Terrorism and Globalization Or the Nature of the Struggle

- - -

Te rrorism and globalization

JAM ES D. Kl RAS

• Introduction 358

• Definitions 358

• Te rrorism: from transnational to global phenomenon (1968-2001) 360

• Te rrorism: the impact of globalization 361

• Globalization, technology, and terrorism 364

• Combating terrorism 368

• Conclusion 370

Reader's Guide cultural, economic, and religious terms linked to glo balization. However, such terms are not sufficient to Globalization has contributed to the growth of terror explain the relationship. Technology associated with ism from a regional phenomenon into a global one. globalization has enabled terrorist groups to conduct Precisely how it has contributed, however, is hard to operations that are more deadly, distributed, and diffi determine. The difficulty lies in the complex nature cult to combat than in the past. Technological advan of terrorism and disagreements on what constitutes tage is not one-sided and states can use technology to globalization. Global terrorism has been explained in diminish the global impact of terrorism. JAMES D. KIRAS

Introduction

The relationship between terrorism and globalization or the nature of the struggle. Terrorism is a weapon is difficult to describe accurately. Each phenomenon of the weak, conducted by a minority who promote is complicated and defies simple characterization. It is an extremist ideology-it often fails to create political inaccurate to suggest that globalization is responsible change. Theglobal community is not powerless in the forterrorism, but technologies associated with global face of such violence. In order to succeed, the global ization have been exploited by terrorists. In particu community must utilize the resources at its disposal lar, technologies have increased the ability of terrorist collaboratively, in a way that is consistent with inter groups to work together, share information, and reach national law and human rights, to diminish support for out to previously unavailable audiences. Technology terrorism and demonstrate the illegitimacy of terrorist cannot change the character of the terrorist message messages and aspirations.

· ·- · · · Definitions

Terrorism and globalization share at least one thing methods is the foremost reason for disagreement (see in common-both are complex phenomena open to Box 23.2). Some view terrorist acts as legitimate only if subjective interpretation. Definitions of terrorism vary they meet the criteria associated with revisionist inter widely but all start froma common point of departure. pretations of 'just war' tradition, which focus on the Terrorism is characterized, first and foremost, by the actions of individuals. Thesecriteria, which apply to all use ofviolence. Thistactic of violence takes many forms applications of force, have been expanded to include a and oftenindiscrimi nately targets non-combatants. The just cause, proportional use of violence, and the use of purpose forwhich violence is used, and its root causes, force as a last resort. Realists suggest that the political is where most of the disagreements about terrorism violence used by terrorist groups is illegitimate on the begin. Historically, the term 'terrorism' described state basis that states alone have a monopoly on the legiti violence against citizens during the French Revolution. mate use of physical force. Over the past half-century, however, terrorism has come to mean the use of violence by small groups aim Box 23.1 Types of terrorist groups ing to achieve political change. Terrorism differs from ... criminal violence in its degree of political legitimacy. Audrey Kurth Cronin has outlined d ifferenttypes of terrorist Thosesympathetic to terrorist causes suggest that vio groups and their historical importance in thefollowi ng way : lence is the only remaining option that can draw atten tion to the plight of the aggrieved. Such causes have 'There are fourty pes of terrorist organizations currently included ideological, ethnic, and religious exclusion or operating around the world, categorized mainly by their source of motivation: left-wing terrorists, right-wing persecution. terrorists, ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists, and reli Defining terrorism can be difficult as groups often gious or 'sacred' terrorists. All fourtypes have enjoyed espouse multiple grievances and compete with one periods of relative prominence in the modern era, with another for resources and support. In addition, the left-wing terrorism intertwined with the Communist relative importance of these grievances within groups movement, right-wing terrorism drawing its inspiration from Fascism, and the bulk of ethnonationalist/separa can change over time (see Box 23.1). Those targeted tist terrorism accompanying the wave of decolonization by terrorists are less inclined to see any justification, especially in the immediate post-World War II years. much less legitimacy, behind attacks that are designed Currently, "sacred" terrorism is becoming more significant to spread fe ar by killing and maiming civilians. As a ...many groups have a mix of motivating ideologies result, the term 'terrorist' has a pejorative value that is some ethnonationalist groups, forexam ple, have religious usefulin delegitimizing those who commit such acts. characteristics or agendas-but usually one ideology or motivation dominates.' Reaching consensus on what constitutes terror (Cronin 2002/3:39) ism is difficult. The legitimacy of terrorist means and Chapter 23 Terrorism and globalization

Terrorist groups risk fadingin to obscurity if they do Box 23.2 Legitimacy not cow the public or conduct newsworthy attacks.

Martha Crenshaw provides an approach to determine the However, attacks by terrorists that are so horrific, legitimacy of acts ofterror ism: such as publicized beheadings in Taliban-controlled parts of western frontier Pakistan, puts support for 'The value of the normative approach (to terrorism) is that terrorist causes at risk. Thereforeterrorism is defined it confronts squarely a critical problem in the analysis of here as 'the use of violence by sub-state groups to terrorism, and indeed any form of political violence: the issue of legitimacy ...the need forscholarly objectivity inspire fe ar, by attacking civilians and/or symbolic and abstraction does not excuse us from the obligation targets, for purposes such as drawing widespread to judge the morality of the use of force, whether by the attention to a grievance, provoking a severe response, state or against ...Te rrorism must not, as the terrorists or wearing down their opponent's moral resolve, to can foresee, result in worse injustice than the condition effect political change'. the terrorists oppose ...The targets of terrorism are mor ally significant; witness the difference between material As with definitions of terrorism, there is general objects and human casualties.' agreement on at least one aspect of globalization. (Crenshaw 1983: 2-4) Technologies allow the transfer of goods, services, and information almost anywhere quickly and efficiently. In the case of information, the transfer can be secure As with other forms of irregular warfare,terrorism and is nearly instantaneous. The extent of social, cul is designed to achieve political change for the pur tural, and political change brought on by globalization, poses of obtaining power in order to right a perceived including increasing interconnectedness and homoge wrong. Terrorism, however, is the weakest form of neity in the international system, remain the subject irregular warfare with which to alter the political of much disagreement and debate, as other chapters landscape. The reasonfor this weakness is that terror in this volume have outlined. These disagreements, in ist groups rarely possess the broader support of the turn, influence discussion of the extent to which global population that characterizes insurgency and revolu ization has contributed to the rise of modern terrorism. tion. Terrorist groups often lack broader support for There is little doubt that the technologies associated their objectives because their goals for change are with globalization have been used to improve the effec based on radical ideas that do not have widespread tiveness and reach of terrorist groups. Therelat ionship appeal. In order to influence change, terrorists must between globalization and terrorism is best understood provoke drastic responses that act as a catalyst for as the next step in the evolution of political violence change or weaken their opponent's moral resolve. In a since terrorism became a transnational phenomenon few cases, terrorist acts have achieved relatively rapid in the 1960s. change. Thebo mbings in Madrid in 2004, forexa m ple, influenced the outcome of elections in Spain in Key Points a dramatic fashion, and anecdotal evidence suggests

that the attack was designed with just this purpose in • Agreement on what constitutes terrorism continues to be mind. Many terrorist leaders hope that their actions difficult given the range of potential acts involving will lead to disproportionate reactions by a state, violence. which in turn disaffects public or international opin • Terrorism, or acts of violence by sub-state groups, has ion and increases support fortheir cause. Other lead been separated from criminal acts on the basis of the purpose forwhich violence is applied, namely political ers using acts of terrorism seek immediate impact, change. to demonstrate the weakness of their opponent, and • Te rrorist groups succeed when their motivations or by extension the group's power and reach, by gen grievances are perceived to be legitimate by a wider erating fe ar through media coverage. For example, audience. Disproportionate or heavy-handed responses by during the 2008 attack in Mumbai, one leader told states to acts of terrorism serve to legitimize terrorist terrorists to tell the media that the attack ' ...was groups. just the trailer, just wait till you see the rest of the • The definition of globalization, as with terrorism, is open film'. Terrorist campaigns, however, often take years to subjective interpretation, but the technologies associated with globalization have increased terrorist or decades to achieve meaningful results and the capabilities. amount and nature of forceused can be problematic. JAMES D. KIRAS

Te rrorism: from transnational to global plienomenon (1968-2001)

Historically, terrorists have used readily available means coverage was termed the oxygen that sustains terror to permit small numbers of individuals to spread fe ar ism, terrorists discovered that reporters and audiences as widely as possible. In the late nineteenth and early lost interest in repeat performances over time. To sus twentieth centuries, anarchists relied on revolvers and tain viewer interest and compete for coverage, terrorist dynamite. Yet terrorists and acts of terrorism, includ groups undertook increasingly spectacular attacks, such ing bombings or assassinations in Austria-Hungary as the seizure of Organization of Petroleum Exporting (Empress Elisabeth of Austria, assassinated in Geneva Countries (OPEC) delegates by 'Carlos the Jackal' in in 1898), Tsarist Russia (Tsar Alexander II, assassinated Austria in December 1975. Terrorism experts specu in Saint Petersburg, 1881), the United States (Wall Street lated that terrorist leaders understood that horrific,mass bombing, 1920), and the United Kingdom (the 1885 casualty attacks might cross a threshold of violence. This London Underground bombing) among others, rarely may explain why few terrorist groups have attempted to had an impact beyond national borders. Three factors acquire or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), led to the birth of transnational terrorism in 1968: the including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. expansion of commercial air travel, the availability of TheIranian 'Islamic Revolution' of 1979 was a water televised news coverage, and broad political and ideolog shed event in transnational terrorism. Although Israeli ical interests among extremists that intersected around a interests remained primary targets for attack, due to common cause. As a result, terrorism grew froma local to continued sympathy for the Palestinian cause, a num a transnational threat. Air travel gave terrorists unprec ber of groups began to target citizens and other symbols edented mobility. For example, the Japanese Red Army of the United States. Thedecade of terrorism (1980-90) trained in one country and attacked in another, such included incidents such as suicide bombings (Lebanon, as the 1972 Lod Airport massacre in Israel. Air travel 1983) and hijackings (TWA Flight 847, 1985). During appealed to terrorists for other reasons. Airport security this decade, three disturbin& trends emerged: fewer measures, including passport control, were almost non attacks, that were more deadly and indiscriminate; the existent when terrorists began hijacking airlines. These increasing sophistication of attacks; and a greater will skyjackings suited terrorist purposes well. Hijacked ingness to performsuicide attacks. airlines offered a degree of mobility, and thereforesecu Transnational Marxist-Leninist groups discovered rity, for the terrorists involved. States also acquiesced to that their source of support disappeared at the end of terrorist demands, which encouraged furtherincidents. the cold war. In addition, state law enforcement and The success of this tactic spurred other terrorist groups, paramilitary forceswere increasingly effective in com as well as criminals and political refugees,to followsuit. bating terrorism. Other terrorist groups discovered As a result, incidents of hijacking skyrocketed from five that transnational attacks were counter-productive in in 1966 to ninety-fourin 1969. Shared political ideologies achieving local aims. For example, ETA and the IRA stimulated cooperation and limited exchanges between sought negotiations but still used terrorist attacks as a groups as diverse as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) bargaining ploy and to remain visible domestically until and the Basque separatist Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), eventually giving up armed struggle entirely. Although and groups demanded the release of imprisoned 'fellow Marxist-Leninist transnational terrorism was decreas revolutionaries' in different countries, giving the impres ing in scale and intensity, militant Islamic terrorism, sion of a coordinated global terrorist network. The real symbolized by the group Al Qaeda and enabled by glo ity was that groups formed relationshipsof convenience, balization, was growing into a global phenomenon. based around weapons, capabilities, and money, to advance local political objectives. Ke y Points Televised news coverage also played a role in expand ing the audience who could witness the theatre of ter • The majority of transnational terrorist attacks from 1979 rorism in their own homes. Individuals who had never onwards targeted American citizens and symbols. heard of'the plight of the Palestinians' became notionally • Trends in terrorism since 1968 include greater casualties, increasing sophistication, and suicide attacks. aware of the issue after incidents such as the live cover age of the hostage taking conducted by Black September • Transnational Marxist-Leninist groups have been replaced by global militant Islamic terrorist groups. during the 1972 Munich Olympics. Although media Chapter 23 Terrorism and globalization

Te rrorism: ttie impact of globalization

Al Qaeda, or 'The Base', received global recognition continuing influence and appeal of its message across as a result of its attacks conducted in New York and national boundaries as 'franchises' have sprung up Washington on 11 September 2001 . But what exactly in the Arab Maghreb, Yemen, the trans-Sahal, and is Al Qaeda? Is it a global terrorist group that threatens Nigeria. Efforts to explain the vitality of global terror Western civilization and values, a sub-state financial ism in general-and Al Qaeda in particular-focuson and resource provider to like-minded terrorist groups, three areas linked to aspects of globalization: culture, or merely the purveyor of an extremist set of beliefs economics, and religion. that justifiespolitical violence to fulfilmili tant Islamic myths? Experts continue to debate what Al Qaeda is, Cultural explanations what it represents, and the actual threat that it poses, particularly since the killing of Osama bin Laden in Culture is one way to explain why militant Islam's call Abbotabad, Pakistan in May 2011. Part of the rea for armed struggle has been successful in underde son for the disagreement stems from the fact that veloped countries. In particular, violence is the only Al Qaeda, as the standard bearer for militant Islam, method of preserving traditions and values against a has evolved considerably despite loss of territory and cultural tsunami of Western products and materialism. the death or capture of most of its senior leadership. Once sought afteras an entry method to economic pros Today Al Qaeda appears less as a terrorist group and perity, Western secular, materialist values are increas more as a global movement that markets and exploits ingly rejected by those seeking to regain or preserve its own form of militant Islam in a loose network of their own unique cultural identity. The social changes 'franchised' cells and groups (see Fig. 23.1). Regardless associated with globalization and the spread of free of how one views Al Qaeda, one cannot dispute the market capitalism appear to overwhelm the identity

D Losser affiliates AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) �------� AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AS Al-Shabaab {Somalia) DHDS Dhamat Houwet Daawa Salafia {Algeria) I EIJ Egyptian lslamicjihad GICM Moroccan Islamic Combat Group HuJI B Harakat-ul-Jihad-lslami Bangaladesh HuM Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (Pakistan/Kashmir) JeM Jaish-e-Muhammad {Pakistan/Kashmir) Lej Laskar-e-jhangvi (Pakistan} LeT Laskar-e-Taiba TIP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Figure 23.1 The terrorist nebula and regional clusters Modified from Rabasa, Chalk, et al. (2006), Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global jihadist Movement: 80. JAM ES D. Kl RAS or values of groups who perceive themselves as the los policies can be unfavourable to the underdeveloped ers in the new international system. In an attempt to countries, or global South, that comprise the periphery preserve their threatened identity and values, groups or gap. Political decisions by the leaders of underdevel actively distinguish themselves from despised 'others'. oped countries to deregulate or privatize industries to At the local level, this cultural friction may translate be competitive globally may lead to significant social into conflicts divided along religious or ethnic lines to and economic upheaval. The citizenry may shift loy safeguard identity. alties to illegal activities such as terrorism if the state According to one explanation, however, the num breaks its social contract with them (Junaid 2005: 143- ber of distinct civilizations is limited globally. Samuel 4), including activities outside of state control through Huntington suggests that a major fault-line exists global underground economies such as 'System D', between the liberal Western civilization and an Islamic using alternative currencies (BitCoin), and alternative one 'humiliated and resentful of the West's military websites on the 'Deep Web' such as 'Silk Road'. presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelm Wealth is also linked to personal security and vio ing military dominance, and ... [unable] to shape their lence. With little possible opportunity to obtain wealth own destiny' (1993: 32). Critics of Huntington suggest, locally, individuals will leave to pursue opportunities among other things, that he ascribes a degree of homo elsewhere. Paradoxically, rising standards of living and geneity within the Islamic world that simply does not greater access to educational opportunities associated exist. Theologically and socially, the Islamic 'civiliza with globalization may lead to increased individual tion' contains a number of deep fault-lines that impede expectations. If those expectations are unrealized, indi the cooperation required to challenge the West. The viduals can turn to extreme political views and action extremely bloody sectarian violence between Sunni and against 'the system' that denies them the opportunity Shi'a in Iraq is only one example of these very real fis to realize their ambitions, as Ted Robert Gurr hypoth sures. Militant Islamic calls to kill non-combatants and esized in 1970 (Gurr 1970: 46). One study suggests that a fellow Muslims represent another internal fault-line. sense of alienation and lack of opportunity among some Non-believers fallinto the categories of infidels (those Muslim males is a contributing factor in their decision of different religion) and apostates (those Muslims who to turn to violence globally. Within militant Islamic do not share their interpretation of the Koran). In 2005, groups, however, most leaders and senior operatives Osama bin Laden gave unequivocal sanction to Abu attended graduate schools around the globe in fields as Musab al-Zarqawi to kill Muslim Shi'a in Iraq. Such diverse as engineering and theology, and were neither actions call into question the morality of the means, poor nor downtrodden (Sageman 2004: 73-4; 95-6). and thereforethe legitimacy of bin Laden and militant Other views offer a broader explanation. In particu Islam as the champions of Muslim values among the lar, the writings of revolutionary Franz Fanon provide wider and moderate Islamic community. The victims insights in the use of political violence to right eco of militant Islamic terrorist violence have been other nomic wrongs (Onwudiwe 2001: 52-6). In the 1960s, Muslims and not Western 'others', a fact bin Laden Fanon suggested that the struggle would exist until the acknowledged in 2011 (Lahoud et al. 2011: 21-42). economic and power imbalances were removed (Fanon 1990: 74). Terrorist violence is motivated by inequali Economic explanations ties of the global economy. Therefore terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001 were Not everyone agrees that defence of culture or iden not reactions against the policies of the United States per tity is the primary motivation for globalized terrorist se, but rather a blow against an icon of global capital violence. Others see economic aspects as the crucial ism. Statements by fringe groups, including neo-Nazis, motivating factor in the use of violence to effect politi anarchists, and the 'New, New Left',are additional evi cal change. Although globalization provides access to dence that globalization might be a stimulus forpoliti a world market for goods and services, the net result cal violence (Rabasa, Chalk, et al. 2006: 86-93). has also been perceived as a formof Western economic The links between terrorism and poverty also vary imperialism. The United States and the post-industrial considerably between regions. Many militant Islamic states of Western Europe formthe global North, or eco terrorists in Europe have employment rates and sala nomic 'core', which dominates international economic ries that are close to EU averages for their age group institutions such as the World Bank, sets exchange (Bakker 2006: 41, 52). The changing character of mili rates, and determines fiscal policies. The actions and tant Islamic violence, and its shiftin intensity to Yemen, Chapter 23 Terrorism and globalization

Mali, Nigeria, and elsewhere, suggests that while the terrorism difficult if not impossible, as secular states ideology, leadership, and facilitation are still the pur cannot credibly threaten materially that which the ter view of the relatively privileged within terrorist groups, rorists value spiritually. Secular terrorism has had as its economic and ethnic factorsmay increasingly become goal the pursuit of power in order to correct flawsin soci the means by which the next generation of terrorists are ety but retain the overarching system. Religious terror recruited. ists, in contrast, do not seek to modifybut rather replace the normative str cture of society (Cronin 2002/3: 41). Religion and 'new' terrorism Terrorists may be unable or unwilling to compromise on what they see as a 'sacred value' (Atran 2010: 400). In the decade prior to September 11, a number of schol The use of religion as a reaction to and an explana ars and experts perceived that fundamental changes tion for the phenomenon of global terrorism contains were taking place in the character of terrorism. Theuse some of the same incongruities as those focused on of violence for political purposes, to change state ide cultural and economic aspects. For Western observers, ology or the representation of ethnic minority groups, religious reasons appear to explain how individual ter had failedin its purpose and a new trend was emerg rorists are convinced to take their own lives and kill ing (see Ch.14). Postmodern or 'new' terrorism was others. Personal motivations can include promises of conducted for different reasons altogether. Motivated financial rewardsfor famil y members, achieving fame by promises of rewards in the afterlife,some terrorists within a community, taking revenge for some griev are driven by religious reasons to kill as many of the ance, or simply achieving a form of self-actualizing. non-believers and unfaithfulas possible (Laqueur 1996: Yet few religious terrorist leaders, planners, and coor 32-3). Although suicide tactics had been observed in dinators martyr themselves. Religion provides terror Lebanon as early as 1983, militant Islam had previously ist groups with a crucial advantage: the mandate and been viewed as a state-sponsored, regional phenom sanction of the divine to commit otherwise illegal or enon (Wright 1986: 19-21). immoral acts. Thereis a substantial differencebe tween New terrorism, which some authors use to explain religious motivation as the single driving factor for the global jihad, is seen as a reaction to the perceived individuals to commit acts of terrorism and the ulti oppression of Muslims worldwide and the spiritual mate purpose for whichviolence is being used. Scholars bankruptcy of the West. As globalization spreads and disagree on the ultimate political purpose of religiously societies become increasingly interconnected, Muslims inspired suicide violence. Such purposes can include have a choice: accept Western beliefs to better integrate, competing with other terrorist groups forpopular sup or preserve their spiritual purity by rebelling. Believers port in a process of 'outbidding' (Bloom 2005: 77-9), in the global jihad view the rulers of 'Islamic' countries or self-determination, to convince foreign occupiers to such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq as apostates withdraw their forces (Pape 2005: 45-6). A common who have compromised their values in the pursuit and theme among jihadi statements is another political maintenance of secular, state-based power. The only purpose: overthrowing apostate regimes and assuming possible response is to fight against such influences political power. Political power, in turn, is necessary to through jihad. Jihad is understood by most Islamic impose the militant Islamic formof Sharia law in a state scholars and imams to mean the internal struggle for and restore the just and pure society of the caliphate. purity spiritually, although it has also been interpreted historically as a method to establish the basis forju st war. Extremists who espouse militant Islam, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, understand • Cultural, economic, and religious aspects provide jihad in a different way. For the jihadi terrorist, there necessary explanations forglobal ized terrorist violence, can be no compromise with either infidelsor apostates. but they are insufficient individually.

Zawahiri and bin Laden may die but the ideology and • The current wave of terrorist violence uses religion as a the 'cosmic struggle' can and must continue. motivator and to provide the justification for killing The difference in value structures between secular non-combatants. and religious terrorists makes the responses to the lat • The ultimate purpose for modern militant Islamic ter difficult. Religious terrorists will kill themselves and violence is obtaining political power in order to conduct political, social, economic, and religious reform according others to secure rewards in the afterlife. Differences to Sharia law. in value structures make the deterrence of religious JAMES D. KIRAS

Globalization, technology, and terrorism �

Few challenge the point that terrorism has become Wide Web, as the case of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar much more pervasive worldwide due to the processes suggests (see Case Study 1). and technologies of globalization. The technological Another form of empowerment forterrorist groups advances associated with globalization have improved brought on by globalization is the volume, range, and the capabilities of terrorist groups to plan and conduct sophistication of propaganda materials. Terrorist operations with farmore devastation and coordination groups were once limited to mimeographed manifes than their predecessors could have imagined. In par tos and typed communiques. Terrorist supporters and ticular, technologies have improved the capability of sympathizers now build their own websites. An early groups and cells in the following areas: proselytizing, example was a website sympathetic to the Tupac Amaru coordination, security, mobility, and lethality. Revolutionary Movement. This website posted the group's communiques and videos during the seizure Proselytizing of the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1997. Webmasters sympathetic to terrorist groups also control the content Terrorist groups have traditionally sought sympathy and connotation of the material posted on their web and support within national boundaries or in neigh sites. Terrorist groups in Chechnya and the Middle East bouring countries as a means to sustain their efforts. have made increasing use of video cameras to record Sustaining terrorist causes has traditionally been the preparations for and results of attacks, includ more difficult as terrorist messages, goals, and griev ing successful roadside bombings and the downing of ances tend to be extreme, and therefore less appealing, helicopters. Individuals or small groups have produced than those of insurgents. For example, land reform, music or videos useful in inspiring potential recruits government corruption, or foreign occupation moti and seeking donations. Messages, files, and polemics vates larger numbers of individuals to support or join can be dispatched to almost anywhere on the globe via insurgencies, whereas the radical political ideology the Internet or text messaging almost instantaneously. espoused by groups such as the Japanese Red Army and Although media content is generated individually, the Weather Underground had little appeal in largely that is not to say it is simple or crude. The electronic prosperous and stable democratic societies. States have publication Inspire, produced by the group Al Qaeda traditionally had an advantage in their ability to con in the Arabian Peninsula, has been noteworthy forthe trol information flows and use their resources to win sophistication of both its production and messaging. the battle of hearts and minds against terrorist groups. For the purposes of spreading messages to the widest But terrorist leaders understand how the Internet has possible audience for thosewithout Internet or text mes changed this dynamic: 'we are in a battle, and that more saging capabilities, and where speed of communication than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield is not a requirement or a possibility forsecuri ty reasons, of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race terrorists need not rely exclusively on virtual methods. for the hearts and minds of our Umma' (Office of the Any computer of modest capabilities can be used by Director of National Intelligence 2005: 10). members of terrorist groups and their sympathizers to Thecontinued expansion of the number of Internet create propaganda leaflets, posters, and even magazines service providers, especially in states with relaxed or at very low cost in large quantities. Whereas offsetprin t ambivalent content policies or laws, combined with ing machines and photocopiers are difficult to move, a capable and inexpensive mobile devices, laptops, tab laptop or tablet and printer can be packed in a suitcase, lets, software, applications, and wireless technolo increasing the mobility of the terrorist cell generating gies, has empowered individuals and groups with the the material and making them more difficult to locate. ability to post tracts on or send messages throughout the World Wide Web. One form of empowerment is Coordination the virtual presence that individuals have. Although prominent jihadi terrorists' physical presence can be During the era oftransnational terrorism, groups planned removed through imprisonment or death, their virtual and conducted individual attacks or mounted multiple presence and influence is immortalized on the World attacks from a single staging base. The technologies Chapter 23 Terrorism and globalization

Case Study 1 Three generations of militant Islamic terrorists

works are numerous and include various interviews and pam phlets, as well as a massive 1,600-page tract and detailed training manual entitled Global Islamic Resistance Call. In addition, Nasar videotaped a number of his lectures based on the manual. What sets Nasar apart was that he foresaw the effectiveness of US and partner nation effortsag ainst the traditional hierarchical organi zation of Al Qaeda, and decried the 'Tora Bora mentality' offight ing fixed battles against forces that dominate air and space. Nasar argued to move to something more secure, elusive, and difficult to defeat:a system ofji had comprising 'a method of secret guer rilla war consisting of unconnected cells, numerous and differ ent types of cells' rather than a first-generation organization (or tanzim) (Lia 2008: 315). He transferred his knowledge and skills

© www.istockphoto.com/Ludger Vorfeld to next-generation militant Islamic terrorists virtually. Both the manual and the videos are available online despite Nasar's cap The first generation of militant Islamic terrorists closely affili ture in Pakistan in November 2005, realizing part of his ambition. ated with Al Qaeda shared a number of common traits. A num Younis Tsouli represents the new generation of militant ber foughtin Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and aligned Islamic terrorism, with different skills from his predecessors and with Osama bin Laden over disagreements in 1994 about who the system envisioned by Nasar. Ts ouli's identity was unknown to fight next. Bin Laden believed it was necessary to fight the 'far' to authorities until just before his arrest. The same cannot be enemy, the United States (and by extension, the West), which said for Ts ouli's virtual persona, 'lrhabi 007' ('Terrorist 007'). was responsible for a number of perceived injustices against lrhabi 007 achieved notoriety in jihadist discussion forumsfor Islam. Others advocated the overthrow of 'near' enemies who his technical acumen fo r hacking websites, circumventing on line ruled over secular Islamic states. To fight the far enemy, bin surveillance techniques, and posting militant Islamic training Laden moved to Afghanistan in 1998, and one of those who also and propaganda videos. Law enfo rcement officials suspected migrated was Mustafa Setmariam Nasar. that l rhabi 007 was in the United States, given his use of web Nasar is better known as 'A bu Musab al-Suri' or 'The Syrian'. sites and servers based there. Cooperation between British and He fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and supported local jihadist American officials led to Ts ou I i's eventual discovery and arrest at groups in Spain, Algeria, and elsewhere. Prior to 9/1 1, Nasar ran a flat in West London in late 2005. His reputation in onlinejihad a training camp in Afghanistan tied to bin Laden. Like his peers, ist circles was built in a year. Nasar is well educated and this is apparent in his writings. His

associated with globalization have enabled terrorist cells conduct their attacks in separate locations or converge and groups to mount coordinated attacks in different on a specifictarg et area. For example, the 9/11 hijackers countries. Indeed, a hallmark of militant Islamic groups used cheap and readily available prepaid phone cards is their ability to conduct multiple attacks in different to communicate between cell leaders and senior leader locations, such as the simultaneous bombings of the US ship. In Mumbai in 2008, cell leaders maintained regu embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, synchronized lar contact with operational controllers in Pakistan via detonation of ten of thirteen bombs on packed commuter cell phone and satellite phone throughout the three trains in Madrid in March 2004, and three of the four days of the attack (see Case Study 2). July 2005 London Underground bombings. Terrorist groups under pressure from aggressive The technologies associated with globalization, counter-measures have utilized technologies and including commercially available handheld radios and other innovations to maintain their activities tacti phones, have allowed terrorist cell member and groups cally and strategically. On a tactical level, IRA and to operate independently at substantial distances from Al Qaeda bomb manufacturers have demonstrated one another and network together. The Global System the ability to respond rapidly to electronic counter for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard, for measures. Press reports suggested that Shi'ite groups example, ensures that any compliant phone will work in Iraq were able to intercept and download Predator anywhere in the world where a GSM network has been drone video fe eds using commercially available soft established. E-mail and cellphone contact among geo ware. At the strategic level, Al Qaeda has continued graphically separated group members allows them to to evolve, despite losing their sanctuary and training JAMES D. KIRAS

Case Study 2 Mumbai

buildings: two iconic hotels, the Taj Mahal and Trident Oberoi, and Nariman (or Chabad) House, a Jewish outreach centre. These teams proceeded to take hostages, barricade themselves inside the buildings, and communicate with Indian negotiators and media outlets. For the next two days media attention focusedon the buildings and the hostage crisis drama inside. Indian police forces, the National Security Guard commandos, stormed all three buildings and rescued surviving hostages by the morning of 29 November. In all, nine of the ten terrorists were killed but 156 people died and more than 300 were injured over the course of the three-day attack. Several aspects related to the technologies of globalization Cl m were evident in the attack and response. The targets forattack � were scouted out by a Pakistani-American, David Headley, who cc> travelled between the United States, India, and Pakistan repeat u edly in the two years before the attack. The separate terrorist �c 0 teams were able to manoeuvre in a foreigncit y at night with the E E aid of hand held Garmin GPS receivers and maps developed from 0 u Google Maps. In addition, the teams were able to communicate -� " with each other, and their coordinators, using commercial satel ., E lite and cell phones. Indeed, the attacks were coordinated from :;;; � Pakistan to a high degree, with terrorist team leaders being told Cl. ! Zabiuddin Ansari, who was watching live media coverage of the z attacks more than SOO miles away, ordered the team inside the On 26 November 2008 ten terrorists landed ashore and entered Taj hotel, by satellite phone, to move to the higher floors and the the port city of Mumbai (formerly Bombay) in India. The ten outside rooms, pile carpets up in the corners, and set them on fire. split up into a number of 'teams', each with separate targets. The communications between coordinators and teams were Two teams conducted 'hit and run'-style attacks on a number of intercepted by Indian authorities. These conversations allowed public areas, including the central rail station (Chhatrapati Shivaj i identification of some of the coordinators by voice pattern, and Terminus) and attractions such as a movie theatre and a cafe pop much of the commercially obtained material was traced back to ular with tourists (Cafe Leopold), over the course of almost two their point of sale and purchaser. The wealth of evidence allowed hours. These attacks were designed to inflict maximum casualties Indian officials to identifythe source of the attacks: the Pakistani and spread confusion among Indian first responders, politicians, terrorist group Laskar-e-Taiba. and the population. Other teams converged upon three separate camps in Afghanistan, since December 2001. Instead Security of a hierarchical organization with fixed training bases, what has developed in its stead is a virtual Terrorist cells without adequate security precautions are global militant Islamic 'community of practice' char vulnerable to discovery and detection. Translations of acterized by individuals exchanging information and captured Al Qaeda manuals, forexample, demonstrate discussing the best ways to coordinate and conduct the high value its writers place on security, including attacks. Cells formaround individuals sympathetic to surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques. The militant Islamic goals, accessible via webcast or online technological enablers of globalization assist terrorist jihadi discussion forums. Law enforcement officials cells and .leaders in preserving security in a number of believe that there are more than 5,000 active militant ways, including distributing elements in a coordinated Islamic discussion sites along the lines of the now network, remaining mobile (see 'Mobility'), and using defunct Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami. The watchword clandestine and/or encrypted communications. for such violence can be thought of as a variation on The security of terrorist organizations has been the activist motto 'think globally, act locally', which preserved historically by limiting communication and reinforces the perception of militant Islam's global information exchanges between cells. Thisensures that depth, power, and reach. if one cell is compromised, its members only know Chapter 23 Terrorism and globalization each other's identities and not those of other cells. Mobility Thereforethe damage done to the organization is mini mized. Security is even more important to clandestine The reduced size and increased capabilities of per cells operating on their own without central direction. sonal electronics also give terrorists mobility advan Technological advancements, including fasterprocess tages. Mobility has always been a crucial consideration ing speeds and software developments, now mean that for terrorists and insurgents alike, given the superior those sympathetic to terrorist causes can contribute to resources that states have been able to bring to bear the cause virtually through servers located hundreds or against them. In open societies that have well-developed thousands of miles away. infrastructures, terrorists have been able to move rap Terrorist groups have been able to leverage techno idly within and between borders, and this complicates logical developments designed to shield a user's identity efforts to track them. The globalization of commerce fromunau thorized commercial or private exploitation has also improved terrorist mobility. The expansion in (Gunaratna 2002: 35). Concerns about infringements the volume of air travel and goods that pass through on civil liberties and privacy during the early years of ports has increased exponentially through globaliza the Internet led to the development of 128- and 256-bit tion. Between states, measures have been taken to ease encryption freeware thatis extremely costly and time the flow of goods, services, and ideas in a less restric consuming to crack. In addition, access to hardware tive fashion to improve efficiency and reduce costs. such as cell phones, personal data assistants, and com One example is the European Schengen Agreement, in puters can be restricted via the use of passwords. The which border security measures between EU member use oflnternet protocol address generators, anonymity states have been relaxed to speed up deliveries. protection programs, and rerouted communications, The use of air travel by terrorists has been well doc as well as private chat rooms where password-pro umented. Carlos the Jackal evaded arrest through air tected or encrypted files can be shared, also provide travel, and two of the London 2005 bombers travelled a degree of security. Within the virtual jihadist com to Pakistan before the attack, allegedly to film their munity, youth sympathetic to the militant Islamic 'martyrdom videos' and receive bomb-making instruc cause post information in discussion groups on ways tion. Thelatest generation of terrorists, including Umar to circumvent electronic surveillance through aware Farouk Abdulmutallab, resembles their transnational ness of phishing and mobile phone monitoring tech predecessors in exploiting travel methods for attacks niques and the use of electronic 'dead letters'-sa ving (see Case Study 3). Terrorist use of transportation draft messages in shared third-party email accounts, need not necessarily be overt in nature, as the volume such as Gmail, without sending anything that could of goods transported in support of a globalized econ be intercepted. omy is staggering and difficult to monitor effectively.

Case Study 3 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab

miidha citizen and the privileged son of a wealthy and successful African banker. Abdulmutallab had every advantage growing up, including schooling at the British International School (Nigeria}, University College London, the San'a Institute for the Arabic Language (Yemen), and the University of Wo llongong (United Arab Emirates). Despite his material comforts, Abdulmutallab blogged about his sense of loneliness and isolation. His travel put him into contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni imam linked to a number of global terrorists including the Fort Hood gunman, Nidal Malik Hasan. At some point, Abdulmutallab received a specialized two-stage bomb manufactured in Yemen sewn into an undergarment. He tried unsuccessfully to deto nate the device on Northwest Flight 253 after purchasing a © www.istockphoto.com/Keith Binns ticket in Ghana and travelling from Lagos to Amsterdam to Detroit on 25 December 2009. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab provides a portrait of a globally mobile citizen turned terrorist. He is a 23-year-old Nigerian JAM ES D. Kl RAS

For example, customs officialscannot inspect all of the gas in attacks in Jordan and Iraq. Militant Islamic state vehicles or containers passing through border points or ments have mentioned, and one fatwasupp orts, the use ports. To illustrate the scale of the problem, the United of any means, including WMD, to kill as many infidels States receives 10 million containers per year and one and apostates as possible. Globalized media may play a port, Los Angeles, processes the equivalent of 12,000 role in shaping terrorist plans as Al Qaeda leaders are twenty-footcontainers daily. Western government offi alleged to have been inspired by the spectacular special cials fe ar that terrorist groups will use containers as a effects of Hollywood blockbuster movies. convenient and cheap means to ship WMD. Incidents In the absence of WMD, globalization has facili in Italy in 2001 and Israel in 2004 confirmthat terrorist tated access to weapons, resources, and the proficiency groups are aware of the convenience and cheapness of required to conduct smaller, but more lethal attacks. globalized shipping to improve their mobility. Terrorist groups fromChechnya to Pakistan have shared their expertise in the manufacturingoflethal bombs trig Lethality gered by increasingly sophisticated and globally avail able remote control devices. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Globalization has undoubtedly had a troubling influ insurgent and terrorist groups have built sophisticated ence on terrorism, but the one element that concerns 'improvised explosive devices' (IEDs). IEDs vary in counter-terrorism experts and practitioners the most lethality and complexity. The United States, for exam is future catastrophic attacks using WMD. During the ple, claims that Iran supports terrorist violence in Iraq transnational era, terrorists could obtain advanced through the supply of specific IED technology able to weapons to conduct more lethal attacks, including penetrate heavily armoured vehicles. State sponsorship, rudimentary WMD, but on the whole they did not. however, may no longer be necessary in a globalized Few tried to acquire them and fewer still, including world. Digital videos suggest that terrorists are already the Weather Underground, threatened their use. The conducting distance learning through a 'virtual jihad precise reasons why terrorists did not acquire and academy' in which prospective terrorists study every use such weapons during this era are unclear. Experts thing from conducting ambush attacks to making and speculated, however, that terrorist leaders understood using IEDs, to increase their effectiveness and lethality. that the more lethal their attacks were, the greater the likelihood that a state or the international community would focus their entire efforts on hunting them down and eradicating them. • Elements of globalization that permit the rapid exchange Since the end of the cold war, however, some ter of ideas and goods can also be leveraged and exploited by rorist leaders have expressed both the desire and will terrorist groups. to use WMD. Evidence that US troops recovered in • The technologies associated with globalization allow Afghanistan in 2001 outlined plans by Al Qaeda to pro terrorists to operate in a highly distributed global 'network' duce and test biological and chemical weapons under that shares information and allows small cells to conduct a plan code-named zabadi (curdled milk). A raid on highly coordinated, lethal attacks. a suspected Al Qaeda flat in London (2004) revealed • Globalization may allow some terrorist groups to acquire, manufacture, and use weapons of mass of destruction to quantities of ricin, a toxin, and in 2004 and 2007 Al conduct catastrophic attacks. Qaeda-affiliated groups used or planned to use chlorine

· Combating terrorism ·

States plagued by transnational terrorism responded such as the West German Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG- individually and collectively to combat the phenomenon 9). Successful rescues in Entebbe (1976), Mogadishu during the cold war. These responses ranged in scope (1977), Prince's Gate, London (1980), and Singapore and effectiveness and included passing anti-terrorism (1991) demonstrated that national counter-terrorism laws, taking preventative security measures at airports, forces could respond effectively both domestically and and creating special operations counter-terrorism forces abroad. A normative approach to tackling the problem, Chapter 23 Terrorism and globalization

foundedon the principles of international law and col its own citizenry. In their eyes, terrorism is a crime lective action, was less successful. Attempts to define that is best dealt with through law enforcementmeth and proscribe transnational terrorism in the United ods. By dealing with terrorism as a police problem, Nations bogged down in the General Assembly over states uphold the rule of law, maintain the moral high semantics, but other cooperative initiatives were suc ground, preserve democratic principles, and prevent cessfully implemented. These included the conven the establishment of martial law. Military force should tions adopted through the International Civil Aviation only be used in extreme circumstances and even then Organization (ICAO) to improve information-sharing its use may have negative consequences. Terrorism is and legal cooperation, such as the Hague Convention for best dealt with inside state borders and through coop the Suppression of UnlawfulSeiz ure of Aircraft (1970). erative international law enforcement efforts to arrest Another collective response to improve information suspects and provide them with due process. The law sharing and collaborative action was the creation of the enforcement approach to terrorism must balance tak Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate in Interpol ing enough measures against terrorist groups with in 1985. However, most initiatives and responses out crossing over into the realm of "'political justice," throughout this decade were largely unilateral, regional, where the rules and rights enshrined in the principle or ad hoe in nature. of due process are either wilfully misinterpreted or State leaders disagree on how best to deal with the completely disregarded' (Chalk 1996: 98). To do little current form of global terrorist violence. Much of the against domestic or global terrorism, in the name of controversy relates to the nature of the threat and the upholding the rule oflaw, risks offering terrorist groups best approach to tackle it. Some national leaders view a sanctuary and the security of rights and laws. the formof militant Islam as an intractable problem in The virtual opinion of a number of non-govern which there can be no negotiation. The stakes in 'the mental organizations (NGOs), members of biogs, and Long War' consist of the preservation of basic free webmasters has also been critical of the 'war' on ter doms and a way of life. In order to defeat terrorism, rorism. Those suspicious of the motives of the political individual states have a responsibility to protect civil elite of the United States range widely in their opinions. ian populations while dealing with terrorist cells, sup Conspiracy theorists online suggest that the war in porters, and sympathizers within their own borders. Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere is the firststag e in the Given the global, elusive, and adaptive character of the establishment of an Orwellian system that is constantly militant Islamic threat, the best approach for dealing in conflict with the terrorist 'other' to justify continued with global terrorism is to pool resources together in a violation of personal rights and privacy. More objective coalition of the willing: the global North improving the communities of practice and NGOs, such as Human capabilities of much of the global South. Theend result Rights Watch, routinely provide monitoring and online will be the development of a Global Counter-Terrorism reporting of suspected government human rights and Network (GCTN) of states able to detect, track, and civil liberties abuses. One example is the persistent eliminate terrorist threats while non-military efforts attention paid to the status of terrorist detainees held in address the root causes of terrorism. One example of US custody at Guantanamo Bay. globalization in practice has been the use by the United Although disagreements still exist over how best to States of unarmed and armed Global Hawk, Predator, deal with terrorism philosophically, pragmatically the and Reaper drones to conduct surveillance and strikes largest problems reside in locating terrorists and isolat against terrorist targets. Thedrones are flown remotely ing them from their means of support. Locating and from bases thousands of miles away, their video fe eds identifying terrorists is a tedious and time-consuming are disseminated to operations centres and users process that requires collecting, assessing, and ana locally, regionally, and globally, and attacks are autho lysing information collected from a range of sources. rized, conducted, and monitored without US forces Information technologies associated with globalization having to engage in direct combat, leading to claims of have been usefulin assisting this process. Such technolo 'extrajudicial' or 'targeted killing' by others. gies allow identification of terrorist patterns before and Other national leaders are less comfortable with the after attacks, with systems capable of performing cal concept of'war' against terrorism. In their view, actions culations measured in the trillions per second (floating by the military can only lead to terrorist reprisals, or point operations, or 'flops'). Terrorist finances and orga worse-the return of terrorism to its original connota nizations are evaluated through link analysis to con tion, the sanctioned use of terror by the state to repress struct a more comprehensive picture of how the terrorist JAMES D. KIRAS

elements interact. In addition, huge volumes of infor rather than personal enlightenment. In other words, mation can be reduced and exchanged electronically suicide attacks offerthe promise of private goods (spiri between departments, agencies, and other governments, tual reward) rather than public good (positive contri or made available on secure servers whose capacities are butions to the community over a lifetime). Precisely measured in terabytes. Discovering terrorist cells, how how the processes and technologies of globalization ever, has much to do with luck and pursuing non-tech can assist in delegitimizing the pedagogy that incites nical leads. States' bureaucracies can impede or negate terrorists will remain one of the most vexing challenges technical and resource advantages over terrorist groups. forthe international community forye ars to come. In order to deal with global terrorism, the interna tional community must address its most problematic Ke Points modern aspects: the appeal of messages that inspire

terrorists to commit horrific acts of violence. Killing • States, individually and collectively, have political, military, or capturing individuals does little to halt the spread legal, economic, and technological advantages in the of extremist viewpoints that occur under the guise struggle against terrorist groups. of discussion and education. In the case of Islam, for • Differences between states over the nature and scope of the current terrorist threat, and the most appropriate example, radical mullahs and imams twist the tenets of responses to combat it, reflect subjective characterizations the religion into a doctrine of action and hatred, where based on national biases and experiences. spiritual achievement occurs through destruction

� Conclusion

The onset of the 'Arab Spring' and the 'Twitter globalization has changed the scope of terrorism but Revolution', combined with the deaths of Osama not its nature. The benefits that globalization provides bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki, led some to sug terrorists are neither one-sided nor absolute. The same gest that militant Islamic terrorism was in its final technologies and processes also enable more effective throes. However, the 2012 terrorist attack on the means for states to combat them. Global terrorists can American consulate in Benghazi, Libya, served as a only succeed through popular uprising or the psycho reminder that such terrorism will be with us forye ars logical or physical collapse of their state-based adver to come. Terrorism remains a complex phenomenon sary. Neither outcome is likely given the limitations in which violence is used to obtain political power to of terrorist messages and capabilities. Terrorist and redress grievances that may have become more acute counter-terrorist campaigns are characterized by pro through the process of globalization. Globalization has longed struggle to maintain advantages in legitimacy increased the technical capabilities of terrorists and domestically and internationally. The challenge forthe given them global reach, but has not altered the funda global community will be in utilizing its advantages to mental factthat terrorism represents the extreme views win the war of ideas that motivates and sustains those of a minority of the global population. In other words, responsible forthe current wave of terrorist violence.

Questions

Why is linking terrorism with globalization so difficult to do theoretically? 2 When did terrorism become a truly global phenomenon and what enabled it to do so? 3 In what ways are the technologies and processes associated with globalization more beneficial to states or terrorists? 4 Given that terrorism has been both a transnational and a global phenomenon, why has it not been more successful in effecting change? Chapter 23 Terrorism and globalization

5 Of all of the factorstha t motivate terrorists, is any one more important than others, and if so, why? 6 What has changed in terrorism over the past half-century and have any factors remained the same? If so, what are they and why have they remained constant? 7 What is the role that technology plays in terrorism and will it change how terrorists operate in the future? If so, how? 8 What are the dilemmas that terrorist groups facewith respect to WMD? 9 What is the primary challenge that individual states and the international community as a whole face in confronting terrorism? 10 How has the concept of security, in personal, societal, and international life,chang ed as a result of globalized terrorism-and how will it change in the future?