of understanding, trying to contain the Democratic Union and to include the National Council as a partner in the fledgling administrative, service and military committees established by the Democratic Union Party, which was still in its infancy and it had not yet turned into institutions and bodies, as it announced the Hawler 1 agreement in June 2012 and its right to the Hawler 2 agreement in July 2012 as a detailed appendix, and announced the establishment of the Supreme Kurdish Commission as a political representative for the Kurds. The agreement was not implemented and its detailed provisions were not translated into facts, and when it appeared that most countries of the world under the heading of Friends of the Syrian People recognize the National Coalition for the Forces of the Revolution and the Opposition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, the Kurdish National Council decided in August 2013 to join the coalition, as it was accepted in September 2013, the PYD also expressed its readiness to join the coalition, which was rejected by the latter. Therefore, the PYD continued its approach to preparing for the Autonomous Administration, as it issued on August 19, 2013 the draft of the formation of the local democratic transitional administration

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for Western Kurdistan, which was approved on November 12, 2013 by the Movement for the Democratic Society and 35 institutions, parties and organizations, which are: (1 - The Syriac Union Party. 2- Syriac Youth Union. 3- Syriac Cultural Association. 4- Syriac Academics Union. 5- Syriac Women’s Union. 6- The National Coordination Authority. 7- The Syrian National Bloc. 8- The Arab National Authority. 9- The Communist Action Party. 10- The Kurdish Left Party. 11- The Kurdistan Democratic Party. 12- The Kurdish Democratic Left Party. 13- The Kurdish National Democratic Assembly in Syria. 14- The Kurdish Democratic Peace Party. 15- The Kurdistan Liberal Union. 16- The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party. 17- Star Union. 18- Syrian Women's Initiative. 19- Women Jurists in Western Kurdistan. 20 - Civil Peace Authority. 21- PYD. 22- Shoresh Women Organization. 23- Department of Diplomatic Relations for Western Kurdistan. 24 - People's Assembly of Western Kurdistan. 25- The Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria. 26 - Community organization for the state and citizenship. 27- Sarah organization for combating violence against women. 28- The Future Syria Youth Assembly. 29 - The Kurdistan Communist Party. 30 - Democratic Society Movement. 31 - The Supreme Kurdish Authority. 32- Center for Strategic Studies. 33 - Kurdish student confederation. 34 - Revolutionary Youth Movement 35 - Revolutionary Young Woman Movement).

These organizations announced in an official statement the Constituent General Council for the Interim Joint Administration, from which a follow-up body emerged to complete the Autonomous Administration project, as it would assign a mini-committee of various components to prepare and draft various documents in a consensual manner (management project document, social contract, electoral law ) and then submit it for approval.

The Follow-up Committee for the Completion of the Joint Interim Administration Project held its first meeting on 11/15/2013 and elected a committee of 19 members from Al-Jazirah, Kobani and Afrin and summarized their mission by drafting the joint interim administration project, preparing the social contract document and preparing an electoral system.

On January 6, 2014, the final version of the social contract charter was announced, which is divided into nine chapters containing 98 articles, and it is a constitution for the three provinces (Al-Jazeera-Kobani-Afrin) the contract states that Qamishlo is the center of the Autonomous Administration in al-Jazeera canton, but in fact it was and is in , The contract also mentioned that the structure of the Autonomous Administration is: 1- The Legislative Council 2- The Executive Council 3- The High Electoral Commission 4- The Supreme Constitutional Court. 5- Local councils), and the contract considered that the official languages in Al-Jazira district are Kurdish, Arabic, and Syriac.

On January 21, and one day before the Geneva meeting, the committee announced the completion of the Autonomous Administration project, at the behest of the Democratic Society Movement and with the approval of its Legislative Council, on the authority of the Executive Council for Democratic Autonomous Administration (an interim government) from the city of Amuda with 22 ministers. These ministries were termed bodies.

With the expansion and control of hard-line Islamic factions, chiefly Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, and confronting the People's and Women Protection Units (YPG-YPJ), which led to giving local acceptance and legitimacy to these units as a civil protection force in the face of these dark forces, these confrontations culminated in their victory over ISIS in Kobani in 2014 with air assistance from the coalition forces, which marked a turning point in managing and controlling the region, as the PYD's strength increased through the support provided by the

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international coalition to fight ISIS after the failure of the armed Syrian opposition, which was subject to Turkey's influence and surrendered to its pressures and conditions, the Kurdish Units have become the arm of the international coalition in their war against ISIS, Al-Nusra, and the rest of the Islamic factions in most of the Syrian regions.

Therefore, the International Coalition began working to expand the participation of the Arab component in the Kurdish fighting units through the establishment of the Syrian Democratic Forces in November 2015, where the Kurdish participation rate did not exceed 40%, according to a study published by the Pentagon.

These forces begin the attack on ISIS in , the stronghold of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the organization, and defeat him in the spring of 2017, and continue to pursue ISIS remnants in the countryside of Deir Ezzor and end it in its last stronghold in the town of Al- Baghouth in March 2019.

There was an actual need to form an inclusive Syrian political umbrella for these forces. Therefore, the Syrian Democratic Council was established, whose conference was held in the city of Derek / Al-Malikiyah on December 8-9, 2015 according to a political vision calling for building a pluralistic, democratic, decentralized, secular Syria that adopts its political project based on territorial integrity, societal diversity and the need for constitutional recognition of the components of the Syrian people, and ending tyranny and the unilateral vision in the administration of the state and society, with the participation of all the political forces participating in the Autonomous Administration, in addition to the Syrian National Democratic Alliance, the Kurdish political reference party bloc, the Qamh Movement, and the gathering of the era of dignity and rights.

The Syrian Democratic Council now includes the following political forces: Democratic Union Party (PYD) - Syriac Council - Syriac Union Party - Future Syria Party - Kurdish National Alliance - Conservative Party - Assyrian Democratic Party - Modernity and Change Party - Kurdistan Peace Party - Syria - Democratic Change Party - Coordination Committee / Movement of Democratic Change - the Kurdistan Green Party - the Kurdish Left Party in Syria Muhammad Musa's wing - the Kurdish Renewal Movement - the Syrian Women’s Council - the Arab National Commission - the Kurdistan Liberal Party - the Free Patriotic Union Party - the Roj Party - the Revolutionary Left-wing and Syrian National Alliance.

The Future Syria Party was also established on March 27, 2018 in the Syrian city of Raqqa, with the presence of 800 delegates from various Syrian regions and 100 guests from various parties, political blocs, national and social figures under the slogan of a democratic, pluralistic and decentralized Syria. The founding conference was held in an attempt to be an alternative to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) who could not be separated from the PKK. Despite the international efforts that were evident in supporting the Syrian Democratic Council the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the Future Party to remove the Kurdish element's control over the Autonomous Administration regions and push for a participatory approach, these areas have become large and include large Arab areas, but the real effectiveness remained in the hands of the main Kurdish force (the Democratic Union Party).

With the liberation of the Arab regions from the control of ISIS (Raqqa - Deir Ezzor), the Autonomous Administration and its power party, the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian Democratic Council faced fundamental challenges in maintaining security and stability in an environment whose loyalty could not be won by slogans and some Kurdish nationalist

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achievements as they did in Jazira, Afrin and Kobani. The Autonomous Administration worked to achieve a more open approach in managing these areas and sought to give the authorities in these areas an Arab character from the people of the region, so civilian local councils were formed to manage these areas along with military councils that bear the responsibility of protection and security. So the administrations in the regions of northern and eastern Syria became as follows:

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria: Its mission is to coordinate and achieve integration between the seven departments and councils: • Al-Jazeera region (Al-Hasakah) administratively includes Qamishli district - Al- Hasakah district • The Euphrates includes the district of Kobani and Tell Abyad • Manbij • Afrin As for the councils, they included: • Class Civil Council • Al-Raqqa Civil Council • Deir Ezzor Civil Council

However, the problem remained in the method and mechanism of appointing officials in these departments, which were confined to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its auxiliary institutions such as the Free Women Foundation (Star), the Martyrs' Families Foundation, the Youth Foundation, and a few figures who are trusted with their loyalty to the party, the administration seemed lame under the weight of confining the decision and leadership in vital sectors such as the oil sector, finance, defense and education in the hands of Turkish Kurdish cadres in the ranks of the PKK, these cadres are not familiar with the Syrian situation and create a real problem with the Syrian Kurds apart from the understandable sensitivity of Arabs and Syriacs, therefore, the administration has been dispersed between the method of appointments that are made in secret and has a relationship with the mentality of clandestine work that has been addicted to the Syrian opposition in general, and an open mindset that tries to rely on the mentality of the usual democratic institutions and methods that depend on professional competence and experience, this is in addition to the fact that the Syrian Kurdish cadres have spent long periods of their political activity in the ranks of the PKK, while they still consider the latter as their intellectual and procedural reference, which is negatively reflected in their performance and in the decisions they make.

After the announcement of these administrations, changes were made to the structure of the Autonomous Administration, whose bodies were reduced in September 2018 to ten bodies, namely (the Economy and Agriculture Authority, the Finance Authority, the Culture and Art Authority, the Local Administrations Authority, the Education Authority, the Health and Environment Authority, the Women Authority, the Youth and Sports Authority. The Social Affairs and Labor Authority, the Interior Authority) and eight offices (Foreign Relations, Defense Affairs, Religions and Belief Affairs, Advisory, Media, Oil and Natural Resources, Development and Humanitarian Affairs, Planning and Development) whose main task is to coordinate between similar bodies and offices in the regions and councils.

These offices are divided into two parts: central offices: the finance office, the defense office, the foreign office and the oil office, and decentralized offices: the health office, the education office, the municipal office, and the office of religious affairs. And for the importance of

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education and its future effects, we take it as a detailed example of the work of Autonomous Administration in the Education and Teaching Authority. Before moving to the educational situation, the Syrian Kurdish political landscape after the fragmentation, and end of the actual control of the situation by the hands of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) can be summarized to:

Most of the Kurdish parties are framed in three main coalitions plus one. The Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria, led by the late Abdul Hamid Darwish, is unique as one of the main parties that does not belong to any political framework.

The Kurdish National Council in Syria ENKS: The council was established on October 26, 2011. The council now includes the membership of the following parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party - Syria led by Saud Al-Mulla, the Kurdistan Yekiti Party - Syria led by Suleiman Oso, the Kurdish Equality Party in Syria led by Nemat Daoud, the Kurdish Reform Movement in Syria led by Faisal Yusuf The Kurdish Democratic Left Party in Syria led by Shalal Kado, the Kurdistan Left Party - Syria led by Mahmoud al-Mulla, the Kurdish National Democratic Party in Syria led by Tahir Safouk, the Kurdistan Unity Party led by Fasala Yusuf, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria- Yekiti led by Hajar Ali, al-Parti al-Talii Kurdistan - Syria led by Ismail Husaf, the Kurdish Freedom Movement in Syria led by Siamand Hajo, the Future of led by Rizan Sheikhmous, The Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (Al-Parti), with its three wings, is led by Bahjat Bashir-Badr al-Din al-Barazi-Ahmad Sino, and the council included many youth coordinators that were divided between their loyalty to the Kurdish parties as a result of funding issues, and they no longer have a significant impact.

The Council held its last meeting in Erbil on 10-11 January 2017, which ended with the recommendation of Saud Al-Mulla, Secretary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party - Syria as Chairman of the Council, in addition to a quadripartite political committee from Fassla Yusuf, Deputy Secretary of the Kurdistan Union Party - Syria, and Abdul Samad Khalaf Berro, member of the Political Bureau in The Kurdish Yekiti Party - Syria, Nemat Daoud, secretary of the Kurdish Musawat Party in Syria, and Faisal Youssef, general coordinator of the Kurdish Reform Movement in Syria.

The Kurdish National Alliance in Syria Hevbendi The alliance was established on February 12-13, 2016 and includes five parties: the Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria (Yekiti) led by Muhyiddin Sheikh Ali, the Kurdish Democratic Accord Party in Syria led by Fawzi Shankali, the Kurdish Democratic Left Party In Syria, led by Saleh Kado, the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria led by Nasreddin Ibrahim, and the Reform Movement - Syria led by Amjad Othman. The Syrian Democratic Council (Masad): It was held in the city of Derek / Al-Malikiyah on December 8-9, 2015 and now includes, in addition to democratic opposition figures, the following political forces: the Democratic Union Party (PYD) - the Syriac Council - the Syriac Union Party - the Future Syria Party - the Kurdish National Alliance - Conservative Party - Assyrian Democratic Party - Modernity and Change Party - Kurdistan Peace Party - Syria - Democratic Change Party - Coordination Committee / Democratic Change Movement - Kurdistan Green Party - Kurdish Left Party in Syria Muhammad Musa Wing - Kurdistan Renewal Movement - Syrian Women’s Council - Arab National Authority - The Kurdistan Liberal Party - the Free Patriotic Union Party - the Roj Party - the leftist revolutionary trend, the Syrian National Alliance.

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Educational Situation:

The educational situation was not isolated from the disasters and destruction that befell Syria, as it witnessed an unprecedented collapse in all of the Syrian geography, but in varying proportions, including Hasakah Governorate, especially after it was partially controlled and subjected to the laws of the Autonomous Administration.

The Autonomous Administration did not impose its curricula and cadres on all schools, whose total number according to the statistics of the Education Authority in the Autonomous Administration reached (2044). Rather, some of these schools retained their previous status before the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, especially those related to the Syriac and Armenian schools in addition to the school that falls under Control of the two security squares in Hasaka and Qamishli.

Therefore, these schools can be divided according to the dominant party and the curriculum in which they are taught into three sections:

1. Schools are under the regime’s supervision and control, and the educational process in them is managed by former cadres in the Syrian Ministry of Education, and these schools are confined to the so-called security squares in the cities of Hasaka and Qamishli, where there are about thirty schools in the city of Hasakah, and ten schools for basic and secondary education in the city Qamishli. 2. Private schools of the Christian communities (Syriac, Armenian, and Evangelical) such as Al-Amal and Al-Mowahada School, Al-Liwaa and Al-Nahda (Evangelical) schools. These schools operate under the supervision of the Syrian Ministry of Education and teach the Syrian state curriculum in addition to teaching the Syriac or Armenian language, and these schools existed before 2011. 3. Schools that were controlled by the Autonomous Administration:

The remaining schools in Al-Hasakah, Qamishli, the regions, sub-districts, rural areas and their subordinate towns were subject to the authority of the Autonomous Administration, where their curricula and staff were imposed on them, taking into account that not all of these schools were returned to the educational process, especially the cities’ schools, as many of them were transformed into (military, security, and administrative), shelter for the IDPs, in order for the region to turn into a main safe haven for the IDPs from the rest of the Syrian governorates (especially: Raqqa - Deir Ezzor - Aleppo), as a result of the devastating war against Islamic extremist factions, which constituted tremendous population pressure on the region, in addition to the Turkish invasion of the areas of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain, as More than 250,000 people were displaced from their homes as a result of the recent invasion. For example, but not limited to, we present a table showing a number of schools that have gone out of service and turned into centers for other sectors:

Name of the school Current service field The Industrial Secondary in Al-Hasakah ISIS fighters imprisoned Granada High School for Girls, in Al-Hasakah Asayish center (Civil Police) Ghassaniyeh School (elementary) Military headquarters Adnan Al-Maliki School Administrative center for the Executive Council Sharia Secondary School in Gueran Military headquarters

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Al-Quds School County administration headquarters A group of schools in the Gueran neighborhood (Al- Shelter centers for the IDPs Hasakah), such as Salem Khalaf, Fatima Al-Zahraa and Al- Andalus Schools

The nature of the political and military conflict between the regime on the one hand and the Autonomous Administration bodies, which began to intensify and move away from the regime and impose its conditions on the other hand, after the momentum obtained in the war of its forces (the Syrian Democratic Forces) Qasd against ISIS, this conflict left chaos and confusion in the educational process Which reflected negatively on the fate of students in all stages. This conflict was most evident in the city of Hasaka and Qamishli, as a result of the regime’s strong presence in its vital centers. As a result, schools and universities were closed more than once, and schools were reopened again according to understandings and temporary settlements. Several meetings were held to open schools so that the Kurdish curricula were taught outside the working hours, and special institutes were opened to teach the Kurdish language and allow the Kurdish language classes to be taught at the preparatory stage and taken from the quorum of the Arabic language and religious education, which was rejected by the Autonomous Administration and continued preparing its curricula until the third secondary grade (the baccalaureate) and imposing it on the schools that it controls and supervises. Therefore, the Directorate of Education in Al-Hasakah relinquished the schools of their records and supervision (these schools have become unrecognized as well as their certification. It continued this path until the stage of higher education, where it established two universities, one in Kobani and the other in Qamishli and Rumailan (University of Rojava). With the expansion of the areas that fell under the control of the Autonomous Administration after the liberation of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor countryside from ISIS, the burden of the educational institution increased and the administration seemed unable to provide the requirements of the educational process, as the number of schools covered by their areas of control reached 4153, of which 800 were out of service and the number of students included in the Educational and teaching operation, about 850 thousand students, distributed according to the following table according to the statistics of the Education Authority: Schools Partially The number of The number of The Areas completely destroyed the schools the students destroyed schools Al-Jazeera 2044 230000 32 18 Deir Al- 650 283476 94 463 Zour Al-Raqqa 344 119064 59 79 Euphrates 559 64906 13 2 region Menbej 338 96381 6 9 Al-Tabaqa 218 54000 13 11 Total 4153 847827 217 582

Educational bodies and institutions of the Autonomous Administration

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It is the responsibility of the Education Authority to set curricula, teaching methods and plans, and supervise their implementation through a group of committees: 1. Steering Committee: It presents proposals for appointing school principals, developing educational curricula, supervising exams and examinations, and developing teaching methods. 2. Financial Committee. 3. Bureau and Archiving Committee 4. Services and Supplies Management Committee. 5. Legal and Supervisory Committee. 6. Curriculum and Development Committee. 7. Media and Public Relations Committee. 8. Special Education Committee. 9. Examinations Committee. Autonomous Administration’s Curriculum: The Autonomous Administration worked on its own curricula developed by former employees of the Syrian Ministry of Education, in addition to party cadres from the Democratic Union Party, where it developed curricula in three languages (Arabic and Kurdish) from the first grade of primary to the third secondary, and the Syriac language curriculum for the primary stage only. The curriculum is based mainly on two basic factors: The first is the imposition and obligation of learning in the Kurdish language on all Kurds. The second has ideological dimensions based on the philosophy of (Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers) and subjecting the educational staff to ideological training at the hands of old cadres in party work, previously in the ranks of Kurdish Workers party and now in the ranks of the Democratic Union PYD. Therefore, the Autonomous Administration worked on developing curricula that suit its ideology and commensurate with the aspirations of the components of society (especially Kurdish) on the basis of pluralism in language and thought, and in a way that suits the difference in ethnicities without marginalization. The Autonomous Administration removed from these curricula the subject of religious education and replaced it with the subject of culture and ethics starting from the first year of middle school (seventh grade). This subject covers the ethics, society, and social life surrounding the student, starting with the student’s personality, passing through the family and the neighborhood. The subject of “Genealogy” has also been added to the curriculum starting from the first secondary grade (tenth grade), this class is considered an extrapolation from the ideology of the Kurdish Workers Party that insists on the forced partnership of women at various levels, starting with the allocation of educational material and passing through institutions, bodies and offices for women and ending with her direct presence at the top of the administrative hierarchy. Each student also learns, in addition to his/ her mother tongue, three other languages according to the components of the region, namely (Kurdish-Arabic-Syriac and English), where the English language is taught starting from the fourth grade of primary school. The history of the peoples of the region and its components are also taught, starting from the Stone Age through ancient civilizations and the emergence of Islam and ending with the Ottoman and French occupation of Syria and then its independence. As for the geography course, it teaches the Fertile Crescent and Greater Kurdistan areas (between Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq), and it depends in its structure on a desirable political

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vision far from reality, so it considers north-eastern Syria a geographical unit bordered by Kurdistan from the north, meaning the Turkish borders, and the desert from the south without mentioning The Syrian suffix (the Syrian Badia), this vision contradicts the Syrian national identity, which considers Syria the final home of its citizens, which is bordered by Turkey on the north, Iraq, and Jordan on the south, the Mediterranean and Lebanon to the west. In conclusion, it should be noted that the absence of official recognition from the government of the regime or any international or regional body of educational achievement for students holding documents of the Education Authority of the Autonomous Administration puts students in front of an unknown future where no student can continue his university studies in the rest of the Syrian cities or in neighboring countries. In addition, these curricula are the result of a crisis and have not been subjected to adequate scrutiny. The IDPs Camps’ reality The waves of displacement to the Autonomous Administration areas can be divided into three levels or phases: The first Phase 2011-2013: Individual waves of displacement that were a result of the attacks launched by the regime forces on the opposition-controlled areas in separate periods, and that led to internal displacement to northeastern Syria at limited levels without there being accurate statistics in this aspect, but this phenomenon can be seen on a specific basis in the main towns and cities like Al-Hasaka and Al-Qamishli. The Second Phase 2014-2018: The control of Islamic militias over large areas of Syria, as in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Kobani, and their practices that contradict the simplest rules of human rights, and conflict with the civilian life, which have reached brutal limits, have led to large waves of displacement exacerbated by the atmosphere of war led by the Syrian Democratic Forces with the support of the international coalition against ISIS ( Raqqa, for example) to the almost complete collapse of vital structures and facilities in these cities and the lack of conditions for normal life in them, in addition to the waves of displacement from the Sinjar Mountains (Shinkal) in Iraqi Kurdistan as a result of the war of religious annihilation carried out by ISIS against the Yazidi sect. The Third Phase, March 2018-2020: Mass displacement waves from Afrin, Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad following the attacks launched by the extremist Islamic factions with the support of the Turkish army. The areas of northern and eastern Syria, called the Democratic Autonomous Administration regions of northern and eastern Syria, were a safe haven for thousands of Syrians fleeing the hell of war, as the Autonomous Administration, with scarce assistance from international organizations, built many camps, where these camps can be divided according to the administrative division of the Autonomous Administration into two parts, Al-Jazeera province, which is the areas that follow according to the administrative division of Al-Hasakah Governorate, and Al-Shahba province (Afrin), which are the areas that belong to the Aleppo governorate, in addition to Al-Raqqa, Manbij, and Al-Tabqa.

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The number of these camps is fifteen official camps, in addition to many villages and schools that were turned into shelters. These camps are spread in all areas of the Autonomous Administration, especially in the countryside of Deir Ezzor - Raqqa - Tabqa - Manbij. The following table shows the names of these camps and their areas: Province Name of the The number of the The area from which the IDPs camp camp residents were displaced Al-Jazeera Al-Houl 67000 30000 Iraqi refugees, 10000 ISIS families, 26000 Syrian IDPs

Al-Jazeera Al-Arisha 12902 Syrian Al-Jazeera Washokani 12107 Syrian (Ras Al-Ein) Al-Jazeera Norouz 445 Syrian (Ras Al-Ein) Al-Jazeera Rouj 2108 Iraqi, Syrian, ISIS families Al-Jazeera Sere Kaneh 3000 Syrian (Ras Al-Ein) Afrin /AL- Al-Awda 466 Syrian (Afrin) Shahbaa/ Afrin /AL- Al-Shahbaa 444 Syrian (Afrin) Shahbaa/ Afrin /AL- Al-Asser 3136 Syrian (Afrin) Shahbaa/ Afrin /AL- Al-Mokawamah 2640 Syrian (Afrin) Shahbaa/ Afrin /AL- Afrin 406 Syrian (Afrin) Shahbaa/ Al-Raqqa Tal Abiad 3525 Syrian (Tal-Abiad) Al-Tabaqa Al-Mahmoudali 8493 Syrian Menbej Old Eastern 1970 Syrian Menbej Menbej New Eastern 3210 Syrian Menbej

Al-Houl camp, which belongs to the province of Hasaka and is located near the Iraqi border, is the largest and oldest camp, which includes 67 thousand people, most of them from areas controlled by ISIS and includes in addition to individuals, entire families, as this camp constitutes a terrifying human reservoir, perhaps for the second generation of ISIS. In addition to the low level of services in this camp, which suffers from a severe shortage of sewage and water supply networks, and the almost complete lack of educational institutions that seek to limit the effects of extremist ideology, there is a noticeable activity of ISIS women to raise children and minors in the approach of the so-called Islamic Caliphate. After the battle of Al-Baghouth and the end of ISIS in its last stronghold in the town of Al- Baghouth on March 20, 2018, most of the families that were under ISIS rule were placed in Al-Houl camp, and according to the UN spokesperson (Stephane Dujarric), most of the women joined the "moral police of ISIS", and they are very concerned about the fate of the residents of this camp, which accounts for more than 90% of women and children together in the camp's population, as children constitute 67% of the total population of the camp, which is approximately 45,000 children, and about 15,500 women, and they mainly need education.

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Among them are 26,000 children in need of psychological and social support, while the camp receives support from UNICEF to educate only 3000children, and psychological and social support for 12000 children, and some local organizations such as Shams and Nour provide a small portion of support for the educational process that does not exceed in the best conditions the needs of hundreds. According to many studies (in particular a study issued by the German government) Al-Houl camp is about to turn into a dangerous school for raising a new generation of extremists, as the ideology of the "Islamic State" is being systematically applied and therefore the level of extremism among children and adolescents is very high. Al-Houl camp is considered a model and not an exception to what is happening in other camps. In the end, it can be said that the camps generally constitute, under the aforementioned circumstances, a fertile social environment for religious and national extremism. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about the end of terrorism and extremism in Syria and the environment that sponsors it without providing the supplies necessary for a normal life from the infrastructure to educational institutions and awareness programs that establish a generation tolerant of its past and open to its future in these camps as a temporary step, and the serious and relentless pursuit to end the suffering of Syrians by the international community and under its auspices through a final political settlement based on Security Council Resolution 2254.

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