Israel and Climate Change: a National Portrait of Inaction

Home , Alon Tal, Gideon Ezra, Makor Rishon

Israel and Climate Change: A National Portrait of Inaction

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of “DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”

Lucy Michaels

Submitted to the Senate of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

23.10.2012

Beer-Sheva

Israel and Climate Change: A National Portrait of Inaction

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of “DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”

Lucy Michaels

Submitted to the Senate of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Approved by the advisors

Approved by the Dean of the Kreitman School of Advanced Graduate Studies

______

23.10.2012

Beer-Sheva

This work was carried out under the supervision of Prof. Alon Tal (principal advisor) Dr. Yaakov Garb Dr. Tally Katz-Gerro, Haifa University

In the Albert Katz International School of Desert Studies The Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research, Ben-Gurion University

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Research-Student's Affidavit when Submitting the Doctoral Thesis for Judgment

I, Lucy Michaels, whose signature appears below, hereby declare that (Please mark the appropriate statements):

_X__ I have written this Thesis by myself, except for the help and guidance offered by my Thesis Advisors.

___ The scientific materials included in this Thesis are products of my own research, culled from the period during which I was a research student.

___ This Thesis incorporates research materials produced in cooperation with others, excluding the technical help commonly received during experimental work. Therefore, I am attaching another affidavit stating the contributions made by myself and the other participants in this research, which has been approved by them and submitted with their approval.

Date: ___23.12.2012______

Student's name: ___Lucy Michaels______

Signature: ______

or of the School …………… Date ………….…

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Israel and Climate Change: A National Portrait of Inaction Author: Lucy Michaels Advisors: Professor Alon Tal, Dr Yaakov Garb, Professor Tally Katz-Gerro (Haifa University).

This dissertation explores why, despite overwhelming scientific evidence, countries are still failing to take appropriate action to address climate change. It uses Israel as a case study to highlight how modern democracies and the general public (s) use resonant discourse, rooted in local worldviews and beliefs, to justify their failure to promote climate change legislation and to adopt climate-friendly behaviour.

The dissertation employs a mixed-method approach to present a rich and complex national portrait of Israeli climate change (in) action. It draws on both quantitative methods (survey analysis and media content analysis) and interpretative methods (a critical frame analysis of key texts including policy documents, official government statements and protocols, conference and interview transcripts and news articles). The quantitative findings offer strong support for the interpretative findings.

The dissertation presents evidence for how pre-existing societal worldviews and beliefs are coloring Israeli perceptions and discourse around climate change. It illustrates how internationally identifiable responses to climate change receive local expression. For example, one prominent discourse relates to the Middle East conflict and the belief that Israelis have ‘more important things to worry about’, reflecting the widely identified ‘finite pool of worry thesis’.

Specific religious and national groupings also hold specific beliefs about climate change that are influencing their responses. For example, the mainstream Jewish Israeli belief in Israel’s scientific and technological prowess encourages a sense of techno-optimism about climate techno-fixes; ‘climate fatalism’ in the generally disempowered Arab public; ‘climate skepticism’ among Russian immigrants influenced by the Russian media; and climate change as an opportunity for Orthodox Jews to critique materialistic secular lifestyles.

The dissertation also illustrates how specific policy discourses about climate change allow policymakers to be seen to pursue climate policy, while actually pursuing wider goals: from economic growth and national security to improving Israel’s brand image and boosting the environmental credentials of the political Right.

Lastly, the research offers an analytic framework to assess how likely it is that current Israeli discourses around climate change will motivate appropriate and scientifically validated action. This ‘frame resonance’ framework illustrates that although some of ways in which climate change is framed in Israel may be very resonant (either for society as a whole or for specific groupings) none of the current framings promote the thoroughgoing changes that are truly necessary to address climate change.

Abstract This dissertation explores why, despite overwhelming scientific evidence, countries are still failing to take appropriate action to address climate change. It uses Israel as a case study to highlight how modern democracies and the general public (s) use resonant discourse, rooted in local worldviews and beliefs, to justify their failure to promote adequate climate change legislation and to adopt climate-friendly behaviours.

The dissertation presents evidence for how pre-existing societal worldviews and beliefs color Israeli perceptions and discourse around climate change and illustrates how widely identifiable responses to climate change receive local expression. For example, one prominent discourse relates to the Middle East conflict and the belief that Israelis have ‘more important things to worry about’, reflecting the well-known ‘finite pool of worry thesis’. Specific religious and national groupings also hold specific beliefs about climate change that are influencing their responses. For example, the Jewish Israeli belief in Israel’s scientific and technological prowess which promotes techno-optimism about techno-fixes; ‘climate fatalism’ among the disempowered Arab public; ‘climate skepticism’ among Russian immigrants to Israel influenced by the Russian media; and as an opportunity for Orthodox Jews to critique materialistic secular lifestyles. Some discourse also allows policymakers to be seen to pursue climate policy while actually pursuing wider goals: from economic growth and national security to improving Israel’s brand image and boosting the environmental credentials of the political Right.

Acknowledgements Everything is in God’s hands, except for the heat and the cold. Talmud Avoda Zara 3b

Many individuals have contributed to and supported the research presented herein, and I would like to gratefully acknowledge their contributions.

I would like to offer special thanks to my three academic supervisors who have supported and believed in this project: Professor Alon Tal who kindly accepted me as his doctoral student, inspired me with confidence and to think creatively, gave invaluable writing advice as well as many unique opportunities to broaden my academic experience; Dr Yaakov Garb who contributed his breadth of knowledge and academic rigour to this dissertation and always encouraged me to sharpen my thinking; and Dr Tally Katz-Gerro for her incisive comments and for helping to resolve some sticky theoretical and methodological issues. I would also like to thank Dr Anthony Leiserowitz of the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication who hosted me for the 2009 Fall semester at the Forestry and Environmental Studies School at Yale University as a Fulbright Doctoral Dissertation scholar. I am grateful for his enthusiasm and the time he dedicated to my project.

I would also like to thank Maccabi Healthcare who made the 2010 survey data available; Tally Katz-Gerro who made the 2010 Haifa survey data available; and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, who part-funded the 2009 survey research. My academic research was fully funded by a New Immigrant Scientist grant from the Ministry of Absorption and the Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research.

I am ever grateful to my academic colleagues and friends for the intellectual succour and inspiration that have helped to shape this thesis: Shiri Bass-Specktor, Adi Inbar, Merav Katz-Kimchi, Shira Leon-Tzchut, David Levy, Naomi Lipstein, Maya Negev, Daniel Orenstein and Na’ama Teschner. I was also fortunate to have Rebecca Spencer as my copy-editor.

I also want to thank my friends and comrades in the Israeli environmental movement for involving me so intimately in the their work as a member of the Israeli NGO Delegation to the UNFCCC COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 and as a steering committee member of xi

the Paths to Sustainability Coalition – especially Sagit Porat, Maya Givon, Michal Bitterman and Youval Arbel.

I would also like to thank my friends in Midreshet Ben-Gurion who have made this such a nourishing environment to live and work in and have kept me going with this dissertation through some dark days: Ayla Adler (and Charlotte), Jennifer Golding, Zoe Groner, Suleiman Halasah, Rebecca Hart, Anat Madeson, Adi Maimon, Laurie Ornstein, Heather Ryan and Dana Shapiro.

I am indebted to Dr Elli Groner, of the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies for putting me on the PhD track and offering me teaching opportunities, as well as my wonderful research assistants – Elazar Volk (who contributed to the media analysis) and Mohammad Azraq (who conducted the focus group interviews in Sachnin). I would also like to thank Dorit Levin and Yael Kaplan at the Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research for vital administrative advice and support.

Finally, I want to thank my beloved husband, Uri Gordon, who followed me down to the desert and believed in me all along, and my parents, Diane and Bruce Boucher, and my in-laws, Shifra and Ze’ev Gordon for their patience, support, and unlimited willingness to help with childcare.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother Evelyn Haya Michaels, to my daughter Ruth Haya Gordon, and to the Great Turning, the essential adventure of our time: the shift from the Industrial Growth Society into whose heady days my grandmother was born to a life-sustaining civilisation that I will strive for my daughter to inherit.

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Contents List of Abbreviations and Terms ...... 7

Introduction: Constructing a portrait of national inaction on climate change ...... 8 1. Israel, climate change and public opinion ...... 8 2. Literature review ...... 10 2.1 Academic research on perceptions of climate change ...... 10 2.2 Academic research on climate change and the media ...... 18 2.3 Relevant research in Israel ...... 22 3. Research questions and hypothesis ...... 30 4. Research design: The ‘National Portrait of Inaction’ approach ...... 32

Chapter 1: Anthropogenic global warming in Israel: Weak responses to strong warnings ...... 37 1. Introduction ...... 37 2. Observed climate changes in Israel in the early 21st century ...... 38 2.1 Israeli research on climate change and anthropogenic global warming ...... 38 2.2 Changing temperature and precipitation trends ...... 39 3. Predicted climate forecasts for Israel in the 21st century ...... 41 3.1 Overview of predicted impacts on Israel ...... 41 3.2 Research on the likely impacts of global warming on Israel ...... 42 3.3 Regional implications of anthropogenic global warming ...... 43 4. A background to climate change policy in Israel ...... 44 4.1 From Rio to Israel’s First National Communication on Climate Change (1992 – 2000) ...... 44 4.2 Israel’s climate policy (2001 – 2009) ...... 45 4.3 Israel and OECD accession process (2006 – 2010) ...... 48 4.4 Israel at the 2009 UN Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen ...... 51 4.5 Israel’s climate change mitigation policy, October 2010 ...... 53 4.6 Israel and green growth ...... 59 4.7 Climate change adaptation policies ...... 59 4.8 Civil Society: NGOs, subnational efforts, industry, media and academia ...... 61 4.9 Israel’s energy crossroads: The major challenge for Israel to reduce its GHG emissions ...... 63 5. Summary ...... 69

Chapter 2: Climate change and Israeli public opinion ...... 72 1. Introduction ...... 72 2. Survey methodologies ...... 72 2.1.Research question and hypothesis ...... 72 2.2. Dependent and independent variables ...... 74 3. Survey results ...... 82 3.1. Knowledge, understanding and beliefs about climate change ...... 83 3.2 Climate Change Concern and Risk Perception ...... 93 3.3 Trust in climate communicators (2009 BGU survey) ...... 102 3.4 Trust in new technology to solve climate change (2009 BGU survey) ...... 104 3.5 Support for climate policy, policy preference and national priority ...... 105 3.6 Adoption and intention to adopt pro-environmental behaviors ...... 108 4. Summary of survey findings ...... 111

Chapter 3: Climate change and the Israeli Media ...... 121 1. Introduction ...... 121 2. Media and Climate change (‘2009 BGU’ survey) ...... 121

3. Content analysis of Israeli media coverage of climate change (2007 – 2010) ...... 122 3.1 Research aims ...... 122 3.2 Research methods ...... 123 3.3 Results ...... 129 4. Summary of findings ...... 147

Ch. 4 Framing climate change denial, scepticism and concern in Israel ...... 153 1. Introduction ...... 153 2. Effective frames and denial frames ...... 154 3. Israel climate change frames ...... 157 3.1 The ‘Finite pool of worry’ frame ...... 158 3.2 ‘Climate fatalism’ frame ...... 161 3.3 Alarming Israeli climate change frames ...... 163 3.4 Climate change scepticism in Israel ...... 175 3.5 The Jewish community and engagement with climate change ...... 183

Ch. 5 ‘A renewable light unto the nations’: technology, opportunity and techno-optimism in Israeli climate discourse ...... 191 1. Introduction ...... 191 2. Technology in the climate change debate ...... 192 2.1 Technology and techno-optimism in global climate change discourse ...... 192 2.2 Critiques of the technology focus in the climate change debate ...... 194 3. Technology in the Israeli climate debate ...... 196 3.1 The emergence of the ‘climate techno-opportunity frame in Israel ...... 196 3.2 The effectiveness of the climate techno-opportunity frame ...... 198 4. Summary ...... 215

Conclusion: A national portrait of climate change inaction and developing effective climate frames for Israel ...... 218 1. Israel’s policy response to climate change ...... 219 2. The Israeli public and perceptions of climate change ...... 219 2.1 Summary of the quantitative survey and media findings ...... 220 2.2 Summary of the frame analysis findings ...... 224 3. Effective and scientifically validated action on climate change ...... 227 4. ‘The National Portrait of Inaction’ model for analysing climate change inaction ...... 229 5. Missing issues in Israeli climate discourse ...... 230 5.1 Individual lifestyle and behavioral changes ...... 231 5.2 Policy measures to address climate change ...... 232 5.3 Structural changes ...... 232 6. Effective climate change frames for Israel ...... 233

References ...... 238

Appendix I: Survey questions in Hebrew ...... 284 ISSP 2000 ...... 284 ISSP 2010 (2011) ...... 284 Haifa University survey 2010 ...... 285 ‘Health’ survey 2010 ...... 285 BGU survey 2009 ...... 285

Appendix II: Israeli television coverage of climate change ...... 288

Appendix III: Personal Communication ...... 289

Appendix IV: Summary of two focus groups on climate change conducted in Sachnin, December 2010 ...... 295 1. Introduction ...... 295 2. Focus group with non-experts ...... 296 2.1 Interview questions ...... 296 2.2 Results ...... 297 3. Focus group with environmental campaigners ...... 299 3.1 Interview questions ...... 299 3.2 Interview results ...... 301

List of figures

Figure 1: Self-reported knowledge 2007 and 2009 Gallup World Poll, Israel ...... 26 Figure 2: Self-reported knowledge in 20 countries (2007-2008) Gallup World Poll ...... 27 Figure 3: Causes of climate change 2007 and 2009 Gallup World Poll, Israel ...... 27 Figure 4: Israel’s total GHG emissions 1996 - 2008 (in million tonnes of CO2eq) ...... 48 Figure 5: Israel’s GHG abatement potential in 2020 and 2030 ...... 51 Figure 6: Israel’s GHG emissions by sector (2007 figures) ...... 56 Figure 7: Distribution of CO2 emissions by sector in MtCO2eq (2005 figures) ...... 57 Figure 8: Israel’s Electricity Generation by fuel type ...... 63 Figure 9: Self reported climate change knowledge, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 83 Figure 10: Self-reported climate change knowledge 2010 Health Survey ...... 84 Figure 11: Principal causes of climate change, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 87 Figure 12: ‘Climate influences’, 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 90 Figure 13: Word associations with climate change, Haifa University, 2010 ...... 92 Figure 14: Worry about climate change, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 93 Figure 15: Concern about specific impacts, 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 95 Figure 16: ‘Climate change as a dangerous threat to the environment’, 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys, Israel ...... 98 Figure 17: ‘Trust in new technology,’ 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 104 Figure 18: Adoption of pro-environmental behaviors, 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 110 Figure 19: Israeli major sources of climate information ...... 121 Figure 20: Major named news sources for information about climate change ...... 122 Figure 21: Timeline of media coverage by number of articles (2007-2010) ...... 130 Figure 22: Total number of occurrences of each frame ...... 131 Figure 23: Major groups communicating about climate change in the media ...... 134 Figure 24: Major climate communicators across selected news sources ...... 135 Figure 25: Local and global prognostic and diagnostic frames (2007 – 2010) ...... 137 Figure 26: Alarming and reassuring tone and content by new sources ...... 138 Figure 27: Ha’aretz top five news frames (2007-2010) ...... 140 Figure 28: Israel Hayom top three frames 2007 - 2010 ...... 141 Figure 29: Yediot Ahronot top four frames (2007-2010) ...... 142 Figure 30: Ynet top four frames (2007 – 2010) ...... 143 Figure 31: NRG top five frames (2007- 2010) ...... 144 Figure 32: Jerusalem Post top five frames (2007-2010) ...... 146 Figure 33: Effective frames ...... 155 Figure 34: Summary of Israeli climate change ‘denial’ and ‘effective’ frames ...... 228

List of tables

Table 1: An OLS multiple regression model for Israeli climate self-reported knowledge, 2009 BGU Survey, Israel ...... 84

Table 2: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change self-reported knowledge, 2010 Health Survey, Israel ...... 85

Table 3: Mean and standard deviations for assessed climate knowledge, 2000 ISSP Environment survey, Israel ...... 85

Table 4: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change is caused by the burning of coal, gas and oil 2000 ISSP Environment survey, Israel ...... 86

Table 5: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change is caused by a hole in the atmosphere, 2000 ISSP Environment survey, Israel ...... 86

Table 6: A nominal logistic regression model for principal causes of climate change (human/natural), 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 88

Table 7: A nominal logistic regression model for climate change is happening and has anthropogenic causes 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 89

Table 8: Descriptive statistics of likely consequences of climate change and ‘likelihood’ scores, 2009 BGU Survey, Israel ...... 89

Table 9: An OLS multiple regression model for likelihood’ scores, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 90

Table 10: Summary statistics for ‘influence’ scores, 2010 Health Survey, Israel ...... 91

Table 11: An OLS multiple regression model for ‘influence’ scores, 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 91

Table 12: An OLS multiple regression model for Climate worry 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 94

Table 13: ChiSquare test for relationship between likelihood of impacts and concern about that impact variables, 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 96

Table 14: Summary statistics for ‘immediate personal concern’ scores, 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 96

Table 15: An OLS multiple regression model for ‘immediate personal concern’ score, Israel, 2010 97

Table 16: Means and standard deviations for ‘Dangerous threats to the environment’, 2000 and 2011 ISSP survey, Israel ...... 98

Table 17: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change concern, 2000 ISSP survey, Israel ...... 99

Table 18: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change concern, 2011 ISSP survey, Israel ...... 100

Table 19: Climate change concern by political affiliation, 2011 ISSP survey, Israel ...... 100

Table 20: Self and collective efficacy, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 101

Table 21: An OLS regression model of ‘collective efficacy’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 102

Table 22: Means and standard deviations for ‘trust in climate communicators’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 102

Table 23: An OLS regression model of trust in scientists as climate change communicators 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 103

Table 24: An OLS regression model of trust in environmental organisations as climate change communicators, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 103

Table 25: An OLS multiple regression model for ‘trust in new technology’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 105

Table 26: Means and standard deviations for policy support and policy preference, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 105

Table 27: Means and standard deviations for ‘national agenda priorities’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 106

Table 28: OLS multiple regression models for ‘climate policy support’ 2009 BGU survey, Israel ... 106

Table 29: Means and standard deviations for ‘adoption of or intention to adopt pro-environmental behaviors’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 108

Table 30: Factor Analysis for ‘adoption of or intention to adopt pro-environmental behavior’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 109

Table 31: OLS multiple regression models for ‘adoption of or intention to adopt pro-environmental behavior’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel ...... 109

Table 32: An OLS multiple regression model for adoption of pro-environmental behaviors scores, 2010 Health survey, Israel ...... 111

Table 33: Exposure rate for top four Israeli newspapers, July 2010 ...... 127

Table 34: Number of climate change news articles (2007-2010) by news source ...... 127

Table 35: Israel relevant articles by newspaper ...... 131

Table 36: Most frequently mentioned events, people and places ...... 132

Table 37: Most frequently mentioned climate impacts ...... 132

Table 38: Top ten Israel climate change communicators across all media sources ...... 133

Table 39: Coverage of frames by media source (by percent) ...... 135

Table 40: Assessing Israeli climate change frames ...... 157

List of Abbreviations and Terms

CDM: Clean Development Mechanism MoF or Finance Ministry: Israeli Ministry of Finance

CO2: Carbon dioxide MNI: Israeli Ministry of National Infrastructures CSP: Concentrating solar power MW: Megawatt

CBS: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics NGO: Non-governmental organization

EV: Electric vehicle NOx: Nitrogen oxide

GHG: Greenhouse gases OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development IEA: International Energy Agency

IEC: Israeli Electric Corporation PUA-E: Public Utilities Authorities – Electricity kWh: Kilowatt hour PV: Photovoltaics MK: Member of Knesset TAMAT: Ministry of Industry, Trade MEP or Environment Ministry: and Labor Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection SO2: Sulfur dioxide

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Introduction: Constructing a portrait of national inaction on climate change

1. Israel, climate change and public opinion In December 2009, a delegation of over 100 Israelis attended the United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen. Led by President Shimon Peres, it also included leading politicians, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and NGO representatives. In the conference plenary, Peres re-stated Israel’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and his wider vision for how collaboration around this environmental threat could be a stepping- stone for peace in the Middle East. In particular, he emphasised the role that Israel’s cutting- edge renewable energy and drylands technologies could play in both solving climate change and bringing peace to the region.

There was however one cloud on the horizon. The government was about to give the go-ahead for a new coal-fired power station that would increase yearly GHG emissions by five percent. This contradiction caused well-known climate activist Bill McKibben to exclaim “Israel has the capacity, resources and knowledge to lead the world on renewable energy. This could be your gift to the world. And still you want to build a coal-fired power station? What exactly are you guys smoking?”(Datz 2009).

This dissertation seeks to understand Israel’s weak engagement with the very real threat posed by climate change, defining ‘engagement’ as supporting and taking scientifically validated measures to both reduce GHG emissions and adapt to a changing climate (IPCC 2007b; Lorenzoni et al. 2007). What follows is a rich and multi-faceted analysis of Israel’s responses to climate change, both at the policy level and at the societal level. Although it focuses on the unique particularities of one nation’s response, it is also an extended case study that highlights broad themes and an analytic framework for understanding national-level responses to climate change more generally. It thus contributes to answering the wider question of how advanced modern consumer democracies manage to continue and justify activities they know to be unsustainable (Blühdorn and Welsh 2007).

Israel is not the only country that is failing to significantly reduce its GHG emissions or adapt sustainably to climate change, but the focus on Israel is not arbitrary. As an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member country situated in a geographic region particularly vulnerable to climate change, Israel’s limited engagement is conspicuously surprising. Although Israel’s GHG emissions are only a tiny fraction of global emissions, unlike most developed countries they are rapidly rising and set to double by 2030 (McKinsey and Company 2009).

The question of what explains action or inaction around climate change has intrigued sociologists, political scientists and policy analysts alike and as outlined below, explanations have drawn on many different intellectual traditions. There are two widely cited reasons for Israel’s inaction. As outlined in Chapter 2, the first is political. As a non-Annex 1 country in the United Nationals Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Israel has had no binding obligation to the international community to reduce its GHG emissions. The second reason, discussed in Chapter 5, is technological. As a predominantly arid country, Israel has long invested in drylands technologies, including drip irrigation, drylands agriculture and coastal desalination technologies, that today can help it adapt to potential climate changes. For this reason, policymakers tend not to perceive climate change as such a direct threat.

This dissertation, however, argues that, although little examined, Israeli societal perceptions of climate change have also contributed to the limited response. Thus understanding societal perceptions, alongside these political and technological explanations, can greatly enhance our understanding of individual and policy inaction.

Understanding public perceptions is particularly important because climate change is not a conventional pollution problem, akin to ozone depletion or acid rain, which have been solved through policy measures.1 It is, in fact, a ‘wicked problem’, more akin to poverty or complex public health issues such as obesity or malaria (Levin et al. 2009; Lazarus 2009; Nisbet 2011).2 It is a ‘wicked problem’ because the long-term policy thinking and planning that characterise effective measures to reduce GHG emissions and adapt to potentially dramatic forecast climate

1 For these problems, technological alternatives were available, the economic benefits of action certain, and policymakers 2 A ‘wicked problem’, a phrase originally from social planning, is one that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. The term ‘wicked’ is used to mean resistance to resolution. Levin et al. (2010) call climate change as a ‘super wicked problem’ whose ‘wickedness’ relates not only to the problem itself but also to those trying to solve it. 9

changes can be politically costly and rarely offer easy political capital within limited four-year re-election timeframes (Bazerman 2006). In addition, those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change – the poor in developing countries – are the least able to address the issue. It is those in the developed world, least vulnerable to the threat of climate change, who must adopt a low carbon lifestyle with all the perceived personal sacrifices that entails (Gardner and Stern 2008; Leiserowitz 2009). For this reason, a supportive ‘issue public’ advocating for effective climate policy measures is a vital precondition for any serious climate policy (Nisbet 2011a).

Thus, the premise of this thesis is that unlike many policy problems that tend to remain solely in the policy-making sphere, the response to climate chance is characterised by the complex interrelationship between scientific knowledge, political and economic interests and public opinion (Weingart et al. 2000; Fletcher 2009; Hulme 2009; Nisbet 2011b). Nowhere is this more evident than in the United States where the debate around climate policy, and more recently climate science itself, has become a bi-partisan election issue widely discussed in the media and popular discourse (Oreskes and Conway 2010).

2. Literature review

2.1 Academic research on perceptions of climate change Academic interest in the public response to climate change has grown enormously in recent years (Nisbet and Myers 2007). It has included quantitative research, controlled psychological studies, focus group research and anthropological fieldwork (Bulkeley 2000; Stoll- Kleeman et al. 2001; Sterman and Sweeney 2008; Norgaard 2011). It is important to note that although surveys have been conducted around the world, the majority of academic research has focused on North America and Europe.34

2.1.1 Cognition – what people understand about climate change “Twenty years after scientists and journalists first alerted the public to the potential problem of global warming, few Americans are confident that they fully grasp the complexities of the issue,

3 It is important to note that a large minority of the global population is unaware of climate change. The 2007 – 2008 Gallup World Poll, which represents 90 percent of the global population aged 15 and over, found that 39 percent were unaware of concept of ‘climate change’ (although they may have observed changes in the climate). Awareness was highest in developed countries but low in the Middle East, Asia and Africa (Pugliese and Ray 2009). 4 The small body of research on climate change pereptions in developing countries has focused on farmer perceptions of climate vulnerability and adaptation, which is not directly relevant for this research (c.f. Roncoli 2006; Orlove et. al 2009). One of the few in depth studies on climate change and risk perception includes a Kenyan study (Shisyana and Khayesi 2007). 10

and [the public scores very low] on questions measuring actual knowledge about either the science or the policy” (Nisbet and Myers 2007).

This section illustrates that the concepts of ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ are in themselves difficult concepts to grasp, a fact that inevitably contributes to social inaction. There is ample academic evidence to support this conclusion. Based on their meta-analysis of 20 years of climate surveys, Nisbet and Myers (2007) illustrate that the American public does not fully appreciate what GHG are, and does not link climate change to energy systems or transport in any coherent manner. Similarly, Bostrom and Lashof (2007) found that the public consistently confuses climate change with weather and the hole in the ozone layer; and Leiserowitz et al. (2011b) found that 44 percent of American teens believed that stopping rockets from punching holes in the ozone layer would reduce global warming. The public also tend to view any future ecological or political disaster as a plausible consequence of climate change (McDaniels et al. 1995; Reynolds et al. 2009).

Drawing on cognitive psychology, some researchers argue that this confusion reflects the fact that the public has a faulty ‘mental model’ to explain climate change (Bostrom et al. 1994; Nisbet 2011).5 More accurate mental models and better analogies would thus facilitate public engagement with climate change. Sterman and Sweeney (2007) similarly call for more effective analogies arguing that human cognition is not wired to understand the complex iterative systems that lie at the heart of climate science such as the Carbon cycle.

This widespread misunderstanding of climate change raises some important questions for researchers. Malka et al. (2009) argue that there is often a gap between how much survey respondents believe they know about climate change (‘self-reported’ knowledge) and what they actually know (‘assessed’ knowledge.) McCright (2010) for example found that while men tended to report greater knowledge about climate change, women actually exhibited greater assessed knowledge women are both more knowledgeable and less confident in their scientific knowledge than men (cf. Jacobs and Simpkins 2006; Rathzel and Uzzell 2009). Malka et al. (2009) thus highlight the importance of including factual questions about the causes and consequences of climate change in survey research.

5 A mental model or schema is a metaphorical term for an inferred system of related ideas about a concept or issue. Once activated, it provides short cuts for reaching an opinion about a complex topic, serve as a basis for inference, and operate as a mechanism for storing and retrieving information from memory (Nisbet 2011a). Note that a ‘mental models’ and frames are similar concepts arising from different disciplines – mental models arising from psychology and frames from sociology. 11

Implicit in this type of research is the belief that simply improving public understanding of climate change would increase public engagement. This belief is known as ‘the knowledge deficit’ hypothesis (O’Connor et al. 2002). It assumes that given all the information, the public would act as perfectly rational risk-evaluators and take steps to prevent climate change. Others researchers argue that greater knowledge is necessary but insufficient by itself to promote engagement (Bord et al. 2000; Allum et al. 2008; Kahan et al. 2012). Another important aspect moderating the relationship between knowledge about climate change and willingness to engage is the extent to which climate change is perceived as a risk.

2.1.2 Risk perception - climate change as a potential hazard Israel offers a valuable case study for researching climate change risk perceptions given the wider backdrop of on-going local military and terrorist threats (Bar-Tal 2001; Halperin et al. 2008; Soffer et. al. 2010). This section offers an overview of the different ways in which climate change can be perceived as a threat, and how concern about climate change can influence personal lifestyle decisions, voting behavior and support for policy initiatives (Bostrom et al. 1994; O’Connor et al. 1999; Leiserowitz 2006).

Research illustrates that concern about climate change does not necessarily reflect the actual threat faced by a community or country. For example, although Japan faces a small threat from climate change, the Japanese tend to express high levels of concern. Meanwhile, some of the lowest levels of worry are reported in Egypt, one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change (Leiserowitz 2007). Likewise, although some research associates greater awareness of climate change with greater concern, other research illustrates that it is possible to be well- informed yet unconcerned about climate change (Kellstedt et al. 2008; Malka et al. 2009; McCright 2010; Kahan et al. 2012).

One explanation for this gap between understanding and concern lies in socio-demographic differences, such as ‘the white male effect’, the tendency of white males to fear climate change less than women and minorities (O’Connor et al. 1999; Patchen 2006; Leiserowitz 2006; Malka et al. 2009; McCright 2010). Similarly, high earners tend to know more about climate change while also being less concerned (O’Connor et al. 1999; Sandvik 2008; McCright 2010). This suggests that those used to being in control of their lives based on gender, socio-economic status or ethnicity are less likely to be concerned about climate change (Patchen 2006). Research also suggests that young Americans (aged 18 to 34) are less concerned and less preoccupied with

global warming than older generations. This is somewhat counter-intuitive given the fact that climate change is likely to have more impact on future generations (Feldman 2010). Likewise having children does not predict awareness or concern (Stedman 2004).

Another explanation for the gap between awareness and concern about climate change lies in the psychological process of evaluating risk. Slovic (2000) argues that humans evaluate risks in two ways: ‘analytically’ through rationally assessing facts and figures; and ‘experientially’ through personal experiences, emotional responses and affect i.e. an immediate positive or negative emotional response. Research suggests that risk communication that appeals to experiential processing is most likely to evoke concern and a physical response to a threat (Slovic et al. 2002).

Yet until recently, researchers argue, climate change communication has not adequately appealed to experiential processing mechanisms (Leiserowitz 2006; Weber 2006). Climate change thus still appears as a vague, intangible threat, distant in space and time as compared to other threats such as flooding, earthquakes and car accidents (Slovic 2000; Leiserowitz 2006). On the other end of the spectrum, for example, terrorism as a threat easily appeals to experiential processing mechanisms: it has vivid and dreadful consequences; exposure is involuntary and difficult to avoid; it is unfamiliar; often catastrophic; and is caused by human malevolence (Slovic 2003). It is no surprise therefore, that terrorism is far more likely to generate public concern and engagement than climate change.

Supporting this explanation is the fact that people who have experienced extreme weather events or have observed changes in the climate are more likely to engage with climate change (Spence et al. 2011; Hamilton and Keim 2009). Researchers thus highlight the importance of ‘experiential’ communications about climate change such as creating opportunities for people to experience climate hazards vicariously through sharing the experiences of others or through simulations of potential climate impacts on familiar places (Weber 2006).

Two other psychological mechanisms proposed to explain the gap between climate change awareness and concern are the ‘Finite pool of worry’ thesis and ‘emotional numbing’ (Shome and Marx 2009; Moser and Dilling 2011). The ‘Finite pool of worry’ thesis proposes that humans only have a limited capacity for the number of issues they can worry about at the same time. They are thus more likely to pay more attention to immediate and personally relevant 13

threats, than to long-term threats such as climate change. ‘Emotional numbing’ is a commonly observed reaction in individuals living in war zones or facing repeated hurricane threats (Linville et al. 1991; Norgaard 2011). Norgaard (2011 p. 7) argues, “There are limits to how long it is possible for individuals to live with the extremely pessimistic environmental perspective. Anxiety reduction mechanisms make people look for brighter aspects of development”. For a similar reason overly dramatic media representations of climate change can actually decrease concern because they lessen the belief that climate change can be addressed through human action i.e. they reduce a sense of self-efficacy (Lowe et al. 2006).

A final challenge posed by communicating climate change as a risk lies in the fact that climate scientists inherently cannot make accurate predictions about the likely impacts of climate change because of natural variability, uncertainly about future levels of GHG in the atmosphere and the fact that the climate system is still not well understood (Shackley and Wynne 1996). Policy makers and the general public prefer to rely on very clear and scientifically proven research before they implement policies or change their behaviors.

Public opinion polls show a broad decline in concern about climate change since 2008, especially in the USA (Pew Center for People and the Press, 2008, 2009; Saad, 2009; Jowit, 2010; Kaufman, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011). Dunlap and McCright (2008) blame coordinated efforts by American conservatives to discredit climate science for this decline, while Ratter et al. (2012) relates it to ‘issue attention cycles’: the current downswing explained by information fatigue, the influence of cooler weather, the failure of the UN Copenhagen Summit and the Climategate controversy. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) invoke the ‘finite pool of worry' thesis, arguing that following the 2008 recession, concern about job security and personal finances lessened concern about climate change.

In addition to correctly understanding climate change, this section illustrates that a complex combination of sociological and psychological factors also influence risk perception around climate change. Faced with the complexities of communicating climate change as a potential hazard, some climate advocates argue that it is more effective to present the positive benefits of addressing climate change as a means to promote engagement (Spence and Pidgeon 2010; Nordhaus and Schellenberger 2007; Hartwell Group 2011).

2.1.3 The role of personal values, beliefs and worldviews Kahan et al. (2012) have argued that wider cultural commitments can also influence risk perception around climate change. Similarly, Lakoff (2010) argues that pre-existing ideological beliefs and political identity have shaped perceptions of climate change in the USA. These arguments are also supported by the wider sociological and psychological literature that has demonstrated the role of values, beliefs and worldviews in shaping environmental attitudes and behaviors. This includes Stern’s ‘value-belief-norm’ (VBN) theory, Inglehart’s ‘post- materialism’ scale and Schwartz’s norm-activation theory. VBN theory has employed a range of different value indexes to assess value orientations including the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP);6 Schwartz’s Value survey, the Cultural Theory of Risk, and Stern’s ‘Biospheric, Social- Altruistic and Egoistic’ index. In general this research shows that those already motivated by pro-environmental values are more likely to adopt climate-friendly behaviors (Stern 2000; Dietz et al. 2007). From a Cultural Theory of Risk perspective, perceptions of climate change are more likely to relate to wider political values (see below).

Until now, the main body of research on diverse societal perceptions of climate change has focused on the USA. This includes the ‘Six Americas’ series of nationally representative surveys, which divides the American public into six distinct ‘interpretative communities’, which share a common socio-demographic background, similar mental models and values, and rely on the same media sources (Leiserowitz 2007b). These are the Alarmed, the Concerned, Cautious, Doubtful, Disengaged and Dismissive (Leiserowitz et al. 2008). This research identified a relatively small Alarmed ‘issue public’ seeking to mobilise concern around climate change and a similarly small Dismissive group mobilising against policy action on the other, with a large diverse and relatively ambivalent public in between (Nisbet 2011a).

2.1.4 Climate change scepticism and political beliefs There has been considerable research on how political beliefs and ideological worldviews have influenced scepticism about climate change in the USA (Lakoff 2010; Kahan 2012). Although scepticism is an integral and healthy component of scientific enquiry, some climate scepticism has been clearly motivated by political and economic interests, and this is very evident in the American political arena (Hulme 2009; McCright 2011). While the Democrat Party has long supported climate change legislation, climate scepticism is a touchstone for the American Tea Party Movement, which has growing influence in the Republican Party (Pooley 2010). The

6 The NEP is actually a measure of environmental worldviews as influenced by values (Dunlap et al. 2000). Note that it is not neceesarily well validated outside the USA (c.f. Lalonde and Jackson 2002; Bostrom et al. 2006) 15

right-wing ideologues behind the Tea Party Movement argue that government measures to reduce GHG emissions are a threat to their core values, including rolling back governmental regulation and not ceding power to distant institutions such as the UN (Oreskes and Conway 2010).

The divergence of views on climate change among American political elites is increasingly influencing American public opinion. Between 1997 and 2008 there has been a clear and growing divergence in beliefs between self-identified Democrats or liberals and Republicans or conservatives (Krosnick et al. 2000; Hamilton and Keim 2009; Malka et al. 2009; McCright and Dunlap 2011). Republicans, especially those affiliated with the Tea Party, increasingly agreed that climate change was an exaggerated threat while Democrats increasingly agreed that it was already happening and serious (Leiserowitz et al. 2010; 2011a).

Kahan et al. (2012) show that political identity is a stronger predictor of climate change beliefs than educational level, scientific literacy and awareness of climate change. They found that while educated and climate-aware Democrats were significantly more likely to be concerned about climate change, educated climate-aware Republicans were significantly less likely to be. Based on these findings they propose the ‘Cultural Cognition’ thesis. This conjectures that individuals unconsciously credit information that supports ‘self-defining’ values and attitudes and allows them to secure group standing among peers. They do so even if these perceptions fail to converge with scientific information essential for personal safety (Kahan et al. 2012).

Brossard and Nisbet (2006) argue, the lay-public tends to rely on trusted communicators to explain complex science-related policy problems such as climate change. Clearly whom the public chooses to trust to communicate to them about climate change relates to wider values, beliefs and worldviews (Kunreuther et al. 1996; Siegrist et al. 2000; Brossard and Nisbet 2006; Lakoff 2010). The public figure most closely identified with climate change is former US vice- president, Al Gore who tends to couch his communication about climate change in strong progressive language that appeals to Democrats. Republicans thus tend to perceive Al Gore, as an untrustworthy and bi-partisan communicator (Nisbet 2011b). Some Christian denominations are also distrustful of what scientists have to say about climate change, due to a general distrust of science, preferring to rely on the interpretation of religious leaders (Leiserowitz et al. 2008).

2.1.5 Additional barriers to adopting climate-friendly behaviors A ‘value-action’ or ‘attitude-behavior’ gap has been widely observed around climate change (Ungar, 1994; Blake 1999; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). Although the public may be well informed and concerned about climate change, this does not necessarily mean that it will adopt ‘climate-friendly’ or pro-environmental behaviors to reduce GHG emissions. This suggests that there are additional reasons why individuals fail to take effective action to address climate change (Bazeman 2006).

Gardner and Stern (2008) argue that a major reason for personal inaction is that households lack accurate, accessible, and actionable information about effective behavioral changes for reducing personal CO2 emissions. Psychologists, however, have pointed to the influence of psychological constructs such as habit, social norms and efficacy in determining likelihood to make behavioral changes (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; Shome and Marx 2009).

Efficacy is a particularly important variable for explaining the lack of public engagement with climate change. There are three relevant aspects to ‘efficacy’: the belief that one is capable of taking action (self-efficacy); the belief that the action can in fact reduce the threat posed by climate change (response efficacy); and the belief that the group is capable of achieving its goals (collective efficacy) (Roser-Renouf and Nisbet 2008). Social norms, i.e. how others in society are behaving, are also clearly influential on the likelihood of adopting behavioral changes. Lorenzoni et al. (2007), for example, have identified a ‘the tragedy of the commons’ effect that deters people from changing their behavior i.e. many argue, “why should I engage with climate change when governments, industry and my peers do not?”

Lorenzoni et al. (2007) also identify the role of ‘denial’ strategies in climate change discourse, for example, shifting the blame to others and denying personal responsibility for the problem. Lorenzoni et al. (2007) also highlight the role of structural disincentives such as poor public transport infrastructure and the higher price of environmentally friendly goods to changing behaviors.

2.2 Academic research on climate change and the media The media is widely regarded as the major source of information about climate change for the general public.7 Research on the media coverage of climate change has focused on the media message itself; the media influence on public and policy responses to climate change; and the wider political, economic and ideological forces shaping media coverage. It has included longitudinal and comparative studies between types of news source, regions and countries.

The study of public opinion and media communication around climate change has given rise to the interdisciplinary field of ‘climate change communication’. This draws on insights from the social and decision sciences, media studies and science communication to explore the aspects of climate change that makes it challenging to promote widespread engagement (Pidgeon and Fischoff 2011; Newig 2011).

2.2.1 Trends in climate change media coverage over time Media coverage of climate change has fluctuated since the issue first rose to prominence in 1988 (Boykoff and Rajan 2007).8 Between 1995 and 2009, however, both the frequency of coverage and length of articles about climate change increased globally, reflecting key newsworthy events Boykoff (2010). There are major peaks in English language media coverage in Europe, North America and Oceania around the 2006 movie, ‘An Inconvenient Truth’, and the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment report. The UN Climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009 caused the greatest peak in all geographic regions. In 2010 and 2011, however, media coverage declined significantly around the world, including in major US news sources (Fischer 2012).

Boykoff (2010) blames the 2008 global financial crisis and the changing nature of news media for this decline. Looking at US media ‘attention cycles’, however, Lockwood (2011) argues, “we should not underestimate the American public’s capacity to become bored – especially with something that does not immediately threaten them, or promise huge benefits for a majority or strongly appeal to their sense of injustice” (Downs 1972 cited in Lockwood 2011). This decline is significant because the quantity of media coverage tends to influence the salience of issues on the public agenda (Wahlberg and Sjoberg 2000; Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui 2009; Fischer 2011). In

7 Other sources include the education system and interpersonal channels, i.e. friends and family (Stamm et al. 2000). 8 1998 saw unprecedented heat waves across the United States. It was also the year in which NASA scientist James Hansen testified to the US Congress that he was 99% certain “that warmer temperatures were caused by the burning of fossil fuels and not solely a result of natural variation” and UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher argued at the Royal Society of London that “we have unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of the planet itself.” Boykoff and Timmons Roberts (2007) however, identified the first articles written about anthropogenic climate change in the 1950’s. 18

recent years, therefore, it is unsurprising that the decline in media attention has been accompanied by a decline in public concern about climate change (Boykoff 2010).

2.2.2 Politics and media coverage of climate change The media acts as a bridge between science, politics and the public as well as being an actor in its own right. Boykoff and Timmons-Roberts (2007) refer to this complex and increasingly politicized interaction around climate change as the ‘triple interface of science-media-policy’. It is clear that both scientists and politicians have played a role in shaping the media coverage of climate change (Trumbo 1996;Weingart et al. 2000; McCright and Dunlap 2007). In the USA, in particular, concerted lobbying efforts by an influential right-wing counter movement ensured that climate change was low on the US public agenda in the late 1990s (McCright and Dunlap 2010). Some news sources have themselves taken an ideologically biased position, which has influenced public perceptions. For example, although the British media initially supported the scientific consensus, Carvalho (2007) found that once the issue became overtly politicized in the early 1990s, newspapers began to cover the issue from their usual ideological standpoint.

2.2.3 The role of media production Even if not ideologically biased per se, research shows how journalism has influenced climate policy. Kunelius and Eide (2012) for example, argue that journalistic responses to 2009 UN Copenhagen conference were part of a change of tone that helped to undermine the possibility of an agreement and led to a lessening of trust in the UN.

The process of media production itself also influences the media portrayal of climate change (Carvalho and Burgess 2005). As a complex, uncertain long-term phenomenon that does not conform to the breaking news approach of most newsrooms, journalists have struggled with how to present climate change to the lay public (Smith 2005; Carvalho and Pereira 2008; Ward 2008). Some have chosen to make climate change into a scare story (Lowe 2006). Others have conformed to the journalistic norm of giving ‘a balanced view’ of climate change, thus giving climate sceptics a disproportionate amount of media coverage. Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) call this the ‘balance as bias’ effect. They argue that this journalistic norm perpetuates the belief that there is no scientific consensus around climate change and contributes to public confusion. Antilla (2005) found many instances of ‘balance as bias’ in the American media, with some news outlets repeatedly citing climate sceptics with known fossil fuel industry ties.

2.2.4 Climate change frames in the media Frames are the way in which the media and communicators emphasize certain attributes of an issue to help an audience define a problem, its relevance to them and their response (Lakoff 2010). Nisbet (2009) defines a frame as an ‘interpretative storyline that sets a specific train of thought in motion, communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what might be responsible for it, and what should be done about it’. A number of studies have discussed how climate change has been framed in the media (Lowe 2006; Moser and Dilling 2007; Nisbet 2009; Hulme 2009; Fletcher 2009; Crompton 2010; Lakoff 2010; Dirikx and Gelders 2010).

Ereaut and Segnit (2006), for example, identify distinct ‘alarmist’ and ‘optimistic’ repertoires or frames in the British media. Alarmist repertoires are typified by an inflated or extreme lexicon, and incorporate an urgent tone and cinematic codes. Optimistic repertoires emphasize ‘easy’ solutions to climate change such as employing technological solutions and taking ‘small actions’ i.e. asking people to take small actions reduce their CO2 emissions. Ereaut and Segnit (2006) argue that these repertoires do not motivate public engagement with climate change. Alarmist messages can be overwhelming and actually induce denial, while ‘small actions’ offer improbably easy solutions to a problem usually portrayed as apocalyptic. Techno-optimism allows the public not to personally and emotionally engage with climate change based on the belief that technology will solve it.

Other studies have identified similarly ineffective kinds of framing. McManus (2000) shows how Australian newspaper reporting of the 1998 Climate Summit in Buenos Aires failed to make climate change relevant for Australians, creating a distanciation or distancing between the viewer and the issue. Likewise, Billett (2010) argues that the overwhelming pre-occupation in Indian English language national newspapers with the ‘risk-responsibility divide’ between the USA and developing countries around climate change does not encourage Indians to effectively engage with the issue.

Comparative research shows national variation in media frames. For example, the German media has generally conveyed scientific certainty, while the Australian and American media has conveyed uncertainty (McComas and Shanahan 1999; Weingart et al. 2000; Peters and Heinrichs 2008; Gaillard and Ferreira 2009). American newspapers tend to focus on conflicts between scientists and politicians while French media coverage has focused on international relations (Brossard et al. 2004). Ahchong and Dodds (2012), however, found that climate 20

change was similarly portrayed in regional and national Canadian newspapers as a national and international problem. Variations in national media coverage can be ascribed to the specific national context including national role in the international negotiations, media ownership, journalistic norms and capacity, and international and local focusing events (Takahashi 2008).

Research suggests that who communicates about climate change is as important as what is being communicated in terms of shaping public perceptions (Trumbo 1996; Weingart et al. 2000; Kellstedt et al. 2008; Malka et al. 2010). Boykoff and Goodman (2009) for example, have explored the role that celebrities have played in communicating climate change. Scientists have also blamed the media for oversimplifying scientific findings and failing to distinguish between findings that were well founded and those that were not (Pew/AAAS 2009).

Clearly the media can also play a pro-active role in encouraging engagement with climate change. For example, tailoring messages for specific media and audiences; using well thought- out metaphors and allusions; telling stories that draw on moral responsibility, values and personal experience; and prompting new ways of thinking about the personal relevance of issue (Moser and Dilling 2007; Nisbet 2009; Hulme 2009; Lakoff 2010; Nerlich, et al. 2010).

2.2.5 Climate change frames and discourse theory An important distinction for this research is between an empirical understanding of frames as patterns of speech and ideas that can analysed quantitatively, and frames as understood by social theorists from the ‘linguistic turn’ or interpretative approach in the social sciences. This latter understanding begins from the perspective that language builds rather than mirrors social reality and that frames play a vital role for individuals trying to“organise and make sense of an ambiguous stream of events and issues in the world” (Fletcher 2009).

From this perspective, climate change is not a stable policy problem or public issue rather “a series of complex and constantly evolving cultural discourses” (Hulme 2009). In terms of policy-making, Litfin (1994) argues that frames act“[as] determinants of what can and cannot be thought, discourses define the range of policy options, thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes”. Effective frames can thus mobilise key stakeholders, engage the media, build consensus and lead to policy action, effective or otherwise (Nisbet 2009).

Lakoff (2010) proposes the psychological mechanism by which frames shape reality and elicit an emotional, behavioral and policy response. Looking at the US conservative framing of climate change as a left-wing plot to promote government intervention and restrict individual freedom he identifies how language - metaphor, rhetoric and storylines – has been used that relates to ‘individual frames of reference’. He defines these individual frames as ‘underlying cognitive structures’ constituted by values, beliefs and worldviews, social identity and lived experience, that guide how individuals think about the world.9 Lakoff argues that when faced with a complex scientific and policy question such as climate change, the lay public rely on frames that resonate with individual frames of reference to shape their understanding; especially those shared by trusted communicators (Nisbet and Brossard 2006). The US conservative framing of climate change has proved so persuasive precisely because it taps into conservative ‘frames of reference’ as communicated by commentators and politicians.

2.3 Relevant research in Israel

2.3.1 Israeli perceptions of the environment As an issue, ‘the environment’ has received scant attention from Israeli social scientists. This reflects the generally limited public engagement with environmental issues in Israel as a whole. For example, a 2010 nationally representative survey conducted by the Department of Industry, Trade and Labor (TAMAT) (n=1600) found that only nine percent of Israelis strongly identified themselves as ‘green consumers’ who avoided using environmentally harmful products and actively sought eco-friendly products (Bar-Zori and Shratzky 2010). Israelis were less likely to recycle, use reusable bags to pack food, consider energy efficiency in purchasing appliances or pay more for green certification than citizens in most other OECD countries (Bar-Zori and Shratzky 2010). The limited published literature on the topic mainly seeks to explain why engagement with environmental issues is not widespread in Israeli society.

Tal (2002) describes the modern Israeli environmental ethos as influenced by two currents within Zionism - an early romantic tradition and a more modernist techno-optimism.10 He argues that unlike their counterparts in other developed countries, Israeli environmentalists

9 ‘Beliefs’ are inward convictions, a feeling of certainty about what something means. They can influence ‘values’ i.e. a person’s sense of right and wrong or what ‘ought’ to be (Schwartz 1992); ‘Worldviews’ are the over-arching framework of ideas and beliefs by which an individual interprets and interacts with the world (OED 2012). 10 The romantic Zionist tradition was shaped by the writings of early Zionists, Rav Kook and AD Gordon, and a tradition of nature study and field trips. 22

generally support technological solutions such as waste incineration, desalination, high-speed rail and extended road tunnels to preserve scenic countryside. Tal (2002) argues that given this ideological context and the recognition that Israel is a small over-crowded country with a high- consumption economy, Israeli environmentalists also pay little attention to deep ecology and ‘ecologically pure’ lifestyles.

Empirical research supports Tal’s portrayal of the Israeli environmental ethos. Despite rising prosperity in the country, there has been no consequential shift to post-materialist values, such as prioritizing environmental protection over economic growth, as observed elsewhere (Yuchtman- Ya’ar 2002). Neaman-Abramovitz and Katz-Gerro (2006) argue that although Israeli society adopts global trends of environmental concern and the values of a liberal civil society, these cannot be deeply rooted in a society that still emphasizes Zionist nationalism, economic growth and security. Thus while there is interest in environmental issues in Israel, researchers agree that these are not rooted in a post-materialist ethos, rather reflecting instrumental and local concerns.

2.3.2 Factors determining Israeli concern and engagement with the environment Survey research shows that the most significant predictors of environmental concern and engagement in Israel are educational level and awareness of environmental risks (Ne’eman- Abramovitz and Katz-Gerro 2006; Katz-Gerro 2009).11 Besides this, Israeli environmentalism is not strongly associated with any specific social grouping, gender, income, or ethnicity. Ne’eman-Abramovitz and Katz-Gerro (2006) argue that this finding is consistent with the ‘broadening base’ hypothesis: as environmental hazards become more noticeable and evident in the media, environmental awareness, concern and willingness to adopt pro-environmental behaviors become widely pervasive and unconnected to specific social strata (Jones and Dunlap 1992; Tevet 1997).

Suporting the ‘broadening base’ hypothesis, Katz-Gerro (2009), found that unlike in other developed countries, ‘the new middle class’ in Israel (defined as specialist social-cultural workers in the public sector) was no more environmentally progressive than the old middle class (defined as technocrats) or other classes. Similarly, although De Shalit (1994) found in survey research that environmentalism was most strongly associated with the Israeli left, more recent

11 Ne’eman-Abramovitz and Katz-Gerro (2006) did find that older educated Israelis, who were more aware of environmental dangers, were also more likely to engage in environmental behaviors. 23

research suggests that the environment is not a partisan issue for Israeli political elites or the Israeli public (Tal 2004; Arian 2005; Karassin 2011).12

Katz-Gerro (2009) has also surmised that situational, psychological and social network factors are likely to be stronger predictors of environmental concern than socio-demographic factors. Supporting this, Drori and Yuchtman-Yaar (2002) found that perceived local environmental vulnerability was a stronger and more consistent predictor of environmental concern than socio- economic factors. Similarly, a survey of Israeli schoolchildren found that the presence of an adult who mediated the child’s relation to nature was more strongly related to environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behavior than any other factor (Negev et al. 2008).

Challenging the ‘broadening base’ hypothesis, however, Negev et al. (2008) identified that environmental knowledge was higher among Israeli children in wealthier communities. In addition, Haller and Hadler (2008) highlight that Israeli Arabs have a ‘pronounced fatalistic environmental view’. In their analysis of international comparative responses to survey questions about fatalism and readiness to make sacrifices for the environment, they found that environmental fatalism was high in Israel, especially among Israel’s Arab community. They ascribe this to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where other priorities rank more highly.13 Other research suggests that Israeli women are more concerned about environmental risks (Soffer et al. 2010). This gender difference has been observed in other Israeli risk perception studies. For example, both Arian and Gordon (1993) and Bar-Tal et al. (1995) found that Israeli women perceived themselves as more likely to be victims of terrorist attacks and war.

The 2010 TAMAT survey cited above also suggested some differences in environmental behavior between different social groupings. For example, recent immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union and younger Israelis (18-34) were less engaged in pro-environmental behaviors than other groupings. Arab and Ultra-orthodox populations were less likely to recycle but more likely to engage in cost-saving and incidentally environmental activities such as mending broken items rather than replacing them. Supporting previous findings, the TAMAT

12 Israeli left and right politics tends to divide along persistent cleavages in Israeli society such as hawkish and dovish approaches to the peace process; religious and secular issues; rich and poor; and new immigrants to Israel especially from the former Soviet Union versus veterans (Arian 2005). 13 Haller and Hadler (2008) constructed a dependent variable “pessimistic environmental orientation” based on responses to the statements “we worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today” and “its just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment”. 24

survey also found that Israelis educated to academic degree level and high-income Israelis were more likely to be engaging in pro-environmental behaviors (Bar-Zori and Shratzky 2010).

2.3.3 Environmental Literacy in Israel Negev et al. (2008) evaluated the environmental literacy of Israeli elementary and high school students. The representative survey (n= 3121) found that both groups of students exhibited poor scores for environmental knowledge, and there was little correlation between levels of environmental knowledge and the adoption of pro-environmental behavior. Overall these findings suggest that school has only a modest effect on environmental attitudes and behaviors among Israeli children, relative to other factors. This reflects the fact that Israeli schools place little emphasis on science and environmental education (Negev et al. 2008).

A longitudinal study researching the environmental literacy and behavior of students at three teacher training colleges in Israel presents a similarly depressing picture (Goldman et al. 2006; Pe’er et al. 2007; Yavetz et al. 2009). The initial survey found poor environmental literacy and limited pro-environmental behavioral engagement among the new students. By the end of their studies, although students were more likely to be engaging in pro-environmental behaviors, the research found that their studies has done little to develop their environmental literacy and worldviews. The authors noted that their levels were still inadequate for educators.

2.5.4 Survey research on Israeli knowledge and concern about climate change Five public opinion surveys have explored Israeli perceptions of climate change. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2007) included three questions on climate change in a survey of 16 countries conducted in March 2007. This nationally representative telephone survey (n=593) showed that just over half of Israelis (54 percent) believed that “steps should be taken now to address climate change even if it involved significant costs”. This support for action ranked Israel well above most developing countries such as India, Thailand and the Philippines; Eastern European countries such as Poland and the Ukraine; and the USA (only 42 percent agreement) but behind Australia and Peru (69 percent agreement). Similarly, a comparatively low 10 percent of Israelis agreed that “until we are sure that global warming is a really a problem, we should not take any steps that have economic costs”.

The 2007 Chicago Council survey also found that 52 percent of Israelis saw climate change as a critical threat to the country’s interests in the next 10 years, a greater percentage than the Indians

and Chinese, but a lower percentage than the Mexicans, Australians and South Koreans. Fifteen percent of Israelis did not perceive it as a threat at all.14

The Gallup World Poll collects survey data on a wide range of issues, including climate change, from 150+ countries.15 A nationally representative face-to-face survey in Hebrew and Arabic conducted in August 2007 (n = 1002) included three questions about climate change. A further survey in November 2009 (n=1005) repeated two of these questions (Pugliese and Ray 2009; Gallup World Poll 2009).

The number of Israelis claiming to have heard of climate change was consistent between 2007 and 2009, at around 85 percent (Figure 1). Comparative figures for the 2007 survey found that levels of self-reported knowledge in Israel were comparable to Eastern and Southern European countries, but behind Northern European, North American and Far Eastern developed countries. (Pugliese and Ray 2009). See Figure 2.

2007 2009

% 59 25 52 32 26 11 12 3 3 1 0 0 Never heard Know Great deal Don't know Refused something

Figure 1: Self-reported knowledge 2007 and 2009 Gallup World Poll, Israel

14 The full question read: “Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of Israel in the next 10 years. For each threat please select whether you see it as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat or not an important threat at all.”(Chicago Council 2007). 15 Dataset analyzed with permission from Anita Pugliese at the Gallup World Poll. 26

100

50 97 97 96 96 93 93 93 91 87 86 85 85 84 84 79 76 67 62 25 55 35

0 USA Iran Italy India Spain China Brazil Israel Russia France Britain Mexico Poland Sweden Hungary Lithuania Germany Argentina Czech Rep South Korea Figure 2: Self-reported knowledge in 20 countries (2007-2008) Gallup World Poll

The 2007 and 2009 Gallup World Poll also included a question on the causes of climate change (Figure 3). The results showed a considerable increase in the number of Israelis who believed that climate change had natural or both human and natural causes from 2007 to 2009. It also showed a concomitant decline in the number of Israelis who thought that climate change had primarily human causes. The 2007 survey also found that 62 percent of Israelis agreed that “climate change poses a threat to me and my children” with 31 percent of those arguing that it posed a very serious threat and nine percent believing that it was not at all a serious threat. This question was not repeated in 2009.

2007 2009 75

% 63 25 45 26 28 20 15 3 1 0 Human Both Natural Don't know

Figure 3: Causes of climate change 2007 and 2009 Gallup World Poll, Israel

The 2010 TAMAT Survey included two questions about climate change. In a self-reported knowledge question, 93 percent of Israelis claimed to have heard of climate change, of which 76.2 percent claimed to understand it. In a ranking exercise, a quarter of Israelis stated that they were more concerned about climate change than water pollution, recycling, clean energy and biodegradable waste (Bar Zori and Shratzky 2010).

Israel was also included in a 2011 Nielsen online survey on the environment conducted in 51 countries (n=25,000).16 In this survey, 77 percent of Israelis said they were at least quite concerned about climate change, which was higher than the global average of 69 percent and the EU average of 68 percent. According to Neilsen, concern about climate change in Israel had risen by 26 percent from the previous survey in 2009 representing one of the most dramatic national increases in concern over this time period. This mirrored a similar increase in concern across the Middle East and Africa, although there was a decline in concern in the USA and China (Nielsen 2011). A local survey containing relevant data was a 2010 survey conducted in Israel’s hyper-arid region also included data on climate change perceptions. It was based on a small convenience sample (75 kibbutz residents and 58 Eilat residents). Roughly 65 percent of respondents agreed that it was hotter now than in the past (Sagi et al. 2012).

A final survey relevant to this research is a frame analysis of Israeli scientists’ responses to climate change (Kliot et al. 2008). This rich source of information, commissioned by the Israeli Ministry for Environmental Protection, contains interviews with over 90 Israeli natural scientists. Findings included the fact that Israeli climate scientists were more concerned about the impact of climate change on water availability than water scientists; and that overall Israeli scientists resented the way that climate change has now come to dominate the research agenda (Kidar et al. 2010).

Overall these findings suggest that although concern about environmental issues, including climate change, is widespread and seemingly increasing in Israeli society, there is nevertheless limited active engagement and little willingness to adopt pro-environmental behaviors. This is especially true when compared to other developed countries. The factors influencing this include the fact that environmental values are not deeply rooted in Israeli society; the lack of emphasis on environmental literacy in the education system; the apparent increase in scepticism

16 The sample size for Israel was not reported in the documentation, although in each country gender and age quotas were used to ensure country samples were representative of internet consumers. 28

around climate change; as well as the influence of the Arab—Israeli conflict on risk perceptions of environmental threats. Existing research also suggests that educated and wealthier Israelis are more likely to be concerned and engaged on environmental issues, although concern and engagement are also likely motivated by personal interest, social norms and direct experience.

2.3.4 Existing research on Israeli media coverage of climate change Two events aimed at improving climate change communication have taken place in Israel: a November 2009 workshop organized by the Hebrew University and Friends of the Earth Middle East and a November 2010 workshop organized by the Association for a Beautiful Israel (ABI).

Participants noted that the Israeli media had made little effort to connect changing weather patterns in Israel with the global picture or to make climate change relevant to Israelis in their daily life. They also highlighted challenges faced in communicating climate change such as: editors demanding an unequivocally clear message; little interest from commercial TV in broadcasting on public issues; the limited resources of Israeli environmental organizations for media work; and the fact that environmental issues do not attract high viewer ratings (ABI 2009). The summary of the ABI 2010 workshop thus concludes, “The media does not give Israeli citizens a complex picture and does not explain the responsibility that is placed on the citizen, the local authority, the government and the state. It does not highlight the connection between industrialization and the delicate balance of the weather” (ABI 2010).

Nossek (2010) examined Israeli media coverage of two UN climate conferences, Bali in 2007 and Copenhagen in 2009 in two Israeli newspapers Yediot Ahronot and Ha’aretz. He identified only nine stories about the Bali conference; two in Yediot Ahronot and seven in Ha’aretz. Dan Rabinowitz who headed the Israeli environmental NGO delegation to Bali wrote a daily blog in Ha’aretz which itself accounted for six articles and both newspapers carried editorials on the last day of the Summit.

The Copenhagen Summit two years later generated significantly more coverage (85 articles). Nossek argues that several factors increased its news value: it was the first time that Israel had sent a senior representative to a UN climate conference; Netanyahu’s last minute failure to attend generated controversy; and the conference failed to produce the expected treaty. The

conference only received front-page attention at the beginning and at the end of the conference, although Ha’aretz coverage include soft news articles, commentaries and non-news articles.

Nossek argues that the Israeli media primarily identified climate change as a global problem rather than one facing Israel. The coverage also focused less on climate change itself and more on the internal and international politics around it. Overall, Nossek argues that limited media coverage reflects the fact that the Israeli media agenda is primarily shaped by the domestic political agenda where security issues take priority and environmental issues have low news value. Nossek also relates the poor coverage to the commercial orientation of the Israeli newspaper industry (Nossek 2010).

3. Research questions and hypothesis The research questions animating this research, explore both the national and individual response to climate change in Israel. These are: a) What has been Israel’s policy response to climate change, and to what extent is this response in line with the actions supported by the international scientific community for both adaptation to and mitigation of climate change? b) How does the Israeli public(s) perceive climate change? c) How has the way in which climate change has been framed in popular and policy discourse influenced public perceptions and the overall national policy response? d) Do these framings promote the most effective and scientifically validated action? e) Can an integrated analysis that draws together political, technological and societal explanations, help to explain Israeli inaction around climate change?

At its heart, this research hypothesises that Israeli inaction around climate change, and national-level inaction in general, has multiple interlocking causes – economic, cultural, political, psychological and historical. It argues that although societal factors are often overlooked, understanding these factors is integral to presenting a true picture of climate change inaction. The research thus takes the entire citizenry of Israel, the general public as well as opinion-formers, as its research population.

As intimated in question (b) this dissertation does not see the Israeli public as a homogenous whole. It is particularly interested in identifing whether perceptions of climate change are

shared or differ across socio-demographic lines. This perspective is strongly influenced by Hulme (2009) who argues that differing cultural worldviews clearly influence attitudes to risk, technology, wellbeing, priorities and visions for the future, all of which can influence perceptions of climate change. Kahan et al. (2012) similarly argue that what guides individual risk perception around climate change is not the “truth of such beliefs, but rather their congruence with individuals’ cultural commitments.” These arguments all support the notion of distinct ‘interpretative communities’ around climate change with views shaped by a common socio-demographic background, identity and worldview, shared risk perception and media sources which reinforce, define, and shape a common shared outlook relative to climate change (Leiserowitz 2007b; Nisbet 2011a).17

If ‘cultural commitments’ play a role in shaping perceptions of climate change then Israel offers a fascinating case study. Although a small country of seven million people, Israeli society represents a diverse array of worldviews and belief systems.18 Israel encompasses different religious and national groupings, different movements of Jewish religious observance and strongly held political views across the left-right political spectrum (Arian 2005 p. 414). Israelis from these different backgrounds already hold diverse beliefs relevant for shaping perceptions of climate change such as trust in science, technology and the media, risk perception and personal and national efficacy (Bar-Tal 2001; Golan 2004; Efron 2006). This research seeks to illustrate that Israeli climate frames draw on the diversity of beliefs and worldviews reflective of some of the complex tensions in Israeli society.

Against this diverse backdrop, however, it is hypothesised that Israelis do share some ‘cultural commitments’ that shape wider perceptions of climate change; notably the widely-held belief that Israel faces an ongoing ‘existential threat’ from its hostile neighbours (Halperin et al. 2008). Bar-Tal (2001) argues that the Israeli ‘collective fear orientation’ has been shaped by collective history and memory, the experience of de-legitimization, and personal or family experiences of terror attacks, army service and the Holocaust. How this ‘orientation’ affects perceptions of other potential risks may thus an important starting point for understanding Israeli perceptions of climate change.

17 What Lakoff would call shared “individual frames of reference” 18 Drawing on Swidler (1986) this research defines culture as a repertoire or tool-kit of symbols, stories, rituals, and worldviews, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems. 31

In proposing that some distinct social groupings within Israeli society hold distinct culturally- crafted views on climate change, this research presents the first comprehensive national portrait of societal inaction, with a specific interest in societal difference, which draws on both qualitiative and quantitative research. It also seeks to sharpen and refine Leiserowitz’s (2007) concept of ‘interpretative communities’ and extends his research on diverse cultural responses to climate change beyond the USA.19 It also challenges the ‘broadening base’ hypothesis for Israel as proposed by Neaman-Abramovitz and Katz-Gerro (2006): that as environmental information is widely disseminated in society, concern about environmental issues and willingness to adopt pro-environmental behaviors becomes pervasive and not associated with any distinct social groupings, gender, ethnicity or income.

This research process as a whole draws on grounded theory i.e. it focuses on generating theory regarding social phenomena based on a systematic analysis of data rather than testing an existing theory as such (Glaser and Strauss 1967:2). For this reason, the research questions and hypothesis are broad allowing for new and unexpected theoretical perspectives to emerge. The critical frame analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 emerged out of the empirical data presented in the first three chapters and from a wider analysis of literature and other sources.

4. Research design: The ‘National Portrait of Inaction’ approach This dissertation argues that several distinct types of sociological analysis and a range of different methods are needed in order to address the research questions and to present a composite picture of Israeli inaction on climate change. This innovative methodological approach proposed here to achieve this is called ‘the national portrait of inaction’ approach.

To answer question (a), the dissertation drew on insights from interpretative policy analysis and political economy to fully characterise Israel’s national response to climate change, the wider forces that have shaped it, and to place it in comparative international perspective. This is informed by analysis of media coverage of key events, semi-structured interviews with opinion-formers, politicians and scientists and analysis of Knesset protocols. Question (a) is primarily addressed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, which also serves as a background

19 Although it uses frame analysis rather than an audience segmentation analysis to illustrate how existing groupings in Israeli society hold distinct views on climate change (Maibach et al. 2011b). Although applying Leiserowitz’s methodology would clearly refine this analysis perhaps identifying additional interpretative communities, it was beyond the scope of this research. 32

chapter, explaining the history of climate change policymaking process in Israel. This chapter thus presents the major structural considerations underlying Israeli climate change inaction.

To answer research questions (b) and (c), the dissertation drew on a mixed-method approach informed by sociology, media studies and science and technology (STS) studies (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie 2003; Migiro and Magangi 2010).20 A mixed method approach permits a full exploration of societal differences. The quantitative research included survey research and a media content analysis to highlight broad sociological trends. The qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews, focus groups and a critical frame analysis to help deepen understanding of trends and the factors shaping them.

The quantitative findings are presented in Chapters 2 and 3, with a summary of the findings at the end of each chapter. Chapter 2 focuses on the quantitative social survey work conducted for this dissertation. The chapter includes a full methodological description of five public opinion surveys conducted in Israel between 2000 and 2011 and a descriptive and multivariate statistical analysis of each.

The chapter also includes a full description of the dependent and independent variables examined and how they are relevant to the research questions in helping to identify distinct Israeli perceptions of climate change both in comparison with other countries and in terms of distinct cleavages in Israeli society. For example, the 2009 nationally representative survey specially commissioned for this research includes dependent variables related to understanding of climate change; scepticism; risk perception; likely behavioral responses; trust in communicators and trust in technology. It also includes a full range of socio- demographic variables, which were used as dependent variables. Several of the surveys also offered data for internationally comparative and longitudinal analysis. The full list of questions in Hebrew is included in Appendix 1.

20 Although some argue that there is an epistemological incompatibility between empirical and interpretative approaches, this research follows Johnson and Onwuegbuzie’s (2004) appeal to pragmatism as a philosophical partner to a mixed methods approach. Quantitative purists or positivists maintain that social science inquiry should be objective and focus on identifying generalizable fact. This epistemological approach underlies quantitative social research, such as survey research and content analysis. Qualitative purists (also called constructivists or interpretivists) reject the notion of objectivity or even ‘fact’. They argue that it is impossible to make generalizations, and instead focus research on specific examples of how ‘reality’ is given meaning. Constructivists also focus attention on the power dynamics that underlie the production and reproduction of meaning. This epistemological belief underlies critical theory.

Chapter 3 focuses on how the Israeli print media has portrayed climate change. In order to assess how the quantity and content of Israeli media coverage of climate change may be affecting public perceptions, the research included a quantitative content analysis of six mainstream Israeli media sources between 2007 and 2010. The media sources analysed included Ha’aretz, NRG/Ma’ariv, Ynet, Yediot Ahronot, Israel Hayom and Jerusalem Post. The chapter gives a full explanation of the methodological approach and outlines how and why each media source was chosen. It includes a timeline of the quantity of coverage over the stated period and highlights key frames, key communicators, and most frequently mentioned events, people and places. It also details the coverage in each individual news source.

Chapters 4 and 5 draw on the results of the critical policy analysis in Chapter 1, the findings of the survey and media content analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 and additional analysis of key texts and semi-structured interviews to offer an interpretative frame analysis of Israeli societal perceptions of climate change. The chapters present and discuss ten prominent Israeli climate ‘frames’. They essentially serve as a discussion section for the dissertation, ordering and engaging the quantitative findings with a ‘thick description’ to offer a deeper response to questions (b) and (c).

Critical frame analysis was identified as the best method for the systematic analysis of the interplay between actors, language, public perceptions and policy (Fletcher 2009). It allows for a detailed analysis of the diversity of beliefs and worldviews in Israel while also drawing together the many diverse political, technological and societal factors into a holistic picture of the factors influencing Israeli inaction around climate change. The goal of frame analysis, however, is not simply to surface these frames but also to show how they are consciously constructed. Frame analysis thus also focuses on how and why actors in specific social contexts try to shape public perceptions of climate change by linking resonant metaphors and cultural resources to a set of recommendations for addressing this issue (Fletcher 2009).

The methodological process involved in identifying the frames included an inductive coding of survey and media research findings, policy documents, meeting and conference transcripts and transcripts of 58 semi-structured interviews using Atlas-ti qualitative data analysis software. For each of the semi-structured interviews, lists of interview questions were prepared in advance relevant to the specific interviewee with time and space given for additional questions to emerge during the interview process (See Appendix III for a full list of 34

personal communications). It also included analysis of data collected in two focus groups conducted in the Arab city of Sachnin. These were undertaken because the national survey sample sizes for the Israeli Arab population were too small and written texts were unavailable (see Appendix IV for more detail).

Chapter 4 focuses on the most common frames identified in Israeli climate discourse which include overtly sceptical frames (the ‘Russian sceptic’ frame; the ‘Tea Party’ sceptic frame; the ‘academic sceptic’ frame); concern frames (the ‘environmental threat’ frame; the ‘peace threat’ frame; the ‘demographic threat’ frame; and the ‘Jewish values’ frame); and denial frames (‘Finite pool of worry’ frame; the ‘climate fatalism’ frame). Chapter 5 presents the frame most prevalent in Israeli climate policy discourse, ‘the techno-opportunity’ frame. This frame proposes that Israel can make a valuable, if not unique, contribution to global efforts to address climate change through its technological capabilities.

Intepretative frame analysis was employed because, unlike other social constructivist and discourse analysis methods, it does not require an a priori commitment to radical relativism. That is, rather than accepting each frame as having equal value, this research engages critically with the frames identified thus offering an epistemological means to answer question d) (Fletcher 2009). These chapters assess each frame for its ‘effectiveness’ based on the two- axis scale. ‘Effectiveness’ is defined on one axis by the extent to which the frame promotes the scientifically agreed upon measures that will reduce GHG emissions and promote adaptation strategies. On the second axis, ‘effectiveness’ is defined by how resonant this framing is likely to be for the general public or specific publics. Resonant ‘frames’ are those that draw on national or culturally relevant metaphors, storylines and values, and are thus likely to elicit an emotional and behavioral response (Lakoff 2010; Kahan et al. 2012). This framework thus argues that to be ‘effective’, climate frames must encourage the Israeli public and policymakers to take appropriate climate actions and also draw on resonant arguments that appeal either widely or to specific groupings.

This overall ‘national portrait’ methodological approach thus draws on multiple data points to substantiate the responses to each of the research questions. For example, Israeli ‘interpretative communities’ are not only identified through survey research, but also through reference to wider literature to illustrate how the framings reflect and reproduce the beliefs held by the different groupings. Drawing on multiple data points ranging across scales, units 35

of analysis and a variety of contexts can clearly strengthen the assertions made here by illustrating the pervasiveness of a social construct throughout society.

This research does, however, note that some of the arguments made are based on cautiously presented inferences. For example, this dissertation draws on media analysis, policy analysis, semi-structured interviews, survey analysis and existing literature to substantiate the claim that Israelis may be more techno-optimistic about climate change than other nationalities. Although additional survey research could have substantiated these causal linkages or comparative claims more tightly, this dissertation asserts that adopting a mixed method approach adds far more richness to this argument than relying on survey analysis alone.

In terms of wider impact, this research seeks to contribute to the literature on the politics of unsustainability or ‘post-ecologism’ – a body of literature that pays specific attention to societal self-deception in eco-political matters (Blühdorn and Welsh 2007). This literature argues that this self-deception lies not only in overt expressions of scepticism about environmental problems, but rather in how states manage their inability and unwillingness to become truly sustainable despite claiming to be so. Blühdorn and Welsh (2007) highlight how this self-deception is most evident where discourse and rhetoric have been used to paper over the mutual incompatibility between sustainability and ‘business as usual’ development. At its heart, this self-deception lies in the denial that the capitalist economy’s need for infinite economic growth is ecologically, socially, politically and culturally unsustainable and destructive. This dissertation hypothesises that there are similar discursive mechanisms at work in Israel and that this highlights the importance of sociological analysis in terms of understanding public and policy inaction around climate change in Israel.

Chapter 1: Anthropogenic global warming in Israel: Weak responses to strong warnings

1. Introduction Climate and archaeological records from the last ten thousand years show that there has always been significant climate variability in the East Mediterranean (Issar and Zohar 2004). As we enter the twenty-first century, however, Israel’s climate is entering a new period of uncertainty. Over the last forty years, the unexpected ways in which humans influence the climate have become increasingly evident. Although scientists now have a fairly clear picture of the likely effects of global warming21 in the region, as will be illustrated in this chapter, successive Israeli governments have paid little attention to the issue. They have been slow to allocate research funding, slow to introduce GHG emissions reduction policies, and slow to introduce adaptation policies to protect Israel against the changing climate.

Israel’s categorisation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a ‘developing country’ with few international obligations has permitted this slow and limited policy response. Although the Ministry of Environmental Protection has been quietly working on this issue since 1989, only accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 2009 UN Climate Change Summit mobilised Israel’s leaders to action.

This introduction presents an overview of how Israeli scientists and policy-makers have come to understand current anthropogenic global warming, and highlights the political and economic motivations behind Israel’s current inaction. The chapter thus answers the first question posed by this dissertation by characterising Israel’s political response to climate change, which forms part of the wider explanation for Israeli inaction around climate change. It also serves as a background on the subject relevant for understanding subsequent chapters.

21 The scientific section uses the accurate scientific definitions for ‘global warming’- the increase in the Earth’s average surface temperature due to an increase in anthropogenic atmospheric GHG and ‘climate change’ - a long-term change in the Earth’s climate or localized climatic changes. These terms are used interchangeably elsewhere. 37

2. Observed climate changes in Israel in the early 21st century

2.1 Israeli research on climate change and anthropogenic global warming Scientific debate about Israel’s changing climate began in the mid-1970s. It initially focused on how direct human activity, and specifically irrigation, had changed weather patterns in central-southern Israel (Alpert and Mandel 1986; Otterman et al. 1990; Ben Gai et al. 1993). From the early 1990s onward, Israeli researchers began to explore the likely influence of global warming on the Eastern Mediterranean region, with particular concern for how it might affect the water balance. Since then, global climate models (GCMs) have become more sophisticated, observed data have been analyzed, and the way in which the region’s climate is influenced by other local and major climate systems is better understood. Israeli climate researchers have also conducted cutting-edge research on effects of anthropogenic aerosols, including cloud-seeding, on urban pollution and rainfall patterns (Alpert et al. 2008b; Givati and Rosenfeld 2004, 2005; Levin et al. 2010; Levin et al. 2011).

While the impact of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other GHGs in the atmosphere has been the source of scientific debate since the mid-nineteenth century, it was concern about an observed warming trend in the late 1970s that initially widened the scientific and public debate. By the summer heat waves of 1988 the issue was firmly on the public stage, with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) founded that year.22

Against this background, in 1989 the newly founded Israeli Ministry of Environmental Quality nominated a National Committee for Research on Climate Change. The committee was mainly responsible for the organization of an international workshop on ‘The Regional Implications of Future Climate Change’ at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot in May 1991. The workshop demonstrated Israel’s particular concern about global warming, clearly summarized by Professor Joshua Jortner, president of the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities in his opening address: “As Israel is a very small country on the edge of a desert, the consequences of global change may have much greater effects regionally than those observed globally . . . especially with respect to the future of water sources in the region” (Graber et al. 1994 p. 4).

22 The IPCC was founded to synthesize the state of the art of climate research on “a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis” for policy makers; see the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (4AR) (IPCC 2007a) 38

Although the climate models presented at the workshop diverged in their predictions, all identified an impact on water availability in the region (Druyan and Rind 1994; Kay 1994; Segal et al. 1994). Segal et al. (1994) performed the first runs of regional climate models in the East Mediterranean to study the potential impacts of doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere on several rainfall-bearing cyclones. The results projected a change in the spatial distribution of precipitation i.e. less rainfall in the south and more in the north, which also suggested that Israel’s desert zone was likely to advance northward. The climate model also projected a significant reduction in winter snowfall and disappearance of Jerusalem snow.

The workshop highlighted the need to undertake the basic and comprehensive research necessary to build more effective regional climate models and to understand the local and regional water cycle. Yet despite the alarming predictions and apparent concern of both government and scientists, funding for a dedicated research program only became available a decade later through the German government–funded GLOWA-Jordan River project. This project, which ran from 2000 to 2012, brought together Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, and German researchers to “explore the future of the water scarce Jordan river basin under the impact of climate and global change” (GLOWA-JR website 2010). From 2005 onwards the Environment Ministry has also made research funds available.

These funds have massively improved the state of the art in research in Israel, bringing it somewhat closer to what has been done in North America and Europe. Israeli scientists are now contributing to the IPCC process, with Israeli data included in the 2013 Fifth Assessment report for the first time (Lavie 2010a).

2.2 Changing temperature and precipitation trends According to Israel’s Water Authority, Israel suffered a severe period of drought from 2005 to 2012. The current dry years concur with global trends, showing that the decade ending in 2009 was the warmest on record (NASA 2010). Israel’s climatological and meteorological community agree that the region is experiencing a warming trend. Israel’s summers have become warmer with an increase in the number and duration of summer “hot days” (Ben-Gai et al. 1999; Ziv et al. 2005). There has also been a rise in the relative humidity in the Eastern Mediterranean (Ziv and Saaroni 2011). There have, however, been longer and more severe periods of drought in the last one hundred years (Rom et al. 2006).3

There is however less consensus as to whether and why rainfall patterns are changing in Israel (Ben Gai et al. 1998; Alpert et al. 2002; Givati and Rosenfeld 2004; Zhang et al. 2005; Halfon et al. 2009; Kafle and Bruins 2009; Yosef et al. 2009). Alpert et al. (2002), for example, identified ‘the Mediterranean Paradox’ – the paradoxical increase of extreme rainfall despite an overall declining rainfall trend across the Mediterranean region. They did not, however, find this trend to be significant in Israel. Kafle and Bruins (2009) also found that only some parts of the country have experienced decreasing rainfall and rising aridity; the coastal plain has not been significantly affected. Researchers blame this lack of consensus on the fact that there are no local facilities to develop climate models in Israel, and on the inherent difficulties in downscaling global circulation models (Alpert et al. 2008a; Feitelson et al. 2012).

There are however, two locations in Israel where rainfall has decreased significantly. Researchers have observed a clear decreasing trend in the Upper Jordan river basin around Lake Kinneret, the country’s major freshwater reservoir from 1980’s onwards (Alpert and Ben-Zvi 2001; Givati et al. 2010; Sowers et al. 2011; Pers. Comm. Amir Givati 2010). Ginat and Shlomi (2008) also show a decrease in the annual rainfall in Israel’s hyper-arid Arava desert. Although data do not exist for a long enough period to prove a definitive shift in climate, they also show that rainfall events are less frequent, more localized and more intense.

Some researchers have attributed these changes to the urban effect (Halfon et al. 2009); teleconnection patterns23 (Yosef et al. 2009) or cloud seeding (Givati and Rosenfeld 2004; Alpert et al. 2008b) rather than global warming. Shohami et al. (2011), however, argue that global warming is leading to drier conditions in Israel but that this change is not yet evident in surface station rainfall data because it is masked by the high natural precipitation variance in the region.

Alpert (2004) also argues that the teleconnection and global warming explanations are compatible. He suggests that global warming is already indirectly affecting Israel’s climate through its influence on regional and global atmospheric circulation systems that have an effect on Israel’s climate. These include the Red Sea Trough and the Persian Trough; major tropical systems such as the El-Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the South Asian Monsoon and tropical cyclones; as well as the North Atlantic Oscillation and the East Atlantic/West Russia pattern (Alpert et al. 2006; Saaroni et al. 2010).

23 Major circulation patterns that also influence local climate are known as ‘teleconnections’. 40

The scientific debate over climate change in Israel was vividly brought home on 2nd December 2010, when an accidental fire in the Carmel forest quickly turned into the worst forest fire in Israel’s history. The fire extended to 35,000 hectares and destroyed five million trees, killing 44 people and causing 17,000 people to be evacuated from their homes (Yakir and Brand 2012). Although there is still no conclusive scientific evidence that the fire was caused by climate change, ongoing drought and a long hot summer in Israelmade the forest vulnerable to forest fire.24 Leading ecologists and environmentalists immediately made the connection between these conditions and climate change, and suggested that such forest fires were likely to become a more common occurrence in Israel (Rabinowitz 2010; Pe’er 2010).

3. Predicted climate forecasts for Israel in the 21st century

3.1 Overview of predicted impacts on Israel Despite the on-going debate over the influence of climate change on local rainfall patterns, many climate models suggest that rainfall will decrease and extreme weather events will increase in Israel (Alpert et al. 2008a; Black 2009; Sowers et al. 2011). In its December 2011 report, Israel’s Climate Change Information Centre (ICCIC) identified the following forecast changes to be of particular concern for Israel (ICCIC 2011):

• A decadal increase in average annual temperatures of between 0.3-.0.5°C varying according to location and season; • The reduction in the average quantity of rain of between 1.1-3.7 percent per decade; • Increased desertification in Southern Israel; • An increase in the duration and intensity of heat waves; • Increased risk of flooding causing damage to property and ecosystems; • Increased probability of forest fires; • Uncertainty about the impacts on biodiversity which are likely to include an increasing number of invasive species and an earlier bird migration; • Increased human migration to Israel; • Increased conflict over water resources; • Changes in sea level and impacts on civilian and military facilities on the coast.

24 The forest fire released between 350,000 to 500,000 tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere, which accounted for between 0.5 - 0.8 percent of Israel’s CO2 emissions that year (Yakir and Brand 2012). 41

3.2 Research on the likely impacts of global warming on Israel Initial research on the likely influence of global warming on Israel has largely focused on the effects on water resources, agriculture, biodiversity and public health. There is already concern that global warming could affect the quantity and quality of Israel’s freshwater sources. Although currently available climate models are not detailed enough to allow for assessments of the effects on groundwater recharge, it is fairly certain that sea-level rise will lead to further intrusion of seawater into the already degraded coastal aquifer (Bar-Or and Golan-Angelko 2008; Feitelson et al. 2012). Decreased precipitation is also likely to reduce freshwater availability in the Jordan River Basin. Increased temperatures could also result in evaporation and algal blooms in Lake Kinneret, decreasing its storage potential (Kitoh et al. 2008; Sowers et al. 2011).

Fleischer et al. (2007) argue that a mild increase in average temperatures could be beneficial to Israeli agriculture, allowing farmers to supply early fresh produce to international markets. A drastic change, however, would be disastrous. The loss of soil moisture would damage crops and the warmer climate would encourage new agricultural pests. Heavy rainfall events would also increase topsoil erosion and soil salinity damaging plant health. Nevertheless, with agriculture increasingly shifting to recycled wastewater, overall water availability is likely to be unaffected (Feitelson et al. 2012).

Israel is already experiencing an increase in farm animal diseases, partially attributable to climate change (GLOWA-JR 2010). Paz (2007; 2009) also attributes the emergence of two human pest-borne diseases in Israel to global warming; West Nile Virus and Vibrio Vulnificus disease. She also expresses concern about the effects of global warming on public health in Israel with the likely increase in incidences of heat stress and natural disasters.

Israeli ecologists predict that climate change and land use changes will cause animal species to shift their distribution to the west and northwest of Israel (GLOWA-JR 2010). Experimental research found, however, that local vegetation was resilient to changes in rainfall distribution over time, although the experiment did not measure extreme events (Köchy et al. 2008; Dayan and Sternberg 2012).

Israel is also vulnerable to sea level rises. Klein et al. (2004) present a scenario of a 50- centimeter rise in sea level by 2050, increasing to one meter by 2100. They claim that this could lead to coastline retreat of two to ten meters and the loss of 0.4-2 square kilometres of coastal area every ten years. In addition to the damage to coastal ecology, archaeological sites, and tourism, this loss of coastal area would have a serious impact on Israel’s narrow Mediterranean coastal strip, where 60 percent of Israel’s population, vital infrastructure, and a recharge aquifer are concentrated (Sowers et al. 2011).

Based on these findings, initial estimates by the Ministry of Environmental Protection show that failing to address climate change would carry reasonably high economic price. By 2020, inaction over water scarcity could cost the economy around 450 million NIS a year and flood damages could cost 340 million NIS a year (equivalent to $200 million) (Bar-Or and Golan- Angelko 2008).

3.3 Regional implications of anthropogenic global warming A super-high-resolution climate model of the whole Middle East region suggests that decreased rainfall and a severely reduced stream flow in the region’s major rivers could contribute to the total disappearance of the area known as the Fertile Crescent by the end of the twenty-first century (Kitoh et al. 2008; Jin et al. 2010). Even a moderate rise in the average global temperature would threaten rain and flood based-agriculture and livelihoods in the region. The Fertile Crescent, which gave rise to the Neolithic agricultural revolution, may thus ironically be one of the first to be dried out by human activities in modern times.

Freimuth et al. (2007) make equally pessimistic predictions. They refer to global warming as a ‘threat multiplier’ that would exacerbate water scarcity and conflict over water in the region. Paz and Kidar (2007) echo these concerns. Israel may have the technological ability to adapt to sea level rise and drought, but its neighbours have far less adaptive capacity. They predict political destabilisation, damage to oil reserves and waves of climate refugees heading to Europe and the Mediterranean.

Given this context, Brown and Crawford (2009) argue that global warming will make a peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours less likely as nations compete over scarce water resources. Feitelson et al. (2012) however, argue that this scenario is unlikely because

Israeli can expand its desalination program to meet water scarcity. See Chapter 4 for more discussion of the likely effects of global warming on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The IPCC conclude that the scientific evidence that the global climate is warming is now “unequivocal” (IPCC 2007a). This is based on observations of global average air and ocean temperature increases, the widespread melting of snow and ice and rising sea levels. The IPCC also posit that it is “very likely” that this warming has been caused by human activities, especially anthropogenic emissions of CO2 (ibid.). There are still, however, a handful of prominent and respected Israeli scientists who question the scientific consensus. Climate change scepticism is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

4. A background to climate change policy in Israel

4.1 From Rio to Israel’s First National Communication on Climate Change (1992 – 2000) Israeli policy makers displayed an almost complete lack of interest in global warming until beginning the accession process to join the OECD in 2006 (Pers. Comm. Valerie Brachya 2011). This was underlined by the failure of Prime Minister Shamir to join 117 heads of state attending the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), known as the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro.25

As a result of Israel’s low profile at the Earth Summit and the rapid influx of nearly a million immigrants from the former Soview Union to the country in the early 1990s, Israel was recognized as a non-Annex 1 or ‘developing’ country to the UNFCCC initiated in Rio. This meant that Israel received no binding targets to reduce its GHG emissions. Until the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen, December 2009, Israel’s only obligations to the international community were to keep a national GHG emissions inventory and to formulate and implement a voluntary national mitigation program. With no binding treaty obligations, Israel quickly ratified the UNFCCC in 1996 and become a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in December 1998, ratifying it in February 2004. Israel established an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change in 1996, although this did not convene until four years later.

25 Shamir was contesting a General Election a week after the Earth Summit in June 1992, which also explains his absence. 44

In November 2000, Israel submitted its First National Communication on Climate Change to the UNFCCC. In the ten years from 1990, Israel’s population grew 29.4 percent and it had achieved one of the highest annual GDP growth rates in the developed world (six percent). As a result, Israel’s GHG emissions skyrocketed. At that time, over 80 percent of Israel’s emissions came from the burning of fossil fuels for vehicle and energy use, with methane and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture, waste production and industrial processes accounting for the rest.

Based on research by the Samuel Neaman Institute, the First National Communication lists a number of policy recommendations by which Israel could reduce these emissions. These include improving solid-waste management; switching from coal to lower carbon fuel sources such as natural gas; improving energy efficiency; promoting renewable energy; reducing industrial emissions; promoting green building and appliance efficiency; improving vehicle efficiency and public transport; addressing private vehicle use through urban planning measures; and promoting composting and improving animal feed to reduce methane emissions. The report also highlights the urgency of addressing water scarcity through both conservation and generation of new sources, as well as effective land management to prevent desertification (Pe’er and Safriel 2000).

Overall, the report is optimistic that significant measures could be taken without major structural changes to the economy and with significant additional benefits such as reducing air pollution and traffic congestion. The report is also a rallying cry for the leading role that Israel could play in global adaptation efforts (Pe’er and Safriel 2000).

4.2 Israel’s climate policy (2001 – 2009) During the early 2000s, the Israeli government made a number of decisions related to GHG emission reduction. These included a 2001 decision to voluntarily reduce GHG emissions (Government Decision 2913); a November 2002 decision to significantly expand renewable energy to two percent of total electricity production by 2007 (Government Decision 2664); and a 2003 decision to develop a sustainable development strategy (Government Decision 246).26

26 For a detailed list of relevant government decisions see Porat (2008) and Axelrod (2010). 45

The 2001 decision established Israel as a participant in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM is an arrangement under the Kyoto Protocol by which developed countries with emissions reduction targets can invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries instead of having to undertake more expensive reductions in their own countries (CDM 2001). As a de facto ‘developing’ country under the Kyoto Protocol, Israel can receive CDM financing for its emissions reductions, and it plays this paradox to its advantage. The Ministry of Environmental Protection advertises Israel as “an excellent venue in which to develop CDM projects because although categorized as a developing country under the Kyoto Protocol, it has all the characteristics of a developed country” (MEP 2006; 17).

Israel’s CDM projects, financed mainly by the UK and Germany, include collecting methane from landfills and introducing technology to reduce industrial emissions. By 2008, Israel’s sixteen UN-registered CDM projects reduced national emissions by an estimated 1.8 million 27 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2eq) a year (Inbar 2008). By 2011, Israel had registered 22 CDM projects, estimated to reduce national emissions by 4.2 MtCO2eq in 2012 with an additional 11 projects awaiting registration (Edwards 2011; CDM 2012).28

At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, Israel committed to develop a national strategy based on sustainable development. At that time, Israel’s environmental NGO community established the ‘Paths to Sustainability’ coalition in order to monitor this commitment. The coalition of 40 member organizations coordinates NGO lobbying efforts and research on Israel’s progress on sustainable development (Porat 2009).

In its 2008 report, the coalition criticized the government’s failure to implement a strategic master plan for sustainable development across ministries or to give adequate budgetary expression to relevant decisions (Porat 2008). The report also criticised the government for not meeting modest objectives such as the two percent target for renewable energy, and for making contradictory decisions such as investing both in public transport and road construction (Porat 2008).

27 Carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2eq) is a quantity that describes, for a given mixture and amount of GHG, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming potential (GWP), when measured over a specific timescale (generally one hundred years). It allows comparison of the relative contribution of different GHGs. 28 Not all of these projects have been successfully established due to regulatory complexity, technical difficulties, and a lack of funding (Pers. Comm. Ofer Ben Dov 2012). 46

In December 2008, two prominent environmentally minded Knesset members (MK) proposed a Climate Bill for Israel to introduce ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets. The Bill failed to reach a preliminary reading in the plenary, although according to one of its proposers, Hadash MK, Dov Khenin, it had been primarily introduced to bring attention to the issue of climate change rather than as a serious piece of legislation (Pers. Comm. Dov Khenin 2009).

Israel’s emissions grew steadily during the first decade of the 21st century (see Figure 1). This reflected an increase in electricity demand met primarily by coal, an increase in private kilometres travelled and little official interest in green building and energy efficiency. In 2009 global management consultancy firm McKinsey and Company (2009) predicted that Israel’s emissions would double by 2030 under a ‘Business as Usual’ (BAU) scenario driven by a growing population, economic growth and corresponding rise in electricity demand.29 In most developed countries, GHG emissions are stabilizing or falling. Israel’s pattern of emissions growth thus more closely resembles that of ‘recently developed countries’ such as Spain (Yanai et al. 2008).30

During this period, Israel’s GHG emissions did, however fall in certain categories as a result of improved solid-waste disposal, CDM projects and a switch in electricity generating capacity to natural gas. After years of parliamentary debate in 2008, Israel’s Knesset also passed a Clean Air Law that can be used as a tool for regulating GHG emissions.31 Late 2008 also saw a flurry of potentially ambitious policies relating to energy use including a commitment to reduce electricity consumption by 20 percent by 2020 (Government Decision 4095/150) and for 10 percent of energy to come from renewable sources by 2020 (Government Decision 4450). For the most part, however, these reductions did not constitute a deliberate effort to reduce GHG emissions and implementation was poorly defined.

29 Israel’s population is 7.8 million (2011 figures) and growing at an annual rate of 1.9% (CBS 2010, 2011). Israel’s economy has grown roughly 4-5 percent since 2007, weathering the 2008 recession. The International Monetary Fund forecast a 4.8 percent rise for 2011, triple the pace for the average of 34 advanced economies (Odenheimer and Ackerman 2011). Between 2001 and 2010, the aggregate demand for electricity in Israel grew at an average annual rate of 3.38 percent (IEC Statistical report 2010). Analysts predict an average annual increase in demand of 4 percent until 2020 (The Economist – Israel Energy Report 2011). 30 McKinsey’s figures are based on Infrastructures Ministry figures and Master plan for Electric Power Economy (July 2009). Even with Israel’s increasing GDP and population growth, some argue that BAU figures are unrealistically high. The implications of inflated figures would be that Israel would find it easier to meet its targets (2010 Mitigation workshop). 31 Clean Air Act 2008: GHG fall under the CAA (274). “The CAA prohibits” any natural or legal person “from causing strong or unreasonable air pollution” (274). 47

It is important to note that although Israel’s total GHG emissions are tiny (0.19 percent of total global emissions), its per capita emissions are, however, relatively large. In 2008, an average

Israeli emitted 10.7 tonnes of CO2eq, which is comparable to many Western European countries. Under a BAU scenario, by 2030, Israel’s per capita emissions are forecast to grow 40 percent to 14.3 tonnes. By comparison, US per capita emissions are forecast to be 23 tonnes, in Western Europe, 10.7 tonnes and China, 11.3 tonnes (McKinsey and Company 2009).

Figure 4: Israel’s total GHG emissions 1996 - 2008 (in million tonnes of CO2eq)

Carbon dioxide Other GHGs

100 73 75 77 78 72 73 73 74 75 63

0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Sources: 2011 Statistical Abstract of Israel. Since 2008, figures also include fluorine gases (between 1-2 MtCO2eq a year). In 2009, the global recession caused a fall in emissions worldwide (EEA 2009).

4.3 Israel and OECD accession process (2006 – 2010) In 2006 the Governor of the Bank of Israel, Stanley Fischer recommended that it would be in Israel’s best interests to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD does not operate through legally binding mechanisms instead it requires member countries to demonstrate that they are ‘like-minded’ across a range of issues. As part of the accession process, Israel therefore had to demonstrate a like-minded position on climate change. At that time all the OECD countries bar Mexico and South Korea (and Chile which joined at the same time as Israel) were Annex 1 signatories to the UNFCCC, with binding emissions reduction targets.32 OECD membership did not compel Israel to become an Annex

32 Noting the surprising number of environmental instruments in the OECD, head of international affairs at Israel’s Finance Ministry, Oded Bruck remarked, “The Environment Ministry may well be the main beneficiary of Israel’s OECD accession”. (Pers. Comm. Valerie Brachya 2011). 48

1 country. It did, however, require Israel to demonstrate that it was making efforts to reduce its emissions within a three-year accession period. This motivated the Israeli government to consider climate change legislation seriously for the first time.

Since the 2000 First National Communication, Israeli academics, think tanks, and NGOs have proposed numerous policy options to reduce Israel’s GHG emissions (Avnimelech 2002; IUED 2007; Porat 2009). These have all come to similar conclusions to the First National Communication in 2000: that by implementing existing technologies across a wide range of sectors as part of a national strategy, Israel could reduce its emissions by as much as 43 percent (IUED 2007). Other researchers have explored how carbon taxation and emissions trading could be effective in Israel (Dagan 2008; Schechter and Palatnik 2008).

Some within the Environment Ministry were sceptical about the possibility of introducing ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets. Director General Yossi Inbar claimed that this would be “effectively saying we must close the country down” (Rinat 2008). Nevertheless, the first official research commissioned by the Environment Ministry in January 2009 suggested that Israel could relatively easily reduce 31.7 MtCO2eq a year (Axelrod et al. 2010).

In June 2009, an inter-ministerial Director General committee was established to prepare Israel’s climate change policy (Government decision 474). This initially came under the auspices of enthusiastic new Likud environment minister, Gilad Erdan who took office in March 2009. In June 2009, he employed international management consultancy firm, McKinsey and Company and policy think-tank, the Samuel Neaman Institute, to support this work.

4.3.1 The McKinsey Abatement Cost Curve for Israel The McKinsey report, published in November 2009, presented a cost-benefit analysis of various emissions reductions measures for Israel based on McKinsey’s GHG abatement cost curve methodology; an approach McKinsey had employed in over twenty countries worldwide including Russia, Indonesia and the Congo (McKinsey and Company 2009). The report suggested that an abatement potential of 45 MtCO2eq a year was possible primarily through switching to low carbon fuel sources, energy and vehicle efficiency measures and green building. Some measures would require significant up-front investment and other measures would be more cost efficient in the future when technology had improved, however, almost all

the measures would save money in the long term. By 2030, the total net cost to the Israeli economy of implementing the measures would be zero. McKinsey noted that Israel had a lower GHG emissions reduction potential than other countries because it lacks heavy industry and has limited possibilities for hydroelectric, nuclear or wind power or carbon capture and storage.

Due to its growing population and rising standard of living, even if Israel undertook significant mitigation measures, its GHG emissions would still rise significantly by 2030. For this reason, McKinsey could not propose an emissions reduction target for Israel based on an absolute reduction of GHG compared to a given baseline year such as 1990 or 2005. Instead, McKinsey proposed an emissions reduction target based on the formula of reducing Israel’s emissions relative to a forecast BAU scenario i.e. a reduction of 20 percent of the 2020 projected BAU scenario. This allows Israel’s emissions to rise from their current level, although only by 80 percent of the amount McKinsey suggests would have risen without policy intervention. See Figure 2. BAU emissions reduction targets such as this are more commonly proposed by developing countries rather than developed countries.

Although characterizing it as a step in the right direction, environmental NGOs and academics criticized the McKinsey process for being too rushed. They were critical of its un-ambitious targets and sceptical of how the figures were calculated and the reliance on a single scenario (Axelrod et al. 2010: Ayalon et al. 2011).33

The Environment Ministry commissioned the McKinsey report at considerable expense primarily to demonstrate to the international community Israel’s commitment to reducing its GHG emissions. It allowed Israel to present a ‘like-minded’ position to the OECD in October 2009 as a compromise that was “the minimum acceptable to the OECD but maximum we could get out of the Israeli government” (Pers. Comm. Valerie Brachya 2011). It also allowed Israel to present an informed emissions reduction target at the UN Climate Summit in December 2009. As Gilad Erdan confessed in a Jerusalem Post interview “It would be very bad for our international image if we did not take on some commitment even if not expressly required to” (Waldoks 2009). When it came to working out the details of Israel’s climate policy, however,

33 These were some of the conclusions of wide-ranging discussions of the McKinsey report at the Climate Change Mitigation Policy Workshop held at Ben-Gurion University, May 25, 2010. 50

the Israeli government drew on a new study conducted by the Samuel Neaman Institute that Greenhouse gas abatement potential in Israel was more firmly grounded in the Israeli reality (Ayalon et al. 2011).34

Exhibit 5.12 The mid-way situation: emissions in 2020 Figure 5: Israel’s GHG abatement potential in 2020 and 2030

MtCO2e per year 180

142 BAU 2030 135 -32% 109 Abatement case -20% 97 2030 90 88 71 +23% +36% Emissions 2005

0 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

Source: McKinsey and Company (2009) Average4.4 Israel costs at inthe 2020 2009 in UNthe abatementClimate Change scenario Summit are approximately in Copenhagen -6 €/tCO2e (Exhibit 5.13). In the run-up to the 2009 UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen, Israel’s leaders began to recognize the potential trade, public relations and wider geo-strategic opportunities of adopting climate change policy and rhetoric. At a special meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2009, Environment Minister Gilad Erdan argued that Israel should be recognized as a developed country and take responsibility for its emissions. He also said that Israel was prepared to serve as a regional laboratory and centre of excellence for climate change adaptation technologies and renewable energy (Erdan 2009). A month later, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also noted how his personal geo-political goal to end global oil dependency by 2020 through developing oil-substitution technologies aligned with reducing GHG emissions.

34 Israel’s actual climate policy was not based on even one figure from the McKinsey report (Pers. Comm. Ofira Ayalon 2011). Describing the McKinsey report Ayalon argues, “They converted to Judaism but not according to the Orthodox tradition” implying that McKinsey crudely applied their universal abatement curve to Israel, without in depth analysis.34 51

Despite these positive developments, just before the 2009 conference, the Israeli State Comptroller criticized the Israeli government for not having implemented even the basic actions necessary for addressing climate change. The country had still had not formulated a national mitigation plan nor collected sufficient data to inspect and supervise its emissions (Rinat 2009b). In addition, UNEP chastised Israel for its almost complete domestic reliance on fossil fuels, despite being a leading developer of solar technologies (Rinat 2009c).

President Shimon Peres officially announced Israel’s GHG emissions reduction target during the High Level Segment of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen on 17 December 2009. The target was based on McKinsey’s formulation, a 20 percent reduction from the BAU scenario by 2020.35 Environment Ministry officials describe a tense process in gaining Finance Ministry approval (Pers. Comm Avi Moshel 2012). The Environment Ministry calculated that based on previous government decisions related climate change, renewable energy and energy efficiency, Israel had already legally committed to reduce its GHG emissions by 22- 25 percent by 2020 compared to McKinsey’s BAU forecasts. This gave the Finance Ministry no choice but to agree to the proposed target.

Israel GHG emissions reduction target is internationally binding (UNFCCC 2010). Nevertheless, as a non-Annex 1 country, it is not subject to the same rigorous monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) as Annex 1 countries are. This may change in 2017 or 2020 depending on future negotiations (Karassin 2012). At the 2011 UN Climate conference in Durban, Israel claimed to have already designed its domestic MRV system although others dispute this (Ayalon et al. 2011; Segev-Steinberg 2011). Israel’s next national communication and biennial update are due at the end of 2014.

The emissions reduction target announced in Copenhagen disappointed Israel’s environmental NGO community. In a joint statement the Paths to Sustainability Coalition stated, “A 20 percent reduction in emissions growth does not reflect Israel’s capabilities as a developed nation, nor is it backed by a national plan” (Waldoks 2009h). The target also compared unfavorably to other national and regional emissions reduction targets. The European Union, for example, aimed to reduce its 2020 GHG emissions by between 20 – 30 percent compared to 1990 levels. By comparison, even if Israel met its proposed targets, its GHG emissions will

35 The night before announcing Israel’s emissions reduction targets in Copenhagen, Peres was asked to choose Israel’s emissions reduction target from between 15 – 20 percent, and Peres choose 20 percent (Pers. Comm. Gaddy Weissman 2011) 52

still have risen over 90 percent between 1990 and 2020. Of those countries for which data is available, Israel’s forecast 2020 emissions increase is only exceeded by Singapore, whose emissions are expected to rise by 115 – 124 percent compared to 1990 levels (UNFCCC 2010).

Several other countries also adopted GHG emissions reduction targets based on BAU forecasts in the Copenhagen Accord including Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, South Africa and Brazil. Israel’s target was, however, second lowest behind Singapore, which committed to reduce emissions by 7-11 percent based on a BAU scenario (UNFCCC 2010; USCAN 2010).

Israel’s Infrastructures Minister, Uzi Landau was also critical, although for different reasons. In a letter to the Prime Minister, he complained that the Environment Ministry could not simply present the McKinsey report as if it were Israel’s official climate policy (Darel 2009b). Behind this exchange was an on-going dispute between the two ministries over the direction of Israel’s energy policy (Lavie 2010b). This is explained in more detail below.

4.5 Israel’s climate change mitigation policy, October 2010 In March 2010, an inter-ministerial committee was established to formulate Israel’s GHG reduction plan to reflect its Copenhagen Accord commitment (Government decision 1504). At the initiative of the Environment ministry, the Director General of the Finance Ministry, Haim Shani, was appointed head of the ‘Shani’ committee. This shifted oversight of climate policy out of the politically weak Environment Ministry to the influential Finance Ministry, increasing the likelihood that the measures would be given adequate budgetary expression. The Finance Ministry was also a neutral given a conflict between the Environment and Infrastructures Ministry. To avoid further conflict, but to the detriment of the overall policy, Israel’s sole electricity provider, the Israel Electric Corporation, was also excluded from the policy process (Pers. Comm. Ofira Ayalon 2011).

In November 2010, the Israeli government approved the National GHG Emissions Reduction Plan (Government decision 2508; Government resolution 1504). The Plan committed NIS 2.2 billion ($586 million) over ten years to replacing inefficient appliances, improving vehicle efficiency and driver education programs, introducing green building measures and subsidising GHG emissions reductions in the industrial, commercial and public sectors. It also included NIS 40 million for the commercialisation of Israeli technologies (MEP 2011). The Plan only adopted ‘no-regrets’ policy

measures with a direct, quantifiable and immediate economic benefit, with savings estimated at 34 million NIS to be retained by the Finance Ministry (Ayalon et al. 2011).36

4.5.1 Reaction to Israeli Climate policy Israel’s environmental community were deeply disappointed by the limited scope of Israel’s climate policy. The NGO umbrella group Paths to Sustainability, the Knesset Internal Affairs and Environment Committee and even the Samuel Neaman Institute, who had advised the Shani Committee on policy development, all published in depth critiques of both the policy and the policy-making process (Ronen 2010; Ayalon et al. 2011; Paths to Sustainability 2011).

The Paths to Sustainability Coalition argued that while they welcomed the process, the policy was unlikely to achieve even the modest emissions reduction targets that Israel had committed to in the Copenhagen Accord (Paths to Sustainability 2011). Instead of reducing Israel’s emissions by 20 percent from BAU forecasts (22 MtCO2eq), Ayalon et al. (2011) calculated that they would only account for a 14 percent reduction (15.95 MtCO2eq) All the reports also criticised the fact that Israel’s climate policy failed to address the most significant source of Israel’s GHG emissions: its continued reliance on fossil fuels. See sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 for a more in depth critique of Israel’s climate policy measures.

Ayalon et al. (2011) also highlight that the policy failed to take an integrated economy-wide approach in developing its climate policy, which best practice and existing research suggests is the most effective means to reduce GHG emissions. For Israel to meet its Copenhagen Accord commitment, they argue, it would need to introduce a carbon tax alongside switching to low carbon fuels, taking energy efficiency measures and promoting public transportation. Despite these clear recommendations for effective policy, Israel’s climate policy focused primarily on abatement potential in just one area, energy efficiency in buildings. Ayalon et al. (2011) also criticised the failure to include no-regrets measures such as scaling up the use of Israeli water heater technology and mandating for more efficient Combined Heat and Power gas-fired power stations.

Reflecting on the policy-making process itself, NGO representatives, who had advised the committee, were initially encouraged by the apparent participatory and inclusive approach. However, both the media and some committee members criticised the lack of transparency

36 ‘No regrets’ measures refer to measures that would be of benefit no matter how or if predicted climate impacts materialize. 54

around the final budget allocations, with the full report never released to the public (Pers. Comm. Michal Bitterman 2011; Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011). There was also criticism that the policy had been poorly coordinated with other government decisions that would influence Israeli GHG emissions. These include Israel’s decision to promote oil substitutes, the uncertainty around the new Ashkelon coal-fired power station, Israel’s natural gas finds and the possible exploitation of its oil shale reserves (Paths to Sustainability 2011).

Alongside the very short-term quantifiable ‘no-regrets’ criteria for policy adoption, insiders also blame the limited policy on competition between ministries for funding and personality conflicts (Pers. Comm. Ofira Ayalon 2011; Michal Bitterman 2011). For example, potential GHG emissions reductions achieved from introducing renewable energy were not explicitly included in the figures for ‘political reasons’ (Ronen 2011; Knesset Internal Affairs and Environment Committee 2012). This is despite the fact that if Israel met its renewable energy targets it would reduce emissions by 5.6 MtCO2eq.

Despite the significant funds allocated for Israel to meet its GHG emissions reductions targets, both Ayalon et al. (2011) and the Environment Ministry estimate that the budget is insufficient to meet the expected goals.37 With no clear metrics established to assess energy efficiency improvements, no interim targets, no ministry appointed to oversee implementation, poor understanding of the issue among different ministries, no clear monitoring process and the resignation of committee chair, Haim Shani in August 2010, environmental campaigners worry that many of the measures will not be implemented at all (Pers. Comm. Maya Givon 2011).

Although also critical of the process, the Environment Ministry felt it was better to have agreed upon measures and allocated budgets rather than to continue to argue over policy (Pers. Comm. Avi Moshel 2012). In July 2011, it launched the new Green Building Standard together with the Israel Standards Institution. By September 2011, it had received 98 tenders for available subsidies from the industrial, commercial and public sectors for projects showing quantifiable emissions reductions by 2020 (Erdan 2011). Many major Israeli companies have also signed up for the Environment Ministry’s voluntary GHG registry (Axelrod et al. 2011).

37 Ayalon et al. (2011) argue that the budget is missing 900 million NIS and the Environment Ministry calculates that emissions reductions of only 10.9 MtCO2eq are budgeted for (Knesset Internal Affairs and Environment Committee 2012). 55

4.6.2 Reducing emissions in the building sector According to the IPCC (2007) energy use in buildings accounts for 25 percent of total global

CO2 emissions. In Israel, energy use in buildings accounts for a third of all CO2 emissions, and over half of Israel’s urban emissions (Mor and Serrousi 2007; Bass Specktor et al. 2009). See Figures 3 and 4. These emissions are expected to rise by 81 percent by 2030 as the amount of floor space is set to double to accommodate Israel’s rising population (McKinsey and Company 2009; Pers. Comm. Valerie Brachya 2011). Israel’s Climate Mitigation Plan thus rightly focused on energy efficiency measures. The International Energy Agency (IEA) also highlights that energy efficiency measures are also the most cost-effective emissions reduction measures (Heffner 2011).

The Infrastructures Ministry received over half of the total funds made available for climate change to improve energy efficiency, with a majority of funds going to a programme to subsidise the upgrading of inefficient refrigerators, lightbulbs and air-conditioners. This high-profile initiative to replace 600,000 refrigerators and five million lightbulbs by 2014 in low-income populations will also be rolled out to the general public, albeit at a lower subsidy.

It is easily implementable and one for which detailed and immediate CO2 reductions can be shown. Air conditioners are particularly energy intensive, accounting for 12 percent of Israel’s total electricity use, and up to 40 percent of electricity use in the height of summer (Hirsh et al. 2004; Bet-Hazavdi 2006; Hassid 2009).

Figure 6: Israel’s GHG emissions by sector (2007 figures)

Agriculture, Industry, 3.2% 4.4% Waste, 7.8%

Energy , 84.5%

Figure 7: Distribution of CO2 emissions by sector in MtCO2eq (2005 figures)

Direct emissions Electric power emissions 32 35 30 24 25 20 21 13 15 11 10 9 6 4 4 5 3 2 2 0 0

Notes: Electric power use in buildings (21 MtCO2eq), chemicals factories (2 MtCO2eq) and other industry (9 MtCO2eq) explain the distribution of the 32 MtCO2eq of electric power emissions in the first column. Electric power emissions exclude 5 MtCO2eq from energy processing, self-use and the Palestinian Authority. Source: McKinsey and Company (2009)

These funds significantly bolster the Energy Efficiency Division of Infrastructure Ministry, which until this decision was small and under-funded. Energy efficiency measures are also supported by subsidies from the Environment Ministry for commercial, industrial and public sector emissions reductions projects. The focus on energy efficiency in buildings essentially supports an existing 2008 decision to reduce 20 percent of anticipated electricity consumption by 2020 through energy efficiency measures (Government Decision 4095 clarified in July 2010).38

While these measures are welcome, the significant funding for energy efficiency over- shadows the limited funds made available for green building. National energy efficiency policy is usually based on a comprehensive package of upgrading appliances; green building measures and incentives for behavioral change (Ayalon et al. 2011). From the beginning, however, upgrading electrical appliances and green building were dealt with in separate sub-

38Dery (1998) demonstrates that ‘policy by the way’ i.e. a policy that is primarily made by way of making other policies, is a particular feature of Israeli policy-making.

committees by the Shani Committee so potential synergies were lost (Pers. Comm. Michal Bitterman 2011).

The McKinsey and Company report (2009) shows that green building measures, such as green construction for new builds and building retrofits have far more emissions reduction potential than upgrading appliances. Despite this, the government decision only included limited plans for updating the voluntary green building code, a retrofitting pilot project and academic and professional training.39 In addition, no funds were allocated to implement the findings of the pilot project.

The Finance Ministry was opposed to the inclusion of green building measures arguing that it would not be possible to show an immediate quantifiable benefit to the economy (Pers. Comm Michal Bitterman 2011; Ofira Ayalon 2011). They argued that existing studies had not been undertaken in a similar climate to Israel and it would take up to five years to establish the emissions saved from a newly built green home. The Israel Green Building Council (ILGBC) argued that relevant figures did exist and could have been provided on request (ILGBC 2010). Overall, the ILGBC argues that Israel’s climate policy was a lost opportunity to change the long-term direction of construction and insulation standards in Israel. This lack of foresight was however, an inevitable result of the short-term, quantifiable orientation of the policy process (Ayalon et al. 2011).

4.6.3 Transport Transport accounts for 20 percent of Israel’s total GHG emissions. The country has poor public transport provision, especially in the periphery (Paths to Sustainability 2011). Private vehicles make up 78 percent of motorized vehicles in Israel. In 2008 there were 2.4 million cars on Israeli roads, with census figures showing that 56 percent of Israelis commuted to work by car daily. There are predicted to be three million private cars on Israeli roads by

2020, with the sector emitting 24 MtCO2eq by 2030 (Axelrod et al. 2010). Transport, however, was barely considered in Israel’s climate policy.

Reducing GHG emissions through improving public transport was apparently not considered because financing for public transport was being considered in other forums (Pers. Comm. Avi

39 According to Environment Minister, Gilad Erdan, “The Environment Ministry intends to invest significantly in the new green building standard” (Erdan 2011). Green building usually comes under the auspices of the Interior Ministry although in this case they passed responsibility to the Environment Ministry. 58

Moshel 2012). The measures that were included in the Plan thus focused on improving vehicle efficiency and driver education programs. These did not, however, include no-regrets measures such as mandatory improvements to conventional combustion engines and switching heavy vehicles to run on biofuels and natural gas (McKinsey and Company 2009; Ayalon et al. 2011).

The Transportation Ministry was, however, reluctant to engage with the Shani Committee or to take responsibility for any funds allocated. For this reason, no budget was allocated for these measures and it is unlikely that they will be implemented (Pers. Comm. Michal Bitterman 2011). Israel’s widely trumpeted measure to reduce GHG emissions from the transport sector has, however, been significant support for the development of electric car infrastructure. This decision is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5.

4.6 Israel and green growth In 2009, member countries of the OECD announced a major initiative to shift the world’s economy towards green growth. ‘Green growth’ represents a renewed global effort to reduce GHG emissions by focusing on the positive long-term economic benefits of developing clean technologies, ‘greening’ business and green consumption (MEP 2011). See Chapter 5 for a more in depth discussion. Based on OECD guidelines, on 23 October 2011 the Israel government approved the creation of a ‘Green growth’ strategy for Israel (MEP 2012). This plan is, however, faced with a similar fate to Israel’s climate change policy – the refusal of the Transportation and Infrastructures ministries to actively engage with the process (Porat 2012).

4.7 Climate change adaptation policies Considering the lack of progress by the international community in significantly reducing GHG emissions, there is a very real possibility that the global temperature will continue to rise bringing about significant climate changes including extreme weather events and sea level rise (IPCC 2007). The IPCC (2007a) argues that the Mediterranean basin is particularly vulnerable to climate change and in response Israel has begun to make preparations to adapt to climate change.

In March 2011, the Environment Ministry established the Israel Climate Change Information Centre (ICCIC) to gather and co-ordinate scientific knowledge about the likely impacts of climate change in Israel and the region, as well as identify research gaps and make policy

recommendations. The centre focuses on climate forecasting over the next 40 years, public health, water, biodiversity, urban planning and green building, the economy and the geo- strategic implications for Israel in relation to its neighbours.40

Israeli scientists are divided as to whether Israel should take climate change into consideration in its approach to future water management, with climate scientists expressing more support for doing so than water scientists (Kidar et al. 2010). Nevertheless, Israel’s Water Authority does take climate change into account in strategic water planning (Bar-Or and Golan-Angelko 2008). One of the ways in which it has done this is to massively scale up its water desalination efforts.

Israel has made considerable breakthroughs in desalination technology and desalination constitutes Israel’s most significant ‘adaptation’ strategy. In 2012, desalination systems accounted for a fifth of the freshwater used in Israel and, according to existing plans, by the end of the decade that amount will be doubled (Rinat 2012a). Importantly, however, the ICCIC did not specify desalination systems as a preferred policy, arguing that the benefits did not justify the high environmental costs of desalination in taking up valuable coastal space, causing sea pollution, as well as being highly energy intensive, thus contributing to Israel’s GHG emissions. For example, by 2020, Israel’s Infrastructure Minister, Uzi Landau claimed that desalination will account for nine percent of Israel’s energy consumption (Globes 2011). The ICCIC recommended instead that Israel could save 100 million cubic meters a year through water preservation, prevention of leaks, purification of polluted wells and greater wastewater purification and reuse (Rinat 2012a).

The Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) is also building climate scenarios into its long-term planning, projecting that climate change will increase demand for heating and cooling appliances (Axelrod et al. 2010). Clearly meeting this increased electricity demand will itself also contribute to Israel’s growing GHG emissions.

Another area of concern for the current Israeli government is the possible influx of climate refugees from North Africa and the Middle East (Paz and Kidar 2007). To prevent this, Israel

40 The ICCIC does not explicitly focus on the effects of climate change on agriculture. This is because Israel has invested significantly in research and development to overcome the country’s lack of natural resources and its arid climate and as a result, it is not unduly concerned about climate change. “Our farmers have high-tech farming methods and they adapted to higher temperatures even before we knew about climate change” (Pers. Comm. Moti Schechter June 12 2011). In addition, agriculture represents only a very small proportion of Israel’s GDP. 60

is completing a border fence along its border with Egypt and is considering a fence along its Jordanian border. Since this measure is partly motivated by concern about future climate refugees, it also constitutes an adaptation strategy (ICCIC 2011).

In general, however, policy analysts have criticized the failure to integrate green building and urban planning more fully into the climate discussion. Such measures would not only reduce GHG emissions but also make buildings and cities more resilient to climate variability and extreme weather (Pers. Comm. Valerie Brachya 2011; Michal Bitterman 2011). More efficient planning would also prevent communities and infrastructure being sited in locations vulnerable to extreme flooding or coastal erosion due to increased storm intensity and sea level rise.41

4.8 Civil Society: NGOs, subnational efforts, industry, media and academia The ‘Paths to Sustainability’ NGO coalition has been the main civil society group focused on climate change. It focuses its efforts primarily on educating and lobbying policymakers rather than raising public awareness. The coalition has also sent NGO delegations to the major UN Climate Summits including a delegation of over 30 Israeli NGO representatives to the 2009 Climate Summit in Copenhagen.

Until 2010, there was little public campaigning about climate change. Even the campaign against the Ashkelon coal-fired power station focused primarily on raising awareness about the public health consequences of the new plant, with little attention paid to the fact that a new plant would significantly contribute to Israel’s CO2 emissions (Pers. Comm. Gil Yaakov 2008; Knesset Interior Affairs and Environment Committee 2008). Only Greenpeace Mediterranean has taken a number of high profile actions linking the proposed Ashkelon plant to climate change. However, some argue that the Israeli public does not perceive Greenpeace as an organisation grounded in the Israeli reality since it is an international organisation following an international agenda (Pers. Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011; Valerie Brachya 2011).

Israeli groups have participated in global climate change awareness-raising events such as the Live Earth concert in 2007 and the yearly Earth Hour event, a one-hour voluntary lighting blackout by residents of major cities. Israeli environmental groups also participated in the

41 Some environmentalists argue that Israel would benefit more by focusing its efforts on becoming world-class innovators in energy efficient planning rather than renewable energy (Pers. Comm. Valerie Brachya 2011). 61

350.org Day of Action in October 2009. The Jewish National Fund (JNF) also promotes its long-term afforestation efforts as carbon offsetting, although this is primarily to a Diaspora audience. In 2010, the Environment Ministry initiated the first national public awareness campaign about climate change, ‘What are you doing everyday?’ in co-operation with environmental NGOs, museums and schools. This was followed by a media campaign on a more general environmental theme, called ‘Let’s Think Green’.

Environmental correspondents in some of Israel’s major newspapers and internet sites have given in-depth coverage to climate change, in particular Zafrir Rinat writing in Ha’aretz, Yael Darel in Ynet, Aviv Lavie in Ma’ariv. Israeli environmentalist and social scientist Dan Rabinowitz has also been a prolific commentator on the issue. See Chapter 3 for more in depth analysis of Israeli media coverage of climate change.

Where governments have failed to implement effective climate legislation, subnational groups, such as municipalities, have been more successful (Betsill and Bulkeley 2007). Israel’s Forum 15 network of 15 financially independent municipalities plus Jerusalem, Ashkelon, and Bat Yam are members of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). In February 2008 Forum 15 signed up to ICLEI’s Convention on Climate Protection which obliges municipalities to develop local action plans to reduce GHG emissions by at least 20 percent by 2020 compared to 2000 levels. Some municipalities, notably Ra’ananna, have already implemented impressive GHG emissions reduction measures. In general, however, Israeli municipalities are limited by budget and the centralized nature of energy and transport planning in their ability to reduce GHG emissions (Bass Specktor et al. 2009).

Other voluntary initiatives include the Environment Ministry-led Green Schools and Green Campus initiatives. There are also a number of private industry initiatives to reduce GHG emissions both for economic reasons and because they have internalised the need for environmental reporting due to operating businesses in Europe (Ayalon et al. 2011).

Israeli entrepreneurs and innovators are also beginning to see climate change as an economic opportunity, identifying potential markets for climate mitigation and adaptation technologies. Israel is home to world-class renewable energy innovators such as Ormat Technologies, Inc and BrightSource, Inc. In recent years, Israel has also started to showcase for export its cutting-edge

environmental technologies ranging from desalination and wastewater treatment to the electric car and concentrated photovoltaic (CPV) technology. See Chapter 5 for more discussion.

4.9 Israel’s energy crossroads: The major challenge for Israel to reduce its GHG emissions

As noted throughout this chapter, energy use is the major contributor to Israel’s CO2 emissions. This is primarily due to the country’s long-term reliance on coal, the fossil fuel that releases the most CO2 on combustion. Although the amount of electricity generated from coal has reduced in recent years from 74.6 percent in 2005 to 61 percent by 2010, fossil fuel- based power plants and oil refineries still account for 65% of CO2 emissions (IEC 2010; Axelrod et al. 2010). Despite this, Israel’s fuel mix was not directly addressed in Israel’s official climate policy partially because Israel is at an energy policy crossroads (Figure 5).

Figure 8: Israel’s Electricity Generation by fuel type

77.9% 74.6%

61.0%

Coal

36.6% Diesel Oil

Fuel Oil 20.0% 11.6% Natural Gas 8.5% 5.3% 2.1% 0.9% 1.5%

2001 2005 2010

Source: IEC

Significant gas finds in Israeli waters, the tripling of the price of coal globally, and Israel’s commitment to end reliance on oil and increase renewable energy production could lead to a significant shift towards less carbon intensive fuels.42 Israel is already actively supporting this move through R&D funding for clean energy technologies. There is also keen interest in developing civilian nuclear energy, which does not produce GHG emissions during power generation. On the other hand, there is still uncertainty around the proposed coal-fired plant in Ashkelon and the country is also exploring the possibility of exploiting extensive oil shale

42 Global coal imports are slated to rise 78 percent in 2011 alone, driving international prices to the highest level in two years and introducing new volatility to global markets (Sethuraman and Sharples 2010). At the end of 2009, for example, coal was 16% more expensive than gas (Bar-Eli 2010). 63

reserves, which could increase Israel’s yearly CO2 emissions by 15 million tonnes (KKL-JNF 2011). The political and economic debates around these different fuel sources are outlined below. See Chapter 5 for discussion on oil.

4.9.1 The shift to natural gas Israel began shifting energy production to natural gas as the result of a 2004 agreement with Egypt, which offered favourable gas prices to Israel. The gas agreement has, however, faced considerable political, security, engineering, and supply-side challenges. Following the fall of the Mubarak regime, the gas pipeline was sabotaged fourteen times and in early 2012, Egypt and Israel announced the termination of the gas deal (Sherwood 2012a). These challenges resulted in consumer price rises and the over-pumping of Israel’s dwindling Tethys Sea gas reserves in 2011. The IEC was also forced to import expensive diesel fuel to meet demand, since the Environment Ministry prohibits it from using the cheaper but more polluting heavy oil (Trilnick and Bar-Eli 2012).

Despite these setbacks, the 2009 discovery of substantial natural gas reserves in Israeli territorial waters, with reserves estimated at 25 trillion cubic meters, means that the country is still likely to increase its reliance on natural gas. Gas from the Tamar gas field came online in April 2013 and it is now anticipated that by 2014, this domestically sourced gas will be Israel’s primary fuel for electricity generation (MNI 2011a).

Environmentalists have generally welcomed Israel’s shift to natural gas, which releases 44 43 percent less CO2 compared to coal on combustion. They have also supported national protests for a just distribution of profits from Israel’s natural gas and against its unrestricted export (Waldoks 2011). It is, however, important to note that natural gas is still a fossil fuel and research has shown that methane, a more potent GHG than CO2, can escape during the extraction, transport and production process (Victor 2011; Wigley 2011).44

In terms of reducing GHG emissions, the Environment Ministry suggests that increasing the natural gas share to 70 percent of Israel’s fuel mix would reduce CO2 emissions by 20 percent (Erdan 2011). The IEC has argued that a significant shift to natural gas along with improving the efficiency of coal-fired power plants and substituting up to 20 percent biomass for coal

43 Coal emits 208,000 pounds of emissions per billion British Thermal Units (BTU) compared to natural gas which emits 117,000 pounds. Source: US Energy Information Administration. 44 Methane is 72 times more potent than CO2 in trapping heat in the atmosphere over a 20-year period. 64

could deliver a 10 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 (Bachar 2011). Commentators have noted that Israel’s inadequate climate policy may well stem from the recognition that the switch to natural gas will reduce Israel’s CO2 emissions without the need for serious policy intervention (Pers. Comm. Valerie Brachya 2011).

4.9.2 Renewable energy In 2008, Israel committed to switch 10 percent or 2.76 GW of electricity production to renewable energy sources by 2020 (Government decision 4450/176). The main renewable energy technologies that can be implemented in Israel are solar, wind, and biomass (OECD 2011). Although introducing renewable energy should result in an emissions reduction of 5.6

MtCO2eq a year, many do not feel this target can be achieved because key government institutions are not fully committed to the switch (Ayalon et al. 2011).45 In mid-2012, Israel was producing just 225 MW (0.44 percent) of electricity from renewable energy sources.

Israel receives relatively high insolation, which makes solar an obvious choice of renewable energy (Vardimon 2011).46 Nevertheless, the Finance Ministry has argued that solar energy makes little economic sense because of the cost of the feed-in tariffs, which are necessary to subsidise domestic power producers so that they can compete with fossil fuels at current prices. It argues that these subsidies will mostly benefit Chinese solar PV manufacturers and overseas investors (Knesset Finance Committee 2011). Similarly, Israel’s independent energy regulator, the Public Utilities Authority - Electricity (PUA-E) claims that the extra cost of introducing renewable energy into the electricity market would be NIS 2.75 billion annually, and lead to a 15.2 percent increase in electricity prices. As a result, in February 2011, the Finance Ministry froze all new licences for large-scale solar fields; and in November 2011, the PUA reduced the value of the feed-in tariff for medium-sized fields, to reflect the fall in price of solar PV technology (Ahituv 2012).

Environmental groups have also objected to solar fields on land-use and biodiversity grounds, although they generally support placing solar panels on rooftops (SPNI 2011; Darel 2011). Other concerns relate to fact that solar is an intermittent source being dependent on weather conditions, and thus less reliable (Solomon et al. 2010).

45 The Israel Renewable Energy Association argues that given rising consumption, 2.76 GW will most likely account for 6.5 percent rather than 10 percent of Israel’s electricity production by 2020 (Pers. Comm. Eitan Parnass 2011). 46 On average, a solar yield of around 2400 kWh/m. 65

Israeli solar advocates say this narrow economic perspective does not take into account the environmental, health, transport and transmission costs of fossil fuels, and the job opportunities especially in Israel’s periphery offered by solar energy production. They also argue that Israel’s low electricity prices distort the market and it will take longer for Israeli solar production to reach grid parity than other countries (Ahituv 2012). The uncertainty around the feed-in tariffs and quotas for solar energy production, as well as the complexity of applying for planning and production permits, has caused frustration for the nascent solar industry (Ahituv 2012). As of August 2012, an independent committee, led by the chair of the Israel’s National Economic Council, Eugene Kandel, was seeking to resolve this issue.

The Infrastructures Ministry argues that biogas/biomass and wind would in fact, be the most cost effective renewable energies for Israel to pursue (MNI 2010). 47 Compared to solar energy however, these have fewer supporters and have thus received less regulatory support (Pers. Comm Noam Segal 2011).

4.9.3 Civilian nuclear energy Switching to nuclear energy would significantly increase Israel’s domestic energy supply and reduce CO2 emissions. Nuclear energy has prominent political supporters including the Chief Scientist of the Infrastructures Ministry, and a feasibility study was conducted in 2011.

Opponents argue that Israel is a poor candidate for nuclear energy given security fears, lack of space for nuclear waste, seismic activity and the high water demand of the technology (Dolev and Segal 2011). In addition, in March 2011, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the deadly accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant has caused him to “reconsider… building civil nuclear power plants” adding that it would take a “very good argument” to convince him to proceed (Rinat and Ravid 2011). The major barrier to Israel’s nuclear aspirations is however, its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signing this would force Israel to admit that it has been secretly enriching uranium for weapons since the 1960s.

4.9.4 The proposed Ashkelon coal-fired power station The policy decision identified as a ‘litmus test’ of Israel’s commitment to sustainable development has been the fate of two proposed additional coal-fired generating units at the

47 This calculation takes into account the avoided cost of burning fossil fuels, as well as population distribution, climate and pollutant concentrations. It also accounts for the fact that wind requires back-up from conventional fossil fuel sources. 66

Rutenberg D power plant in Ashkelon. If built, the 630 MW units would increase Israel’s yearly emissions by 3.5 MtCO2eq – an increase of roughly five percent of total yearly emissions (Ayalon et al. 2011).

The plant was initially proposed in August 2001. It has faced opposition from local residents and environmentalists primarily due to health concerns and frustration at the secretive fast-track planning process used to gain approval. The plant has been a source of contention between the Environment and Infrastructures Ministries, with Environment Minister, Gilad Erdan, an Ashkelon native, voicing his personal opposition (Lavie 2010b).

At the beginning of 2011, the Environment and Infrastructures Ministries reached a compromise deal that the units would run primarily on natural gas, although maintain a coal reserve in case of emergencies (Sandler 2011).48 In July 2011, the Finance Ministry gave permission for a dual fuel plant but stipulated that the choice of fuel, gas or coal, should be based on economic and strategic needs (Trilnick and Bar-Eli 2012). Thus the matter is by no means resolved.

4.9.5 The Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) The IEC is Israel’s sole national electricity utility, generating, transmitting and distributing almost all the electricity in the country.49 It is also Israel’s largest single employer with over 12,000 employees, a powerful union and wages double the Israeli average (Tishler et al. 2008). The IEC has been a long-term advocate of a new coal-fired plant in Ashkelon (Knesset Internal Affairs and Environment Committee 2008). Israel is already generating electricity at maximum capacity and faces the threat of brownouts, especially during periods of high demand. Although Israel will soon have access to its domestic natural gas reserves, these will only come online in 2014. The new plant at Ashkelon is thus proposed as an emergency measure to create immediate additional generating capacity (Trilnick and Bar-Eli 2012). The additional capacity would also allow for existing power plants to be temporarily taken out of service to install scrubber systems to improve air quality.50

The IEC has also argued that coal is vital for Israel’s energy security and this should override concerns about GHG emissions. Although Israel has no coal reserves, there are many global

48 This in fact that would be the least environmentally-sound solution, since a power plant that can run on both fuels would be very inefficient (Pers. Comm Avi Moshel 2012). 49 The IEC purchases around 0.5 percent of electricity from independent power producers (2009 figures). 50 i.e. SCR (selective catalytic reduction) and flue gas desulphurization systems that remove particulates, sulphur, and NO2. 67

coal suppliers who are friendly to Israel and since coal is shipped, suppliers can be easily changed unlike gas, which requires a fixed pipeline.51 Coal can also be easily stored. These considerations are especially relevant since Israel is one of the most energy import dependent countries in the world, importing 93 percent of its fuel (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) figures 2007). It is also an energy island, with no grid connection to neighbouring grids to meet energy usage spikes or other emergencies. These concerns were clearly highlighted during the 2011-2012 Egyptian gas crisis (Sherwood 2012a).

With the price of coal rising significantly and local sources of natural gas becoming available in the coming years, these arguments have become less compelling. In addition, in March 2012, Israel signed agreements with Greece and Cyprus to conduct a feasibility study for the EuroAsia Interconnector, a submarine cable to link their national power grids (Udasin 2012a). The IEC has also begun to recognise the importance of reducing electricity demand and improving its carbon footprint. It has also investigated substituting biomass burning in coal fired-plants (Pers. Comm. Michal Perle 2009; Bachar 2011).

The clash between the IEC and the Israeli Government over the Ashkelon power plant has been partially shaped by government plans to privatize and break the power of the IEC. Electricity privatisation in Israel began in 1996, when the IEC’s concession to generate, supply and distribute electric power was renewed by the Electricity Sector Law. The Law sought to place 20 percent of Israel’s electricity market in private hands and blocked the IEC from developing new markets, such as renewable energy, until reforms had been completed (Trilnick and Bar-Eli 2012).52 53 The Law also saw the founding of the PUA as an independent regulator, which sets the price of electricity. The IEC is highly critical of the PUA for setting electricity prices artificially low and not reflecting the cost of production, which has lead to the IEC running up vast debts (Waldoks 2010a; Ben David 2011). Similarly, Environment Minister, Gilad Erdan argues that the low rates have boosted demand, making the construction of new power plants inevitable in the long term (The Economist 2011). The IEC has thus perceived building the coal-fired plant as a means to retain some

51 Israel imports coal from South Africa, Colombia, Indonesia and Australia (Ravina and Lulav 2008). 52 The IEC also signed a 1986 agreement that it would not develop solar energy. It has been pushing for this to be overturned although renewable energy plants owned by IEC would be ineligible for the renewables tariff (Mor & Seroussi 2007). Until recently, the IEC master plan included a wind farm (Pers. Comm. Noam Segal 2011). 53 A restructuring plan approved in August 2010 would result in the privatization of the utility’s power stations by 2015. It is, however, unlikely that this will be met (The Economist – Israel Energy Report 2011). 68

control over the energy market, while viewing renewable energy, and especially any increase in production quotas, as a threat to its monopoly (Bachar 2011; Ahituv 2012).

4.9.6 Oil Shale The term oil shale refers to sedimentary rock that contains solid bituminous materials (called kerogen). It can be mined and processed to produce oil similar to that pumped from oil wells, although the process of extracting oil from oil shale is more complex and more expensive than conventional oil recovery. There are estimated to be oil shale deposits under 15 percent of Israel, and in the 2000s, several companies proposed extraction of the recoverable sources, which would significantly reduce Israel’s oil dependence. As of 2012, however, there are no large-scale commercial oil shale operations in Israel.

In 2010, Israel Energy Initiatives (IEI) obtained a licence for a pilot project in the Adullam region, southwest of Jerusalem. IEI claims its technique is cleaner than other methods since the oil will be separated from the shale rock underground. Environmental groups have opposed it claiming that environmental risks exist at all stages of project; that it would cause irreversible damage to an area with unique ecology and could pollute an important underground aquifer (KKL-JNF 2011). The IUED filed a petition to successfully halt the project in 2010. The IEI, however, has powerful investors including Rupert Murdoch and billionaire, Michael Steinhardt. It hopes to begin mass production by 2020, producing 50,000 barrels per day at the outset (King 2011).

5. Summary “I don’t believe that the OECD would expel us for not implementing adequate climate policy. Instead we will see Israel taking small steps and doing all sorts of tricks and games to avoid implementing serious climate legislation”. Pers. Comm. Zafrir Rinat, 2011

“When I bring up [climate change] for discussion among the ministers, I feel like I’m discussing some personal matter” Environment Minister, Gilad Erdan (Rabinowitz 2009d).

Climatologists are in no doubt that global warming is already altering Israel’s climate and that in the coming years the changing climate could bring with it potentially devastating impacts. The principle motivation for Israel’s climate policy has, however, been meeting international norms.

The low priority accorded to climate change beyond meeting the conditions of OECD membership is reflected in the limited policy measures introduced. These measures do not represent the most effective economic levers or long-term economy wide changes that economists argue should drive climate policy. They instead reflect both ‘the art of the possible’ and narrow short-term economic thinking. This is partly because, with its seemingly tiny contribution to global emissions, Israel sees that it can get away with the bare minimum. Unfortunately, climate policy advocates are sceptical that the Israeli government will meet even these policy commitments, and certainly do not see Israel meeting its Copenhagen Accord commitment.

Nevertheless, achieving what little climate policy exists today marks quite an achievement in a challenging policy environment. The political disputes between ministries over the Ashkelon coal-fired power plant and domestic solar energy quotas, as well as deliberate lack of engagement in the issue shown by some ministries have been significant challenges. In addition, limited public campaigning on the topic has resulted in little public pressure for climate policy. Faced with pressing local environmental issues such as water and air pollution and a poorly funded Environment Ministry, Israel’s environmental movement has tended to focus on local issues, paying far less attention to global issues such as climate change (Tal et al. 2011).

Unlike other countries, however, there are no obvious business interests lobbying against climate change legislation.54 In addition to the energy efficiency measures outlined in Israel’s climate policy, some other recent policy decisions will also indirectly reduce Israel’s GHG emissions. This includes the decision to exploit domestic natural gas and the likely development and deployment of oil substitution technology. Israel will also be less vulnerable to increasing drought conditions due to its decision to scale-up seawater desalination, even though this not the most effective means for it to confront water scarcity.

Overall, however, the story of Israel’s climate policy will hold little surprises for scholars of Israeli politics. It also highlights how few government decisions are actually implemented and that those which are tend to be the ones of particular interest to the bureaucracy (Nachmias and Arbel-Gantz 2006). It also shows the relative weakness of the Environment Ministry, with at least 16 other government ministries also legally authorized to handle environmental issues (Choshen and Laster 2005). More generally it illustrates how security concerns override any other policy

54 The IEC would clearly lose out from an aggressive GHG emissions reduction strategy. However, several Israeli oil and gas companies have recently diversified into renewable energy, making climate policy less directly threatening. 70

concern (Horowitz and Lissak 1990; de-Shalit and Talias 1994). Within this, it illustrates how energy policy is primarily considered a security issue, with little emphasis given to environmental considerations (Shaffer 2011).

Chapter 2: Climate change and Israeli public opinion

1. Introduction Chapters 2 and 3 explore some of the sociological features of inaction around climate change in Israel. These chapters provides robust quantitative evidence to support the research hypothesis that beyond the political and economic explanations for the failure to introduce meaningful climate change legislation in Israel presented in Chapter 1, there are clear sociological explanations for climate change inaction.

The social survey research presented in this chapter provides some broad generalisations about how the Israeli public perceives climate change, as posed by research question (a). It also provides empirical evidence for how the way in which climate change has been ‘framed’ in Israeli public and policy discourse may be affecting public perceptions, in answer to research question (b).

This chapter includes an in depth methodological discussion and original statistical analysis of five Israeli public opinion surveys conducted between 2000 and 2011, including one commissioned specifically for this research. The survey findings are summarised at the end of the chapter.

2. Survey methodologies

2.1.Research question and hypothesis Noting the dearth of empirical data on environmental perceptions in Israel illustrated above, this research aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of Israeli perceptions of climate change drawing on existing datasets and a specially commissioned survey. The research was particularly interested in identifying whether pre-existing societal beliefs were influencing Israeli perceptions of climate change. This included both pervasive beliefs in Israeli society as well as those associated with particular social groupings or socio-demographics.

2.1.1 2009 Ben-Gurion University of the Negev “2009 BGU” Survey Between 23 October and 3 November 2009 the author conducted the first comprehensive and nationally representative survey on public views of climate change in Israel (Doyle 2001).55 The survey aimed to establish a baseline of information about Israeli public opinion and give an indication of what the public was thinking in advance of the pivotal UN climate conference in Copenhagen, which took place in mid-December 2009.

The research population (n = 552) was fully inclusive of the rural and urban non- institutionalized population aged 18 and above (margin of error of +/-4.2 percent) and included representative sampling from the Israel Arab population (n= 100).56 It was a telephone survey conducted by professional survey and market research company, TRI Strategic Research.

Some of the questions asked were identical or very similar to those asked in the 2008 ‘Six Americas’ survey, an annual nationally representative survey of American climate change attitudes, behaviors and beliefs conducted by the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication and Centre for Climate Change Communication (Leiserowitz et al. 2008).57 The Six Americas survey is a comprehensive survey including between a thousand and two thousand respondents and several hundred questions. This survey,however, only included variables useful for comparative purposes.

2.1.2 2010 Health Service “2010 Health” Survey An Israeli health services group included eight questions about climate change in their regular omnibus telephone survey conducted by a professional survey company (n=503).58 The research population was fully inclusive of the adult Israeli Jewish rural and urban non-institutionalized and Hebrew-speaking population aged 18 and above. It was conducted in Hebrew in Jewish population centres and weighted based on national averages (CBS Census data 2010).

Although the author had some input into the questions, the health service researchers decided on the final questions and wording based on their own priorities. As a result, none of the questions

55 The results were presented at the 2011 Israel Society for Ecology and Environmental Studies conference. The results were also covered in mainstream Israeli media (Lavie 2009c; Waldoks 2009e). 56 This is a slight under-sampling of the true percentage of Arabs living in Israel. It was 16.8 percent in this survey compared to 20.8 percent in the general population (CBS 2009). 57 With permission from Anthony Leiserowitz, Yale Project on Climate Change Communication. 58 The data was made available by Maccabi health services research team. Since the survey was conducted for their own research, they declined to be publicly associated with it. 73

were identical to the 2009 survey. Since the sampling frame was also different, the 2010 results cannot provide accurate longitudinal data.

2.1.3 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys “2000 ISSP” and “2011 ISSP” In 1993, 2000 and 2010, Israel participated in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey on environmental perceptions. 59 It was one of 26 countries participating in the 2000 survey (n=31,042) and one of 38 countries participating in the 2010 survey. The 2000 survey included three questions on climate change, and the 2011 survey only repeated one question on climate change risk perceptions. The 2000 survey was conducted between April and July 2000. Due to time pressures, the 2010 survey collection took place between March 2011 and August 2011.60 The full 2000 ISSP Environment survey dataset was available allowing for comparative analysis. Comparative 2010 results were not yet available at the time of analysis.

The research population was Israeli adults aged 18 and above from the entire country who live in households. The two surveys were conducted face-to-face and translated into Hebrew, Arabic and Russian. They were both conducted through the B.I. and Lucille Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research at Tel Aviv University. The sample sizes were in 2000 n=1205 and in 2010 n = 1216. 61

2.1.4 2010 Haifa University “2010 Haifa” The question “What do you associate with climate change?” was asked in a written survey on sustainability conducted at Haifa University in 2010 (n=1929). Respondents were asked to provide three words or expressions that they connected with the issue in a method known as free or continued word associations. Free associations minimize researcher bias typically imposed in closed questionnaires, they are relatively context free and spontaneous thus providing a unique means to access and assess subjective meaning (Leiserowitz 2005). The responses were then coded using an inductive content analysis. It was not possible to show evidence of statistical significance here since only the list of associations was available and not the full dataset

2.2. Dependent and independent variables For a complete list of survey questions in Hebrew see Appendix 1.

59 ISSP is an international public opinion consortium that since 1983 has annually surveyed various social issues in different countries across the globe including education, welfare, and inequality. See below for more discussion. 60 Pers. Comm. Noah Lewin Epstein 12 Dec 2011; dates of interviews are also recorded in the survey itself 61 The sample was selected using a probability field sample. In cases of absence from the home the surveyors visited the address three times before they took it out of the sample. Participants from different households were chosen according to the latest birthday. 74

2.2.1 Knowledge variables The 2009 BGU survey and the 2010 Health surveys included items on self-reported knowledge about climate change. The 2009 BGU survey asked respondents how much they knew about climate change on a five-point scale, from 1(never heard of it) to 5 (know about great deal). 62 The 2010 Health survey asked the same question on a four-point scale.

Although self-reported knowledge is a widely used measure of knowledge in social surveys, it is not by itself a valid measure of knowledge about climate change (See discussion above) (Malka et al. 2009). Both surveys thus also included factual or assessed questions about the causes and consequences of climate change.

The 2009 BGU survey asked what respondents thought was the primary cause of climate change, with three response options: primarily human, primary natural or neither because it is not happening. The response, ‘both human and natural activity’ was not offered since the question was phrased to acknowledge that there are other causes besides the principal cause. Survey respondents who are unsure of an answer also show bias towards a ‘both’ option (Bryman 2008).

The 2010 Health survey asked two separate dichotomous (yes/no) questions. The first asked, “To the best of your knowledge is climate change happening or is it the invention of scientists and interested parties?” The second asked whether the primary cause of climate change was human or natural.

This research begins with the scientific consensus that climate change is primarily caused by human activities (IPCC 2007a). In countries where the public is familiar with the issue of climate change, those stating that it has natural causes are more likely to be expressing a sceptical opinion. In Israel, where there is less familiarity with the issue, this may be a measure of scepticism although it could also reflect poor understanding. There is thus a slight validity issue with the 2009 BGU question, although not the 2010 Health survey where the question is more clearly asking for respondents to offer their opinion.

is more commonly used to describe the abrupt anthropogenic (התחממות כדור הארץ In Israel, the term global warming (hebrew 62 global climate change. This was used in the all five survey instruments. In the English translation the terms climate change and global warming are used interchangeably. 75

The 2000 ISSP survey included two assessed knowledge questions. The first asked whether the burning of fossil fuels causes climate change. The second asked whether a hole in the earth’s atmosphere caused it. Responses were rated on a four-point scale: 1 (Definitely not the cause); 2 (Probably not the cause); 3 (Probably the cause) and 4 (Definitely the cause). Climate sceptics do not claim that climate change is caused by a hole in the earth’s atmosphere (Horner 2007). Those agreeing with this explanation are thus confusing climate change with ozone layer depletion, another human-caused environmental problem in the upper atmosphere.63

The 2009 BGU and 2010 Health surveys also included questions about the predicted consequences or impacts of climate change. The 2009 BGU items were tailored to reflect predicted local and regional impacts of climate change including drought, coastal flooding, epidemics and diseases, an influx of refugees and regional conflict (Bar-Or and Golan-Angelko 2008; Freimuth 2008; Brown and Crawford 2009). The question asked only how likely these outcomes would be if steps were not taken to address climate change. These items were rated on a five-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The 2010 Health survey asked which of six named predicted impacts respondents thought climate change would influence: extreme weather, drought, sea level rise, health, species extinction and the economy. It was a dichotomous (yes/no) question.64 Both of these questions could also be considered risk perception questions.

2.1.2 Concern and risk perception Two questions assessed levels of concern about climate change. The 2009 BGU survey asked respondents to rate the question “how much do you worry about climate change?” on a five- point scale ranging from 1(Not at all) to 5 (great deal). The 2010 Health survey asked respondents whether they were concerned about six specific impacts of climate change: extreme weather, drought, sea level rise, health, species extinction and the economy. It was a dichotomous (yes/no) question.

Several questions focused on risk perception. The 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys asked respondents whether they considered climate change a threat to the environment on a five-point scale ranging from 1(not at all a threat) to 5 (an extremely dangerous threat). Since the complete

63 Although there is a connection between the two, a layperson with a good understanding of anthropogenic climate change would not confuse them since they have different causes and different solutions (IPCC 2007). 64 These are cautiously treated as measures of “assessed knowledge”. This is because climate sceptics would also list few consequences since they tend to believe that climate change will not have serious consequences and that the issue has been over-hyped by alarmist scientists and the media (Horner 2007). 76

ISSP 2000 dataset was available it was also possible to make international comparisons with the other 26 participating countries.

The 2010 Health survey included two risk perception questions. The first asked whether respondents considered climate change a threat to “you and your family” on a four-point scale. The second asked when respondents thought climate change would begin to affect their health. Response options were as follows: 1 (already affecting health); 2 (10 years); 3 (25 years); 4 (50 years); 5 (100 years); and 6 (Never).

2.2.3 Efficacy, Trust in Communicators, Trust in New Technologies (Climate change techno-optimism) and Political identity The 2009 BGU survey included additional items that have been theorised to explain the relationship between climate change knowledge, concern, policy support and the adoption of climate-friendly behaviors. These are personal and collective efficacy; trust in expert communicators; political identity and the belief that technology will solve the problem of climate change.

2.2.3.1 Personal and Collective Efficacy The 2009 BGU survey included one item assessing self-efficacy. Respondents were asked to respond to the statement “There is little that I can do personally to address global warming” on a five-point scale ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).65 It also included a second item assessing collective efficacy. On an identical five–point scale, respondents were asked to respond to the statement “Despite the fact that Israel is very small, we can still take steps to address global warming”.66

2.2.3.2 Trust in Communicators This question identifies a number of experts who regularly communicate with the Israeli public about climate change – scientists, green organizations, weather forecasters, the media and government. Respondents rated their trust in each expert to communicate accurately about climate change on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Very low) to 5 (Very high).

65 This question has a small validity issue since it does not distinguish between those who are unaware of effective personal mitigation actions and those who are aware but believe them to be ineffective (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet 2008). 66 This item was included to test the frequent informal Israeli response that because Israel is such a small country it cannot make a significant difference in the overall reduction of GHG emissions. This has been a commonly cited reason by policymakers as to why Israel should not be expected to introduce meaningful policy on climate change. The question was posed the other way round to avoid acquiescence bias i.e. the tendency simply to agree. 77

2.2.3.3 Trust in new technology Based on an identical question in the 2008 Six Americas survey respondents were asked to respond to the statement, “New technologies will solve the problem of climate change without the need for people to make fundamental changes in their lifestyles” on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).

2.2.3.4 Political identity In the 2009 BGU survey, Israelis were asked to give their Left-Right political alignment on a five-point scale: 1 (Very Right); 2 (Right); 3 (Centre); 4 (Left) and 5 (Very Left). Political identity was not recorded in the 2010 Health survey or the 2000 or 2011 ISSP surveys. A question about affiliation to Israeli political parties was however included in the 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys. 67

2.2.4 Climate Policy Support and Policy Preferences The 2009 BGU survey included several climate policy related items. The first set of items on national priorities was asked to all 552 respondents and the two policy support and one policy preference question were asked to those who were aware of climate change and believed that it was happening (n= 379).

2.2.4.1 Priority on the national agenda Respondents were thus asked to rate how high climate change should be on the national agenda on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Very low) to 5 (Very high). This was compared with four other pressing national issues: water situation, the economic situation, the Iran situation and swine flu. In order not to alert respondents to the environmental nature of the survey and thus avoid possible bias, these were the first set of items in the survey instrument.

2.2.4.2 Support for international climate action This question ascertained on what scale and over what time frame Israelis believed global climate mitigation action should take place. Respondents were asked whether the international community should take “urgent steps very soon”, “moderate steps in the coming years” or “no action”. This was based on a question asked in a 2007 BBC survey (BBC 2007).

67 Although the template ISSP survey used by participating countries included questions on left-right political views, these were not included in the Israeli surveys. In the 2011 Israeli documentation, the authors stated, “We do not ask this question in Israel - This is very problematic in the Israeli case since the traditional left-right issues are not central to most political parties. We prefer not to force this variable on the list of parties” (ISSP Environment, Israel 2011). 78

2.2.4.2 Support for Israel signing an international treaty to reduce GHG emissions Respondents were asked to express their level of support on a five-point scale for one of the expected outcomes of the UN climate conference in Copenhagen in December 2009; an international treaty binding signatories to reduce national GHG emissions by 90 percent by 2050. This was identical to an item asked in the 2008 Six America’s survey.

2.2.4.3 Support for raising the price of fuel Since there has been little debate about climate policy measures in Israel, this survey asked only one policy preference question. Respondents were asked to respond to the statement, “The government should raise the price of fuel and other products that cause climate change in order to encourage the reduction of use” on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).

2.2.5 Adoption of pro-environmental behaviors Both the 2009 BGU survey and the 2010 Health survey included items related to the adoption or intention to adopt specific pro-environmental or climate-friendly behavior.68 The behaviors represented very different ends of the spectrum in terms of ease, cost, availability and potential for profound lifestyle change (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon 2006). In the 2009 BGU survey, these items were asked the beginning of the survey, in order not to alert respondents to the environmental nature of the survey and thus avoid possible bias. In the 2010 Health survey, they were asked at the end of the survey.

In the 2009 BGU survey respondents were asked about their willingness to adopt four behaviors in the coming year: using air conditioners more efficiently by increasing the temperature of the air-conditioner to 25 degrees Celsius in summer or using it less; using public transport or bicycling more; purchasing an energy efficient car or an energy efficient air-conditioner. Respondents ranked these on a five-point scale from 1 (Not at all likely) to 5 (Very likely) and could also indicate if they were already engaging in these behaviors. The 2010 Health items asked respondents whether they had adopted any of eight named environmental behaviors in recent years for environmental reasons. These were recycling, using compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs), reusing plastic bags, reducing car use, eating organic food, and composting. This was asked as a dichotomous (yes/ no) question.

68 Social survey methods generally capture intentions to engage in environmentally- friendly behavior and support governmental initiatives rather than actual behaviors, which are difficult to survey (O’Connor et al. 2006). Ajzen (1991) provides evidence that behavioral intentions and actual behaviors are correlated. 79

2.2.6 Sources of information about climate change The 2009 BGU survey asked respondents to name their primary source of information about climate change in an open question. Those identifying the mainstream media could then specify up to three named sources. See Chapter 3 for these results.

2.2.7 Demographic breakdown of the survey samples Socio-demographics ISSP 2000 ISSP 2011 2009 BGU 2010 Health L-R political alignment Very right - - 5.7% - Right - - 22.2% - Centre - - 41.3% - Left - - 13.9% - Very Left - - 3.8% - Refused - - 12.9% - Age groups 18-24 years Average: Average: 12.7% 19.6%; 25-34 years 41 years 46.1 years. 16.3% 16.8%; 35-44 years Std Dev 16.3 Std Dev 19.1% 20.1%; 45-54 years 18.36 19.7% 17.7%; 55-64 years 16.4% 15.1% 65+ 12.3% 10.5% Refused 3.4% - Socio-demographics ISSP 2000 ISSP 2011 2009 BGU 2010 Health Education* Less than secondary 32% 33% 6%; 3.1% Secondary 26% 18% 30.6% 37% Post secondary ^ 21.4% 22.1% 18.6% 17.2% Academic degree 20.4% 26.8% 40.9% 36.2% Refused - - 3.8% 7.4%

Children 69.5% 61.4% No children - - 24.6% 32.3% Refused - - 5.8% 6.3% National Identity Jew 91.4% 86.2% 79.4% - Arab 12.6% 13.7% 16.8% - Refused - - 3.8% - Jewish observance ** Secular - - 42.2% 48.4% Traditional - - 22.5% 25.7% Religious - - 11.4% 13.4% Ultra-orthodox - - 0.3% 10.4% Refused - - 3.8% 2% Income*** Average Average Very below average monthly monthly - 9.5%

Below average income 5185 income 20.5% 15.8% Average NIS standard 10669 NIS 21.7% 22.1% Above average deviation Standard 27% 13.9% Very above average 3764 deviation: 5% 16.4% Refused 7211 26% 22.3% Gender Male 43.1% 46% 49.6% 49.9% Female 56.1% 54% 50.4% 50.1% New immigrant USSR - 6.8% Israeli born - 93.2% Country of origin (country of birth/ father’s birth) Asia or Africa 13.9% 10.8% - - Europe or America 12.3% 7% - - Former USSR 11.6% 21.1% - - Israel 62.1% 68% - - Party affiliation (Major parties) Likud 25.1% 19% - - One Israel 21.3% - - - Shas 5.8% 3.2% - - Meretz 7.2% 3.2% - - Hadash 8.1% - - - MAFDAL 4.2% - - - UTJ 3.1% 3.4% - - HaYerukim/ Tnua Yeruka) - 2.5% - - No party affiliation 6.5% 21.2% - - Refused 6.5% 17% - - Socio-demographics ISSP 2000 ISSP 2011 2009 BGU 2010 Health Location North 22.5% 21.4% South 11.9% 15.7% Tel Aviv 39.7% 45.7% Jerusalem 13.2% 13.7% Arab sector 12.6% 3.4%

*In the ISSP surveys, the ‘less than secondary option’ included ‘secondary without certificate (bagrut)’ and the post-secondary option was labelled ‘post-secondary/ academic incomplete’. These differences, the lower refusal rate (it was a face-to-face survey) and the inclusion of the Arab population, which has a lower level of educational attainment, account for the differences in the distribution of variables here. ** Jewish groupings such as “religious” and “Ultra-orthodox” are not homogeneous and contain many sub-groups within them. These labels are shorthand to describe broader movements. See Chapter 4 for more discussion. *** In the 2009 BGU survey the average household monthly income was 8800 NIS a month (CBS 2009). ^ ‘Post secondary’ refers to a non- academic degree qualification beyond high school i.e. vocational qualification.

3. Survey results This section presents the descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis for the five surveys. Multivariate analysis was conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression and nominal logistic regression models as appropriate (O’Connor et al. 1999; Bord et al. 2000; O’Connor et al. 2002; Leiserowitz 2006; Kellstedt et al. 2008; Malka et al. 2009, McCright 2010). It was conducted using JMP 9 statistical analysis software. In keeping with this literature and to help the reader make sense of the large amount of statistical data presented, only the significant co-efficients are shown and not the full list of co-efficients (Miller 2005).

For the multivariate analysis, all variables were re-coded between 0 and 1 to make comparison and interpretation of un-standardized regression coefficients easier. Unless expressed otherwise, 0 represented the lowest possible value and 1 represented the highest possible value. Where there were a large number of ‘refused/ don’t know’ responses, for example for the income variables, a ‘refused’ variable was included in the analysis. Otherwise, these responses were coded as missing.

In the 2009 BGU survey, respondents who had never heard of climate change or who had only heard the expression were not asked the subsequent assessed knowledge, concern and policy support questions. This was because their responses would not be based on actual knowledge or informed opinion. The 2010 Health survey instrument did not filter respondents based on their responses. For the same reason, therefore, respondents who had never heard of climate change or just heard the expression (n=87) were manually excluded from the assessed knowledge, concern and risk perception questions.

In the 2000 ISSP survey the knowledge and risk perception variables were the dependent variables. The knowledge variables were also treated as independent variables to assess whether knowledge predicted risk perception. In the 2010 ISSP survey the risk perception variable was the dependent variable and the socio-demographic variables were the independent variables.

In the 2009 BGU survey, the knowledge, concern, risk perceptions, efficacy, trust and attitude variables were initially treated as the dependent variables. They were later treated as independent variables to identify for example, whether knowledge was a determinant of concern and whether policy support was a determinant of the adoption of climate friendly behaviors.

The behavior scores were dependent variables. The socio-demographic variables and the political identity variables were independent variables. Similarly in the 2010 Health survey, the knowledge, concern and risk perception variables were first treated as dependent variables and then as independent variables. The behavior scores were dependent variables.

3.1. Knowledge, understanding and beliefs about climate change

3.1.1 Self-reported knowledge

3.1.1.1 2009 BGU survey The 2009 BGU survey found that 92 percent of Israelis reported that they had heard of climate change. Of these, 72 percent reported that they knew at least ‘a little’ (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Self reported climate change knowledge, 2009 BGU survey, Israel

% 20 28 29 10 20 15 8 0 Never heard Just heard A little A fair amount A great deal expression n=552 (Mean 3.49 Std Dev 1.31)

An OLS regression model found a significant medium sized effect, with six predictors explaining 38 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.38 F(6,508)=52.34 p=<.0001 (Table 1). The strongest positive predictor of self-reported knowledge was national identity. Arab Israelis (Muslim/Christian) reported a significantly lower level of knowledge than Jewish Israelis. Young Arab Israelis (18-24 years) were, however significantly more likely to report a higher level of awareness.

More educated and wealthier Israelis were more likely to report a greater level of knowledge about climate change. Israelis with children were also more likely to report a greater understanding of climate change and this was not obviously a function of age or educational

level. Israelis aged between 18-24, however, were significantly more likely to report a lower level of knowledge.

Table 1: An OLS multiple regression model for Israeli climate self-reported knowledge, 2009 BGU Survey, Israel

Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.58 0.03 17.41 <.0001*** Arab -0.44 0.03 -13.12 <.0001*** Academic 0.11 0.02 4.53 <.0001*** Age 18-24 -0.15 0.05 -3.20 0.001*** Have children 0.09 0.03 2.70 0.007** Arab*Age 18-24 0.23 0.08 2.92 0.004** Income above average 0.05 0.03 2.06 0.040* Unstandardized estimates n= 515 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

3.1.1.2 2010 Health survey In the 2010 Health survey, 94 percent of Jewish Hebrew-speaking Israelis reported that they had heard about climate change. Of these, 30 percent claimed to understand the issue (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Self-reported climate change knowledge 2010 Health Survey

% 30 54 20 30 10 6 10 0 Never heard Just heard Just know Know and expression generally understand it n=503 (Mean 3.08 Std Dev 0.79)

An OLS multiple regression model found a small but significant effect with six predictors explaining seven percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.07 (5,452) =8.41 p=<. 0001 (Table 2). Similar to the 2009 BGU survey education and income variables were predictors of self-reported knowledge. Contrary to the 2009 BGU survey, however, low income rather than high income

Israelis were more likely to be aware of climate change.69 Ultra-orthodox and religious respondents also reported a significantly lower level of knowledge.

Table 2: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change self-reported knowledge, 2010 Health Survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.64 0.02 31.42 <.0001*** Academic 0.10 0.03 3.68 0.0003** Income below average 0.07 0.03 2.70 0.007** Ultra-orthodox Jews -0.12 0.04 -2.77 0.005** Religious Jews -0.08 0.04 -2.29 0.02* Post-secondary education 0.07 0.03 2.07 0.04* Unstandardized estimates, weighted n= 365 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

3.1.2 Assessed knowledge about climate change

3.1.2.1 2000 ISSP survey In the 2000 ISSP survey, 78 percent of Israelis agreed that the greenhouse effect was caused by a hole in the atmosphere; and 84 percent agreed that it was caused by burning fossil fuels (Table 3 shows the mean results for comparison).

Only a small minority of Israelis (14 percent) however agreed both that the greenhouse effect was definitely or probably caused by burning fossil fuels and definitely or probably not by a hole in the atmosphere. This figure was significantly below the average across the 26 countries surveyed, where 32 percent answered that the greenhouse effect was caused by burning fossil fuels and not by a hole in the atmosphere (χ2 (104, 26370) = 14224.08 p < .0001). In addition, 16 percent of Israelis disagreed that the burning of fossil fuels caused the greenhouse effect.

Table 3: Mean and standard deviations for assessed climate knowledge, 2000 ISSP Environment survey, Israel Item Mean Std Dev Greenhouse effect caused by a hole in atmosphere 3.02 0.89 Greenhouse effect caused by burning fossil fuels 3.16 0.78 Note: Respondents rated each item on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (Definitely untrue) to 4 (Definitely true). n = Between 1054 and 1083

69 These differences may be connected to the exclusion of the Arab population from this survey. Israel’s Arab population tends to earn below the average Israeli income and in the 2009 BGU survey knew less about climate change (CBS 2010). 85

OLS regressions were conducted on both variables. The models found tiny but nevertheless significant effects. The OLS regression model of “the Greenhouse effect is caused by the burning of fossil fuels” found that five predictors explained 1.5 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.015 F(5,1002) = 4.13 p=0.001 (Table 4). Those who received less than secondary education and affiliates to right wing and religious political parties, Shas, now defunct MAFDAL (National Religious Party), Likud and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) Party were less likely to believe climate change had human causes.

Table 4: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change is caused by the burning of coal, gas and oil 2000 ISSP Environment survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 3.26*** 0.04 92.76 <.0001 Less than secondary -0.11* 0.05 -1.99 0.0469 education Likud -0.12* 0.06 -2.04 0.0415 Shas -0.24* 0.11 -2.22 0.0269 UTJ -0.32* 0.15 -2.16 0.0312 MAFDAL -0.28* 0.12 -2.28 0.023 Unstandardized estimates n= 1008 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

The OLS regression model for the greenhouse effect is caused by a hole in the earth’s atmosphere found that three predictors explained two percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.017 F(3,1044) = 7.12 p=<.0001 (Table 5). Arab respondents, those who had completed high school and those earning far above the average household income (17, 500NIS a month) were significantly more likely to agree with this explanation.

Table 5: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change is caused by a hole in the atmosphere, 2000 ISSP Environment survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 2.94*** 0.03 89.27 <.0001 Monthly income 0.71** 0.25 2.90 0.004 17500 NIS Secondary education 0.20** 0.07 3.00 0.003 complete Arab 0.17* 0.08 2.22 0.03 Unstandardized estimates n= 1048 *=significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

A new variable was created based on those who stated that climate change was probably or definitely caused by the burning of fossil fuels and probably or definitely not caused by a hole in the atmosphere. An OLS regression model showed a tiny but significant effect F(1,1193) = 5.78 p=0.02. One predictor explained 0.3% of the variance. Those who had completed secondary school were significantly less likely to answer that climate change was caused by burning fossil fuels, and more likely to think it was caused by a hole in the earth’s atmosphere.

3.1.3 Understanding or belief in the anthropogenic causes of climate change

3.1.3.1 2009 BGU survey The 2009 BGU survey found that 47 percent of Israelis who had heard of climate change believed that climate change had primarily human causes and 26 percent volunteered that climate change had both human and natural causes (Figure 11). Since the ‘both’ answer acknowledges that climate change is at least partially caused by human activity, these results showed that overall 73 percent of Israelis who knew something about climate change believed that humans were responsible for climate change to some degree. Four percent of Israelis did not believe that climate change was happening, and 20 percent of Israelis believed it had primarily natural causes.

Figure 11: Principal causes of climate change, 2009 BGU survey, Israel

30 47

Percent 20

26 10 20

4 0 3 Human activity Both human Natural Not happening Don't know and natural changes (Volunteered) n= 395

Since this was a dichotomous variable, it was analysed using a nominal logistic regression analysis (Table 6). The model found a small but significant effect (Rsquare (U)=0.06; and a misclassification rate of 0.21). Three predictors were significant: Israelis with an academic 87

degree and those who trusted environmental organisations to communicate about climate change were more likely to agree that it had human causes. Right-wing Israelis were significantly less likely to agree.

Table 6: A nominal logistic regression model for principal causes of climate change (human/natural), 2009 BGU survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Odds ratio (Upper and Lower 95% Confidence Intervals) Intercept -0.45 0.32 1.92 Academic 0.43** 0.14 9.84 2.36 (1.39-4.1) Trust in green 1.14** 0.44 6.67 1.32 (1.01-3.36) organisations Right-wing -0.28* 0.14 4.23 1.76 (1.02-3.01) Unstandardized estimates, n= 367 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001. Wald ChiSquare = 20**

3.1.3.2 2010 Health survey The 2010 Health survey found that 74 percent of Jewish Israelis who knew at least a little about climate change agreed both that the earth was warming and that it had at least partially human causes. Eight percent of Israelis agreed that climate change was the invention of scientists and interested parties, ten percent were unsure whether it was happening or an invention and eight percent thought that it was happening but had primarily natural causes.

Since this was a dichotomous variable, it was analysed using a nominal logistic regression analysis (Table 7). A nominal logistic model showed a small but statistically significant effect (Rsquare (U)=0.06; and a misclassification rate of 0.26). Three predictors were significant. New immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union, Ultra-orthodox Israelis and less educated Israelis/ those who refused to give their educational level were significantly less likely to think that climate change was happening and had human causes. Political variables were not recorded in the 2010 Health survey.

Table 7: A nominal logistic regression model for climate change is happening and has anthropogenic causes 2010 Health survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Odds ratios (Upper and Lower 95% Confidence Intervals) Intercept 0.47* 0.32 2.18 Edu refused/ primary or less -0.54** 0.18 9.03 3 (1.45 –6) Immigrant from Soviet Union -0.53** 0.20 7.07 2.9 (1.3-6.25) Ultra-orthodox -0.42* 0.18 5.37 2.3 (1.1-4.7) Unstandardised estimates, weighted n= 404 Significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001. Wald Chi Square 26.72***

3.1.5 Likely consequences of climate change

3.1.5.1 2009 BGU survey In the 2009 BGU survey, 84 percent of Israelis who knew at least a little about climate change thought that at least one of the five named problems facing Israel were likely to worsen if climate change were not addressed. Only 12 percent thought all five were likely to worsen. Israelis were most likely to think that water shortages would worsen, and least likely to think that regional disputes would worsen (Table 8 shows the mean results). The items formed an acceptable score (Cronbach’s alpha α =0.78). The higher the individual score, the greater number of consequences identified as likely to worsen. These are referred to here as ‘likelihood scores’. All scores were between 0 and 1.

Table 8: Descriptive statistics of likely consequences of climate change and ‘likelihood’ scores, 2009 BGU Survey, Israel Item Mean Std Dev Water shortages 4.10 1.12 Epidemics and diseases 3.62 1.22 Coastal flooding 3.57 1.33 Refugees 3.18 1.34 Regional disputes 3.04 1.4 Likelihood score 0.63 0.24 Note: Respondents rated each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Very unlikely) to 5 (Very likely). n = Between 341 and 379

An OLS multiple regression model of the ‘likelihood’ scores found a medium sized effect with six predictors explaining 20 percent of the variance AdjR2= 0.20 F(6,336)=15.58 p=<.0001 (Table 9). Those who reported a greater level of knowledge, and agreed that climate change had human causes thought more of Israel’s problems would worsen because of climate change. In

addition, Jewish women scored significantly higher and right-wing religious Jewish Israelis scored significantly lower.

Table 9: An OLS multiple regression model for likelihood’ scores, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 2.50*** 0.18 13.93 <.0001 Age 25-34 -0.38** 0.13 -2.89 0.0041 Knowledge VOLUME 0.81*** 0.19 4.26 <.0001 Causes HUMAN 0.35** 0.12 2.98 0.0031 Right*Religious -0.80** 0.23 -3.47 0.0006 Arab*Female -1.23* 0.53 -2.32 0.0208 Female 0.55*** 0.09 5.92 <.0001 Unstandardized estimates, n= 341 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

3.1.5.2 2010 Health survey In the 2010 Health survey, 96 percent of Jewish Israelis who had heard of climate change thought that it would influence at least one of the six problems. Only four percent thought that it would influence all six. Israelis were most likely to think climate change would influence ‘extreme weather’ (72 percent). Less than half of Israelis (44 percent) believed that climate change would influence the economy. See Figure 12.

Figure 12: ‘Climate influences’, 2010 Health survey, Israel

100

Percent 72 65 65 58 54 25 44

0 Extreme Human Drought Species Sea level The weather health and water extinction rise economy shortages

Note: This was a dichotomous question so the mean is not reported here. n=423

The items formed an acceptable score (Cronbach’s alpha α = 0.69). Higher scores represent a greater number of influences identified. These are referred to here as ‘influence scores’. All scores were between 0 and 1. See Table 10 for summary statistics of scores.

Table 10: Summary statistics for ‘influence’ scores, 2010 Health Survey, Israel Item Mean 0.60 Std Dev 0.30 Std Err Mean 0.01 Upper 95% Mean 0.62 Lower 95% Mean 0.57 N 417

Table 11: An OLS multiple regression model for ‘influence’ scores, 2010 Health survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.21** 0.07 2.83 0.005 Academic*Secular 0.20** 0.06 3.35 0.0009 Knowledge volume 0.28** 0.09 3.23 0.0014 Post secondary education 0.11** 0.04 2.70 0.007 Secular 0.09** 0.03 2.99 0.003 Happening anthropogenic 0.08* 0.03 2.43 0.01 causes Academic 0.08* 0.03 2.39 0.02 Unstandardized estimates, weighted n= 365 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

An OLS multiple regression model found a small but significant effect with six predictors explaining ten percent of the variance AdjR2= 0.10 F(6,367)=8.33 p= < .0001 (Table 11). Similar to the 2009 BGU survey, a greater level of self-reported climate knowledge and belief in the anthropogenic explanation were good predictors for believing that climate change have a higher number of influences. Secular Israelis and those educated beyond high school (with a post secondary education or academic degree) were the most likely to score highly.

3.1.5.3 2010 Haifa University word association survey The 2010 Haifa University climate word association survey gives a good indication of how educated Israeli university students perceive climate change. Both the 2009 BGU and 2010 Health surveys indicated that Israelis educated beyond high school were more likely to be aware

of climate change. Nevertheless, the 26 percent refusal rate among Haifa University students for this question actually suggests low awareness. There were 4234 associations in total given that each respondent could offer up to three associations. These were coded inductively, with 12 codes explaining 97 percent of the terms (See Figure 13).

The most popular response was to simply associate climate change to ‘global warming’. The second most popular response was to mention one of the likely impacts of climate change on the environment such as sea level rise. There were so many references to ‘ice sheets melting’ that it was given its own category.

These results suggest that Haifa University students had a poor understanding of the causes and consequences of climate change. For example, they were slightly more likely to associate climate change with ozone layer depletion than the greenhouse effect (several responses referred to “the warming of the ozone”). This is consistent with the 2000 ISSP Israel survey findings (see Table 3). They were also more likely to associate climate change with general terms related to the weather and the environment or unrelated natural hazards such as earthquakes.

Figure 13: Word associations with climate change, Haifa University, 2010

25 20 20 15 15 10 13 Percent 10 10 5 7 2 3 4 4 4 6 0

Codes

Only one percent of Israeli responses referred to impacts likely to affect Israel. Of these drought received only mentioned 22 times. This is surprising since both the 2009 BGU and 2010 Health surveys found that Israelis were reasonably well informed and concerned about the likely local impacts of climate change such as water shortages. Similarly, in the 2010 survey, 65 percent of

Israelis were aware of the connection between human health and climate change, yet this only accounted for 0.2 percent of associations.

Only two percent of responses indicated scepticism about climate change, far fewer than the percentage of sceptics in the general population (see 2009 and 2010 surveys). Both of these surveys, however, indicated that Israelis educated beyond high school i.e. the population assessed here, were significantly less sceptical which is thus supported by these findings.

These survey results can be compared to a similar nationally representative survey (n=673) conducted in the USA in 2002 (Leiserowitz 2006). Respondents were asked, “What is the first thought or image that comes to your mind when you think of global warming?” Similar to this survey, the largest category of responses was the impact of climate change on non-human nature (34 percent), with 21 percent of Israelis associating climate change with melting glaciers and icebergs. Again similar to this survey, a relatively high number of Americans (11 percent) associated climate change with the unrelated phenomenon, ozone layer depletion.

3.2 Climate Change Concern and Risk Perception

3.2.1 Worry about climate change (2009 BGU survey) In the 2009 BGU survey, Israelis were split on whether they were worried about climate change or not. Just under half of Israelis (48 percent) stated that they were worried about climate change. Only 19 percent were very worried. (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Worry about climate change, 2009 BGU survey, Israel

Percent 32 29 10 19 10 8 0 Not at all Not worried Neither Worried Very worried worried worried nor not worried n= 379 (Mean 3.39 Std Dev 1.18)

An OLS multiple regression model found a medium sized effect with 13 predictors explaining 37 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.37 F(13,329) = 16.63 p = <.0001 (Table 12). The strongest positive predictors of worry were greater self-reported knowledge; believing the anthropogenic explanation and identifying a greater number of likely impacts (high likelihood scores). Political identity was also important: respondents who identified themselves as very left-wing were significantly more worried about climate change while those identified as very- right were significantly less likely to be worried. Ultra-orthodox respondents were also significantly less likely to be worried.

Trust in those communicating about climate change was also associated with concern. Israelis who trusted scientists to communicate to them about climate change were significantly more concerned. Those who trusted government officials to communicate to them about climate change, however, were significantly less worried.

Table 12: An OLS multiple regression model for Climate worry 2009 BGU survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.123* 0.062 1.97 0.05 Likelihood scores 0.531*** 0.055 9.71 <.0001 Human causes 0.112** 0.032 3.52 0.0005 Self-reported knowledge 0.103* 0.052 1.97 0.0497 Self-reported knowledge 0.330** 0.117 2.82 0.005 *Human causes

Very right -0.285** 0.077 -3.71 0.0002 Secular Jew -0.079** 0.026 -3.05 0.0024 Very left 0.186* 0.083 2.24 0.0256 Very right*Less than 0.531** 0.184 2.88 0.0042 secondary education INCOME REFUSED -0.076* 0.029 -2.57 0.0107 Very right*Secular -0.304* 0.151 -2.02 0.0443 Ultra-orthodox -0.572** 0.150 -3.82 0.0002 Jew*Politics refused

Trust in scientists 0.130* 0.053 2.44 0.0154 Trust in government -0.168** 0.053 -3.16 0.0017 Unstandardised estimates n= 343 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

3.2.2 Risk perception

3.2.2.1 2010 Health survey The 2010 Health survey included three risk perception questions. The survey found that 69 percent of Jewish Israelis who had heard of climate change believed that it posed a high or moderate direct threat to them and their family. Similarly 56 percent believed that climate change was already affecting human health and 13 percent said would begin to affect health in ten years time. In a question on specific climate impacts, Israelis were most concerned about drought and water shortages and the influence on health, although less concerned about the influence on the economy or sea level rise (See Figure 15).

Figure 15: Concern about specific impacts, 2010 Health survey, Israel

30 57 57 50 Percent 20 30 29 29 10

0 Drought Human Extreme Species Economy Sea level health weather extinction rise n=423 Since this was a dichotomous question (respondents were asked to list which of six named possible impacts they were concerned about) it was treated as a nominal variable. Pearson chisquare tests were run to explore whether the belief that climate change would influence a specific problem was associated with greater concern about that problem (See 2.1.5.2). These showed that in all cases the relationship between specific influences and concerns were significant (See Table 13).

Table 13: ChiSquare test for relationship between likelihood of impacts and concern about that impact variables, 2010 Health survey, Israel

Pearson ChiSquare Climate influence & concern

Extreme weather (1,502)=52.25 p= <.0001*** Human health (1,502) =45.44 p= <.0001*** Species extinction (1,502) =48.45 p= <.0001*** Drought (1,502) =58.94 p= <.0001*** Economy (1,502) =37.44 p= <.0001*** Sea level rise (1,502) =55.18 p= <.0001***

The six concern variables, the personal health and immediate threat variables were combined to create an ‘immediate personal concern’ score (Cronbach’s α 0.70).70 The variable is a measure of the perception of the intimacy of the threat posed by climate change, with scores ranging between 0 and 1 (Table 14). Respondents scoring more highly were concerned about a greater number of climate threats, felt that climate change was already affecting Israel or would do in ten years and perceived it as an immediate threat to them and their family.

Table 14: Summary statistics for ‘immediate personal concern’ scores, 2010 Health survey, Israel Mean 0.48 Std Dev 0.25 Std Err Mean 0.01 Upper 95% Mean 0.50 Lower 95% Mean 0.46 N 417

An OLS multiple regression model found a medium sized effect with four predictors explaining 22 percent of the variance. Adj R2 =0.21 F(3,403)= 36.57 p= <.0001 (See Table 15). Similar to the 2009 survey, the best predictor of concern was having a good understanding of the causes and consequences of climate change. Younger Israelis (18-24) were, however, significantly less likely to be concerned.

70 The specific concern questions were dichotomous variables. The personal threat question was asked on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (High). The question about when climate change would affect health was a nominal variable. To create the score, it was converted into a dichotomous variable with 1= climate change is already influencing health or will influence health in 10 years and 0 = climate change will influence health between 25 to 100 years. 96

Table 15: An OLS multiple regression model for ‘immediate personal concern’ score, Israel, 2010 Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.24*** 0.03 8.01 <.0001 ‘Influence’ score 0.34*** 0.04 9.02 <.0001 Happening anthropogenic 0.07** 0.02 3.89 0.041 causes 18-24 -0.06* 0.03 -2.26 0.02 Unstandardized estimates, weighted n= 407 *=significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

3.2.2.2 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys In the 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys Israelis consistently perceived climate change as a dangerous threat to the environment (Figure 16). In 2000, 84 percent of Israelis agreed that climate change was a dangerous threat to the environment with 56 percent agreeing that it was a very or extremely dangerous threat. This is consistent with the average across the 26 countries surveyed, although the percentage of Israelis who perceived climate change as a very or extremely dangerous threat was somewhat lower than the average (66 percent) (χ2 = 52.66 p= 0.02). Israelis were nevertheless more concerned than most Northern Europeans and Americans.

Similarly, in 2011, 84 percent of Israelis perceived climate change as a dangerous threat to the environment with 57 percent agreeing that it posed a very or extremely dangerous threat. International comparative data was not available for 2011 at the time of analysis. In both surveys, climate change ranked highly compared to other threats to the environment, although lower than the threat posed by industrial air pollution and water pollution. In 2011, the threat posed by climate change was perceived as a commensurate threat to that of car pollution and pesticides, but a lesser threat than air pollution by industry, nuclear power or water pollution (Table 16 shows the means for comparison).

Figure 16: ‘Climate change as a dangerous threat to the environment’, 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys, Israel

20 33 Percent 31 28 25 24 27 10 2000 8 6 1 1 6 8 2011 0

2000 n = 1131; 2011 n = 1127

Table 16: Means and standard deviations for ‘Dangerous threats to the environment’, 2000 and 2011 ISSP survey, Israel Item 2000 Mean (std dev) 2011 Mean (std dev) Car pollution 3.18 (0.95) 3.7 (0.89) Industry pollution 4.12 (0.88) 4.2 (0.78) Pesticides 3.55 (1) 3.78 (0.93) Water pollution 4 (0.92) 3.92 (0.92) Climate change 3.77 (0.97) 3.78 (0.94) GM crops 2.84 (1.17) 3.28 (1.11) Nuclear - 4.18 (1) Note: Respondents rated each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Very unlikely) to 5 (Very likely). 2000 n = between 1128 and 1200; 2011 n = between 998 and 1192

An OLS regression on the 2000 ISSP concern variable found a small but significant effect AdjR2 = 0.05 F(5,936) =11.06 p=.0001 (Table 17). Five predictors explained five percent of the variance. Those who agreed that climate change was probably or definitely caused by burning fossil fuels were significantly more likely to be concerned. Those who agreed that it was probably or definitely caused by a hole in the atmosphere were significantly less likely to be concerned. This highlights the role of correct understanding of climate change and scepticism in shaping concern.

In both 2000 and 2011, affiliates of the Ultra-orthodox UTJ party, right-wing Likud and MAFDAL parties were significantly less likely to be concerned about climate change. This is consistent with the 2000 ISSP finding that illustrated that affiliates of these parties were less likely to agree that climate change had human causes (See Table 4).

Table 17: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change concern, 2000 ISSP survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 3.70*** 0.09 41.21 <.0001 Hole in atmosphere -0.33*** 0.08 -4.27 <.0001 Burning fossil fuels 0.30** 0.09 3.41 0.0007 Likud -0.21** 0.07 -2.93 0.0035 UTJ -0.42* 0.18 -2.27 0.0231 MAFDAL -0.31* 0.15 -2.01 0.0452 Unstandardized estimates, n = 942 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

An OLS regression on the 2010 ISSP concern variable found a small but significant effect AdjR2 = 0.07 F(7,802) = 9.8 p=<.0001 (Table 18). Seven predictors explained seven percent of the variance. Jews living in the South of Israel and Jerusalem; those with an academic degree; and UTJ party affiliates were significantly less likely to be concerned about the threat of climate change to the environment.

The most interesting finding here, however, is the fact that unlike in 2000, by 2011 affiliates of the mainstream right wing parties were no longer less concerned about the impact of climate change on the environment than the centrist or left wing parties. In fact, although they are weak predictors, educated affiliates of the left-wing party Meretz and centrist party, Kadima were considerably less concerned about climate change and affiliates of far-right party Israel Beiteinu (English - Our Home is Israel) were significantly more concerned than the other parties.

Table 18: An OLS multiple regression model for climate change concern, 2011 ISSP survey, Israel

Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|

Intercept 4.01*** 0.05 88.91 <.0001 UTJ -0.49** 0.16 -3.08 0.0022

Israel Beitenu 0.03* 0.02 2.11 0.035

Academic*Meretz -0.70* 0.29 -2.39 0.017 Academic*Kadima -0.41* 0.17 -2.36 0.0185

Jewish Israeli from South -0.46*** 0.09 -5.21 <.0001 Unsta Jewish Israeli from Jerusalem -0.30** 0.10 -3 0.0028 ndard Academic degree completed -0.23** 0.07 -3.09 0.0021 ised estim ates, n = 607 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

These somewhat surprising findings are confirmed by ANOVA analysis (See Table 19). Although affiliates of the two green parties (The Green Movement and the Green Party) are the most likely to be concerned about climate change, this finding is not significant in the OLS regression, probably because of a wider standard error.

Table 19: Climate change concern by political affiliation, 2011 ISSP survey, Israel Level Mean Std Error Lr 95% Ur 95% Green Parties 4.25 0.27 3.7243 4.7757 Pensioners 4.14 0.35 3.4546 4.8311 Israel Beiteinu 4 0.12 3.7567 4.2433 No party affiliation 3.9 0.06 3.79 4.03 Likud 3.86 0.06 3.7391 3.9886 Labour 3.81 0.12 3.5752 4.0377 Hadash 3.78 0.22 3.3486 4.207 Shas 3.7 0.21 3.2928 4.1072 Balad 3.62 0.2 3.2217 4.0164 Kadima 3.61 0.08 3.4589 3.7603 Meretz 3.51 0.16 3.2065 3.8221 Mafdal 3.5 0.27 2.9743 4.0257 Raam, Taal 3.36 0.19 2.9958 3.7242 UTJ 3.28 0.15 2.9871 3.5629 Note: Respondents rated items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all dangerous) to 5 (Extremely dangerous).

This requires some explanation since Israel Beiteinu traditionally represents recent immigrants to Israel from the former-Soviet Union, a population that the 2010 Health survey actually found

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to be significantly more sceptical about climate change (See Table 7). The ISSP survey nevertheless shows a strong correlation between the Israel Beiteinu variable and the ‘recent immigrants from the former-Soviet Union’ variable, r (740) = 0.47 p=<.0001. When an interaction variable between Israel Beiteinu and ‘new immigrants’ was introduced in the OLS regression (Table 20), Israel Beiteinu lost its 0.05 significance although the p-value remained under 0.10. This finding suggests a tension between climate concern and scepticism among Israel Beiteinu voters. This is explored in greater depth in Chapter 4.

3.2.2.3 2010 Haifa University climate word associations Despite the levels of concern expressed in the ISSP surveys, it is notable that only four percent of respondents to the 2010 Haifa University survey used terminology expressing concern to describe climate change such as ‘frightening’, ‘are we too late?’ and ‘global concern’ (See Figure 13 above).

3.3 Self and Collective Efficacy (2009 BGU survey) The 2009 BGU survey included two questions on efficacy (Table 20). Israelis were split on ‘self-efficacy’: 40 percent agreed that there was little they could do personally to address climate change while 36 percent disagreed i.e. believed that they could personally take action. They did, however, express a high level of ‘collective efficacy’: 67 percent agreed that Israel could address climate change, despite being small.

Table 20: Self and collective efficacy, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Item Mean Std Dev Collective efficacy 3.88 1.3 Self efficacy 3 1.5 Note: Respondents rated each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).

An OLS regression model of the self efficacy variable found a tiny but significant effect AdjR2 = 0.03 F(2,352) = 6.11 p=.0024. Two predictors explained three percent of the variance. Arab respondents and those who received less than secondary education were significantly more likely to express low self-efficacy, although they were weak predictors. Notably, the knowledge variables were not significant predictors.

An OLS regression model of the collective efficacy variable found a medium-sized significant effect AdjR2 = 0.21 F(7,314) = 13.20 p=<.0001 (Table 21). Seven predictors explained 21

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percent of the variance. Unlike personal efficacy, here accurate knowledge of the causes and consequences are good predictors of collective efficacy. The ‘trust in new technologies’ variable and ‘trust in the media and scientists’ variables are also positive predictors of collective efficacy. The most striking result, however, was that Israeli women were significantly more likely than men to express collective efficacy. Similar to the personal efficacy variable explored above, Arab Israelis expressed significantly lower collective efficacy.

Table 21: An OLS regression model of ‘collective efficacy’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.08 0.08 0.96 0.338 Female 0.13*** 0.03 4.03 <.0001 Likelihood scores 0.06** 0.02 3.53 0.0005 New technology 0.17** 0.05 3.29 0.0011 Trust in media 0.15** 0.06 2.59 0.0099 Trust in scientists 0.14* 0.07 2.12 0.0348 Arab -0.20* 0.09 -2.28 0.0235 Human causes 0.10* 0.04 2.49 0.0133 Unstandardized estimates, n = 369 *=significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001. 3.3 Trust in climate communicators (2009 BGU survey) The 2009 BGU survey asked Israelis to indicate whether they trusted scientists, green organisations, weather forecasters, the media and government to communicate to them accurately about climate change. Israelis expressed greatest trust in scientists (77 percent) and environmental organizations (67 percent) but least trust in government officials (11 percent). (See Table 22 for mean results for comparison).

Table 22: Means and standard deviations for ‘trust in climate communicators’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Item Mean Standard deviation Scientists 3.91 1.14 Green organisations 3.73 1.17 Weather forecasters 3.34 1.14 Media 2.93 1.17 Government 2.28 1.09 Note: Respondents rated each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). N between 534 and 540.

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OLS regression models for the five trust in communicators variables as dependent variables found the following socio-demographic predictors:

Trust in scientists – The OLS regression model found a small but significant effect AdjR2 = 0.05 F(3,305) = 9.27 p=<.0001. Three predictors explained five percent of the variance (Table 23). Academic Israelis were significantly more likely to trust scientists. Ultra-orthodox Jews and those aged between 18 and 24 were less likely.

Table 23: An OLS regression model of trust in scientists as climate change communicators 2009 BGU survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 3.90*** 0.07 53.89 <.0001 Ultra-orthodox -0.84** 0.26 -3.19 0.0015 Academic 0.28** 0.10 2.78 0.0056 Age 18-24 -0.34* 0.15 -2.29 0.0227 Unstandardized estimates, n = 552 *=significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

Trust in environmental organisations - The OLS regression model found a small but significant effect AdjR2 = 0.05 F(3,316) = 9.55 p=<.0001 (Table 24). Three predictors explained five percent of the variance. Women were significantly more likely to trust environmental organisations. Right wing Israelis and Arabs were significantly less likely.

Table 24: An OLS regression model of trust in environmental organisations as climate change communicators, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.70*** 0.02 33.75 <.0001 Female 0.07** 0.03 2.7 0.0071 Right -0.09** 0.03 -3.09 0.0021 Arab -0.14*** 0.04 -4.06 <.0001 Unstandardized estimates, n = 552 *=significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

The OLS regression models of the remaining trust variables found significant but tiny effects and the predictors were only weakly significant. For the trust in the media variable, two predictors explained two percent of the variance. AdjR2 = 0.02 F(2,532)=5.54 p = 0.0042.

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Ultra-orthodox Israelis were significantly less likely to trust the media, while those earning above the average income were more likely to do so.

For the trust in weather forecasters variable, three predictors explained three percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.03 F(3,511)=5.73 p=0.0007. Women and parents were significantly more likely to trust weather forecasters, while Israelis with an academic degree were less likely to do so. For the trust in government variable, only one predictor explained one percent of the variance. Religious Jews were significantly more likely to trust government AdjR2 = 0.01 F(1, 531) =5.02 p=0.025.

3.4 Trust in new technology to solve climate change (2009 BGU survey) In the 2009 BGU survey, 52 percent of Israelis agreed with the statement “New technology will solve climate change without the need for people to make fundamental changes in their lifestyles” (Figure 17).

Figure 17: ‘Trust in new technology,’ 2009 BGU survey, Israel

29 Percent 23 23 10 11 8 0 Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly disagree nor Disagree agree n= 379 (Mean 3.52 and Std Dev 1.32)

An OLS multiple regression model found a medium sized effect with seven predictors explaining 11 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.11 F (7,318) = 6.82 p=<.0001 (Table 25). Israelis who trusted green organizations and those on low incomes were significantly more likely to trust new technology. Academic Israelis and those who were more concerned about climate change were significantly less likely to trust new technology. Arab and Ultra-orthodox Israelis were also significantly less likely to do so.

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Table 25: An OLS multiple regression model for ‘trust in new technology’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.53*** 0.06 8.41 <.0001 Trust in green orgs 0.18** 0.06 2.79 0.0056 Ultra-orthodox Jews -0.29** 0.09 -3.19 0.0016 Arabs -0.22* 0.10 -2.26 0.0243 Academic -0.08* 0.03 -2.15 0.0321 Income below average 0.09* 0.05 2.09 0.0373 Worry -0.12* 0.06 -2.01 0.0452 Israel efficacy 0.14* 0.05 2.53 0.0117 Unstandardised estimates n= 326 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001. 3.5 Support for climate policy, policy preference and national priority The 2009 BGU survey included two questions on support for international climate policy and one question on climate policy preference (Table 26). An overwhelming number of Israelis wanted to see the international community take action on climate change (96 percent). Of these 73 percent wanted to see ‘urgent action very soon’ and 74 percent wanted Israel to sign an international treaty to reduce its GHG by 90 percent by 2050. Fifty four percent expressed very strong agreement for this measure. Israelis were less enthusiastic about the one proposed national policy: raising the price of fossil fuels. Only 24 percent agreed, while 49 percent actively disagreed.

Table 26: Means and standard deviations for policy support and policy preference, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Item Mean Standard Deviation International action 2.71 0.52 Israel commit to 90% reduction in 4.25 1.07 GHG emissions by 2050 Raise the price of fuel 2.53 1.37 Note: These means cannot be directly compared since the international action question was asked on a three-point scale: 1 (No action); 2 (Moderate steps in the coming years); and 3 (Urgent action very soon). The second two questions were asked on a five-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). n = between 356 and 373

When asked to compare five priority issues on the national agenda, the Israeli public placed climate change as its lowest priority compared to swine flu, the water situation, the economic situation and the Iran situation (Table 27 show the mean results for comparison). 37 percent of Israelis placed climate change high on the national agenda while 41 percent of Israelis placed it

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low. Table 28 shows the OLS regression models for these four policy-related variables. The findings are summarised underneath.

Table 27: Means and standard deviations for ‘national agenda priorities’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Item Mean Standard Deviation Water situation 4.16 1.1 Iran situation 3.91 1.26 Economy 4.04 1.13 Swine flu 3.30 1.29 Climate change 3.15 1.26 Note: All five questions were asked on a five-point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). n= between 537 and 548

Table 28: OLS multiple regression models for ‘climate policy support’ 2009 BGU survey, Israel Independent variables Climate International Israel Treaty Raise prices priority Community Knowledge volume 0.41 (0.05)*** Human causes 0.15 (0.03)*** Likelihood scores 1.04 (0.27)*** 0.25 (0.08)** Worry 1.44 (0.22)*** 0.2 (0.04)*** 0.15 (0.04)** Water priority 0.26 (0.06)***

Israel efficacy 0.11 (0.04)** 0.19 (0.04)*** 0.15 (0.06)** Human causes* Israel 0.46 (0.08)*** Efficacy

Trust in weather 0.14 (0.04)** -0.18 (0.07) ** forecasters Trust in green orgs 0.22 (0.07)** Trust in government 0.2 (0.07)** Trust in scientists 0.20 (0.05)*** Trust in technology -0.21 (0.06)**

Age 18-24 -0.1 (0.04)* Age 25-34 -0.55 (0.16)** Age 35-44 -0.28 (0.14)* Age 25-34* Academic 1.72 (0.71)* Intercept 0.72* 0.47*** 0.11 0.14* Adj R 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.14 N 352 332 341 326 Unstandardized estimates with standard error in parentheses *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

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Climate priority – An OLS multiple regression model found a medium sized effect, with six predictors explaining 33 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.33 F(6,345)=30.17 p= <..0001. Those with high likelihood scores (listing a greater number of likely climate impacts); who placed water high on the national agenda (water priority); and were worried about climate change were significantly more likely to rank climate change more highly. Israelis aged between 25 to 44 were a significantly more likely to rank it lower, although academic 25 to 34 years olds were significantly more likely to rank it highly.

Pearson chi-squared tests also showed that 64 percent of Israelis who ranked water highly on the national agenda also stated that water shortages would worsen because of climate change in the previous question about likelihood of impacts χ2 (16, 363) 37.43 p=0.002. See Table 28.

International community - An OLS multiple regression model found a medium sized effect, with six predictors explaining 33 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.33 F(6,325)= 28.57 p =<.0001. Israelis worried about climate change, those with a strong sense of collective efficacy, those stating that climate change had human causes and who trusted weather forecasters were significantly more likely to support international action. Those aged between 18 and 24 were significantly less likely to do so.

Israel treaty – An OLS multiple regression model found a medium sized effect, with four predictors explaining 30 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.30 F(4,336)= 37.92 p=<.0001. Israelis with higher levels of self-reported knowledge, worry, collective efficacy and a greater trust in scientists were significantly more likely to support this measure.

Raise prices – An OLS multiple regression model showed a medium sized effect with six predictors explaining 14 percent of the variance AdjR2 = 0.14 F(6,319)=9.85 p=<.0001. Israelis with greater sense of collective efficacy, high likelihood scores, greater ‘trust in government’ and ‘trust in environmental organisations’ variables were significantly more likely to support this measure. Israelis who trusted in weather forecasters and in new technologies were significant less likely to support it.

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3.5.1 2010 Haifa University climate word associations Despite the strong support for international and national climate policy expressed in the 2009 BGU survey, the 2010 Haifa university word association analysis found limited reference to climate policy. In the Haifa University data there were 39 references to climate policy (less than one percent of total responses) and these primarily related to alternative energy sources.

3.6 Adoption and intention to adopt pro-environmental behaviors

3.6.1 2009 BGU survey In the 2009 BGU survey, the most popular environmental behavior that Israelis were likely adopt in the coming year or had already adopted was to operate air conditioners more efficiently (Table 29). Just under half of all Israelis were willing to buy or had already bought energy efficient air conditioners (A/C) and energy efficient cars. Israelis were least likely to use public transport or bicycling more.

Table 29: Means and standard deviations for ‘adoption of or intention to adopt pro- environmental behaviors’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Item Mean Std Dev Operate A/C more efficiently 4.14 1.62 Use public transport or bicycle more 2.92 1.79 Buy energy efficient A/C 3.40 1.77 Buy energy efficient car 3.21 1.61 Note: These variables were coded on a 6 point scale with 1 (Not at all likely); 2 (Unlikely); 3 (Neither unlikely nor likely); 4 (Likely); 5 (Very likely); 6 (Doing it already).

While these figures are encouraging, it should be noted that a quarter of Israelis said that there was no chance that they would operate A/Cs more efficiently; and a quarter said there was no chance that they would buy energy efficient cars or A/Cs; 35 percent said there was no chance that they would use public transport or a bicycle; and only 2.5 percent had already bought an energy efficient car. Overall, only 29 percent had already adopted at least one of these behaviors; and only two percent had adopted three out of the four behaviors mentioned. None were doing all four. Factor analysis found an ‘efficient purchase’ factor constructed by combining the efficient car and efficient A/C variables (Table 30).

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Table 30: Factor Analysis for ‘adoption of or intention to adopt pro-environmental behavior’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Factor 1 “Efficient purchase”co-efficients Factor 2 Use A/C efficiently 0.2363573 0.2483039 Alt transport 0.0071892 0.2262245 Efficient car 0.5796577 0.0329583 Efficient A/C 0.6112465 0.1146143 Eigenvalue 1.58 1.04 Note: The factor analysis used the principal components and Varimax rotation method.

Table 31 shows the OLS regression models for these four behavior- related variables. The findings are summarised underneath.

Table 31: OLS multiple regression models for ‘adoption of or intention to adopt pro- environmental behavior’, 2009 BGU survey, Israel Independent Use A/C less Alt transport Efficient Purchase variables NOT SIGNIFICANT Worry 0.12 (0.05)* 0.15 (0.06)* Self efficacy 0.1 (0.04)* 0.09 (0.05)* Trust in weather 0.15 (0.07)* forecasters Having children 0.14 (0.04)** Religious 0.15 (0.05)** Ultra-orthodox 0.38 (0.1)*** Income above -0.14 (0.04) ** average

Intercept 0.49*** 0.16* Adj R 0.06 0.11 N 360 345 Unstandardized estimates with standard error in parentheses *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

Use A/C efficiently - An OLS multiple regression model showed a small but significant effect (Table 31). Three predictors explained six percent of the variance F(4,356)= 9.28 p=<.0001. Israelis who were worried about climate change, felt self-efficacy and were parents, were significantly more likely to be willing to use A/Cs more efficiently, or were already doing so.

Alternative transport - An OLS multiple regression model found a medium effect, with six predictors explaining 11 percent of the variance F(6,338)= 7.94 p=<.0001 (Table 33). Israelis

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who were worried about climate change, felt self-efficacy, trusted weather forecasters and were religious or Ultra-orthodox were significantly more likely to be willing to use public transport or bicycle more, or were already doing so. Israelis who earned above the average household income were significantly less likely to use public transport. An OLS multiple regression model for the ‘efficient purchase’ variable was not significant, with none of the survey variables explaining the any of the variance.

OLS multiple regression models were also built to explore whether the policy support variables were related to pro-environmental behavioral intentions. However, these models were also not significant and none of the policy variables predicted behaviors.

3.6.2 2010 Health survey The 2010 Health survey found that Israelis were most likely to have adopted easy pro- environmental behaviors such as recycling and switching to CFLs (Table 10). Less Israelis had adopted more lifestyle changing behaviors such as reducing car use. The items (excluding ‘other’) formed an acceptable score (Cronbach’s alpha α = 0.70).

Figure 18: Adoption of pro-environmental behaviors, 2010 Health survey, Israel

70 60 50 40 30 64

Percent 56 20 38 10 16 14 10 0 4 Recycle Switch to Reuse Reduce Eat Compost Other CFL plastic car use organic bags food

Note: These were dichotomous variables so the mean and standard deviation are not shown. The “Other” category included keeping immediate environment clean, water use and “other”.

An OLS multiple regression model of the behavior scores found a medium-sized effect with seven predictors explaining 18 percent of the variance. F(7, 451) = 15.81 p=<0001 (Table 32). Greater self-reported knowledge, higher influence scores and concern about climate change were significant predictors of pro-environmental behaviors. Israelis earning below the average income and those more educated were also significantly more likely to have adopted environmental behaviors. Young Israelis (18-24) and Israelis with children were significantly

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less likely to have done so.

Table 32: An OLS multiple regression model for adoption of pro-environmental behaviors scores, 2010 Health survey, Israel Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Intercept 0.14** 0.04 3.58 0.0009 Influence score 0.14** 0.04 3.25 0.0012 Immediate personal concern 0.17** 0.05 3.42 0.0007 score Knowledge volume 0.09* 0.04 2.13 0.03

Children -0.08** 0.02 -3.34 0.0009 Income below average 0.08** 0.02 3.38 0.0008 18-24 -0.07** 0.03 -2.88 0.0042 Post-secondary Education 0.07* 0.03 2.56 0.011 Unstandardized estimates, n= 460 *= significant at 0.05 **=significant at 0.01 ***= significant at 0.001.

3.6.3 2010 Haifa University climate word association survey A last reflection on willingness to adopt climate friendly behaviors comes from the 2010 Haifa University survey. In the word association analysis, there were only 15 references (out of 4234 total references) to environmental behavior or green lifestyles.

4. Summary of survey findings Despite the variations between the questions asked, the sample sizes and sampling frames, the survey findings can be summarised as follows:

4.1. Until recently Israel trailed developed countries in terms of awareness of climate change. By 2010, self-reported knowledge appeared to have risen significantly The 2000 ISSP survey results analysed here and the 2007 and 2009 Gallup World Polls cited in the literature review situate Israel in an international comparative perspective. The Gallup World Polls showed that Israelis trailed citizens of most of the other OECD countries in terms of self-reported knowledge. The 2000 ISSP survey results showed that a greater number of Israelis confused the greenhouse effect with ozone layer depletion than in many other countries.

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Self-reported knowledge appears to have risen between 2009 and 2010. In the 2009 BGU survey 92 percent reported having heard of climate change, with 56 percent reporting understanding a fair amount or great deal about the issue. In the 2010 TAMAT survey, 93 percent of Israelis reported that they had heard of climate change, with 76 percent reporting that they understood climate change in a detailed way. The 2010 TAMAT survey did not, however, include factual questions to assess correct understanding of climate change. Note however, that this is not a statistical finding, and the questions were asked in different ways.

4.2 Correct understanding of climate change relates to levels of concern about climate change, policy support and pro-environmental behavior. Efficacy, institutional trust, religious and cultural beliefs also relate to these factors. The 2000 ISSP, 2009 BGU and 2010 Health surveys all illustrate that an accurate understanding of climate change, i.e. being aware of its human causes and likely impacts, relates to levels of concern, policy support and pro-environmental behavior. These findings thus offer empirical support for the ‘knowledge deficit’ hypothesis - that accurately understanding climate change will lead to concern and willingness to support and take action (O’Connor et al. 2002). This relationship between knowledge/ concern and behavior was more significant in the 2010 Health survey, although this could well have been influenced by the way the questions were posed and the survey instrument itself.71

However, this research also shows that this relationship may be moderated by other factors (Leiserowitz 2006; Dietz et al. 2007; Malka et al. 2009; Dunlap and McCright 2008; Kahan et al. 2012; Kellstedt et al. 2008). In 2009 BGU survey, those who trusted scientists and government officials to communicate to them about climate change were more likely to be concerned. Left-Right political alignment also related to levels of concern: very right wing Israelis were less concerned and very left wing Israelis were more concerned. A greater sense of self and collective efficacy and trust in green organisations, weather forecasters and new technologies were also related to support for a range of different climate policies and likelihood of pro- environmental behaviors. The 2009 BGU and 2010 Health surveys also suggest that

71 The 2009 BGU survey asked about likelihood of adopting climate friendly behaviors in the coming year, while the 2010 Health survey focused on behaviors already adopted. Already adopting behaviors does suggest a greater commitment to the environment overall which would include understanding the issues in greater depth. It was also clear from the wording and the placement of this item in the 2010 Health survey that the theme of the survey was the environment. In the 2009 BGU survey, these items were deliberately included early in the survey so that respondents would not be biased by the knowledge that this was an environmental survey. 112

convenience, economic factors and unique Israeli considerations such as army conscription, may relate to support for pro-environmental behavioral adoption.

4.3 Israelis perceive climate change as a threat to environment and one that threatens water shortages and health The 2000 and 2011 ISSP surveys found that almost all Israelis believed that climate change was a dangerous threat to the environment. The 2009 BGU and 2010 Health surveys both suggested that Israelis primarily perceived climate change as a threat that would cause water shortages and health consequences. They were less likely to perceive climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ to existing threats likely to result in worsening regional conflict or an influx of refugees. This suggests a lack of awareness of the observed connection between environmental disturbance and human migration and conflict (UNDP 1993). One could, however, cautiously interpret the 2011 ISSP survey finding that affiliates of Israeli right wing parties (which traditionally place greater emphasis on security issues) showed greater concern about climate change, as evidence of the increasing perception of climate change as a security threat.

The 2010 Haifa University word association survey suggested that the potential threat posed to Israel by climate change was not at the forefront of Israelis’ minds when thinking about climate change. Israelis were far more likely to associate climate change with spatially distant impacts, such as ice melting, rather than drought. Confirmation bias may explain this discrepancy i.e. Israelis do not make an automatic connection between climate change and water or health impacts; it is only clear when suggested (Shome and Marx 2009).

4.4 Both climate change scepticism and concern about climate change appear to have risen in Israel in recent years; ‘focusing events’ may have influenced this. A consistent minority of Israelis are sceptical about climate change. Longitudinal data showed that between 2007 and 2009 the number of Israelis who thought that climate change had natural causes almost doubled to 28 percent (Gallup WorldPoll 2007; 2009). In the 2010 Health survey, eight percent of Jewish Israelis indicated that they believed climate change was the invention of scientists and interested parties and eight percent stated that it had primarily natural causes. Although this may appear to be a decrease, a considerable ten percent also stated that they were unsure whether climate change was happening or not.

In the 2009 BGU survey, Israelis did not appear to be particularly concerned about climate change. Israelis placed climate change low on the public agenda compared to other important

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issues facing Israel just before the pivotal 2009 UN Climate conference in Copenhagen, and less than 50 percent of Israelis actively worried about it. Although not directly comparable, the 2010 Health survey, on the other hand, suggested that Jewish Israelis were considerably concern about climate change: 69 percent perceived it as a direct threat them and their family and 56 percent agreed that that climate change was already affecting their health. The Nielsen survey also found that concern about climate change in Israel had increased significantly between 2009 and 2011.

These results suggest a growing polarisation of views on climate change in Israel between those sceptical and those concerned about climate change. Birkland (1997) highlights the importance of focusing events, such as political crises and natural disasters in influencing public opinion and policy change. The 2009 Climategate scandal and the rise in scepticism in the Israeli media may have influenced growing climate scepticism (Leiserowitz et al. 2010).72 Meanwhile, years of drought, the long hot 2010 summer and its effect on food prices and the Carmel forest fires in December 2010 may have influenced growing concern.

4.5 Unique social groupings in Israel hold diverse perceptions of climate change The survey results support the hypothesis that different socio-demographics in Israel hold different perceptions of climate change. This includes different social groupings. For example, in the 2009 BGU survey, Israel’s Arab population reported significantly lower awareness and lower personal and collective efficacy than Israeli Jews. In the 2010 Health survey, immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union expressed greater scepticism about climate change than the rest of the population. In all the surveys, Israel’s Ultra-orthodox community knew less and were less concerned about climate change. In the 2011 ISSP survey, Jews living in the South of Israel were less concerned about climate change. This probably relates to the fact that it is one of the poorest regions of the country (Shatil 2011). These findings are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

There were no apparent differences among socio-demographics in the adoption of climate friendly behaviors. Although the 2009 BGU survey found that Ultra-orthodox Jews were more likely to use public transport, this was probably for economic rather than for ideological reasons.

72 The most public attack on climate science has been the so-called Climategate controversy in December 2009. This saw the publication of thousands of private emails between prominent climate scientists, seemingly providing evidence that they manipulated climate data and attempted to suppress critics. All the scientists involved were exonerated by subsequent enquiries (Pearce 2010). 114

4.6 Political alignment and affiliation influence Israeli climate perceptions Similarly to the USA, Canada and Australia political beliefs do appear to have influenced Israeli perceptions of climate change (Dunlap and McCright 2008; McCright 2011). However, these results suggest that this influence is both complex and evolving.

In the 2000 ISSP survey, affiliates of the mainstream right wing party, Likud; religious right wing parties (Shas, National Religious party) and Ultra-orthodox party, UTJ were significantly less likely to agree that burning of fossil fuels caused climate change. Similarly, in the 2009 BGU survey Israelis self-identified as ‘right-wing’ were more likely to believe that climate change had natural causes. In the same survey, ‘very right-wing’ Israelis were less worried about climate change and ‘very left-wing’ Israelis were more worried.

In both surveys, however, political identity and political affiliation were only weakly significant predictors. In the 2009 BGU survey, the right were also not actively opposed to climate policy measures or adopting environmental behaviors. This suggests that unlike in the USA, the Israeli right is not clearly ideologically opposed to climate legislation. The 2011 ISSP survey showed that by 2011 affiliates of right-wing parties were no less likely to be concerned about climate change than affiliates of any other parties, apart from affiliates of the UTJ Party. In fact, supporters of far-right political party, Israel Beiteinu, were significantly more likely to be concerned about climate change than any other political party.

Overall these findings suggest that in the 2009 BGU survey, rather than strongly- held opinion, the scepticism expressed by ‘right-wing’ Israelis was influenced by a poor understanding of the issue and the belief that other issues were far more concerning. From 2009 onwards, the ruling Likud Party and several right-wing religious factions have become far more engaged with climate change. The reasons for this are outlined in more detail in Chapter 4. The 2011 survey findings thus most probably reflect this shift.

4.7 Young Israelis are less engaged with climate change; those educated beyond high-school are more engaged The greenhouse effect has been taught routinely in Israel in 6th and 8th grade (ages 11 and 13) since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, in the 2009 BGU survey Israelis aged between 18 and 24 reported a significantly lower level of awareness about climate change and were more likely to state that climate change had natural causes. This age group was also less likely to support

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international action on climate change. In both the 2010 Health and 2010 TAMAT surveys, 18- 24 year olds were less likely to engage in environmental behaviors.

These findings are consistent with findings from the USA and Israel that suggest that recent school leavers have a poor understanding of environmental issues and do not engage in environmental behaviors (Negev et al. 2008; Yavetz et al. 2009; Feldman et al. 2010; Leiserowitz et al. 2011b). See literature review for more discussion.

These findings also support other Israeli findings that show that educational attainment is an important predictor of environmental engagement (Ne’eman-Abramovitz and Katz-Gerro 2006; Katz-Gerro 2009). In both the 2009 BGU and 2010 Health surveys, Israelis with higher education levels i.e. a vocational certificate or academic degree, demonstrated greater self- reported and assessed knowledge about climate change and were more likely to engage in pro- environmental behaviors. In the 2009 BGU survey, Israelis with an academic degree were also more likely to agree that climate change had human causes.

The 2009 BGU survey highlighted that Israelis with children were more likely to have heard of climate change, and this was not obviously a function of age or education. This suggests that Israelis with children are interested in issues that could affect their children’s future. Another explanation could be that Israeli children were educating their parents about climate change. Given the low level of self-reported knowledge by recent school leavers this explanation is less likely.

Israel’s mandatory conscription for Israeli citizens over the age of 18 may also account for weaker engagement with climate change by younger Israelis. Serving in the army i.e. facing many immediate personal threats, may be leading young Israelis to perceive climate change as a less pressing threat (Weber 2006). Living on army bases also limits the opportunity to engage in pro-environmental behavior. 73

73 In reality this accounts for only 50 percent of the population (Grinberg 2007). Arab citizens of Israel are exempt (although Druze citizens are conscripted). Other exceptions are made on religious, physical or psychological grounds as well as refusal, ‘low motivation’ and a criminal record. 116

4.8 Israelis believe that addressing the drought currently affecting Israel is a top priority; some associate the drought with climate change Considering Israeli public rhetoric around security, it is surprising that in the 2009 BGU survey Israelis placed water at the top of the national agenda above the economic situation, the Iran situation, swine flu and climate change.74 There was no obvious event related to Israel’s drought at the time of the survey that could have influenced perceptions. It may simply be that water shortages are a ‘consensus issue’ i.e. non-politically contentious issue, that most Israelis can agree is a serious problem. As noted earlier, in the 2009 BGU survey, 76 percent of Israelis who knew something about climate change agreed that drought and water shortages would worsen in Israel if nothing were done to address climate change. Likewise, in the 2010 Health survey 65 percent connected climate change with water shortages.

4.9 Gender is a strong predictor of perceiving climate change as a risk In the 2009 BGU survey, Jewish women were significantly more likely to agree that more of Israel’s problems would worsen if climate change were not addressed. As shown in the literature review, similar findings are observed in both the climate change literature and the literature on risk perception in Israel (Arian and Gordon 1993; Bar-Tal et al. 1995; O’Connor et al. 1999; Patchen 2006; Leiserowitz 2006; Malka et al. 2009; McCright 2010; Soffer et al. 2010). Nevertheless, Israeli women were no more actively worried than men about climate change in any of the surveys. One explanation provided by the 2009 BGU survey could be that women expressed a significantly stronger sense of collective efficacy than men.

4.10 Levels of trust in climate communicators reflects wider societal perceptions of institutional trust The 2009 BGU survey asked Israelis whom they trusted most to communicate to them accurately about climate change: scientists, green organisations, the media, weather forecasters or government officials. As discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4, Israelis tend to place high trust in scientists. It is therefore no surprise that Israelis placed greatest trust in scientists to communicate accurately to them about climate change. Trust in scientists was a significant predictor of support for Israel adopting stringent international GHG emissions reduction targets. Trust in scientists is also a widely observed positive predictor of climate change concern in the literature (Dietz et. al 2007; Malka et al. 2009).

74 This finding is consistent with Krosnick et al. (2006) who found that people only judge problems as serious for which they think action can be taken. Although water shortages do pose a direct threat to Israel, Israelis are also likely to be familiar with proposed solutions to the ongoing drought such as the expansion of seawater desalination facilities. 117

Ultra-orthodox Jews were, however, significantly less likely to trust scientists or the media to communicate to them about climate change. Right wing Israelis were also less likely to trust environmental organisations. See Chapter 4 for greater discussion of these findings.

Overall, the survey also found that Israelis placed high trust in green organisations and the low trust in government officials. These also reflect existing Israeli patterns. The Israeli public tends to distrust the government, its institutions and officials and trust in the Knesset is lower than in most Western democracies (KRIC and Dahaf Institute 2001; Rolef 2005; Arian et al. 2008). Trust in civil society groups such as green organisations has risen in Israel as trust in centralized institutions and establishment politics has declined (Shafir and Peled 2002; Arian et al. 2008).

American research has shown that weather forecasters enjoy a reasonable level of public trust especially around climate change communication, but are significantly more likely than climatologists to be sceptical about climate change (Maibach et al. 2011a). This is despite the fact meteorology and climatology involve different scientific approaches. Trust in weather forecasters in Israel is considerably lower (36 percent) than in the USA (56 percent in 2011). Although some Israeli meteorologists have expressed doubt about climate change publicly and privately, ANOVA analysis again showed that those who trusted weather forecasters were no more or less likely to be climate sceptics (IMS 2008; Pers Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011).

The mainstream American media also does not reflect the near-universal scientific consensus on climate change, instead giving the impression of an unresolved and balanced debate between ‘believers’ and ‘sceptics’, the so-called ‘balance as bias’ thesis (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). For this reason, those who trust the media to communicate to them about climate change may be receiving a confused message that amplifies climate scepticism (Kellstedt et al. 2008). This did not seem to be the case in Israel. ANOVA analysis again showed that those who trusted the media were no more or less likely to be climate sceptics.

Lack of trust in the United Nations, which oversees the international climate negotiations, may also have moderated Israeli support for international climate action (Nossek 2010). In a 2004 Gallup survey of 65 countries, 48 percent of Israelis expressed a negative opinion about the UN, the highest number of any country surveyed. The 2009 BGU survey did not, however, test for this. 118

4.11 The way climate change has been framed in Israel may have influenced popular perceptions As explored in subsequent chapters, the media, politicians and other opinion formers have framed climate change in diverse ways. One way it has been framed is as an economic opportunity to export Israeli cleantech and innovation. In the 2009 BGU survey Israelis displayed a comparatively high level of trust in new technologies to solve climate change: 52 percent of Israelis agreed that technology could solve climate change. In an identical question asked in the 2008 ‘Six Americas’ survey, only 30 percent of Americans agreed with such a statement (Leiserowitz et al. 2008).

This techno-optimistic belief appears to have influenced other beliefs about climate change. In the 2009 survey, techno-optimism is a significant positive predictor of high collective efficacy i.e. those who believed that new technology would solve climate change also believed that Israel could contribute to global efforts to address climate change. The survey results also showed that Israelis who trust technology were significantly less likely to support raising the price of fossil fuels. The possible influence of the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing on public opinion is explored in depth in Chapter 5.

4.12 Climate change as a problem for government and not individual action; Israelis may not understand their personal role in addressing climate change. In the 2009 BGU survey, Israelis expressed considerable support for stringent international emissions reduction targets, albeit over a long-time frame when it is unlikely to affect their quality of life. Despite apparent enthusiasm for climate action, Israelis were not keen to see climate policy directly affect their pockets through raising the price of fossil fuels. Israelis already pay high fuel prices and the global price of fuel rose rapidly during 2008, which could also have affected responses (GIZ 2009). The enthusiasm for climate policy also did not relate to likelihood of adopting climate friendly behaviors (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002).

The 2009 BGU survey found that overall Israelis were only moderately likely to adopt pro- environmental behaviors, and these were primarily simple actions, such as using the air conditioner more efficiently, rather than actions that reflected a lifestyle change or sacrifice. In addition, only half of Israelis expressed self-efficacy around climate change i.e. Israelis did not feel that taking personal action could reduce CO2 emissions. The perception of low self-efficacy

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may be supported by the few references made to pro-environmental behaviors in the Haifa University climate change word association survey.

Both the 2010 TAMAT survey and the 2010 Health survey found that by far the most popular environmental action was recycling. Recycling paper, glass, plastics, aluminium and steel can reduce CO2 emissions through avoided material production (EPA 2011). Recycling, however, still involves transportation and manufacturing that can increase CO2 emissions. Other measures such as switching to CFLs and more efficient appliance use would actually be far more effective in reducing GHG emissions (Gardner and Stern 2008).

These findings suggest that Israelis see climate change as a problem for government rather than for individual action or sacrifice. This explanation is supported by the fact that in the 2009 BGU survey Israelis expressed far greater national efficacy than personal efficacy i.e. they believed that the government could do something about climate change but not themselves personally. Note, however, that Israelis in general tend to express a strong sense of national efficacy (INSS 2007). Bagno-Moldavsky and Ben-Meir (2010), for example, found that the Jewish public is confident that Israel can cope successfully with any conceivable threat.

Of course, there are many complex reasons why people adopt certain behaviors that were not tested for in these surveys. Personal circumstance, environmental worldviews, habit, affect, personal experience, cultural values, social norms and structural limitations are all significant predictors for the adoption of environmental behavior (McKenzie-Mohr et al. 2000; Leiserowitz 2006; Shome and Marx 2009; Spence and Pidgeon 2010).

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Chapter 3: Climate change and the Israeli Media

1. Introduction Having explored Israeli public peceptions of climate change in the previous chapter, this chapter goes on to explore the major factor likely to be shaping these perceptions: the media. It begins from the premise that public views on complex policy debates such as climate change tend to be shaped by media coverage in interaction with other cultural forces (Nisbet 2009; Lakoff 2010). Chapter 3 presents further sociological data to contribute to a holistic picture of Israeli perceptions of climate change and how climate change has been framed in the Israeli media in order to answer to research questions (b) and (c). This chapter presents an in-depth study of Israeli media coverage of climate change. Section 2 contains descriptive findings from the 2009 BGU survey (see above) on sources trusted to communicate accurately on climate change. Section 3 presents a quantitative frame analysis of climate change coverage in six major Israeli news sources between 2007 and 2010: Ha’aretz, NRG, Ynet, Yediot Ahronot, Israel Hayom and Jerusalem Post.

2. Media and Climate change (‘2009 BGU’ survey) The 2009 BGU survey asked Israelis whether they trusted the media to communicate to them accurately about climate change - only 33 percent agreed (See Chapter 2; section 3.3).

Figure 19: Israeli major sources of climate information

20 37 Percent

24 23 10

6 6 4 0 Broadcast media Newspapers Internet Education system Other Don't know

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Figure 20: Major named news sources for information about climate change

16 14 13 14 11 12 10 9 9 9 10 8 6 5

Percent 6 4 3 4 2 1 1 2 0

Figures 19 shows that despite placing low trust in the media for accurate information on climate change, 59 percent named mainstream media sources (broadcast and newspapers) as their main source of information about climate change, specifying Channels 2 and 10, Yediot Ahronot and Ha’aretz, Ynet and educational TV channels as their major information sources (figure 20).

The survey analysis also explored whether any media source was related to any other finding in the survey. Only one relationship was statistically significant: Ha’aretz readers were significantly more likely to support raising the price of fossil fuels in order to reduce CO2 emissions. This response probably reflects the socio-economic status and political leanings of Ha’aretz readers as much as the actual Ha’aretz content.

3. Content analysis of Israeli media coverage of climate change (2007 – 2010)75

3.1 Research aims The aim of this research was threefold: to gain a general insight into Israeli media coverage of climate change; to identify the biases of different Israeli media sources; and to explore the relationship between Israeli media coverage and public opinion.

75 This research was presented at the Kinneret conference on social and environmental media, Kinneret College, May 4 2011 and at the social and environmental media research seminar, Dept. of Communications, College of Management, Rishon LeZion, 22 May 2011 122

3.2 Research methods Six major news sources were analyzed for this research, representing different facets of the mainstream media in Israel. Similar to the majority of research on climate change coverage by the media, this primarily focused on print and internet coverage (c.f Trumbo 1996; McComas and Shanahan 1999; Brossard et al. 2004; Antilla 2005; Carvalho and Burgess 2005; Takahashi 2008; Boykoff 2010; Achchong and Dodds 2012; Billet 2009; Dirikx and Gelders 2010). The focus on print media also reflected the very limited coverage of climate change on mainstream Israeli TV channels (Pers. Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011; Zafrir Rinat 2011; Aviv Lavie 2012). See Appendix II for a list of Israeli TV coverage of climate change (2007 and 2010).

The time frame was limited to 2007 – 2010. Although the Israeli media has covered climate change since the mid-1990s, this time frame coincides with a dramatic increase in news coverage both in Israel and globally (Boykoff 2010). The increase in Israel reflected the beginning of Israeli political engagement with the issue and was also partially technical: Israel Hayom was launched in August 2007; and Ma’ariv/NRG and the Jerusalem Post hired their first full-time environment correspondents at the start of this period. Ha’aretz, Ynet and Yediot Ahronot already had dedicated correspondents.

3.2.1 Prestige media sources: Ha’aretz (English The Land) A majority of academic research on climate change media coverage has focused on the prestige or quality media. This is because these sources usually employ specialist science and environment correspondents and the coverage is usually of higher quality (Boykoff and Mansfield 2008). One media source included in this analysis can be described as a prestige media source: Ha’aretz.

Founded in 1918, Ha’aretz is a privately owned commercial daily broadsheet.76 The company describes itself as broadly liberal on domestic and international issues (Ha’aretz website 2012). Although it is has relatively low circulation figures (around 65,000 copies on weekdays and 75,000 copies at weekends) Ha’aretz is widely read by the Israeli liberal intellectual elite and policymakers (Nossek 2007; Pers. Comm. Zafrir Rinat 2011).77

76 A broadsheet is a newspaper format that is usually characterized by long vertical pages. Beyond their size, broadsheet papers tend to employ serious tone (Oxford English Dictionary 2012). 77 Ha’aretz does not publicly disclose its full circulation figures. See more discussion below. 123

The paper publishes a daily printed Hebrew language edition, including standalone business supplement, The Marker. It also publishes a daily English language version sold together with the International Herald Tribune. Ha’aretz has English and Hebrew language websites, both of which have independent editorial control. The Hebrew language website publishes most of the articles from the print edition and carries additional content (Pers. Comm. Zafrir Rinat 2011).

The paper is 60 percent owned by the Schocken publishing family; 20 percent owned by German publishing company, DuMont Schauberg, and 20 percent by Russian Israeli businessman, Leonid Nevzlin who acquired his stake in June 2011 (Ha’aretz website 2012).78

Ha’aretz has covered climate change consistently since 1995.79 Current environmental correspondent, Zafrir Rinat, joined the paper in 1994. Other long-term contributors include hydrologist Arie Issar and environmentalist and academic, Dan Rabinowitz.

3.2.2 Tabloid newspaper coverage Less research has focused on tabloid newspaper coverage of climate change.80 This is despite the fact that large segments of the population reads these papers and they are traditionally shared in public spaces, which significantly increases their readership. Although tabloid coverage of climate change may be less extensive, they are nevertheless more likely to influence public opinion. Boykoff and Mansfield (2008) have shown how between 2000 and 2006, British tabloids framed climate change primarily through weather events, charismatic mega-fauna and a focus on political actors and rhetoric rather than more complex analysis. Alarmist headlines with tones of fear, misery and doom were also prevalent.

Israel’s three high circulation daily newspapers Yediot Ahronot, Ma’ariv and Israel Hayom are tabloid newspapers. In common with the tabloid format, they have bold headlines, large pictures, a tendency to sensationalize issues and an emphasis on domestic stories especially related to scandal and conflict (Boykoff and Mansfield 2008; pers. comm. Hillel Nossek 2009). Unlike some tabloid papers, which focus solely on entertainment, these papers can also be described as ‘middle-market newspapers’. They also contain serious news coverage and

78 Nevzlin, a Russian oligarch and Israeli philanthropist, was previously a high-ranking oil executive and currently faces criminal investigations in Russia (Golan 2011). 79 The first article on climate change in the Ha’aretz archives was “Come let’s decide before it gets too hot” Zafrir Rinat Ha’aretz 3 Mar 1995. 80 A tabloid newspaper is half the size of the average broadsheet, typically popular in style and dominated by sensational stories (Oxford English Dictionary 2012). 124

influence national agenda- setting, with leading political figures writing regular columns. Ma’ariv is described in the proceeding section on internet news portals.

3.2.2.1 Yediot Ahronot (English Latest News) Yediot Ahronot, founded in 1939, is a privately owned mass circulation newspaper (weekday circulation 300,000 copies and weekend circulation 600,000 copies) (Nossek 2007). The political orientation of the paper can be described as centrist, with a bias towards Kadima and against Netanyahu in the 2009 Israeli elections (Arian et al. 2008; 2009). Yediot Ahronot has a dedicated environmental correspondent Amir Ben David who was originally a police reporter (Pers. Comm. Amir Ben David 2011). The Mozes family founded and owns the Yediot Ahronot Group which also partially owns two commercial TV channels (Channel 2 and Hot); weekly local newspapers, Yediot Tikshoret; Vesti, a Russian language newspaper; and magazines.

3.2.2.2 Israel Hayom (English Israel Today) Israel Hayom was founded in August 2007. As Israel’s first free daily newspaper it quickly gained a very high exposure rate (Averbach 2010). The paper prints 275,000 copies on weekdays and 350,000 at weekends and it is distributed throughout the country in residences, workplaces, public locations and on public transport (Israel Hayom website 2012). Research shows that the paper is biased towards Netanyahu and the Likud party (Israeli Democracy Institute 2008; 2009). It also has a dedicated environment correspondent, Dan Lavie.

American gambling billionaire, Sheldon Adelson, owns Israel Hayom. Adelson, who describes himself as very right wing, is a strong supporter of Israel’s Likud Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. He is also a major funder of the US Republican Party (Institute for Policy Studies 2012).

3.2.3 Internet news portals81 The internet has become an important news medium (Gerhards and Shafer 2009). It is becoming more accessible, used more often and is increasingly considered as a legitimate news source. Many researchers perceive the internet as having the means to transform societal communication because it gives actors with fewer resources access to a broad stage, and provides a forum for discussion. Internet news portals can carry significantly more information than their printed counterparts. This can, however, create information overload with readers having to seek out

81 Other important Israeli internet news portals not included in this analysis include Walla! (which sources its news coverage from Ha’aretz and increasingly from its own independent news and editorial staff) and Mako (which is owned by Keshet, one of the two franchisee holders of Channel 2). 125

specialized news articles rather than simply being exposed to them, as happens in a newspaper (Allan 2006; Trench 2007).

3.2.3.1 Ynet Ynet was launched in 2000. Although it is owned by Israeli daily tabloid, Yediot Ahronot, all of Ynet’s content is original, written by independent staff and published exclusively on the website. According to Alexa internet traffic rankings, Ynet is among the top five most visited internet sites in Israel (Alexa 2010). Ynet has two environmental correspondents Yael Darel (who left Ynet to become the energy correspondent of Ma’ariv at the end of 2011) and Ronen Bodoni.

3.2.3.2 NRG Privately owned Ma’ariv (English Evening Prayer) is Israel’s third highest circulation daily tabloid (160,000 on weekdays and 270,000 on weekends) (Ma’ariv 2010). It is considered the most right- wing of Israel’s mainstream tabloid papers (Sheizaf 2011). The Ma’ariv media group also owns the semi-independent website, NRG, that publishes the articles from the print edition as well as additional content. This research focused on NRG articles.

In February 2008, Ma’ariv hired public intellectual and environmental activist, Aviv Lavie, as its environmental correspondent and commentator. Climate sceptic Gabriel Avital also wrote a weekly column in NRG for eight years.

The Ma’ariv media group also owns a nationwide chain of local newspapers and a magazines division. In March 2011, Israeli billionaire, Nochi Dankner acquired Ma’ariv. Dankner owns one of Israel’s largest diversified business groups with interests in insurance, biotech and finance.

3.2.4 English language newspapers: Jerusalem Post Although it has a low circulation within Israel, the Jerusalem Post is widely read in English- speaking Jewish communities and does influence how Israel is perceived internationally (Pers. comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011). Founded in 1932, the newspaper’s circulation is roughly 30,000 during the week and 50,000 at the weekend. It also publishes a weekly English international edition with circulation of 70,000 and a French international edition with circulation of 7,500 (Pers. comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011). The Jerusalem Post newspaper is also published online at JPost.com. Mirkaei Tikshoret, one of Israel’s largest media groups owns the newspaper (Jerusalem Post website 2012).

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The paper features both liberal and conservative columnists (Nossek 2007). In October 2007, the paper hired Ehud Zion Waldoks as its first full-time environment correspondent. He was succeeded by Sharon Udasin in March 2011.

3.2.5 Comparative importance of each news source Since not all Israeli newspapers publicly disclose their circulation rates, the most relevant measure to establish the comparative importance of each Israeli news source is ‘exposure rate’.82 83 See Table 33.

Table 33: Exposure rate for top four Israeli newspapers, July 2010 July 2009- July 2010

Newspaper Weekday edition (%) Weekend edition (%) Israel Hayom 30.4 25.7 (launched Jan 2010) Yediot Ahronot 34.3 46 Ma’ariv 13.1 16.7 Ha’aretz 6.5 7.9

3.2.6 Identifying news articles Relevant articles were identified using the Hebrew search terms ‘global warming’, ‘climate change’ and ‘greenhouse gas’. The entire archive of Israel Hayom, Jerusalem Post, YNET and NRG are available digitally online. Ha’aretz articles were accessed through the search database at the Ha’aretz archives in Tel Aviv. Since Yediot Ahronot would not grant access to their news archive, articles were identified using the search database at the national newspaper archives at Beit Ariela library in Tel Aviv although this only allowed searches for articles already tagged by the librarians. Once identified, articles were read and those where climate change was the main topic or joint main topic, were included in the analysis. See Table 2.

Table 34: Number of climate change news articles (2007-2010) by news source News source No. of articles

Ynet 488

82 This figure is established by a bi-annual nationally representative self-administered survey of Israeli adults (18+) (n=5000) conducted by TGI media research (Israel). www.news1.co.il/RedirectToFile.aspx?FileID=2393. For more details of the methodology see http://www.tgi.co.il/tgi/www/mutsarim-p2.html 83 Only Israel Hayom and Ma’ariv publish their circulation figures. 127

Ha’aretz 297 NRG 225 Jerusalem Post 182 Israel Hayom 44 Yediot Ahronot 27 Total 1263

3.2.7 Frame analysis This research used qualitative frame analysis to gain an insight into Israeli perceptions of climate change and the different biases of Israeli media sources. As noted in the literature review, frame analysis has been widely employed to understand climate change communication. Since existing climate framings discussed in the literature (e.g. Nisbet 2009) did not fit well with Israeli media coverage, the frames were determined using an interpretative approach.84 Based on an initial inductive coding of 100 articles selected at random, the research identified 13 key frames. The remaining articles were then read in their entirety and frames ascribed based on general topic, terminology used and individuals cited. Each article was ascribed one or two frames as necessary to capture the richness of the coverage (Boykoff and Mansfield 2008). The frames were divided into diagnostic and prognostic frames: the former referring to the main characteristic of an issue and attribution of blame; the latter focusing on solutions and reasons for action (Tynkkynen 2010).

Table 35: List of media frames

Diagnostic Frame Explanation 1 Science Climate change as a scientific issue. 2 Overt scepticism Climate change is either not happening or not caused by humans. 3 Global impacts Climate change will or may be already affecting the globe, or specific locations, populations and species. 4 Local impacts Climate change as a problem for Israel and the region. 5 Israel as GHG emitter Israel as a GHG emitter responsible for reducing emissions.

84 Nisbet’s typology of frames include ‘social progress’; ‘economic development and competitiveness’; ‘morality and ethics’; ‘scientific and technical uncertainty’; ‘Pandora’s box’; ‘public accountability and governance’; ‘middle way/alternative path’; ‘conflict and strategy’. The lack of fit with Israeli media relates to the greater emphasis on climate policy and skepticism in the USA. The Israeli debate is instead mainly directed by international events. 128

Prognostic Frame Explanation

International Climate change as an international problem to be addressed in

1 politics forums such as the UN or G8. Climate change as a problem that must be addressed through

2 Israeli policy introducing effective national policy. Addressing climate change as an opportunity to increase Israeli Israel cleantech exports, wean the world off oil and to improve Israel’s

3 opportunity public image abroad. Climate change as a problem that can be addressed by changing

4 Green lifestyles personal behavior. Climate change as a problem that can be addressed by local

5 Local climate action campaigns or local authority action. Technological Climate change as a problem that can be solved by technology:

6 solutions mitigation, adaptation or geo-engineering. Several technical articles on the economics of climate change

7 Economics cannot be explained by other frames. Climate change as a problem that must be addressed for moral

8 Morality and ethics and ethical reasons, including Jewish perspectives.

3.2.8 Alarming and reassuring tone and content The analysis also explored the extent to which the tone and content of the coverage was alarming or reassuring (Ereaut and Segnit 2006; Smith and Joffe 2009; Carvalho and Pereira 2008). This was measured on a five-point scale categorized as follows: 1 (very alarming); 2 (moderately alarming); 3 (Neutral); 4 (moderately reassuring); and 5 (very reassuring). Very alarming articles were defined as those employing an alarming and urgent tone. Very reassuring articles were defined as those employing a reassuring tone e.g. dismissing or ridiculing the idea that climate change is happening or strongly expressing the belief that climate change can be solved by technology alone.

3.3 Results

3.3.1 Timeline of climate coverage Figure 21 illustrates the quantity of climate change media coverage between 2007 and 2010. The small peak at the end of 2007 coincided with two newsworthy events, Al Gore and the IPCC

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winning the Nobel Peace Prize and the UN climate conference in Bali. The major peak in coverage was in December 2009, around the UN climate conference in Copenhagen. After the conference media attention fell back to pre-Copenhagen levels of roughly 20 articles per month.

Figure 21: Timeline of media coverage by number of articles (2007-2010)

250 UN Copenhagen conference and 200 IPCC 4AR released; Al Climategate Avital sacked; Gore & IPCC Nobel Prize; Climate policy; UN Bali conference Carmel forest 150 ires; Extreme Al Gore in Israel; weather globally Cleantech buzz 100 No. of articles 50

0 Jul Jul Jul Jul Jan Jan Jan Jan Nov Nov Nov Nov Mar Mar Mar Mar May May May May Sept Sept Sept Sept 2007 2008 2009 2010

The slight increase towards the end of 2010 coincided with extreme weather events, including the Carmel forest fires in Israel; the announcement of Israel’s climate policy; and the controversy around the dismissal of Israeli climate sceptic, Gabriel Avital, as Chief Scientist of the Education Ministry. Other small peaks in news coverage included Al Gore’s visit to Israel in May 2008 and the UN climate conference in Poznan in December 2008.

3.3.2 Key frames Figure 22 shows the most popular frames occurring during this period. International politics was by far the most popular, accounting for a quarter of all frames. Global impact was the next most popular frame, followed by the scientific and national policy frames (both 13 percent), and Israel opportunity frame (11 percent). Sceptical frames account for ten percent, while only six percent framed Israel as a GHG emitter. Five percent focused on local action and four percent of frames focused on lifestyle and behaviors. Only two percent focused on morality and ethics.

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Figure 22: Total number of occurrences of each frame

International 393 Global impact 234 Scientiic 169 Israel policy 168 Israel opportunity 138 Scepticism 126 Local impact 100 General technological solutions 79 Israel as polluter 77 Local campaign 62 Lifestyle and behavior 54 Morality and ethics 24 Economics 17

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450

Note that each article may have either one or two frames.

3.3.3 Articles framing climate change as relevant for Israelis Table 36 shows the number of articles (by news source) that sought to portray climate change as an issue relevant for Israelis. These included articles using the local impact, Israel policy, local action and Israel as a GHG emitter frames; articles written by Israeli scientists or sceptics; interviews with international figures visiting Israel; articles on Jewish ethics, and articles about international events with a local angle. This accounted for only 41 percent of all articles.

Table 36: Israel relevant articles by newspaper Israel relevant Percent of total (no. of articles) coverage

Jerusalem Post 97 53 NRG 103 46 Ha’aretz 132 44 Israel Hayom 18 41 Yediot Ahronot 10 37 Ynet 156 32 Total 516 41

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3.3.4 Frequently mentioned events, people and places Table 37 shows that UN conferences were the most frequently mentioned climate change-related events. The 2009 UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen generated 155 articles alone (compared to an overall average of 20 articles per month). Al Gore, who visited Israel in May 2008, was the most frequently named and quoted individual. The controversy around the Ashkelon power station also featured prominently.

Table 37: Most frequently mentioned events, people and places

Topic Number of articles

UN conferences (Copenhagen, Bali, Poznan and 208 other minor conferences) Al Gore 41 Ashkelon power station 31 Earth Hour 11

3.3.5 Most frequently mentioned impacts of climate change Table 38 shows that the most frequently mentioned impact of climate change were polar icecaps or glaciers melting. This was followed by references to global stability and security. There were fewer references to the impacts that are predicted to and may be already affecting Israel such as drought and water shortages; temperature extremes; the Carmel forest fires; sea level rise and jellyfish.

Table 38: Most frequently mentioned climate impacts Climate impact Number of articles

Ice melting 56 Global stability and security 26 Drought and water crisis 22 Temperature extremes 18 Carmel forest fires 15 Israeli security (incl. possible threats to 11 peace and climate refugees) Sea level rise 5 Jellyfish invasion 5

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3.3.6 Most prominent climate change communicators Table 39 shows that Tel Aviv University social scientist and environmentalist Dan Rabinowitz was the most prolific communicator about climate change in the Israeli media, appearing in all news sources bar Israel Hayom. Zafrir Rinat cites Rabinowitz as a pioneer in bringing the issue to public attention (Pers. Comm. Zafrir Rinat 2011).

Table 39: Top ten Israel climate change communicators across all media sources85

Total number of articles Professor Dan Rabinowitz 34 Gabriel Avital 20 President Shimon Peres 19 Environment Minister Gilad Erdan 18 Tzipi Isser-Itzik 13 Yeshayahu Bar-Or 11 Environment Minister Gidon Ezra 11 Professor Nir Shaviv 10 MK Dov Khenin 9 MK Ophir Pines Paz 8 Former Israel Union for Environmental Defense (IUED) director, Tzipi Isser-Itzik, was the only other environmentalist to feature on the list of ten most prominent communicators. The environment correspondents interviewed noted that IUED was very active in issuing press releases and always available for comment (pers. comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011; Zafrir Rinat 2011).

Government officials and politicians were also prominent communicators including President Shimon Peres, Environment Minister Gilad Erdan, former Environment Minister Gidon Ezra and MK’s Dov Khenin and Ophir Pines-Paz. The list contains two scientists, Nir Shaviv, and Environment Ministry Chief Scientist, Yeshayahu Bar Or.

85 This list includes those who have written op-eds and articles as well as those quoted in news sources themselves. Environmental correspondents were not included. 133

Figure 23: Major groups communicating about climate change in the media

100

50 86

25 54 37 36 17 6 0

Figure 23 shows that environmentalists were the most prominent communicators about climate change. Besides Rabinowitz and Isser-Itzik, this group also included Alona Caro-Sheffer former director of Life and Environment and presently Director General of the Environment Ministry; academic and KKL board member, Orr Karassin; academic and environmentalist Alon Tal; Israel Energy Forum and Greenpeace.

Natural scientists and climate sceptics communicated in the Israeli media a similar number of times, illustrating that climate scepticism was given greater prominence in the Israeli media than is warranted, given the almost universally-held scientific consensus. Besides Bar-Or, the scientists included climatologists Pinhas Alpert, Daniel Rosenfeld, Alon Angert and Arie Issar. The one business entrepreneur who spoke prominently about climate change was Better Place CEO, Shai Agassi.

Figure 24 shows that Israel Hayom had the greatest number of climate sceptics communicating while Ynet had the greatest number of environmental campaigners communicating. Natural scientists accounted for 31 percent of Ha’aretz communicators but only 10 percent of Israel Hayom. Ynet coverage included none of the most prominent Israeli scientists, although it did cover Israeli scientific research.

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Figure 24: Major climate communicators across selected news sources86

100%

90% 18 23 80% 40 28 21 70% 18 Entrepreneurs 9 60% Politicians 5 39 50% Government oficials 27 40% 32 Sceptics 50 Environmentalists 30% 56 23 20% Natural scientists 31 10% 23 0 10 13 0% 0 Ha'aretz Jerusalem Israel Ynet NRG Post Hayom

3.3.7 Coverage of frames by media source Table 40 shows that international politics and global impact frames accounted for almost half of Israel Hayom and Ynet frames and a third of Ha’aretz and Jerusalem Post frames. The morality and ethics frame was most strongly associated with Jerusalem Post. Ynet and NRG were most likely to use the local action frame, and Ynet was most likely to use the Israel as a GHG emitter frame. Ha’aretz and Jerusalem Post were most likely to use the Israel opportunity frame. Climate scepticism accounted for 21 percent of Israel Hayom’s frames but was a far less prominent in Ynet or Jerusalem Post.

Table 40: Coverage of frames by media source (by percent) Ynet Ha’aretz NRG Jerusalem Israel Yediot Frame Post Hayom Ahronot International 27 21 19 27 30 20 Global impact 17 13 18 4 18 29 Israel policy 9 12 10 13 5 14 Scientific 12 7 11 11 9 9 Local impact 4 6 7 8 7 9

86 Yediot Ahronot was excluded because in the small sample of articles only three communicators were mentioned. 135

Scepticism 6 9 10 4 21 14 Local campaign 4 1 7 4 2 0 General technology 2 12 4 2 0 3 Israel opportunity 5 12 6 17 4 0 Lifestyle and behavior 5 3 2 0 5 3 Israel as polluter 8 2 2 5 0 0 Morality and ethics 0 1 2 5 0 0 Economics 1 1 2 1 0 0

3.3.8 The climate scepticism frame Of the 126 articles using the climate scepticism frame, only 15 were authored by climate sceptics. These included US Republican presidential hopeful Sarah Palin (an article translated from The New York Times); Boaz Arad from Libertarian think-tank, The Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies; Hebrew University professor, Nir Shaviv; and Gabriel Avital writing in Israel Hayom, NRG and Ynet.

Other articles included profiles of Israeli sceptics, Nir Shaviv (6 articles) and Gabriel Avital (11 articles) and profiles of famous sceptics visiting Israel such as Danish economist, Bjorn Lomborg.87 There were also articles about the Heartland Institute conference, an international gathering of climate sceptics and the controversial TV documentary, ‘The Great Global Warming Swindle’.

Ha’aretz, NRG, Ynet and Israel Hayom all included articles pitting Israeli scientists supporting the consensus position on climate change against Israeli climate sceptics. Regular environmental commentators Aviv Lavie, Dan Rabinowitz and Arie Issar also wrote articles responding to Israeli climate sceptics.

3.3.9 Local and global prognostic and diagnostic frames Overall, the Israeli media focused more on prognostic frames than diagnostic frames mainly due the large number of international politics frames. Figure 25 compares global prognostic and diagnostic frames, with local prognostic and diagnostic frames over the four years surveyed.

87 Note that on his second visit to Israel in 2010, Lomborg stated that he was no longer a climate sceptic. 136

Local diagnostic frames define climate change as a local problem e.g. Israel impacts and Israel as polluter and local prognostic frames highlight local solutions e.g. Israel policy and local action.

Figure 25 shows that the pattern of coverage of Israeli engagement with climate change (i.e. local prognosis frames) clearly follows specific UN global events addressing climate change (i.e. global prognosis frames). This is especially evident around the UN climate conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, but also around the Bali conference in December 2007. This reflects how local politicians, environmentalists and environmental correspondents used these global events to bring attention to local issues, such as lack of Israeli climate policy and the Ashkelon power station.

Figure 25: Local and global prognostic and diagnostic frames (2007 – 2010)

Global Diagnosis Global Prognosis Local Diagnosis Local Prognosis

175

150

125

100

No.of articles 50

0 Jan Jan Jan Jan July July July July Nov Nov Nov Nov Mar Mar Mar Mar May May May May Sept Sept Sept Sept 2007 2008 2009 2010

The local prognosis frame also followed local focusing events, such as the visit of Al Gore to Israel in mid-2008; the formation of the new Israeli government in spring 2009; and three local focusing events at the end of 2010, the dismissal of Gabriel Avital, the announcement of Israel’s climate policy and the Carmel forest fires.

Figure 25 also reveals that during this period, the Israeli media focused more on Israeli responses to climate change than on diagnosing or characterizing the problem from a local perspective. The largest number of local diagnosis frames appeared towards the end of 2010 reflecting both the Carmel forest fires and an increase in discussion around climate change scepticism generated by Gabriel Avital.

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3.3.10 Alarming and reassuring coverage The majority of Israeli climate media coverage was neutral in tone and content, although this differed by news source. ‘Alarming’ articles were mostly related to real or potential climate impacts while ‘reassuring’ articles mostly related to climate change scepticism. Figure 26 shows that Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz coverage was primarily neutral; while Yediot Ahronot was both the most alarming and the most reassuring news source.

Figure 26: Alarming and reassuring tone and content by new sources

100% 15

75% 44 45 19 58 36 Very reassuring 50% 71 22 Reassuring Neutral 25% 45 40 36 24 33 Alarming 15 0% Very alarming

3.3.1 Media coverage by specific news source

3.3.11.1 Ha’aretz “I don’t think that climate change will gain an important place in the Israeli agenda unless we can demonstrate its relationship to economics or security issues” (Pers. Comm. Zafrir Rinat 2011).

Ha’aretz newspaper contained extensive coverage of climate change. It closely followed international climate-related events and the development of domestic climate policy. Zafrir Rinat Ha’aretz environment correspondent contributed 51 articles; an additional 65 articles were taken from press agencies or were direct translations into Hebrew from the International Herald Tribune, The Guardian and New York Times; and the remainder were op-eds or coverage in different sections of the newspaper such as the weekend supplement or the culture section, Galeria.

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This extensive coverage reflects a long-term commitment to environmental issues. Ha’aretz has had a dedicated environment correspondent for twenty years. There was also a surprising amount of coverage in the Ha’aretz business section, The Marker (59 articles) following a 2007 editorial commitment. “The failure to take a stand is the most extreme stand. And when it comes to the environment, there's nothing like continuous erosion to create irreversible damage to our planet, to our country and to ourselves. Therefore we at The Marker and throughout the Haaretz Group have made the strategic decision to take a stand. We are adopting the environment as a flagship issue” (The Marker 2007).

Figure 27 shows that the Israel opportunity framing was one of the most prevalent frames in Ha’aretz and The Marker. This included articles with titles such as “Israel is a world power in dealing with the greenhouse effect” (2 May 2007); “Climate change has never looked more economic” (30 Oct 2007); and “Greenhouse gas emissions: the next hot commodity” (11 Jan 2010). The general technology frame was also most prevalent in Ha’aretz and included articles about geo-engineering and translated articles by American climate techno-optimists, Stewart Brand and Thomas Friedman.

Rinat explains how his coverage deliberately emphasized the benefits of adopting climate policy. “Climate change is very important globally but locally it is hard to explain why Israelis should make any sacrifice when we are such small contributors. What I’ve been trying to do (and I believe in it, it is not just a tactical move!) is to emphasize the additional benefits of climate change policy (Pers. Comm Zafrir Rinat 2010).

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Figure 27: Ha’aretz top five news frames (2007-2010)

40 International 30 General technology Global impact

Percent 20 Israel opportunity Israel policy 10

0 2007 2008 2009 2010

Overall, Ha’aretz coverage of climate change was sophisticated, reflecting the interests of its small but environmentally engaged readership. As such it would have played little role in shaping wider public opinion. However, the focus on climate change as an economic and wider environmental opportunity may well have influenced Israeli policy makers (Zafrir Rinat Pers. Comm 2010).

3.3.11.2 Israel Hayom There are two notable features of Israel Hayom coverage. First, the dearth of articles on the subject, only 44 articles in total; and second, as shown in Figure 28, the fact that three frames (international politics, global impact and scepticism) accounted for almost 70 percent of coverage. Israel Hayom’s coverage drew primarily on material from newswires. Other contributors included environment correspondent, Dan Lavie, international correspondents and guest editorials and op- eds.

The limited number of articles can partially be explained by the fact that Israel Hayom was only launched in August 2007. Dan Lavie, however, had another explanation. Comparing Israel Hayom coverage with other Israeli papers, he argued “They accept the assumption of global warming as a given. The paper I work for doesn’t make this automatic assumption. This is an important and principled stand.” (Pers. Comm. Dan Lavie 2011).

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This sceptical viewpoint was especially evident in the eight articles published about the UN Summit in Copenhagen 2009. According to Dan Lavie, “during those two weeks in December we presented the opposing opinions. The traditional green line, that global warming is dangerous and concerning and the other that even if there is warming, it is doubtful whether humans are responsible.” (Pers. Comm. Dan Lavie 2011). Israel Hayom’s coverage was in fact, fairly one- sided. It includes a ‘balance as bias’ article “The Earth is heating up and so are the experts” (11 Dec 2009); an article entitled “Don’t panic: Could the Greens be over-reacting?” (8 Dec 2009); an article highlighting the economic cost of addressing climate change, “Green is costly” (11 Dec 2009); an article by Gabriel Avital; and two articles by Dan Lavie on the failure of the Summit and the Climategate controversy.

Figure 28: Israel Hayom top three frames 2007 - 2010

6 International Skepticism 4 Global impact

0 2007 2008 2009 2010

Israel Hayom made little attempt to make climate change locally relevant, although one article did frame climate change as an economic opportunity (“A new light on Ben-Gurion’s vision” Aug 29 2007). Articles about the possible global impacts of climate change were also not alarming, focusing for example, on the possibility of no snow at the Winter Olympics and the disappearance of an island of disputed ownership between Bangladesh and India because of sea-level rise. The paper also carried two articles about the positive economic and geo-strategic benefits of the Arctic Northern Passage melting.

3.3.11.3 Yediot Ahronot The Yediot Ahronot archive is not publicly available and environment correspondent, Amir Ben David, did not agree to be interviewed for this research. It is thus unclear how representative the

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27 articles identified in the public archives were of the overall coverage. Figure 29 shows that the main frames identified in this sample were global impacts, international, Israel policy and scepticism.

Figure 29: Yediot Ahronot top four frames (2007-2010)

5 Global impact 4 International 3 Israel policy 2 Skepticism 1

0 2007 2008 2009 2010

Despite the small sample, it was clear that paper employed a sensationalist tone (a third of the articles were ‘very alarming’), which reflects the general personality of the paper. Other media commentators noted that the paper took an active interest in promoting domestic climate change policy (Pers. Comm. Zafrir Rinat 2011; Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011; Aviv Lavie 2012; Alon Tal 2012).

3.3.11.4 Ynet Ynet published by far the most articles about climate change of any of the news sources examined (488 articles). Of these, 37 percent were translated directly from international news wires and 19 percent were simply attributed to Ynet. Ynet environment correspondent, Yael Darel, contributed 62 articles; Ronen Bodoni contributed 34 articles and Dan Rabinowitz contributed 20 articles. Ynet also included 15 guest op-eds contributed by environmentalists, including MKs and academics.

As illustrated in figure 30, more than any other news source, Ynet framed climate change as a local issue: Israel as GHG emitter (49 articles), Israel policy (48 articles) and local action (27 articles). Ynet also covered the controversy around the establishment of a coal-fired power plant in Ashkelon in great depth (24 articles). Ynet also included extensive coverage of all four UN climate conferences that took place from 2007 to 2010, including 73 articles about the

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Copenhagen conference. However, the majority of these articles came from international newswires and there was little attempt to make these relevant to the local context. The coverage was also repetitious. For example, there were three articles about Netanyahu’s decision not to go the Copenhagen conference, six articles about arrests during protests at the conference and numerous op-eds by environmental commentators.

Figure 30: Ynet top four frames (2007 – 2010)

120

100

80 International

60 Global impact Israel policy 40 Israel as GHG emitter 20

0 2007 2008 2009 2010

Although the Israel opportunity frame was less evident here than it was in other news sources, Ynet did include some interesting articles framing climate change in this way. These included “The engine that will save the economy is painted green” by Alona Caro-Sheffer (3 Dec 2008) and “Take advantage of the climate crisis and lead to a greener world” by IUED spokesman Aviad Oren (23 Dec 2009).

Ynet coverage also included some fairly sophisticated climate policy discussions. For instance, it published a series of articles debating whether the electric car would actually reduce GHG emissions. Ynet also used the celebrity ‘hook’. For example, an article about Arnold Schwarznegger’s visit to Israel is entitled “Schwarznegger: Greenhouse gases are not sexy: that’s the problem” (16 Nov 2009).

Overall, Ynet’s coverage of climate change was thorough with a particular focus on locally relevant policy discussion. Ynet also provided a platform for Israeli environmentalists, with relatively few articles about climate scepticism and only four articles written from a sceptical perspective.

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3.3.11.5 NRG/ Ma’ariv The increase in climate change coverage in NRG from 2008 onwards can be partly attributed to the appointment of Aviv Lavie, who was employed not only as an environmental correspondent (with a weekly two-page column in Ma’ariv supplement) but also as a commentator. Lavie explains however, that he was not hired as the result of a reasoned editorial decision, rather at the initiative of a specific editor (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012). Overall, Aviv Lavie contributed 33 articles; science correspondent, Alex Doron contributed 34 articles; and 39 articles were taken from international newswires (relatively few compared to the other news sources). Other correspondents and guest op-ed writers contributed the remainder.

NRG coverage was spread fairly evenly across all the frames. (see Figure 31) There was however, a steady increase in the scepticism frame from 2008 onwards. This can be attributed the fact that prominent Israeli climate sceptic Gabriel Avital wrote a weekly column during this period, and because of the controversy around his appointment as the Chief Scientist of the Education Ministry in February 2010. Avital’s dismissal from his position in October 2010 was officially the result of an interview he gave in Ma’ariv, “The Chief Scientist opens the school year” (28 Aug 2010). Despite the considerable discussion around climate scepticism in NRG, in another article, writer Yaki Menschenfreund criticises Yediot Ahronot for being sceptical about climate change (“Warming up the imagination for a green headline” 23 Dec 2009).

Figure 31: NRG top five frames (2007- 2010)

25 International 20 Global impact 15 Skepticism 10 Israel policy 5

0 2007 2008 2009 2010

Similar to Ynet, NRG coverage of climate change was thorough and sophisticated. However, the coverage also reflects a tension between the diametrically opposed positions of Aviv Lavie and

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Gabriel Avital: one focused on giving a broad and sophisticated insight into the issue and the other seeking to dismiss it completely.

3.3.11.6 Jerusalem Post coverage “Few Israelis have an international outlook or think of themselves as global citizens, despite the global attention we receive. For that reason, I wanted to try and make the issue locally relevant in terms of impacts, but also in terms of opportunities… But you still have to mention that Israel’s contribution to global GHG is negligible. That was always a dampener on these articles” (Pers. Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011).

Although the Jerusalem Post has very little influence on Israeli popular discourse, it was included in this research because of the very high number of articles focused on climate change in Israel, including detailed and complex articles on Israeli climate policy and interviews with key opinion formers (more than most other Israeli new sources). Jerusalem Post journalist Ehud Zion Waldoks is thus widely cited because of his extensive coverage and insights into the policy-making process and Israeli media coverage in relation to coverage in other countries.

Table 36 illustrates that it is the Jerusalem Post is the news source with the highest proportion of locally- relevant articles (52 percent). The focus on the local context is unsurprising since it is primarily a news source for international readers seeking to know about Israel. During the research period, climate change was also of considerable interest to an American audience, who form the majority of the Jerusalem Post’s readership.

Figure 32 shows that the Israel opportunity frame was prominent in the coverage following international interest in Israeli cleantech. Articles included “Cleantech transfer could mean big opportunities for Israel” (16 Dec 2008) and “Israel should lead the way to environmental sustainability”, (21 Dec 2008). It also included coverage of Al Gore’s visit and interviews with Henry Waxman (D-CA) and prominent Israeli cleantech entrepreneurs. There was also considerable coverage of KKL afforestation research and techniques and its contribution to global efforts to address climate change in a KKL-sponsored section called Green Israel.

Framing climate change in this way was calculated to engage the readership of the Jerusalem Post. “For my audience, primarily overseas and laypeople, covering a conference in Cancun or

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polar ice-caps isn’t as significant as stating this is what Israel is doing…for example, covering the technologies that Israeli companies are working on that could have an impact not just on Israel but worldwide” (Pers. Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011). It may also have been inspired by three Jerusalem Post articles which argued that highlighting Israel’s environmental and cleantech achievements could unite Israel with Diaspora communities and improve Israel’s brand image (“Can environmental activism unite Israel, Diaspora?” 31 Mar 2008; “Green is our lever to move Israel from Second to First World” 2 Apr 2008; “Environment could be strong connector between Israel and Diaspora, Jewish Agency believes” 11 Nov 2008).

Figure 32: Jerusalem Post top five frames (2007-2010)

20 International 15 Israel opportunity Israel policy 10 Scientiic

5 Local impact

0 2007 2008 2009 2010

Jerusalem Post coverage also widely cited criticism of Israel’s lack of climate policy. See for example, “Environmentalists' laments receive presidential backing” (4 Feb 2008) and “Paz- Pines decries Israel's lack of environmental policy” (3 June 2008). Jerusalem Post coverage also placed greater emphasis than the other newspapers on the morality and ethics frame, especially from a Jewish perspective (10 articles).

Jerusalem Post coverage contained few articles about climate scepticism. “I personally had little interest in investigating this – most people are pretty much convinced one way or the other” (Pers. Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011). Only two op-eds contributed by ‘Start-up Nation’ author, Saul Singer, were overtly sceptical.

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4. Summary of findings The number of articles about climate change identified across the six media sources over the four years examined was 1263 articles. The steady number of articles per month reflects the fact that most of the news sources were editorially committed to covering environmental issues. It also reflected the fact that most of the news sources had dedicated and experienced environmental correspondents who saw their role as advocates for environmental issues (Pers. Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011; Zafrir Rinat 2011 and Aviv Lavie 2012).88

Nevertheless, Israeli coverage of the issue was a fraction of the coverage seen in Europe, North America and Australia. Over the same time period, the five major American newspapers (including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post) carried well over 12,000 articles; three major Canadian papers carried over 9000 articles and five major Australian newspapers carried over 23,000 articles, including 1400 articles published during the UN climate conference in Copenhagen alone (CIRES 2012).

As illustrated above, the frames identified by European, North American and Australian researchers looking at media coverage of climate change were also somewhat different from the Israeli context. This is mostly because in these countries the public has a more sophisticated understanding of the issue (whereas Israel news sources are still explaining the basic science); the scepticism debate is more prominent; discussion around climate policy is more advanced; and these countries have a more prominent involvement in international policy forums. Local natural disasters have also been more publicly connected with climate change (e.g. Hurricane Katrina in the USA and forest fires in Australia and California). In addition, unlike in some of these countries, there are no Israeli climate scientists or celebrities publicly communicating on the issue or advocating for action. Note, however, that there has to date been very little indepth research on the media coverage in countries that may have a similar profile to Israel.

Each Israeli news source had a quite distinctive orientation in the way they framed climate change. For example, Ha’aretz and Jerusalem Post were more likely to frame climate change as an opportunity for Israel, while Ynet emphasized Israel’s domestic responsibility to reduce its GHG emissions and adopt effective climate legislation. This emphasis is linked to the fact that

88 Although NRG is committed to covering environmental issues, its parent newspaper, Ma’ariv is less committed (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012). Despite the sceptical stance of Israel Hayom, its environment correspondent, Dan Lavie was still a graduate of the prestigious Heschel Fellowship for Environmental Leadership. 147

Ynet prioritised the voices of Israeli environmental campaigners, and included extensive coverage of local campaigns and green lifestyles compared to other news sources. Ynet coverage, however, did not cite prominent Israeli climate scientists, whereas Ha’aretz and Jerusalem Post were more likely to do so. Yediot Ahronot was more likely to sensationalize climate change, using alarming language, while Israel Hayom took a sceptical and irreverent editorial line. NRG coverage was for the most part sober, sophisticated and locally relevant although Gabriel Avital’s column and some supportive articles were categorically dismissive of climate change.

4.1 Overall themes in Israeli media coverage of climate change Despite this diversity of coverage a number of key themes emerge from the media coverage:

4.2.1 Israelis do not see the media as a trusted source to provide accurate information about climate change Only 33 percent of Israelis trust the media to provide accurate information about climate change. This is despite the fact that 59 percent named mainstream media sources as their main source of information about climate change. This poor level of trust is most probably related to a general Israeli distrust of the media. Between 2005 and 2009, the Israeli Democracy Institute identified a significant decline in public trust in the media from 50 percent to 34 percent (Arian et al. 2009). In 2005 trust was significantly higher among secular, centrist and leftwing Jewish Israelis, and lowest among religious and rightwing Israelis (Arian et al. 2005).

4.2.2 Climate change as an international rather than a local issue Climate change was most frequently framed as an international political issue. The widely hyped UN Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009 caused a massive peak in Israeli news coverage. Since Israel was a very minor player in the UN Copenhagen Summit, these findings corroborate Nossek (2010) who showed that a majority of the Copenhagen coverage in Ha’aretz and Yediot Ahronot focused on conflict between the major negotiating parties, major personalities, and the drama of the final days of conference itself including the mass protests.

Most Israeli news sources did attempt to find a local angle on the story. This ranged from commentary about the implications for Israeli policy, op-eds by leading Israeli environmental campaigners, interviews with arrested Israeli Greenpeace activists and using the Summit as a backdrop against which topics more directly relevant to Israel were discussed. These efforts

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nevertheless varied across news sources. For example, only 19 out of 90 articles published by Ynet about Copenhagen had a local angle.

Overall less than half of all articles published in these sources between 2007 and 2010 framed climate change as an issue relevant to Israel. Three local climate change news stories did generate small peaks in coverage: Al Gore’s visit to Israel in May 2008; the controversy around the appointment and dismissal of Israeli climate sceptic, Gabriel Avital as Chief Scientist of the Education Ministry during 2010 and the Carmel forest fires in December 2010.

The local diagnostic framing also received the least coverage, i.e. the Israeli media placed less emphasis on Israel as either a contributor to the problem or a country that would experience the consequences of climate change. There was double the number of frames focused on climate change as a global problem than as a local problem, with a majority of that coverage highlighting the melting of the polar ice caps. Although clearly a concerning development, it is nevertheless a distant and intangible threat.

4.2.3 Climate change is framed as a problem to be addressed primarily by government policy and technology Besides the International politics framing, the major prognostic frames were Israel policy (13 percent of all articles); Israel opportunity and General technology (17 percent of all articles). These are combined because the Israel opportunity frame primarily focused on existing or potential Israeli climate-friendly technologies.

Fewer articles focused on Local action i.e. local campaigns to address climate change (five percent) and even fewer highlighted the need for lifestyle changes (four percent). Most of the articles appeared in Ynet. This coverage focused primarily on Israeli involvement with symbolic international events such as the Live Earth rock concert in 2007 and Earth Hour. Only the protests against the proposed Ashkelon coal-fired station made a direct and tangible connection between climate change and Israel’s responsibility to reduce its GHG emissions.

4.2.4 Climate change as an opportunity for Israel rather than a threat The environmental correspondents interviewed explained that they deliberately used the Israel opportunity frame to make the issue relevant to Israelis (Pers. Comm. Zafrir Rinat 2011; Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011). This framing was also widely used by Israeli government officials,

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politicians and environmentalists communicating in the media. This period also coincided with a more general interest in developing and promoting Israeli cleantech, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Noting the prevalence of the Israel opportunity frame over the ethics and morality frame as a means to engage Israelis around climate change, Aviv Lavie notes, “Because of the perceived immediate ‘existential threat’ here, discourse around our moral responsibility to Tuvalu or to future generations has little traction. If you want to promote engagement, therefore, you have to focus on how it would benefit Israel practically” (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012).

Israeli climate scientists and environmentalists did seek to highlight climate change as a potential threat to Israel although this was less prevalent than one would have expected. Similarly given Israel’s preoccupation with security issues, it is surprising that climate change was barely framed as a threat to global stability and security by the Israeli media. The specific threat to Israel and regional security was only mentioned 11 times during the 2007 to 2010 period. See Chapters 4 and 5 for more discussion.

4.2.5 Environmental campaigners, politicians and climate sceptics communicated more about climate change in the Israeli media than scientists Environmental campaigners and politicians were four times more likely to be the ones communicating about climate change in the Israeli media than natural scientists. None of Israel’s leading climate scientists who support the scientific consensus on climate change appeared in the list of the ten most prominent communicators about climate change, except for Chief Scientist of the Environment Ministry Yeshayahu Bar-Or. Astrophysicist and climate sceptic, Nir Shaviv was however, a prominent scientist communicating in the Israeli media about climate change.

4.2.6 Overt climate scepticism and discussion around climate scepticism was evident but only in some sources Only a handful of articles were actually written by climate sceptics and very few displayed a ‘balance as bias’ tendency, nevertheless ten percent of all the articles referred to climate change scepticism. Although barely touched upon in other news sources, climate scepticism appeared to be a deliberate editorial decision of Israel Hayom, and primarily influenced by libertarian columnist, Gabriel Avital in NRG. Although Israel Hayom owner, Sheldon Adelson has claimed that his newspaper is not political, its climate sceptical outlook has most likely been influenced by conservative American political discourse on the issue (Berkman 2009). See Chapter 4 for discussion of the likely influence these news sources have on climate scepticism in Israel.

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4.2.7 Focusing events helped shape Israeli media coverage of climate change Israeli media coverage of climate change did not follow the pattern of US media coverage, which showed a significant growing trend from 1995 onwards and a decline from 2010 (See discussion in the literature review). Instead, the coverage was fairly steady, albeit limited to an average of around 20 articles a month, throughout the period but punctuated with peaks of interest around key focusing events.

The crescendo of news coverage leading up to the December 2009 UN Copenhagen conference and its failure to produce the expected treaty resulted in the biggest spike in media coverage. Lavie attributes this spike in coverage to the fact that climate change was still a relatively fresh and new topic in Israel following Al Gore’s 2008 visit, and the fact that there were no major security stories at that time (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012). By January 2010, however, news coverage had dropped off as dramatically as it had risen. This decline corroborates Nossek (2010) who argues that the Israeli media was primarily interested in the Copenhagen conference as a news event, rather than in climate change itself.

The news spike around Copenhagen was not only evident in Israel. Ratter et al. (2012) attribute the global news vacuum around climate change at the beginning of 2010 to journalists grappling with how to reframe the issue in the light of the failure of the Copenhagen conference. Lavie, however, argues that the decline reflects features of the Israeli media itself such as a reluctance to engage with complex issues and a short attention span for issues that do not appear to be immediately relevant. With so many other local issues on the agenda and little attempt by the Israeli media to make climate change locally relevant, it is not surprising that it again disappeared as a media story in 2010 (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012).

These findings also illustrate the importance of ‘focusing events’ on Israeli national climate policy. This follows Birkland’s (1997) assertion that national policymaking tends to follow ‘focusing events’ such as natural disasters or major international conferences. The media analysis clearly illustrates that after major global or local events, there was a resulting rise in the Local prognosis framing, as politicians and environmentalists sought to use these events to lobby for policy.

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4.2.8 Israeli media coverage of climate change relies on the ongoing interest in the topic shown by key environmental correspondents and commentators Although Israeli media coverage of climate change is already limited, there are reasons to believe that the quality and quantity of coverage will decline in the coming years. This, however, is for different reasons from those cited for the decline in climate change media coverage in the USA, i.e. media lobbying by conservative think tanks, the 2008 economic recession or media attention cycles (Dunlap and McCright 2008; Boykoff 2010; Lockwood 2011; Ratter et al 2012; Scruggs and Benegal 2012).

Climate change received the coverage it did in Israel between 2007 and 2010 because of the work of committed environmental correspondents and commentators. They maintained sophisticated coverage and analysis, and actively sought to make the issue locally relevant. Media coverage of environmental issues worldwide has, however, suffered as traditional media sources have sought to remain commercial when faced with competition from new social media (Boykoff 2010; Spencer 2010). Israel has not been immune to this trend. In December 2011, Aviv Lavie was dismissed from Ma’ariv. Faced with serious financial difficulties, the paper passed under new ownership and editorial control and “decided for reasons of its own that the social-environmental field did not deserve such extensive coverage as it had received over the previous four years” (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012).

Reflecting on his dismissal, Lavie argues there are few senior editors with strong positions in Israeli newspapers that understand environmental issues, let alone climate change. In addition, taking a more critical approach to environmental issues inevitably means touching on sensitive issues that may conflict with the economic and advertising interests of the paper (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012).

The changes at Ma’ariv reflect how commercial pressures can shape the Israeli media response to climate change. Similarly, Yediot Ahronot’s alarmist framing was designed primarily to increase the commercial appeal of their newspapers rather than for effective communication. Israel Hayom’s sceptical framing was also most likely shaped by commercial pressure and the political bias of its owner, Sheldon Adelson.

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Ch. 4 Framing climate change denial, scepticism and concern in Israel

1. Introduction This chapter and the proceeding chapter serve as a discussion section for this dissertation, ordering and engaging the findings of the previous chapters to offer a deeper response to the research questions. In particular they explore how climate change discourse is shaped by and interacts with public perceptions to influence the overall national response to climate change; the extent to which climate discourse has promoted the most effective and scientifically validated action; and how a mixed method approach through integrating political, technological and societal explanations, can offer a holistic explanation for climate inaction.

As a nebulous and intangible concept, climate change lends itself well to a multiplicity of framings (Nisbet 2009; Fletcher 2009). These chapters illustrate the ten most prominent ways in which social actors from across the political spectrum and social cleavages in Israeli society have framed and mobilised climate change discourse. This chapter focuses attention on the nine most prominent framings in public discourse, while the following chapter focuses on the most prominent framing in Israeli climate policy discourse: the techno-opportunity framing.

From a methodological perspective, these chapters employ a critical frame analysis, a standard interpretative social science approach that draws on the results of the critical policy analysis in Chapter 1, the findings of the social survey and media content analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 and additional analysis of key texts, literature and semi-structured interviews. These frames are also presented within a wider theoretical framework that assesses the extent to which discourse and language have influenced and are likely to influence Israeli perceptions and responses to climate change.

It is important to clarify here how this critical frame analysis differs from the media frame analysis included in Chapter 3. As explained in the introduction, this chapter is rooted in a more interpretative and discursive type of analysis seeking to explore how language shapes and is shaped by social forces. From a more technical perspective, some of the key frames identified here were not evident in the mainstream media, which is mainly aimed at a secular

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Jewish audience. These include frames evident in religious Jewish, ex-Soviet and Arab Israelis discourse. In addition, some frames only emerged after the period when the media frame analysis was conducted (2007–2010), such as the ‘climate refugee’ frames. Some frames were also only prominent in the social survey research but not in the media research such as the ‘climate fatalism’ frame. The ‘local impacts’ frame highlighted in the media frame analysis has been explored here in greater depth identifying three distinct frames related to impacts on the environment, the peace process and the Jewish majority in Israel.

The frames discussed in these chapters thus focus on those specific and interesting in the Israeli context which can contribute to a greater understanding of both Israel and climate change discourse. Since the overarching theme of this research is to explain Israeli climate inaction, the chapters also pay special attention to frames that may make resonant arguments, but in fact only promote limited or no engagement.

2. Effective frames and denial frames If the goal of climate communication is to motivate effective action, what does being ‘effective’ mean in this context? This dissertation defines this in two ways. First, that the frame encourages appropriate and scientifically valid actions to address climate change such as reducing GHG emissions and making provision for adaptation to climate induced changes. The second aspect of an effective frame is that it resonates with personal beliefs and worldviews (Crompton 2010; Lakoff 2010; Kahan et al. 2012).

In defining ‘effective climate action’, this research clearly asserts an implicit normative position i.e. that climate change is happening and that to reduce the threat requires shifting society away from a system by which most basic requirements are met through burning fossil fuels that cause climate change. To do so requires a mix of policy measures which have been clearly identified by Israeli policy analysts, such as adopting and enforcing mandatory green building codes, improving public transportation and introducing an economy wide carbon tax (IPCC 2007b; Paths to Sustainability 2011; Ayalon et al. 2011). Other elements include localising production and consumption, technological innovation and deployment, and widespread lifestyle and behavioral changes (Hulme 2009; Tal 2009; Urry 2011;).

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This research presents a dual axis scale for understanding the effectiveness of climate frames (Figure 33). The x-axis focuses on the extent to which the frame promotes appropriate measures that will reduce GHG emissions and promote adaptation strategies. The y-axis is the ‘resonant-non-resonant’ axis. According to this framework, frames can thus promote actions of varying appropriateness while either strongly resonating or having little resonance with wider societal worldviews.

Figure 33 Effective frames

Resonant frames Resonant but limited action frames

Effective Effective denial frames action frames

Inappropriate / Ineffective Appropriate frames climate action frames (i.e. mitigation and adaptation action).

Non- resonant frames

This research pays special attention to frames that may make resonant arguments, but in fact only promote partial policy measures or other actions than those scientifically proven: for example, focusing on a single policy or the role that technology can play in solving climate change without mentioning the need for behavioral changes. It argues that these frames can, in fact, be detrimental. This is partially because of the widely identified psychological phenomenon, the ‘single action bias’. This highlights that when responding to a threat, individuals tend towards engaging in only one response to prevent the threat even where it

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may take many actions to make a significant difference (Shome and Marx 2009).89 Kahan et al. (2012 p. 3) also illustrate the potential damage of ineffective communication. “The aim of climate change communication should be to dispel the tragedy of the risk-perception commons. i.e. the fact that it is effectively costless for an individual to form a perception of climate change risk that is wrong but culturally congenial, whereas it is harmful for collective welfare if individuals in aggregate form beliefs in this way.”

The research argues that frames that promote action on climate change but do not fully endorse these appropriate measures could be called ‘denial’ frames. Cohen’s (2001) elucidation of the differences between literal, interpretative and implicatory denial is particularly valuable in explaining why. Denial does not simply involve denying the facts (literal denial), although climate scepticism is clearly evident in climate discourse. Denial also occurs where the facts are acknowledged but given a different meaning from what seems apparent to others (interpretative denial) or where the facts are acknowledged but implications that commonly follow are denied or minimized (implicatory denial).

Applying Cohen’s definitions to climate change, it is evident that implicatory denial frames are pervasive in climate change discourse. Stoll-Kleeman et al. (2000) identified nine such climate denial frames. These range from blaming governments for inaction to doubting the efficacy of personal actions when the effects of climate change seem so distant and uncertain. Similarly, Norgaard (2011) demonstrates how Norwegian villagers used implicatory denial strategies to overcome the dissonance between their awareness and concern about climate change and simultaneous unwillingness to incorporate its implications into their everyday life. For example, they avoiding talking about the topic and would argue that Norway was a minor contributor to GHG emissions compared to the USA.

The psychological reasons for climate denial are evident. Climate change brings up unpleasant emotions such as fear, guilt, helplessness and a sense of loss (Lertzman 2009; Norgaard 2011). Stoll-Kleeman et al. (2000) argue that denial mechanisms also arise from the fact that for citizens in developed countries, the consequences of shifting away from comfortable high-carbon lifestyles appear more daunting that the distant and uncertain effects of climate change. Denial thus allows individuals to maintain a positive sense of self while

89 This is because the first action succeeds in reducing a sense of worry or vulnerability (Shome and Marx 2009) 156

failing to take appropriate action (Festinger 1957; Pennington et al. 1999; Stoll-Kleeman et al. 2000; Lorenzoni et al. 2007 Norgaard 2011).

Summarising this theoretical section, this chapter seeks to illustrate the diversity of interpretative communities in Israeli society. It also offers the novel typology of ‘effective- action and ‘effective-denial’ frames as a means to explain the limited response to climate change. In doing so, it contributes to the growing literature on climate frames (Nisbet 2008; Fletcher 2009).

3. Israel climate change frames Climate change has entered a highly politicized discursive arena in Israel. These chapters illustrate how Israeli climate frames draw on the diversity of beliefs and worldviews reflective of some of the complex tensions in Israeli society. This includes the tensions between religious and secular Israelis; between new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and native-born Israelis; between the right and left wings and how these terms are defined in Israel; as well as between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.

Ten key climate frames were identified through in-depth analysis of mainstream media coverage and specialised media sources in Hebrew, transcripts of conferences and semi- structured interviews, analysis of policy documents and analysis of the survey results (See Table 41). These frames are discussed in turn below with specific focus on their likely resonance for the public and policymakers and whether they prescribe appropriate actions to address climate change. The survey findings are also used to support the extent to which the frames are likely to be resonant. See Appendix III for complete list of interviewees.

Table 41: Defining Israeli climate change frames Frame Definition 1) ‘Finite Pool of Worry’ Climate change is a problem but marginal compared to the more immediate existential threats facing Israel. 2) ‘Climate fatalism’ Climate change is happening but there is little that Israelis can do about it.

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‘Existential threat’ Climate change poses an existential threat 3) ‘Environmental threat’ to the environment, peace process or to 4) ‘Peace threat’ Israel’s Jewish majority (because of the 5) ‘Demographic threat’ large number of non-Jewish climate refugees likely to come to Israel). ‘Climate scepticism’ Sceptical views in Israel range from the 6) ‘Academic scepticism’ belief that climate change is not 7) ‘Putin-inspired scepticism happening to the belief that it may be 8) ‘Tea Party inspired scepticism’ happening but is mainly a natural phenomenon and not concerning. 9) ‘Jewish values’ Materialism and over-consumption have caused climate change. Jewish values offer a path to solving the crisis and environmental lifestyles. 10) ‘Techno-opportunity’ Israel’s renewable energy and drylands technologies can significantly contribute to solving climate change.

3.1 The ‘Finite pool of worry’ frame “Who can blame Israelis - worried about jobs, social cleavages and the pending release of 1,000 terrorists, not to mention the prospect that Iran will detonate a nuclear device over Tel Aviv - for not putting global warming at the top of their concerns?” Jerusalem Post Editorial (2009)

The 2009 BGU survey results highlighted that less than half of Israelis were actively worried about climate change. It also demonstrated that despite strong support for international action on the issue, climate change was still the lowest ranked priority on the national agenda behind economic, security and health issues. Israelis also showed little support for climate mitigation actions perceived to involve personal sacrifice, including raising the price of fossil fuels or adopting lifestyle changes such as using public transport or cycling more.

These results reflect one of the most frequent informal framings of climate change in Israel: that Israelis have far greater things to worry about than climate change. This framing gives

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active expression to the ‘finite pool of worry’ thesis: a theorised construct suggesting that given the limited mental capacity for worry, people are more likely to worry about pressing and urgent problems than long term problems such as climate change (Weber 2006; Marx and Shome 2009). Psychological research suggests that the ‘finite pool of worry thesis’ is particularly pertinent in Israeli culture. The on-going experience and perception of conflict has led to Israelis prioritising national and personal security above all else (Bar-Tal and Jacobson 1998; Yaar 2002; Arian 1989; Bar-Tal et al. 1998; Oren et al. 2003; Ben Meir and Shaked 2007; Soffer et al. 2010).

The argument that “Israelis have more important things to worry about” is a familiar Israeli excuse for not engaging on a whole range of issues relating to social justice or the environment. This situation is well described by Rabinowitz (2009) “In a state of endless war, public opinion in Israel is ‘occupied’. In this context long-term problems critical to our future, drop from our consciousness without arousing a sense of urgency”. This perception may also go some way towards explaining why in the survey results, young Israelis (aged 18- 24) were significantly less engaged with climate change than older Israelis. Israel has mandatory conscription for citizens over the age of 18, and the experience of army service may thus be influencing risk priorities (Weber 2006).90 The comparative risk perception of climate change and the Iranian threat is neatly expressed in the incredulous tone of this Ynet op-ed: “A Pentagon report called global warming the primary threat to world peace in the twenty-first century. Apparently not Ahmadinejad but our tumble dryer!” (Shapiro-Rosenberg 2007).

If Israel has more important things to worry about, then climate change is someone else’s problem i.e. “… the concern of Gentiles who have solved all their problems and have the leisure to deal with this marginal issue called the future” (Rabinowitz 2007); “For Israelis, climate change is a far off theoretical problem …Here there are more burning problems; this is not Sweden, you know” (Lavie 2010d).

The very limited coverage of climate change in the mainstream Israeli media is likely to have reflected and reinforced the belief that climate change is not a salient issue; as well as the fact that climate change was mainly framed in the media as an international rather than a local

90 In reality this accounts for only 50 percent of the population (cf. footnote 65). 159

issue.91 Few articles emphasised that Israel contributed to growing GHG emissions and is a country that could experience climate-induced impacts.

Israel is not the only country facing an ‘existential threat’- the excuse that it gives for why it should be exempt from other considerations.92 Merom (1999) argues however that this familiar Israeli refrain is not simply instrumental but based on historical Jewish experience and deep-rooted cultural beliefs. He illustrates how this belief has undermined the ability of Israel’s leaders to accurately assess political situations leading to military rather than political responses. It has also created a psychological climate where Israeli leaders believe that they can disregard international constraints.

Some of Israel’s responses to climate change appear to have been influenced by the perception that Israel should be exempt from action because of its exceptional circumstances. For example, both Environment Minister Gideon Ezra and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to attend pivotal UN climate conferences ‘for security reasons’. In addition the Israel Electric Corporation has argued that security concerns justify Israel’s on-going reliance on coal and should override environmental concerns, i.e. there are more coal-supplying countries that are friendly to Israel. Likewise, there is broad support for Israel to exploit its shale oil reserves for security reasons with scarce concern expressed about the increase in GHG emissions this would entail (Pers. Comm. Sam Daniel 2011; Valerie Brachya 2011).

Another area where Israelis have cited ‘exceptional circumstances’ is on the issues of population growth and rising consumption levels; the major drivers of Israel’s GHG emissions. Israeli climate change discourse has barely addressed population growth (Levin 2010).93 Orenstein (2004), however, argues that this is not surprising; population growth is rarely considered in Israeli environmental campaigns or in academic literature because pro- natalism is central to Zionist and Jewish beliefs.

Likewise, Benstein (2006) argues that it is hard to campaign on the issue of over-consumption in Israel because following recent experiences of privation in the Holocaust and the early

91 It is important to note that Israelis tend view the United Nations in a negative light because of the role it has played in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Nossek 2010). 92 Several small island nations face literal disappearance due to rising sea levels as a result of climate change. 93 Although note that both Orly Ronen of the Heschel Center for Environmental Learning and Leadership and ecologist Marcello Sternberg have directly confronted this issue at public events on climate change. 160

years of the state, many Israelis now feel that profligate consumption is a basic right. Until the late 2000’s for example, despite the threat of electricity brownouts and an on-going drought, utilities placed very little emphasis on reducing electricity and water consumption.

With its tiny contribution to global GHG emissions, Israel can rightly argue that it bears less of a responsibility than bigger GHG emitters to take the lead in reducing emissions. The excuse that Israel’s exceptional circumstances should exempt it from engagement is less convincing. As Bill McKibben argued in Israel in October 2009, "Every country has big problems, but global warming is everybody's big problem" (Rinat 2009b). This framing, however, draws on a familiar and possibly psychologically rooted justification for recognising but failing to engage with concerns that do not pertain to a direct military threat. It is thus a resonant ‘implicatory’ denial framing for Israelis, likely to deter Israeli engagement with climate change.

3.2 ‘Climate fatalism’ frame The ‘climate fatalism’ framing states that while climate change is a real and dangerous phenomenon, there is little that can be done to prevent it from happening. Although not widely identified in the mainstream Israeli media, the ‘climate fatalism’ framing was a common response from Israel’s Arab community, who represent 20.4 percent of the population (CBS figures 2009).

This framing was identified primarily in semi-structured interviews with Israeli Arab environmental campaigners and two December 2010 focus groups on climate change (n=6; n=4) conducted in the Arab-Israeli city of Sachnin. It was reinforced by the findings of the 2009 BGU survey which highlighted that Israeli Arabs felt a significantly lower sense of self and collective efficacy around climate change than other sectors of the population i.e. they did not feel that they personally nor Israel collectively could make a difference in preventing climate change.94 This finding also corroborated Haller and Hadler (2008) findings that identified greater ‘pessimistic environmental orientation’ among Israeli Arabs than any other grouping in the 23 country ISSP-Environment survey.95

94 None of the Christian Arabs surveyed had heard of climate change. This response thus reflected the view of Muslim Arabs. 95 Based on strong agreement with questions such as “its just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment”. 161

Since Islam is often portrayed as a fatalistic religion, it is possible to associate this fatalism with religious beliefs i.e. that humans do not control their fate, and all is ultimately God’s will (Acevedo 2006). Survey research conducted in Islamic countries has demonstrated, however, that although fatalistic beliefs are common in these countries, they are not solely related to religious belief but also to historical, cultural, economic and socio-political processes (Acevedo 2006).96 Acevedo (2006) thus distinguishes between ‘cosmological fatalism’ as a distinct belief system influenced by religious belief, and ‘structural fatalism’ that arises from structural conditions, such as inequality and discrimination.

A general sense of fatalism, or low self-efficacy has been widely identified among Israeli Arabs. In survey research, Moore (2003) demonstrated that Israeli Arab students (Christian and Muslim) were less optimistic than Jewish students regarding their life circumstances and felt less able to control their future. Supporting Acevedo’s premise, Moore (2003) argues that this perception is mostly related to the experience of Israeli Arabs in Israeli society where ethnicity automatically puts them at a disadvantage.

Although Israel’s Declaration of Independence stipulates that all citizens are equal, many argue that Israeli Arabs are often treated as second-class citizens (Morris 1987). Arab citizens often live in segregated and peripheral towns and villages with poor public infrastructure. Arab citizens are under-represented in the Knesset and rarely hold positions of power in government (Shafir and Peled 2002; ACRI 2009; Tarabeih 2012).

In the 2010 Sachnin climate change focus groups, only two interviewees expressed the cosmological fatalistic view that climate change was ‘God’s will’. Interviewees mostly expressed a structurally fatalistic view: that Israeli Arabs had little political representation to lobby for a reduction in GHG emissions and that Israeli Arab towns had limited provisions for environmental behavior e.g. few recycling points and little public transport. See Appendix IV for a transcript of the focus groups.

The 2009 BGU survey also found that Arab Israelis were significantly less aware of climate change than Israeli Jews: only 35 percent claimed to have heard of the phenomenon. Arab Israeli environmental campaigners claim that awareness in their community significantly

96 Fatalism is a philosophical worldview that posits that all events or actions are subject to fate or unalterable predetermination, and that human beings are powerless to change them (Merriam-Webster dictionary 2010). 162

increased following the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference which included Israeli Arab attendees (Pers. Comm. Mostafa Abu Raba 2009; Hussein Tarabeih 2012; Tarabeih 2012). Arab environmental organisations have also focused on educating Arab school children, which may explain why 18-25 year old Arab Israelis reported a significantly higher level of climate change awareness in the 2009 BGU survey.

The ‘climate fatalism’ frame is a form of implicatory denial since it allows individuals to justify their failure to take action to prevent climate change. Given the general context, the implicatory denial frame is still likely to find considerable resonance in the Israeli Arab community, despite the work of environmental groups. It may be that some Jewish Israelis share this fatalistic view, however, this was not identified in the empirical research.

3.3 Alarming Israeli climate change frames The following sections focus on alarming framings of climate change in Israeli discourse. Alarming framings of climate change can be divided into secular framings, which challenge the ‘finite pool of worry’ frame to argue that climate change does indeed pose an ‘existential threat’ to Israel; and religious framings, which focuses less on the consequences and more on the moral foundations of climate change, framing it as an inevitable consequence of secular, materialist values.

3.3.1 Climate change as an ‘existential threat’ to Israel Since it is impossible to present information about potential climate impacts in a neutral manner, the way that climate risks are framed is paramount (Lorenzoni et al. 2005; Hulme 2009). Framing, climate risks are not however, a simple issue. As a minimum, it involves judgments about uncertain and complex science and potential impacts far into the future. It also makes assumptions that people share the same values in judging whether a particular outcome is acceptable or not (Spence and Pidgeon 2010).

One reason citizens in developed countries have failed to engage with climate change has been the perception that it is a geographically and temporally distant issue (Leiserowitz 2005; Rathzel and Uzzell 2009). The following sections explore how Israeli opinion formers have thus sought to frame climate change as a compelling and resonant threat as a means to promote engagement (Lorenzoni and Pigeon 2006; Lorenzoni et al. 2007; Spence and Pidgeon 2010). They have focused on threat posed to Israel’s environment; how it could act as a

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‘threat multiplier’, worsening political tensions in the region; and the likely influx of climate refugees from across the region.

Despite the difficulty in establishing significant causal links between national security and climate change, these frames all seek to construct climate change as a national security threat albeit in different ways. Securitising an issue, i.e. constructing it as a national security threat, increases the likelihood of media, policy and financial support (Fletcher 2009). Barnett (2001 p. 11) nevertheless notes that such a framing may alienate those who see climate change as a human security issue because it turns climate change into “a military rather than a foreign policy problem, and a sovereignty rather than a global commons problem.”

These framings are diagnostic frames, focused on understanding the nature of climate change rather than proposing a solution to the problem (Tynkkynen 2010). They are also fear framings since they seek to motivate behavioral change and policy support through emphasising the threat posed by climate change and using emotive language (Spence and Pidgeon 2010). The ‘peace threat’ and ‘demographic threat’ frames are also identity frames since they draw on concerns related to national identity (Levin et al. 1998; Shmueli et al. 2006; Fletcher 2009).

One important result highlighted in the 2009 BGU survey, which is relevant in assessing the likely resonance of all these ‘threat’ framings, is to note that Israeli women were significantly more likely to perceive climate change as a threat than men. Israel women were more likely to agree that climate change would lead to a worsening of all the threats surveyed: water shortages, sea level rise, a refugee influx, regional conflict and epidemics and disease. This gender effect has been widely observed in the climate risk perception literature. It is also observed in risk perception literature in general in Israel (Arian and Gordon 1993; Bar-Tal et al. 1995; O’Connor et al. 1999; Patchen 2006; Leiserowitz 2006; Malka et al. 2009; McCright 2010; Soffer et al. 2010).

3.3.1.1 Climate change as an ‘environmental threat’ to Israel "The recent dry months, including the driest November in the history of the state, are a warning light to us all that the threat of climate change is no less menacing than the security threats that we face. I intend to act determinedly in this field. In a country that suffers from a

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severe water shortage, this is an existential struggle." Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (MFA 2010).

Israel’s on-going drought and the December 2010 Carmel forest fires have given environmentalists, scientists, politicians and government officials the opportunity to frame climate change as a direct threat to Israel’s environment, and thus to its citizens. Different communicators have, however, framed the connection between these events and climate change differently.

3.3.1.1.1 Climate change as a threat to Israel’s water resources Local hydrologists and climatologists have been the major communicators about the threat posed to Israel’s water resources by climate change. Despite Netanyahu’s clear assertion about climate change posing an ‘existential threat’, they have expressed varying levels of certainty in attributing Israel’s current drought to climate change. This caution reflects the lack of scientific consensus about whether global warming is influencing local rainfall patterns, as well as norms of scientific communication (See Chapter 1 for more discussion)

Few scientists have thus been emphatic about the connection between climate change and drought. Hydrologist Arie Issar is an exception. In a 2008 Ha’aretz op-ed, he argued “Already in 1997 I wrote: ‘Within 30 years the Middle East will have a prolonged drought because of global warming’. Despite this forecast in Israel we will do nothing in the face of this apocalypse” (Issar 2008). Other Israeli scientists, however, have been more circumspect. Israeli Meteorological Service (IMS) forecaster Robert Olimsky, for example, has argued, “Let's not be so quick to blame global warming [for five years of winter rainfall well below average]… Who is to say it’s not a natural trend?” (Jacobs 2008).

Israeli scientists also tend to use norms of scientific communication which do not adequately convey the kind of certainty that the public and policy makers would need to motivate urgent action. For example, asked whether a 2010 rainstorm could be attributed to climate change, leading climatologist, Pinhas Alpert argued, “To determine if the recent storm was really a product of climate change, 110 years of climate records would have to be combed to determine if the storm was one of a kind. Even then it wouldn’t be responsible to say something about a specific incident” (Waldoks 2010d).

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3.3.1.1.2 Carmel forest fires and climate change The dramatic 2010 Carmel forest fire was, however, unequivocally linked to climate change in public discourse. This reflects both those who were communicating: mainly politicians and environmentalists, and a scientific consensus that Israel’s summers have become warmer with an increase in the number and duration of summer ‘hot days’ (Ben-Gai et al. 1999; Ziv et al. 2005).97

Dan Rabinowitz, for example, wrote in the news website, Ynet, “the Carmel disaster is a sign of the future: global warming will not spare Israel. We will unfortunately see many more dry trees go up in flames in many more forest fires” (Rabinowitz 2010). Similarly, ecologist Guy Pe’er wrote, “These fires are the face of climate change. It's just not a failure of government or the fire-service or the fault of a reckless youth or an irresponsible minister. The main reason for the force and intensity of the fire was eight months of drought combined with warm easterly winds” (Pe’er 2010).

Other environmentalists used the fire as a platform to discuss how climate change was already affecting Israeli citizens. For example, it created ‘climate refugees’, those whose homes and communities had been destroyed by the fire. The long hot summer also affected food production and food prices in Israel, most notably the disappearance of butter from supermarket shelves (Mishal 2010). Securitising the environmental threat posed by climate change, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also announced the allocation of funds for fire fighting planes as supporting, “an aerial force, which we will need in the era of global warming” (Derfner 2010).

3.3.1.1.3 The effectiveness of framing climate change as an ‘environmental threat’ Relatively speaking, this research shows that framing climate change as a threat to Israel’s environment has not been prominent. The climate media analysis illustrated that between 2007 and 2010, only 100 of the 1261 articles framed it as such. The Israeli media primarily focused on the wider global threat of climate change, such as the melting of the polar ice caps. Although is clearly a very worrying development this is nevertheless a distant and less tangible threat for most Israelis.

97 Note that there is as yet no published scientific research establishing a direct causal link between climate change and the Carmel Forest fires. 166

The Carmel forest fires did give Israeli environmentalists a chance to make the connection with climate change emphatically and gave Israelis a vivid local image of climate change. Nevertheless, out of several hundred news articles covering the fires, only 15 articles clearly connected them to climate change. There was greater editorial interest in casting the blame for the fires on negligent Arab youth and politicians.

There are other reasons why the ‘environmental threat’ frame has not been pervasive. Israeli environmental organisations have primarily focused on climate policy demands or highlighting the positive benefits of addressing climate change. Likewise, the Israeli scientific community has also engaged very little in public discourse around climate change, despite the fact that they are actively researching the issue. Some news sources, including widely read internet news portal Ynet, included no perspectives from Israeli climate scientists at all between 2007 and 2010.

This limited engagement is relevant given the high degree of trust Israelis placed in scientists to communicate to them accurately about climate change, as illustrated by the 2009 BGU survey. Greater trust in scientists also led to significantly greater concern, as well as greater support for Israel adopting stringent international GHG emissions reductions targets. The wider literature also suggests that trust in scientists is a strong predictor of climate change concern, and that locally- based scientific voices are vital for promoting engagement with climate change (Cole and Watrous 2007; Dietz et. al 2007; Malka et al. 2009).

Despite the challenge of communicating the complexity and uncertainties of climate science, scientists in many developed countries have been at the forefront of communicating around climate change (Weingart et al. 2000; Moser and Dilling 2007; Hulme 2009). The limited engagement in Israel may, however, reflect a wider cultural trend; that Israeli scientists have historically adopted a cautious and apolitical role in Israeli society (Steinberg 1994). It may also reflect the fact that Israel does not have a body such as the Union of Concerned Scientists to facilitate effective public communication on the issue (Cole and Watrous 2007; Pers. Comm. Pinhas Alpert 2009).

Arguing a different point, Newman (2004) suggests that highlighting the environmental threat posed to Israel may not successfully promote Israeli engagement with climate change anyway. This is because attempts to broaden the notion of security to include environmental and water 167

security threats have failed to change Israeli discourse in a significant way. The environment is still widely perceived as a low-priority quality-of-life issue while security means safety from suicide bombers and from the existential threat to the state. Thus while Israeli citizens may be concerned about environmental degradation, the notion of security is confined to military, territorial and demographic security.

The survey findings support Newman’s (2004) assertion that environmental threats are not as concerning as security threats for Israelis. The surveys illustrated that Israelis primarily conceived of climate change as a threat to the environment, especially to Israel’s water resources. They were less likely to link climate change with wider geo-strategic threats such as worsening regional conflict, an influx of refugees or damage to the economy. At the same time, the 2009 BGU survey showed that less than 50 percent of Israelis were actively worried about climate change and it was a low national priority.

Nevertheless, the 2009 survey did show that Israelis placed the water situation in Israel at the top of the national agenda, and the 2011 Neilsen consumer survey findings show a dramatic increase in concern about climate change in Israel between 2009 and 2011. This could well have been influenced by years of drought, the long hot 2010 Israeli summer and its effect on food prices and the Carmel forest fires in December 2010.

The environmental threat posed by climate change has influenced some policy decisions. It was cited as influencing the decision to acquire fire-fighting planes (see above). It was also one of the many factors influencing the March 1999 government decision (4895) to invest in seawater desalination as a means to augment water supplies. Both the Israeli Water Authority and the Israel Electric Corporation have integrated likely climate changes into their long-term planning (See Chapter 2). However, despite Netanyahu’s rhetorical assertion that climate change “is no less menacing than the security threats that we face”, Israel’s climate policy has not received anywhere near the same level of policy attention or budget that other security threats have done.

Perhaps the most important factor undermining the effectiveness of this frame is that if water shortages are the main problem resulting from climate change, then the Israeli government has clearly signalled to the public that it has the solution. In widely broadcast 2010 TV advert entitled, “Israel is drying out” (Hebrew Israel Mityabeshet), the Israeli public was urged to 168

conserve water in the face of the on-going national drought. They were also reassured that within three years the crisis would be over as new desalination plants became operational (Waldoks 2010c).

3.3.1.2 Climate change as a ‘Peace threat’ to Israel Several organisations have framed climate change as a threat multiplier to existing political tensions in the Middle East (Paz and Kidar 2007; Freimuth et al. 2007; FAO 2008; Brown and Crawford 2009; Trondalen 2009). As noted above, framing climate change as an environmental threat in and of itself is unlikely to make it a salient issue for Israelis. These organisations have thus securitised climate change in a different way, by highlighting how the environmental consequences of climate change could heighten tensions in the region. In this framing, climate change poses an indirect but nevertheless serious threat to Israeli national security (Fletcher 2009).

Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME) have argued that climate change is likely to exacerbate water scarcity and thus tensions over water between nations linked by hydrological resources, geography and shared political boundaries. They have also argued that climate change may affect agricultural production that could lead to economic unrest and political instability across the Middle East and North Africa. Scenarios developed by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) indicate that a half-meter rise in sea level could displace nearly 2–4 million Egyptians by 2050 In addition, sea level rise could cause seawater intrusion into the Gaza aquifer further contaminating the drinking water of 1.5 million Gazan Palestinians. This could result in a public health crisis, political unrest and attempted migration (Freimuth et al. 2007).

The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has argued that concern about water scarcity as a result of climate change may make Israel less inclined to part with the Golan Heights, territory it annexed from Syria during the 1967 war (Brown and Crawford 2009). This is because a peace deal would mean ceding control over the headwaters of the river Jordan, which are in the Golan Heights, and permitting Syrians access to Lake Kinneret, one of Israel’s major sources of freshwater. Brown and Crawford (2009) argue that future water scarcity may also make an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal harder to reach as negotiators harden positions around water, especially concerning control over the Mountain aquifers that lie beneath the West Bank. They also express concern that the protracted conflict in the region would prevent the trans-boundary co-operation necessary for adapting to climate change.

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Paz and Kidar (2007) envisage another potential source of conflict. As freshwater becomes scarcer in the region, they suggest that Israeli desalination plants could become a high value target for terrorist attacks and a military target for neighbouring countries in desperate need of water resources.

Soffer has also expressed concern that internal Bedouin migration as a result of climate change could threaten Israel’s security. “I can see how the desert will penetrate slowly to Kiryat Gat, Gaza and Hebron—everywhere. Within Israel proper many Bedouin communities have already moved en masse out of the Negev to the country’s centre ... because of population explosion or because of water loss. This migration trend will only continue” (Udasin 2012b). Soffer argues that this migration could create a continuous Arab population between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This he believes could be the prelude for an attempted armed unification between West Bank and Gazan Palestinians in co-operation with Israeli Bedouins living in between these two territories (Pers. Comm. Arnon Soffer 2012).

3.3.1.2.1 The effectiveness of the ‘Peace threat’ framing Between 2007 and 2010, the mainstream Israeli media published only four articles framing climate change as a threat to the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, besides FOEME, few organisations or individuals have publicly promoted this framing. Addressing the fears inherent in the framing, Feitelson et al. (2012) note that given the political fragility of the region it is not surprising that these concerns have been raised. Nevertheless, they argue that even under rapid population growth scenarios ‘normative’ water needs can be met in both Israel and Palestine through reallocating natural resources and desalination plants.98 According to them, a bigger threat to the Arab-Israeli peace process from climate change lies in the perception of increased water scarcity, which could harden negotiating positions.

Surveying research on conflict and climate change from around the world, Gleditsch (2012) comes to a similar conclusion. There is only limited evidence that climate change will directly cause armed conflict. However, they also caution that framing climate change as a security problem could influence the perceptions of key policy actors and contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

98 Feitelson (2012) divides water use into normative needs and economic demand. ‘Normative needs’ are defined as domestic needs (60 M3 per capita per year), spiritual water needs, environmental needs, and the needs of peripheral agricultural communities. 170

Opposing this framing, Israeli Arab environmental campaigner, Hussein Tarabeih optimistically believes that in the face of climate change, nations and communities in the region will actually choose to co-operate (Sagi 2012; Pers. Comm. Hussein Tarabeih 2012). Others have similarly argued that climate change actually presents an opportunity for regional co-operation through a solar energy super-grid (Levy 2010; Udasin 2011a). As discussed in Chapter 1, existing trans- boundary collaborations such as GLOWA–Jordan River and FOEME’s ‘Good Water Neighbours’ project are also making efforts to engage policymakers and the public to think regionally about future water use and beyond the politics of the conflict.

Although one would assume that the ‘Peace threat’ frame would have resonance for Israelis, the 2009 BGU survey also highlighted that only 40 percent of Israelis actively made the link between climate change and worsening regional conflict. In addition, the ‘Peace threat’ frame is unlikely to motivate public and policy action.

Many Israelis already believe that the conflict is intractable and unsolvable, so will not see how increased water scarcity could actually worsen the situation (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal 2007). For example, the monthly Negotiations Index survey conducted in Israel, regularly find that less than half of Israelis have faith that the peace negotiations will result in peace (Peace Index 2012). This framing is also unlikely to motivate Israeli policymakers to ‘make peace’ as water is a minor sticking point in the negotiations. If anything, it is likely to encourage negotiators to downplay the issue of climate change to discourage Palestinians from hardening their negotiating positions around the Mountain aquifers.

3.3.1.3 The demographic threat framing “We were just warned that climate change and desertification may impel many more Africans to seek better lives elsewhere. Exceptionally liberal Israel, on Africa’s doorstep, is sure to become an even more powerful migrant-magnet that it already is… Israel still refuses to face the daily reality created in our cities by lax mind-sets and ideology-driven denial” Jerusalem Post editorial (2012)

In 2007, Paz and Kidar drew on UN Environment Programme (UNEP) scenarios to argue that climate-induced drought, desertification and sea level rise would result in a major refugee crisis in the Middle East and North Africa. As Europe increasingly closed its doors to migrants, they argued that the obvious result would be floods of refugees attempting to enter

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Israel. Although their research received little media attention, in the 2009 BGU survey just over half of Israelis nevertheless believed that the flow of refugees to Israel would increase if climate change were not addressed.

In May 2012, the Israel Climate Change Information Centre (ICCIC) submitted an extensive 200-page report to the Ministry for Environmental Protection with numerous policy recommendations to enhance Israel’s climate policy. The Ministry press release, however, specifically highlighted one potential impact of climate change: “waves of refugees fleeing floods and droughts occurring in the region … and eventually infiltrating Israel”. It also noted the solution recommended by the ICCIC: to build a fence along the whole of Israel’s borders, including maritime fences in the Mediterranean and Red Sea (MEP 2012b).

3.3.1.3.1 The effectiveness of the ‘demographic threat’ framing This ICCIC finding received a flurry of media coverage primarily because it coincided with an increase in tension in Israel around the presence of African migrants after a wave of violent crime in South Tel Aviv (Scheindlin 2012; Sheizaf 2012). Concern about African immigration to Israel, however, also taps into a deeper Israeli fear. One of the ICCIC authors, demographer Arnon Soffer, is well known for his view that Israel faces a demographic threat as a Jewish state because of increasing Arab birth rates. This report highlights that Soffer has now identified another ‘demographic threat’ arguing “If we want to keep Israel a Jewish State, we will have to defend ourselves from what I call climate refugees” (Udasin 2012b).99

Similar to anti-immigrant discourse worldwide, far-right Israeli politicians have fanned anti- immigrant feeling in Israel. They allege that Israel will be overwhelmed by millions of African ‘infiltrators’, bringing with them violent crime and threatening national security (White 2010).100 However, survey research suggests that the majority of Israelis share Soffer’s fear.101 A 2011 Ynet-Gesher public opinion survey found that 78 percent of Jewish Israelis believed that migrants and refugees endangered the Jewish character of the State of

99 At a workshop on Climate Change and Geo-strategy at the University of Haifa, Jan 21 2012, Soffer was more circumspect about the climate refugee threat. Although he argued that worstcase scenarios were possible, he also highlighted many knowledge gaps and uncertainty. 100 Interior Minister, Eli Yishai, has argued for example “I want everyone to be able to walk the streets without fear or trepidation...The migrants are giving birth to hundreds of thousands and the Zionist dream is dying” (Sherwood 2012b). 101 Arnon Soffer claims he is neither right nor left wing. “I’m always being asked if I’m a left-winger or a right-winger”… “I’m in favor of socially oriented economics, so that makes me a left-winger, but I’m against the increase of the Arab population in Israel, so I’m a right-winger, but I’m in favor of uprooting settlements, so I’m a left-winger. I tell people I’m exactly in the middle.” (Derfner 2004). 172

Israel; with 57 percent believing this very strongly. Concern was highest among religious Jewish respondents (Ynet 2011).

These findings suggest that the ‘demographic threat’ frame is resonant for Israelis. The ICCIC recommendation to construct border fences also gives additional support to existing government policy: Israel is currently constructing fences along its Egyptian borders to stem the flow of African migrants and to prevent smuggling and terror attacks (Ravid 2012).

Perhaps the most powerful cultural and historical reason why this framing may be successful, however, is that it gives climate change a human face. Drawing on the biblical story of the attack on the Children of Israel by the people of Amalek, Cromer (2001) explores the process of ‘othering’ in Jewish tradition. He argues that throughout history, the Jewish people have continually identified individuals or groups whom they consider pose an existential threat to their survival. It can thus be argued that giving climate change ‘a human face’, i.e. ‘African infiltrators’ fits more readily with what Jews consider to be an ‘existential threat’.

Whether this framing promotes appropriate action to address climate change is another matter. Constructing border fences to prevent climate refugees is not unprecedented. India has constructed a similar wall along its border with Bangladesh. Although not its stated aim, it is clear that this would prevent Bangladeshi climate refugees from seeking refuge in India (Banerjee 2010; Femia and Werrell 2012). The focus on climate refugees and wall construction nevertheless draws attention away from Israel’s culpability for causing climate change in the first place; its ethical responsibility to reduce its GHG emissions; and its current limited efforts to that effect (White 2011). It also distracts attention away from the other vital adaptation measures that Israel must adopt, such as retrofitting buildings to promote resilience to extreme climate events. In this sense it is an interpretative denial strategy. It accepts the basic facts of climate change but suggests that it is a problem that can be solved by building border fences rather than active public and policy engagement.

In any case, White (2011) argues that separation barriers are a poor means of preventing climate-induced migration. A far better solution, he proposes, is to assist neighbouring states to climate-proof infrastructures, economies and natural resources (White 2011; Femia and Werrel 2012). Although less widely reported, Environment Minister, Gilad Erdan recognised this. In response to the ICCIC report he argued, "Hiding behind fences is not a solution. 173

Instead, it's important to develop cooperative (initiatives) with neighbouring countries and international agencies" (Frenkel 2012).

A further question lies in whether climate change has and will actually lead to increased migration in the region. Several thousand asylum-seekers have arrived in Israel from the Darfur region of Sudan where the UN identified that climate change was an ultimate cause of the violent unrest (UNEP 2007; Giannini et al. 2008). However, the majority of asylum- seekers currently in Israel have fled forced conscription and discrimination in Eritrea, and were not motivated by environmental factors (Derfner 2012).

Research also suggests that previous extreme weather events in Africa have not actually resulted in mass migration. During the Sahel drought in the 1970’s, for example, most migration was short-distance and short-term (Thomas 2012). Likewise, prohibitive costs tend to prevent international migration, with climate change more likely to trap vulnerable groups (UNHCR 2008; Foresight 2012; Thomas 2012). Hartmann (2010) also argues that since many factors are involved in decision-making around migration one cannot simply label the process ‘climate-induced’.

Hartman (2010) argues that some of this ‘climate refugee’ discourse is ultimately, racist. It ignores the fact that the most common response to drought in Africa is co-operation, rather than conflict and migration. Given political stability and good information, poor Africans are just as likely to employ creative and effective adaptation strategies as rich Northern countries. Thus where climate change does result in mass migration, it is likely to be one of a range of destabilising factors.

Speaking out against alarmist climate refugee discourse in Israel, Lavie (2010c) calls on Israelis to respond with kindness rather than panic to refugees fleeing their homes due to natural disasters and extreme weather events. Others argue that Israel can use the opportunity to educate refugees to use its celebrated drylands farming techniques so that they can return to their communities, make them more resilient to climate change and thus make international migration less likely in the future (Adler 2010).

Ultimately, the ‘demographic threat’ frame speaks more to Israeli concerns about national identity, then concerns about climate change. The findings of the 2011 survey may support

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this. The fact that affiliates of political party, Israel Beitenu, which has an overt platform opposing non-Jewish immigration, were the most concerned about the threat posed by climate change to the environment, may indicate that they are beginning to associate climate change with this wider demographic threat (Phillipov 2008; Arian et al. 2009).

By framing poor and vulnerable populations as a threat, this frame does little to address either the root causes of migration or climate change. It is an example of how climate change has been framed for wider political reasons unrelated to climate change itself and promotes policy action that is at best partially appropriate.

3.4 Climate change scepticism in Israel The survey results showed that a significant minority of the Israeli public was sceptical about climate change. They also highlighted the complex ways in which Israeli left-right political alignment have influenced climate change scepticism, and the fact that new immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union and Ultra-orthodox Jewish communities were significantly more likely to be sceptical about climate change. The survey findings thus support the premise that different communities within Israel have different perceptions about climate change. This section further conjectures that this is because climate change has either been deliberately framed or can easily be perceived in ways that are consistent with their wider social identities and worldviews. It begins by highlighting the main way in which sceptical views about climate change have been framed in Israel.

3.4.1 Academic climate change scepticism in Israel Kliot et al. (2008) interviewed over ninety Israeli scientists for their opinions about climate change, finding only a handful of scientists actively disagreeing with the IPCC consensus. These included Hebrew University astrophysist, Nir Shaviv who is well known for his comprehensive alternative explanation for climate change. Shaviv argues that global warming has primarily natural causes, and can be explained by the interaction between solar activity and cosmic ray flux (Shaviv 2005).102 Although he acknowledges some anthropogenic forcing on the climate, he also believes that the climate is far less sensitive to the increased GHG levels than the IPCC alleges (Ziskin and Shaviv 2011). In any case, he is not concerned about climate change since the natural solar cycle will pass, and anthropogenic CO2 emissions will fall dramatically with the widespread adoption of solar energy (Pers. Comm. Nir Shaviv

102 Energetically charged subatomic particles originating in outer space. 175

2012). “The hysteria surrounding the concept of ‘global warming’ will fade …People will see that the apocalyptic forecasts are not coming true…A Grad missile falling in Sderot should be more cause for concern” (Ahronovitz 2009).

Shaviv claims that he began researching the topic when he was asked whether supernovae had an influence on the earth, unaware that he was entering a political minefield around climate science. He claims that he and most of his colleagues are politically liberal but his research is motivated entirely by the search for scientific truth, “I’m a scientist and I’m not going to change my research because it doesn’t suit my political views”. He also claims to have only become politicised when faced with an orchestrated campaign to discredit his research (Pers. Comm. Nir Shaviv 2012).

Shaviv’s alternative explanation for climate change is popular in climate sceptic circles and the well-known climate sceptic Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) has cited him.103 Shaviv also appeared in the celebrated 2007 documentary, “The Great Global Warming Swindle” and presented his research at a 2009 international conference organised by American free-market think-tank, the Heartland Institute. In Israel, he featured in ten news articles in the mainstream media between 2007 and 2010. He has also appeared a dozen times on mainstream Israeli TV channels, on numerous public panels about climate change and has presented his views to the Israeli Finance Ministry (Pers. Comm. Nir Shaviv 2012).104

Like Shaviv, eminent Israeli climatologist Nathan Paldor does not deny that the climate is changing. He however, argues that the temperature rise is not statistically meaningful (Pers. Comm. Nathan Paldor 2012). His main disagreement with climate change, however, is with climate modelling. This is because he argues that scientists cannot build accurate models since they still do not adequately understand the role the oceans, clouds and precipitation play in driving climate. Although human activity may have a small influence on the climate, like Shaviv, he is unconcerned. This is because he believes that fossil fuels will run out long before they have a serious effect (Pers. Comm. Nathan Paldor 2012). Although Paldor has not featured in the Israeli media, he has shared his views in scientific debates and was cited in the US Senate (US Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 2007).

103 Shaviv claims to disagree with 99 percent of the rest of Inhofe’s views (Pers. Comm. Nir Shaviv 2012). In 2003, Inhofe famously called climate change “the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people” (Inhofe 2012). 104 During our interview, Shaviv was planning a visit to Guinea-Bissau, where an NGO coalition had invited him to present his research on climate change. 176

Paldor and Shaviv’s response to anthropogenic global warming lies between literal and interpretative denial. They do not dispute the basic facts of global warming - the earth is warming and human activity has some influence on the climate. However, their interpretation of the facts differs significantly from the scientific consensus and they do not believe that climate change is a threat that requires active concern or engagement (IPCC 2007a).

Although not denying anthropogenic global warming per se, other Israeli climatologists have questioned whether it is causing local observed climate changes (Kliot et al. 2008). They argue that recent climate anomalies should not be automatically ascribed to anthropogenic global warming since complex local and regional atmospheric systems mean that climate variability has always been a feature of Middle East climate.105 Likewise, some ecologists have argued that there is no clear link between climate change and the changes they have observed in Israel (Kliot et al. 2008; Pers. Comm. Dan Malkinson 2011). Kliot et al. (2008) also found resentment among scientists that some fellow scientists had compromised their scientific integrity in order to access readily available funds for research on climate change.

3.4.2 American Tea Party-inspired climate scepticism in Israel "If they continue to write in the textbooks that the planet is warming due to carbon dioxide emissions, I will insist that it is not the case. Environmentalism is a false religion like that of evolution. Solar activity is the main cause of climate change, and this has been proven by Prof. Nir Shaviv of the Hebrew University” Dr Gabriel Avital, former chief scientist of the Education Ministry (Yerushalmi 2010)

There are few overt climate sceptics in Israeli politics. A notable exception is Dr Gabriel Avital. An engineer, prominent Likud member, NRG columnist and former Chief Scientist of the Education Ministry, Avital is a controversial figure.

Avital claims to have become sceptical about climate change following the Kyoto Protocol agreement in the late 1990’s (Pers. Comm. Gabriel Avital 2012). Avital broadly supports Nir Shaviv’s Cosmic Ray Flux explanation for global warming. Like Shaviv he believes that there may be some anthropogenic effect, but he is not concerned because he believes that the effect will disappear as the global population begins to decline in fifty years. He mainly believes,

105 One scientist cited the Genesis story of the seven years of plenty and seven years of drought to illustrate regional climate variability (Pers. Comm. Nurit Kliot 2009). 177

however, that environmentalists have wildly exaggerated anthropogenic global warming to suit their own agendas. “Have a look at Michael Crichton’s book, he’s not far off the truth in my opinion. They are exaggerating the problem because otherwise they wouldn’t get any funding” (Avital 2011).106 He has also alleged that environmentalists in general are socialist and pro-Arab (Avital 2011).

Avital’s views mirror the ideological perspective of the American Tea Party movement, which were outlined in Chapter 2. These includes his scepticism about the motives of environmental organisations and big government; support for individual freedom over environmental protection; argument that his views are rooted in Judeo-Christian thinking (he is an Orthodox Jew); and support for the continued exploitation of fossil fuels based on a cornucopian beliefs (Leiserowitz et al. 2008; Broder 2010; Kahan et al. 2012).107

Avital claims to have support within the Likud party, although he alleges that others are afraid to speak publicly (Pers. Comm. Gabriel Avital 2012). Avital’s political appointment in early 2010 as Chief Scientist of the Education Ministry, and his public statements about climate change and evolution, resulted in growing calls for his dismissal. This included an open letter written by Israel Prize and Nobel Prize laureates. Avital was dismissed from his post in October 2010 (Kashti 2010; Kashti and Rinat 2010).

Boaz Arad, founder of American Tea Party-inspired Israeli Freedom Movement, has expressed similar views to Avital in the mainstream Israeli media. Arad also runs the anti- environmentalist website, ‘The Green Blog’ which among other accusations claims the Israeli environmental movement is anti-modern, post-Zionist, anti-intellectual and draws on ‘politically-motivated’ science (Schwartz 2012).

Israel’s free daily newspaper, Israel Hayom, is also overtly sceptical about climate change. From 2007 to 2010, articles by and about both Avital and Shaviv were prominently featured. American billionaire, Sheldon Adelson who is also a major US Republican Party donor, funds the paper. This connection to right-wing American interests may thus account for the climate sceptical editorial line.

106 Michael Crichton’s (2004) novel State of Fear characterized climate change as the invention of eco-terrorists. 107 A cornucopian posits that there are few intractable natural limits to growth and believes the world can provide a practically limitless abundance of natural resources (Oxford English Dictionary 2009). 178

3.4.3 Putin-inspired climate scepticism In the 2010 Health survey, immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union were significantly more likely to agree that climate change was either an invented phenomenon or caused by nature than any other sector of the Israeli public. Although Russian language Israeli media was not analysed as part of this research, the result does suggest the influence of official Russian state media, which has a sceptical position on climate change, on the ex-Soviet Israeli public.108 This research thus posits the likely existence of a ‘Putin-inspired climate scepticism’ frame that is influencing perceptions in the Israeli ex-Soviet community, although at present cannot offer empirical evidence of its existence.

Russia is one of the leading GHG emitters, accounting for 17 percent of global emissions. It nevertheless only ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, delaying the entire treaty coming into force. The delay has been attributed to the climate change scepticism of President Putin and his leading advisors (Henry and Sundstrom 2007).109 Despite experiencing extreme weather events during 2010, evidence suggests that now-Prime Minister Putin, Russian academia and the mainstream media remain sceptical about climate science, with recent documentaries alleging an American conspiracy to harm Russia’s economic growth (Antonova 2010).

Almost a million immigrants from the former Soviet Union immigrated to Israel during the early 1990s, and by 2012, this community made up 15 percent of the population. The ex- Soviet population has nevertheless maintained a distinct identity, including Russian media sources and the political party Israel Beiteinu (Philippov 2008; Arian et al. 2009).

3.4.4 Effectiveness of the climate scepticism framings It is evident that these three different framings appeal to different populations within Israel, although there is some overlap. For example, Gabriel Avital publicly supports Nir Shaviv’s explanation for climate change, although Shaviv and Paldor both distance themselves from Avital and his evident political bias (Pers. Comm. Nir Shaviv 2012: Nathan Paldor 2012).

Shaviv and Paldor argue that the Israeli scientific community is open to a genuine debate about anthropogenic global warming. They attribute this to the fact that other Israeli scientists

108 At the January 2012 Haifa University workshop on Geo-strategy and Climate change, Russian Israeli academic, Anton Berkovski, overtly drew on Russian sources to argue that climate change could be a positive development in terms of growing agriculture and exploiting minerals in Russia and Canada on land that is currently covered in permafrost. 109 In 2003, President Putin famously quipped, "an increase of two or three degrees wouldn't be so bad for a northern country like Russia. We could spend less on fur coats, and the grain harvest would go up" (Pearce 2003). 179

are also questioning the scientific consensus, especially its impact on Israel, and less people are employed by the ‘climate change industry’. As a result they have not been ostracised for their views, unlike colleagues in Europe or the USA and there is an atmosphere of tolerance and engagement with climate scepticism in Israeli academic circles. (Pers. Comm. Nir Shaviv 2012: Nathan Paldor 2012).

Citing Ben-Gurion’s well-known aphorism, ‘two Jews three opinions’, Paldor has argued that the considerable public climate scepticism can be explained by the fact that Israelis tend to make up their own minds, not taking the orthodox opinion for granted. Similarly leading climatologist, Pinhas Alpert attributes Israeli climate scepticism to the Talmudic tradition of Jewish scholarship that privileges questioning and the promotion of alternative voices (Pers. comm. Pinhas Alpert 2009; Nathan Paldor 2012). On the other hand, Paldor blames poor scientific education in Israel for the widespread belief in anthropogenic global warming, since it has not equipped Israelis with the tools to question the data themselves.

In addition, the fact that the ex-Soviet Israeli community maintains it own distinct identity within Israeli society and tend to rely on specialised Russian media sources, may also have influenced levels of scepticism in that community (Arian et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the 2010 ISSP Environment survey suggests there may be a tension within the ex-Soviet Israeli community between those concerned about climate change as a security threat and those sceptical about it. This conclusion is reached because supporters of the main political party associated with the ex-Soviet community, Israel Beiteinu, expressed the highest levels of concern of affiliates of any political party.

Gabriel Avital has undoubtedly raised the profile of climate scepticism in Israel, writing in many of the national newspapers, appearing several times on television and at public debates (Pers. Comm. Gabriel Avital 2012). Ironically his provocative articles have also helped to keep the issue of climate change alive in the Israeli media.

Avital’s brand of climate scepticism is most likely to appeal to a small minority of right-wing religious Israelis who already distrust the Israeli environmental movement, perceiving it to be a primarily secular, left-wing movement. For them, Avital’s framing of climate change as a conspiracy perpetrated by scientists and leftists (two favourite hate figures) and his recourse to biblical text, is likely to prove attractive. Similarly, the association of climate change with the 180

left i.e. those opposed to Jewish settlement on the West Bank or even anti-Zionists, would automatically result in distrust in the issue by this constituency. This is because they perceive lending credence to environmental issues as strengthening the left, and thus potentially undermining the future of the Jewish settlements on the West Bank, a central ideological issue for the religious right (Dahan 2011; Avital 2011; Pers. Comm. Aharon Ariel Lavie 2012). 110 Avital’s rise in media visibility and the Climategate affair were accompanied by a seemingly concurrent rise in scepticism in the 2010 Health survey. It is, however, doubtful that Avital’s style of climate scepticism will gain that much traction in Israel. To begin with, although Avital is a prolific writer, his strong opinions about the Israeli environmental movement are not widely shared. The main reason why it is unlikely to prove successful, however, is that his brand of libertarian discourse has little cultural resonance in Israel.

It is true that in some countries the debate around how to respond to climate change has split along right-left ideological lines. The political left tends to support the regulatory interventions necessary to reduce GHG emissions (Harrison and Sandstrom 2007). Climate change also lends itself to a left-wing critique of the capitalist economy and brings attention to the unequal share of risk and responsibility between the rich polluting North and poor vulnerable South (Klein 2011).

On the other hand, the libertarian right has associated climate change legislation with the curtailment of economic freedom, excess regulation and ceding legislative control to international bodies such as the EU and UN. Conservative elements in the US Republican Party have increasingly alleged that climate change is a left-wing conspiracy to extend government regulation and control (Skolnikoff 1999; Oreskes and Conway 2010). In co- operation with the US fossil fuel industry they have actively sought to discredit climate science (Oreskes and Conway 2010; McCright 2011; Klein 2012). These elite political framings have contributed to a clear and growing divergence in beliefs around climate change in the USA between liberals and conservatives (Lakoff 2010; McCright 2011; Kahan et al. 2012).111

110 Environmentalists have been branded ‘post-Zionist’ or unpatriotic for opposing Jewish settlement on environmentally sensitive land in the Negev and Galilee, and ‘pro-Palestinian’ for ignoring environmental crimes committed by Arabs, such as illegal construction (Shani 2011; Merhav 2011). 111 Left-right economic beliefs clearly do not explain the whole picture. For example, right-wing French and German governments have been at the forefront of promoting climate policy (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). The polarization around climate change in the USA can also be linked to a general polarizing trend in American politics since the late 1990’s (McCright 2011). Some attribute this to a ‘culture war’ between Republican and Democrat political identities while others see ‘party-sorting’ is an inevitable feature of the binary nature of US politics (Hunter 1991; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). 181

Seemingly reflecting these trends, Israeli left-right political alignment initially correlated with scepticism and concern about climate change. In the 2009 BGU survey, right-wing Israelis were significantly more likely to be sceptical and less worried about climate change. Right- wing Israelis were also significantly more likely to distrust environmental organisations to communicate to them about climate change. Very left-wing Israelis, however, were significantly more likely to be concerned about climate change in the 2011 ISSP survey, however, party affiliates across the Israeli political spectrum were equally likely to be concerned about climate change.

Although the initial proponents of Israeli climate policy were from left-wing parties, climate change has not been framed as a left-wing issue in Israel. In fact, environmental issues in general are marginal to the Israeli political agenda and Israeli environmentalists come from across the political spectrum, motivated more by personal belief than political ideology (Karassin 2011).112

Since coming to power in 2009, Israel’s right-wing Likud Party has actually overseen the introduction of climate policy under the leadership of Environment Minister, Gilad Erdan. Erdan has advanced the environmental agenda because “he has the prime minister's ear because of his stalwart support for Netanyahu's right-wing political agenda” (Waldoks 2009d).113 Aside from Erdan’s undoubted personal commitment, Likud’s embrace of climate change probably represents a wider political strategy to appeal to new voter constituencies and demonstrate that Likud can show more effective leadership than the left on issues beyond its traditional focus on security (Tuchfeld 2011; Pers. Comm Aharon Ariel Lavie 2012). Although, given Likud’s neo-liberal agenda it is no surprise that Israel’s climate policy focuses primarily on no-regrets measures, economic incentives and voluntary-based initiatives. As discussed in greater depth below, the right-wing Settler movement has also begun to embrace environmental issues (Tuchfeld 2011; Chen 2011).

Although some notable Israeli climate sceptics are right-wing, these observations suggest that the right-left ideological split in Israel does not obviously determine climate change concern

112 Communist MK Dov Khenin and Labour MK Ophir Pines-Paz proposed the first climate bill in the Knesset in 2008. Only left-wing Israeli academic Dan Rabinowitz, MK Dov Khenin and a few others have publicly framed climate change as a social justice issue and advocated for a transition to a more sustainable and socially-just society as the solution (Rabinowitz 2009a; Khenin 2010; Rinat 2010). 113 Erdan is hawkish on geo-strategic issues, supports Jewish settlement in the West Bank and has argued that left-wing environmental organisations have harmed Jewish interests (Tuchfeld 2011). 182

or scepticism. This is because the libertarian and extreme economic neo-liberal beliefs that have influenced climate scepticism in the USA and elsewhere, are not defining features of the Israeli right and have little historical, political or cultural relevance for most Israelis (Arian 2005).114 This fact is lamented by Israeli climate sceptic Boaz Arad, “…In the Likud and the right-wing parties there are islands of understanding about the principles of freedom. Unfortunately, most of the political spectrum in Israel is painted in shades of red, though on the right the red is a bit lighter” (Schwartz 2012).

It is probable that the right-wing scepticism identified in the 2009 BGU survey reflected the tiny section of the Israeli right-wing religious community that shares Gabriel Avital’s American conservative beliefs. It may also reflect a poor understanding of the issue among the political right and the general belief that climate change is irrelevant for Israelis given the more pressing security concerns. This explanation is supported by the fact that right-wing Israelis did not significantly disagree with the policy measures proposed in the 2009 BGU survey, a position that would follow from ideological climate scepticism. Other climate scepticism can be explained by the contrarian streak in Israeli society for which Nir Shaviv’s alternative explanations are appealing; lack of interest in Ultra-orthodox communities; and the influence of Russian state media on the Israeli ex-Soviet community.

3.5 The Jewish community and engagement with climate change The Israeli Jewish religious public falls into three main movements based on different levels of adherence to Jewish law. The Ultra-orthodox and Orthodox (or National Religious Jews) strictly adhere to rabbinic interpretation of Jewish law, which dictates everyday behavior. They account for 7 and 15 percent of the Israeli population respectively. ‘Traditional’ Jews, who represent 32 percent of the Israeli population, are more liberal in their interpretation of Jewish law (Keissar-Sugarmen 2009).115

Although the Ultra-orthodox and Orthodox movements are internally composed of numerous different sects and groupings, there are several broad differences between these movements relevant for this discussion. Orthodox Jews, especially the Modern Orthodox, are more open to global cultural currents, while Ultra-orthodox Jews are more inward looking and focused on

114 This is supported by the fact that Israeli researchers did not include right-left political questions in the 2010 ISSP Environment survey stating, “Traditional left-right issues are not central to most [Israeli] political parties. We prefer not to force this variable on the list of parties” (ISSP Environment, Israel 2011). 115 The remaining 46 percent of the Israeli Jewish population self-identifies as secular. 183

community interests. In addition, while Ultra-orthodox Jews are sceptical about modern science, Orthodox Jews see no contradiction between religion and science with many working as natural scientists (Efron 2006; Alpert 2009). Another difference relates to support for Israel as a Jewish state. Whereas the Ultra-orthodox movement is reticent in its support for Zionism, the Orthodox movement views settling Israel as part of the realisation of Jewish identity (Ben- Rafael 2008). The Orthodox movement is thus generally associated with the political right in its support for West Bank Jewish settlement and a hawkish position on the Arab-Israeli conflict (Ben-Meir and Shaked 2007).

The Israeli Orthodox Jewish community only began to actively engage with climate change from 2009 onwards. In doing so it trails several years behind the secular Israeli public and a decade behind the American Jewish public (Tal 2007; Pers. Comm. Yedidya Sinclair 2011; Einat Kramer 2012). Two initiatives have sought to frame climate change as a serious and relevant issue for religious Jews. The Jewish Climate Initiative (JCI), a coalition of American Jewish and Israeli environmental groups, was founded to articulate a Jewish response to climate change drawing on Jewish theology, practices and values. In November 2009 the JCI presented the document “Sustaining Our Vision: The Jewish Climate Change Campaign” at an interfaith conference on climate change.116

The second initiative was the inception of an annual global ‘Sustainability Shabbat’ (Heb. Shabbat Brit Olam) in October 2009 as an opportunity to raise awareness about environmental issues in the Jewish community. The date coincides with the annual reading in synagogues of the biblical story of Noah. Although small, the event has grown in popularity in Israel. In 2011, it included the publication of a widely-read Shabbat newsletter focused on an environmental theme; green events in six religious communities in Israel and the West Bank; and a central event in Jerusalem entitled “Before the Flood” which included a fair and workshops (Jewish Nature 2012).

The Ultra-orthodox Jewish community, however, remains unengaged with climate change. In the surveys, they reported a lower awareness of climate change, greater scepticism and less concern than other sectors of Israeli society. They were also significantly less likely to trust scientists or the media to communicate accurately to them about climate change. In the 2011

116 The event was entitled, “Many Heavens, One Earth: Faith Commitments for a Living Planet” was held at Windsor Castle in the UK. It was jointly hosted by the Alliance of Religions and Conservation and UNDP. 184

ISSP-Environment survey, affiliates of the Ultra-orthodox United Torah Judaism party were also significantly less concerned about climate change. Although one of the most environmentally engaged Knesset members, MK Moshe Gafni, is also a member of this party, his commitment has had little influence on the rest of his community (Karassin 2011).

3.5.1 The ‘Jewish values’ framing “We are facing a crisis today but Jewish culture offers us a way to balance our human needs with those of the world…It also offers a rich alternative to Western culture.” Einat Kramer, Director, Jewish Nature (Kramer and Bergman 2010)

The ‘Jewish values’ frame illustrates how Jewish tradition, law and values compels observant Jews to engage with climate change (Lavie 2007; JCI 2009; Chen 2011). Berkovitz (2009) argues that Judaism can offer vital insights on climate change precisely because Jewish spirituality was profoundly shaped by the same situation the world finds itself in today: poised between the desert and the availability of water.117 This task is especially urgent since climate change poses an existential threat to Judaism: it would irrevocably disrupt the Middle Eastern agricultural seasons on which Judaism is built (JCI 2009).

A key storyline used in Jewish advocacy work on climate change is the story of Noah and the Flood. There are evident similarities between this story and climate change. This includes their apocalyptic qualities and wider public failure to recognise or adequately prepare for the coming crisis (Lavie 2007). The central parallel, however, is the stark critique of modern society (Benstein 2006; Lavie 2007; Kramer and Bergman 2010; Kramer 2011).

In the story of Noah, God eradicated an entire generation that had turned away from God and was “filled with violence” (Gen. 6:11). According to Kramer and Bergman (2010), Jewish sources consider Noah’s generation to be guilty of the sin of hubris before nature and the order of the world. They argue that the current generation is guilty of the same sin, which in this case has led to the ecological crisis. Sinclair (2009) highlights that while the Flood was a direct punishment from God, today the earth’s climate system is directly responding to millions of human activities that also represent “the sin of hubris”, and that these actions are creating their own retribution.

117 Climatologist Pinchas Alpert (2009) notes that discussions on weather and climate are so common in Jewish tradition, that he has constructed a ‘Torah-based climatology’. 185

The story of the Flood ends with God entering a covenant with Noah not to destroy the earth again by flood, and to maintain the regularity of the seasons.118 Waskow (2001) argues, however, that as humans have sought to emulate God in their destruction of the natural environment they have violated their side of the covenant. “The Noah story is a powerful warning from Torah. The human race has in the past few generations done much to shatter the seasons and their celebration -- in ways that…endanger life on earth”. Other Jewish sources also highlight that God’s covenant does not preclude the destruction of the Earth by fire and other natural disasters or even the flooding of individual nations (Benstein 2006; Lavie 2007; Waskow 2011; Halpert 2012).

Noah survived the Flood because he alone found favour with God. Faced with climate change, therefore, humanity must repair its relationship with God. “Without rectification of the foundations and moral codes of our society, and its relationship with G-d, the next catastrophe is only a matter of time” (Lavie 2007). For Jews this requires a return to Jewish values and practices. As Lavie (2007) argues, however, we can either choose to be like Noah and simply save ourselves, or strive to be more like Abraham, and demand that our entire generation also embraces change.

Apart from the looming threat of mass destruction, core Jewish values should impel Jews to act to prevent climate change (JCI 2009). These include the Biblical injunctions to “choose life” (Deut. 30:19);119 to pursue justice (Deut. 16:12); to save life (Deut. 22:8); to commit to children and future generations (Kiddushin 30a) and to commit to tikkun olam or fixing the world. The Jewish ethic of modesty and restraint, “to walk humbly with your God” (Micah 6:8) can also be an important guiding principle out of the current crisis (Kramer 2011).

Central Jewish practices can also be interpreted as a reflection of the Jewish commitment to the environment; for example recognising Shabbat as a day of energy conservation and equality between humans and nature (Benstein 2006). Other Jewish laws have also been interpreted as mandating environmental behavior such as the prohibition against the wasteful misuse of resources known as ‘ba’al tashchit’ (Deut. 20:19-20); the law that compels taking responsibility for the damage caused to others through pollution (Bava Batra 23a); and the

118 “While the earth remains, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease”(Gen 8:22). 119 Al Gore referred to this in his 2007 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech (Gore 2007). 186

prohibition against causing an animal’s extinction known as ‘tzaar baalei chayim’ (Deut. 22, 6-7) (Benstein 2006).

The ‘Jewish values’ frame draws on two foundational Jewish theological beliefs. The first relates to the Jewish ethic of environmental stewardship and based on the biblical injunction “to cultivate and protect the earth” (Genesis 2:15-16).120 The second relates to the apt

Talmudic teaching, “Everything is in Heaven's hands, except for the cold and the heat” (Avoda Zarah 3b).121 The underlying implication of this teaching is that humans cannot simply take a fatalistic view and blame Providence for problems that through their own actions they can avert, such as wearing appropriate clothing to address the ‘cold and the heat’. The wider implication is that in Jewish thinking, catastrophic climate change is not a foregone conclusion, and can be averted through active human engagement (Lavie 2007).

Sinclair (2009; 2010) draws on another Jewish text, the Babylonian Talmud tractate Ta’anit, arguing that it offers the most authentic Jewish response to climate change. The tractate, written between the 3rd and 5th centuries AD, articulates the Jewish response to drought. It details the daily prayers for rain that are said throughout the winter. In the eventuality that the rains fail, the tractate prescribes a series of public fast days of increasing severity. It also outlines the rituals of communal fasting, prayer and mourning to be followed in the event of full-blown climate catastrophe (Sinclair 2009). Religious Jewish communities have followed these prescriptions in response to Israel’s prolonged drought (Israel 21c 2010).

The organisations behind the ‘Jewish values’ frame, such as Jewish Nature (Hebrew Teva Ivri) also seek to encourage relevant behavioral changes alongside spiritual activities. These include ‘greening’ synagogues, promoting biodegradable disposable utensils for use on Shabbat and ‘eco-kashrut’, a movement to extend Jewish dietary laws to address environmental concerns (Jewish Nature website 2012).122

120 Commentators also cite the midrash (English biblical teaching) Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:13 “When God created Adam, he led him around all of the trees in the Garden of Eden. He told him, ‘See how beautiful and praiseworthy are all of my works… do not corrupt the world; for if you corrupt it, there will be no one to set it right after you’”. 121 The Hebrew words for thorns and snares are also interpreted to mean cold and heat (Soncino Babylonian Talmud 1968). 122 Although the religious Jewish community perceives itself as anti-consumerist, it does engage in specific ‘anti- environmental’ practices. This includes having large families, the widespread use of disposable utensils and frequent flights to the USA, home of the largest Jewish population globally (Zeveloff 2012; Pers. Comm. Aharon Ariel Lavie 2012). 187

3.5.2 The effectiveness of the Jewish climate framing Sinclair (2010) identifies three reasons why Orthodox Jews failed to engage with climate change until 2009. First, although Jewish thinking does have a universalist aspect, most religious Jews are primarily motivated by local, nationalist and particularistic concerns. Second, climate discourse tends to be technocratic and policy-oriented and thus alienating for religious Jews with their emphasis on values and behavior. Third, religious Jews perceive attempts by progressive American Jews to fit a Jewish agenda onto climate change as artificial, politically motivated and based on a shallow interpretation of Jewish sources.

This ‘Jewish values’ frame clearly aspires to make climate change a serious issue for observant Jews. It is likely to be resonant because it is rooted in a Jewish religious worldview; has emerged from trusted communicators; and suggests that Judaism has a novel and profound contribution to the wider climate debate. Invoking the connection between climate change and Ta’anit tractate is especially likely to engage the Orthodox Jewish community because it is both rooted in Jewish religious practices and focuses on particularistic concerns for Israel (Sinclair 2010).

Jewish environmental activists also argue that the ‘Jewish values’ frame is likely to have appeal beyond the religious community because of the Jewish roots in Israeli culture and the growing dissatisfaction with materialist values (Waldoks 2009c). Although secular Israelis have shown increasing interest in the Jewish environmental interpretation, whether it would influence their lifestyle decisions is another matter (Pers. Comm. Aharon Ariel Lavie 2012; Einat Kramer 2012).

It is important to situate the ‘Jewish values’ framing within the small but growing Orthodox environmental movement in Israel. Although American Jewish movements have actively engaged with climate change since the late 1990’s, this has primarily been within the progressive Reform, Renewal and Reconstructionist movements, which have a long history of social and environmental activism.123 These movements, however, are not widely represented

123 There is a flourishing North American Jewish environmental movement under the umbrella of the Coalition on Judaism and the Environment (COEJL). It includes national and local organizations focusing on issues such as food sustainability and environmental education. Jewish environmental groups also actively campaign against the exploitation of fossil fuels e.g. the group Jews Against Hydro-fracking opposes the extraction of natural gas from geological structures in Upstate New York where there are many Jewish summer camps (Goldsmith 2011; Halpert 2012). In August 2011, Jewish leaders were arrested in protests against the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline that will bring oil to the USA from Canadian tar-sands (Halpert 2012). 188

in Israel.124 In Israel, this framing has instead emerged from a relatively new Israel Orthodox environmental movement, which incorporates voices across the political spectrum from progressive Orthodox rabbis to the Settler movement. For progressive voices in the Jewish community, engagement with climate change represents another means to make Judaism more engaged with the current global debates. For the religious right and settler movement, engagement with climate change marks an attempt to reclaim leadership on environmental issues from the secular left similar to the Likud Party’s recent embrace of environmental issues (Rinat 2012b).125

The Jewish community’s engagement with climate change thus does have political motivations. Similarly, some conservative and traditionalist rabbis have refused to engage with climate change on principle because they perceive it as a ‘progressive’ issue (Pers. Comm. Aharon Ariel Lavie 2012).

Despite the potential appeal of the ‘Jewish values’ framing, many within the Orthodox community are not incorporating environmental practices into everyday life. This is for several reasons. Some argue that the only Jewish action necessary to address climate change is to observe the Torah commandments as they have been observed for centuries; they thus see no need to engage in environmental behaviors. Others are optimistic about the imminent Messianic Age, as heralded by the founding of the State of Israel and in this context do not believe that climate change can pose a serious threat (Pers. Comm. Einat Kramer; Aharon Ariel Lavie 2012). Others still may agree with Gabriel Avital’s theological interpretation of Jewish texts, which justify his climate scepticism and undermine a Jewish environmental ethic (Lavie 2011).

Tirosh-Samuelson (2001) argues that although there may appear to be theological tensions between Judaism and an environmental ethic, the lack of environmental engagement is more related to Jewish culture. Pre-modern Jewish culture has given rise to an Orthodox lifestyle that is either indifferent to nature or consciously aspires to transcend it (c.f. Schwartchild 1983).

124 The Reform movement represents 35 percent of the American Jewish population but only four percent of the Israeli Jewish population (Ament 2005; Rosner 2012). 125 Progressive Orthodox rabbis who have engaged with climate change include Rabbi Yuval Sherlow and Rabbi Beni Lau, both of whom promote a pluralistic agenda on a wide range of social and environmental issues. With mainstream religious organisations refusing to work on environmental issues in the West Bank, the Settler movement has established its own environmental organisation Green Now (Hebrew Yarok Achshav).

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In addition, there is a growing current of climate scepticism in American Orthodox Jewish communities, where responses to climate change have been increasingly influenced by American bi-partisan politics (Halpert 2012). Evonne Marzouk Director of Canfei Nesharim, a US-based environmental NGO that works with the Orthodox community, highlights the influence of the American right-wing climate sceptical media. “Orthodox Jews watch a lot of Fox News which mirrors their socially conservative views and presents a more favourable perspective towards Israel” (Halpert 2012).126 An internet debate among American Ultra- orthodox Jews similarly attributed climate scepticism to increasing alignment with the US Republican party (Slifkin 2009).

126 Fox News Channel is a television network owned by News Corporation. A 2010 leaked memo revealed that Fox News editors urged reporters to give climate change reporting a sceptical slant (Goldenberg 2010). 190

Ch. 5 ‘A renewable light unto the nations’: technology, opportunity and techno- optimism in Israeli climate discourse

Yesterday [Ray Kurzweil] said that the efficiency of solar energy doubles every two years…I say let's make it happen faster. If we have placed a man on the moon, surely we can harness the energy of the sun.” Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu (2009)

1. Introduction As discussed in Chapter 1, Israel avoided serious engagement with climate change for many years and the issue has remained almost entirely the concern of environmentally minded politicians, bureaucrats, environmental campaigners and academics. Since 2007, however, a popular framing has emerged suggesting that Israeli can make a valuable, if not unique, contribution to global efforts to address climate change through its technological capabilities. This ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing has fired up the Israeli popular imagination and the framing been widely echoed by Israeli politicians, environmental campaigners, entrepreneurs and investors, the elite media and public figures visiting Israel.

This framing is founded in real developments. Israel has long been a pioneer in technologies appropriate for drylands development, including solar energy, drip irrigation, desalination, drylands agriculture and afforestation. These can be considered climate adaptation and mitigation technologies. Israel also has a long history of sharing technology and know-how through international development programs (Fedler 2002). This frame draws on well rehearsed and appealing nation-building narratives of Israel as a nation surviving in a hostile environment through deploying its key natural resource, ‘Jewish ingenuity’. It also reinforces the image of Israel as a technologically savvy ‘start-up’ nation, developing globally relevant technologies. Given this context, it is unsurprising that techno-optimism quickly became a popular Israeli national response and heuristic for the Israeli public to conceptualize climate change and its solutions.

This chapter argues, however, that this framing is especially attractive to Israeli policy-makers because it suggests an altruistic motivation for scaling up government and private investment

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in cleantech R&D. Israel’s main interest in doing so is actually driven by more pressing national goals. These include tapping into a potential new economic growth area and supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal mission to find substitute fuels and technologies to end global oil dependency. Other motivations include increasing Israel’s soft power in developing countries and improving its PR image abroad, which have been eroded due to political developments.

Israel is not the only country that has attached action on climate change to economic and security goals. Indeed, some leading climate advocates argue that it may be the only way to promote action on the issue. Research suggests however that it is misguided for national climate policy to focus on technological innovation and deployment alone, since technology alone is unlikely to solve climate change (Huesemann 2006; Hulme 2009; H; Urry 2011). Despite this critique, ‘techno-opportunity’ frames and climate techno-optimism in general have received little attention in the academic literature. Drawing on the framework introduced in the previous chapter, this chapter also explores the extent to which this framing allows the Israeli government and public to avoid fully integrating the implications of climate change into policy and everyday practice.

2. Technology in the climate change debate

2.1 Technology and techno-optimism in global climate change discourse Discussion on the role of technology is pervasive in the global climate change debate. In 1992, the UNFCCC identified the diffusion and transfer of technologies as a central means to mitigate GHG emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change (UNFCCC, Articles 4, 9, and 11) (UNFCCC 2009). Article 14 of the Kyoto Protocol established the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as an important channel for technology financing in developing countries and the IPCC has argued that without technology transfer “it may be difficult to achieve emission reduction at a significant scale” (IPCC 2007b). A central element to international climate negotiations focuses on how to overcome investment and intellectual property barriers to the development, deployment and transfer of climate technologies (Martinot et al. 1997; Bazilan et al. 2008; Yang 2009; Popp 2011).

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One polarising debate has focused on whether it is more beneficial to stimulate technological innovation to replace fossil fuels or to instead encourage the deployment of existing technologies. 127 Some argue that the most cost-effective strategy would be to wait for a massive investment programme similar to the Manhattan Project to develop new breakthrough energy technologies (Revkin 2006; 2011). Others argue that climate change can be solved now through aggressive deployment of existing alternative energy technologies (Socolow and Pacala 2006). Still others have argued that the market can effectively set the pace of both innovation and deployment without the need for state support. Kurzweil (2011) has argued, for example, that he is unconcened about climate change because by 2030, the USA will be wholly reliant on solar technologies due to increasing efficiency and falling costs.128

The US Democratic Party made cleantech innovation and deployment central to the 2009 recovery program for the American economy. In his rhetoric, President Obama focused on the potential economic and energy security benefits of doing so as a means to bypass the divisive climate scepticism debate while still ensuring GHG emissions reductions (Romm 2007; Fletcher 2009).129 This policy strategy is supported by some influential American environmentalists who have argued that framing climate change within the usual ‘pollution paradigm’ would not excite wider engagement. Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2005) cite the work of the Apollo Alliance in the USA, which unites environmentalists, business, labour and community activists to promote the transition to clean and sustainable technologies as more likely to be successful. This is because it aligns economic development, job creation and ending dependency on foreign oil with strong action on global warming.

These moves represent a wider shift towards framing climate change as an opportunity (Hartwell Group 2011). For example, in early 2011, UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon announced that he would shift his efforts away from climate change and toward accelerating the development and deployment of clean energy, especially in the developing world (Goldenberg 2011). Following this, the major focus at the United Nations conference on

127 Alternative technologies include solar and wind power, bio-fuels, green building technology, sustainable transport technologies, the smart grid, portable fuel cells, water- saving and water-filtration devices, nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. Not all these technologies can also be defined as ‘cleantech’. Pernick and Wilder (2007) define cleantech as “a product, service, or process that delivers value using limited or zero non-renewable resources and/or creates significantly less waste than conventional offerings”. By Pernick and Wilder’s definition, nuclear energy and CCS technologies are thus not ‘cleantech’. 128 The idea that technological development progresses exponentially, as each iteration is used to help build the next, better, faster, cheaper one (Kurzweil 2001). This pattern has been observed in microprocessor development. 129 The 2009 proposed bill to introduce policy measures to address GHG emissions was in fact officially titled, ‘The American Clean Energy and Security Bill’. 193

Sustainable Development in Rio in 2012 (Rio + 20) was on how to grow the green economy, with little reference to climate change.

The role that technology can play in solving climate change is particularly evident in the discussion on geo-engineering. Faced with the failure of the international community to mitigate GHG emissions, some argue that the only solution would be to employ technological strategies that could reduce or delay climate change. Technological measures proposed to fix climate change include 'whitening' clouds to reflect the sun’s rays; dumping iron particles in the oceans to nurture CO2 -absorbing plankton and firing silver iodide into clouds to produce rain (The Royal Society 2009).

2.2 Critiques of the technology focus in the climate change debate Criticism of the emphasis on technology in climate change debate has come from many quarters: technical, sociological and philosophical (Hueseman 2006; Hulme 2009; Urry 2011). Although Socolow and Pacala (2006) and others have illustrated that it is possible to solve climate change using current commercially available low-carbon energy technologies, these technologies still face numerous social and political barriers to deployment (Jacobson and Delucchi 2011; Hartwell Group 2011). Others argue that the focus on technology distracts from the fairly modest changes in household energy use that could reduce US GHG emissions by seven percent or by more than 1.5 percent of global emissions (Dietz et al. 2009).

Research also suggests that even if there were a breakthrough in energy technology, it typically takes 25 years after commercial introduction of a primary energy form to obtain a one percent share of the global market. For example, despite being widely touted as an alternative, hydrogen fuel cell cars are still not commercially available160 years after their invention (Romm 2009). Considering the short time window available to reduce GHG emissions, humanity may not have time to wait for a ‘magic bullet’ solution (IPCC 2007b).

Geo-engineering has come under considerable criticism given how little scientists understand of Earth’s complex and dynamic systems and the potential for unintended catastrophic consequences (ETC 2010a).130 So too has another seemingly promising ‘techno-fix’, Carbon

Capture and Storage (CCS), a technology to capture CO2 from coal-fired plants and pump it

130 See ETC Group Briefing for full overview of potential negative consequences of geo-engineering (ETC 2010). 194

into sealed storage facilities before it reaches the atmosphere. CCS is also an expensive and energy-intensive technology and far from commercial availablility (Hartwell Group 2011).

Some of the debate around technological solutions to climate change is also characterised by the philosophy of ‘techno-optimism’: the belief that technological progress can solve human problems and improve quality of life; the so-called ‘technological fix’ (Rosner 2004). Emerging from Enlightenment philosophy, techno-optimism is a central feature of modernist thinking as well as some mainstream environmental thinking.131 132 For example, the late 20th century Ecological Modernisation school sees technological innovation as integral both to environmental protection and economic growth, and thus central to sustainable development (Spaargaren 2000; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000).133

Techno-optimists tend to see technological development as value-free, thus sidestepping the complex social and political context in which technologies are invented and deployed (Wauzzinski 2001). Techno-optimism also ignores the social and environmental implications of technologies and the broader context in which the problems arose in the first place. Critics argue that by failing to address the causes of a problem, technological fixes often have unintended consequences that may be worse than the problem they were trying to solve (Allen and Hecht 2001; Nye 2007; Volti 2010).

An instance of this is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), one of the main UNFCCC policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions, which has in reality done little to reduce GHG emissions while also creating additional social and environmental problems (Bachram 2004). For example, the CDM-supported wind farm project in Maharashtra, India was built on traditional grazing land without the consent of local villagers; and plans for hydroelectric power in the Amazon basin would displace thousands of indigenous peoples and cause untold environmental damage (Fearnside 2006; Smith 2008).

Some also question the interests behind climate techno-fixes: the CDM has created a new lucrative carbon-trading industry and CCS appeals to politicians because it perpetuates

131 French philosopher, Condorcet was among the first to argue that technological advancements and economic changes would enable changes in moral and cultural values and thus social progress. 132 More extreme 20th century proponents include libertarian economist Julian Simon and trans-humanist, Ray Kurzweil. 133 Some Ecological Modernisation theorists have a more nuanced perspective arguing that the modernisation process itself has exposed humans and the environment to new forms of risk such as pollution, illnesses, crime and of course, climate change (Giddens 1999). 195

‘business as usual’ and does not create confrontation with the formidable fossil fuel industry (The Economist 2009). Likewise, geo-engineering allows industrialised countries to avoid their responsibility to reduce their GHG emissions (ETC 2010a).

The focus on technology also sidesteps the central need for societal change in solving climate change (Huesemann 2006). To seriously reduce GHG emissions it will be necessary to fundamentally rethink how people’s needs are met, since humans are currently locked into a system where meeting almost all basic needs requires the burning fossil fuels (Urry 2011). More robust solutions would thus include downscaling society so that more goods and services can be provided locally (Rabinowitz 2009a). Technofixes are thus a less challenging solution for politicians than asking the public to conserve energy, use private transport less, rethink food choices and address the prevalent culture of consumption and waste.

3. Technology in the Israeli climate debate

3.1 The emergence of the ‘climate techno-opportunity frame in Israel The first reference to Israel’s potential technological contribution to addressing climate change appears in Israel’s First National Communication on Climate Change to the UNFCCC, published in November 2000. Then environment minister, Dalia Itzik argued in her foreword “… Israel has the national capability to develop innovative technologies to mitigate the impacts of climate change…and the capacity and readiness to transfer and share its expertise in such crucial fields as water conservation, afforestation and combating desertification with countries worldwide” (Pe’er and Safriel 2000).

Although Israeli government interest in these climate-friendly technologies has risen and fallen over the years, in 2006 Israel also began its accession process to the OECD, which forced Israel to establish a ‘like-minded’ climate strategy to other OECD members. Some climate policy advocates thus saw this as an chance to frame climate change as an opportunity for Israel. In a May 2007 Ha’aretz op-ed entitled, ‘Israel is a world power in dealing with the greenhouse effect’, Environment Ministry Chief Scientist, Yeshayahu Bar-Or argued that “a wise government can position Israel as regional (and perhaps global) knowledge center for climate change technologies.” (Bar-Or 2007).

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Elected Israel’s president in June 2007, Shimon Peres reiterated this framing in his Jewish New Year address, stating “It is crucial that Israel carve out a role for itself in the sphere of global science and technology and serve as a pioneer in the infinite search for solutions to…global warming” (Peres 2007a). In another address he argued “I thus call upon all of us, on the Eve of Yom Kippur … to search for and find creative solutions for two of the most significant challenges today: The Terror against the Environment that is Global Warming and The Terror against Humanity”(Peres 2007b). Despite Peres’ advocacy on the issue, however, few harboured serious expectations for a change in policy orientation. A few months later, the Environment Minister, Gidon Ezra failed to attend the important 2007 UN climate conference in Bali in December 2007 (Rinat 2007).

During 2008 and 2009, the techno-opportunity framing nevertheless proliferated. Former US vice-president Al Gore, receiving the Dan David award in Tel Aviv in May 2008, exhorted “The people of Israel can lead the way to a renewable future” (Solomon 2008). This call was echoed by other senior American politicians engaged in the climate change debate, such as Democrat Congressman Henry Waxman (D-Ca) and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger visiting Israel in November 2009 to sign a renewable energy co-operation agreement (Darel 2009).

Numerous official Israeli statements at this time also contained references to the role that Israeli technology could play in addressing climate change, including speeches by Environment Minister Gilad Erdan in international forums and President Shimon Peres’ speech to the plenary at the 2009 UN conference in Copenhagen. Similarly Israeli cleantech entrepreneurs widely repeated this framing. A week before Copenhagen, GreenFuel Technologies founder, Isaac Berzin argued, “Only technology will save us. The technology that Israel needs to develop will change the world and lead a change in the struggle against climate change” (Berzin 2009). Berzin believes that Israel can “lead the green revolution” in algae biofuel innovation because of proven ability to cultivate the desert and leadership in water conservation techniques (Tedx Tel Aviv 2010).

Taking their cue from Israeli entrepreneurs and initiatives such as the Apollo Alliance, the Israeli environmental movement also embraced this framing. Chairing a discussion at a 2008 Green Economy conference in Tel Aviv, entitled ‘Climate change as a corporate opportunity’ former Life and Environment director, Alona Sheffer argued, “Israel's capabilities and 197

relative economic strength allow her to turn the climate crisis into an engine of growth and an economic opportunity” (Sheffer 2008). Similarly, Zipi Isser Itzik, then IUED director, argued, “... we expect [Israel] to become a leading power in confronting climate change by developing technological innovations” (NIF 2007). Referring to Israel’s expertise in drylands’ technologies KKL-JNF World Chairman, Efi Stenzler argued, “the current [climate] crisis also presents environmental and economic opportunities’ (KKL 2010). The environmental correspondents for the elite newpaper, Ha’aretz, and English language newspaper, Jerusalem Post also widely employed the techno-opportunity framing in their coverage.134

3.2 The effectiveness of the climate techno-opportunity frame The ‘climate techno-opportunity’ frame clearly has broad material appeal. Israel’s NGO community and environmental journalists perceive it as a positive framing that could have broad appeal with the Israeli public and sustain policymakers’ interest in climate change (Pers. Comm. Ehud Zion Waldoks 2011; Zafrir Rinat 2011). For entrepreneurs and investors, it reflects well on their business motivations and is also clearly a means to attract venture capital investment. American politicians campaigning on climate change have also identified a common cause with their support for Israel through a shared interest in developing cleantech. For example, one of the authors of the 2009 US Climate bill (‘The Waxman Markey’ bill) Congressman Henry Waxman (R-CA) argued that by combining intellectual capacity, “the USA and Israel could develop new technologies which could reduce CO2 emissions, end dependence on Arab oil and be source of unimagined wealth for the two countries” (Waldoks 2008b).135

3.2.1 Convergence with other national priorities For Israeli policymakers the climate techno-opportunity framing allows them to express concern about climate change while actually pursuing ‘more important’ strategic goals. As highlighted above, Israeli climate change discourse is not unique in linking climate change with opportunities for economic development and energy security. Israeli policymakers have

134 Although not overtly supporting the techno-opportunity framing, Israel’s reticent climatologist community has nevertheless expressed its support for geo-engineering research. Hebrew University climatologist, Daniel Rosenfeld has, for example, has presented research showing that aerosol-producing ships could convert patchwork cloud layers into solid cloud to increase global albedo and cool the earth (Morton 2009; Kalaugher 2010). Leading Israeli climatologist Pinhas Alpert has argued, “Israel has no choice but to get organized for geo-engineering.’ (KKL2010). Rosenfeld has also argued, ‘nobody wants it [geo-engineering] to happen but given the present paralysis in the international political arena, we are getting closer and closer to a climate emergency situation” (Kalaugher 2010). In addition, interviewing Israeli natural scientists (n = 90), Kidar et al. (2010) found more support for technological means to augment the water supply than for water savings measures as a means to address climate induced water shortages. 135 Likewise Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA) took members of the House Select Committee on Global Warming to Israel arguing “We need a strategy where [cleantech] is made in the USA and Israel” (Businessweek 2009). 198

also identified an additional goal that can be met through the climate techno-optimism framing: improving Israel’s soft power and public image abroad. These components are discussed in turn below.

3.2.1.1 Economic opportunity and green growth Cleantech is one of few global markets that is currently expanding. The sector has experienced a rapid growth rate of 230 percent since 2005 and has proved resilient to the economic downturn. It is forecast to grow again reflecting the fact that many G20 governments included clean energy investment in their economic recovery stimulus packages, amounting to $2.3 trillion by the end of 2020 (Pew 2010). Recognizing the economic potential of this sector in 2009, OECD member countries, including Israel, announced a major initiative to shift the world’s economy towards ‘green growth’, i.e. “promoting growth and development while reducing pollution and GHG emissions, minimizing waste and inefficient use of natural resources, maintaining biodiversity, and strengthening energy security” (OECD 2009). The OECD identifies ‘eco-innovation’ as one of the main drivers of this strategy among others, and has called on governments to provide the right environment for eco-innovation through clear market signals, public investment in R&D and support for mechanisms to help prevent market failure (OECD 2011).

Science and technology innovation have been central to Israel’s economy since its foundation. It is at the heart of Israel’s most developed sectors including computer sciences, defence industries, agriculture, electronics, medicine, and information and communication technologies (ICT).136 Israel’s high-tech exports constitute around 45 percent of total exports, and are valued at about $18.4bn a year (Moskovitch 2011).

Israel’s interest in cleantech, however, has risen and fallen over the years. In the first half of the 2000s, for example, it was a low priority. Between 2002-2005 the government cut the energy research budget, including for solar energy, by a third (Brodet 2008; Ayalon et al. 2011).137 A 2004 study by influential policy think-tank, the Samuel Neaman Institute showed that Israeli companies represented less than half a percent in the $570 billion global

136 Israel has the world’s third largest concentration of high-tech companies, accounting for a third of its industrial output and a quarter of jobs in the industrial sector (Efron 2006; Axelrod 2010). The percentage of Israelis engaged in scientific and technological inquiry, and the amount spent on R&D in relation to GDP are among the highest in the world (Pasher and Shahar 2007). On joining the OECD, the organisation praised Israel's scientific and technological progress noting that it had “produced outstanding outcomes on a world scale” (BBC 2010). 137 In 2004, solar PV related R&D funding from government sources only amounted to 688,000 NIS, and 200,000 NIS from non-government sources (cited in Mor and Seroussi 2007) 199

environmental technologies market (Goren et al. 2004).138 Goren et al. (2004 p.4) argued, “Israel’s environmental technologies… have not yet generated the necessary interest from investors and from government.”

Israel’s requirement to develop a likeminded position to the OECD on climate change, and the increasing OECD focus on cleantech coincided with a growing concern in the Israel that the traditionally favoured defence and ICT high-tech sectors could not continue to grow indefinitely. Cleantech was thus identified as a vehicle to maintain Israel’s cutting edge as a ‘start-up nation’ (Pers. Comm. Karin Kloosterman 2011; OECD 2011).

From 2006 onward Israel began to commit new investment to support its cleantech sector, which at the time consisted of a few well-established water technology and renewable energy companies (OECD 2011). This included establishing a marketing board for Israeli water and renewable energy technologies (NEWTech); a yearly cleantech exhibition; and a biennial trade fair of Israel’s water technologies (WATEC). These efforts helped to attract substantial venture capital investment: $330 million in 2008 and $288 million in 2010 (OECD 2011). By 2011, there were around 500 Israeli cleantech companies, almost half of which were focused on clean energy.139 140

Israel’s cleantech sector has proved it has significant potential. The 2012 Global Cleantech Innovation Index ranked Israel the second most advanced cleantech sector in the world, behind Denmark.141 Israel has the highest number of companies per GDP represented in the 2011 Global Cleantech 100 ranking, and its companies have been the second most successful in attracting venture capital behind the USA (OECD 2011; Knowles 2012). 142 143 These companies have been praised by the OECD for pushing“upward trends in filing patents for technologies with direct or indirect climate mitigation potential such as renewable and non-

138 Defined in the paper as renewable energy, water and agricultural technologies. 139 232 of these companies were focused on energy, 165 on water technologies and 86 focused on environmental technologies (OECD 2011). 140 Israel nevertheless failed to include budgetary support for green growth in its post-recession 2009 economic stimulus package, unlike the EU and USA (Waldoks 2009b). 141 Assessed by The Cleantech Group and World Wildlife Federation (WWF). 142 In 2010, the UK Guardian newspaper listed eight Israeli cleantech companies in the Global Cleantech 100 index of most successful cleantech companies (Kloosterman 2010). 143 This is primary for renewable energy technology. Water technologies are less attractive to venture capitalists because of the length of time it takes for a water company to mature and the nature of technological developments in the water sector, which rely on engineering improvements in efficiency (Pers. Comm. Noam Ilan 2010). 200

fossil resources” (Udasin 2011). Overall the OECD has cited the Israeli mechanisms for support for eco-innovation as a model for other countries to emulate (OECD 2011).

Speaking at a major Israeli cleantech conference in July 2010, Bank of Israel Governor, Stanley Fischer, summarized the benefit for Israel of adopting a green growth strategy. “The field can serve as an engine for growth, and assist in diversifying exports and export [markets] and thereby reduce harm from crises. In addition, developing the sector will help promote environmental issues in Israel, reduce Israel's dependence on imported fuel and assist Israel's integration in the OECD” (Levy 2010). The chair of Israel’s committee on GHG emissions reductions, Haim Shani, also saw his purpose as developing this potential. “The committee was established in recognition of the importance of GHG emissions reduction in order to promote green growth, which will contribute both to environmental improvement and the development of Israel's cleantech industry” (MEP 2010).

3.2.1.2 Energy security and ending oil dependency Investing in technology to find substitutes for oil also aligns with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s grandiose plans to end global oil dependency. In October 2009, Netanyahu argued, “The primary and most important issue for Israel - from a geopolitical point of view, from a security point of view, from an environmental point of view, as far as securing the future is concerned, in terms of altering the global priorities - is finding an alternative to oil” (Benn 2011).144 This goal is supported by a massive increase in government and private sector funding for oil-substitution technologies, such as biofuels and electric vehicle (EV) technology (Government resolution number 1354 approved 30 Jan 2011).145

Innovating in clean energy also makes sense for Israel’s security. The country is dependent on imported fossil fuels, which makes it subject to global price fluctuations, and boycotts from hostile energy-exporting states. It is also an energy island, not connected to neighbouring grids. These factors make it vulnerable to sudden energy crises. Renewable energy would be a non-imported energy source; and thus a means to diversify and strengthen Israel’s electricity supply. It would also help create a distributed grid i.e. numerous installations located around

144 Israel imports oil from former Soviet Union states, as well as from Chad, Angola, Mexico, and Norway, although a majority of the world’s oil supplies are in Arab countries hostile to Israel. 145 A more idealistic version of the energy security narrative comes from those advocating for Israel to join a regional or Mediterranean-wide solar energy super-grid. European partners would guarantee security of supply; connecting up to other national grids would address the intermittency issues with solar energy. Supporters of this plan believe that ‘energy interdependence’ with Egypt and Jordan would improve political relations (Levy 2010; Udasin 2011). 201

the country rather than one installation that could be destroyed in a rocket attack (Mor and Serrousi 2007; Jacobson 2008).

Israel’s preoccupation with developing technological solutions to improve its energy security is not new. In the early years of the state, Israel suffered serious energy shortages, which prompted the inception of Israel’s groundbreaking solar energy research program. When the 1973 Yom Kippur War triggered the OPEC oil embargo on Israel and its supporters, Israel invested heavily in developing the solar water heater. In 1980 the Knesset passed a law requiring the installation of solar water heaters in all new homes and as a result the country is global leader per capita in solar water use, saving two million barrels of oil a year (Moskowitz 2011). The OPEC oil crisis also led to the rapid development and deployment of solar thermal technology by US-Israeli company, Luz Corporation in California’s Mojave desert in 1982.

As this illustrates, the price of oil has influenced funding for research on oil substitutes. When oil prices fell in the mid-1980s, funding for solar projects dried up (Kandel and Oded 2011). During 2008, however, oil prices were again heading towards a record peak of $147.27 a barrel (GIZ 2009). At the May 2008 Dan David award ceremony to honour Al Gore in Tel Aviv, Shimon Peres made the direct connection between climate change, renewable energy and ending oil dependency. ‘From Israel’s perspective, it is better to depend on the sun than the oil producing countries. The sun is more permanent, objective, not a member of the Arab League; we have straight connections. We have plenty of it. This is our future, the sooner we enter it the better’ (Peres 2008).

3.2.1.3 Improving Israel’s brand image "Israel is offering to the world the pioneering green technologies that it has developed. The goal of the [Green Israel TV] campaign is to the show the world Israel's great abilities in the field of green technology." Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, June 2012 (MFA 2012)

The ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing is also a means to reframe Israel itself. Despite years of engaging in public relations efforts to improve its image abroad, survey research shows that Israel has one of the poorest brand images of any country (Luntz 2005b; Brand Israel Group 2005; Hassman 2008; East West Communications 2009). Highlighting Israel’s scientific and technological contribution to solving global problems is seen as a potentially

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effective means to rebrand Israel.146 147

Speaking at a 2010 Ministry of Foreign Affairs seminar on climate change, Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon argued that promoting Israel’s climate technology could support this re-branding. “Politically Israel faces de-legitimization and a problematic image that others are trying to make stick. One of the ways of dealing with this is to brand Israel as a state that contributes to the world, especially in the field of the environment. This has a positive impact on Israel’s image” (MFA 2010).

The ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing draws on PR expertise which has argued that Israel should emphasize three branding concepts and strategies: Israel’s ethical commitment to the Jewish concept of ‘tikkun olam’ (English repairing the earth) ; 148 the concept of ‘creative energy’ and increasing Israel’s development assistance work (Hassman 2008; Ayalon 2010). Explaining the concept of ‘creative energy’ Ayalon (2010) explains, “The best minds in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the private sector in Israel and around the world have all joined forces and formed an organizing principle for the branding of Israel: ‘Creative Energy.’ The principle of Creative Energy is based on the self-perception of many Israelis”. The other proposed facets of Israel’s branding are discussed at greater length later in this chapter.

As highlighted above, these branding concepts are evident in state-supported marketing for Israeli cleantech (NEWTech 2010). In 2012, Israel also launched the “Green Israel” initiative, a global TV campaign in association with CNN to brand itself green with the slogan “Israel: Green technology for a better world” (MFA 2012). These branding concepts have also been widely adopted by various news outlets and NGOs dedicated to improving the image of Israel abroad. For example, in 2011, the Israel Project produced a detailed report on Israeli cleantech, and the US Hasbara Fellowship ran a “Think Green. Think Blue” on-campus campaign (The Israel Project 2011).149

Israeli entrepreneurs also recognize their role in improving Israel’s brand image. The American-Israeli company, Better Place, has gained global attention for developing effective

146 Scientists and members of the technological community have long been a channel for Israeli diplomacy and international acceptance (Steinberg 1994). 147 Another strategy is to focus on Asian markets, which are less concerned with Israel’s political record (Udasin 2011c). 148 The term is commonly used in Hebrew transliteration rather than English translation. 149 The ‘blue’ refers to the blue and white colors of the Israeli flag. 203

infrastructure for the electric car (see below). Better Place CEO Shai Agassi argues “Israel is also a brand and branding work has to be constantly conducted for it. That's what we do at Better Place. We combine our brand with Israel's” (Nissan 2010). Foreign Ministry officials recognize the value of this work. At a recent conference, one official admitted, “Better Place is where people come to visit when they come from abroad. It’s done a great service for Israel” (Ben-Abba 2011).

The hype and branding is also aimed at attracting American venture capitalists. A total of 80 venture funds, predominantly American, manage a total of $10 billion in Israel, with an increasing share going to cleantech (Farzad 2009). Israeli cleantech has enthusiastic advocates in the USA such as the Boston Israel Cleantech Alliance and California Israel Chamber of Commerce Initiative, which organized a 2008 conference and five delegations to Israel during 2008 and 2009.

3.2.1.4 Improving Israel’s soft power “Israel aspires to share its knowledge, experience and innovative technology with the world in the spirit of friendship as well as a strategic policy tool” (MFA 2012)

Alongside improving Israel’s brand image is the goal of increasing Israel’s soft power, i.e. influencing international politics through projecting a positive national image, rather than through financial or military influence. One of the means to extend soft power is through development assistance overseas (Hassman 2008). Israel’s Second National Communication on Climate Change lists numerous technology transfer and technical assistance projects (Axelrod 2010).150 At a presentation in Senegal, for example, Israeli Agriculture minister, Shalom Simhon announced, “Israel is getting ready to share technology and skills with African countries struggling to sustain agricultural output due to increasingly unreliable rains” (Reuters 2010).

Building on this perceived opportunity, one of Israel’s goals in the international climate process has been to harness international financing to support the transfer of Israeli technology and know-how to developing countries, including lobbying for funding to establish a demonstration site for climate technologies in Israel (Pers. Comm. Gaddy Weissman 2011).

150 These include projects run by Israel’s MASHAV program and its Centre for International Agricultural Development Cooperation (CINADCO), as well as Ben-Gurion University’s African Market Garden project in Niger and Netafim’s Family Drip Irrigation System (FIDS). 204

KKL-JNF has also used UN climate conferences as a forum to promote Israeli afforestation and wastewater re-use technologies.151 American businessman Ronald Lauder, who has invested in Israeli water cleantech, also acknowledges the soft power value of cleantech for Israel. He argues that, “when we go to another country solving their water problems, it’s the best public diplomacy” (Udasin 2011b).

3.2.2 Appealing national narratives and metaphors Beyond these material factors, however, it is clear that the ‘climate techno-opportunity framing’ also has a deeper resonance with Israeli national identity. This is because it draws on distinct and compelling national narratives and metaphors around science, technology and Israel’s wider mission to the world.

3.2.2.1 Israel as a technological nation “I'd like to begin by hailing technology and modernity, for Israel certainly enjoys their fruit” Shimon Peres, September 2007 (Peres 2007b)

This love affair between the state of Israel and science and technology dates to the techno- utopianism of Zionism’s founder, Theodore Herzl (Davidovitch and Seidelman 2003). As a nationalist political ideology, Zionism was strongly influenced by early 20th century modernism and techno-optimism (Efron 2006; De Shalit and Talias 1994; Corry and Golan 2010).152 Following the 19th century tradition of the grand historical and teleological narrative, Zionism essentially constructed a strong sweeping interpretation of Jewish history (Zerubavel 2005). This shifted from the decline narrative, which stretched from the golden age of antiquity to Jewish life in exile, to the techno-optimism or progress narrative, beginning with Herzl and the Zionist return to the Land of Israel and leading towards national redemption. This progress narrative clearly had the subtext of framing Israel as a modern Western society as distinct from its ‘backwards’ Arab neighbours.

Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion was an overt techno-optimist, believing that science and technology should play a key role in the realization of Zionism. In 1955 he presciently argued “[Israel requires] the study of desalination, massive utilization of solar energy, preventing waste of useful rainwater and maximization of power from wind turbines" (Ben-Gurion 1955a). Ben-Gurion’s former secretary and heir, Shimon Peres, has been

151 For example, at the 2009 Copenhagen conference, KKL-JNF sponsored a workshop entitled ‘Achievements in Arid Climate Conditions: Israeli afforestation and wastewater re-use technologies’. 152 Herzl’s 1902 novel The Old New Land (German Altneuland) describes his vision of a future techno-utopian Palestine. 205

instrumental in establishing Israel as a technological nation. He is credited with developing Israel’s aeronautics industry and military R&D sector including bringing French nuclear technology to Israel in the late 1950s. In recent years, his vocal and material support for Shai Agassi’s Better Place electric car infrastructure has influenced Israel’s adoption of the technology (Senor and Singer 2009).

Israel has often relied on large scale and dramatic technological solutions to solve national problems. Famous examples from the early years of the state include the draining of the Hula lake and wetlands system for agricultural land and to eradicate malaria, and the ambitious National Water Carrier to bring water from the Sea of Galilee across the country “to make the desert bloom” (Ben-Gurion 1955b). In the mid 2000s, Israel ‘solved’ its water problems by investing in large seawater desalination plants. Tal (2008) argues that these technologies were almost always perceived as positive developments: “Zionism has never showed even a modicum of discomfort …towards technological progress. Nor was there a serious critique of the dehumanizing and polluting impacts of modern technologies. Rather, a fierce technological optimism, along with a visceral ‘love of homeland’—has been at the heart of the Zionist environmental creed from the start and remains so to this day … the notion that human, and more specifically, Jewish application of technology can bring a blessing to the land of Israel is still largely accepted”.153

Numerous Israeli public opinion surveys demonstrate that the general public shares the perception that science and technology underlie Israel’s success, and supports public investment in innovation (Arad and Alon 2005; Yaar 2006). For example, in a 2009 nationally representative survey conducted by the Dahaf Institute (n=500), 78 percent of Israelis believed that Israel’s achievements in science and technology relative to its size resembled or exceeded those of most developed countries (Dahaf Institute 2009).154

153 Israeli techno-optimism has a quite different quality to American techno-optimism. Unlike Tal (2008)’s characterization of Israeli techno-optimism, Leo Marx’s seminal book, The Machine in the Garden (1964) illustrates through contemporary literature the dialectical tension caused in the USA in the 19th century by the sudden and shocking intrusion of the world’s most productive industrial machine into a rustic and largely wild landscape. 154 The nationally representative 2005 Herzliya Patriotism survey (n=800) found that above all, Israelis were most proud of the nation’s scientific and technological achievements. A 2006 nationally representative survey conducted by the Samuel Neaman Institute (n = 490) found that Israelis ranked achievements in science and technology as their leading source of pride in the country. They expressed a near total consensus (96 percent) in the importance of maintaining a high level of science and technology, perceiving it as vital for economic development, security and quality of life (Yaar 2006). 206

Given this context, it is conceivable that Israelis would see Israeli technology, including electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure, solar thermal technologies and large seawater desalination facilities as a feasible solution to climate change. With Israel’s experimentation and practice of cloud-seeding since the 1950s, geo-engineering may also appear a less daunting and more familiar prospect in Israel than in other countries.

3.2.2.2 Developing technology out of necessity: ‘Plucky little country’ The emphasis on science and technology is of course not unique to Zionism, as a nationalist ideology (Edgerton 2007). One unique feature of Israeli technological narrative, however, is the characterization of Israel as a ‘plucky little country’: 155 a nation that has succeeded in a hostile environment with limited natural resources and unfriendly neighbours, because it viewed these as challenges to be overcome by creative thinking and technological advancement (Kloosterman 2009; Peres 2009a).

In his 2009 speech at the UN conference in Copenhagen, Peres reminded the delegates, “For over 60 years of independence, Israel … didn’t allow shortage of water, land or energy to determine our future. Instead we based our tomorrow on science and technology” (Peres 2009b). Similarly biologist Jared Diamond, author of the acclaimed Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed has cited Israel as an example of a society successful overcoming environmental limits (Canetti 2008).

3.2.2.3 Israel’s wider mission to the world: ‘A light unto the nations’ The climate techno-opportunity framing does not simply trumpet Israel’s technological ability for its own sake. A key part of the framing focuses on Israel’s moral responsibility to share its abilities for the betterment of humanity. As Shimon Peres magnanimously offered at the 2009 UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen, “Israel outstretches her hand to her neighbours. To nations inside and outside the Mediterranean to partake in our global laboratories and employ Israel as a pilot plant for environmental trials” (Peres 2009b).

This argument draws on two distinct Jewish themes. The first is the Jewish notion of ‘tikkun olam’ (English: repairing the world). This concept has a number of distinct meanings but is interpreted by some as the responsibility of the Jewish people for the welfare of society at large (Blidstein 1997). The second concept is the prophetic role of Israel as a “Light Unto the

155 Princess Diana apparently used this phrase to describe Israel to Shimon Peres in 1986 (Avner 2007). 207

Nations” (Hebrew: ‘Or L’Goyim’) a quotation from the Book of Isaiah (42:6-7). In 1954, Ben-Gurion drew on this quotation to argue that the State of Israel had the obligation and the privilege to realize Isaiah’s vision by offering its “uncommon intellectual and moral virtue” to the whole world (Ben-Gurion 1972).156 This belief influenced the establishment of MASHAV, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Center for Co-operation, in 1958, which offers technical assistance and technology transfer to developing countries (Inbal and Zahavi 2009).

Efi Stenzler of KKL-JNF used this exact phrase in talking about Israel’s potential contribution to combatting climate change: “My dream is that we share our knowledge and expertise with our neighbors that we literally become a 'light unto the nations’” (KKL 2010). Similarly Professor Dan Yakir argues that Israel has an ethical responsibility to deploy its technological know-how to address climate change: “We cannot say that we are small and insignificant. We must do everything we can to help prevent a tragedy. We have the ability to lead the way with our technology and know-how. It is no longer a technical matter, it is an ethical issue.” (Friedman 2007).157

Underlying the entire Zionist techno-nationalist discourse is the subtext of ‘Jewish ingenuity’.158 In his exploration of the relationship between Jews and modern science, Efron (2006) dismisses the common essentialist idea that Jews are particularly talented at science, arguing that in fact the story of the Jewish engagement and success in science should be understood in historical terms and reflects the different local contexts in which Jews have lived.159

Senor and Singer (2009) also reject the notion that innate Jewish talent is behind Israel’s success in developing high-tech start-up companies. In their popular book, ‘Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle’, they nevertheless identify specific elements of Israeli ‘culture’ that have helped to shape this success. This includes the argument that Israel is an

156 The phrase first appears in Isaiah,42: 6-7 ‘I the LORD have called unto you in righteousness, and have taken hold of your hand, and submitted you as the people's covenant, as a light unto the nations’. See Ben-Gurion (1954) “History did not spoil us with power, wealth, nor with broad territories or an enormous community lot, however, it did grant us the uncommon intellectual and moral virtue, and thus it [the virtue] is both a privilege and an obligation to be a ‘Light Unto the Nations.”’ 157 Russia has also framed its engagement with climate change as a moral mission, drawing on the historical framing of Russia as a Great Power (Tynkkynen 2010). 158 See Edgerton (2007) for a critique of notions of racial and cultural superiority in technological inventiveness. 159 Efron (2006) argues that a common theme that have shaped the Jewish contribution to modern science has been an openness to engage with discussions of science and natural philosophy in the diverse cultures in which they lived, whether constrained or facilitated by those communities in their access to places of learning. Golan (2004) argues that the Jewish respect for science mirrors a traditional reverence for religious study. 208

immigrant culture, where by nature people are risk-takers. They also argue that Israel’s military culture provides an ideal training ground for future entrepreneurs because it offers conscripts skills, access to cutting edge technology, contacts, a sense of responsibility and encourages creativity and assertiveness.

In a more sober analysis, Getz (2010) traces Israel’s success in translating scientific and technological R&D into economic growth to massive public support and investment in research and higher education in the country’s first decades. She argues that Israel’s recent success in cleantech mostly builds on the skills and experience developed in the high-tech sector; a pool of skilled immigrant engineers from the former Soviet Union; and judicious government support (c.f. Schwaber 2010).

Nevertheless, some still hark back to the notion of Jewish ingenuity to explain Israel’s advanced water, agricultural and energy technologies. For example in a section entitled ‘Israel’s culture of technology and ingenuity’, Israel’s official cleantech marketing literature states, “Since its inception, Israel has faced a variety of difficulties … To overcome these hurdles Israel has always relied on its most valuable asset – the human resource…Israelis are widely and deservedly perceived as being driven by a creative entrepreneurial spirit. This spirit and the incredible human resource it drives have enabled Israel to develop considerable expertise in the various fields of water conservation” (NEWTech 2010).

3.2.3 Resonance for the Israeli public These perceptions of Israel and technological progress have surely influenced one of the most common implicatory denial frames around climate change in Israel: that technology alone can solve the problem. In response to the 2009 BGU survey question, “New technology will solve climate change without the need for people to make fundamental changes in their lifestyles”, 52 percent agreed, with 29 percent expressing strong agreement. Since this question was modeled on an identical question in the 2008 Six America’s climate survey, one can compare results. In the USA, only 30 percent of Americans agreed that new technology would solve climate change, with only 4 percent expressing strong agreement (Leiserowitz et al. 2008).

The Israeli public’s endorsement of a technological response to climate change appears to be exceptionally high from a global perspective. A 2011 51-country Neilsen internet survey

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(n=25,000) found that only 23 percent of online consumers were unconcerned about climate change because they believed that it could be solved by technology (Nielsen 2011).160 161

Climate techno-optimistic beliefs have implications for both levels of concern and policy support. In both the American and Israeli surveys, techno-optimists were less concerned about climate change, and in Israel, techno-optimism was associated with significantly lower support for raising the price of fossil fuels, i.e. a carbon tax. This is important because Israeli researchers suggest that such a measure would be necessary for Israel to meet its Copenhagen Accord commitments (Ayalon et al. 2011).

Climate techno-optimistic beliefs were also significantly correlated with a strong sense of national efficacy i.e. the belief that Israel could contribute to global efforts to address climate change. Although Israel’s technological contribution was not specified in the question, this association perhaps implies that Israeli climate techno-optimists have been influenced by the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing which emphasizes the role that Israeli technology can play in helping to address climate change. Ultra-orthodox and Arab respondents were, however, less techno-optimistic and had a significantly lower sense of national efficacy around climate change than other Israelis reinforcing the interpretation that this framing is particularly resonant for Zionist Jewish Israelis.162

Reinforcing these survey findings, a July 2009 online survey conducted by survey company, IPSOS (n =1505) demonstrated that Israeli drivers were more interested than their counterparts in other countries in buying electric vehicles: 57 percent of Israelis expressed an interest and 28 percent said they would only consider buying an electric vehicle (Better Place 2009; Feldman 2009).163 The major reasons for this choice were “personal concern about air

160 The primary reason for lack of concern cited in the survey was “more urgent and serious matters in the world today” (48 percent) followed by 37 percent who believe that climate change is not the result of human behavior. 161 Techno-optimistic climate beliefs are more associated with low-income countries suggesting a more circumspect approach to technology in high-income societies (Leiserowitz et al. 2005). A 2005 Globescan survey asked whether “new technologies will resolve most of our environmental challenges, requiring only minor changes in human thinking and individual behavior,” 62 percent of respondents from low-GDP countries agreed, while 55 percent from high-GDP countries disagreed. 162 Techno-optimistic climate beliefs in the USA are more associated with climate sceptics although this was not the case in the Israeli survey. This is based on the dismissive libertarian approach to climate change i.e. even if climate change is happening we can address it with technology and won’t need to recourse to any kind of government interference. See also Nir Shaviv’s climate sceptical arguments as outlined in Chapter 4. 163 By comparison, 40 percent of Danes; 39 percent of Australians; 35 percent of Canadians and 30 percent of Americans are interested in buying an electric car (Margin of Error +/- 2.5 %). 210

pollution or climate change” (70 percent) and “seeing Israel as a leader in developing renewable energy” (67 percent).164 Interest spanned all gender, age and income levels.

The Israeli climate techno-opportunity framing itself does not state that technology alone can solve climate change. Nevertheless the prevalence of discussions around technology in association with climate change in public discourse and limited discussion on other possible measures must surely have influenced this techno-optimism.

Although this framing is clearly resonant for the Israeli public, the framing has not gone un- criticised in the Israeli environmental movement. Dan Rabinowitz and the Israel Energy Forum have highlighted that despite the rhetoric, the electric car will not significantly reduce Israel’s GHG emissions. This is because it will draw primarily on electricity from fossil fuels rather than renewable sources, as Agassi first claimed (Friedman 2008; Rabinowitz 2009b; Rabinowitz 2009c). They remind Israelis that a far more effective way of reducing emissions would be to cycle more and improve public transport (Segal and Paran Cohen 2008). Similarly, environmental commentator Aviv Lavie has spoken out against geo-engineering and other techno-fixes (2009a; 2009b). In one op-ed he argues“Before we looks for the green invention to power the lights of the world, we should we get used to turning off the lights as we leave the office”. Despite their rhetorical support for the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ discourse, mainstream Israeli environmental organisations have also opposed the domestic development of large-scale solar fields on both land and biodiversity conservation grounds.

3.2.4. Appropriateness of measures proposed to address climate change Based on the dual-frame axis described in Chapter 4, this framing is clearly resonant for the Israeli public. This section looks through the hype generated around Israeli cleantech to explore the extent to which the measures discussed by the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing can actually reduce GHG emissions and help countries adapt to climate change.

3.2.4.1 The commercial potential of Israel’s cleantech sector Israel’s water technology sector has many mature companies and commercially available products. These include Netafim, which produces innovative drip irrigation technology and

164 The study (n=8000) was conducted in March/ April 2009 by IPSOS, when gas prices were near a 52-week low with respondents from the U.S., Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Israel. IPSOS drew a stratified, random sample to reflect the gender, income and age profile of each local market from best-of-class, online-survey panels in each market. The sample was filtered to include only those individuals involved in the selection of their prior car or expected to be involved in their next car purchase. Participants were given comparable descriptions of electric, hybrid, and gas-only cars to assess their interest (BetterPlace 2009). 211

IDE, a leading global company building desalination plants (OECD 2011). Israel also initiated research into desalination technology, with many basic patents for reverse osmosis desalination held by Israelis (Pers. Comm. Eilon Adar 2012). Another successful start-up is TaKaDu, who identify undetected leaks in water systems (Knowles 2012).

Israel deploys many of these technologies nationally, since they were developed specifically as strategies to overcome local water scarcity. The export of water technologies is also growing rapidly, totaling about $1.5 billion in 2010 (MFA 2011). Israeli water companies control around 50 percent of the global drip irrigation market with plenty of opportunity for growth (NEWTech 2009). Israeli water management companies also export technology and know-how to more than 100 countries worldwide (Susskind 2010). Environment Ministry Chief Scientist Dr. Yeshayahu Bar-Or argues that Israel’s water sector will only benefit from climate change especially as Europe is predicted to become more arid (Waldoks 2009f).

Israeli agricultural technologies that can assist drylands development include drought-resistant and salt-tolerant crop varieties, saline water irrigation, greenhouse technologies and desert aquaculture (Fedler 2002; Invest in Israel 2010).165 These technologies do not yet account for large export markets although they have been the focus of technological transfer to developing countries (Pers. Comm. Gaddy Weissman 2011).

Israel’s renewable energy sector has fewer commercially available technologies, thus accounting for fewer global exports. Nevertheless the value of this sector has more than doubled between 2007 and 2010 from $110 million to $260 million (Kedmi 2011). Three Israeli-based multinational corporations account for the majority of sales: geo-thermal pioneers Ormat and solar thermal companies Solel and BrightSource Israel (Mor and Seroussi 2007).166 Exports have been primarily targeted at the well-established Spanish and American markets, although both markets have slowed in recent years (Voosen 2009; Woody 2010). Israeli companies are also developing promising concentrating photovoltaic (CPV) technologies and solar thermal technologies; as well as biofuels, energy efficiency and smart grid technologies, drawing on Israeli expertise in ICT.167

165 Although Israel’s total agricultural exports accounts for around $340 billion in 2011, 80 percent related to the export of irrigation technologies, pesticides and fertilizers (Dvoskin 2012). 166 Israeli solar PV optimizer technologies produced by SolarEdge and Tigo Energy are also successful exports (OECD 2011). 167 See for example, CPV start-up companies, Zenith Solar and MST; Solar Thermal start-up company, Aora; biofuels companies, UniVerve Biofuels and the Galten Group; energy efficiency start-up companies, Metrolight and Powersines; and the Israel Smart Grid (ISG) consortium. 212

The main focus of Israeli climate techno-opportunity discourse has been the American-Israeli Better Place electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure and Israeli solar technologies. In both cases, discourse has been accompanied by policy support. The Israeli government has supported Better Place through taxing conventional vehicles at 72 percent and EVs at 10 percent to encourage EV uptake (MNI 2011b).168 Although Better Place is targeting other international markets, as of 2012 its infrastructure is yet to be widely operational. The company is also reported to be making considerable losses as initial excitement has waned and been replaced by concern about the range and high cost of EVs (Gyimesi and Viswanathan 2011).

In August 2008, the Israeli government initiated a five-year plan for the development of the renewable energy sector “in the light of Israel’s relative advantage in the field” (Government decision 3954). This made substantial funds available for R&D and technology incubators; established a beta site to validate and test new technologies in Israel’s Arava desert; and introduced other measures to make private investment in Israeli technology more attractive. In January 2009, Israel announced production quotas and generous feed-in tariffs to meet the target of producing 10 percent of domestic electricity needs from renewable energy by 2020 (Government decision 4450/176).

Although a strong domestic solar energy sector would be a visible manifestation of Israel meeting its green growth targets, ending national oil dependency as well as a PR success, efforts to do so have faced numerous obstacles, as outlined in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. As of 2012, Israel is producing less than one percent of electricity demand from domestic renewable energy and virtually none from Israeli technologies.169

Although Israel has a large number of clean energy start-ups, only a few companies are thus actually selling mature and commercially tested technologies.170 171 It is also important to note

168 Israeli EVs also cannot by law be plugged into ordinary electrical sockets, which means Better Place will initially have a monopoly on access to charging and its newly developed switchable batteries (Mincer 2012). 169 This may well be detrimental for the future development of Israel’s solar sector. Industry lobbyist, Eitan Parnass argues, “Israel can not lead technological advances in the field without significantly producing solar energy itself…since innovations only arise when dealing with problems, and these problems are only revealed with widespread deployment” (Parnass 2010). 170 Although Israel ranks second in terms of innovation in the Global Cleantech Index 2012, it only ranks 14th in terms of actual commercialized cleantech (Knowles 2012). 171 With a limited domestic market and difficulty in raising funds for commercialization, Israel has sought overcome these barriers through a) establishing co-operative agreements with bigger players such as the European Union (Moskowitz 2010; Oren 2011; Kloosterman 2011; Udasin 2011c); b) becoming subsidiaries of foreign multinationals e.g. Solel of Siemens. 213

that 2008 global recession has caused a general slow down in the cleantech market, which may affect venture capital investment and future markets.172

In sum, therefore, current commercially available Israeli technologies can contribute to global efforts to address climate change. Israel has been one of the few countries to pioneer technological innovation in solar energy and drylands technologies. It has thus become a world leader in the sector. There are also opportunities to expand exports into the rapidly growing developing country markets, and a number of promising technologies nearing commercialization (Belman et al. 2012). Analysts also suggest that Israel has the right constellation of conditions to foster innovation and breakthrough in the cleantech sector.

In terms of the precise quantity of GHG emissions avoided and actual adaptation to climate change, however, the contribution of Israeli technology to solving climate change has thus so far been pretty limited. Likewise, how commercially successful these technologies and newly commercialized technologies will be in a crowded global market is hard to predict. As argued earlier, there is extensive literature exploring the complexity and unpredictable character of technology uptake (Rosner 2003; Nye 2007).

Israel can look at its own experience to note some salutary examples, including the reasons Israel has not widely adopted domestic solar energy technology; the delays in activating national electric car infrastructure; the environmental opposition to solar thermal plants in California; and the failed uptake of Israeli-developed drip irrigation technology across Africa (Farzad 2009).173 In terms of the potential for Israeli innovation, the timeframe on commercializing future ‘breakthrough’ low-carbon energy technologies may be too long in terms of the current window of opportunity to significantly reduce GHG emissions and prevent global temperature rise of more than two degrees (IPCC 2007a).

3.2.5 The longevity of the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing? As noted above, Israel has sought to rapidly develop its cleantech sector to meet several pressing national goals. Its enthusiasm for cleantech, however, may wane as its priorities shift. For example, Israel’s enthusiasm for ending oil dependency may dissipate if the country

172 Venture Capitalists have complained that cleantech has a long product development time and does not provide as many quick exits as other technologies (Fehrenbacher 2010) 173 Research suggests that complex political, cultural and economic factors contributed to the success of drip irrigation technology in Israel, but its failure across Africa (Friedlander and Garb 2011). 214

decides to exploit its own substantial oil shale reserves. Such a move would clearly end Israel’s own dependency on foreign oil, but it would also decouple the discourse on ending oil dependency from that of reducing GHG emissions. Gal Luft one of the architects of Israel’s strategy to ending oil dependency, highlights that a national effort for supporting innovation for coal/ gas substitutes, such as renewable energy, makes little sense for Israel’s energy security considering Israel’s recent significant gas finds (Pers. Comm. Gal Luft 2011).

Inbal and Zahavi (2009) also caution about the likely success of Israel’s attempts to extend soft power by using Israeli cleantech for technology transfer and technical assistance programs. Israel’s past experience has shown these programs may inject practical content into emerging relations in the short-term, but are unlikely to substantially influence these relations when larger political issues are at stake. Although at its height, Israel’s MASHAV program in the late 1960’s and early 1970s was sending thousands of agricultural experts, engineers and doctors around the world, all but four African countries severed their links with Israel following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In terms of improving Israel’s brand image, opinion is also mixed. On the one hand, former Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour, Dr Eli Opper, argues that today “the global interest in Israel’s energy R&D and technology is out of all proportion to the size of the country” (Barkat 2011). Others are less convinced. Solel CEO, Avi Brenmiller has argued, “I understand the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to use Israeli cleantech to improve our global status. If Israel can’t even meet its own objectives to promote renewable energy …how will the world perceive us then?” (Brenmiller 2011).

4. Summary “Netanyahu's green awakening evokes a certain optimism, but at the same time his statements indicated that he was not really concerned about environmental issues …Actually Netanyahu is quite old-fashioned in his view, Israel should become a superpower in renewable energy to screw the Arabs.” Aviv Lavie, Ma’ariv environment correspondent (Lavie 2009b)

Meeting the challenge of reducing GHG emissions while maintaining national interests is the key challenge facing all countries seeking to address climate change. Israel’s ‘climate techno-

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opportunity’ framing represents a genuine attempt to meet this challenge. However, the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing has appeal beyond the fact that it aligns action on climate change with other national priorities. It is also appealing because it heeds Norhaus and Shellenberger’s (2005) advice and moves away from a ‘dire consequences’ framing to focus on the wider social benefits of addressing climate change. As such it has what climate communication researchers Spence and Pidgeon (2010) call a ‘gain frame advantage’. Another evident reason for its appeal is because it is an ‘identity’ frame, clearly drawing on appealing nation building narratives and metaphors, which reinforce a positive national identity (Shmueli 2006). The combination of these three factors have ensured that the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ frame has engaged segments of Israeli society who would normally have little interest in climate change, including politicians, business entrepreneurs and investors.

Nevertheless, a resonant and pervasive framing can lose sight of the actual goal – to make urgent and significant reductions in GHG emissions. Although Israel may be one of the few countries pioneering and giving substantial support to cleantech R&D, this does not however, mean to say that it is yet creating substantial benefit on the ground (or in the atmosphere). In addition, considering the complexity of technology uptake, it is impossible to predict whether Israeli cleantech can manifest its purported potential.

Israeli policy analysts and environmental campaigners have clearly outlined more effective policy measures for Israel to be taking to reduce its GHG emissions, especially in the construction and transportation sectors (See Chapter 1 for overview). The ‘climate techno- opportunity’ framing, however allows policymakers and the public to sidestep these more effective but potential challenging measures altogether. Israeli policymakers can benefit from the economic, security and PR benefits of the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ discourse, while avoiding the inconvenience and political costs of introducing serious regulatory measures to address climate change. Unlike some frames and actions, the “climate techno-opportunity frame” is also not threatening to the existing system of consumer capitalism and vested interests. It also allows Israel to adopt the external image of an environmental actor while still allowing economic considerations to continue to subordinate the interests of the environment (Blühdorn and Welsh 2007). Such big claims from a country that otherwise would have little to offer the global debate on climate change, could be said to reflect ‘small country syndrome’.

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For the Israeli public, the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing does not compel them to change their behaviors and give up their high-consuming lifestyles or raise difficult questions around population growth, the primary drivers of Israel’s spiralling GHG emissions. This is particularly important because such discussions have been almost entirely absent from Israeli climate change discourse (For more discussion see ‘Conclusion’ section). From a psychological perspective, one could argue that this framing also allows Israelis to avoid feelings of guilt at their limited engagement with climate change and helplessness as a minor contributor with limited ability to effect global GHG emission reductions. Instead, it allows them to feel national efficacy and pride in the perceived contribution of Israeli scientists and entrepreneurs (Norgaard 2011). In fact, this framing entirely shifts responsibility for climate change to companies and government. In doing so, it also negates the idea that individuals have agency to change their own lifestyles and way they organize socially, economically and politically in order to provide the foundations for a sustainable society (Urry 2011).

Ultimately therefore, the climate techno-opportunity frame can be described as a form of implicatory denial because it permits Israelis to avoid actively engaging with the political, moral and psychological implications of climate change. As such it is a successful strategy to manage policy and personal inaction around climate change.

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Conclusion: A national portrait of climate change inaction and developing effective climate frames for Israel

Although the decision on the new Rutenberg D power plant in Ashkelon has not been finalised, in June 2011 it was announced that it would be built as a dual-fuel (gas and coal) facility, with somewhat lower carbon emissions. This research has argued that this decision was partially influenced by the timing of the 2009 UN climate conference in Copenhagen. The intense Israeli media coverage of the conference shone a spotlight on the debacle around the Ashkelon plant, as a local angle on the climate change story. The media and leading government officials, including President Shimon Peres, emphasised that commissioning a new coal-fired power station was at odds with Israel’s simultaneous commitment in Copenhagen to reduce its GHG emissions. The year 2009 also saw a peak in Israeli discourse about both ending oil dependency and the potential of Israeli cleantech R&D as a new economic growth area. In December 2009, campaigners succeeded in delaying a crucial discussion about the Ashkelon plant. Because of these converging factors, it seemed as though the Israeli government was beginning to consider a sustainable energy path for the country.

Israel will clearly face more dilemmas around whether to prioritise a low-carbon energy strategy. However, without the intense scruntiny that surrounded the 2009 Copenhagen conference the Israeli government has less immediate motivation to prioritise reducing its GHG emissions. This is also the case given the decline in global discourse around climate change, the slowdown in the global cleantech market in 2011, and the discovery of fossil fuel sources within Israel that can guarantee energy security.

This research has argued that unless climate advocates find a means to frame climate change more effectively and capture the imagination of both the public and policymakers, Israel could renege on its Copenhagen Accord commitment.174 In late 2012, the options of reverting to a coal-only plant in Ashkelon or choosing to exploit its domestic oil shale reserves appeared to be in Israel’s more immediate national security and economic interests. In mid 2012 following the Egyptian gas crisis the IEC again called on the government to rethink the Ashkelon

174 The IEI has already incorporated into its PR message how its ‘in situ’ method of oil shale exploitation will reduce ‘wells to wheels’ GHG emissions. Of course, this fails to address the emissions released on combustion (IEI 2012). 218

decision and to make coal the primary fuel source, or else face imminent blackouts (Trillnick and Bar-Eli 2012).

This concluding section demonstrates how the research conducted for this dissertation answers the research questions posed in the introduction. It also discusses some of the issues that have been missing in Israeli climate discourse, and offers the elements of a new framing with the potential to inspire new and effective engagement with climate change in Israel.

1. Israel’s policy response to climate change The first research question called for a detailed account of Israel’s policy response to climate change. It also called for an assessment of whether these measures satisfied calls from the international scientific community to effectively mitigate and adapt to climate change.

Chapter 1 outlined the history of climate change legislation in Israel. It used a critical political analysis approach not just to explore the legislation adopted but also to detail the political and economic motivations behind these measures. It argued that the main motivation for Israel in establishing climate change legislation has been to comply with international norms i.e. OECD membership and the UN climate negotiations process, rather than the threat of climate change itself. It also argued that the limited policy measures introduced are not the most effective economic levers or long-term economy-wide changes that economists propose for driving climate policy. Instead they reflect short-term economic thinking and “the art of the possible” in a hostile policy environment. Climate advocates are further sceptical that the Israeli government will meet even these policy commitments, given the compelling economic, political and energy security reasons to continue to rely on coal and exploit newly found deepwater natural gas and oil shale reserves instead of pursuing a path towards renewable energy and energy saving and efficiency measures.

2. The Israeli public and perceptions of climate change The second research question asked: how does the Israeli public perceive climate change? This research used both quantitive and qualitative methods to answer this question, as demonstrated in chapters two to five. The answers to this question are, however, intertwined with the answers to the third research question: how has the way in which climate change is framed in popular and policy discourse influenced public perceptions and the overall national

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policy response. This third question is essentially answered in two ways: a) by considering the survey results alongside the media analysis (section 2.1); and b) through discourse analysis (section 2.2).

2.1 Summary of the quantitative survey and media findings Clearly an important aspect of the response to this question is to assess whether Israelis have actually heard of climate change. The survey analysis suggested that awareness of climate change is growing in Israel. Although Israel initially trailed behind many developed countries in terms of comparative self-reported and assessed knowledge, by 2010 over three quarters of the respondents claimed to understand the issue in a detailed way. This increase could relate to the significant spike in Israeli media coverage around the December 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen, which would have raised the salience of the issue for the Israeli public. In particular, regular readers of Ynet, NRG and Ha’aretz, which all carried extensive detailed coverage of climate change from 2007 to 2010, would have little excuse not to have a basic understanding of the issue.

This spike in coverage highlights how events in the global arena have significantly influenced both the Israeli media and public opinion around climate change. It also reflects the fact that in 2009 climate change was a relatively fresh issue for Israeli journalists, and that there were no competing domestic or security stories at that time that would have usually taken precedence (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012). The equally dramatic fall in Israeli media coverage back to pre-Copenhagen conference levels immediately afterwards suggests that the main story was a big international political event, and not climate change itself (Nossek 2010). The surveys also illustrated that while the number of Israelis concerned about climate change grew during the period covered, so did the number of Israelis sceptical about the phenomenon. These findings are important because the surveys also found that both concern about climate change and agreement that it has anthropogenic causes, i.e. non-sceptical beliefs, are significantly related to support for climate policy and the adoption or likely adoption of environmental behaviors.

The increase in both scepticism and concern may again relate to media coverage. Until the December 2009 Climategate scandal, sceptical opinions were almost non-existent in the Israeli media. After this, sceptical views were more freely expressed especially in two news sources: the high-circulation free daily newspaper Israel Hayom and online news portal NRG.

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Likewise, the end of 2010 saw an increase in extreme weather events worldwide, including unprecedented forest fires in Israel’s Carmel forest, which were covered by the Israeli media. These events may well have influenced the large number of Israelis in the 2011 ISSP survey who agreed that climate change posed a dangerous threat to the environment.

In terms of addressing climate change, the findings imply that Israelis perceive climate change primarily as a problem for the international community, the government and science to solve rather than for them personally. The 2009 BGU survey found that Israelis have not widely adopted the most effective environmental behaviors that could reduce GHG emissions, such as prioritising energy efficiency in purchasing or choosing to use public transport or bicycles more often. There are also, however, many structural barriers for them to do so (see literature review). They also express little support for raising the price of fossil fuels to reduce use (a change that would impact them personally), while at the same time expressing strong support for national and international action. In addition, over half of Israelis expressed the belief that new technologies alone could solve climate change. In the 2009 BGU survey, Israelis also expressed a low sense of self-efficacy but a high sense of collective efficacy around climate change.

Media coverage is again likely to have contributed to these perceptions. A majority of the articles focused on international efforts to address climate change. There were articles about Israeli climate policy and the role that Israeli technology could play in addressing climate change, but there was almost no reference to how Israelis could personally reduce their GHG emissions. It may be, therefore, that because of this lack of information the Israeli public is unclear about the role that individual actions can play in reducing emissions, and does not understand which actions would be most effective in doing so.

This argument is supported by the way in which Haifa University students responded to the 2010 climate word association survey, where virtually no ‘top-of-head’ associations were made between climate change and possible personal and behavioral changes. In general, the Haifa University survey suggested that Israelis perceived climate change as an international issue, with far more references made to the possible global impacts of climate change than to local impacts such as drought. This again is likely to have been influenced by the fact that relatively few articles in the Israeli media referred to the local threat posed by climate change.

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In terms of determining what influences willingness to engage with climate change, the surveys clearly supported the ‘knowledge deficit’ hypothesis, i.e. that greater awareness of the issue was a major determinant of engagement. The surveys also found several other variables that could be moderating this effect, including socio-demographic characteristics; trust in communicators and in new technologies; self and national efficacy; and political beliefs.

The surveys interestingly found that specific groupings in Israeli society were associated with specific perceptions of climate change. For example, new immigrants to Israel from the former Soviet Union were more sceptical about climate change, Arab Israeli citizens expressed lower efficacy, and the Ultra-orthodox community knew and cared less about it. This finding seemingly reflects wider sociological issues in Israel, for example, a generally low sense of efficacy in the Israeli Arab community, the inward focus of the Ultra-orthodox community, and the fact that the ex-Soviet community retains its own distinct identity within Israeli society. This was explored in greater depth in the critical frame analysis (Chapters 4 and 5). These results also reflect the sectorial political nature of Israeli society (Herzog 2005).

Other socio-demographic characteristics were also related to specific perceptions. For example, Israeli women perceived climate change as a more likely threat than men, young Israelis were less engaged than elders, and political beliefs were initially related to levels of scepticism and concern. Gender, age and political beliefs have been widely identified as determinants of environmental behavior in the literature. However, as explored in this dissertation, Israel’s unique circumstances, particularly risk perceptions around the on-going Arab-Israel conflict, may also be influencing the way in which these variables interact with perceptions of climate change. For example, the fact that many young Israelis are conscripted into the army may be affecting their perception of risk, with a military attack seeming more palpable a threat than climate change. In addition, young military conscripts living on army bases would have limited scope to adopt pro-environmental household behaviors even if they wanted to do so.

Aggregating the survey results suggests that the socio-demographic profile of the typical Israeli concerned about climate change and taking action to reduce GHG emissions is that of an educated, secular or ‘traditional’, Israeli-born Jewish woman in her 30’s, living in the centre or north of the country. This by it self would constitute a very small ‘issue public’ to advocate for climate action (Nisbet 2011a). 222

These findings thus partially reject the ‘broadening base’ hypothesis for Israel with regards to concern and willingness to adopt pro-environmental behaviors to address climate change. Although like Neaman-Abramovitz and Katz-Gerro (2006)’s hypothesis, this research finds that educational attainment is a major determinant of concern and behavioral change, it is also clearly evident that specific socio-demographic factors are significantly associated to perceptions of climate change. The specific and unique dimensions of climate change as an environmental problem may well explain the difference in these findings.

The survey results also suggest that other societal beliefs relating to national identity have influenced Israeli climate perceptions. These include the comparatively high level of techno- optimism, the strong sense of collective efficacy, and high trust in scientists to communicate accurately about climate change. Despite expressing the greatest trust in scientists to communicate about climate change and the least trust in government officials, the media analysis showed that in fact the most significant communicators in the media were government officials, with very few prominent mainstream climate scientists featured. This fact may well have influenced how reliable Israelis considered media coverage of climate change to be, and their overall perceptions. It also highlights that mainstream climate scientists should be encouraged to communicate more in the Israeli media.

Israelis identify the media as their major source of information on climate change. Therefore, the scant Israeli media coverage of the issue, compared to other developed countries, alone goes a long way towards explaining limited Israeli engagement with climate change. It also helps to explain the low salience of the issue on the Israeli national agenda evident in the 2009 BGU survey. The explanations by Israeli environment correspondents for the limited coverage of climate change mirror complaints heard worldwide: that editors have a poor grasp of the issue; that Israelis are parochial and primarily interested in local issues; and that Israel’s GHG emissions are minimal compared to the global scale so it is hard for Israelis to see why mitigation actions are relevant. They have also pointed to the commercial orientation of the Israeli media in shaping the portrayal of climate change – with editors either deeming it too complex to have commercial appeal, sensationalizing it, or denying it altogether based on the newspaper owner’s ideological bias (Boykoff 2011).

Some Israeli news sources are nevertheless committed to in-depth coverage of environmental issues, and their editors and journalists do have a sophisticated understanding of climate change. 223

They have also sought to make the issue locally relevant, especially by framing it as an opportunity for Israel. These commendable efforts, however, represent less than half of all coverage and draw little attention to what individuals can do about climate change, instead portraying it as a problem mainly for politicians and entrepreneurs to address. Here again, the voice that Israelis trust the most to communicate to them accurately about climate change is missing: that of Israeli natural scientists who support the consensus position on climate change. In addition, although minority groups do read mainstream Israeli news sources, there was little attempt to make climate change relevant to Arab, ex-Soviet or religious audiences.

These findings highlight interesting potential future areas for research on Israeli perceptions of climate change. For example, including a values survey or items under cultural cognition of risk framework in future surveys could usefully unpack some of the socio-demographic constructs explored here i.e. illustrating what specific values the Ultra-orthodox community or Russian-speaking Israelis hold that may be influencing their beliefs (Dietz et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2012). Such items could also help explain the aspects of Israeli right-left political beliefs that are influencing Israeli climate perceptions.

In addition, these findings highlight the influence of local and global focusing events on public opinion. Future surveys could thus include questions related to the potential influence of focusing events such as the 2009 Copenhagen conference and the Carmel forest fires. A final proposal for future research would be to include questions related to the theorised psychological construct the ‘finite pool of worry’ which this research assumes, although cannot quantitatively prove, significantly influences Israeli perceptions of climate change (Weber 2006).

2.2 Summary of the frame analysis findings Despite the limited media coverage, climate change has nevertheless received considerable discursive attention from different sectors of Israeli society. This research has argued that an in-depth qualitative study of the ways in which climate change is framed in Israel contributes to a richer and thus more accurate picture of Israeli perceptions of climate change. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the most common, interesting and culturally specific discourses identified in Israel through survey and media analysis and additional analysis of key texts and semi- structured interviews. These chapters also provide a more in depth response to the third research question: how framing has influenced public perceptions and the overall national policy response.

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As outlined above, the ten most common frames in Israeli public discourse include frames focused on different aspects of concern around climate change (the ‘environmental threat’ frame; the ‘peace threat’ frame; the ‘demographic threat’ frame; and the ‘Jewish values’ frame); overtly sceptical frames (the ‘Russian sceptic’ frame; the ‘Tea Party’ sceptic frame; the ‘academic sceptic’ frame); and frames which contribute more broadly to denial around climate change (‘Finite pool of worry’ frame; the ‘climate fatalism’ frame). The final frame, most prevalent in Israeli climate policy discourse is the ‘the techno-opportunity’ framing.

None of the framings identified here are completely unique to Israel. Given the scope of climate change and the fact that directly confronting it brings up unpleasant emotions such as fear, hopelessness and guilt, it is not surprising that humans have developed ‘denial’ strategies to avoid having to address it (Norgaard 2011). In their empirical research both Stoll-Kleeman et al. (2000) and Norgaard (2011) have identified similar framings to those found in Israel, although based on different cultural metaphors and storylines than in Israel.

Indeed, given the fact that climate change is perceived as a distant and ambiguous political problem, it is not surprising that climate advocates and policy actors worldwide have sought creative means to attach climate change discursively to other dominant concerns in society. In his general typology of climate framings, for example, Nisbet (2009) has identified an ‘economic development and competitiveness’ frame and a ‘morality and ethics’ frame, which correspond respectively to the ‘techno-opportunity’ framing and the ‘Jewish values’ framing. In addition, Fletcher (2009) has outlined how a version of the techno-opportunity framing became prevalent in the USA and Hartmann (2010) illustrates how the ‘climate refugees’ framing in the English language media was originally inspired by a 2007 UNEP report that partially attributed the Darfur conflict to climate change (UNEP 2007).

That said, there are clearly ways in which these framings do have specifically Israeli characteristics. It is no surprise that Israel’s on-going regional political conflict has influenced the frames. The experience of long-term, wearying and intractable conflict clearly underlies the ‘finite pool of worry’ frame. The political conflict with the Palestinians also underlies the marginalisation of Israeli Arabs in Israeli society and hence their experience of disempowerment as expressed by the ‘climate fatalism’ frame. The ‘demographic threat’ framing reinforces the idea that Israel faces an existential threat as a Jewish state from an increase to its non-Jewish population by ‘hordes’ of African climate refugees. Even the techno-opportunity framing is 225

partially influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict, given the interest in developing technological substitutes for Arab oil and the need to improve Israel’s brand image, which has been damaged by years of political conflict. These findings are thus reminiscent of the famous line from Israeli songwriter Meir Ariel, "At the end of every Hebrew sentence sits an Arab with a nargileh ". 175

Given the complexity of Israeli society, it is also unsurprising that the way in which different groupings have mobilised climate change reflects wider internal tensions. For example, the criticism of secular Jewish society inherent in the ‘Jewish values’ framing; the sense of marginalisation in the Arab Israeli community reflected in the ‘climate fatalism’ framing; and the ways in which the ex-Soviet Israeli community has sought to maintain its distinctiveness as reflected in the ‘Russian-scepticism’ framing. This is why the concept of different interpretative communities, based on distinct social groupings, has strong sociological explanatory value in the Israeli climate change context.

This research also highlights the fact that using climate change rhetoric to add extra weight to other policy goals, e.g. building border fences or developing a cleantech sector, often results in framings that fail to promote the most effective actions to reduce GHG emissions. This is because promoting effective climate action is not the main goal of the framing. This dissertation thus argues that well-meaning environmentalists should be cautious when seeking to hang action on climate change on the coattails of other goals that are of greater priority to policymakers, since it may not result in the most effective action.

A final element illustrated by the climate frame analysis is the incredible discursive plasticity of climate change: that at the same time, some actors can use climate discourse to justify building border fences, while others use it to call for a shift to a more local and socially just means of production (Rabinowitz 2009a; Soffer 2012). As a result, Israelis with diverse views on other issues have come to share a common concern or scepticism about climate change. For example, the major advocates for Israeli climate legislation have been politicians from the far left to the far right of the spectrum, e.g. Israeli Communist Party MK Dov Khenin and pro- settlement Likud Environment Minister Gilad Erdan.

175 The title of the song is “Pain Song” (1978) with lyrics and music by Meir Ariel. 226

3. Effective and scientifically validated action on climate change Research question four focuses specifically on the frame analysis research asking, “Do these framings promote the most effective and scientifically validated action?” This question was posed to establish the extent to which social discourse has played a role in shaping the policy and public response to climate change in Israel.

The novel framework proposed in this dissertation for assessing the effectiveness of climate change communication finds, however, that none of the existing framings can motivate serious policy or individual action. In terms of ‘scientifically validated’ action, this is because current Israeli public discourse almost completely lacks a serious discussion on effective climate policy, the role of individual agency and the structural changes necessary for Israel to reduce its GHG emissions, not least so in terms of reducing consumption. This is either because the framings have limited resonance for Israelis, and are thus unlikely to result in an emotional or behavioral response; or because they are very resonant for the Israeli public as a whole or certain sections of the public, but fail to promote the most appropriate policy or personal response, i.e. they fail to cause an urgent reduction in GHG emissions and help the country adapt to climate change. Furthermore, some frames that actively discourage engagement have deep resonance for the Israeli public or certain sections of the public.

Based on the proposed framework, this dissertation argues that two framings do have the potential to motivate at least partial Israeli engagement with climate change. The ‘Jewish values’ frame draws on resonant Jewish values and storylines and proposes appropriate GHG mitigation actions for the Jewish community to engage in. Likewise, the ‘climate techno- opportunity’ framing has already influenced the government decision to increase state support for cleantech R&D.

However, this research argues that to a large extent these framings too allow Israelis to remain in denial about climate change. The ‘Jewish values’ frame is unlikely to garner widespread appeal in Israel beyond the progressive Orthodox and settler groupings that have championed it for wider political reasons. In terms of its resonance, despite being grounded in Jewish thinking, the frame still draws on fairly esoteric theological arguments, to which some have raised theological objections. In terms of supporting appropriate actions, although Orthodox Jews may increasingly engage with the framing e.g. in observing the Sustainability Shabbat, and although the frame may well reinforce the existing Jewish ethic of modesty and restraint,

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it does not necessarily follow that Orthodox Jews will adopt other personal or community level measures to reduce GHG emissions. As Tirosh-Samuelson (2000) argues, there is also little cultural basis for engaging in environmental behavior within the Orthodox community.

On the other hand, the major framing of climate change in Israeli policy circles - the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ framing - has allowed policy-makers to demonstrate their engagement with climate change and even to express concern. However, it also allows them to avoid the inconvenience and political costs of introducing serious regulatory measures to reduce GHG emissions. It also does not compel the Israeli public to change lifestyles or behaviors, rather shifting the problem to scientists and entrepreneurs. This framing may also help explain the relatively high levels of climate techno-optimism in Israeli society.

Figure 34: Summary of Israeli climate change ‘denial’ and ‘effective’ frames

Frame Definition Denial/ Effective 1. ‘Finite Pool of Climate change is a problem Implicatory denial. Worry’ but marginal compared to the Likely to be resonant with wider more immediate existential Israeli population. Does not threats facing Israel. promote appropriate action. 2. ‘Climate Climate change is happening Implicatory denial. Resonant with fatalism’ but there is little we can do Israeli Arabs. It may have wider about. appeal in Israeli society but no empirical evidence. Does not promote appropriate action. ‘Existential threat’ Climate change poses an ‘Environmental threat’ - likely to 3. ‘Environmental existential threat to the only be resonant with those threat’ environment, peace process already concerned about the 4. ‘Peace threat’ or to Israel’s Jewish majority. environment; ‘Peace threat’ – 5. ‘Demographic limited resonance with the Israeli threat’ public; ‘Demographic threat’ – growing resonance but does not promote appropriate action but rather e.g. building border fences. Interpretative denial frame.

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‘Climate Sceptical views in Israel Literal and interpretative denial scepticism’ range from the belief that frames. Likely to be resonant for 6. ‘Academic climate change is not specific populations such as scepticism’ happening to the belief that it libertarians and ex-Soviet Israelis. 7. ‘Putin-inspired may be happening but is Likely to appeal to contrarian scepticism’ mainly a natural phenomenon streak in Israeli culture. 8. ‘Tea Party and not concerning. inspired scepticism’ 9. ‘Jewish values’ Materialism and over- Likely to be resonant for some consumption have caused sections of the Jewish public. climate change. Jewish Fairly effective frame for this values offer a path to solving constituency although limited the crisis and environmental cultural basis for environmental lifestyles. behavior and fairly esoteric arguments may prevent widespread adoption. 10. ‘Climate Israel’s renewable energy and Likely to be resonant for the techno- drylands technologies can Jewish Zionist public. Promotes opportunity’ significantly contribute to government support for Israeli solving climate change. R&D. May explain high levels of techno-optimism in Israeli society – an implicatory denial strategy.

4. ‘The National Portrait of Inaction’ model for analysing climate change inaction The final research question asked, “Can an integrated analysis that draws together political, technological and societal explanations, help to explain Israeli inaction around climate change?” This research constructed a comprehensive methodology to explore climate change inaction from these different perspectives and on different scales (individual, institutional and structural). Particular emphasis was placed on societal factors since these are often overlooked when seeking to understand inaction. The focus on technology (especially perceptions of technology) was also deemed particularly relevant to the Israeli case.

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The findings demosntrate that viewing climate change inaction from these multiple perspectives does offer a richer and potentially more accurate understanding of the issue, and especially of how the social, political and technological dimensions interact to provide different pieces of the puzzle. They illustrate very clearly that climate change inaction stems from far more than simply inadequate policy or lack of public interest. The methodology also highlights that the process of framing is not simply a social process i.e. drawing on cultural resources to make these frames specifically resonant for Israeli society; but also a political process i.e. seamlessly connecting frames with specific and local political goals.

The individual framings highlight that Israelis employ a considerable degree of creativity in excusing their limited action around climate change, with the cultural and historical role of technology in Israel proving significant. As highlighted in Chapter 5, discussions around technology are fairly central to the climate change debate, although clearly technological framings may be less important in other national and cultural contexts.

5. Missing issues in Israeli climate discourse Nations clearly have different roles to play in addressing climate change. The bulk of responsibility for reducing GHG emissions falls on the major emitters such as the USA and Europe, as well as the newly developing economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa. Israel too can play its part, as it has discursively argued, through developing appropriate technologies for climate mitigation and adaptation. This does not, however, absolve Israel and Israelis from their responsibility to reduce their GHG emissions as part of global efforts. As noted in Chapter 1, Israel’s per capita emissions are relatively large compared to many developed countries and are forecast to grow by 40 percent by 2030 (McKinsey and Company 2009).

At the moment, however, Israel would conspicuously like other countries to take strong action to address climate change i.e. through adopting its technologies, while it does very little itself. It has adopted only a very limited climate policy and even failed to adopt the very technologies that it claims can help address climate change. This research postulates that one of the reasons why Israel and Israelis have failed to take the most appropriate actions to address climate change is that discussion of such actions has been absent in Israeli climate discourse. These missing actions are now discussed.

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5.1 Individual lifestyle and behavioral changes Between 2007 and 2010, the Israeli media barely mentioned the role that individuals can play in addressing climate change. The environmental NGO community also paid limited attention to public awareness campaigning during that time. This changed in 2010, when the Environment Ministry launched the first national public awareness campaign about climate change, ‘What to do in the everyday?’ (Hebrew Ma osim bayomyom). This was followed by an on-going series of media advertisements on a more general environmental theme, called ‘Starting to think green’ (Hebrew Mathilim lachshov yarok).

The ‘What to do in the everyday?’ campaign focused primarily on small changes that Israelis could make in their daily lives, such as walking more and taking cloth bags to the supermarket. It provided the overall branding for around twenty activities that occurred during 2010, organised by a range of environmental organisations, schools and museums. Although some of the activities directly related to climate change, none of the campaign literature actually mentioned the term by name. In addition, the campaign imagery was not particularly eye-catching. It is thus unlikely that it was very influential in raising awareness about the importance of individual actions in addressing climate change.

The advertising campaign, launched in early 2011, was more striking. Working with a well- known comedian, the campaign produced a series of humorous videos and radio broadcasts, as well as newspaper and billboard adverts. It also had a user-friendly website in Hebrew, English and Arabic providing more information (Greenlife 2012). The emphasis of the campaign was on responsible consumerism; i.e. taking simple actions that would both protect the environment and save money. For example, green driving as a way to save fuel and reduce pollution; saving paper and encouraging recycling; energy saving; green building; and buying responsible quantities of food to reduce waste.

Again, this campaign shied away from even mentioning climate change by name. The market research group behind the campaign argued that this should be deliberate. They had found in focus group research that Israelis were deterred by ‘environmental discourse’, including references to scientific concepts and hyper-criticism of existing behavior (MEP 2011a). Although this campaign is promoting relatively effective personal GHG mitigation actions and is likely to have wide appeal, it cannot be considered a climate frame as such.

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5.2 Policy measures to address climate change Specific policy measures that could be taken to reduce Israel’s GHG emissions received little attention in Israeli public discourse, despite being the focus of considerable academic research and NGO lobbying. As noted above, between 2007 and 2010, although there was media discussion of the need for effective national climate mitigation policy, there was little actual technical discussion around the most effective policy measures to introduce. Although discussion of Israel’s future energy direction is a major preoccupation of the Israeli media, this is not widely discussed in the context of climate change. This is in contrast to Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand where there has been extensive public debate around the relative benefits of carbon taxation and ‘cap and trade’ mechanisms for reducing GHG emissions. The exception has been some limited media discussion of Israel’s poor public transport infrastructure, especially in relation to the electric car (Rabinowitz 2009a; Rabinowitz 2009b).

This lack of public debate was reflected in the Israeli survey research. Israelis offered very little support for carbon taxation, despite the fact that policy researchers show that introducing an economy-wide tax will be essential for Israel to meet its Copenhagen Accord commitment (Ayalon et al. 2011).

5.3 Structural changes There has also been little discussion of the structural issues that are contributing to Israel’s spiralling GHG emissions, including rapid population growth, over-consumption and the role of industrial capitalism in creating climate change. As outlined in Chapter 4, Israel’s population growth and over-consumption are almost taboo subjects. Other structural constraints limiting effective climate action include the institutional politics underlying the IEC’s commitment to the Ashkelon coal-fired power plant, and the commercial interests of the mainstream Israeli media.

Although Israel’s Environment Minister Gilad Erdan has made some surprisingly radical comments about the environmental failings of the current economic system, such discussions are yet to be widely heard in mainstream discourse.176 Dan Rabinowitz is one of the few

176 In December 2010, Erdan argued that a country that only measured its success in terms of economic growth, without taking into account things like sustainability or preparedness to meet the challenges of climate change, was short-sighted and lacked real understanding of the upcoming challenges. “We like most other Western countries, live in a capitalist society and have gotten used to encouraging a culture of consumption, and measure our success based on our ability to purchase commodities 232

public figures in Israel who has advanced a more radical critique of the current economic system in relation to climate change (Rabinowitz 2009a).

6. Effective climate change frames for Israel Communicating the need for thoroughgoing steps in response to climate change is clearly challenging. Calls to adopt a simpler and less materialistic lifestyle as a means to address climate change can appear to imply sacrificing current standards of living for uncertain benefits. Such calls offer little gain for politicians and risk portraying environmental campaigners as self- righteous and ascetic. They can thus reinforce the idea that climate change is a special interest issue for middle class environmentalists (Stoll-Kleeman et al. 2000; Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2005). Similarly, discussions around climate policy can appear technical and boring, appealing primarily to rational rather than experiential processing mechanisms and thus unlikely to motivate behavioral changes (Leiserowitz 2005; Weber 2006). Talk of significant change and upheaval is also clearly at odds with economic interests that benefit from maintaining the status quo of high GHG emissions.

Since these issues focus on the deep societal roots of climate change which require us to fundamentally question basic principles of social organisation, cultural meaning and identity, it is not surprising that Israeli climate communicators have resisted addressing them (Moser and Dilling 2007; Nisbet 2011b). Drawing on Gramsci’s critique of power and culture, one could argue that the absence of a more radical structural critique of climate change in Israeli public discourse, and the acceptance of frames that maintain the status quo and prevent social change such as the ‘climate techno-opportunity’ frame, illustrate how hegemonic culture and discourse plays a role in maintaining the current unequal relations of production and social control (Gramsci 1971).

In any case, climate change communication that focuses on sacrifice for the environment or on the relative benefits of a single policy or behavior is bound to fail. This is because, as highlighted at the beginning of this dissertation, climate change is not a conventional policy problem but rather a ‘wicked’ problem that only a profound social transformation can resolve.

as we wish, even if we don’t really need them. The same goes for national expenditure. What I’m saying is that we need to change our priorities.” (Friedman 2010). 233

Nevertheless, this dissertation argues that as creatures of social routine, habit, fashion and fad, humans can change these systems. Changes in the way humans organise and conduct basic transactions do take place, sometimes very rapidly (Urry 2011). In reasserting the importance of sociology in the climate change debate, this dissertation thus argues that effective communication, which both specifies the most relevant GHG emissions reduction activities and is rooted in relevant culturally resonant language and values, will be one of the means by which this profound change could come about (Hulme 2009).

Such communication must evidently go further than simply encouraging green consumerism and establishing a few green practices such as recycling. It must question and redefine prevailing values, asking profound questions such as how we really want to live our lives and how we envision the future (Hulme 2009; Nisbet 2011b). Crompton (2010) argues that constructing ‘values-led’ climate frames, especially ones focused on intrinsic or self- transcendent values such as a sense of community, connection with nature, and social justice, will not only improve climate communication but also help cultivate and strengthen such values in society.177 Such frames must also, however, offer clear material benefits deriving from shifting to a low-carbon society, such as healthier food and lifestyles; shorter working hours; localisation of production, consumption and exchange; and increased democratic control over multiple aspects of life (cf. Przeworski and Wallerstein 1982; Wright 2010).

Also exploring the factors contributing to effective communication, Moser and Dilling (2007) argue that traditional ‘one-way’ message delivery techniques are insufficient to generate such discussions in society. Instead, campaigners should seek to create or identify existing forums for communal visioning and a search for solutions to climate change as part of a wider project to promote environmental citizenship and community values (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). The Transition Town movement or the grassroots Climate Camps that have taken place globally, including in Israel, are examples of how such a conversation can take place (Climate Camp 2011; Transition Culture 2012).

Looking at Israeli climate discourse, it is evident that the ‘Jewish values’ frame has attempted to offer a public forum for co-creating this discourse. This dissertation argues, however, that

177 Drawing on Schwartz’s value survey, Crompton (2010) defines intrinsic values as those that are rewarding to pursue. These values are closely connected with political engagement, concern about social justice, environmental behavior and lower levels of prejudice. Extrinsic values are those that are centred on external approval and rewards such as wealth, material success, concern about image, prestige, authority and social status. 234

although it has the potential to reinforce transcendent values in the observant Jewish community, such as an ethic of modesty and restraint and a sense of community, these effects are likely to remain limited. Some proposals for more effective communication in the Israeli context that draw on intrinsic values, elements of Israeli identity and the ‘gain frame’ advantage are offered in the proceeding paragraphs.

One of the early ideas for the 2010 “What to do in the everyday?” campaign was to evoke images of Israel in the 1950’s, an imaginary golden age when life was simpler and more innocent, there was a greater sense of community and collective mission to build the country together. In the public perception, Israel at that time was less developed with fewer cars, there was greater emphasis on local neighborhoods, and entertainment included public singing and folk dancing. The campaign proposed faded photographs of children playing on the beach, in the streets and in kibbutzim as well as comedians from that era riding bicycles.

This message is, of course, also problematic since it reinforces the critique of environmentalists as ‘anti-progress’ rather than forward-looking, appeals primarily to native-born secular Israelis, and papers over the discrimination against Arabs and Mizrachi Jews in this period. This example nevertheless illustrates that a climate frame can be built around behavioral changes based on intrinsic values and material benefits that would appeal to many Israelis. Similarly, Israelis widely perceive themselves as having a family-oriented culture, drawing on both Jewish tradition and Zionist pro-natalist ideology (Katz and Peres 1986). With more thought, a climate frame focused on simple and healthy living, family and community as inherent Israeli values could well be effective.

Other potentially effective communication strategies are evident from the survey and media analysis. This includes tailoring messages about climate change to distinct interpretative communities e.g. the Ultra-orthodox, Arab and ex-Soviet Israelis, and using communicators with particular affinity to these communities. For the mainstream secular and traditional public, this includes supporting Israeli climate scientists to develop more effective communication strategies and to have greater visibility in public discourse. Israeli weather forecasters could also play a greater role in communicating climate change.

It is also possible to build a narrative around Israeli technology as part of, rather than the entire, solution. As illustrated in Chapter 5, the psychological appeal of the ‘climate techno 235

opportunity’ framing is partly due to its reinforcing a sense of national pride (albeit more of an extrinsic value than an intrinsic value per se). Promoting the widespread adoption of household smart meters using Israeli ICT technologies could, for example, be a way to provide better information for consumers around energy usage and save money, while also promoting Israeli exisiting technology (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). Similarly, imbuing the public with a sense of collective mission to shift to a low-carbon society through both technological innovation and lifestyle changes (rather than simply through technology as implied in the ‘climate techno-opportunity framing’) could engender a similar sense of collective efficacy while also being individually empowering.

Another vital component of an effective climate frame is to connect the issue to local concerns. This is especially relevant in Israel, where the ‘finite pool of worry’ frame allows the public to argue that climate change is not a pressing or relevant issue. As journalist Aviv Lavie has argued, “When I talk about climate change I take it to places of the here and now – refugees, food prices, electricity prices, water shortages, it's the only way to grab Israeli attention for this topic… On Israeli Independence Day, I wrote about barbecues, the price of meat and how people don't make the connection between rising food prices and global warming. The linkage astonished readers and it received many ‘shares’ and ‘likes’“ (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012).

At the policy level, researchers highlight the need for an economy-wide carbon tax if Israel is to meet its Copenhagen Accord committments. Taxing the carbon content of fuels would raise the price of fossil fuels and provide incentives to develop and deploy carbon-reducing measures such as energy efficiency, low carbon fuels and energy conservation-based behavior (Carbon Tax Center 2012). Many agree that such carbon taxes should be revenue neutral, with little if any of the revenues being retained by government and the bulk being returned to the public through dividends or tax relief elsewhere. Thus the population may pay more for fossil fuels, but are not financially penalised overall.

Although in the 2009 survey Israelis expressed little enthusiasm for raising the price of fossil fuels, introducing a revenue neutral tax and explaining it adequately may increase support for carbon taxation. Given the pervasive sense of national pride in Israeli science and technology, another way for such a policy to gain acceptance would be if part of the revenue were channelled into funding for Israeli cleantech R&D. Similarly, given the social protests that took place in Israel in 2011, which highlighted the unequal distribution of wealth in the country, such 236

a tax could also be redistributive. Wealthier households use more energy – driving and flying more, owning bigger houses and consuming more in general (Carbon Tax Center 2012). If the tax threshold were raised to account for basic needs, most of the tax revenues would come from families of above-average means who could ‘afford’ to pollute. This could then be redistributed to benefit lower income households through dividends or tax relief.

On another level, introducing Israeli solar thermal technology into the domestic power production market would be a visible manifestation of Israel’s commitment to addressing climate change, as well as of the country’s technological prowess. Thinking beyond the narrow short-term economic focus of the Finance Ministry, this shift would also have numerous co-benefits (See discussion in Chapter 1). Although the 2002 government decision to develop renewable energy (No. 2664) included plans to build two solar thermal power plants based on Israeli technology at Ashalim in the Negev desert, little has happened to make this a reality.178 Israel has trial sites for some exciting new solar and wind technologies, but again there is little prospect that they will be commercialised in the domestic market.

Israeli media has so far failed to offer a complex analysis of the root cause of the climate change, namely capitalism’s dependency on perpetual economic growth (Pers. Comm. Aviv Lavie 2012). This did not change following the 2011 social protests, which in contrast to parallel events in Greece, Spain, and the USA failed to raise a fundamental critique of capitalism (Gordon 2012). Lavie argues that this reflects a wider lack of maturity in the Israeli media, which is afraid to alienate its audience through offering a more complex critique or to say anything that could be considered ‘left-wing’.

Addressing national inaction is not simply a question of improving and increasing the level of public and policy discourse but changing whole systems of economic, technological and social practice, and reversing many of the systems set in motion during the 20th century (Urry 2011). Nevertheless, this dissertation has made the case that discourse, both ineffective and effective, has played and will play a role in defining our response to climate change and hence our future.

178 With a total output of up to 220 MW, plus a PV power plant with an installed capacity of 30 MW 237

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Appendix I: Survey questions in Hebrew

ISSP 2000

- 35. באופן כללי, האם אתה חושב שזיהום האוויר הנגרם על ידי מכוניות הוא... - 37 באופן כללי, האם אתה חושב שזיהום האוויר הנגרם על ידי מפעלי תעשייה הוא... 38. האם אתה חושב שכימיקלים וקוטלי מזיקים שמשתמשים בהם בחקלאות הם... 39. האם אתה חושב שזיהום הנהרות, האגמים והנחלים בישראל הוא... - 40. האם אתה חושב שהעלייה בטמפרטורות בעולם הנגרמת על ידי אפקט החממה היא... 41. האם אתה חושב ששינויים גנטיים בגידולים חקלאיים מסוימים הם...

1. מסוכנים ביותר לסביבה 2. מאוד מסוכנים 3. מסוכנים למדי 4. לא מאוד מסוכנים 5. לא מסוכנים בכלל לסביבה

לא להקריא:

8. לי יכול לבחור 9. לא יודע, אין תשובה

ISSP 2010 (2011)

- 44. באופן כללי, האם אתה חושב שזיהום האוויר הנגרם על ידי מכוניות הוא... - 45. באופן כללי, האם אתה חושב שזיהום האוויר הנגרם על ידי מפעלי תעשייה הוא... 46. האם אתה חושב שכימיקלים וקוטלי מזיקים שמשתמשים בהם בחקלאות הם... 47. האם אתה חושב שזיהום הנהרות, האגמים והנחלים בישראל הוא... - 48. באופן כללי, האם אתה חושב שהעלייה בטמפרטורות בעולם הנגרמת על ידי שינוי האקלים היא... 49. האם אתה חושב ששינויים גנטיים בגידולים חקלאיים מסוימים הם... 50. באופן כללי, האם אתה חושב שכורים גרעיניים הם...

1. מסוכנים ביותר לסביבה 2. מאוד מסוכנים 3. מסוכנים למדי 4. לא מאוד מסוכנים 5. לא מסוכנים בכלל לסביבה

לא להקריא:

284

8. לי יכול לבחור 9. לא יודע, אין תשובה

Haifa University survey 2010 One question

איזה מושג את/ה מקשר עם הביטוי "שינוי אקלים"?

‘Health’ survey 2010

- מתי, לדעתך, שינוי האקלים יתחיל להשפיע על בריאות האדם בישראל?

- באיזו מידה, לדעתך, התחממות כדור הארץ ושינוי האקלים מהווה איום או סכנה לך ולמשפחתך?

- על מה, לדעתך, משפיע שינוי האקלים? (נעזר)

- איזה מההשפעות הבאות של שינוי האקלים מדאיגה אותך במיוחד, אם בכלל? (נעזר)

BGU survey 2009

- 1. אקריא בפניך מספר נושאים הנדונים בימים אלה בכנסת. ציין/י בבקשה בסולם בין 1 ל 5 את מידת העדיפות שיש לתת לדעתך לכל אחד מנושאים אלו בסדר היום הלאומי, כאשר 1 מציין "עדיפות נמוכה - מאד" ו 5 – "עדיפות גבוהה מאד". מה מידת ההעדפה שיש לתת ל...

1.1 מצב עם איראן 1.2 מצב הכלכלה 1.3 מצב המים 1.4 שינוי האקלים 1.5 שפעת החזירים

2. בחלק הבא אקריא בפניך מספר פעולות הקשורות לחיסכון באנרגיה. ציין/י בבקשה בסולם - - בין 1 ל 5 את הסיכוי שתעשה/י כל אחת מפעולות אלו בשנה הקרובה, כאשר 1 מציין "אין כל סיכוי" ו 5 – "סיכוי גבוה מאד". במידה ואת/ה עושה את הפעולה כיום נא ציין/י זאת. מה הסיכוי ש...

2.1 תקנה/י מזגן שחוסך בחשמל

285

2.2 תקנה/י רכב שחוסך דלק 2.3 תפעיל/י את המזגן על 24 מעלות או תפחית/י את השימוש בו 2.4 תשתמש/י יותר בתחבורה ציבורית או אופניים

(להקריא תשובות)

- 3. כמה שמעת או קראת על התחממות כדור הארץ או שינוי האקלים?

3.1 כלום – מעולם לא שמעתי על זה 3.2 רק שמעתי את הביטוי 3.3 רק קצת 3.4 די הרבה 3.5 הרבה מאוד

להקריא תשובות 1-3

4. האם הסיבה העיקרית לכך שהתחממות כדור הארץ מתרחשת היא...

4.1 פעילות אנושית 4.2 שינויים טבעיים בסביבה או 4.3 אף אחד מאלה כי התחממות כדור הארץ לא מתרחשת

4.4 [לא להקריא] גם אנושית וגם טבעיים 4.5 [לא להקריא] לא יודע/ת 4.6 אחר

להקריא תשובות 1-3

5. איזה מההיגדים הבאים הוא הנכון ביותר למיטב ידיעתך

- 5.1 רוב המדענים חושבים שהתחממות כדור הארץ מתרחשת - 5.2 רוב המדענים חושבים שהתחממות כדור הארץ איננה מתרחשת - - 5.3 יש אי הסכמה רבה בקרב מדענים בשאלה האם התחממות כדור הארץ מתרחשת

5.4 [לא להקריא] לא יודע

לא להקריא תשובות - 6. מהו מקור המידע הראשי שלך לגבי התחממות כדור הארץ?

6.1 בני משפחה וחברים 6.2 טלוויזיה – איזה ערוץ? 6.3 מערכת חינוך 6.4 לא יודע/ת 6.5 אינטרנט – איזה אתר? 6.6 עיתון – איזה? 6.7 פרט / אחר

286

- - 7. ציין/י בסולם בין 1 ל 5 באיזו מידה את/ה מודאג/ת מהתחממות כדור הארץ כאשר 1 מציין "כלל לא - מודאג/ת" ו 5 – "מודאג במידה רבה מאד"

- 8. אם לא ייעשה דבר כדי להתמודד עם התחממות כדור הארץ בעשרים השנה הקרובות, באיזו מידה - - - התחממות כדור הארץ תגרום לדברים הבאים בסולם בין 1 ל 5 דרגות כאשר 1 מציין "כלל לא" ו 5 מציין "במידה רבה מאד"

8.1 סכסוכים אזוריים 8.2 מחסור במים 8.3 מגיפות ומחלות 8.4 פליטים ממדינות שכנות 8.5 הצפת אזורי החוף בשל עליית מפלס הים

להקריא תשובות 1-3 9. האם לדעתך על הקהילה הבינלאומית לנקוט צעדים כדי לצמצם את התחממות כדור הארץ?

9.1 לא 9.2 כן, צעדים מתונים בשנים הבאות 9.3 כן, צעדים משמעותיים בקרוב

9.4 [לא להקריא] לא יודע/ת

- 10. בחלק הבא אקריא בפניך מספר היגדים, ציין/י בבקשה בסולם בין 1 ל 5 את המידה בה את/ה מסכים/ה עם - כל אחד מהם, כאשר 1 מציין "כלל לא מסכים/ה" ו 5 – "מסכים/ה במידה רבה מאד". באיזו מידה את/ה מסכים/ה ש..

- 10.1 על ישראל לחתום על אמנה בינלאומית המחייבת מדינות להפחית את פליטת הפחמן הדו חמצני שלהן בתשעים אחוז עד שנת 2050. 10.2 על הממשלה להעלות את מחיר הדלקים ומוצרים אחרים שגורמים להתחממות כדור הארץ כדי לעודד את הפחתת השימוש בהם. 10.3 טכנולוגיות חדשות יפתרו את התחממות כדור הארץ בלי לחייב אנשים לעשות שינויים מהותיים באורח חייהם. 10.4 למרות שישראל מאוד קטנה, היא עדיין יכולה לנקוט צעדים שיעזרו להפחית את התחממות כדור הארץ. 10.5 יש מעט שאני יכול/ה לעשות באופן אישי כדי להפחית את התחממות כדור הארץ.

- 11. ציין/י בבקשה בסולם בין 1 ל 5 את המידה בה את/ה סומך/ת על כל אחת מהקבוצות הבאות שייתנו לך - - מידע אמין על התחממות כדור הארץ, כאשר 1 מציין "כלל לא" ו 5 – "במידה רבה מאד". באיזו מידה את/ה סומך/ת על... שיתנו מידע אמין:

11.1 חוקרים ומדענים 11.2 הממשלה 11.3 אמצעי תקשורת 11.4 ארגונים ירוקים 11.5 חזאי מזג האוויר

287

Appendix II: Israeli television coverage of climate change

Israeli broadcast coverage of climate change included the screening of English language documentary ‘The Great Global Warming Swindle’ on cable TV (Yes Doco Oct 14 2007); a 2008 Israeli documentary by MK Nitzan Horowitz about urban sustainability, ‘Urban Legend’ on Channel 10; three hour long Israeli documentaries featuring Dan Rabinowitz broadcast in May 2012 as part of the ‘Introduction to…’ series on Channel 2; and a short series in November 2010 on Channel 2 nightly news program entitled ‘The Real Threat’ with environment correspondent Haim Rivlin and weather forecaster Danny Deutsch.

Research only identified eight news interviews about climate change between 2007 and 2010 on the three national TV channels (Channels 1, 2 and10) including with Nir Shaviv, Dan Rabinowitz, and Nitzan Horowitz (Pers. Comm Channel 1 archivist 2012). There may have been greater coverage on Channel 2 and Channel 10, but further research was not possible since the cost of accessing these archives was prohibitive.

Publicly available broadcasts included the following: 1) Channel 2 news (2009) Interview with Nehama Ronen, Oct 13 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9JKGXtVWkPQ, 2) Channel 1, The Local Edition (2009) Interview with Megama Yeruka, Dec 14 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWQuWjoDKMA 3) London And Kirshenbaum, Channel 10 (2009) Interview with Nitzan Horowitz, Dec 21 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=baxXh3BCRbI, 4) Channel 2 news (2010) ‘The Real Threat’ a three part series screened in November http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6sfIn8mjQo, 5) The Daily Measure, Channel 1 (2010) Interview with Nir Shaviv on Earth Day, March 28 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Flv_OYh1X8Y&feature=related, , 6) Today In The News, Channel 1 news (2011) Interview with Dan Rabinowitz, Oct 13 http://azerimix.com/vplayer.php?id=rV25bfxjUEk, 7) The World This Morning (2011) Channel 2 Interview with Aviv Lavie, Nov 11 http://reshet.tv/Shows/Haolam_Haboker/videomarklist,190117/,

288

Appendix III: Personal Communication

Position Interview type, Name Location Date 1. Adi Dishon Founder and director, Ecotraders Personal interview Sde Boker 24th July 2011

2. Aharon Ariel Jewish Nature Personal interview Lavie Tel Aviv 8th February 2012

3. Dr. Aliza Hartog School of Government, Personal interview Belman Inbal Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv 10th November 2011

4. Amir Ben David Environment correspondent, Telephone interview Yediot Ahronot 12th June 2011

5. Dr. Arnold Founder, BrightSource Energy, Personal interview Goldman Inc. and BrightSource Industries Jerusalem (Israel), Ltd 7th April 2009

6. Arnon Soffer Professor of Geo-strategy and Personal interview Vice Chairman of the National Haifa Security Studies Center at Haifa 21st March 2012 University

7. Amir Givati Hydro-meteorologist Email interview Israel Hydrological Society 2nd August 2010

8. Avi Moshel Independent consultant, former Personal interview deputy head of Air Quality & Haifa University Climate Change Division, 28th February 2012 Ministry of Environmental Protection

9. Aviv Lavie Environment correspondent, Personal interview Ma’ariv Tel Aviv 23rd May 2012

10. Dan Lavie Environment correspondent, Telephone interview Israel HaYom 5th June 2011

289

11. Dr. Dan Ecologist, Haifa University Personal interview, Malkinson Kibbutz Ketura 23rd June 2011 12. Dr. Dov Khenin Member of Knesset, Hadash Personal interview, Party; Joint Committee for Health Tel Aviv and the Environment Chairman; 17th August 2010 Internal Affairs and Environment Committee Member 13. Ehud Zion Former Environment Personal interview Waldoks Correspondent, The Jerusalem Be’er Sheva Post 28th April 2011

14. Eilon Adar Director of the Zuckerberg Personal interview Institute for Water Research at Sde Boker the Jacob Blaustein Institutes for 20th February 2012 Desert Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

15. Einat Kramer Jewish Nature Telephone interview 27th February 2012

16. Eitan Parnass CEO, Renewable Energy Personal interview, Association of Israel Jerusalem 5th September 2011

17. Eran Doron Former co-ordinator, Renewable Telephone interview energy, Ramat Negev regional 9th October 2011 council

18. Dr Gabriel Former Chief Scientist of Personal interview Avital Education Ministry, Likud Party Bar Ilan University, activist, NRG columnist Ramat Gan 21st March 2012

19. Gaddy Trade Linkages, Foreign Trade Personal interview Weissman Administration at Ministry of 2nd December 2009 Industry Trade and Labor. Israeli Telephone interview negotiator at UNFCCC. 4th September 2011

20. Gil Ya’akov CEO, Green Course Personal interview Tel Aviv 3rd May 2009

21. Henia Berkovitz Managing Director, Israeli Personal interview Meteorological Service Haifa University 28th February 2012

290

22. Hillel Nossek Professor of Communication at Personal interview the School of Media Studies of the Tel Aviv College of Management Academic 17th August 2009 Studies Rishon Lezion, Israel

23. Dr. Hussein Co-founder and director, Towns Personal interview Tarabieh Association for Environmental Sachnin Quality, Sachnin 1st March 2012

24. Itai Trilnick Energy correspondent, Ha’aretz Personal interview Ramat Gan 28th November 2011

25. Dr. Jeremy Associate Director of the Personal interview Benstein Abraham Joshua Heschel Center Tel Aviv for Environmental Learning and 23rd May 2012 Leadership

26. Joseph Gale Emeritus Professor, Dept. Plant Personal interview and Environmental Sciences, Ben-Gurion Institute of Life Sciences, Hebrew University, Sde Boker University of Jerusalem 10th March 2010

27. Karin Founder, Green Prophet blog Personal interview Kloosterman Jaffa 16th August 2011

28. Linor Sagi Director of environmental Personal interview projects, Forum 15 ISEES conference, Carmel Forest 27th June 2011

29. Maya Givon Co-ordinator of the Israeli NGO Personal interviews Climate Change coalition “Paths 28th November 2011 to Sustainability”. 14th August 2012

30. Michal Founder and executive Personal interviews Bitterman committee member of the Israel Tel Aviv Green Building Council 30th August 2011 17th August 2012 31. Michal Perle Environmental Director, Israel Personal interview Electric Corporation Kibbutz Ketura 26th March 2009

32. Mordechai Professor, Dept. of Economics Personal interview Shechter and Dept. of Natural Resource & Haifa Environmental Management, 4th June 2011 University of Haifa. Director

291

Israel Climate Change Information Centre.

33. Mostafa Abu- Former director, Towns Personal interview Raba Association for Environmental Copenhagen Quality, Sachnin 28th December 2009

34. Nadav Senior Lecturer at the Dept. of Personal interview Davidovitch Health Systems Management, Beer Sheva Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben- 9th March 2009 Gurion University of the Negev

35. Naor Director, Life and Environment Personal interviews Yerushalmi NGO coalition 18th December 2009

36. Nathan Paldor Professor of Dynamical Telephone interview Meteorology and Physical 7th March 2012 Oceanography at the Institute of Earth Sciences, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

37. Nir Shaviv Professor, Racah Institute of Personal interview Physics, The Hebrew University Jerusalem of Jerusalem 20th February 2012

38. Noam Ilan Co-Managing Director, Eilat-Eilot Personal interview, Renewable Energy Initiative Kibbutz Lotan 16th May 2010

39. Noam Segal Head of research and policy Personal interview planning, Israel Energy Forum Tel Aviv 27th August 2011

40. Nurit Kliot Emeritus professor, University of Personal interview Haifa Coordinator, Water Haifa Resources Science, Israel Climate 5th February 2008 Change Information Centre

41. Ofer Ben Dov CTO, Elysium Carbon Trade & Personal interview Investments Ltd. and Tel Aviv Sustainable Energy Director, 25th May 2008 Assif-Strategies Ltd. 42. Ofira Ayalon Senior Researcher, Head of Personal interview Environment Cluster Samuel Binyamina Neaman Institute, Technion; 15th November 2011 Director, Natural Resource & Environmental Research Center;

292

Associate Professor, Dept. of Natural Resources & Environmental Management

43. Dr. Orr Karassin KKL-JNF Member of Board of Personal interview Directors London 25th December 2008

44. Pinhas Alpert Professor in Atmospheric Personal interview Sciences, and Head of the Porter Tel Aviv School of Environmental Studies, 7th June 2009 Tel Aviv University

45. Roni Cohen Coordinator, Air Quality and Personal interviews Ginat Climate Change Division Ministry Jerusalem/ of Environmental Protection Copenhagen 27th December 2008 14th December 2009

46. Sagi Dagan Senior Economist, National Personal interview, Economic Council, Prime Tel Aviv Minister’s Office 31st January 2012

47. Sam Daniel Actions co-ordinator, Greenpeace Personal interview Mediterranean Sde Boker 14th September 2011

48. Sagit Porat Director, Business and Personal interviews Environment program, Tel Aviv 5th February 2008 University. Former co-ordinator 7th July 2009 of the Israeli NGO Climate Change 6th December 2009 coalition “Paths to 25th August 2011 Sustainability”. 24th May 2012 18th August 2012

49. Shuli Nezer Senior Deputy Director General, Personal interview, Industries and Licensing, Copenhagen 14th Ministry of Environmental December 2009 Protection

50. Uriel Safriel Emeritus professor, Hebrew Personal interview University of Jerusalem. Head of Sde Boker the Center of International 12th January 2010 Conventions of the Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research

51. Valerie Brachya Director of the Environmental Personal interview Policy Center at the Jerusalem Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies 24th July 2011

293

52. Yael Cohen Founding director, Israel Energy Personal interview Paran Forum ISEES conference, Carmel Forest 27th June 2011

53. Yael Darel Environment correspondent, Telephone interview Ynet 18th June 2011

54. Dr. Yedidya Rabbi, Co-founder and Director Personal interviews Sinclair of Education for Jewish Climate Jerusalem/ Sde Boker Initiative and Hazon Senior 7th April 2009 Rabbinical Scholar 29th December 2010

55. Yohanan Division Head, Energy Efficiency Personal interview Burstyn and Renewable Energy, Ministry Ramat Gan of Environmental Protection 28th November 2011

56. Yosef President and Co-Founder, Arava Personal interview, Abramowitz Power Company Boston 29th June 2010.

57. Dr. Youval Arbel Deputy director, Friends of the Personal interview Earth Middle East Copenhagen 20th December 2009 Personal interview Haifa 29th August 2011

58. Zafrir Rinat Environment correspondent, Personal interview Ha’aretz Kinneret 4th May 2011

294

Appendix IV: Summary of two focus groups on climate change conducted in Sachnin, December 2010

1. Introduction Presented below are the findings from two focus groups conducted in the Israeli-Arab town of Sachnin (n=6, 4) in the north of Israel in December 2010. In the first group, participants responded to an advert at a local health clinic. Four of the respondents were educated to degree level and were health professionals; one was an undergraduate student; and one was a farmer and taxi-driver. The group was mixed male and female, Christian and Arab. All of the respondents had heard of climate change before the focus group meeting (Ashwaq, Basma, Ayman, Haneen, George and Fakhira).

The second focus group was conducted with four Arab-Israeli environmental campaigners on the same day (Maha, Manar, Laithi and Mostafa). Both focus groups were conducted in the health clinic in Arabic. The focus groups were conducted by Mohammad Azraq, a Jordanian student as part of his studies at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, under the supervision of doctoral candidate, Lucy Michaes at the Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Sachnin (pop. 25,600), located in the Lower Gallilee in the North of Israel, was chosen as the location for the focus groups because it is also home to the the Towns Association for Environmental Quality (TAEQ), one of the major Israeli-Arab NGOs which works with six Arab towns in the Galilee region on environmental education and protection. TAEQ helped organize the focus groups. Because of the presence of this organization, it was also assumed that there was a greater likelihood of finding a group who had at least heard of climate change, given the low level of awareness identified by the 2009 BGU survey.

Note: the focus groups coincidentally took place during the first rains in the region after a long hot summer and a week after forest fires swept the nearby Carmel forest.

295

2. Focus group with non-experts

2.1 Interview questions The first focus group was loosely structured around these questions: 1) Associative meanings (10 minutes – warm-up question) a) What is your immediate image/ association with the term "climate change"? b) What about the term "global warming"? c) Affect - Do you have a positive or negative immediate feeling associated with these terms? 2) Understanding of causes (15 minutes) a) How much do you understand about the causes of climate change? b) What do you consider are the principle causes of climate change or global warming? c) Can anyone explain to me the process of "global warming"? 3) Personal experience (5 minutes) a) Do you think that you personally have experienced climate change or global warming in Israel? 4) Risk perception (20 minutes) a) Are you concerned about climate change? b) How does it rank compared to other risks facing Israel? c) What do you think the main impacts of climate change will be locally? d) When do you think these things will begin to happen? e) Do you think climate change will affect you? Your children? And how? 5) How will we solve climate change? (15 minutes) Technology? Government policy? Grassroots action? Changing consciousness? 6) Fatalism/ Self-Efficacy (20 minutes) a) In general, do you think that we can prevent climate change? b) Do you think that you personally can do anything to prevent climate change? c) Do you think that Israel, as a small country, can do anything to prevent climate change? d) To what extent do you think that climate change is out of our hands/ in God's hands? In general, do you consider yourself religious? 7) Information source (5 minutes) What is your major source of information about climate change? Media? Mosque?

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2.2 Results Understanding Climate Change • Climate change is when the weather changes from hot to cold that leads to sickness. [Basma]

• Climate change is long-term related to ozone layer, earth temperature, ice in the poles, floods and desertification, and is leading ultimately to weather change. [Ashwaq, Ayman, and Haneen]

• Climate change is the change in my identity and surrounding environment, erasing my Palestinian identity. It reminds that Israel obliterates my identity and history [Fakhira]

• Climate change is the lack of rain precipitation that is caused by God [George]

Immediacy of Climate change in Israel • Climate change in Israel is not an immediate or pressing concern. We have not seen major catastrophes like floods and earthquakes similar to other countries yet. [Ashwaq, Ayman, Basma]

• Climate change is not prioritized by the state of Israel. Take the Carmel fire for example. Despite developing nuclear weapons and having a superior military, the country failed to control the fire. This was regardless of the wind and the type of trees that might have helped in spreading the fire. So, these countries that Israel considers “ the enemy” do not need to fight Israel with nuclear weapons, all what they need is a matchbox. A match-stick could burn down the entire country and Israel would be distracted by it. Israel is not putting the environment on top of its agenda. [Ashwaq]

• Fascism and radical religious groups are far greater threats than climate change to Israel [ Ashwaq]

Climate change as a concern for Arab-Israelis • Not to undermine climate change, but our voice is not heard on matters more important to us. Without a doubt, we are facing greater challenges as a community in education, employment, and living conditions. Newlyweds are facing

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socioeconomic challenges to be able to support themselves. Climate change is an issue we can put on the shelf for the time being [Ashwaq, Ayman, Basma, and Haneen]

• There is a flagrant discrimination policy against Arabs in Israel. On a community level, there is social equality and civil rights, and on an individual level, there is employment, education, and economic opportunity [Ashwaq, Ayman, and Basma]

• There is a deep and consistent policy to keep Arabs away from public life. [Ashwaq, Ayman, Basma, and Haneen]

• MK Dov Khenin is a good example of Jewish politicians working against such discriminatory policy [Ashwaq and Ayman].

Divine Intervention? • If hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, or ozone layer depletion happen, it is not because humans are not preserving the environment. Layers heat up and volcanoes erupt because of God's will. Human's are not in control of their destiny [Basma and George].

• I should do the maximum I can with regards to climate change to minimize the effects of phenomena caused by God. [Ayman and Ashwaq]

• If there is a hurricane or flood in an area that is not used to having such phenomena, then it's the effects of climate change [Ayman]

• I don't buy into this notion that it's caused by God, humans have control over their destiny [Fakhira]

Personal Responsibility • Saving energy and rationing electricity, I disconnect the power from the TV when I'm not watching to save energy [Ayman]

• Limit the use of plastic bags, and the use of plastic in general [Ashwaq and Fakhira]

• Raise awareness about the environment [Ayman and Ashwaq]

• Ration waste disposal [Ayman]

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• My husband and brother use public transportation [Basma]

• We could do a lot more, but we are not, because we have more important priorities. [Ayman, Fakhira]

• We do not use public transportation because it is not available to us. If it gets organized and uniformly applied to all citizens then we will use it. When it becomes convenient and we feel more belonging we will use public transportation [Ayman, Ashwaq, Basma, Haneen, Fakhira, and George]

3. Focus group with environmental campaigners

3.1 Interview questions The interview questions were loosely based around these questions 1) Climate change knowledge • Survey research shows that around 65% of the Israeli Arab community has never heard about climate change. Why do you think this?

• Who in the Israeli Arab community does know about climate change? Can you define it by socio-demographics e.g. Education? Age? Religion? People who have connections in Europe and the USA?

• Is there a strong difference between Muslim and Christian communities?

• Why is it is that more Jewish Israelis know about climate change than Arab Israelis?

• Do you think things changed after in the Israeli Arab community after Copenhagen e.g. was there increased media interest? E.g. more people asking what they can do to reduce climate change?

• Is there good coverage of environmental issues in the Israeli Arab media in general? And on climate change?

• To what extent does the international Arabic speaking media influence Israeli Arab perceptions e.g. Al-Jazeera?

• Who are the major communicators about climate change to the Israeli Arab

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community? Are there well-known Arab “environmentalists” (both Israelis and non- Israelis)? Or mostly Jewish communicators?

• Who do you think Israeli Arabs are most likely to trust to tell them about climate change? Politicians? Religious leaders? Scientists?

• Do you think most people that know about climate change, think that it is caused by humans or natural causes? Is there a debate about this?

• Does religion play a role in people’s beliefs about climate change? For example, do you think many people believe that climate change is God’s will and that they cannot prevent climate change through human actions

2) Risk Perception

• Most Jewish Israelis think that the government should take action on climate change but that in general it is a low priority. Do you think it is similar for Arab Israelis?

• What would you say were the key issues for Arab Israelis today? Where does climate change rank in comparison to these key issues?

• Do you think Arab Israelis make a connection between climate change and water?

• Are Arab Israelis concerned about climate change?

• Do you think Arab Israelis may be more vulnerable to the effects of climate change?

• Do you think that Israeli Arab farmers are more concerned about climate change?

3) Dealing with climate change

• Many Jewish Israelis believe that technology alone can solve climate change – do you think there is the same techno-optimism in the Arab community?

• Do Arab Israelis understand that they will have to change their way of life in order to prevent climate change?

• Are there any things that culturally would be difficult for Arab Israelis to “give up” to prevent climate change? Would they be willing to eat less meat? Use public transport more? Flying because of Diaspora Palestinian communities?

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• Do Arab Israelis consider themselves equally as responsible for emissions as Jewish Israelis?

• Do you think most Arab Israelis believe that they can personally make a difference to address climate change through changing their behavior?

3.2 Interview results 1) Perception among Arab-Israelis. • There is a general lack of awareness among the Arab community about the issue of climate change. [Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha]

• They have more pressing priorities to care about. [Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha]

• Related to level of education, socio-economic status and profession [Mostafa, Mana, Laithi, and Maha]

• Lack of association, the policies of depopulation and discrimination make people care less about the environment. [Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha]

2) Immediacy and Risk Perception • Water shortages are the issue Arab Israelis see and feel the most, particularly Arab farmers [Mostafa and Laithi].

• Generally, people understand factory smokestacks are polluting the atmosphere and harm the environment, but only a few make the connection between such pollution and climate change [Mostafa, Laithi, Manar, Maha]

• Climate change is not immediate to Arab-Israelis since they have not seen damaging floods or hurricanes in the country [ Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha].

3) Priority issues for Israeli Arabs • Deliberate deportation, discrimination by the state, and social and economic inequality. [Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha]

• Challenges in access to education and employment [Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha]

• Inadequate access to services such as sewage systems, waste treatment and public

301

transportation. [Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha]

4) Divine Intervention? • Everything is fate or destiny, but people can still do something about it. If there are floods, you can build a dam to minimize the damage. If there are earthquakes in the area you account for it in planning and construction strategy [Laithi]

• Arabs believe in fate when it comes to climate change for two reasons; they are not effectively causing it since they don't own or run the polluting factories and facilities, and they do not have the tools or authority to mitigate it's consequences. They feel helpless and await God's mercy [Mostafa and Laithi]

• People who generally work on and believe in climate change are secular [Manar].

5) Personal Responsibility • Arab-Israelis cannot assume responsibility because they are not effectively causing it. [Mostafa]

• Education and raising awareness is one way to get people more involved, but ultimately it is government policies regarding equality and infrastructure that would get people to take care of the surrounding environment. [Mostafa, Manar, Laithi, and Maha].

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תקציר

חיבור זה בוחן מדוע, למרות ראיות מדעיות מכריעות, עדיין לא נוקטות מדינות בפעולות משמעותיות להתמודדות עם שינוי האקלים. ישראל משמשת כאן כמקרה מבחן כדי לטעון לחשיבות שיש לתפיסות ולשיח במתן האפשרות לדמוקרטיות מודרניות להתמיד בפעילויות - שידוע כי אינן בנות קיימא.

- החיבור נוקט בשיטת מחקר מעורבת כדי להציג דיוקן לאומי עשיר ומורכב של (אי )פעולה ישראלית בנושא שינוי האקלים. הדבר כולל הן מחקר כמותי (ניתוח סקרים, ניתוח תוכן - תקשורתי וראיונות מובנים למחצה) והן מחקר פרשני (ניתוח ביקורתי של "מיסגור" הנושא במסמכי מפתח, בהם מסמכי מדיניות, הצהרות ממשלתיות, תמלילי ישיבות ממשלה וכינוסים, ומאמרי עיתונות).

- הממצאים המרכזיים נוגעים להשפעתן של תפיסות עולם ואמונות קיימות על תפיסות חברתיות של שינוי אקלים. תפיסות בדבר הסכסוך במזרח התיכון, כמו גם האמונה בכוחה המדעי והטכנולוגי של ישראל, משפיעים על הדיון בשינוי האקלים לרוחב החברה. אמונות אחרות מופיעות במגזרים דתיים ולאומיים מסויימים, בהן פטליזם בקרב ערביי ישראל וספקנות בקרב מהגרים מברה"מ לשעבר. המחקר גם זיהה כיצד תגובות לשינוי אקלים המוכרות מרחבי העולם, כמו הכחשת התופעה, מקבלות ביטוי מקומי ייחודי.

המחקר גם מאייר כיצד מדיניות שינוי האקלים בישראל, כבעולם כולו, קשורה למטרות לאומיות - רחבות הנתפסות כחשובות יותר, לרבות שימור הצמיחה הכלכלית והביטחון האנרגטי. סדרי יום נוספים מקודמים באמצעות שיח אקלימי, בהם שיפור תדמית המותג של ישראל, והגברת תדמיתו הסביבתנית של הימין.

- לבסוף, מציע המחקר מסגרת תיאורטית חדשנית כדי להעריך עד כמה עשויים מבני שיח ישראליים עכשוויים הן להדהד בקרב ציבור רחב והן לעודד פעולה ראוייה ומבוססת מבחינה מדעית. על בסיס מסגרת זו, נטען כי למרות שכמה מהדרכים שבהן ממוסגר שינוי האקלים - – בישראל עשויות לזכות להד אם בציבור הרחב ואם בקרב מגזרים מסויימים אף אחת מהם אינה מקדמת את השינויים המעמיקים שאכן נחוצים כדי להתמודד עם שינוי האקלים.

מילות מפתח: שינוי אקלים, התחממות כדור הארץ, ישראל, חברה, תפיסות, שיח, מדיניות - אקלים, מדיניות אנרגיה, טכנו ופטימיזם, תפחסות סיכון, הכחשה

Keywords: climate change, global warming, Israel, society, perception, discourse, climate policy, energy policy, techno-optimism, risk perception, denial

ישראל ושינוי האקלים: דיוקן לאומי של אי-פעולה

מאת: לוסי מיכאלס מנחים: פרופ אלון טל פרופ יעקב גארב - פרופ טלי כץ גרו, אוניברסיטת חיפה

המחקר גם מאייר כיצד מדיניות שינוי האקלים בישראל, כבעולם כולו, קשורה למטרות לאומיות רחבות הנתפסות כחשובות יותר, לרבות שימור הצמיחה הכלכלית והביטחון - האנרגטי. סדרי יום נוספים מקודמים באמצעות שיח אקלימי, בהם שיפור תדמית המותג של ישראל, והגברת תדמיתו הסביבתנית של הימין.

הצהרת תלמיד המחקר עם הגשת עבודת הדוקטור לשיפוט

אני החתום מטה מצהיר/ה בזאת: (אנא סמן):

_X__ חיברתי את חיבורי בעצמי, להוציא עזרת ההדרכה שקיבלתי מאת מנחה/ים.

___ החומר המדעי הנכלל בעבודה זו הינו פרי מחקרי מתקופת היותי תלמיד/ת מחקר.

___ בעבודה נכלל חומר מחקרי שהוא פרי שיתוף עם אחרים, למעט עזרה טכנית הנהוגה בעבודה ניסיונית. לפי כך מצורפת בזאת הצהרה על תרומתי ותרומת שותפי למחקר, שאושרה על ידם ומוגשת בהסכמתם.

תאריך ____23.10.2012____ שם התלמיד/ה __לוסי מיכאלס ____

! חתימה______

23 באוקטובר 2012 ז' בחשוון תשע"ג

באר שבע

העבודה נעשתה בהדרכת אלון טל יעקב גארב - טלי כץ גרו, אוניברסיטת חיפה

בבית ספר הבינלאמי ללימודי מדבר במכוני בלאושטין לחקר המדבר, אונ' בן גוריון

iii

ישראל ושינוי האקלים: דיוקן לאומי של אי-פעולה

מחקר לשם מילוי חלקי של הדרישות לקבלת תואר "דוקטור לפילוסופיה"

מאת

מיכאלס לוסי

הוגש לסינאט אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב

אישור המנחים

אישור דיקן בית הספר ללימודי מחקר מתקדמים ע"ש קרייטמן

______

ישראל ושינוי האקלים: דיוקן לאומי של אי-פעולה

מחקר לשם מילוי חלקי של הדרישות לקבלת תואר "דוקטור לפילוסופיה"

מאת

מיכאלס לוסי

הוגש לסינאט אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב

23 באוקטובר 2012 ז' בחשוון תשע"ג

באר שבע i