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Naturalistic Fallacy ORIGINAL ARTICLE Naturalistic fallacy Błąd naturalistyczny Article history: Received: 10.09.2017 Accepted: 15.11.2017 Published: 30.12.2017 Łukasz Kurek Abstract: Lawyer and philosopher, assis- The goal of the paper is to determine the meta-ethical influence of the ‘natu- tant professor at the Department of Philosophy of Law and Legal ralistic fallacy’ argument formulated by George E. Moore. In the first part of the Ethics at the Jagiellonian Univer- paper, the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ argument is subject to critical analysis. In the sity, member of the Copernicus following parts of the work, the influence of this argument on the inception of Center for Interdisciplinary Stud- ies. Stipendist of the Founda- two main meta-ethical standpoints – namely naturalism and antinaturalism – is tion for Polish Science. Author or indicated. What is more, the paper contains the assessment of strengths and co-author of publications pertain- ing to legal philosophy and philos- weaknesses of these meta-ethical conceptions. ophy of mind, including Dualizm przekonań (Copernicus Center Press 2016). Keywords: naturalistic fallacy, metaethics, naturalism, antinaturalism, emotivism Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest próba ustalenia jaki wpływ na rozwój metaetyki miał zarzut „błędu naturalistycznego’ sformułowany przez George’a E. Moore’a. W pierw- szej części artykułu zarzut ten został poddany krytycznej analizie. W kolejnych częściach tekstu wskazano wpływ owego zarzutu na wykształcenie się głów- nych stanowisk metaetycznych, w szczególności naturalizmu oraz antynatu- ralizmu. W artykule dyskutowane są również mocne oraz słabe strony tych koncepcji metaetycznych. Słowa kluczowe: błąd naturalistyczny, metaetyka, naturalizm, antynaturalizm, emotywizm 262 Pol Law Rev, 2017 Vol. 3 (1), p. 262-278 DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0010.7849 Naturalistic fallacy ORIGINAL ARTICLE Introduction meta-ethical theory, or the theory of meaning of moral judgments. The formulation of this theory was possible due to Moore’s clear distinction Philosophical research on morality has been between considerations about what is good divided into two categories. The first of these from the considerations about the concept of is the study of general moral issues that con- good. It is on this distinction that his famous sist in attempts to answer such moral ques- naturalistic fallacy argument is based – a fallacy tions as: ‘Which deeds are good and which are which is to be committed by anyone who de- bad?’, ‘What kind of person should one be?’ fines moral concepts. In particular, when he de- or ‘What has moral value?’. Normative ethics fines them in naturalistic terms. The importance is concerned with these studies, and as their of this aforementioned domain distinction was result various moral judgments are formulated. so great that in the first half of the twentieth Ethical theories built within normative ethics are century, metaethics completely dominated sometimes referred to as first-order theories. moral philosophy, and it was only in the 1970s, The second category of philosophical research when traditional questions of normative ethics on morality concerns the nature of morality and regained their prestige. This was mainly due to moral judgments, and examples of questions the fact that many contemporary philosophers related to these issues are: ‘Do moral truths thought that thanks to Moore, ethics was grant- or properties exist?’, ‘Do moral judgments ex- ed the basis on which real research on morality press convictions or emotions?’ or ‘What is the and moral judgments became possible for the relationship between morality and rationality?’ first time in the history of philosophy[1]. These studies belong to metaethics, because as their result, it is not moral judgments that Distinguishing ethical theories of the first and are formulated, but claims about morality and second order quickly led to the development moral judgments. Therefore, the ethical theo- of three meta-ethical theories which dominated ries built within metaethics are sometimes the first half of the twentieth century, namely called second-order theories, paying attention emotivism, antinaturalism and naturalism. It to the important difference between ethics and is difficult to provide uncontroversial descrip- metaethics. tion of these theories, in particular naturalism and antinaturalism, but it seems that they can From the perspective of the history of philoso- be distinguished by taking into account two phy, many thinkers have undertaken consid- questions: the ontological question – ‘Do mor- erations on the nature of moral judgments and al properties exist?’ – and an epistemological morality, but systematic meta-ethical reflection question – ‘How can one learn moral proper- was undertaken much later, at the beginning ties?’. Naturalists argue that moral properties of the 20th century, and the reason for their exist and can be known by empirical methods. commencement was the publication of Prin- According to antinaturalists, moral properties cipia Ethica by George E. Moore in 1903. In his also exist, but they believe that they cannot groundbreaking work, the British philosopher be known by empirical methods. On the other undertakes to answer not only to the traditional questions of normative ethics, but – what is par- 1Baldwin, T., Moore, G. E. (1990) The Arguments of the ticularly important – he builds the first mature Philosophers, Honderich, T. (ed.) Londyn, Routledge, p. 66. 263 Polish Law Review www.polishlawreview.pl ORIGINAL ARTICLE Naturalistic fallacy hand, the emotivists claim that moral properties more, he claimed that this mistake ‘can be do not exist. Hence, they cannot be known by found in almost every ethical work’[2]. empirical methods. Before presenting the influ- ence of Moore’s argument on the development The term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ is introduced by of these theories, it is worth paying attention to Moore in the context of considerations about the meta-ethical views of this philosopher. the analogy between the qualities ‘yellow’ and ‘good’. He believes that just as it is a mistake to Moore’s argument define ‘yellow’ by referring to physical proper- ties that cause some objects to be perceived as yellow, it is also wrong to define ‘good’ by refer- Opposing the naturalistic ethical theories, ring to the natural properties of things that make which assume that moral truths can be found it good. In addition, ‘yellow’ and ‘good’ are sim- by referring to the nature of man, Moore ple concepts that cannot be explained to some- claimed that the basic moral truths are in- one who does not know the color of yellow and dependent of the moral subject. In Principia what good is. This leads to the conclusion that Ethica, the British philosopher argued that the ‘good’ is not a natural and definable property. With few exceptions, under the influence of Moore, the 20th century began with the rejection of naturalism in ethics. It occurred despite the fact that many modern philosophers assumed that their research is a continuation of scientific research, and the facts about human nature are in a close relation to traditional philosophical questions, in particular with ethical questions. status of these truths is close to the status of In the context of Moore’s ethical considerations, the truths of arithmetic, because they are ab- this solution is particularly important, because stract, necessary and concern the values that he believes that the concept of good is the most belong to certain states of things due to their fundamental moral concept. essence. In addition, these truths are known directly, by means of a special kind of moral The key argument of the author of Principia intuition. Supporting the claim about the spe- Ethics against the naturalistic ethical theories, cial status of moral truths, Moore stated that supporting the thesis about the indefinability of ethical theories, which define values referring to facts, such as facts about human nature, 2Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica, http://www.gutenberg.org/ are based on a naturalistic fallacy. What is files/53430/53430-h/53430-h.htm. 264 Pol Law Rev, 2017 Vol. 3 (1), p. 262-278 DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0010.7849 Naturalistic fallacy ORIGINAL ARTICLE good, was called ‘the open-question argument’. merely equivalent to ‘That A should be good This argument has the form of a thought experi- is good.’ It may indeed be true that what we ment, which should be carried out by all who desire to desire is always also good; perhaps, come across the definition of good; it was de- even the converse may be true: but it is very scribed by the author as follows: doubtful whether this is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very well what The hypothesis that disagreement about the is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we meaning of good is disagreement with regard have two different notions before our minds[3]. to the correct analysis of a given whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by con- Considering any definition of good, according sideration of the fact that, whatever definition to which it is identical to the complex property be offered, it may be always asked, with sig- of W, it will always be reasonable to ask whether nificance, of the complex so defined, whether W is good. In other words, whether W is good it is itself good. To take, for instance, one of is an open question, because denying that W is the more plausible, because one of the more good is not contradictory. On the other hand, complicated, of such proposed definitions, it the question of whether W is W is meaningless may easily be thought, at first sight, that to be – it is not an open question, because the denial good may mean to be that which we desire to that W is W is contradictory. It follows that good desire. Thus if we apply this definition to a par- cannot be identical to any complex property. ticular instance and say ‘When we think that The basic assumption of the open-question ar- A is good, we are thinking that A is one of the gument is that any proposal to define good will things which we desire to desire,’ our proposi- the truth of any proposal to define good is an tion may seem quite plausible.
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