The Impact of Government-Linked Investment Companies in Malaysia on the Performance and Earnings-Management of Their Portfolio Companies
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Durham E-Theses THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA ON THE PERFORMANCE AND EARNINGS-MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES BIN-MUHAMED, AMIRUDDIN How to cite: BIN-MUHAMED, AMIRUDDIN (2013) THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA ON THE PERFORMANCE AND EARNINGS-MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES , Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9376/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA ON THE PERFORMANCE AND EARNINGS-MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES BY AMIRUDDIN MUHAMED A thesis submitted to Durham University in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy DURHAM UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL 2013 Abstract Research into the impact of government ownership on the financial performance and earnings-management of listed companies typically makes the assumption that the government is a monolithic entity and fails to consider that government ownership rights are usually administered by different types of government organisations. This thesis comprises two empirical studies to investigate whether the existence of different government investment organizations in Malaysia (called government-linked investment companies or GLICs,) which have differing objectives and control structures, also have different results in terms of performance and earnings-management. The portfolio companies that GLICs manage are known as government-linked companies (GLCs). The first empirical project explores the impact of GLC ownership structure (relating to the different group of GLCs, GLICs ownership concentration in GLCs, the existence of golden-share provisions and the presence of senior civil servants and of politicians on the boards of directors of GLCs) in terms of corporate performance as measured by accounting and market data. Using panel data of GLCs listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia between 2004 and 2008, we provide evidence that in Malaysia the impact of government ownership on the financial performance of government-controlled listed companies varies depending on the type of organization managing the government’s ownership stakes. In the second empirical project, we investigate the impact of ownership structure (ownership types, blockholders and managerial ownership) on earnings- management practices of listed companies on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. This involved 2696 firm-year observations between 2004 and 2008. We provide evidence that firms in our sample indeed managed their reported earnings upward; firms controlled by private blockholders engage in earnings- management practices at a higher magnitude than GLCs controlled by government blockholders. Between the GLCs, we found no evidence of the impact of different GLICs had on GLCs earnings-management practices. This research is of interest to policy makers such as government, GLICs or regulators. In addition, the findings from both empirical projects are of potential interest to portfolio investment companies and minority or foreign investors who might either benefit from the presence of blockholders or might be exploited by their power to pursue self-interested objectives rather than shareholders’ value. CONTENTS Abstract List of tables List of figures Abbreviations List of appendices Declaration and statement of copyright Plagiarism statement Acknowledgement CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background of the study……………………………..…………………. 1 1.2 General contributions……………………………………………………. 10 1.3 Structure of the thesis……………………………………………………. 12 CHAPTER 2: GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN MALAYSIA 2.1 Background of government ownership in GLICs………………………. 14 2.2 Government control over GLICs and GLCs…………………………… 16 2.3 Corporate governance in Malaysia…………………………………….. 21 2.3.1 Corporate governance development…………………………… 21 2.3.2 Financial reporting standards…………………………………. 24 2.4 Literature review: government ownership and corporate performance.......26 2.4.1 Theoretical background: ownership structure, government ownership and corporate performance…………………………. 26 2.4.2 Empirical evidence on the relationship between government ownership and corporate performance…………………………. 30 2.5 Hypotheses development……………………………………………….. 37 2.5.1 Types of GLICs and GLC performance………………………… 37 2.5.2 GLIC ownership concentration and GLC performance………… 40 2.5.3 The impact of golden shares on GLCs’ performance…………… 41 2.5.4 The impact of the presence of senior civil servants and politicians in GLCs’ boards on GLCs’ performance……………………….. 43 2.6 Literature review: ownership structure and earnings-management………. 45 2.6.1 Theoretical background: ownership structure and earnings-management………………………………………….. 45 2.6.2 The importance of corporate reporting to firm performance…… 49 2.6.3 Incentive to manipulate or improve corporate reporting……….. 51 2.6.4 Empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings-management……………………………. 57 2.7 Hypotheses development………………………………………………. 63 2.7.1 Types of GLICs and GLC earnings-management……………… 63 2.7.2 Private blockholders and earnings-management……………….. 68 2.7.3 Managerial ownership and earnings-management……………… 69 2.7.4 Blockholders ownership concentration and earnings-management..71 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction …………………………………..………………………. 76 3.2 Research paradigm………………………………………………….… 76 3.3 Quantitative and qualitative research method…………………………. 78 3.4 Validity and reliability in research……………………………………… 84 3.5 The adaptations of quantitative analysis in this study………………… 88 CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………….. 91 4.2 Research approach …………………………………………………….. 95 4.2.1 Sample selection………………………………………………… 95 4.2.2 Year of observations……………………………………………. 98 4.2.3 Control variables………………………………………………… 99 4.2.4 Corporate performance measures……………………………….. 107 4.2.5 Model specifications and variable measurement…………………111 4.2.6 Data analysis procedures…………………………………………114 4.2.7 Data diagnostic………………………………………………… 115 4.2.8 Dealing with outliers and missing data…………………………. 132 4.2.9 Robust regression as alternative to the OLS regression methods.... 134 4.3 Empirical results and analysis……………………………………….. 136 4.3.1 Descriptive statistics…………………………………………….. 136 4.3.2 Univariate analysis………………………………………………. 141 4.3.2.1 Pairwise correlation matrix……………………………… 141 4.3.2.2 The impact of different types of GLICs on GLC performance……............................………. 144 4.3.3 Multivariate analysis……………………………………………. 147 4.3.4 Tests of endogeneity and reverse causality…………………….. 153 4.3.5 Additional analysis and robustness checks…………………. 160 4.3.5.1 Different regression estimators…………………………. 160 4.3.5.2 The impact of total government ownership rather than The impact of ownership concentration of the controlling GLIC …………………………………….. 165 4.3.5.3 Regressions for individual years……………………….. 168 4.3.5.4 Additional control variable…………………………….. 172 4.3.5.5 New definitions of corporate governance measures…. 174 4.3.5.6 Alternative measure of different types of GLICs…….. 177 4.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………. 180 CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA ON THE EARNINGS-MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………. 183 5.2 Research approach…………………………………………………. 187 5.2.1 Sample selection………………………………………………… 187 5.2.2 Year of observations…………………………………………… 189 5.2.3 Blockholder-controlled firms………………………………….. 191 5.2.4 Control variables………………………………………………. 193 5.2.5 Earning management measures……………………………….. 213 5.2.6 Model specifications and variable measurement…………….. 224 5.2.7 Data analysis procedures…………………………………….. 228 5.2.8 Data diagnostic………………………………………………. 229 5.2.9 Dealings with outliers and missing data…………………….. 245 5.3 Empirical results and analysis……………………………………… 248 5.3.1 Descriptive statistics…………………………………………. 248 5.3.2 Univariate analysis…………………………………………… 257 5.3.2.1 Pairwise correlation matrix…………………………. 257 5.3.2.2 Complementary vs substitutive tests…………………. 258 5.3.2.3 Ownership types and earnings-management………….. 264 5.3.3 Multivariate analysis………………………………………….. 268 5.3.3.1 Robust regression analysis (Analysis 1)……………… 268 5.3.3.2 Endogeneity test……………………………………… 274 5.3.3.3 Endogeneity: causes, consequences and treatment…… 275 5.3.3.4 Two-stage least square (2SLS) regression (Analysis 2)… 284 5.3.4 Additional analysis and robustness checks………………….. 301 5.3.4.1 Alternative measures for earnings-management………… 301 5.3.4.2 Different regression estimators…………………………. 305 5.3.4.3 Tests for the directions of earnings-management………. 308 5.3.4.3.1 The magnitude