Concerning Determinism and Contingency
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� Concerning Determinism and Contingency ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι[.] —Aristotle (NE 12, 1095b, I.iv.7)1 By limning the consequences of a most basic (epistemic) choice—fate or fortune— this chapter tenders the general framework of the ma tter under consideration. Simultaneously serving as an initial overview, it provides a (thematic) sketch of the conceptual, methodical, and applicative studies to follow. �.� Chance and Providence (Generally and Particularly) in incerto iudicium est, fatone res mortalium et necessitate immutabili an forte volvantur. Quippe sapientissimos veterum quique sectas eorum aemulantur diversos reperies[.] —Tacitus (Annals. IV–XII. 188–190, VI.xxii)2 The question as to whether events are (wholly) determined or fortuitous remains a perennial problem to lifeforms of a certain consc iousness—both from a universal perspective, and with regard to specific cases. In one way or another, any being of a sustained recollection—as is simultaneously capacitated for reflecting on, and extrapolating, potential causalities—will not infrequently face (be affected by, or forced to confront) this conundrum.3 �� 1 “the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so” (NE 13, 1095b, I.iv.7). Cf. the trans. by Rolfes/Bien: “Denn wir gehen hier von dem ‘Daß’ aus” (Nikomach. Ethik 5, 1095b, I.ii). From a rhetorical perspective, Trimpi accentuates: “We begin, always, with the an sit” (Muses 361). See Waldenfels (175); von Fritz (“Die ἐπαγωγή” 641; 662–663). With Pascal, Blumenberg urges “feste[s] und unbeirrte[s] Hinsehen auf die faktische Situation des Menschen” (“Recht des Scheins” 421). Cf. Schaeffer: “admit where we stand” (“Literary Studies” 271). Küpper: “das Sagen des Faktischen” (“Ordnung” 209). Aquinas stresses: “it is obvious that, if all particular things vanished, their universals could not endure” (250, III.i.75.6; with 253, III.i.75.13). 2 “judgement wavers[:] [i]s the revolution of human things governed by fate and changeless necessity, or by accident? You will find the wisest of the ancients, and the disciples attached to their tenets, at complete variance” (Annals. IV–XII. 189–191, VI.xxii). See Pfligersdorffer (1–2). 3 “Man cannot live without having thoughts about the first things” (Strauss Natural Right 91). “All men naturally [‘φύσει’] desire knowledge [‘τοῦ εἰδέναι’]. […] other animals live by impressions [‘φαντασίαις’] and memories [‘μνήμαις’], and have but a small share of experience [‘ἐμπειρίας’]; but the human race lives also by art [‘τέχνῃ’] and reasoning [‘λογισμοῖς’]. It is from memory that men acquire experience […][;] it is through experience that men acquire science and art […]. Art is produced when from many notions of experience a single universal [‘μία Open Access. © 2020 DS Mayfield, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110701654-002 Determinism and Contingency For particular results might presently be sans ready and reasonable explanation as to their coming about. On occasion, this status may (seem to) be permanent—at least as far as the human eye and mind are concerned. Even so, the knowing of causatives—be they definitive or probable—is not merely a matter of curiosity, but often of vital import.4 By and large, it will be beyond doubt that the (ultimate) grounds of certain events are not always (directly) intelligible. Yet there may well be matters whose workings remain inaccessible not only to a given lifeform, but to any—whether factual or simply conceivable. Sheer chance is a possibility indeed (or theory). Along the lines of said infinite query, one might pose the ensuing experiment of thought. Should there be gods (or one thereof), are they (else he, she, it) causally omniscient; if so, only in hindsight, or also regarding the future; and would the latter necessarily translate into a total predetermination of all affairs.5 May a god be (deemed) subject to time at all (or to aught, for that matter), without violating other assumptions about the divine; and if decidedly supratemporal, can a deity even conceive of sequential relations—and could there be something that such a being cannot do.6 In more down-to-earth terms, the word ‘accident’ is regularly applied to cases where the cause is known and certain, but a particular effect was not—or is said to not have been—willed, by some or all of the concerned. Seeing that love and death are taken to dominate human lives, traffic-related incidents or ineffective birth control might be considered instances of momentaneous evidence. As to the former, a blend of circumstantial conditions—be they ultimately uncontrollable (seasonal precipitation, limited visibility, lightning), or feasibly ;; καθόλου’] judgement [‘ὑπόληψις’] is formed with regard to like objects” (Aristotle Met. 1–9. 2–5, 980a–981a, I.i.1–5; see “Post. An.” 256–261, 100a–b, II.xix). “Thiere […] haben […] bloß anschauliche Vorstellungen, keine Begriffe, keine Reflexion, sind daher an die Gegenwart gebunden, können nicht die Zukunft berücksichtigen” (Schopenhauer WWV I. 213, II.27). Cf. subch. 3.3; the onset of ch. 4; as well as 12, herein. 4 See Aristotle: “we aim at understanding, and […] never reckon that we understand a thing till we can give an account of its ‘how and why’” (Phys. 1–4. 129, 194b, II.iii). 5 Cf. “we ascribe to the gods the capacity to see all things” (Aristotle “Poetics” 81, 1454b, §15). 6 Heuristically, see Normore’s indispensable synopses of affine speculations (“Future” 363; 377–378; 381; passim; “Divine” 16). Cf. Boh (“Omnipotence” 194–195; and spec. 207n.); Grant (539); Korolec (639). Withal, the—decidedly human—principle of (non)contradiction need not be applicable to anything otherworldly (and likely does not hold good). See Blumenberg’s cultured caveat: “Es kann vernünftig sein, nicht bis zum Letzten vernünftig zu sein” (Arbeit 180–181; cf. Dierse 296). As to defining a “supreme being” (wholly) ex negativo (here with reference to Aristotle): “not subject to conditions of time, place, matter, dimension, or change of consciousness” (Wicksteed/Cornford xvi; with xxx). Cf. subch. 4.4, herein. Chance and Providence maneuver-, manageable (moving obstacles, leaping animals, defective parts, inapt maintenance)—could chance to coincide with incompetent, imprudent, inattentive, irresponsible conducting on the part of some or all of the involved. Regarding mammalian intercourse, the humanoid variants may appear to prioritize other uses than the reproductive (whether social or hedonistic); partly also since offspring might not be desired or advisable—at a given point; or at all. When nature has its way even so (as it will), the term in question tends to be employed, although nothing was ‘accidental’, strictly speaking. The word merely signals that the regular biological outcome had not been intended—or even been unwanted—by one or both of the agents implicated.7 Societally, their unwillingness to acknowledge, and so legitimize, said effect may have far-reaching consequences; especially regarding processes of naming (hence communal prestige) and heredity (the material legacy, in particular)—to say nothing of the surgical recourses taken by some.8 Yet as concerns causal relations, naught is in the dark. For the requisite exchange of fluids must have been performed by respectively capacitated beings; and at a fruitful time.9 ;; 7 As is his habit, Freud takes pleasure in having it both ways: “wenn man den Zufall für unwürdig hält, über unser Schicksal zu entscheiden, ist es bloß ein Rückfall in die fromme Weltanschauung […]. Wir vergessen […] gern, daß eigentlich alles an unserem Leben Zufall ist, von unserer Entstehung an durch das Zusammentreffen von Spermatozoon und Ei, Zufall, der darum doch an der Gesetzmäßigkeit und Notwendigkeit der Natur seinen Anteil hat, bloß der Beziehung zu unseren Wünschen und Illusionen entbehrt” (“Leonardo” 210). See Rorty (Contingency 22); Vogt (679, 679n.–681n.). For a Medieval take, cf. Küpper (“Medical” 119–120). 8 See Aristotle (Rhet. 48–49, 1360b, I.v.5); Strauss (Natural Right 103–104; 148). To some extent, the historical institution of marriage (pre)determines, and so protects, against human willfulness—especially as far as the male part is concerned (mater certissima). What occurs outside said socio-moral confines tends to be considered accessory, hence sans entitlement to a full (or any) communal status (depending on the resp. culture). The fact that the latter may still be granted post factum signals the ultimate contingency and precarity of nominal sanctions (incl. the possible dissolution of wedlock, and adoption). Generally, see Küpper (“Moderne” 136–137, 136n.; “Fiacre” 264–265; “modernidade” 207–208); and Beecher: “Women always know who their own children are, men do not. The male mind seems to come equipped with a genetic disinclination to invest in offspring who do not pass into futurity some of his own genetic coding, at least not without negotiation. Women, by contrast, are genetically endowed to seek the highest caliber of sperm in order to gain for their offspring every selective advantage in a hostile and competitive world” (110). See subch. 7.2.3, herein. 9 “the semen is not yet potentially a man; for it must further undergo a change in some other medium” (Aristotle Met. 1–9. 451, 1049a, IX.vii.3); “it is not a matter of chance what springs from a given sperm, since an olive comes from such a[…] one, and a man from such another” (Phys. 1–4. 145, 196a, II.iv; with “Parts of Animals” 72–75, 641b, I.i); “[a hu]man [being, ‘ἄνθρωπος’] is begotten by [a hu]man [being]” (Phys. 1–4. 165, 198a, II.vii; likewise Met. 1–9. 338–339, 1032a, Determinism and Contingency Perhaps this—hardly infrequent—sample may be taken to a more kathólou plane. There are such as maintain that the existence of humankind is due to, and determined by, the will of some supreme being(s).