Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans: What Are the Real Trade-Offs?

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans: What Are the Real Trade-Offs? This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Pensions in the U.S. Economy Volume Author/Editor: Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise, eds. Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-06285-6 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/bodi88-1 Publication Date: 1988 Chapter Title: Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans: What are the Real Trade-offs? Chapter Author: Zvi Bodie, Alan J. Marcus, Robert C. Merton Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6047 Chapter pages in book: (p. 139 - 162) 5 Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans: What are the Real Trade-offs? Zvi Bodie, Alan J. Marcus, and Robert C. Merton Although employer pension programs vary in design, they are usually classified into two broad types: defined contribution and defined ben- efit. These two categories are distinguished in the law under ERISA. Under a defined contribution (DC) plan each employee has an account into which the employer and, if it is a contributory plan, the employee make regular contributions. Benefit levels depend on the total contri- butions and investment earnings of the accumulation in the account. Often the employee has some choice regarding the type of assets in which the accumulation is invested and can easily find out what its value is at any time. Defined contribution plans are, in effect, tax- deferred savings accounts in trust for the employees, and they are by definition fully funded. They are therefore not of much concern to government regulators and are not covered by Pension Benefit Guar- antee Corporation (PBGC) insurance. In a defined benefit (DB) plan the employee’s pension benefit entitle- ment is determined by a formula which takes into account years of service for the employer and, in most cases, wages or salary. Many defined benefit formulas also take into account the Social Security benefits to which an employee is entitled. These are the so-called in- tegrated plans. See Merton, Bodie, and Marcus (1987) for a discussion of integration. Zvi Bodie is professor of finance and economics at the School of Management, Boston University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Alan J. Marcus is associate professor of finance and economics at the School of Management, Boston University, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Robert C. Merton is J. C. Penney Professor of Management at the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 139 140 Zvi BodieIAlan J. MarcusIRobert C. Merton DB and DC plans have significantly different characteristics with respect to the risks faced by employers and employees, the sensitivity of benefits to inflation, the flexibility of funding, and the importance of governmental supervision. Our objective in this paper is to examine the trade-offs involved in the choice between DB and DC plans. In section 5.1, we briefly review the mechanics governing the de- termination and valuation of the benefit streams under DB and DC pension plans. Section 5.2 contains an informal discussion of the rel- ative advantages of each type of plan. In section 5.3 we develop a formal model to examine the trade-offs between the two types of plans in the face of both wage and interest rate uncertainty. Our conclusion is that neither plan can be said to wholly dominate the other from the perspective of employee welfare. Section 5.4 summarizes our results and concludes the paper. 5.1 Plan Characteristics and Valuation 5.1.1 Defined Contribution Plans The DC arrangement is the conceptually simpler retirement plan. The employer, and sometimes also the employee, make regular con- tributions into the employee's retirement account. The contributions are usually specified as a predetermined fraction of salary, although that fraction need not be constant over the course of a career.' Contributions from both parties are tax-deductible,* and investment income accrues tax-free. Often the employee is given a choice as to how his account is to be invested. In principle, contributions may be invested in any security, although in practice most plans limit invest- ment options to various bond, stock, and money-market funds. At retirement, the employee either receives a lump sum or an annuity, the size of which depends upon the accumulated value of the funds in the retirement account. The employee thus bears all of the investment risk; the retirement account is by definition fully funded, and the firm has no obligation beyond making its periodic contribution. Valuation of the DC plan is straightforward: simply measure the market value of the assets held in the retirement account. However, as a guide for personal financial planning, the DC plan sponsor often provides workers with the indicated size of a life annuity starting at retirement age that could be purchased now with the accumulation in their account under different scenarios. The actual size of the retire- ment annuity will, of course, depend upon the realized investment performance of the retirement fund, the interest rate at retirement, and the ultimate wage path of the employee. 141 Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans 5.1.2 Defined Benefit Plans Whereas the DC framework focuses on the value of the assets cur- rently endowing a retirement account, the DB plan focuses on theflow of benefits which the individual will receive upon retirement. A typical DB plan determines the employee’s benefit as a function of both years of service and wage history. As a representative plan, consider one in which the employee receives 1 percent of average salary (during the last 5 years of service) times the number of years of service. Normal retirement age is 65, there are no early retirement options, death or disability benefits, and no Social Security offset provisions. The actuarially expected life span at retirement is 80 years. Assuming the worker is fully vested, at any point in time his claim is a deferred nominal life annuity, insured up to certain limits by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. It is a deferred annuity because the employee cannot start receiving benefits until he reaches age 65. It is nominal because the retirement benefit, which the employer is contractually bound to pay the employee, is fixed in dollar amount at any point in time up to and including retirement age. Many people think that under final average pay plans of the sort described here, retirement benefits are implicitly indexed to inflation, at least during the employee’s active years with the firm, and therefore should not be viewed as a purely nominal asset by the employee and a purely nominal liability by the firm. We examine this issue in detail in section 5.2. For now we focus on the value of the explicit claim only. Given an interest rate and a wage profile, it is straightforward to compute the present value of accrued benefits under our prototype DB plan. Table 5.1 presents such values for workers at different ages as- suming a constant real annual wage of $15,000. The present value of accrued liabilities can increase from continued service because of 3 factors: (1) as years of service increase, so does the defined benefit, (2) if the wage increases, so will the retirement benefit, and (3) as time passes, less time remains until the retirement benefits begin, SO that their present value increases at the rate of interest. To illustrate the separate contributions of each of these factors to the cumulative results reported in table 5.1, consider the case in which the benefit formula calls for 1 percent of final year’s salary times years of service and that the worker lives for 15 years after retiring at age 65. The worker is 35 years old, has worked for the firm 10 years, and his current salary is $15,000. The nominal interest rate equals a real rate of 3 percent per year plus the expected rate of inflation. Under the 7 percent inflation scenario, the sources of the change in the value of the pension benefit from the passage of an additional year are as follows. Prior to this year, the worker had accrued a life annuity Table 5.1 Present Value of Accrued Benefits and Marginal Change in Benefits for Hypothetical Worker, No Early Retirement Marginal Change in Present Value of Present Value of Accrued Benefits from Accrued Benefits an Additional in Constant Dollars Year’s Work 0% Inflation 7% Inflation 0% Inflation 7% Inflation 3% Discount 10% Discount 3% Discount 10% Discount Rate Rate Rate Rate Starting Age 25 Constant % of Constant % of Current Age Dollars Salary Dollars Salary 30 $2,274 $144 $455 3.03 $4 1 .27 35 $5,271 $463 $527 3.51 $82 .55 40 $9,167 $1,120 $61 1 4.07 $158 1.05 45 $14,169 $2,404 $708 4.72 $297 1.98 50 $20,532 $4,840 $82 1 5.47 $546 3.64 55 $28,563 $9,354 $952 6.35 $938 6.25 60 $38,63 1 $17,575 $1,104 7.36 $1,768 11.79 65 $51,181 $32,329 $1,242* 8.28 $2,794* 18.63 NOTES:Worker currently paid $15,000 per year with no real wage growth. Worker will retire at age 65. Pension plan pays 1 percent of average salary in last 5 years times years of service. Pension plan contains no early retirement provisions or makes correct actuarial adjustment for early retirees. Benefits are vested after 5 years.
Recommended publications
  • The Shortcomings of Pension System in Turkey: Solutions with a New Model Proposed
    International Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance Studies, 2019/2: 23-48 The Shortcomings of Pension System in Turkey: Solutions with a New Model Proposed Levent Sumer*, Beliz Ozorhon ** Received: 03.05.2019 Accepted: 19.07.2019 DOI: 10.25272/ijisef.559898 Type: Research Article Abstract Investing for retirement years due to future income concerns is one of the main reasons for people to make savings. Pension funds have always been important tools that match the idea of future investments. Despite the rapid development and increase in the size of the Turkish pension system in the last few years, major improvements and amendments in the current system are required for increasing the total size to OECD level, as well as attracting more participants by increasing the returns and providing alternative investment options. This study investigates the Turkish pension system and suggests a new model to solve the current problems of the system by structuring a sustainable model which may also be applied worldwide. A comprehensive pension system and comparative return analysis of different investment tools are conducted, and the new model is proposed based on creating a new pool of new investment tools consists of asset-based capital market instruments that are issued for long-term specific investment projects financing. While the new model brings a new perspective to the pension system, it also helps to solve the problems of both the current pension system and the financing of investment projects. In the study, policy recommendations and suggestions
    [Show full text]
  • Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation
    OECD CORE PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE PENSION REGULATION G20/OECD INFE CORE COMPETENCIES FRAMEWORK ON FINANCIAL LITERACY FOR ADULTS OECD Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation Photo credits: Thinkstock/Maryna Maschewsky © OECD 2016 FOREWORD Foreword The OECD Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation serve to encourage more efficient regulation and management of private pension systems. Private pensions play a major and growing role in complementing retirement income from public sources in OECD countries and worldwide. Their importance in ensuring adequate pension provision is increasing as government revenues are less able to finance retirement promises. The economic crisis led to a loss of public confidence in private pensions in many countries which needs to be reversed in order to encourage individuals to save for retirement. At the same time, the financial sustainability, solvency and adequacy of private pensions are challenged by population ageing and by an economic environment characterised by low growth, low returns and low interest rates. Efficient regulation and management of private pension systems are essential to withstand these pressures and to rebuild trust in private pensions. The OECD, in coordination with pension regulators across OECD countries, has updated and expanded the OECD Core Principles of Occupational Pension Regulation, first adopted in 2009. The 2016 OECD Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation provide governments, regulators and supervisors worldwide with a relevant common benchmark and high-level guidance on the design and operation of private pension systems. These revised Principles now include all funded pension arrangements, reflecting changes in the nature of private pension provision, especially the rise in defined contribution and personal pension plans; they aim to strengthen the regulatory framework of funded pension systems in order to promote the sound and reliable operation of private pension plans and thereby protect members' savings.
    [Show full text]
  • Civil Service Superannuation Board – Pension Benefits
    CIVIL SERVICE SUPERANNUATION BOARD PENSION BENEFITS: Can I continue to contribute to my pension while on Maternity Leave? Yes- you must complete an “Election Form to Contribute While on Maternity Leave” form (see link below) and return it to your Pay & Benefits Office. Your contributions will be the same as they would be if you had not been on leave. The cost to purchase is based on your salary as at the date of leave and is calculated on 8% of pensionable earnings up to the Canada Pension Plan Maximum and 9% on any pensionable earnings above the maximum for the period you are on maternity leave. To be eligible you must apply prior to the commencement of your maternity leave. • Election Form to Contribute While on Maternity Leave: http://media.wix.com/ugd/a8e4c9_27caeee2b8d84f6bb8999aa9da6ec39e.pdf Can I continue to contribute to my pension while on Parental Leave? Yes – you must complete an “Election Form to Contribute While on Parental Leave” form (see link below) and return it to your Pay & Benefits Office. Please note that you will be required to contribute both the employee portion and the employer’s portion during Parental Leave. The cost to purchase is based on your salary as at the date of leave and is calculated on 8% of pensionable earnings up to the Canada Pension Plan Maximum and 9% on any pensionable earnings above the maximum PLUS an equal and matching portion for the period you are on parental leave. To be eligible you must apply prior to the commencement of your parental leave.
    [Show full text]
  • Social Protection and Social Security (Including Social Protection Floors)
    Guiding Questions for Defining the Normative Content of the Issues Examined at the Tenth Working Session of the Open-ended Working Group: Social Protection and Social Security (including social protection floors) Definition 1. What is the definition of the right to social security and social protection (including social protection floors) for older persons in the national legislation in your country? Or how should such a right be defined, considering existing national, regional and international legal framework? The Ministry of Social Integration, Social Security and National Solidarity has been set up to provide fair, equitable and responsive social protection in a sustainable manner to citizens of the Republic with special attention to senior citizens, persons with disabilities as well as vulnerable persons and reinforce national solidarity. The National Pensions Act Scope of the right 2. What are the key normative elements of the right to social protection and social security for older persons? Please provide references to existing standards on such elements as below, as well as any additional elements: a) Availability of contributory and non-contributory schemes for older persons Non-contributory Benefits Every Mauritian citizen benefits from the National Pension Scheme (NPS) as from the age of 60, at the monthly rate of Rs. 9,000. A person aged 90 and below 100 years receive a pension of Rs 16,210, while centenarian receives Rs 21,710. 1 Retirement Gratuity Older persons who have been in continuous employment for at least 12 months benefit from a retirement gratuity at retirement age (S49, Employment Rights Act). The retirement gratuity is paid in the form of a one-off lump sum, which is calculated on basis 15 days' remuneration for every 12 months' in continuous employment.
    [Show full text]
  • United Kingdom
    United Kingdom United Kingdom: Pension system in 2018 Key indicators: United Kingdom The UK introduced a new State Pension system on 6 United Kingdom OECD April 2016 for people reaching State Pension age from Average worker earnings (AW) GBP 39 328 31 171 that date onwards. It is a flat rate scheme, with some USD 52 467 41 584 transitional arrangements. For people who reached Public pension spending % of GDP 6.2 8.0 State Pension age before that date, the public scheme has two tiers, (a flat-rate basic pension and an earnings- Life expectancy at birth 81.1 80.7 related additional pension). Both are complemented by at age 65 19.8 19.7 a large voluntary private pension sector. An income- Population over age 65 % of working- age population 32.0 31.2 related benefit (Pension Credit) targets extra spending 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888934044214 on the poorest pensioners. Qualifying conditions State Pension age is currently around 65 years and 3 months for men and women, rising to 66 years by October 2020 and to 67 years between 2026 and 2028. The Government has made provision for regular reviews of State Pension age, to take into account changes in life expectancy and other relevant factors. Under the old system (pre 2016), an individual reaching State Pension age qualified for a full basic State Pension by: i) paying; or ii) having been treated as having paid; or iii) being credited with, National Insurance contributions, for 30 qualifying years in their working lives. A proportionally reduced basic state pension was paid to people with fewer than 30 qualifying years, to a minimum of one qualifying year of contribution or credits (for those reaching State Pension age between 2010 and 2016).
    [Show full text]
  • New Legislation in Turkey Requiring Automatic Enrolment in the Voluntary Funded Individual Pension Scheme ESPN Flash Report 2017/10
    New legislation in Turkey requiring automatic enrolment in the voluntary funded individual pension scheme ESPN Flash Report 2017/10 SERDAR SAYAN – EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY NETWORK MARCH 2017 A new law modifying the Turkish voluntary funded Description pension scheme has Employees have been having access expected remarkable results in terms of come into effect in to an existing supplementary boosting the Turkish people’s propensity January 2017: pension scheme to save, underlining the need for unless they request additional incentives to increase The pension reform process that has to opt out in writing, participation and, hence, contributions. all employees been going on for about 20 years in younger than 45 are Turkey includes enactment of Law No. Additional incentives provided after now automatically 4632 in 2001. This law allows insurance 2012 made purchases of individual assigned to a companies to offer individual retirement pension plans more attractive plans, which has essentially transformed pension plan and There were complicated tax breaks for the single-component pension system in contribute 3% of pension plan purchases right from the Turkey into a two-component system, their taxable outset, but they were not visible or with one compulsory component (pay- earnings. If understandable to most participants. as-you-go statutory public pension individuals do not Law Number 6327 was enacted in June schemes) and one optional component opt out of this 2012 to further promote (savings for) (voluntary funded individual pension automatic purchases of complementary pension schemes). enrolment, the new plans by the working population, by policy will increase The current voluntary funded scheme making the tax benefits and incentives “non-mandatory” enabled all individuals, including those more visible.
    [Show full text]
  • Application for Parental Leave Program
    APPLICATION FOR PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAM The Parental Leave Program provides your congregation with a grant of up to $2,500 for the purposes of paying the eligible minister, an interim minister, and/or a pulpit supply during the period of the paid parental leave. Additional assistance of up to $2,500 is payable to the congregation should an unforeseen complication necessitate an extension of the eligible minister's paid parental leave, such as an extended hospital stay or medical complications for the child, minister or spouse. To be eligible for assistance under the Parental Leave Program, the congregation’s pastor must satisfy all of the following criteria: 1. be a credentialed minister in the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) with standing; 2. serve, in full-time or part-time paid capacity, a congregation that offers paid time off under a parental leave policy (which leave is in addition to vacation time, sick leave, sabbatical leave, and unpaid leave); and 3. be eligible for and take leave under the congregation's parental leave policy. To apply for a grant, provide the following items at least 30 days before the start of the anticipated leave period. Include all attachments (including this form) in a single email and send to [email protected] with “Parental Leave” in the subject line. 1. A letter signed by both the minister and board chairperson, requesting a Parental Leave grant. The letter should address: a. How much money is requested (up to $2,500); b. How the funds will be used; c. Anticipated dates for the paid parental leave; d.
    [Show full text]
  • Coverage of Private Pension Systems: Evidence and Policy Options”, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No.20, OECD Publishing
    OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions No. 20 Coverage of Private Pablo Antolin, Pension Systems: Evidence Stéphanie Payet, and Policy Options Juan Yermo https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k94d6gh2w6c-en Please cite this paper as: Antolin, P., S. Payet and J. Yermo (2012), “Coverage of Private Pension Systems: Evidence and Policy Options”, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No.20, OECD Publishing. OECD WORKING PAPERS ON FINANCE, INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS, NO. 20 COVERAGE OF PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS: EVIDENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS Pablo Antolin, Stéphanie Payet, Juan Yermo June 2012 OECD WORKING PAPERS ON FINANCE, INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions provide timely analysis and background on industry developments, structural issues, and public policy in the financial sector, including insurance and private pensions. Topics include risk management, governance, investments, benefit protection, and financial education. These studies are prepared for dissemination in order to stimulate wider discussion and further analysis and obtain feedback from interested audiences. The papers are generally available only in their original language English or French with a summary in the other if available. OECD WORKING PAPERS ON FINANCE, INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS are published on www.oecd.org/daf/fin/wp This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Ce document et toute carte qu'il peut comprendre ne préjugent en rien du statut de tout territoire, de la souveraineté s’exerçant sur ce dernier, du tracé des frontières et limites internationales, et du nom de tout territoire, ville ou région.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel Review of the Private Pensions System
    ISRAEL REVIEW OF THE PRIVATE PENSIONS SYSTEM October 2011 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT The OECD is a unique forum where governments work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies. The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union takes part in the work of the OECD. OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members. This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Ce document et toute carte qu'il peut comprendre ne préjugent en rien du statut de tout territoire, de la souveraineté s’exerçant sur ce dernier, du tracé des frontières et limites internationales, et du nom de tout territoire, ville ou région.
    [Show full text]
  • Structure of Private Pension Systems
    8. PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC PENSION RESERVE FUNDS STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEMS Key results The pension landscape includes various types of plan worldwide. Occupational and personal plans coexist in most OECD countries. In 2016, the size of occupational plans in terms of assets varied greatly across countries. In most cases, pension funds would administer these plans although there are some notable exceptions (e.g. Denmark, France). Personal plans and occupational defined contribution plans are gaining importance at the expense of occupational defined benefit plans. The pension landscape includes various types of plan hybrid DB plan) provide benefits based on a fixed worldwide. For example, pension plans may be accessed contribution rate and a guaranteed rate of return (the through employment or by individuals directly without any guarantee is provided by the sponsoring employer, hence involvement of their employers. When plans are accessed these plans are classified as DB). Such plans are part of the through employment and were established by employers or pension landscape in Belgium (where by law, employers social partners on behalf of their employees, these plans are must provide a minimum return guarantee), Japan and the considered as occupational. The OECD taxonomy classifies United States. Mixed plans are those where the plan has plans as personal when access to these plans does not have two separate DB and DC components which are treated as to be linked to an employment relationship and these plans part of the same plan. For instance, the plan may calculate are established directly by a pension fund or a financial benefits under a DC formula up to a certain age before institution acting as pension provider without any retirement and apply a DB formula thereafter.
    [Show full text]
  • Reforming Kazakhstan's Pension System
    Social Protection Project Briefs Reforming Kazakhstan’s Pension System azakhstan was the last republic to declare weaknesses and poor management resulted in its independence from the former Soviet shortfalls in the collection of contributions. Pension Union in 1991. The severing of economic links payment arrears were at $398 million at the beginning led to a decrease in the real gross domestic of 1996 and peaked at $474 million (about 2.5% of GDP) Kproduct (GDP) of more than 50% from 1990 to 1995. The by the end of June 1996.3 transition period was accompanied by declining average By end-1996, Kazakhstan’s pension system was incomes, increasing unemployment, deteriorating social close to breaking down. The build-up of back pensions services, and decreasing standards of living. The impact had begun to be a focal point for social unrest. As an had been most severe on vulnerable groups, such as immediate response, in June 1997, the Government families headed by women, the children, and the elderly. enacted the “Law on Pension Provision in the Republic As the country gradually recovered from the slump of Kazakhstan” that became effective in 1998. The in 1996 with a real GDP growth of 1.4%, reforms were reform immediately transformed the pension system implemented to ensure macroeconomic stability and from an expensive pay-as-you-go (PAYG)4 system to improvement in social services, including privatization one that was fully funded through defined contribution of state enterprises, private sector development and accounts where workers and/or
    [Show full text]
  • Pension Funds and the Financing Productive Investment. An
    102 S E R I E financiamiento del desarrollo Pensionolíticas funds para canalizarand the financingmayores of productive investment An analysis based on Brazil’s recent experience Rogerio Studart Development Finance Unit International Trade and Development Finance Division Santiago de Chile, August 2000 This document was prepared by Rogerio Studart, consultant of the Joint ECLAC/GTZ “Pension Fund and Old Age Provision” of ECLAC. The author wishes to thank Andras Uthoff, Daniel Titelman, Felipe Jiménez and Günther Held for their enlightening comments. The views expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without formal editing, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Organization. United Nations Publication LC/L.1409-P ISBN: 92-1-121271-5 Copyright © United Nations, August 2000. All rights reserved Sales No.: E.00.II.G.83 Printed in United Nations, Santiago, Chile Applications for the right to reproduce this work are welcomed and should be sent to the Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior authorization, but are requested to mention the source and inform the United Nations of such reproduction. CEPAL – SERIE Financiamiento del desarrollo No 102 Contents Abstract ............................................................................................... 5 I. Introduction ................................................................................
    [Show full text]