Process Explorer Copyright © 1996-2012 Mark Russinovich Sysinternals
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Process Explorer V16.05 (1.07 MB)
United States (English) Sign in Windows Sysinternals Search TechNet with Bing Home Learn Downloads Community Windows Sysinternals > Downloads > Process Utilities > Process Explorer Utilities Process Explorer Download Sysinternals Suite Utilities Index Download Process Explorer v16.05 (1.07 MB) File and Disk Utilities By Mark Russinovich Run Process Explorer now from Networking Utilities Published: March 10, 2015 Live.Sysinternals.com Process Utilities Download Process Explorer Runs on: Security Utilities (1.07 MB) System Information Utilities Rate: Client: Windows XP and higher (Including IA64). Miscellaneous Utilities Server: Windows Server 2003 and higher (Including Share this content IA64). Additional Introduction Installation Resources Ever wondered which program has a particular file or directory open? Now Simply run Process Explorer (procexp.exe). Forum you can find out. Process Explorer shows you information about which handles and DLLs processes have opened or loaded. The help file describes Process Explorer operation and Site Blog usage. If you have problems or questions please visit The Process Explorer display consists of two sub-windows. The top window the Sysinternals Process Explorer Forum. Sysinternals Learning always shows a list of the currently active processes, including the names of Mark's Webcasts their owning accounts, whereas the information displayed in the bottom Mark's Blog window depends on the mode that Process Explorer is in: if it is in handle Learn More mode you'll see the handles that the process selected in the top window has Software License opened; if Process Explorer is in DLL mode you'll see the DLLs and memory- Here are some other handle and DLL viewing tools and Licensing FAQ mapped files that the process has loaded. -
P 240/1 Process Control on Windows
P240.qxp_June 2018 03/05/2018 22:16 Page 41 Process Control on Windows P 240/1 Optimise and Stabilise Your Windows System by Taking Control of Your Processes Using the information given in this article you will be able to: Investigate exactly what processes are using your PC’s processor and memory, Optimise the performance of your system with perfect process management, Find and close Trojans, viruses and other suspicious processes. You’ve probably come across messages from Windows telling you that an application is no longer responding, and wondered exactly what is happening in the background on your Windows system. The egg timer icon or a little blue circle usually appear, the hard drive grinds away and you wait for what seems like an eternity for Windows to do something. When this happens, it usually indicates that Windows is performing tasks in the background. You can take a look at the list of the processes that are running on your system, but they usually have cryptic names which makes it difficult to work out exactly what is going on. However, if a program or service doesn’t run in a stable way, or you suspect that a virus or Trojan may be doing damage to your system, then you can’t avoid checking which processes are running. In this article I will show you the most important processes that Windows runs internally, and the tasks you need to perform in order to maintain your processes and take control of your system. • Check the Hidden Tasks Your Windows System is Running ................. -
Tokenvator Release 3 Written by Alexander Polce Leary | July 22, 2021 Tokenvator Release 3 Is a Long Overdue Update That Includes a Major Overhaul to the Tool
Tokenvator Release 3 written by Alexander Polce Leary | July 22, 2021 Tokenvator Release 3 is a long overdue update that includes a major overhaul to the tool. From the user interface, it will be mostly familiar with some command line tweaks. Under the surface, large portions of the code base have been reworked, and parts of the base have had some updates. In this series, we will go over some of the changes and new features added. Teaser Alert: Adding Privileges & Creating Tokens Improvements First and foremost, the user interface. Historically, every action had a series of positional arguments that were clunky and generally difficult to remember. They were also not very flexible, and as the commands started to have more, and additional optional arguments, they became completely unwieldy. These have been replaced with flags that will auto complete. For instance, to list and enable privileges: This also works in the non-interactive mode (though it won’t tab complete – sorry, it’s Windows): Additionally, the scroll back function was improved and numerous bugs were resolved. For instance, now when you press up you will always go to the last command issued. A printable command history has also been added if you want to copy and paste instead or keep a log of your actions. The info functionality was improved again, removing many bugs and adding additional information, such as impersonation contexts: (Tokens) > whoami [*] Operating as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (Tokens) > info [*] Primary Token [+] User: S-1-5-21-258464558-1780981397-2849438727-1001 -
Oracle® Database Administrator's Reference
Oracle® Database Administrator's Reference 18c for Microsoft Windows E83889-01 August 2018 Oracle Database Administrator's Reference, 18c for Microsoft Windows E83889-01 Copyright © 1996, 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Primary Authors: Tanaya Bhattacharjee, Sunil Surabhi, Mark Bauer Contributing Authors: Lance Ashdown Contributors: Alexander Key, Sivaselvam Narayanasamy, Ricky Chen, David Collelo, David Friedman, Prakash Jashnani, Sue K. Lee, Rich Long, Satish Panchumarthy, Ravi Thammaiah, Michael Verheij This software and related documentation are provided under a license agreement containing restrictions on use and disclosure and are protected by intellectual property laws. Except as expressly permitted in your license agreement or allowed by law, you may not use, copy, reproduce, translate, broadcast, modify, license, transmit, distribute, exhibit, perform, publish, or display any part, in any form, or by any means. Reverse engineering, disassembly, or decompilation of this software, unless required by law for interoperability, is prohibited. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice and is not warranted to be error-free. If you find any errors, please report them to us in writing. If this is software or related documentation that is delivered to the U.S. Government or anyone licensing it on behalf of the U.S. Government, then the following notice is applicable: U.S. GOVERNMENT END USERS: Oracle programs, including any operating system, integrated software, any programs installed on the hardware, and/or documentation, delivered to U.S. Government end users are "commercial computer software" pursuant to the applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation and agency- specific supplemental regulations. As such, use, duplication, disclosure, modification, and adaptation of the programs, including any operating system, integrated software, any programs installed on the hardware, and/or documentation, shall be subject to license terms and license restrictions applicable to the programs. -
Understanding Windows Lateral Movements
Understanding Windows Lateral Movements ATTL4S & ElephantSe4l # ATTL4S • Daniel López Jiménez (a.k.a. ATTL4S) • Twitter: @DaniLJ94 • GitHub: @ATTL4S • Youtube: ATTL4S • Loves Windows and Active Directory security • Senior Security Consultant at NCC Group • Associate Teacher at Universidad Castilla-La Mancha (MCSI) Confs: NavajaNegra, No cON Name, h-c0n, Hack&Beers Posts: Crummie5, NCC Group’s blog, Hackplayers Certs: CRTO, PACES, OSCP, CRTE www.crummie5.club # ElephantSe4l • Godlike Programmer and Elephant Seal • Twitter: @ElephantSe4l • GitHub: @ElephantSe4l • Very curious, he enjoys understanding complex and weird things • Mind behind all the low-level contents of my talks This has been written by ATTL4S www.crummie5.club WWW.CRUMMIE5.CLUB www.crummie5.club The goal of this talk is understanding how to perform lateral movements in Windows and Active Directory environments by comprehending the art of user impersonation www.crummie5.club Credential theft │ Password │ Hash │ Token UserA UserB HostA UserB HostB Agenda 1. Ways of Authentication 2. Authentication Packages 3. Logon Sessions 4. Access Tokens 5. User Impersonation 6. Let’s Move www.crummie5.club Ways of Authentication www.crummie5.club [SAM] : Local Auth [NTDS] : Domain Auth HostA DC [SAM] HostA\UserA [SAM] HostA\UserB [NTDS] Corp\DomainUserA HostB [NTDS] Corp\DomainUserB Remote Authentications • We don’t (usually) care about physical authentications • We care about remote authentications and they require privileges • Being a local user in a system doesn’t mean you have privileges -
Run a Program Under Administrator Privilege
Knowledgebase Article Run a program under Administrator privilege © Copyright 2001-2012 EMCO Software Company web site: emcosoftware.com Support telephone: +44 20 3287-7651 Support email: [email protected] +1 646 233-1163 Knowledgebase Article Run a program under Administrator privilege 2 Run a program under Administrator privilege In this tutorial we will show you how to execute a program under another user rights to gain more access if you don't have it from your current user logon. Some of our programs require Administrator rights to the remote computer to perform correctly, and the most common support questions we get are because the user that is using our product's does not have the required privilege needed for the program to perform the way it should be!. About the RunAs feature The RunAs feature allows you to run any program under another user account rights. Think about it... if you are not a full member of the Administrator group on the computer you are logged into and have a need to run a program as the administrator user you can use the RunAs feature any time you want. But of course you need to know the password for the administrator or the user you want to use for the RunAs function. There are many ways to use and access the RunAs feature, and we will write about two of them here in this short tutorial. emcosoftware.com © Copyright 2001-2012 EMCO Software Knowledgebase Article Run a program under Administrator privilege 3 Using RunAs from the command line, Cmd.exe From the screenshot below you can see how we access this feature easily by writing just the RunAs.exe as the filename into the Cmd.exe dialog. -
Lazarus Under the Hood Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team Executive Summary
Lazarus Under The Hood Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team Executive Summary The Lazarus Group’s activity spans multiple years, going back as far as 2009. Its malware has been found in many serious cyberattacks, such as the massive data leak and file wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014; the cyberespionage campaign in South Korea, dubbed Operation Troy, in 2013; and Operation DarkSeoul, which attacked South Korean media and financial companies in 2013. There have been several attempts to attribute one of the biggest cyberheists, in Bangladesh in 2016, to Lazarus Group. Researchers discovered a similarity between the backdoor used in Bangladesh and code in one of the Lazarus wiper tools. This was the first attempt to link the attack back to Lazarus. However, as new facts emerged in the media, claiming that there were at least three independent attackers in Bangladesh, any certainty about who exactly attacked the SWIFT systems, and was behind one of the biggest ever bank heists in history, vanished. The only thing that was certain was that Lazarus malware was used in Bangladesh. However, considering that we had previously found Lazarus in dozens of different countries, including multiple infections in Bangladesh, this was not very convincing evidence and many security researchers expressed skepticism abound this attribution link. This paper is the result of forensic investigations by Kaspersky Lab at banks in two countries far apart. It reveals new modules used by Lazarus group and strongly links the SWIFT system attacking tools to the Lazarus Group’s arsenal of lateral movement tools. Considering that Lazarus Group is still active in various cyberespionage and cybersabotage activities, we have segregated its subdivision focusing on attacks on banks and financial manipulations into a separate group which we call Bluenoroff (after one of the tools they used). -
Equest MSI Package Installation Procedures For
eQUEST MSI Package Installation Procedures For Non-Administrator and Windows Home Users eQUEST must be installed while logged in as the user who is to use the application. The Windows security system prevents non-administrative users from installing applications into the “Program Files” directory [or “Programs Files (x86)” on 64-bit Windows versions] unless an administrator elevates permissions of the installation process. Below is described the process by which the eQUEST 3.65 MSI install process can be given the required elevated permissions. 1. Opening a command prompt window from the start menu: AllPrograms\Accessories\CommandPrompt 2. Execute the following command in the command prompt window: runas /user:domain\adminUserName "msiexec /i PathAndFilenameOfMSI" 3. You will now be prompted to enter the administrator password and if the password and all the runas command parameters were are valid the installation will proceed. To find the current domain and username type “whoami” at the command prompt. However this would need to be used by the administrative user logged into their own account to obtain the required information. For Windows Home users this may be their own account. For example, on Windows 7 computer, while logged in as a non-admin user, opening a command prompt window and typing in the line below will start the installation of the eQUEST (where "W7PC" is the domain name and "JohnDOE2" is the administrator user name). runas /user:W7PC\JohnDOE2 "msiexec /i C:\ eQUEST_3_65_b7158_2013-11-03.msi" Non administrator users who wish to install eQUEST on Windows 8 simply need to double click on the MSI file and then enter the administrator password when prompted by the pop-up dialog window. -
Windows Rootkit Analysis Report
Windows Rootkit Analysis Report HBGary Contract No: NBCHC08004 SBIR Data Rights November 2008 Page 1 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 4 Clean Monitoring Tool Logs......................................................................................................... 5 Clean System PSList ................................................................................................................. 5 Clean System Process Explorer ................................................................................................ 6 Vanquish......................................................................................................................................... 7 PSList Vanquish ........................................................................................................................ 7 Vanquish Process Monitor (Process Start – Exit) .................................................................. 8 Process Explorer Thread Stack Vanquish .............................................................................. 8 Process Monitor Events Vanquish ........................................................................................... 9 Vanquish Log File (Created by rootkit, placed in root directory “C:”) ............................. 21 Process Explorer Memory Strings Vanquish ........................................................................ 23 NTIllusion.................................................................................................................................... -
BPA-2020-00461-F Is Now Closed with All Available Agency Records Provided
2 pre-decisional and deliberative information in the responsive records set because disclosure of the records would harm the interests protected and encouraged by Exemption 5. In this case, BPA asserts Exemption 5 to protect BPA Cyber Security staff viewpoints and recommendations expressed in the report. Fees There are no fees associated with the response to your request. Certification Your FOIA request BPA-2020-00461-F is now closed with all available agency records provided. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 1004.7(b)(2), I am the individual responsible for the exemption determinations and records release described above. Appeal The adequacy of the search may be appealed within 90 calendar days from your receipt of this letter pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 1004.8. Appeals should be addressed to: Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals HG-1, L’Enfant Plaza U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20585-1615 The written appeal, including the envelope, must clearly indicate that a FOIA appeal is being made. You may also submit your appeal by e-mail to [email protected], including the phrase “Freedom of Information Appeal” in the subject line. (The Office of Hearings and Appeals prefers to receive appeals by email.) The appeal must contain all the elements required by 10 C.F.R. § 1004.8, including a copy of the determination letter. Thereafter, judicial review will be available to you in the Federal District Court either (1) in the district where you reside, (2) where you have your principal place of business, (3) where DOE’s records are situated, or (4) in the District of Columbia. -
Windows Performance Troubleshooting and Analysis Daniel Pearson David Solomon Expert Seminars Daniel Pearson
Windows Performance Troubleshooting and Analysis Daniel Pearson David Solomon Expert Seminars Daniel Pearson • Started working with Windows NT 3.51 • Three years at Digital Equipment Corporation • Supporting Intel and Alpha systems running Windows NT • Seven years at Microsoft • Senior Escalation Lead in Windows base team • Worked in the Mobile Internet sustained engineering team • Instructor for David Solomon, co-author of the Windows Internals book series Agenda • Components of performance analysis • Understanding the tools for troubleshooting and analyzing performance issues • Troubleshooting CPU and memory issues using various Windows tools * Portions of this session are based on material developed by Mark Russinovich and David Solomon Components of Performance Analysis • Event Tracing for Windows • Core component of the operating system • Kernel mode data structures • Used to store information about the system and system objects that can be read by various tools • e.g. dt nt!_KTHREAD KernelTime • CPU performance monitoring events • Refer to the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer‟s Manual • http://developer.intel.com/products/processor/manuals Event Tracing for Windows • Built in to the system • High performance, low overhead and scalable • 2.5% CPU usage for a sustained rate of 10,000 events/sec on a 2 GHz CPU1 • Operations throughout the system that are of interest to performance are fully instrumented • e.g. process and thread activity, registry I/O, disk I/O 1. Milirud, Michael. 2008. Windows Performance Analysis: -
Malware Hunting with the Sysinternals Tools
SESSION ID: HTA-T07R Malware Hunting with the Sysinternals Tools Mark Russinovich CTO, Microsoft Azure Microsoft @markrussinovich #RSAC #RSAC “When combining the results from all four AV engines, less than 40% of the binaries were detected.” Source: CAMP: Content-Agnostic Malware Protection Proceedings of 20th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Symposium https://www.cs.jhu.edu/~moheeb/aburajab-ndss-13.pdf #RSAC #RSAC #RSAC About this Talk Learn about Sysinternals tools and techniques for analyzing and cleaning malware Professional antimalware analysis requires years of deep training But even for professionals, Sysinternals tools can prove useful Analyzing: Understanding the impact of malware Can be used to understand malware operation Generates road map for cleaning infestations Cleaning: Removing an infestation of a compromised system Attempting a clean can also reveal more information about malware’s operation #RSAC Malware Cleaning Steps Disconnect from network Identify malicious processes and drivers Terminate identified processes Identify and delete malware autostarts Delete malware files Reboot and repeat #RSAC #RSAC What Are You Looking For? Investigate processes that… …have no icon …have no description or company name …unsigned Microsoft images …live in Windows directory or user profile …are packed …include strange URLs in their strings …have open TCP/IP endpoints …host suspicious DLLs or services #RSAC What About Task Manager? Task Manager provides little information about images that are running