United States Coast Guard
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United States Coast Guard report of the marine board of investigation into the Commercial Fishing Vessel Destination Sinking and Loss of the Vessel With all Six Crewmembers Missing and Presumed Deceased Approximately 4.4 NM Northwest of St. George island, Alaska On February 11, 2017 MISLE Activity Number: 6088430 Table of Contents List of Acronyms …………………………………………………………………...... iv Executive Summary …………………………………………………………………. vii 1. Preliminary Statement …………………………………………………………. 1 2. Vessel Involved in the Incident ………………………………………………... 2 3. Record of Missing and Presumed Deceased …………………………………… 3 4. Findings of Fact ………………………………………………………………... 3 4.1. The Incident ...……………………………………………………………. 3 4.2. Weather and Environmental Information ………………………………... 17 4.3. Nearby Vessel Operations and Weather Observations …………………... 26 4.4. Regulatory Framework …………………………………………………... 30 4.5. Construction, Modifications, Repairs and Stability Assessments ……….. 40 4.6. Crab Pot Information …………………………………………………….. 51 4.7. Lifesaving and Communications Equipment ……………………………. 54 4.8. Vessel Operations ………………………………………………………... 56 4.9. Crab Fishing Operations ………………………………………………..... 59 4.10. Crab Rationalization ……………………………………………………... 61 4.11. Search and Rescue ……………………………………………………….. 64 4.12. Survey and Dive Operations ……………………………………………... 70 5. Analysis and Opinions ………………………………………………………..... 76 5.1. Voyage Planning and Stability …………………………………………... 76 5.2. Survivability Factors ………………………………………………...…… 90 5.3. Stability Information Accuracy ………………………………………...... 91 5.4. Stability Compliance Oversight ……………………………………..…... 95 ii 6. Conclusions …………………………………………………………………..... 97 7. Actions Taken Since the Incident ………………………………………...……. 99 8. Recommendations …………………………………………………...………… 99 8.1. Safety Recommendations ……………………………………...………… 99 8.2. Administrative Recommendations ………………………...…………...... 101 iii List of Acronyms AAWPP Assumed Average Weight per Person ABS American Bureau of Shipping ACTSUS Active Search Suspended Pending Further Development ADF&G Alaska department of Fish & Game AIS Automated Identification System AKST Alaska Standard Time AMSEA Alaska Marine Safety Education Association BSAI Bering Sea/Aleutian Island CDR Commander CEMS Crew Endurance Management System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CFV Commercial Fishing Vessel CFVE Commercial Fishing Vessel Examiner CG Coast Guard CG-INV Coast Guard Office of Marine Investigations and Analysis CH Change COD Certificate of Documentation COMDT Commandant COMDTINST Commandant Instruction CR Crab Rationalization D Coast Guard District D17CC Coast Guard District 17 Command Center DSF Deployable Specialized Forces EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon FOB Forward Operating Base GM Metacentric Height GT Gross Ton (Gross Registered Tons) iv HF High Frequency ICE Inter-Cooperative Exchange ITC International Tonnage Convention IFQ Individual Fishing Quota IPQ Individual Processing Quota KT Knots (1 KT = 1.151 mph) LCDR Lieutenant Commander LKP Last Know Position MBI Marine Board of Investigation MHz Mega Hertz MISLE Marine Information Safety and Law Enforcement MOC Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance (COMDT CG-CVC-3) MSC Marine Safety Center MSD Marine Safety Detachment MU Memorial University (MU) of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Canada NAVCEN Coast Guard Navigation Center NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health NM Nautical Mile NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration NPFVOA North Pacific Fishing Owner’s Association NT Net Tons NTSB National Transportation Safety Board NVIC Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular NWS National Weather Service OU Operations Unit Controller PFD Personal Floatation Device PII Party-in-Interest PSDA Probability of Survival Decision Aid v PQS Performance and Qualification Standard ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle SAR Search and Rescue SAROPS Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System SC SAR Coordinator SMC SAR Mission Coordinator SOG Speed Over Ground SOLAS International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea SSB Single Side Band SSC Stability and Safety Compliance Check (Safety Spot Check) STCW Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers TAC Total Allowable Catch UMIB Urgent Marine Information Broadcasts USC United States Code VCG Vertical Center of Gravity VHF Very High Frequency VOS Voluntary Observing Ship YN1 Yeoman First Class vi Commandant 2703 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave SE United States Coast Guard Washington, DC 20593-7501 Staff Symbol: CG-INV Phone: (757) 398-6389 Email: [email protected] 16732 February 15, 2018 COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL DESTINATION (O.N. 632374) SINKING AND LOSS OF THE VESSEL WITH ALL SIX CREWMEMBERS MISSING AND PRESUMED DECEASED APPROXIMATELY 4.4 NM NORTHWEST OF ST. GEORGE ISLAND, ALASKA ON FEBRUARY 11, 2017 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On Thursday, February 9, 2017 at approximately 2315, the U.S. flagged Commercial Fishing Vessel (CFV) DESTINATION (O.N. 632374), a Bering Sea/Aleutian Island (BSAI) crabbing vessel, departed Trident Seafoods in Dutch Harbor, Alaska with six crewmembers onboard en route to offload bait at the Trident Seafoods facility in St. Paul, Alaska. From St. Paul, the vessel was to transit west to the opilio crab (snow crab) fishing grounds. Earlier in the day, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued marine forecasts that warned of heavy freezing spray conditions for the region. During the early morning hours of Saturday, February 11, 2017 from approximately 0500 to 0610, the DESTINATION transited along the western leeward side of St. George Island. At approximately 0610, as the vessel transited approximately 4.4 NM northwest of Dainoi Point located at the northwest side of St. George Island, it slowed its speed and made a hard starboard turn into the seas and northeastern winds. Shortly after the starboard turn, the vessel suddenly lost maneuverability. Its heading pivoted to the west while at the same time it drifted to the north. The vessel started to take boarding seas causing it to flood and eventually sink. At 0614, the vessel’s Automated Identification System (AIS) stopped transmitting. At 0615, the Coast Guard’s District 17 (D17) Command Center located in Juneau, Alaska received a 406 MHz Electronic Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) distress alert transmitting near St. George Island. After watchstanders confirmed the EPIRB’s registration belonged to the DESTINATION and attempts to hail the vessel failed, the Coast Guard launched Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. Multiple Coast Guard aircraft and Good Samaritan vessels participated in SAR operations. By mid-day, Coast Guard aircrews located a debris field in the general area of the EPIRB distress alert, and a Good Samaritan vessel recovered the transmitting EPIRB, a lifering and crab pot buoys belonging to the DESTINATION. SAR operations did not locate any survivors or the vessel’s liferaft. After three days of SAR operations, the Coast Guard suspended the search at 1700 on February 14, 2017. On July 8, 2017, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) research vessel FAIRWEATHER used side-scan sonar and located the DESTINATION in 78 meters (256 feet) of water, approximately 7 nautical miles north of Dainoi Point, St. George Island. On July 25, 2017 the Coast Guard’s Regional Dive Locker West working on the Coast Guard Cutter HEALY deployed a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) over the site to collect imagery of the wreck. Due to strong sub-surface currents, the ROV was unable to collect substantial imagery or locate the liferaft, but was able to confirm the vessel’s distinct colors, waterline, draft marks and name. In addition, the HEALY recovered a crab pot belonging to the DESTINATION. The Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) determined that the initiating event occurred when the DESTINATION transited past the leeward and sheltered side of St. George Island and altered course to starboard into the hazardous seas off Dainoi Point. Subsequent events include the vessel’s abrupt loss of speed, maneuverability and heading shift, which allowed boarding seas to flood, capsize and sink the vessel. The primary causal factors that directly contributed to the casualty include: 1) the vessel’s unsafe stability conditions due to the carriage of heavier crab pots that exceeded the weight used in the stability instructions, 2) additional weight and stability stress from bait loaded high on the vessel, and 3) excessive ice accumulations from freezing spray, and 4) downflooding from the open number 3 hold access hatch. Other causal factors include the captain’s failure to: 1) load in accordance with the vessel’s stability information book, 2) prevent excessive icing accumulations from the prevailing freezing spray conditions, and 3) secure the number 3 hold access hatch while transiting. Also contributing to the casualty was the owner’s failure to select a qualified individual to perform tests or calculations necessary to evaluate the vessel’s stability and update the stability instructions to reflect heavier crab pots and other alterations to the vessel. Accordingly, the owner failed to provide the captain with accurate information to maintain the vessel in a satisfactory stability condition. 1.5. The MBI held one public hearing session at the Jackson Federal Building in Seattle, Washington on August 7-17, 2017; 46 witnesses testified in the hearing over a period of nine days. All witnesses appeared as requested, and PII representatives