Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology

The Dynamics of Natural Theological Discourse in Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth-Century England

Larissa Kate Johnson

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of New South Wales, Australia 2009

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

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i COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

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ii ABSTRACT

In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there was a close connection between natural philosophy and theology. However, this connection was neither essential nor intrinsic, but was open to discussion and negotiation, and natural theology played an important role in these negotiations. While there is already a great deal of literature concerned with natural theology from two distinct academic disciplines—history of science and history of religion—neither set of literature has adequately grasped the nature of the tradition, leading to conflicting claims about its historical origin. In addition, the close connection between natural and revealed theology evident in the works of orthodox Christians in early modern England has been frequently overlooked.

This thesis, then, is a contribution to discussions of the relations between theology and natural philosophy in early modern England. Its main purpose is to develop and test a theoretical model of natural theology, designed to overcome some of the limitations of existing approaches. According to this model, a tradition of natural theology only emerged in England in the seventeenth century, due to the theological and natural philosophical turmoil of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution, although it was not without precedents. This tradition of natural theology was apologetically focused, providing arguments in favour of religious doctrines originally derived from revelation. Natural theology was a dynamic discourse, which may be represented by the metaphor of a kaleidoscope, in which resources chosen from natural philosophy and theology were combined and refracted according to the pre-existing views of the practitioner as well as the contextual challenges to which he was responding. By employing a variety of resources from both natural philosophy and theology, natural theology could function as a kind of mediator between these two neighbouring traditions. This model will be tested against a range of historical case studies that represent the moments in the historical trajectory of natural theology at which output of the discourse became more concentrated, due to renewed upheaval within and between theology and natural philosophy. iii CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... vi

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER 1 - HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION ...... 7 1. Introduction...... 7 2. Science and Religion: Conflict, Separation or Harmony?...... 8 3. From “Science and Religion” to “Natural Philosophy and Theology” ...... 22 4. Natural Philosophy and Theology: Negotiations and Articulations ...... 35 5. Conclusion...... 39

CHAPTER 2 - HISTORIES OF NATURAL THEOLOGY ...... 40 1. Introduction...... 40 2. History and Philosophy of Religion...... 42 3. History of Science...... 58 4. Problems With These Accounts ...... 66 5. Conclusion: Moving Forward...... 72

CHAPTER 3 - KALEIDOSCOPIC NATURAL THEOLOGY ...... 74 1. Introduction...... 74 2. Terminology ...... 77 3. Theoretical Dimension: Modelling Natural Theology...... 83 4. Historical Dimension ...... 96 5. Natural Theology in Practice...... 99 6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation ...... 105 7. Conclusion ...... 107

FIRST HISTORICAL INTERLUDE - RICHARD HOOKER (1553/4-1600)...... 109 1. Introduction...... 109 2. Richard Hooker and Natural Theology ...... 111 3. Richard Hooker on Reason, Revelation and Authority...... 112 4. Conclusion...... 123

CHAPTER 4 - THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS ...... 124 1. Introduction...... 124 2. Historical Dimension ...... 128 3. What Natural Theology Was...... 131 4. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments ...... 146 5. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse ...... 163 6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation ...... 167 7. Conclusion ...... 183

SECOND HISTORICAL INTERLUDE - WALTER CHARLETON (1620-1707)...... 185 1. Introduction...... 185 2. Charleton’s Natural Theology ...... 189 3. Articulating Natural Philosophy and Theology...... 196 4. Conclusion...... 200

iv CHAPTER 5 - RESTORATION NATURAL THEOLOGY ...... 202 1. Introduction...... 202 2. Historical Dimension ...... 204 3. The Nature of Natural Theology ...... 217 4. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments ...... 220 5. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse ...... 240 6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation ...... 242 7. Conclusion ...... 247

THIRD HISTORICAL INTERLUDE - JOHN RAY (1627-1705)...... 250 1. Introduction...... 250 2. Ray’s Background...... 251 3. Ray’s Natural Theology ...... 254 4. Articulating Natural Philosophy and Theology: A Priest of Nature ...... 265 5. Conclusion...... 268

CHAPTER 6 - THE BOYLE LECTURES ...... 270 1. Introduction...... 270 2. Historical Dimension ...... 273 3. What Natural Theology Was...... 282 4. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments ...... 290 5. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse ...... 308 6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation ...... 312 7. Conclusion ...... 320

CONCLUSION ...... 322 1. Historical Dimension...... 323 2. Theoretical Dimension...... 327 3. Significance and Limitations of the Present Study ...... 334

APPENDIX – THE BOYLE LECTURES, 1692-1732 ...... 337

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 339 1. Primary Sources...... 339 2. Secondary Sources ...... 346

v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I cannot adequately express my thanks to my supervisor, John Schuster. Throughout the course of researching and writing this thesis, he has guided me with seemingly limitless patience, and continually inspired me with his breadth of knowledge, originality of ideas and quirky sense of humour. I consider myself privileged to have worked with such an outstanding scholar. This experience has led me to construct my own natural theological argument: such an amazing supervisor must be evidence of the providence of God.

I am also grateful for the input of my co-supervisor, David Miller, who was always willing to provide encouragement and assistance when needed. In particular, his self-proclaimed “pedantic” editing of my thesis has no doubt increased its readability, although any errors remain, of course, my own responsibility. I would also like to express my appreciation to the postgraduate coordinators, Anthony Corones and Mina Roces, for their assistance throughout the thesis process.

Writing a thesis can be a lonely experience, so I have been grateful for interaction with my fellow graduate students in the Postgraduate Research Laboratory provided by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. I was also fortunate to receive funding from the faculty for two international conference trips, which enabled me to meet eminent scholars from my field. In particular, I would like to recognise Peter Harrison and John Henry, for both their encouragement on a personal level and the inspiration gained from their published works.

I cannot mention by name all the people who have encouraged and helped me throughout this experience, but I must thank my sister-in-law Lynley for her assistance in editing some of my draft chapters. However, I owe my deepest debt of gratitude to my parents, Nadia and Frank, and my husband, Matthew, for supporting me through too many years of study, and for helping me maintain my sanity, particularly towards the end. Thank you for never losing faith that I would eventually finish my PhD thesis.

vi Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Introduction

INTRODUCTION

The marks of design are too strong to be gotten over. Design must have had a designer. That designer must have been a person. That person is God.

William Paley, Natural Theology.1

From a perspective informed by the development of biology since Darwin, natural theology conjures up images of William Paley’s famous watchmaker argument, perhaps along with a sense of relief that Darwinian evolution has put an end to such naïve arguments (the modern Intelligent Design movement notwithstanding). From a religious point of view, natural theology may be seen as an arrogant attempt to usurp the gracious self-revelation of God through his word and in the person of Jesus Christ. However, in England in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, natural theology was an important enterprise among both theologians and natural philosophers.

This may come as a surprise to the modern reader. The idea that knowledge of God can be gained by applying human reason to the materials of the natural world does not fit with the widespread assumption that science and religion are completely separate enterprises. Looking back at the seventeenth century, for example, it seems strange that a so-called “rational scientist” such as Isaac Newton would have spent so much time writing about theology, or that the “father of modern chemistry” Robert Boyle left an allowance in his will for a series of lectures dedicated to “proving the Christian religion.”

However, the last few generations of historians of science have begun to recognise not only the positive role that religion might have in the study of nature, but also the incredibly complex variety of relations experienced between what we now refer to as science and religion. Natural theology played an important role in these relations, but this role cannot be properly understood without a fully developed model of natural theology. Without this, any attempt

1 William Paley, Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature, 2nd ed. (London, 1802), 473. 1 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Introduction

to understand how natural theology related to science and religion will quickly run into difficulty. For example, if natural theology is viewed simply as an attempt to derive knowledge of God from nature, is it a part of science or religion? If revelation was not involved, could natural theology be considered a part of orthodox theology? Or, could natural theology have been part of the formal study of nature if knowledge of God was its goal? Acknowledging the complexity of the relations between science and religion, as well as of natural theology itself, may obviate such problems.

The aim of this thesis, then, is to develop and test a conceptual model of English natural theology that is designed to take into account the complexity of natural theology itself, as well as its relations with the neighbouring traditions of natural philosophy and theology. While historians of science and historians of religion have both studied natural theology, there has not been adequate effort to delineate, let alone any consensus reached about, what sort of intellectual endeavour natural theology actually was. Models of what it was and how it worked have tended to be simplistic, overly generalised, and often assumed without much effort expended on serious construction of historical categories. Peter Harrison’s excellent work on physico-theology has made a start on this problem, but more work is required.2 We will see that both existing approaches to natural theology have failed to grasp its full nature, and hence the two accounts clash, as in the famous fable of the blind men trying to describe the elephant. While historians of religion view natural theology as a long-running tradition, dating back to the earliest Church Fathers, historians of science tend to view it as emerging in the late seventeenth-century, when Newtonian natural philosophy was employed in defence of low-church Anglicanism. Further, both accounts see natural theology as an endeavour competing with revealed theology, although, as we shall see, revelation continued as a major theme within natural theology well into the eighteenth century. The model presented

2 The most complete articulation of Harrison’s view of physico-theology is found in “Physico- Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 165-183. 2 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Introduction

in this thesis suggests that natural theology emerged as an intellectual tradition in the seventeenth century, though it was not without precedents.

This tradition of natural theology was primarily an apologetic discourse, providing arguments in favour of religious doctrines originally derived from revelation. Natural theology itself was neither theological nor natural philosophical, and it was not tied exclusively to any single system of theology or natural philosophy. Instead, natural theology was a separate tradition that occupied an evolving and contested space between natural philosophy and theology. Due to the contested nature of this space, natural theology did not consist of a single style of argument. Rather, natural theology was a dynamic discourse that may be aptly represented by the metaphor of a kaleidoscope. According to this trope, carefully chosen conceptual resources are combined and refracted according to the practitioner’s pre-existing views, resulting in a variety of arguments targeting particular challenges unique to the natural theologian’s historical context. This thesis will examine the outcomes of several kaleidoscopes—that is, the arguments produced by a number of natural theologians—in order to infer the views, conceptual resources and opportunities or challenges behind the arguments.3

Natural theology could be used to produce arguments in support of religious doctrines, such as the existence and attributes of God, and the duties of religion, and could even be used to argue for the validity of the Christian revelation. However, by participating in this discourse, natural theologians were also engaged in articulating the relations between natural philosophy and theology. Indeed, the location of natural theology between natural philosophy and theology and its role in negotiating between them explains why it emerged as a tradition in the seventeenth century. The space between natural philosophy and theology needed to be open and contested, and this was a result of the theological and natural philosophical upheaval of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. Once the theological turmoil was combined with the increased availability of natural philosophical resources that derived from

3 As the full explication of the kaleidoscope metaphor in Chapter 3 will make clear, the model presented in this thesis sees natural theology not as a single kaleidoscope, but as a set of kaleidoscopes: one for each natural theologian. 3 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Introduction

conflicts between various natural philosophical systems competing to replace the dominant Aristotelianism, the pursuit of natural theology began in earnest.

Unlike natural philosophy and theology, the tradition of natural theology did not operate within, and was not supported by, a strong and continuing institutional framework. Hence there was no clearly defined means of replication of exponents through education or the like. However, there were times of increased natural theological activity, which corresponded to certain moments of natural philosophical, theological and politico-religious turmoil and debate. In this thesis these moments are designated as “inflection points,” and provide a means of narrating the historical trajectory of natural theology. The major case studies in this thesis relate to three main inflection points in seventeenth and early eighteenth-century England. However, natural theological discourse was not absolutely restricted to these inflection points. There were people practising natural theology who do not fit into the case studies analysed in this thesis, or who seem to cut across multiple inflection points. Three such characters will be discussed in shorter “historical interludes.” 4

In order to establish and test the new model of natural theology, this thesis is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the need for the new model as well as its main components. Chapter 1 reviews the historiography of science and religion, concluding that although natural philosophy and theology were closely connected in the early modern period, this connection was neither essential nor intrinsic. Instead, relations between theology and natural

4 As the argument progresses, the reader may begin to suspect a difficulty with regard to the category of “tradition.” On the one hand, I will be arguing that natural theology did not exist as a tradition prior to the seventeenth century. On the other hand, the tradition of English natural theology in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was quite loose. It was not an institutionalised, educationally replicating discipline like theology or natural philosophy. Nonetheless, the seventeenth century witnessed a change (caused, I argue, by the confluence of the Scientific Revolution and the Protestant Reformation). While there were certainly earlier examples of natural theology, these were not sufficiently dense to amount to a tradition. In the seventeenth century, however, there was a much greater density of natural theological texts published and debate occurring. It is this I am referring to by the term “tradition.” Additionally, the organisation of the thesis around a series of case studies is intended to address the problem of conceptualising the “tradition” of natural theology. We might think of the tradition of natural theology as being something like a cloud of fog that occasionally condensed into rain, at particular times and in certain contexts. It is these moments, or “inflection points”, that are represented by the case studies. 4 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Introduction

philosophy were constantly debated, and natural theology was one arena in which these negotiations could take place. Chapter 2 examines the approaches to the history of natural theology made by historians of both science and religion. Conflicts between these accounts point to the need for a carefully articulated and theorised model of natural theology. Chapter 3 develops such a model along two dimensions, historical and theoretical. These dimensions are closely connected, as it is the character of English natural theology as a tradition located between natural philosophy and theology that accounts for its emergence in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. Thus, a better understanding of natural theology as a tradition, loose as it was, aids in understanding its historical trajectory.

The second part of the thesis is devoted to testing the model in a series of empirical case studies, designed to reflect the inflection points noted above.5 The First Historical Interlude considers the case of Richard Hooker: an Elizabethan clergyman who was engaged with some natural theology-like issues but, being before the main tide of the Scientific Revolution, was not himself a natural theologian. Chapter 4 examines the first major inflection point, represented here by the Cambridge Platonists. Here, the crises within the Church of England combined with the first fruits of the novel natural philosophical moves of the Scientific Revolution in England to produce the first major outcropping of natural theology in the seventeenth century.6 In the Second Historical Interlude we will see that this was not the only form of natural theology at the time. Walter Charleton, though a contemporary of the Cambridge Platonists, responded to the same challenges in a very different manner. Chapter 5 considers Restoration natural theology, exemplified by the works of John Wilkins and Matthew Barker. At this time, although the conflicts within English Christianity had not disappeared, challenges from outside the

5 It is not possible, in a thesis such as this, to consider in detail every possible instance of natural theology in the time period considered, which spans over 130 years. I have endeavoured to choose works that are representative of differing time periods and types, while focusing on figures whose natural theology has been neglected or misunderstood. 6 “The Scientific Revolution,” as the term is commonly understood, covers the period from approximately 1500 to 1700. However, as we shall note in Chapter 1, Section 3a, the first half of the seventeenth century was a critical period, particularly in England. As this thesis is concerned with the emergence and development of English natural theology, it is to this period that we will pay the most attention. 5 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Introduction

Church were becoming more of a problem. The further development of natural philosophy provided a range of conceptual resources to be employed against these challenges. The Third Historical Interlude analyses John Ray, who is widely acknowledged as one of the most influential natural theologians of the seventeenth century, but who does not fit neatly into any of the larger case studies. His main natural theological work was published in the late seventeenth century, just prior to the Boyle Lectures, but was based on sermons presented at Cambridge before the Restoration, linking him with the Cambridge Platonists examined in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 6 we will consider the Boyle Lectures. This lecture series is often viewed as the pinnacle of English natural theology, particularly in its connection with Newtonianism and low- church Anglicanism. However, we will see that the lectures clearly represent the dynamic nature of natural theology, as the lecturers sought to prove the Christian religion by whatever means they considered best.

With this overall trajectory in mind, we now turn to consider the historiography of science and religion, aiming to situate our kaleidoscopic model of natural theology in the context of relations between natural philosophy and theology in seventeenth and early eighteenth-century England.

6 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

1. Introduction

This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being… He rules all things, not as the world soul but as the lord of all. And because of his dominion he is called Lord God.

Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.1

The average reader would not expect a quotation like this to come from such a significant figure in the rise of modern science as Sir Isaac Newton, nor in such a foundational text as his Principia. Leaving aside the formality of the language, this statement would not seem out of place coming from a present- day exponent of Intelligent Design. Indeed, it would come as a surprise to many people in contemporary Western culture that science and religion could mix at all. However, the history of science and religion is much more complex than generally acknowledged, and in the seventeenth century in particular there was a close connection between the study of nature and belief in God. This connection, although intimate, was neither simple nor straightforward, but needs to be understood in order to make sense of natural theology—an area that clearly brings together both scientific and religious ideas.

It will be argued in this thesis that natural theology was situated between theology and science,2 forming an arena in which the historical actors could debate what they saw as the correct relations between the two. While there was

1 Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London, 1687). Translated by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman as The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 940. 2 Section 3 of this chapter will establish “natural philosophy” as the preferred term for the study of nature in the seventeenth century. In Section 2, the term “science” will be used, as a reflection of common use. 7 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

a strong connection between theology and natural philosophy in the seventeenth century, it was up to the theologians and natural philosophers of the time to make the connection or argue for a separation. Further, natural philosophy and theology were themselves contested fields or traditions, which could be related to each other in various ways.

This chapter will establish an historiographical background for discussing how the historical actors negotiated and articulated theology and natural philosophy. Section 2 will examine the most common and popular treatments of the issue, demonstrating that none of these sufficiently capture the complexity of the relations between science and religion in the early modern period. Indeed, as Section 3 explains, any such attempt is doomed to failure from the start. The terminology itself is inadequate, and there is no simple way of characterising the situation. Instead of talking about “science” and “religion”, and any single form of “relationship” between the two, historians of early modern thought should consider the varieties of relations between different types of natural philosophy and theology. To do this, the categories of natural philosophy and theology or religion need to be clearly delineated. Finally, Section 4 will introduce a more sophisticated approach to natural philosophy and theology, seeking to describe and understand the relations of these two disciplines in the seventeenth century by employing metaphors of articulation and negotiation.

2. Science and Religion: Conflict, Separation or Harmony?

Traditionally, there have been three metaphors employed to explain or describe the relationship between science and religion: conflict, separation and harmony.3 From a contemporary perspective, there is an expectation that the study of nature should be completely separate from theology, as any attempt to bring these two together will inevitably lead to conflict (and indeed from this perspective, the term “natural theology” seems oxymoronic). Further, the Scientific Revolution has often been viewed as the point when science broke free

3 For a discussion of these metaphors see, for example, John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Margaret J. Osler, “Mixing Metaphors: Science and Religion or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe,” History of Science 36 (1998): 91-113. 8 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

from the constraints of religion and became a separate enterprise.4 However, over the last century, many historians have attempted to demonstrate the positive role that religion had in the development of modern science.

Despite these valiant efforts, the most pervasive of these metaphors is still the conflict thesis, which was first popularised by John Draper and Andrew Dickson White in the nineteenth century.5 This idea has led to the myth of an inherent antagonism between science and religion, from which science will always emerge victorious, at least in the long run. This conflict is often seen to arise from the inherently different “mentalities” of science and religion, one dealing with reason, and the other with faith. According to Draper:

The history of Science is not a mere record of isolated discoveries; it is a narrative of the conflict of two contending powers, the expansive force of the human intellect on one side, and the compression arising from traditionary faith and human interests on the other.6

The separation metaphor was popularised by Stephen Jay Gould, who famously described science and religion as “Non-Overlapping Magisteria.”7 Adherents of this view maintain that science and religion operate in different spheres of practice, and are concerned with different kinds of questions. Thus, any conflict between the two must be a result of a misunderstanding, or practitioners from either field overstepping their bounds.

While the metaphors of conflict and separation are still frequently found in popular science writing,8 both have been widely criticised by professional

4 As the section below on seventeenth-century natural philosophy will show, this view is simplistic. See also Brooke, Science and Religion, especially pp. 53-81. 5 John William Draper, History of the Conflict Between Science and Religion (London: Spottiswoode and Co., 1875); Andrew Dickson White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1896). See also discussion of these works in Brooke, Science and Religion, 34-42. As discussed further below, the metaphor of conflict has disappeared from scholarly histories of science, but remains alive in more popular works. 6 Draper, History of the Conflict, p. vi. 7 Stephen Jay Gould, “The Problem Resolved in Principle,” chapter 2 in Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1999). 8 Bestsellers such as Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion (London: Bantam, 2006) and many popular treatments of the infamous “Galileo Affair” demonstrate that this idea is alive and well. 9 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

historians of science who see religion as having been closely connected with the development of science. For example, Peter Dear outlines the necessity of including the role of the Catholic and Protestant churches, as the pre-eminent social institutions of the time, in any discussion of the pursuit of natural knowledge in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Dear explains:

On the Protestant as well as the Catholic side, knowledge of nature during this period was created in societies powerfully structured by ecclesiastical forces: the Church was a part of the life and thought of everyone.9

From this perspective, it is impossible to fully understand the study of nature at this time without taking into account the religious context.10 For this reason, many historians of science and religion subscribe to some form of the harmony metaphor. a. Theology and the Rise of Modern Science

During the last two generations, there have been many attempts by historians of science to explain the rise of modern science according to the role of various theological doctrines or religious beliefs.11 For example, in a seminal paper written in 1934, M. B. Foster argued that the essential elements of the modern study of nature came not from its origins in Greek philosophy, but from the Christian doctrine of creation.12 According to Foster, Greek science held that

9 Peter Dear, “The Church and the New Philosophy,” in Science, Culture and Popular Belief in Renaissance Europe, ed. Stephen Pumfrey, Paolo L. Rossi and Maurice Slawinski (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 137. Dear’s use of “the Church” here is unusual. From the context, he clearly means all the Christian churches. 10 See Brooke, Science and Religion, as well as the excellent collections of essays on this topic in David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers, eds., God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter Between Christianity and Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); idem. When Science and Christianity Meet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003); and Gary B. Ferngren, ed., Science and Religion: A Historical Introduction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 11 By “science” I mean what is generally referred to as “modern science,” often described as arising after the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. The term is used to reflect common usage and should not be interpreted as an endorsement of this historical perspective. See further discussion in Section 3 below of the concept of natural philosophy and its relation to science. 12 M. B. Foster, “The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science,” Mind 43 (1934): 446-468. 10 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

just as the essence of a geometrical object is definable, so too is the essence of a natural object. It follows from this that the properties of natural objects can be deduced by reason, and that empirical evidence is unnecessary. By contrast, if God created the world by his own free will, the nature of objects in the world is contingent, and can only be discovered by experience. Although Christian medieval philosophers obviously believed in the doctrine of creation, the medieval student of nature “continued to employ the methods of Aristotelian science, entirely oblivious of the fact that Aristotle’s science was based on the presupposition that nature is not created.”13 Not until the seventeenth century did investigators of nature began to take the doctrine seriously in their science as well as in theology. These investigators insisted that the properties of objects must be investigated empirically, prompting an emphasis on experimentalism that has become an essential ingredient in modern science.

Other historians have connected theological ideas with the rise of the concept of the laws of nature, which held an important place in the new science of the seventeenth century. Edgar Zilsel put forward one of the earliest such accounts from a sociological viewpoint.14 He claimed that the concept of physical law was unknown in antiquity and the Middle Ages, and did not arise until the middle of the seventeenth century. According to Zilsel, the reason was that the expression “law of nature” derives from a comparison of nature and state, and “the doctrine of universal laws of divine origin is possible only in a state with rational statute law and fully developed central sovereignty.”15 Here, Zilsel was drawing on the classic Marxist view that the rise of the commercial bourgeoisie was linked to early modern processes of state formation, in that new monarchies always aligned with the rising commercial capitalist middle class. Like the state, God expresses his sovereignty by dictating rational law. The idea of a divine legislator, originally conceived in Judaism, lay dormant for two thousand years until it was reawakened in the “capitalist” socio-political situation of the early modern period. As well as linking the rise of modern science to theological

13 Ibid., 453. 14 Edgar Zilsel, “The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law,” The Philosophical Review 51 (1942): 245-279. 15 Ibid., 279. 11 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

concepts, Zilsel’s account explains why the seventeenth century was so significant, given that the theological concepts in question had been around for millennia.

Reacting to Marxist “externalism” in general, and Zilsel in particular, Francis Oakley proposed a different view of the conception of natural law.16 He argued that it is unnecessary and misleading to postulate the influence of social and political analogies as reasons for why the Semitic concept of divinely imposed laws of nature burst into scientific prominence. Instead, for Oakley, seventeenth-century discussions of natural law reflected medieval debates about the relationship between divine power and God’s creation.

In the Middle Ages, voluntarists, such as William of Ockham, emphasised the primacy of God’s will, stating that creation was entirely contingent and that therefore there could be no a priori demonstration of physical phenomena. Intellectualists, or rationalists, exemplified by St. Thomas Aquinas, argued that God’s reason was prior to his will, and that there is some necessity in the created order, whether God created it or not. Thus, a priori demonstration is possible, at least to some extent. These debates hinged on a distinction between God’s absolute power and his ordained power. God’s absolute power includes everything that God can theoretically do, excluding only acts that would entail a logical contradiction. God’s ordained power, on the other hand, is what he has actually chosen to do. For some theologians, God’s absolute power is constrained by his ordained power. That is, once God has created the world in a particular way, there are certain things about his creation that determine how he may act within the world. Others, such as Ockham, held that while God’s absolute power is unconstrained, he normally acts within the order he has ordained.17

These debates were revived in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, as the Reformers were concerned to re-establish the freedom of God with regard to salvation and the natural world. While Greek natural philosophy had

16 Francis Oakley, “Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature,” Church History 30 (1961): 433-457. 17 Ibid., 433. 12 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

emphasised the idea of laws immanent in nature, seventeenth-century philosophers such as René Descartes, Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton preferred the concept of laws imposed on nature from outside.18 Oakley suggests that the emergence of the concept of divinely imposed laws was to be expected when the seventeenth century natural philosophers adopted and popularised the view of natural law grounded in the will of a sovereign deity.19 Thus, the emphasis here is on the theological idea of God’s free will, rather than socio-political considerations. It was the employment of the theological conception of an all- powerful legislating God that was the crucial factor, not the political idea of state sovereignty.20

Even if religious ideas were involved in the development of the notion of the laws of nature, the concept was eventually separated from any hint of theological origin. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the laws of nature had become a basic concept, which, for many, no longer needed metaphysical justification.21 As philosopher John Milton has argued, “Once the idea of laws of nature had become generally accepted, it was possible (for those who so wished) to reject the theological standpoint which had originally made the idea acceptable.”22 It follows that the connection between theology and science

18 Although the Protestant Reformation sparked these debates, the ideas involved were not exclusive to Protestants. Thus, René Descartes, a Catholic, may be included in this list. 19 While the concept of externally imposed laws of nature is distinct from the theological position of voluntarism, the two are closely connected. For philosophers like Descartes, Boyle and Newton the laws of nature were determined by God’s free will and imposed by him on nature. Oakley explicitly connects voluntarism with this understanding of the laws of nature. 20 For an important critique of the voluntarism thesis, see Peter Harrison, “Voluntarism and Early Modern Science,” History of Science 40 (2002): 63-89. For an equally important defence of the thesis against Harrison’s objections, see John Henry, “Voluntarist Theology at the Origins of Modern Science: A Response to Peter Harrison,” History of Science 47 (2009): 79-113. Harrison responds to Henry’s critique in “Voluntarism and the Origins of Modern Science: A Reply to John Henry,” History of Science 49 (2009): 223-231. At issue here is whether the voluntarist thesis should be accepted in a strong or modest form. Harrison concedes to Henry that discussions of divine will played a significant role in certain controversies in early modern natural philosophy, but does not accept the stronger version that directly correlates the different theological approaches to the natural world of voluntarism and intellectualism with the competing approaches to knowledge of empiricism and rationalism. 21 As we shall note in Chapter 5, something similar occurred with reason and the rise of deism. While most natural theologians of the seventeenth century viewed reason as a type of divine revelation, the deists separated reason from its theological foundation and elevated it as a purely human faculty. 22 John R. Milton, “The Origin and Development of the Concept of the ‘Laws of Nature’,” Archives Européenes de Sociologie 22 (1981): 195. 13 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

depends on the needs of the historical actor and can be readily abandoned once it is no longer convenient. This indicates that although there is a connection between theology and science, this connection is neither essential nor intrinsic. b. Protestantism and the Rise of Modern Science

While the theological concepts discussed above were not unique to either Catholicism or Protestantism, a number of attempts have also been made to link the rise of modern science to particular brands of religious belief, especially various branches of the Protestant church. The most well known of these (and perhaps the most controversial) is the “Merton Thesis,” which highlighted the role of Puritanism in the rise of modern science.23 Robert K. Merton suggested that Protestants held a set of values that were highly conducive to studying the world, and hence Protestant societies came to value scientific enquiry.24 Although Merton acknowledged that there were numerous diverse sects of Protestantism—including Anglicans, Calvinists, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Quakers, and Millenarians—he argued that they shared a “common attitude of mind and mode of life [that] may be denominated by that ‘word of many shades,’ Puritanism.”25 These Protestant values included the glorification of God through practical, public service, diligence and industry in one’s calling, which should be chosen in order to best serve God and the public good, and the exaltation of a reason that is not inconsistent with faith.26 Further, science itself came to be seen as a means of glorifying God: “The study of Nature in a ‘convincing, scientifical way’ furthers a full appreciation of the Creator’s power,

23 Robert K. Merton, “Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England,” Osiris 4 (1938): 360-632. Reprinted as Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970). Page references are to the 1970 edition. This viewpoint is sometimes referred to as the “Puritan thesis” to reflect the fact that Merton was not its only proponent. In the 1930s, the link between Puritanism and science was also put forward by Dorothy Stimson in “Puritanism and the New Philosophy in Seventeenth Century England,” Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine 3 (1935): 360-630. The idea was taken up again in the next generation by Christopher Hill and Charles Webster. See, for example, Christopher Hill, “Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution,” Past and Present 29 (1964): 88-97; and Charles Webster, The Great Instauration (London: Duckworth, 1975). 24 Gary A. Abraham provides a concise definition: “‘Puritanism’ means for Merton simply the religious injunction to remake this world, but specifically so as to be useful to society.” “Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis: A Boundary Dispute between History and Sociology,” Isis 74 (1983): 369. 25 Merton, Science, Technology and Society, 57. 26 Ibid., 60-68. 14 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

so that the natural scientist must needs be better equipped than the casual observer to glorify Him.”27 As part of his evidence for his thesis, Merton claimed to have identified a strong “Puritan ethos” in the early Royal Society of London, something that has since been challenged by many historians.28

Although the Merton thesis has been influential in the history of science, it has also been subjected to widespread criticism. For example, Douglas S. Kemsley has suggested that the terms “Protestant,” “Puritan” and “Calvinist” are too vague and do not match historical usage.29 Further, catch phrases such as “the Glory of God” or the “benefit of mankind” were not exclusively Puritan or Protestant ideas. Similarly, John Morgan argues that the Puritan thesis has not been backed up by historical evidence, as the supposedly Puritan traits that related to science were widespread among Protestants in general.30

Some scholars have attempted to defend Merton against such criticisms. Gary A. Abraham, for example, has argued that historians have misunderstood Merton’s sociological approach.31 He proposes a clarification of Merton’s thesis as claiming that “Puritanism gave rise to a system of values that favoured a positive reception of science, but that, by the late seventeenth century, had little to do with religious partisanship.”32 In particular, Abraham supports the crucial claim made by Merton “that fundamental changes were taking place in the

27 Ibid., 71-72. 28 See, for example, Lotte Mulligan, “Civil War Politics, Religion and the Royal Society,” in The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth century, ed. Charles Webster (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 317-346; Michael Hunter, Science and Society in Restoration England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 29 Douglas S. Kemsley, “Religious Influences in the Rise of Modern Science: A Review and Criticism, Particularly of the ‘Protestant-Puritan Ethic’ Theory,” Annals of Science 24 (1968): 199-226. Interestingly, Merton did acknowledge this point. In designating a range of Protestant sects as “Puritan,” he wrote: “Nor need we be alarmed because this usage does not coincide with the original sense of the term as referring to the reform of the Church of England in a Presbyterian manner since our interest is primarily directed toward the social and not the ecclesiastic implications of Protestantism.” Science, Technology and Society, p. 57. We see here the classic problem of the distinction between “actors’ terms” and “historians’ terms.” This problem will be revisited in more detail in Chapter 2 with relation to definitions of “natural theology,” “natural religion,” and “physico-theology.” 30 John Morgan, “The Puritan Thesis Revisited,” in Evangelicals and Science in Historical Perspective, ed. David N. Livingstone, D. G. Hart and Mark A. Noll (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 43-74. 31 Abraham, “Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis.” 32 Ibid., 373. 15 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

English climate of opinion which had a direct bearing on the ability of scientists to pursue their callings with some measure of foreseeable security in the long run.”33 Rather than providing definitive examples of seventeenth-century scientists being motivated by purely religious reasons, Merton cited the contributions of “publicists” for science, such as Richard Baxter.34 Such publicists argued that there is no inconsistency between religion and science.35

Noting this, Abraham also suggests amending Merton’s thesis, to include a distinction between the motives for doing science and motives for accepting those who do science. That is, in Abraham’s view, the Merton Thesis does not establish Puritan values as a motive for doing science, but rather as something that acted on the popular religious mind as “motives for accepting those who did do science.”36 As Abraham articulates,

Merton often quoted statements by Wilkins and Ray to the effect that science affords a means of confirming the majesty of the deity, of seeing for oneself the hand of God in nature, and so forth. No scientist, however, is ever presented as ever having said that this was what motivated him, either to take up science or to make a particular discovery.37

33 Ibid., 383. 34 Merton follows John S. Flynn (The Influence of Puritanism on the Political and Religious Thought of the English [New York: Dutton, 1920], p. 138) and John Tulloch (English Puritanism and Its Leaders [Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1861], p. 377) in viewing Richard Baxter as “the most representative Puritan in history.” See Merton, Science, Technology and Society, 60. 35 For example, Merton quoted Baxter’s statement that the glory of God can be promoted by studying nature: “The great means of promoting love to God is duly to behold Him in His appearances to man, in the ways of Nature, Grace and Glory. First, therefore, learn to understand and improve his appearances in Nature, and to see the Creator in all His works, and by the knowledge and love of them to be raised to the knowledge and love of Him.” Richard Baxter, Christian Directory, (London, 1825). Quoted in Merton, Science, Technology and Society, p. 71, n. 52. 36 According to Abraham, “The publicist arguments from design, arguments for scientific activity as a field for the legitimate glorification of God, and arguments for the quality of performance in a vocation (which is especially evident, it was argued, in science) as a sign of salvation—all these are nonetheless important. Only they cannot be cast as motives for doing science. They doubtless acted on the popular mind as motives for accepting those who did do science. For it could have provided a convincing argument to laymen, noble and middling alike, that scientists could reveal God’s order in the world” (Abraham’s italics). “Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis,” 372. 37 Ibid., 371. 16 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

John Morgan also raises this issue in his own critique of the Merton thesis, arguing that it is impossible to establish that any actor became a scientist because of his religious beliefs. 38 However, given the religious foundation of the seventeenth century society, it is virtually inconceivable that the legitimation of science in the seventeenth century would not involve religious considerations. Thus, the presence of religious ideas in early modern scientific discourse should not come as a surprise to historians.

From a slightly different perspective, Steven Shapin praises the Merton thesis for drawing attention to the role of external factors in society’s acceptance of science as a practice.39 According to Shapin, Merton was not using social factors to explain the form or content of scientific knowledge or the scientific method, but was actually trying to dissociate himself from such externalism. Merton’s thesis was instead an explanation for the increased social standing of the scientific enterprise in seventeenth-century England, in which Puritanism was only one factor among many. In particular, Shapin points out Merton’s preference for the “circumspect language of ‘mutual dependence’” rather than the “‘vulgar Marxist’ language of ‘cause and effect.’”40 In Shapin’s view, Merton argued that although Puritanism was not required for modern science, it inadvertently contributed to the legitimacy of science as an emerging social institution. Although the Merton thesis has its merits, using it as evidence for the harmony metaphor is simplistic when these assorted criticisms and amendments are taken into consideration.

Despite the criticisms of Merton’s Puritan thesis, many other accounts linking Protestantism to the rise of science have been put forward. In contrast to the views of Draper and White, B. A. Gerrish has argued that the attitudes of the Protestant Reformers were varied and complex, and that there was no unified theological opposition to science.41 While some Reformers, such as Martin

38 Morgan, “The Puritan Thesis Revisited.” 39 Steven Shapin, “Understanding the Merton Thesis,” Isis 79 (1988): 594-605. 40 Ibid., 601. 41 B. A. Gerrish, “The Reformation and the Rise of Modern Science,” in The Impact of the Church upon its Culture, ed. Jerald C. Brauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 231- 265. 17 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

Luther, may have rejected Copernicanism on Biblical grounds, this did not extend to a rejection of scientific investigation itself. In fact, in a similar manner to Merton, Gerrish pointed out that certain aspects of Protestant theology, in particular the Calvinist doctrines concerning predestination and the glorification of God, seemed to support scientific inquiry. A generation later, Gary B. Deason examined the role of Reformation theology in the adoption of the mechanistic conception of nature. He suggested that the mechanical philosophers turned to the Protestant doctrine of the radical sovereignty of God to support their case against Aristotelianism.42 Since God alone is sovereign, matter could not possess active powers, in contrast to the Aristotelian view that “inherent mindlike principles imbued matter with purposive development.”43 This view fitted perfectly with the mechanical philosophy, a key tenet of which was the passivity of matter. Thus, commitment to the mechanical philosophy was reinforced by its compatibility with theological doctrines such as the sovereignty of God, an argument that could also be used in promoting this view of nature to other Protestants.

James R. Jacob and Margaret C. Jacob restrict this view to a more specific type of Protestantism: latitudinarian Anglicanism. In a paper that has provoked almost as much debate as the Merton thesis, the Jacobs attribute the rise of modern science in seventeenth-century England to the religious and political views of the low-church adherents of the Church of England.44 The Jacobs argue that this “latitudinarianism” developed out of a more radical version of Puritanism in response to the dynamics of the English crises of the Civil Wars in the 1640s and the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688-9. In the wake of these events, both of which the Jacobs term “revolutions,” the authority of the church and

42 For Deason, the “radical” sovereignty of God refers to “an understanding of sovereignty peculiar to the Reformers and to some of their followers, such as the English Puritans, which held that God’s sovereignty excluded the active contribution of lesser beings to his work.” “Reformation Theology and the Mechanistic Conception of Nature,” in God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter Between Christianity and Science, ed. David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 170. 43 Ibid., 185. 44 James R. Jacob and Margaret C. Jacob, “The Anglican Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution,” Isis 71 (1980), 251-267. The Jacobs were not the first to promote a link between latitudinarianism and science in England. For an earlier formulation, see Barbara J. Shapiro, “Latitudinarianism and Science in Seventeenth-Century England,” Past and Present 40 (1968), 16-41. 18 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

state was weakened, and the rise of radical sects further challenged social, political and religious stability. In response, “conservative reformers… developed a metaphysics of God and matter that authorized a conservative interpretation of the social hierarchy.”45 The adoption of a Christianised Epicurean atomism—a scientific view that made matter inert—guaranteed the continuing action of God in the universe. This providential God was not only responsible for the laws of nature, but also for socio-political hierarchy. The central tenets of latitudinarianism were “repudiation of predestination, a concomitant emphasis on free will and striving as the keys to salvation, and an almost obsessive concern for design, order, and harmony as the primary manifestations of God’s role in the universe.”46 After the publication of Newton’s Principia in 1687, Newtonianism was accepted by the Anglican, low- church latitudinarians because it best suited their social, political and religious ideologies.

By contrast, Michael Hunter has argued that the claim of “so positive a ‘Latitudinarian’ ideology for science” is “problematic in failing to account for the fact that others who moved in scientific circles had contrary views on many key issues.” Instead he suggests that any kind of “Latitudinarianism” associated with seventeenth-century scientists was just “a generalised attempt to play down disagreement and to emphasise the potential appeal of science to as many people with vaguely similar opinions as possible.”47 In addition, Larry Stewart argues that the question of a Newtonian ideology is not a simple one. Acceptance of Newtonian natural philosophy was not inherently linked to any single political or religious ideology.48 Further, as Geoffrey Holmes notes, some of the leading protagonists of Newtonianism were “deeply tainted with heresy in the eyes of the bulk of the clergy.”49 Thus, the purported connection between

45 Jacob and Jacob, “Anglican Origins of Modern Science,” 253-254. 46 Ibid., 258. 47 Michael Hunter, Science and the Shape of Orthodoxy: Intellectual Change in Late Seventeenth-Century Britain (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1995), 110. 48 Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 318. 49 Geoffrey Holmes, “Science, Reason, and Religion in the Age of Newton,” The British Journal for the History of Science 11 (1978): 169. 19 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

Anglicanism and Newtonianism also fails to justify the use of the harmony metaphor.50 c. Criticisms of the Metaphors

This is a very brief overview of just a few key examples from the vast array of accounts designed to explain the rise of modern science, but all are susceptible to the same fundamental critique. While these stories might have some persuasive or rhetorical value, none are able adequately to describe or explain the rich and varied interactions between science and religion. Examples of supposed conflict between science and religion, although they might be useful in arguing for a separation of science and religion today, can be explained in alternative ways. Even histories of the positive influence of religion on science, which fall into the general category of the harmony metaphor, fail to consider the wide variety of religious beliefs held at the time.51

Not only has the factual basis of these individual views been criticised, but the validity of the whole enterprise of explaining the rise of science according to the role of theological doctrines itself has also been challenged. For example, in his critique of the “Foster thesis,” Edward B. Davis has pointed out that the situation of Christianity and early modern science is one that is historically

50 It should be noted that there are more sophisticated accounts of science and religion that may be considered under the general heading of “harmony.” One particularly important and influential account was proposed by Peter Harrison in The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). In this book, Harrison presents a convincing case for an “indirect, even diffuse, influence of Protestantism on the development of modern science” [8]. While he acknowledges that there would have been a range of factors involved, Harrison credits the Protestant reformers’ insistence on a literal interpretation of Scripture as playing the most significant role in the rise of natural science, by encouraging a parallel emphasis on a literal interpretation of nature. In a more recent book, Harrison has narrowed his focus to one particular consequence of this literal turn, arguing that the myth of the fall of Adam in the Garden of Eden, now read as an historical narrative, influenced the development of experimental science. See Peter Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 51 The neglect of Catholicism in this discussion reflects the overwhelming focus on Protestantism in this genre of history. For a concise treatment of Catholicism and science in the seventeenth century, see William B. Ashworth, Jr., “Catholicism and Early Modern Science,” in God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter Between Christianity and Science, ed. David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 136-166. 20 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

complex, and thus resists any form of simple analysis.52 Further, Lotte Mulligan argues, no inherent degree of compatibility between one specific religious view and science will ever prove a causal connection, since an interest in science was compatible with a whole range of religious, political and social attitudes.53 Similarly, John Henry has stated that only a general affiliation, one that was not dependent on any particular set of theological doctrines, existed between science and religion.54 This rejection of simplistic metaphors has even become a “thesis” in its own right—commonly referred to as the “complexity thesis,” and ascribed most often to John Hedley Brooke.55

These criticisms from historians such as Davis, Henry and Mulligan hint at a point that will be central to the argument presented in this thesis. While a wide range of theories has been proposed in an attempt to explain the connection between science and religion, none of these can stand up to sustained historical critique. The metaphors of conflict, separation and harmony are all inadequate for the purpose of describing, let alone explaining, the relationship between science and religion. However, though these narratives are inadequate, they are not entirely without merit. While religion did not cause the rise of modern science, it was neither absent nor always opposed to science. There were connections between science and religion, and these simple accounts can be viewed as drawing attention to different aspects of this incredibly varied and complex network of interactions.56

52 Edward B. Davis, “Christianity and Early Modern Science: The Foster Thesis Reconsidered,” in Evangelicals and Science in Historical Perspective, ed. David N. Livingstone, D. G. Hart and Mark A. Noll (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75-95. 53 Lotte Mulligan, “Anglicanism, Latitudinarianism and Science in Seventeenth Century England,” Annals of Science 30 (1973), 213-219. 54 John Henry, “The Scientific Revolution in England,” in The Scientific Revolution in National Context, ed. Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 178- 209. 55 The phrase “complexity thesis” is generally agreed to have originated with two important works (Lindberg and Numbers, God and Nature; and Brooke, Science and Religion), although the authors in question did not explicitly call their perspective a thesis. See, for example, the discussion in David B. Wilson, “The Historiography of Science and Religion,” in Ferngren, The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition, 3-11. The “complexity thesis” is also upheld by the more recent collection of essays edited by Lindberg and Numbers, When Science and Christianity Meet. 56 It must also be acknowledged that although there is no inherent conflict between science and religion, conflict does sometimes occur. For a nuanced discussed of the possible conflict 21 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

3. From “Science and Religion” to “Natural Philosophy and

Theology”

There are a number of reasons why histories of science and religion based on the ideas of conflict, harmony or separation fail adequately to grasp the complexity of the situation. Firstly, all three metaphors presuppose a clear distinction between the domains of science and religion, although in the seventeenth century there was no consensus that these boundaries were clear.57 Secondly, in these accounts, “science” and “religion” are taken as terms whose meaning is unequivocal and atemporal. However, a number of historians have cautioned that “science” and “religion” are historically contingent categories.58 Some, such as David B. Wilson, even suggest that historians should stop talking of “science” and “religion” entirely. These terms, Wilson argues, were used in many different ways by the historical actors. As a result, the terms “science” and “religion” are “infinitely malleable” and therefore “lack meanings fixed enough for employment in defining the basic components of a system of knowledge.”59 Further, even taking broad definitions, Wilson points out that intellectual history usually involves conflict not between science and religion, but between different harmonious combinations of “religious” and “scientific” ideas. That is, people have historically had differing, and sometimes conflicting, ideas about how to combine science and religion.

In an attempt to circumvent this problem, Margaret Osler advocates replacing “science” with “natural philosophy,” a more historically accurate term for the

between science and religion, see Kenneth W. Kemp, “The Possibility of Conflict between Science and Christian Theology,” in Facets of Faith and Science, Volume 1: Historiography and Modes of Interaction, ed. Jitse M. van der Meer (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 247-265. 57 This theme will continue throughout the thesis, as the various natural theologians’ views on natural philosophy and theology are discussed in detail. 58 One of the first proponents of this view was Brooke in Science and Religion. 59 David B. Wilson, “On the Importance of Eliminating Science and Religion from the History of Science and Religion: The Cases of Oliver Lodge, J. H. Jeans and A. S. Eddington,” in Facets of Faith and Science, Volume 1: Historiography and Modes of Interaction, ed. Jitse M. van der Meer (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 27-47. See also Peter Harrison, “‘Science’ and ‘Religion’: Constructing the Boundaries,” The Journal of Religion 86 (2006): 81-106 for a sophisticated treatment of the terminology of science and religion. 22 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

study of nature in the early modern period, which will be discussed further below.60 She also draws an explicit distinction between religion and theology. For Osler, “religion” refers to doctrine, faith and practice, whereas “theology” is the enterprise of explaining the meaning of these doctrines or practices, usually by employing philosophical concepts and arguments.61 Thus she concludes that many of the issues discussed as relating to “science and religion” actually concern natural philosophy and theology. Kenneth J. Howell also offers a warning about the use of “theology,” identifying the need for historians to distinguish between theology as a discipline and theology as a set of beliefs. Using Kepler as an example, he argues that “Theology as a formal discipline was distinct from astronomy in his mind, but theology as a set of beliefs provided the metaphysical grounding for the true cosmology.”62 This distinction indicates that interactions between theology and natural philosophy could take place on different levels, such as between the disciplines themselves or amongst the beliefs held by individuals.63

While it is important for the historian to be cautious about the use of terminology, there is an even deeper problem that needs to be addressed. It is true that natural philosophy and theology are more historically appropriate terms than science and religion, particularly when dealing with the seventeenth century, but the fields of theology and natural philosophy were themselves contested. In early modern Europe, there was no single system of natural philosophy, just as there was no monolithic religion to which all people subscribed. Interactions occurred not just between fields but also within them, in part over participants’ views on how to link one field to the other. Thus, before turning to see what a more sophisticated approach to the interactions

60 Osler, “Mixing Metaphors.” 61 “For example, the Roman Catholic celebration of the Eucharist is a religious practice; the explanation of the real presence of Christ in the elements of the mass by the Thomist theory of transubstantiation is theological.” Ibid., 92. This distinction could be used to support a distinction between “natural religion” and “natural theology.” As Chapters 2 and 3 will establish, however, such a distinction may be convenient for the historian, but was not so neatly upheld by the historical actors. 62 Kenneth J. Howell, God’s Two Books: Copernican Cosmology and Biblical Interpretation in Early Modern Science (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 135. 63 This point will be seen to be crucial in the model of natural theology to be developed in Chapter 3. 23 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

between natural philosophy and theology might involve, it will be helpful to examine the fields themselves. a. Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century

Some historians have attempted to define natural philosophy in terms of its connection with theology. Andrew Cunningham, for example, takes the view that the primary purpose and goal of natural philosophy was to study God’s creation and his attributes:

Natural philosophy scrutinized, described, and held up to admiration the universe as the true God had created it and kept it running.… [It] was an autonomous study separate from theology and from natural theology, but whose practitioners had at the forefront of their minds, as Creator of the universe they were studying, the same God whose attributes the theologians studied from other points of view.64

Thus, natural philosophy was “about God’s achievements, God’s intentions, God’s purposes, God’s messages to man.”65 When men stopped looking for God in nature, they stopped doing natural philosophy and started doing the god-less activity of science.

While Cunningham’s account of natural philosophy is valuable for taking the connection between theology and natural knowledge seriously, his argument has been criticised by other historians. Peter Dear, for example, suggests that the link between natural philosophy and God was strong, but contingent.66 While for Cunningham, natural philosophy retained its identity throughout time, Dear argues that what natural philosophy was like at a particular time is an empirical question for historians. According to Dear, Cunningham fails to consider examples of nineteenth-century scientists who believed that God played a central role in their work. Each particular instance must be examined

64 Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams, “De-centring the ‘Big Picture’: The Origins of Modern Science and the Modern Origins of Science,” The British Journal for the History of Science 26 (1993): 421. 65 Andrew Cunningham, “Getting the Game Right: Some Plain Words on the Identity and Invention of Science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 19 (1988): 384. 66 Peter Dear, “Religion, Science and Natural Philosophy: Thoughts on Cunningham’s Thesis,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32 (2001): 377-386. 24 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

to discover the exact nature of the connection between theology and natural philosophy. Before approaching the relations between natural philosophy and theology, it is necessary to articulate the distinction between natural philosophy and science: defining natural philosophy according to its relationship with theology will not do. i. Terminology

In his recent popular treatment of the Royal Society of London, The Fellowship, John Gribbin describes the activities of its members as what we now call “science.” He acknowledges that the people in question would have referred to themselves as “natural philosophers,”

But as the old saying goes, if it looks like a duck, flies like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck. In modern terminology, the people who are the subjects of this book were scientists, and what they did was science; only the saddest pedant would object to my use of the word science in this context.67

However, natural philosophy in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries cannot be regarded simply as science referred to by another name. Rather, there are fundamental differences between the early modern enterprise of natural philosophy and the pursuit of science as it is understood today. This distinction is crucial not only for appreciating the relations of theology and natural philosophy, but also for understanding the period of time generally referred to as “the Scientific Revolution.”68 In the early modern period, the term “science” retained its Scholastic meaning: “‘scientia’ referred to demonstrative knowledge of the real essence of things.”69 Natural philosophy, or “physics”, on the other hand, was a theoretical science that dealt with things

67 John Gribbin, The Fellowship: The Story of a Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 2006), xiii. 68 Throughout the rest of this thesis, “science” will be used to refer to the study of nature in general, in non-specific historical contexts, while “natural philosophy” will be used to designate the study of nature in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 69 Osler, “Mixing Metaphors,” 91. 25 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

“which are inseparable from matter but not immovable,”70 and included the study of “the first causes of nature, change and motion in general, the motions of celestial bodies, the motions and transformations of the elements, generation and corruption, the phenomena of the upper atmosphere right below the lunar sphere, and the study of animals and plants.”71 Thus, natural philosophy was a broader and more unified discipline than what is usually meant by “science” today, encompassing questions about the natural world as well as metaphysical and ethical issues. ii. The Intellectual Tradition of Natural Philosophy

Although a number of historians have attempted to articulate the category of natural philosophy,72 one of the most sophisticated treatments of the issue is found in the work of John Schuster.73 For Schuster, although Aristotelianism

70 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1026a14-15, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 2: 1620. Quoted in Osler, “Mixing Metaphors,” 92. 71 Edward Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 136. Quoted in Osler, “Mixing Metaphors,” 92. 72 See, for example, Andrew Cunningham, “How the Principia got its Name; or, Taking Natural Philosophy Seriously,” History of Science 29 (1991): 377-392; Cunningham, “Getting the Game Right;” Cunningham and Williams, “De-centring the ‘Big Picture’;” Peter Harrison, “Physico- Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 165-183; Osler, “Mixing Metaphors.” 73 John Schuster has developed the category of “natural philosophy” in Scientific Revolution studies in a series of publications: John A. Schuster, “The Scientific Revolution,” in Companion to the History of Modern Science, ed. R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie and M. J. S. Hodge (London: Routledge, 1990), 217-242; Schuster and Graeme Watchirs, “Natural Philosophy, Experiment and Discourse in the Eighteenth Century: Beyond the Kuhn/Bachelard Problematic,” in Experimental Inquiries: Historical, Philosophical and Social Studies of Experiment, ed. H. E. LeGrand (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1990), 1-48; Schuster, “Descartes Agonistes: New Tales of Cartesian Mechanism,” Perspectives on Science 3 (1995): 99-145; Schuster and Alan B. H. Taylor, “Blind Trust: The Gentlemanly Origins of Experimental Science,” Social Studies of Science 27 (1997): 503-536; Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative,” in La Rivoluzione Scientifica, ed. D. Garber (Rome: Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2002), 337- 357; Peter R. Anstey and Schuster, “Introduction,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 1-7. He has sketched the latest version of his model in “From Natural Philosophy to Science(s): Transformations (Intended and Unintended), Not Ruptures, in Early Modern Knowledge Networks—The Disputed Case of the Early Royal Society” (paper presented at the first international conference of the ARC Network of Early European Researchers, University of Western Australia, July, 2007), hereafter cited as NEER.

26 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

was dominant until the seventeenth century, the field or culture of natural philosophising encompassed more than merely its hegemonic Aristotelian variants. The families or genres of natural philosophy differed from each other, yet they obeyed common rules about the production and content of natural philosophical claims. To understand these rules, Schuster has developed a detailed conceptual model of natural philosophy “as a dynamic, elite sub-culture and field of contestation.” This model is not only helpful for understanding natural philosophy as an intellectual tradition, but also provides some categories for describing the seventeenth-century tradition of natural theology.74

Firstly, natural philosophy was an intellectual tradition, characterised by the making and negotiating of claims to systematic natural knowledge and of claims that, in principle, fit with an existing or proposed system. According to Schuster, “when one ‘Natural philosophised’ one tried systematically to explain the nature of matter, the cosmological structuring of that matter, the principles of causation and the methodology for acquiring or justifying such knowledge.”75 The intellectual tradition of natural philosophy was not pursued in isolation. Natural philosophical claims were almost always considered in relation to other fields, variously considered superior, such as theology; cognate, such as mathematics; subordinate, such as the mixed mathematical sciences for Aristotelians; or simply relevant, such as pedagogy or the practical arts. For Schuster, tools borrowed from the sociology of science enable historians to “see that the positioning of natural philosophical claims in relation to other enterprises always involved two routine manoeuvres: the drawing or enforcing

An extended version of the model will appear as Chapter 2, “Conceptual and Historiographical Foundations—Natural Philosophy, Mixed Mathematics, Physico-Mathematics, Method” in Schuster’s forthcoming Descartes Agonistes: Physico-Mathematics, Method and Corpuscular- Mechanism, 1618-37. 74 Of course, natural theology was a looser intellectual tradition than natural philosophy. 75 Schuster, NEER, 3; Schuster, “The Scientific Revolution,” 225; Schuster and Watchirs, “Natural Philosophy, Experiment and Discourse,” 14. 27 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

of boundaries and the making or defending of linkages (including efforts to undermine others’ attempts at bounding and linking).”76

Secondly, Schuster identifies natural philosophy as a competitive creative field, following the sociology of such fields pioneered by Pierre Bourdieu. In part, natural philosophers competed through attempts to co-opt enterprises related to natural philosophy such as mathematics, the mixed mathematical sciences or the practical arts. Indeed, natural philosophers could compete purely through appropriating resources without necessarily producing any new experiments or new phenomena themselves.

Thirdly, natural philosophy was a textual domain, in that actors within the field were concerned with producing textual claims to systematic natural knowledge. Natural philosophical players knew what natural philosophical claims were and negotiated about them. Further, there were negotiable rules, or a grammar of utterance, in natural philosophy. That is, there were rules for the production of natural philosophical claims. As Schuster points out, “Natural philosophers learnt the rules—or template for—natural philosophising while studying hegemonic Scholastic Aristotelianism. Even alternative systems followed the rules of this game.”77

Fourthly, natural philosophy was a sub-culture within a larger culture. The European culture of natural philosophising depended upon “the establishment of a European system of universities all teaching and arguing about variants of a Christianised Aristotelian corpus in logic and natural philosophy.”78 The Christianised Aristotelianism taught in the universities was not simply “a throwaway rite of passage for future stars of the Scientific Revolution,” or just

76 Schuster, NEER, 6. See also Schuster, “The Scientific Revolution,” 222, 226-227; Schuster and Watchirs, “Natural Philosophy, Experiment and Discourse,” 15-16; Schuster, “Descartes Agonistes,” 109-110, 139-142; Anstey and Schuster, “Introduction,” 3. 77 Schuster, NEER, 3. See also Schuster, “Descartes Agonistes,” 110-111; Schuster and Taylor, “Blind Trust,” 515-516; Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative,” 345 (“grammatical conceptuale”). As we will see in Chapter 3, this is the point on which natural theology as a tradition most resembles natural philosophy. The kaleidoscope metaphor will be used to model the grammar of natural theology: the rules by which natural theological utterances were produced. 78 Schuster, NEER, 7. See also Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative,” 337. 28 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

something that the new scientists endured until they could replace it with their own “modern” science. Rather, “it was the intellectual culture for pursuing knowledge of nature in which they lived and breathed.”79

Fifthly and finally, natural philosophy was a set of organisational nodes or loci. Natural philosophy was not a concrete functional institution in the sense understood by, for example, Mertonian sociology of science. However, there were various organisational nodes or loci through which the game of natural philosophy was played. However, natural philosophy cannot be reduced to any one institution, such as the Royal Society of London. Rather, each particular institution needs to be carefully examined to determine how it produced and reproduced natural philosophy. iii. Natural Philosophy in the Scientific Revolution

Historically, there have been wide ranging opinions as to what the Scientific Revolution actually entailed.80 For Andrew Dickson White, one of the earliest and most significant proponents of the “conflict thesis,” the Scientific Revolution marked the liberation of science from the clutches of theology, while for Amos Funkenstein, it included the emergence of a “secular” theology, which could be practised by natural philosophers.81 Peter Dear has viewed the Scientific Revolution in terms of the end of natural philosophy and the beginning of modern experimental science, whereas more recent approaches emphasise “patterns of change in the continuing culture of natural philosophising.”82 As Margaret Osler has put it, “The trick is to recognize that intellectual change occurred while at the same time recognizing that change is

79 Schuster, NEER, 5. 80 For a detailed analysis of the historiography of the Scientific Revolution, see H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994). 81 White, History of the Warfare of Science with Theology; Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 82 Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Anstey and Schuster, The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century, 3. 29 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

not necessarily linear or self-evident progress toward our modern way of thinking.”83

From this kind of perspective, the seventeenth century was a time of great turmoil within the tradition of natural philosophy, but the so-called “Scientific Revolution” was not characterised by a simple replacement of natural philosophy with modern science. Rather, as John Schuster has argued, the seventeenth century was a time of “civil war” among competing natural philosophical systems. From around 1590 to 1650, alternative natural philosophies flourished, and by the middle of the seventeenth century, the cultural dominance of Aristotelianism collapsed.84 In part, this proliferation of natural philosophies was prompted by the religious and political crises of the period, as the “correct” system of natural philosophy was thought to provide support for the “correct” religion. As Schuster points out, “The fact that there was, of course, no consensus on correct religion casts a poignant light on this struggle and explains both its intensity and ultimate lack of closure.”85 There was disagreement even among proponents of the mechanical philosophy, which eventually became dominant, as individuals differed over the details of the natural philosophical system. Thus, there could be no single relationship between natural philosophy and theology, because there was no single system of natural philosophy. Each version of natural philosophy could be articulated with, and used to support, a particular conception of religion.

In addition, by the end of the seventeenth century, the unity of natural philosophy had begun to disintegrate. Mathematics, considered by Aristotelians as incapable of explaining physical phenomena, began to play a greater role in the study of the natural world, as “the emergent physico-mathematical fields, always somewhat distinct from natural philosophy, more and more absorbed

83 Margaret J. Osler, “The Canonical Imperative: Rethinking the Scientific Revolution,” in Rethinking the Scientific Revolution, ed. Margaret J. Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9. 84 Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative,” 337. See also Schuster, “The Scientific Revolution,” 232-238. 85 Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative,” 339. See also Schuster, “The Scientific Revolution,” 236-237. 30 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

questions previously treated in natural philosophy.”86 As this progressed, “the conceptual framework in these areas became detached from their original sources in competing natural philosophies and began to assume more consensual characters, or at least become less hostage to the immediate demands of one or another overbearing natural philosophical system.”87 With the transmutation of the old mixed mathematical sciences and the development of new disciplines, natural philosophy dissipated into many more narrow “scientific” specialities. This did not necessarily entail a change in the primary purpose of the study, as Cunningham proposes. Rather, it was the way in which the study of nature was organised that was transformed.

While the phrase “the Scientific Revolution” generally refers to the period of time from around 1500 to 1700, many historians recognise a critical period spanning the first few generations of the seventeenth century. As Dear points out, “it is only in the seventeenth century that the dream of improving knowledge of nature by restoring the ways of antiquity began to be replaced by a widespread sense that newly developed knowledge surpassed, rather than merely emulated, ancient achievements.”88 In England, this time frame is particularly significant. James R. Jacob locates English contributions to the Scientific Revolution in the period from the 1630s to the 1680s, and John Henry has noted that “a recognizably ‘modern’ science consolidated itself and began to flourish in Interregnum England.”89

86 Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative,” 352. Schuster and Watchirs (“Natural Philosophy, Experiment and Discourse”) earlier applied this model of the process of dissipation of natural philosophy into more narrow successor fields to the problem, raised originally by Gaston Bachelard and Thomas Kuhn, of the emergence of new experimental fields in the eighteenth century. The process for both physico-mathematical and new experimental fields is discussed in Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative.” 87 Schuster, “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative,” 356. Again, an analogous process for the new experimental domains was presented earlier in Schuster and Watchirs (“Natural Philosophy, Experiment and Discourse”) and reprised in Schuster (“L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative”) with the physico-mathematical cases added. 88 Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and its Ambitions, 1500-1700 (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 8. 89 James R. Jacob, The Scientific Revolution: Aspirations and Achievements, 1500, 1700 (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998), 93; John Henry, “The Scientific Revolution in England,” 179-80. 31 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

This is the view of natural philosophy that will be taken throughout the rest of the thesis. Natural theology was separate from, but related to, a complex, contested discourse that was undergoing great turmoil and disruption in the seventeenth century. Indeed, it was this turmoil, the so-called “Scientific Revolution,” that joined with the theological upheaval of the Protestant Reformation to create the space that English natural theology occupied. b. Theology and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Peter Dear has outlined the need for any discussion of natural philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to include consideration of the role of what he terms “the Church.”90 However, as he points out, “the Church” was not a monolithic entity, nor did religious authorities impose a single worldview. The most obvious division in Christianity was between Catholics and Protestants, but each of these churches also contained a variety of groups. Even the Established Church of England had different factions, which changed over time. The seventeenth century, in particular, was a time of great political and religious upheaval in England. As this thesis is concerned with the tradition of natural theology in England, it will be necessary to consider the religious context in which it emerged.

The Church of England first broke with the Church of Rome in the 1530s during the reign of Henry VIII (1509-47), but this was primarily a jurisdictional, rather than theological, breach. Indeed, the history of the Church of England shows that politics and religion were never very far apart. Under Henry VIII’s son, Edward VI (1547-55), “the English Reformation succeeded in smashing Catholicism beyond repair, but little, if anything, had been done to root Protestantism among the English people.”91 Although the Catholic Queen Mary (1553-8) sought to return England to the Church of Rome, a comprehensive settlement of the Church of England was achieved with the accession of Elizabeth in 1558.

90 Dear, “The Church and the New Philosophy.” 91 John Spurr, English Puritanism: 1603-1689 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 9. 32 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

The Church of England was established as an independent church in 1559, with two acts being passed by Parliament. The first, the Act of Supremacy, confirmed Queen Elizabeth I as Supreme Governor of the Church of England. The second, the Act of Uniformity, forced people to attend Sunday service in an Anglican church and established a new version of the Book of Common Prayer. As John Spurr puts it, “The Prayer Book was to be the common mode of the Elizabethan church, the bond between all those of different theological dispositions who were to be comprehended within the one national church.”92 This Elizabethan Settlement was designed to be a compromise, but not all religious factions were satisfied. Some hoped for an eventual return to the Church of Rome, while others desired further reform. Such divisions in the church continued throughout the seventeenth century.

With the accession of the Presbyterian James VI of Scotland as James I of England in 1603, the Puritans, who advocated further reform, thought their time had come. Despite the Scottish Church being modelled along Calvinist lines, James was more moderate than the English Puritans desired. A more serious problem, however, was his particular take on the notion of “the divine right of kings.” For James, this meant that he was above the law, which was merely his instrument for ruling on God’s behalf. Although in one sense this attitude guaranteed the position of the Established Church—“James’s theology of kingship lent support to the idea of religious establishment, thus safeguarding their positions, status, and incomes at a time of uncertainty”93—it also sowed the seeds of discontent between Puritans and the monarchy.

The situation was exacerbated when James I died in 1625 and was succeeded by his son, Charles I, an even more pro-Catholic and anti-Puritan monarch than his father. As John Spurr argues, when the English Parliament began to dismantle the regime of Charles I in 1641, “the most systematic and ferocious attack was not upon the political and legal agents of Stuart tyranny, but upon

92 Ibid. See also Alister McGrath, Christianity’s Dangerous Idea: The Protestant Revolution (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2007), 105-126. 93 McGrath, Christianity’s Dangerous Idea, 134. 33 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

the Church of England.”94 The Civil Wars in England broke out in 1642, and culminated in the execution of Charles I in 1649. The monarchy and the House of Lords were abolished, and replaced with Oliver Cromwell’s “Protectorate” in 1653. After Cromwell’s death in 1658, his son Richard assumed the role but abdicated in 1659. The Stuart monarchy was restored in 1660 with the return of Charles II from exile, and his ascension to the throne.

While Charles II was merely reputed to be a Catholic, his brother James was openly supportive of the Church of Rome. As Charles II had no legitimate heir, James was next in line for the throne, and many feared that England would return to Catholicism. Three years after James II succeeded his brother as King in 1685, the Protestant William III of Orange, who was married to Mary, daughter of James II, was asked to invade England.95 This caused James II to flee, conveniently leaving the throne of England “vacant.” The following year, in 1689, William and Mary were declared joint sovereigns by Parliament. Parliament declared the doctrine of the divine right of kings—that the throne was given by God—to be in error.

Of course, this is a simplistic overview of the politico-religious events of seventeenth-century England. More detail will emerge in the case studies, as the particular historical contexts of the natural theological inflection points are discussed. For the moment, however, it suffices to observe that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were characterised by a great deal of theological upheaval and conflict in England. Although the Puritans and the supporters of the Church of England were the main religious groups in the seventeenth century, there were also a variety of radical sects, commonly designated as “enthusiasts.” Members of these sects tended to be agitating for even more reform of the Established Church than the Puritans desired. In the second half of the seventeenth century, groups that strongly emphasised the role of reason or even denied the validity of the Christian Scriptures were on the rise,

94 John Spurr, The Restoration Church of England, 1646-1689 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 3. 95 Members of the Parliament had conspired with James II’s detractors to deal with the threat of Catholicism. The invitation to William was issue by the Bishop of London, Henry Compton, and six noblemen: the Earls of Danby, Shrewsbury and Devonshire; the Viscount Lumley, Edward Russell and Henry Sydney. 34 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

providing additional challenges for orthodox Christians. Further, although the Church of England was restored along with the Stuart monarchy, there were those who were not comprehended within this settlement, and many clergymen lost their positions. While the Church was once again established, it was still not united, and was certainly not without its detractors. For this reason, it is not possible to speak of merely one “religion” in seventeenth-century England. While the vast majority of people were mainstream Protestant Christians, there was a sufficient variety of viewpoints to mean that any single “relationship” between natural philosophy and religion cannot be upheld.

4. Natural Philosophy and Theology: Negotiations and

Articulations

With these discussions of the complexity of theology and natural philosophy in the early modern period in mind, a more sophisticated understanding of the interactions between them can be developed. For example, Margaret Osler, whose important contributions to this issue were touched upon earlier, has proposed replacing the traditional metaphors of conflict, separation and harmony with new metaphors of appropriation and translation. These, she states, are “designed to emphasize the conceptual influence and interaction between theology and natural philosophy.”96 This approach emphasises the negotiations between theology and natural philosophy, and the discursive nature of both domains.

Similarly, John Hedley Brooke has become well known for his “complexity thesis”, which acknowledges the variety of relations between science (including, but not limited to, seventeenth-century natural philosophy) and Christianity.97 More recently, he has advocated the complete rejection of the idea of a “relationship.” To speak of a relationship between science and religion assumes an essentialist separation between these two domains, but Brooke argues that

96 Osler, “Mixing Metaphors,” 101. 97 Brooke, Science and Religion. As Lindberg and Numbers put it, Brooke “reveled in the rich diversity of interplay between science and Christianity.” When Science and Christianity Meet, 3. 35 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

this needs to be historically and contextually determined. In Brooke’s view, interactions between religious beliefs and the sciences can take place on many levels. Scientific and theological discourses can have many functions, depending both on the role adopted by the scientist or theologian, and the audience to which the discourse is directed.98 For Brooke, the terms used to formulate questions about science and religion are at best linguistic crutches. Trying to reduce the negotiation of religious and scientific views to some inherent “relations between science and religion” is to misunderstand them. Also, it misses the social and existential dimensions of a person’s deepest convictions. Brooke contends that:

The more subtle approach is to recognise that religious beliefs and practices can shape world views, that world views might find expression in a commitment to metaphysical principles that govern theory construction, and that these, in turn, may govern the degree of assent one might give to particular explanatory theories.99

In a similar vein, Peter Harrison points out that natural philosophy and theology are not disembodied practices, but activities carried out by individuals. Thus, there is no single relationship between the two, but instead a variety of interactions depending on the context. People such as Galileo, Descartes and Bacon had their own particular views on how the division of theology and natural philosophy should be managed, which seems to indicate that there was no “single straightforward understanding of the role that God or theological claims might play in the sphere of natural philosophy.”100 Harrison argues that theology and natural philosophy in the seventeenth century were characterised by a variety of interactions and a continual negotiation of boundaries.101

Martin Rudwick contends that even scholarly historical studies of science have escaped only superficially from the powerful triumphalism of modern science,

98 John Hedley Brooke, “Religious Belief and the Natural Sciences: Mapping the Historical Landscape,” in Facets of Faith and Science, Volume 1: Historiography and Modes of Interaction, ed. Jitse M. van der Meer (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 1-26. 99 John Hedley Brooke, “Religious Belief and the Content of the Sciences,” Osiris 16 (2001): 3- 28. 100 Harrison, “Physico-Theology,” 170. 101 Ibid. 36 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

such as that offered by Draper and White in their articulations of the conflict thesis.102 To counteract this, Rudwick advocates the use of an enlarged and enriched version of the famous Edinburgh “strong programme” in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This, he suggests, will lead to a more adequate understanding of the relation between science and religion in terms of our individually and socially constructed sense of the natural world and of God.103

The Edinburgh programme, to which Steven Shapin was a key contributor, is “strong” in the sense that it “deliberately explores the possibility that the social circumstances and social goals of scientists may affect the actual content of the claimed knowledge which results from their activity.”104 However, Rudwick argues, the social construction of scientific knowledge retains “a highly mediated connection to whatever is directly experienced in the natural world.”105 In a similar way, consideration of the social construction of religious knowledge106 should take into account experiences that are “labelled—whether appropriately or not—as the effects of God.”107 The use of this programme will help historians to see that resources from both scientific and religious traditions could be employed by actors in order to achieve their goals. From this perspective, scientific claims are not privileged over theological claims. Instead of asking how religious beliefs influenced scientific views, the historian should ask how a particular view or piece of claimed knowledge (scientific or religious) has been used, by whom and to serve what interests.108

102 Draper, History of the Conflict; White, Warfare of Science with Theology. 103 Martin Rudwick, “Senses of the Natural World and Senses of God: Another Look at the Historical Relation of Science and Religion,” in The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century, ed. Arthur Robert Peacocke (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 241- 261. 104 Ibid., 247. 105 Ibid., 254. 106 Rudwick is careful to refer to claims about God collectively shared by a social group as religious “knowledge” rather than religious “belief,” indicating an equal footing with the claimed “scientific knowledge” of a community. 107 Rudwick, “Senses of the Natural World,” 254. 108 Of course, Rudwick was not the first to suggest replacing the idea of “influence” with the concept of “use” or “employment.” Steven Shapin is notable for this viewpoint within the sociology of scientific knowledge, drawing on earlier work from Quentin Skinner. See especially Steven Shapin, “Social Uses of Science,” in The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science, ed. George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter 37 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

Another crucial lesson for the historian here is that religious beliefs themselves can be motivations for historical actors just as socio-political interests are. This does not imply that it is somehow better for a scientist or natural philosopher to be motivated by doctrinal considerations, but merely that religious beliefs do not have to be taken as an alias for something “real”. By taking the religious beliefs and intentions of the actors seriously, they can be seen as behaving—that is, taking actions and expressing beliefs—for that reason. As Stephen Wykstra has argued, historians need to be more open to the role of religious beliefs in the sciences: “It is essential for historians to sensitise themselves to the experiential, existential and practical functions of religious belief if they are to approach their subject matter with discernment.”109

In considering the religious beliefs of individuals, it is important to be charitable and to view these beliefs as sincere, as opposed to some historians who seem to view religion as having a primarily political purpose. 110 It is cynical to assume that religious beliefs could only be held for socio-political reasons, as though such historians still have not quite escaped the idea that science and religion cannot mix. On the other hand, it is important to avoid naïveté in taking an individual’s pronouncements about his own religious beliefs entirely at face value. It must be acknowledged that there has never been a simple dichotomy between sincerity and political use. Most natural philosophers of the seventeenth century were committed to their religious beliefs, and believed that their own religion had a rational basis. However, their theological statements could also be used for other purposes. If religious beliefs were merely individual, this would not account for the emphasis placed on demonstrating religion, such as through natural theology. Such demonstrations frequently had

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; and “Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes,” Isis 72 (1981), 187-215. 109 Stephen J. Wykstra, “Religious Beliefs, Metaphysical Beliefs, and Historiography of Science,” Osiris 16 (2001): 42. 110 An excellent example of this approach, of taking religious beliefs seriously, is seen in Jan W. Wojcik, Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). She highlights the way in which Boyle’s theological conception of the limits of reason influenced his studies of nature and his expectations of success. The advantage of this kind of historical approach is in its appreciation of how an individual’s sincere religious views can shape his approach to natural philosophy, in contrast to those historians who limit consideration of theology to its wider socio-political ramifications and who translate religiously expressed beliefs and aims as mere surrogates for real social interests. 38 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 1

a dual purpose: to convince others of the reasonableness of theological doctrines, and also to support the use of natural philosophy as a means to a religious end. On the other hand, if religion were merely a means to a socio- political end, this would not fully explain the emphasis on worshipping God, as seen in the work of Robert Boyle and many of the clergymen who participated in his lectureship.111

5. Conclusion

This brief overview of the literature demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between theology and natural philosophy, especially in the seventeenth century. Since it is simplistic to speak of a conflict, separation or harmony between these two fields, these metaphors have been replaced by descriptions and analyses of the various negotiations and articulations between these two fields. In this thesis, it will be argued that English natural theology in the seventeenth century provided a discourse in which these articulations of the relationship between natural philosophy and theology could take place. Although there were many different versions of natural theology, conceived in concert with the varieties of natural philosophical systems and the assorted theological concepts in debate, natural theology had a crucial role in mediating between natural philosophy and theology.

Natural theology did not (and, perhaps, could not) fulfil this role as a static discipline, but rather as a dynamic discourse, able to be changed and adapted to the context and the available conceptual resources. Before modelling natural theology in detail, Chapter 2 will review existing accounts of natural theology, demonstrating that these have failed to grasp its complexity and, therefore, the role it could perform in negotiating the boundaries between theology and natural philosophy. In particular, we will see that natural theology could only emerge as an intellectual tradition in the seventeenth century, when the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation and the upheaval of the Scientific Revolution opened up a space between theology and natural philosophy.

111 See Chapter 5 for further discussion of Robert Boyle, and Chapter 6 for the Boyle Lectures. 39 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

CHAPTER 2

HISTORIES OF NATURAL THEOLOGY

Earth's crammed with heaven, And every common bush afire with God.

Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Aurora Leigh.1

1. Introduction

Although natural theology has been studied from the perspectives of both the history of science and the history of religion, existing accounts are inadequate for the purpose of explaining its role in the negotiations and articulations of natural philosophy and theology in early modern England. Not only are there a number of different definitions of it, but the stories told about its history also vary. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a detailed conceptual model of natural theology that will encompass both how it worked and a narrative of its history. Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to consider existing accounts of natural theology. By comparing these with each other, the advantages and shortcomings of each will be laid bare, ready to be dealt with in the detailed conceptual model of natural theology that will be presented in Chapter 3.

The aim of this chapter, then, is to present the main versions of the history of natural theology that arise from within two different traditions of scholarship: the history and philosophy of religion,2 and the history of science. While there are overlaps between these sets of literature, these ideal types give an idea of the standard approach from within each school of thought. The stories presented here are acknowledged to be idealisations, as there are, in the literature, specific

1 Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Aurora Leigh (New York: C. F. Francis & Co., 1857), 275. 2 For convenience, the history and the philosophy of religion will be treated together. However, it needs to be acknowledged at the outset that philosophers of religion are concerned primarily with the arguments being offered within natural theology, and tend not to be particularly sensitive to the historical context. 40 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

instances of more sophisticated treatments.3 However, for this very reason, these stories offer clear, initial perspectives as a starting point for working towards a better model of how natural theology worked as a tradition and domain of discourse. Amongst other things, it will be seen that while there are some similarities between these treatments, there are also striking differences. We shall see that this is because neither story has properly understood natural theology. A detailed conceptual model of natural theology is required to understand not only its inner workings, but also to narrate its trajectory over time. Thus, the problems of reconciliation between the two accounts point to the need for a carefully articulated model of the structure and dynamics of natural theology.

It is not the aim of this chapter to critique the finer details of either account, or to provide a definitive history of natural theology. Rather, the aim is to show that these stories, though widely accepted, are problematic, and hence that it will not be possible to move forward unless we first take a step back and approach natural theology in a more conceptual and critical fashion. Before we begin we need to note two further points that frame the discussion. Firstly, this chapter will not determine whether natural theology is legitimate from a Christian perspective, though a number of scholars have addressed this issue.4 Secondly, as this thesis is concerned with the connections between natural theology, natural philosophy and theology in seventeenth-century England, this chapter will provide some background on the different understandings historians have of natural theology in this period. While historians of science tend to identify the beginning of natural theology as being in the seventeenth century, historians and philosophers of religion view natural theology as a much older pursuit, dating back at least to Thomas Aquinas, possibly Augustine and

3 One particularly nuanced treatment of natural theology from an history of science perspective is found in Scott Mandelbrote, “The Uses of Natural Theology in Seventeenth-Century England,” Science in Context 20 (2007): 451-480. Mandelbrote argues that two distinct styles of natural theology—exemplified by the Cambridge Platonists on the one hand, and by John Wilkins and Robert Boyle on the other—emerged in seventeenth-century England from debates about the correct interpretation of evidence of divine action in nature. Mandelbrote’s approach is consistent with the model of natural theology developed in this thesis, in that he has identified the dynamic nature of natural theology, and the way in which the arguments developed depended on the existing presuppositions of the natural theologian. 4 See, for example, Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001-2003). 41 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

with hints in the Bible itself. Identifying the longer history of natural theology is therefore necessary for understanding the usual starting place of historians of science, but historians of religion often make the mistake of overlooking the seventeenth century. Further, the history of religion view of natural theology as a long-running tradition may suggest that natural theologians in the seventeenth century were not doing something new, as historians of science imply. Instead, perhaps they were doing something old in a new and more sustained manner.

2. History and Philosophy of Religion a. Definitions

Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg writes that “Christian theology from the very beginning has either stressed a general knowledge of God or at least treated it as self-evident.”5 This general knowledge of God is sometimes referred to as natural theology. Theologians have defined and reacted to the concept of natural theology in a variety of ways. The following statement from Millard Erickson is typical of a definition of natural theology from a modern Christian theology textbook (though, as we shall see, this is a distinctly post- Enlightenment perspective):

The core of natural theology is the idea that it is possible, without a prior commitment of faith to beliefs of Christianity, and without relying on any special authority, such as an institution (the church) or a document (the Bible), to come to a genuine knowledge of God on the basis of reason alone.6

Thus, according to Erickson, a natural theologian believes that there is valid, objective revelation of God to be found in such spheres as nature, history, and human personality, and that it is possible to gain some true knowledge of God from these spheres. Firstly, from observing the wonders of nature, the

5 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, band 1 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1988). Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley as Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 73. All page references are to the English translation. 6 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Michigan: Baker Books, 1998), 181. 42 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

greatness and wisdom of its Creator may be inferred. Secondly, God can be known through his work in human history, such as in the preservation of the nation of Israel. Thirdly, the moral and spiritual qualities of humankind are also thought to point to God’s character.

Similar definitions may also be found in encyclopaedias or dictionaries of religion. Consider, for example, the following definition from an encyclopaedia of the philosophy of religion: “Natural theology seeks to establish truth about God through the natural resources of human reason, in contrast to revelation by means of such special sources as sacred writings and ecclesial traditions.”7 Here is another from an encyclopaedia of Christianity: “In Christian thought, natural theology has usually been considered to be the view that human reason can have knowledge of God and God’s activity in the world without the aid of special revelation.”8 Both definitions emphasise knowledge gained by human reason by contrast with revelation from God. A more philosophical definition comes from the eminent Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga, who views natural theology as the attempt to provide proofs or arguments for the existence of God, or more precisely, for theism—the view that there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good person, who created the world.9

Thus, for historians and philosophers of religion, natural theology is generally viewed as the attempt to gain knowledge of the existence and nature of God, or the “being and attributes of God,” as it is frequently phrased, by using human reason applied to the materials of the natural world. This is generally placed in opposition to what is commonly termed revealed theology, which seeks knowledge of God based on the Scriptures. While the revelation of Scripture might point to the existence of these sources of knowledge of God, the idea in natural theology is that the knowledge itself can be gained without the need for this written word.

7 Anthony C. Thiselton, A Concise Encyclopaedia of the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: One World, 2002), 195. 8 James M. Byrne, “Natural Theology,” in Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. John Bowden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 826. 9 Alvin Plantinga, “The Prospects for Natural Theology,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 287. Plantinga is unusual here in referring to God as a “person” rather than a “being,” but this reflects his theistic view of a personal God. 43 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Theologian and philosopher Keith Ward states very simply that “natural theology is the part of theology that does not depend on revelation.”10 However, it could also be said that natural theology does not depend upon a particular kind of revelation. Christian theologians often refer to a perceived distinction between two types of revelation, general and special.11 General revelation is considered to be God’s communication of himself to all persons, at all times and in all places, while special revelation is God’s particular communications and manifestations of himself to particular persons at particular times. Simply put, the Scriptures are part of God’s special revelation, whereas nature, history and the inner being of human persons are part of general revelation. Natural theology, then, deals with knowledge of God from general revelation while revealed theology concerns knowledge of God from the Scriptures. As philosopher of religion Peter Byrne puts it,

Natural theology contains a body of truths about God and his relationship to the world discoverable by the use of unaided human reason and is contrasted with a body of truths—revealed theology, discoverable only by reflection on God’s special revelation in history.12

Note here that natural theology contains “a body of truths about God.” That is, not only does natural theology involve arguments intended to prove that God exists, but also the attempt to find out what God is like. Philosopher John

10 Keith Ward, “Natural Theology,” in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel Vrede van Huyssteen (Michigan: Macmillan Reference, 2003), 2: 601. 11 See, for example, Erickson, Christian Theology, chapter 8. Of course, the distinction between general and special revelation is itself a historical product. However, it is often taken for granted in discussions of natural theology, and will be treated unproblematically in this chapter. For a detailed discussion of the concept of general revelation, see G. C. Berkouwer, General Revelation (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1955), particularly chapter 1. In addition, this distinction can be seen as parallel, but not identical, to the popular seventeenth-century metaphor of God’s two books—the book of Nature and the book of Scripture. 12 Peter Byrne, Natural Religion and the Nature of Religion: The Legacy of Deism (London: Routledge, 1989), 1. “God’s special revelation in history” refers to God’s direct dealings with individuals or particular groups of people. However, since it is acknowledged by most Christians that God no longer speaks directly to people in this way, “special revelation” is often equated with Scripture; that is, the Holy Bible. Hebrews 1:1-2 states that “Long ago, at many times and in many ways, God spoke to our fathers by the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world.” For us today, this revelation can only be accessed through the written word of the Bible. The Bible is “special revelation” because it was given to particular people at a particular point in history, and is not universally available to all people at all times, in the way that nature is. Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture quotations are from The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Harper Collins Publishers, 2001), hereafter designated as ESV. 44 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Haldane suggests that the purpose of natural theology is to establish certain attributes of God, or what he calls the “preambles of faith,” such as:

Non-religion-specific truths about God, such as that he exists; that he has some or all of the following range of attributes: uniqueness, self- existence, eternity, immutability, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, omnibenevolence, immateriality; and that he is the creator and sustainer of the universe with whose well-being he is concerned.13

Thus, from the point of view of historians and philosophers of religion, natural theology is the pursuit of knowledge about the being and attributes of God, using reason applied to the natural world. This is in contrast to revealed theology, which is concerned with deriving knowledge of God from sources such as the Scriptures and church tradition. b. Natural Theology in the Bible

For many historians and philosophers of religion, natural theology is considered to have a long history, possibly dating back to the biblical authors. Certain passages from the Scriptures are seen as indicating a kind of natural theology, although the exact nature of this knowledge is open to interpretation. The most classic Old Testament reference is the beginning of Psalm 19:

The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands. Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they display knowledge. There is no speech or language where their voice is not heard.14

This indicates that by looking at the heavens, a person can be aware of the glory of God. There is some kind of knowledge, “spoken” by the heavens, which can

13 John Haldane, “Natural Theology,” in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, ed. Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 466. 14 Psalm 19:1-3. The Holy Bible, New International Version (International Bible Society, 1984), hereafter designated as NIV. An alternative translation can be found in the ESV: “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his handiwork. Day to day pours out speech, and night to night reveals knowledge. There is no speech, nor are there words, whose voice is not heard.” The NIV interpretation deals with the apparent paradox of speech being “poured out” and yet there being “no speech” or words. See also Derek Kidner, Psalms 1-72, Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1973), 98. 45 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

be understood by all people. A similar theme is seen in Psalm 8:3-4: “When I look at your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the stars, which you have set in place, what is man that you are mindful of him, and the son of man that you care for him?” From this passage, it can be inferred again that by examining the heavens, a person can be aware of how great God is, and how insignificant humans are.

Some theologians have also considered Job 38-41 to be a type of natural theological argument.15 Here, God himself is the natural theologian, pointing out the knowledge that Job should have gained about him from nature.16 For example, in chapter 38, God asks Job a series of questions, of which the following are just a small snippet:

Have you entered the storehouses of the snow, or have you seen the storehouses of the hail, which I have reserved for the time of trouble, for the day of battle and war? What is the way to the place where the light is distributed, or where the east wind is scattered upon the earth?

Who has cleft a channel for the torrents of rain and a way for the thunderbolt, to bring rain on a land where no man is, on the desert in which there is no man, to satisfy the waste and desolate land, and to make the ground sprout with grass?17

Of course, the answer to these questions is that Job has not done these things— God has. It is God who is in control over all aspects of nature, such as the weather. Job should have known these things from observing nature, and should not have questioned God.

15 See, for example, John J. Collins, “The Biblical Precedent for Natural Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 45 (1977): B:35-67 (supplement); and Wolfgang Philipp, “Physicotheology in the Age of Enlightenment: Appearance and History,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 57 (1967): 1233-1267. 16 The Book of Job tells the story of a righteous follower of God, whom God allows to be tested by Satan. Throughout the immense suffering that Job experiences, he does not respond with anger to God, thus disproving Satan’s prediction that he will curse God. However, he does begin to question God’s providence, and it is this issue that God addresses with a mammoth speech beginning in chapter 38, resulting in this response from Job: “I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted” (Job 42:2). 17 Job 38:22-27. 46 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

This is very poetic language, and could be dismissed as merely such, except that these ideas are also upheld in the New Testament. There are several passages that have commonly been used in support of natural theology. Firstly, there is a scene in the book of Acts where the apostles Paul and Barnabas perform a miracle in Lystra, healing a man who had been crippled from birth. In amazement, the crowds praised Paul and Barnabas as the gods Hermes and Zeus come down to earth in human form. In an attempt to point the crowds towards the true and living God, Paul and Barnabas appealed to the witness of nature:

In past generations he [God] allowed all the nations to walk in their own ways. Yet he did not leave himself without witness, for he did good by giving you rains from heaven and fruitful seasons, satisfying your hearts with food and gladness.18

This passage suggests that although God allowed the nations (that is, the non- Jewish or Gentile nations, who did not have direct access to him as did the nation of Israel) to go about their business by themselves, there was an expectation that they would be aware of his existence and his benevolence, through the witness of the provision of rain and bountiful harvests. Paul made a similar argument in his letter to the church at Rome:

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.19

18 Acts 14:16-17. 19 Romans 1:18-20. 47 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

In this passage, Paul is saying that there is enough knowledge of God available from creation for all people to be responsible for their rejection of God. No one can claim that he did not know any better.20

On the face of it, these passages indicate that something of God can be known from nature, without the need for special revelation. However, it should be noted that these passages themselves are not natural theological arguments. Rather, they are reminders of what knowledge people should have gained about God from nature. As Erickson points out, the Psalms “suggest that God has left evidence of himself in the world he has created,”21 but the Psalmist himself was not concerned with applying detailed information drawn from the natural world to the knowledge of God in any kind of systematic fashion.

The Christian philosopher John Haldane argues that while it is possible to interpret the above passage from Paul’s letter to the Romans as a natural theological argument, albeit not a very good one, early Christianity was not particularly interested in philosophy or in the possibility of deriving support from it. In fact, he points out, Paul drew an unfavourable contrast between faith and human wisdom.22 In his first letter to the Corinthians, Paul stated that God has made foolish the wisdom of the world (1:20) and that “the foolishness of God is wiser than men” (1:25). Indeed, Paul hoped the faith of the Corinthians “might not rest in the wisdom of men but in the power of God” (2:5). This seems to defeat the entire project of natural theology, by questioning the capabilities of human reasoning.23 Whatever the intention of the apostle Paul, however, later theologians such as Thomas Aquinas gave these passages an interpretation that favoured the pursuit of natural theology.24

20 For a discussion of theological debates concerning the interpretation of this passage, see James Barr, “St Paul and the Hebrew Background,” chapter 3 in Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 39-57. 21 Erickson, Christian Theology, 179. 22 Haldane, “Natural Theology.” 23 This was an important theme in Reformation discussions of natural theology, as will be seen below. 24 See Douglas A. Campbell, “Natural Theology in Paul? Reading Romans 1.19-20,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 1 (1999): 231-252. 48 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

John J. Collins, a Catholic Professor of Old Testament Criticism and Interpretation, also suggests that systematic natural theological arguments were not important in the Jewish and early Christian tradition:

The notion that “the heavens tell forth the glory of God” (Ps 19:1) has honorable precedents in the Hebrew Bible. Since the reality and primacy of the God of Israel are almost universally taken for granted in the Bible, however, the problem of arriving at a knowledge of God is never addressed.25

For Collins, a systematic theology based on the study of nature only arose after the Jewish tradition came into contact with Greek philosophy and Greek natural theology. He argues that natural theology provided a way for people from the Jewish tradition to embrace the surrounding Greek culture without abandoning their own religion. Additionally, James Byrne’s view is that Christian thought was influenced by earlier philosophical traditions that regarded the “natural” as the rational. As a result, “many Christian thinkers adopted the assumption that a ‘natural’ theology entails ‘rational’ reflection on the possibility of God’s existence.”26 However, as Haldane points out, while early Christian writers began to make use of Greek thought in the formulation of theology, they made few contributions to philosophy, with the exception of Augustine. Thus, historians and philosophers of religion recognise that systematic natural theology did not begin with the Christian tradition. c. The History of Natural Theology

Wolfhart Pannenberg identifies the first use of the expression “natural theology” in the work of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius, whose ideas reached Rome in the second half of the second century B.C.27 Panaetius used the term to distinguish the philosophical doctrine of God from mythical and political theology: “Natural theology, then, is the talk about God that corresponds to the nature of the divine itself, unfalsified by the political interests related to the

25 John J. Collins, “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 60 (1998): 6. 26 James Byrne, “Natural Theology,” 826. 27 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 76. 49 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

state cults or by the literary imaginings, or lies, of the poets.”28 Thus, early natural theology did not need to develop arguments for the existence of God, as the divine was taken for granted. Instead, natural theology sought to understand the divine nature.

The Latin expression theologia naturalis first entered the vocabulary of Christian theology through St. Augustine’s City of God, but this was a very limited form of natural theology. Although Augustine was generally opposed to the pursuit of knowledge of nature for knowledge’s sake, he affirmed the quest to know God as a fitting and proper use of creation.29 As James Byrne points out, Augustine’s apparent endorsement of natural theology must be understood in the context of his “unwavering principle that God can only be known with the aid of divine grace.”30 However, it pays here to recall Pannenberg’s definition of early natural theology. He explains that for Augustine, “the Christian doctrine of God was identical with a purified form of true natural theology, i.e., theology commensurate with the nature of God. He believed that this theology had found its clearest expression in the biblical testimony.”31

The next time period usually considered in the history of natural theology from a history of religion perspective is the Middle Ages. The large time gap between St. Augustine (354-430) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) reflects the perceived limited pursuit of Christian natural theology in the intervening period. Systematic Christian natural theology is widely recognised as beginning with Aquinas, particularly due to his clear distinction between natural and

28 Ibid., 77. 29 Kevin Powers, Augustine on Natural Theology: A Study of the Invisible Things of God: Romans 1:19-20 (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008), 4. 30 James Byrne, “Natural Theology,” 826. Augustine was convinced that humanity was universally affected by sin as a consequence of “the Fall”—the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden (Genesis 3). The Fall affected even the human capacity for knowledge, particularly knowledge of God. As Alister E. McGrath puts it, “God does not leave us where we are naturally, incapacitated by sin and unable to redeem ourselves, but gives us grace in order that we may be healed, forgiven, and restored. Augustine’s view of human nature is that it is frail, weak and lost, and needs divine assistance and care if it is to be restored and renewed.” Christian Theology: An Introduction, 1st ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 375. The adoption of this view by the Protestant Reformer John Calvin will be discussed below. 31 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 80-81. 50 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

revealed theology; that is, what can be known from reason alone, and what can only be known by direct revelation from God.32

Aquinas argued that natural theology could establish with certainty that there is a God:

There are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God exists, that he is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason.33

However, for Aquinas, natural theology could not provide knowledge of God’s essence. That is, the “proofs” offered by Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae show that God is, but do not show what he is.34 In addition, natural theology must be complemented by special revelation, as there are many central Christian truths, such as the Incarnation and the nature of God as Trinity, which cannot be attained by reason. Aquinas also believed that while philosophical reasoning could establish the existence of God in principle, human blindness prevented such knowledge from being available to all:

If the only way open to us for the knowledge of God were solely that of reason, the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of ignorance. For the knowledge of God, which especially renders men perfect and good, would come to be possessed only by a few, and these few would require a great deal of time in order to reach it.35

As historian of religion Peter Byrne suggests, “Natural theology is deficient then in the universality, ease and certainty with which it can make its branch of

32 A key point that must be kept in mind, however, is that for Aquinas, reason and revelation are both gifts from God. See Alexander W. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages (London: Continuum, 2007), 3. 33 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I.3.2. Translated by Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). 34 Haldane, “Natural Theology,” 466. 35 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I.4.5.

51 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

religious truth available.”36 Thus, for Aquinas, natural theology was a valid but limited pursuit.37

The Reformation is sometimes regarded as dealing a severe blow to the enterprise of natural theology.38 Indeed, Martin Luther, John Calvin and a number of other Reformers were critical of an excessive emphasis on the power of human reason. In this, they drew on the ideas of Augustine concerning the effects of the Fall and the need for divine grace. However, when the ideas of these theologians are studied more closely, we see that they were not completely opposed to the idea of natural theology. Further, it is vital to realise, as Pannenberg points out, that that it was not until after the Reformation that natural and supernatural theology were clearly distinguished. As Pannenberg puts it, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a development where “‘natural’ no longer meant ‘in accordance with the nature of God’ but ‘in accordance with human nature’.”39 Thus, when examining the ideas of Reformation theologians, we should take care to avoid the trap of viewing the past through present-centred glasses.

For Philipp Melanchthon, knowledge of the existence of God is derived from the law of nature, which, in turn, is “impressed on our minds by God.”40 This concept of the “law of nature” should not be confused with the modern scientific idea of “laws of nature.” For Melanchthon, the law of nature “is a common judgment to which all men give the same consent. This law which God has engraved on the mind of each is suitable for the shaping of morals.”41 Thus, while Melanchthon did talk about natural knowledge of God, he was more

36 Peter Byrne, Natural Religion, 3. 37 A contrasting view may be found in Plantinga, “The Prospects for Natural Theology.” Here, Plantinga argues that for Aquinas, the purpose of natural theology is to know that God exists, as opposed to merely believing that he does. From this perspective, a successful piece of natural theology would be an argument that showed that the existence of God had the status of scientia, or knowledge. 38 This perspective derives primarily from Karl Barth’s rejection of natural theology. See discussion in Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, chapter 1. 39 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 81. 40 John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), 11. 41 Quoted in ibid., 11. 52 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

concerned with morality and religious duties—the concept of “natural law”— than abstract knowledge of God. In his early work, Melanchthon referred to human reason as being “so blinded” after “Adam’s fall” that “creation is to be understood by faith.”42 However, in a later commentary on Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Melanchthon took a more optimistic stance on the knowledge of God that can be gained from nature. As theologian John Platt points out, “The extent of this knowledge of God or natural law is limited and not to be confused with that revealed in the Gospel, but it is nonetheless far-reaching and includes the fundamental attributes of the divine nature.”43

The work of John Calvin embraced a similar attempt to balance the effects of the Fall on human reason with the reality of some kind of natural knowledge of God. Although Calvin acknowledged that special revelation was required to know God fully, he believed that enough information could be drawn from nature to ensure that no one could claim to be ignorant of God. In light of his view of the fallen nature of man’s intellect, Calvin believed that God is revealed in creation, but as sinners, we can only see him through the “spectacles of faith.” According to theologian Millard Erickson, Calvin’s view was that

When persons are exposed to the special revelation found in the gospel and respond, their minds are cleared through the effects of regeneration, enabling them to see distinctly what is there. Then they can recognise in nature what was more clearly seen in the special revelation.44

So, in the example from Psalm 19, the writer saw the glory of God declared in the heavens, but only because he had already come to know God through special revelation. As James Byrne notes, “It is only in the divinely revealed Christian scripture that our natural knowledge of God is fulfilled in the encounter with God’s redeeming activity in Christ.”45 In this, Calvin was following the ideas of

42 Quoted in ibid., 13. 43 Ibid., 15. 44 Erickson, Christian Theology, 196. 45 James Byrne, “Natural Theology,” 827. 53 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Augustine, who believed that although human reason had been corrupted by the fall, it could be renewed by grace.46

Calvin’s view of natural knowledge of God was also echoed in the Westminster Confession of Faith of 1646, a classic articulation of English Calvinist and Presbyterian theology:

Although the light of Nature, and the works of Creation and Providence do so farre manifest the Goodnesse, Wisdome, and Power of God, as to leave men unexcusable; yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of his Will, which is necessary unto salvation. Therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times, and in divers maners, to reveale himself, and to declare that his Will unto His Church; and afterwards, for the better preserving and propagating of the Truth, and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the Church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the World, to commit the same wholly unto writing: which makes the Holy Scripture to be most necessary; those former wayes of Gods revealing his Will unto his people, being now ceased.47

That is, whatever knowledge about God can be gained from nature, it is not enough for salvation.

In the next section we will see that historians of science frequently date natural theology as beginning in the seventeenth century. Intriguingly, historians and philosophers of religion tend to skip over this period and move directly to the eighteenth century. Here, they argue that natural theology enjoyed resurgence with the rise of deism, an example of the most extreme reliance on human reason and the rejection of the need for special revelation. Deists thought that any appeal to sacred writings or traditions would compromise the universality of the Creator-God and thus argued that any necessary religious knowledge must be accessible to all through reason and nature. While the Protestant Reformers believed that natural knowledge of God includes the command to worship God without the specifics of how to do so, deists such as Herbert of Cherbury and his followers argued that a good God would show us the right way

46 McGrath, Christian Theology, 370. 47 The Humble Advice of the Assembly of Divines, Now by Authority of Parliament sitting at Westminster, Concerning a Confession of Faith…. (London, 1646), pp. 1-2. 54 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

to worship him.48 Where more orthodox Christians emphasised God as the author of natural law, deists believed that even God himself “obeyed the dictates of reason.”49

However, not everyone agreed that religious knowledge was rational. The famous sceptical philosopher David Hume attacked the very foundation of natural theology in his Dialogues on Natural Religion, which were published posthumously in 1779.50 Both Hume and later Immanuel Kant attacked a key principle of natural theology, “that the very existence and the order of the world allows us to draw conclusions about its origin in a divine being outside the world.”51 This objection did not deter all Christian thinkers from the pursuit of natural theology. In the early nineteenth century, William Paley published his famous Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802). This work is one of the most famous examples of the design argument—using instances of supposed contrivance in nature to point to the existence of a divine designer. Although the young Charles Darwin apparently read this work with admiration, his own work was to strike a serious blow to this style of argument. As James Byrne has expressed,

Rather than evoking the sense of wonder and admiration for its benign design characteristic of Paley and many other Christians, nature in the mid-nineteenth century now came to be seen as ‘red in tooth and claw,’ in Tennyson’s memorable depiction. Rather than being the work of a wise and benevolent deity, nature was perceived by many as a battleground of waste and violence.52

48 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 96. While Herbert of Cherbury died in 1648, deism as a movement did not take hold until the late seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century. 49 James A. Herrick, The Radical Rhetoric of the English Deists: The Discourse of Skepticism, 1680-1750 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 205. 50 Terence Penelhum states that the title of this work “tells us that the conversations in it are about natural religion, that is, about that form of religion that can be based on what natural reasoning can tell us about God and his relationship to ourselves” but “most of the argument is about natural theology, namely, the attempt to establish the truths on which the practice of natural religion would depend.” “Hume’s Criticisms of Natural Theology,” in In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment, ed. James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 31. 51 James Byrne, “Natural Theology,” 827. 52 Ibid., 827. 55 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

The early twentieth century witnessed further challenges to the project of natural theology, but this time from within the Christian community. The most famous example was an exchange between the Swiss theologians Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. For Barth, natural theology compromised the sovereignty of God. Barth argued that God himself chooses where, when, and how he will make himself known, making philosophical theology tantamount to idolatry. As Keith Ward explains, Barth argued that “the program of natural theology is based on human arrogance, and flies in the face of revelation, which is to be accepted on faith, not because it seems on balance to be probable.”53 According to James Barr, Barth’s view was that “Natural Theology” was the very antithesis of the Reformation: “Reformed theology thus ignores ‘natural theology,’ while natural theology exists, in so far as it exists at all, solely by virtue of opposition to Reformed theology.”54 d. Current Perspectives on Natural Theology

At the present time, theological opinions on natural theology are mixed. Protestants, in particular, are viewed as rejecting natural theology, given that human reason has been corrupted by sin and that God can only be known if he reveals himself. As the Catholic theology professor John Collins writes,

Natural theology is traditionally associated with Catholic sensibilities, and was given official endorsement by the First Vatican Council, which affirmed that “God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from the works of creation.” Conversely, the Reformed tradition has typically responded to this subject with a resounding “Nein,” articulated most famously by Karl Barth.55

Indeed, many Protestant theologians are suspicious of the enterprise of natural theology. For example, in the published version of his 1991 Gifford Lectures, James Barr wrote,

53 Ward, “Natural Theology,” 604. 54 Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 8. 55 Collins, “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition,” 1. 56 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Even if natural theology should be a valid mode of procedure, I doubt if I would find it easy to practise it. In this respect, I share many of the doubts and objections that modern theologians have voiced against the whole idea of it.… I am unmoved by the idea of proofs of God’s existence, I dislike apologetics, I start out on the whole subject as one who is distrustful of the entire box of tricks that makes up traditional natural theology, and ultra-modern natural theology as well.56

Wolfhart Pannenberg helpfully insists upon a distinction between “natural human knowledge of God” and “natural theology.” The former refers to knowledge of God that is innate to humans as the creation of God, while the latter indicates knowledge of God that has been acquired by philosophical processes. Although “we have to speak about a natural knowledge of God in Paul’s sense as a fact which is true of all people, the expression ‘natural theology’ is not by any means so widespread.”57

Despite these reservations, natural theology has enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent years, particularly due to the work of historical theologian Alister McGrath.58 However, McGrath does take a somewhat limited view of natural theology, arguing that natural theology cannot be considered as an autonomous theological discipline, “precisely because its foundational and legitimating insight—namely, that nature is to be viewed and recognized as God’s creation—is derived from divine revelation.” Thus,

In its legitimate and defensible form, natural theology is to be viewed as a legitimate and proper theological exercise to be conducted within the scope of a revealed knowledge of God, rather than as an autonomous discipline outside its bounds.59

While the created order possesses an intrinsic ability to reflect its Creator, it only does so because God has chosen to reveal himself in this manner. As the rest of this thesis will demonstrate, McGrath’s view is more consistent with the

56 Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 102-3. 57 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 76. 58 Alister E. McGrath has developed his views on natural theology in a series of works, beginning with A Scientific Theology, and continuing in The Order of Things: Explorations in Scientific Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) and The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). 59 McGrath, Scientific Theology, 1: 295. 57 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

seventeenth-century tradition of natural theology than most other religious historical or philosophical perspectives. Rather than being the pursuit of knowledge of God aside from revelation, seventeenth-century natural theology is best understood as the production of arguments for revealed religious doctrine.

3. History of Science

Historians of science offer an alternative perspective on natural theology. As we shall see, the primary difference is that historians of science place more emphasis on the seventeenth century and on English natural theology. However, there are varying views even among these scholars concerning the exact nature and role of natural theology in England. a. Definitions

For many, the phrase “natural theology” would immediately bring to mind the argument from design, bolstered by Newtonian natural philosophy at the end of the seventeenth century, and made particularly famous by William Paley in 1802. However, some historians of science have tried to define natural theology in a more sophisticated fashion.

Thomas Dixon contrasts natural theology with revealed theology:

Natural theology concerns knowledge of the existence and attributes of God arrived at using only the natural faculties of sense and reason.… Knowledge of God that is based on divine revelation as set down in scripture is the subject of revealed theology.60

Similarly, Peter Harrison defines natural theology as being concerned with theological doctrines that can be known through reason alone, such as God’s existence, the immortality of the soul and moral values.61 Further, Neal

60 Thomas Dixon, “Natural Theology,” in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Maryanne Cline Horowitz (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004), 1610. 61 Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of 58 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Gillespie suggests that “natural theology” could be used to refer either to theological beliefs drawn from the interpretation of nature, or to a theology based on deduction from a priori principles, as opposed to revelation.62

While the word “natural” in the phrase “natural theology” primarily refers to its distinction from “revealed theology,” Dixon also points out that from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, works of natural theology “frequently focused on the wonders of the natural world and on developments in natural science.” Thus, the phrase “natural theology” also came to stand for a rather particular kind of natural theology—“a celebration of the beauty of the natural world and the power, wisdom, and goodness of its Creator, as revealed by the scientific study of nature.”63 It is this form of natural theology that is characterised by the argument from design.64

Other historians have attempted to understand natural theology according to its supposed socio-political purpose. John Gascoigne, for example, defines natural theology as the use of science to bolster religion as an institution. According to Gascoigne, in eighteenth-century British intellectual life, science was “allied to the cause of religion,” and

The tradition of [scientifically based] natural theology provided reassurance that the ecclesiastical order and the political regime with which it was closely associated were consistent with the highest reaches of human reason and were proof against the assaults of the infidel.65

As we shall see below, this definition of natural theology is closely linked with some historians’ views on the history of natural theology.

Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 174-175. 62 Neal C. Gillespie, “Natural History, Natural Theology, and Social Order: John Ray and the ‘Newtonian Ideology’,” Journal of the History of Biology 20 (1987): 4. 63 Dixon, “Natural Theology,” 1610. 64 For example, in his famous historical study of science and religion, John Hedley Brooke associates natural theology primarily with the so-called “argument from design.” Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapter 6. 65 John Gascoigne, “From Bentley to the Victorians: The Rise and Fall of British Newtonian Natural Theology,” Science in Context 2 (1988): 219. 59 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

b. The History of Natural Theology

Although some historians of science may acknowledge that natural theology had roots in ancient Greek philosophy and medieval Christian theology, most identify the seventeenth century as the beginning, or at least the “heyday,” of natural theology.66 For example, Neal Gillespie suggests that natural theology developed together with natural history in the last few decades of the seventeenth century. Although he does acknowledge that natural theology was around earlier, he argues that most Christians did not think that knowledge of God could be gained in this way.67

Some historians of science attribute the rise of natural theology in the seventeenth century to the need for a religion based on something other than revelation. For example, Steven J. Dick believes that in the light of Reformation disputes about the interpretation of Scripture, the authority of revelation was weakened, and a Christianity centred on God’s works in nature became increasingly attractive. Thus, natural theology was “freed from the shackles of revealed theology represented by Scripture.”68 Further, John Gascoigne has noted that the advantage of natural theology over revealed theology was that it focused public attention on aspects of religion about which there was widespread agreement.69

Thomas Dixon comments that the high point of natural theology between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries was intertwined with the rise of modern science:

66 See, for example, Dixon, “Natural Theology,” 1610; and Richard G. Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power: The Interplay between Organic and Mechanistic Imagery in Anglican Natural Theology—1640-1740,” in Approaches to Organic Form, ed. Frederick Burwick (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), 1-48. 67 As Gillespie has argued, “Nature by itself was untrustworthy: at best, redundant; at worst, delusive. In fact, it was only from a sound scriptural perspective that nature could be properly understood.” “Natural History, Natural Theology, and Social Order,” 11. 68 Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 156. 69 Gascoigne, “From Bentley to the Victorians,” 223. 60 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

The natural theological genre was one that both allowed practitioners of the new mechanical and experimental philosophy to justify their work to a sometimes sceptical religious establishment and also allowed religious apologists to enlist new knowledge in the service of Christian piety.70

Many of the natural philosophers of the seventeenth century saw a connection between their Christian faith and their investigation of nature. Most notably, Dixon mentions Robert Boyle and John Ray. Robert Boyle wrote works entitled The Excellency of Theology, Compared with Natural Philosophy (1674) and The Christian Virtuoso (1690), subtitled “shewing that by being addicted to experimental philosophy, a man is rather assisted than indisposed to be a good Christian.” John Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691) was a classic of the genre, providing inspiration for William Derham’s Boyle Lectures in 1712 and 1713, and William Paley’s famous Natural Theology of 1802.

However, perhaps the most significant historical claim concerning the origins and purpose of natural theology in seventeenth and eighteenth century England concerns its alleged connection with Isaac Newton’s natural philosophy. As we saw in Chapter 1, James and Margaret Jacob have famously associated the rise of modern science with a form of latitudinarian Church of England theology.71 In particular, Margaret Jacob has argued for a close connection between natural theology (or “natural religion”72 as she terms it), the socio-political context of late seventeenth-century England, and the rise of Newtonian natural philosophy:

Latitudinarian natural religion, especially as explicated by the Boyle lectures, deals with religion almost solely as a device for curbing self- interest and maintaining social stability—all in imitation of the Newtonian model of the universe.73

70 Dixon, “Natural Theology,” 1610. 71 James R. Jacob and Margaret C. Jacob, “The Anglican Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution,” Isis 71 (1980): 251-267. 72 See Section 4a, below, and Chapter 3, Section 2, for a discussion of the terms “natural theology” and “natural religion.” 73 Margaret C. Jacob, The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 142. 61 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

In Jacob’s view, then, the main purpose of natural theology in late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century England was socio-political, not doctrinal. Latitudinarian writers of natural theology were intent on maintaining a certain hierarchy, both in the Church and in wider society, and Newtonian philosophy provided useful arguments to use for this purpose. Thus, arguments from natural philosophy were used to give support to a particular view of religious order and its associated political system.

Several historians of science have followed Margaret Jacob in associating natural theology with Newtonianism. While Gillespie aligns the origins of natural theology with the development of natural history, he also connects it with Newtonianism, suggesting that natural history and natural theology were merged into a single powerful instrument of religious and social apologetics.74 Similarly, John Gascoigne connects the rise and fall of natural theology to the popularity of Newtonian natural philosophy. He states that although natural theology could take a number of different forms, it was especially popular when linked with Newton. For Gascoigne, natural theology was a potent illustration of the accord between Christianity and reason:

[Newtonian natural theology] was a form of natural theology which attempted to maintain a balance between two images of the Deity-a general Providence who created the world ex nihilo and established and kept in being the laws by which it continued to operate, and a special Providence who continued to intervene in the workings of the universe in the manner suggested by Newton.75

Writers in the history of science commonly view the Boyle Lectures as the epitome of English natural theology—a startling claim given that the historians of religion fail to mention this series at all. The will of natural philosopher Robert Boyle included an endowment for an annual series of lectures devoted to (in Boyle’s words) “proving the Christian Religion, against notorious Infidels, viz. Atheists, Theists, Pagans, Jews and Mahometans, not descending lower to

74 Gillespie, “Natural History, Natural Theology, and Social Order.” 75 Gascoigne, “From Bentley to the Victorians,” 227. 62 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

any Controversies, that are among Christians themselves.”76 These lectures are often characterised as featuring clergymen using “science” to defend the Christian faith. As John Dahm sees it, the Boyle Lecturers were participating in the “age-old exercise of utilizing the discoveries of science in the service of their faith.”77 In this, the lecturers were following Boyle’s own example.

The Boyle Lectures, some argue, also gave the Anglican church an opportunity to counter atheist currents of thought, by using Newtonian natural philosophy to support religious and socio-political stability. Dahm suggests that it was “appropriate” that the most important and popular lectures incorporated the new natural philosophy, particularly Newtonianism, as many of the challenges to the Church were based implicitly or explicitly on a materialistic and mechanistic science. It was the role of the Boyle Lecturers to defend the Established Church against its enemies. As Henry Guerlac and Margaret Jacob put it, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Boyle Lecturers became “the intellectual spokesmen of the moderate faction of the English Church and the men who developed and expounded its characteristic doctrine.”78

While some historians of science emphasise the Boyle Lecturers’ use of science in the service of religion as novel, others view this group as participating in a broader tradition. As Dahm notes, the use of science in religion was a standard procedure at the time:

There was no defensiveness in their attitude toward natural philosophy or its uses in theology. As they saw it, no real degree of tension existed between respectable science and theology; their amalgamation in natural theology was a perfectly normal exercise.79

76 Quoted in Henry Guerlac and Margaret C. Jacob, “Bentley, Newton, and Providence (The Boyle Lectures Once More),” Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969): 309. 77 John J. Dahm, “Science and Apologetics in the Early Boyle Lectures,” Church History 39 (1970): 172. 78 Guerlac and Jacob, “Bentley, Newton, and Providence,” 318. 79 Dahm, “Science and Apologetics,” 186. 63 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Similarly, Larry Stewart argues that the Boyle Lecturers who might be considered Newtonians owed to earlier natural theologians their fundamental proposition—“That the same God who created all things by the Word of his Power, and upholds and preserves them by his continual Concourse, does also by his All-wise Providence perpetually govern and direct the issues and events of things.”80 Thus, while the Boyle Lectures may not have introduced it, they helped to consolidate a characteristically English version of natural theology.

Although the Boyle Lectures continued through the nineteenth century, the most well known sermons were preached between 1692 and 1732. After this period, the two histories of natural theology largely converge. Historians of science and historians of religion agree that natural theology continued into the twentieth century, despite the criticisms of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, as well as the development of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Perhaps, however, historians of religion are a little more sympathetic to the work of Paley than one particular historian of science who described Natural Theology as “the most influential and the most embarrassingly shoddy” example of its genre.81

Historians of science also include the Gifford Lectures in their accounts of the history of natural theology, although these are often overlooked by historians of religion. Adam Lord Gifford, who died in 1887, instituted in his will an annual series of lectures where natural theology was to be treated as a science: a philosophical discourse about the ultimate in intelligibility and being, without any reference to the miraculous or supernatural. The Gifford Lectures were established with the intention of

“Promoting, Advancing, Teaching, and Diffusing the study of Natural Theology,” in the widest sense of that term, in other words, “The Knowledge of God, the Infinite, the All, the First and Only Cause, the One and the Sole Substance, the Sole Being, the Sole Reality, and the Sole

80 Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain, 1660-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85. Stewart is quoting from Samuel Clarke’s second series of Boyle Lectures, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. It is not clear from Stewart’s work exactly who the other natural theologians were, although he obviously does not credit the Newtonians with the invention of natural theology. 81 Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 537. 64 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Existence, the Knowledge of His Nature and Attributes, the Knowledge of the Relations which men and the whole universe bear to Him, the Knowledge of the Nature and Foundation of Ethics or Morals, and of all Obligations and Duties thence arising.”82

As historian Stanley Jaki remarks, Gifford himself gave lectures that demonstrated his view of “the indispensability of a well argued natural knowledge of God for well being, individual and social.”83 However, it is perhaps not surprising that the Gifford Lectures do not feature in accounts of natural theology from a history of religion perspective, once we understand that Lord Gifford expected the lecturers to discuss natural theology without reference to the supernatural. Indeed, the lecturers did not even have to be Christian, as long as they were “able reverent men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth.”84 In his own Gifford Lectures in 2001, theologian Stanley Hauerwas commented on the notable absence of God in the lecture series:

God, at least the God whom Christians worship, has seldom held center stage in the Gifford Lectures.… That some Gifford lecturers have actually tried to show that something like a god might exist seems enough of a challenge. For a Gifford lecturer to maintain that the God who exists is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit seems wildly ambitious, if not foolish.85 c. Current Perspectives on Natural Theology

In the twenty-first century, natural theology does not enjoy the popularity it once had amongst scientists. Although the Boyle Lectures have recently been revived at St. Mary-le-Bow Church in London,86 perceived connections between science and religion are generally not as well received as they once were. For

82 “Trust Disposition and Settlement of the late Adam Gifford, sometime one of the Senators of the College of Justice, Scotland, dated 21st August 1885,” http://www.giffordlectures.org/will.asp, quotation marks present in original. 83 Stanley L. Jaki, Lord Gifford and His Lectures: A Centenary Retrospect (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1986), vii. 84 Ibid., 74. 85 Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001), 15. 86 St. Mary-le-Bow Church, London, “Boyle Lecture,” http://www.stmarylebow.co.uk/?Boyle_Lecture. 65 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

scientists, ideas such as Intelligent Design and the so-called “fine-tuning” of the universe tend to be suspect. The theological issues raised by scholars such as Karl Barth are less of an issue than the conviction, much more popular since Darwin, that the universe can be explained in entirely naturalistic terms. It would seem, now, that there is no place for God, and hence no natural theology. In a sense, this perspective is not inconsistent with that offered by Alister McGrath. After all, for McGrath, the enterprise of natural theology depends on a Christian worldview in which the natural world is viewed as the creation of a providential Creator. It is no wonder that secularised science rejects this viewpoint.

4. Problems With These Accounts

There are several key problems with these accounts of natural theology. The first involves terminology or definitions of natural theology. Historians of religion and historians of science take a slightly different perspective on the definition of natural theology. Secondly, historians from each tradition have conflicting views of the place of the seventeenth century in the history of natural theology. While historians of science see the seventeenth century as the high point, or even the beginning, of natural theology, it barely rates a mention in history of religion accounts. Thirdly, historians of science and of religion view the role of revelation with relation to natural theology in a similar fashion; namely, as a separate and competing authority. However, the rest of this thesis will demonstrate that revelation continued to be an important theme within natural theology throughout the seventeenth century. a. Terminology

Historians and philosophers of religion generally define natural theology as knowledge of God that can be gained using reason alone, by contrast with knowledge of God derived from revelation.87 Historians of science also contrast natural theology with revealed theology, as well as focusing on the role of

87 See, for example, Millard Erickson’s definition in Section 2a, above. 66 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

reason,88 but they place a much greater emphasis on knowledge of God derived from the natural world, and in particular, on the “argument from design.” Further, some historians of science point to a socio-political purpose for natural theology.89 When we examine the history of natural theology more closely, however, we see that such definitions fail to grasp the complex nature of this discourse.

To begin with, there are several terms in use to describe natural theology or similar activities, including “natural religion” and “physico-theology.” According to Peter Harrison, the emergence of the disciplinary category “physico-theology” was an explicit attempt to address the issue of the place of theology in relation to early modern natural philosophy, and it indicated the breakdown of traditional disciplinary boundaries and the disintegration of traditional vocational demarcations.90 Harrison maintains that physico- theology was not simply a sub-set of natural theology, but a separate type of natural philosophical explanation of theological doctrines. However, some writers in the seventeenth century, such as Walter Charleton, used the term “physico-theology” to refer to something having the characteristics of natural theology in the more common sense, as we shall see below in Chapter 3, Section 2.

It is also difficult to determine exactly what the difference is between “natural theology” and “natural religion.” Some historians outline a distinction between the two, while some appear to use the terms interchangeably. Peter Byrne has argued,

Natural theology becomes natural religion when it is thought of not merely as a body of truths about God, but as so extensive a body of truths that it can generate a religion on its own.91

88 See, for example, the definitions from Thomas Dixon and Peter Harrison in Section 3a, above. 89 For example, John Gascoigne and Margaret Jacob, discussed in Sections 3a and 3b, above. 90 Harrison, “Physico-Theology,” 179. 91 Peter Byrne, Natural Religion, 3. 67 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

In this view, natural theology may be thought of as a collection of statements about God which can be derived from reason applied to the natural world, but which are supplementary to revelation. Natural religion, on the other hand, has no need for revelation. Human reason and nature are thought to be sufficient. An alternative distinction comes from Terence Penelhum, in his analysis of David Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion. For Penelhum, natural religion is the “form of religion that can be based on what natural reasoning can tell us about God and his relationship to ourselves,” while natural theology is “the attempt to establish the truths on which the practice of natural religion would depend.”92

Wolfhart Pannenberg, on the other hand, writes that early Protestant theology did not distinguish between natural theology and natural religion, as

Knowledge of the divine law necessarily carried with it a knowledge of God and the duty of worshiping him. The only question was then whether the worship corresponding to the natural knowledge of God is sufficient for salvation.93

From this perspective, “natural theology” refers to knowledge of God, while “natural religion” refers to the duties performed in response to God, although the distinction is perhaps not upheld in practice.

It is not enough, however, for a historian to distinguish only between these two terms. Each term has its own collection of meanings. For example, Peter Byrne locates four different senses of the term natural religion. The first three are opposites: natural religion as opposed to revealed religion, civil and mythic theology, or supernatural religion.94 The fourth refers to a sense of innate human religiosity.95

92 Penelhum, “Hume’s Criticisms of Natural Theology,” 31. 93 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 95. 94 According to Peter Byrne, civil and mythic theology are types of pagan thought: “Mythical (or fabulous) theology is that branch of human thought about the divine represented in the poets’ tales of the gods. ‘Civil theology’ refers to the modes of thinking about the gods displayed in the civic temples and their ceremonies.” Natural Religion, 5. 95 Ibid., 1. 68 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Similarly, but more extensively, David Pailin96 identifies eleven different meanings of the term “natural religion” in use in seventeenth and eighteenth- century Britain. Perhaps the most important of these is natural religion as what is universally acknowledged by reason. That is, religious beliefs and practices that are based on an understanding that all people can allegedly discover for themselves by rational reflection. However, Pailin suggests that “natural religion” was also taken to mean some kind of belief or practice that was the product of human imagination, discovered by empirical observation, or that was common to the different religions found around the world. Pailin argues that since there is a complex variety of meanings and uses,

Readers coming across the term “natural religion” should take care to determine what the author means by it in the particular context—in the hope that the author is using it in a coherent and consistent manner.97

However, it is also necessary to recognise that meanings change over time and between contexts. For early and medieval Christian writers such as Augustine and Aquinas, as well as the Protestant Reformers, there was no sharp distinction between natural and revealed theology, and there could be no natural religion. By contrast, for groups such as the deists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, natural religion could exist independently of revelation, and as Peter Byrne sees it, “revealed religion can only suffer by comparison with natural.” Further, according to Byrne, the Enlightenment distinction between natural and revealed theology “is a distinction between a supposed set of divine truths specially communicated by God in history and a real system of truths available to all by the use of the unaided reason.”98

Another important point is that we cannot simply assume that all versions of natural theology throughout history were concerned with proving the existence of God. As we saw in the discussion of natural theology in the Bible, the heavens might “tell forth the glory of God,” but knowledge of God’s existence is

96 David A. Pailin, “The Confused and Confusing Story of Natural Religion,” Religion 24 (1994): 199-212. 97 Ibid., 209. 98 Peter Byrne, Natural Religion, 4. 69 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

taken as a given.99 Philosopher of science Michael Ruse raises a similar point with relation to St. Thomas Aquinas. Ruse argues that the argument from design was important to Aquinas “not because it proved the existence of God as such—that was not needed—but because it helped to flesh out our analogical understanding of God’s attributes and powers.”100

These terminological difficulties, concerning just what natural theology was and how it changed over time, point to the need for a conceptual model of natural theology and its dynamics that can explain these patterns of changes. While varieties of natural theological utterance were produced at different times and in different contexts, a detailed theoretical model will show how these could all be a part of the same family of natural theological utterances. b. The Seventeenth Century

One glaring difference between the two accounts of natural theology is the treatment of the seventeenth century. Historians of religion tend to skip from the sixteenth-century Reformation to the deism of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, leaving out the seventeenth century entirely. The philosopher Keith Ward even suggests that the rise of the experimental sciences in the seventeenth century led to natural theology losing “its scientific credibility.”101 History of science accounts present a sharp contrast, viewing the seventeenth century as the high point, if not the beginning of the natural theological tradition. Reformation disputes about the interpretation of Scripture, as well as the rise of natural history and Newtonian philosophy, are seen as catalysing factors for the development of English natural theology. Further, the Boyle Lectures, which took place regularly between 1692 and 1732, are seen as one of the key sites of natural theology.

This contrast between the two accounts indicates that a better understanding of natural theology is required, in order to properly trace its historical trajectory.

99 Collins, “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition,” 6. 100 Michael Ruse, Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 22. 101 Ward, “Natural Theology,” 602. 70 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

The model presented in this thesis contains a historical dimension as well as a theoretical approach. While natural theology emerged as a strong intellectual tradition in the seventeenth century, it was not without precedents, which have been clearly identified by historians of religion, but perhaps overlooked by historians of science. We will see that the reasons for this historical claim can be appreciated when natural theology is adequately modelled and conceptualised.102 c. Continuing Emphasis on Revelation

Both the history of science and the history of religion traditions view natural theology as something that was competing against the authority of revealed religion. However, as we shall see throughout the case studies, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, revelation continued to be a matter of great importance. Once again, this arises from an incorrect understanding of natural theology, and can be remedied with a detailed conceptual model. In particular, the problem derives from taking an Enlightenment perspective and using it to define natural theology throughout its history. While there were groups who emphasised the role of reason as separate from, and more important than revelation, this was not the dominant form of natural theology in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, or prior to that time. Revelation was crucial for Augustine, Aquinas and the Reformers, and it is not clear that the Christian Scriptures even leave room for knowledge of God aside from revelation. For example, Wolfhart Pannenberg suggests:

Early Christian theology recognized the critical function of natural theology but not its claim to be able to establish a knowledge of God solely on the basis of philosophical reflection. God can be known only

102 Once again we may note the connection between the problem of conceptualising a tradition of natural theology and the organisational structure of this thesis. Existing treatments of natural theology have generally assumed a continuous tradition of natural theology by connecting the dots between disparate outcroppings of natural theological-like discourse. By contrast, here we are attempting a detailed model that takes into account both these earlier examples and the more concentrated output of discourse in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, which is then applied to a series of case studies representing these denser moments. 71 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

through God himself. Hence knowledge of God is possible only by revelation of the divine reality.103

Thus, if there is any knowledge of God to be gained through “natural” means, it is only because God has chosen to reveal himself in this manner. Moreover, as this thesis will show, natural theology is best understood as an apologetic discourse, engaged in developing arguments in support of doctrines originally derived from nature, rather than a pursuit of novel knowledge claims.

5. Conclusion: Moving Forward

One of the more sophisticated accounts of natural theology from a history of science perspective comes from Richard G. Olson.104 He points out that although the tradition of natural theology dates back to the early Church fathers, it was not until seventeenth-century England that natural theology took on a particularly important role, evidenced by a dramatic increase in both the number of works devoted to natural theology and the audience for those works. Olson argues that this cannot be explained simply by an increased interest in the natural sciences:

This account fails… to explain why similar explosions of natural theologising did not occur elsewhere as interests in natural science grew, nor does it account for the timing of the growing English concern with natural theology, which tended to lead the growing interest in the sciences rather than to lag behind it.105

103 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 94. It is probable that Pannenberg is following Karl Barth on this point. However, this does not mean we must dismiss Pannenberg’s point, as other historians have presented a similar view. For example, recall the earlier quotation from John Collins: “Since the reality and primacy of the God of Israel are almost universally taken for granted in the Bible, however, the problem of arriving at a knowledge of God is never addressed.” “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition,” 6. Philosopher of science Michael Ruse has also argued that the argument from design was important to theologians such as Thomas Aquinas “not because it proved the existence of God as such—that was not needed—but because it helped to flesh out our analogical understanding of God’s attributes and powers.” Darwin and Design, 22. 104 See Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence;” and Olson, Science and Religion, 1450-1900: From Copernicus to Darwin (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). Although Olson’s account is not often followed by historians of science, it has made its way into at least one philosophy of science work: Ruse, Darwin and Design. 105 Olson, Science and Religion, 1450-1900, 85. 72 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 2

Olson contends that it was the religious situation peculiar to post-Reformation England that initially sparked the special interest in natural theology.

Historical theologian Alister E. McGrath echoes Olson’s point of view, arguing that although it is “perfectly proper to speak of the ‘natural theology’ of Augustine, Aquinas or Calvin,” natural theology as it is presently understood is a recent invention that “arose within the English theological tradition, and reflects the social and ecclesiastical conditions of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.”106

Although Olson and McGrath point us in the right direction, we will see in the next chapter that detailed modelling of natural theology provides a more complete picture. Understanding natural theology as a dynamic discourse that occupied the contested space in between natural philosophy and theology explains why it emerged as an intellectual tradition in the seventeenth century. The Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution provided the theological and natural philosophical upheaval necessary for the sustained pursuit of natural theology. Further, at various times, renewed theological and natural philosophical conflict led to increased output of natural theological utterance at particular nodes or inflection points. The model will also encompass the continuing role of revelation in natural theology, something overlooked by existing historical accounts, and suggest that natural theology was primarily concerned with providing arguments for religious doctrines originally derived from revelation. In these ways, a theoretical model can deal with the problems that arise from comparing existing treatments of natural theology in the history and philosophy of religion on the one hand, and in the history of science on the other.

106 McGrath, Scientific Theology, 1: 241-242. 73 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

CHAPTER 3

KALEIDOSCOPIC NATURAL THEOLOGY

Natural theology is not about discovering persuasive grounds of faith outside the bounds and scope of revelation, but a demonstration that, when nature is “seen” through the lens of the Christian revelation, the outcome is imaginatively compelling and rationally persuasive.

Alister E. McGrath, The Open Secret.1

1. Introduction

From the discussion of natural theology to this point, a number of questions have arisen. These may be considered along two dimensions. Firstly, there is the historical dimension, involving the origins and genealogy of natural theology, and the problem of reconciling the competing accounts. Secondly, there is a theoretical or conceptual dimension, concerning the nature of natural theology itself: its content and aims, as well as its relation to natural philosophy and theology. Along these dimensions, there are four main questions: when did natural theology begin; how did it relate to other disciplines; what exactly was it; and what aims could it be used to achieve? The answers to these questions are inter-connected, and can only be elucidated by careful modelling of natural theology, as well as a correct understanding of its historical trajectory.

By the end of this chapter, we will see that natural theology only emerged as a concentrated field of discourse in England in the seventeenth century, even though it was not entirely without precedent. The explanation for this historical claim can be established once we understand where natural theology was situated. Natural theology itself was neither theological nor natural philosophical, and it was not tied exclusively to a single system of theology or

1 Alister E. McGrath, The Open Secret: Explorations in Scientific Theology (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 68. 74 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

natural philosophy. Rather, natural theology was a separate tradition that occupied a space between theology and natural philosophy, a space that was opened up and continually contested in the religious and natural philosophical turmoil of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. In fact, natural theology was precisely an evolving site of articulations and negotiations between natural philosophy and theology. Natural philosophy dealt with knowledge of the natural world, while theology dealt with knowledge of God. Natural theology sat somewhere in between, and thus provided an arena that historians may now explore to witness and study the efforts of seventeenth- century natural philosophers and theologians to determine the proper relations between knowledge of the natural world and knowledge of God. Finally, we will see that the location of natural theology can be understood once we appreciate exactly what it was. Natural theology was primarily an apologetic discourse, providing arguments in favour of religious doctrines originally derived from revelation by drawing upon a range of resources from both theology and natural philosophy, in response to a variety of contextual challenges. Further, natural theology could be used to support either theology or natural philosophy, as well as particular versions of each, depending on the needs of its practitioner.

In particular, it will be argued that natural theology is best conceived as a dynamic discourse that its practitioners changed and developed in response to specific challenges, by mobilising particular resources available to them at particular times. According to this model, natural theology was not tied exclusively to one particular system of natural philosophy or theology. Rather, aspects of natural philosophy and theological doctrines were brought into a discourse that could be used to support different theologies or natural philosophies. However, natural theology was not defined solely by its relations to these boundary disciplines. Actors playing the game of natural theology had a purpose beyond articulating natural philosophy and theology, and it will be argued that this purpose may best be characterised as the apologetic demonstration of theological doctrines originally derived from revelation.

The introduction of this new conception of natural theology will take place in five stages. The first is a terminological prologue. As mentioned in Chapter 2,

75 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

there are a multitude of terminological difficulties associated with this term and its fellows, “natural religion” and “physico-theology.” Thus, it is necessary to decide how to identify “natural theology” before it can be modelled. This stage will conclude with a working definition of natural theology. The second stage will model natural theology as an apologetic discourse, and as a loose intellectual tradition that occupied a contested space between theology and natural philosophy. Although natural theology was a loose tradition, natural theological arguments had in common an underlying grammar, which may be illustrated using the metaphor of a kaleidoscope. Thirdly, this model will allow us to develop a solution to the historical problem, identifying not only the emergence of the tradition, but also its trajectory over time. Since natural theology occupied a space in between natural philosophy and theology, it follows that natural theology could only emerge as a strong intellectual tradition at a time when this space was open and contested. This time was the seventeenth century, in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation and the onset of the Scientific Revolution. Prior to this, however, there were certain exemplars or harbingers of the natural theological tradition, including the Church of England theologian Richard Hooker. Further, the nature of natural theology as a dynamic discourse meant that there were certain moments in history when the output of natural theological utterance was particularly concentrated. These nodes or inflection points, associated with particular challenges in natural philosophy and theology, will be the subject of the case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, as well as three shorter historical interludes.

Fourthly, we will see that as a discourse, natural theology had a variety of functions and uses. Natural theological arguments could be used to demonstrate the reasonableness or certainty of the Christian religion, to argue for the validity of revelation in the form of the Christian Scriptures, and to promote the practical duties of Christianity. In a broader sense, the discourse of natural theology could be used to articulate the relations of natural philosophy and theology, to support particular systems of natural philosophy or theology, or to argue for the validity of the study of nature. Fifthly, and finally, we will consider the relations of natural theology with reason and revelation. Contrary to the belief of many historians, we will see that natural theology was not used

76 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

to replace revelation. Rather, there was a complex connection between reason and revelation in the seventeenth century, and natural theology was well placed as a space in and through which to negotiate the two.

2. Terminology

Before moving on to fleshing out the detail of this model, it is important to delineate exactly what is meant by the term “natural theology.” Firstly, it is necessary to acknowledge that what historians (of science and of religion) mean by “natural theology” may not be what seventeenth-century writers meant. Peter Harrison alerts us to this problem in his discussion of “physico-theology.”2 He notes that the first use of the term “physico-theological” may be found in the extended title of Walter Charleton’s 1652 work, The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature.3 However, Charleton’s use of “physico- theological” is very different to the meaning of “physico-theology” proposed by Harrison. Indeed, Harrison argues that Charleton was doing something that would usually be identified as “natural theology;” that is, attempting to establish the existence of God by the light of nature. It is not possible, then, to apply Harrison’s account of physico-theology to Charleton (something that, of course, Harrison does not do).

Likewise, historians cannot simply take a modern definition of “natural theology” such as those commonly found in theology textbooks or dictionaries of religion, and expect it to apply to all natural theological works of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Indeed, this seems to be where many historiographical problems arise. It is necessary to consider each instance of natural theology to determine what the actor was doing. However, this leads to an even more fundamental problem. Chapter 2 showed that there were a variety of ways in which the terms “natural theology,” “natural religion” and “physico-theology” were used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

2 Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 172. 3 Walter Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature: A Physico- Theologicall Treatise (London, 1652). 77 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

While historians like to distinguish between these terms, the actors often used them interchangeably. Even more frustratingly for historians, these terms were sometimes not even used at all.

So how are historians even to decide what to treat as natural theology? A starting point might be with those works that include the phrase “natural theology” in their title. However, these are surprisingly few in the seventeenth century. Based on a search in the Early English Books Online catalogue,4 there are only two examples. The first appearance of “natural theology” is in the extended title of a work by the physician Gideon Harvey, Archelogia philosophica nova, or, New principles of philosophy containing philosophy in general, metaphysicks or ontology, dynamilogy or a discourse of power, religio philosophi or natural theology, physicks or natural philosophy (1663). The second is the only work titled “Natural Theology” in the seventeenth century: Matthew Barker, Natural theology, or, The knowledge of God from the works of creation accommodated and improved, to the service of Christianity (1674).

A search for “natural religion” provides nine examples, including John Wilkins’ Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675), which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, along with Barker’s Natural Theology. As we shall see in that chapter, Wilkins’ work on “natural religion” fits into the same category of work as Natural Theology. This suggests that although historians might wish to distinguish between “natural theology” and “natural religion”, it is not possible to uphold this as a distinction used by the historical actors themselves.

Searching for the term “physico-theology” provides even fewer results. Indeed, the term “physico-theology” does not appear at all in the seventeenth century, and its related term, “physico-theological,” in only a handful of titles. These were Robert Boyle’s Some Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection (1674); Walter Charleton’s The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature: A Physico-Theologicall Treatise (1652); John Ray’s Three Physico-Theological Discourses (1693); and John

4 Early English Books Online, ProQuest Company, Ann Arbor. 78 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

Turner’s A Phisico-Theological Discourse upon the Divine Being (1698). In the eighteenth century, based upon a search in Eighteenth Century Collections Online,5 two works appeared with the title “Physico-theology”—William Derham’s Boyle Lectures, which were published under the title Physico- Theology, or a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1713); and Thomas Morgan’s Physico-theology: or, a Philosophico-Moral Disquisition concerning Human Nature, Free Agency, Moral Government, and Divine Providence (1741). Most often, references to “physico-theology” within eighteenth-century works are citations of William Derham’s Boyle Lectures. The other frequent use of the term occurs in The Christian Magazine, or, A Treasury of Divine Knowledge.6 This monthly periodical, which covered a variety of topics from the Fall of Mankind to the doctrine of the Trinity, included a number of brief discourses titled “Physico-Theology.” Most of these were reflections on some aspect of the natural world, such as the cotton tree or the wind, although one series of these discourses was devoted to a discussion of Cicero’s treatise on the nature of the gods.

Although physico-theology is often distinguished from natural theology and natural religion, it is not clear that such a distinction can be upheld on the basis of historical use. Several dictionaries from the eighteenth century equate physico-theology with natural theology or natural religion, and Samuel Johnson simply defines it as “Divinity enforced or illustrated by natural philosophy.”7 A clear differentiation between natural theology and natural religion is equally difficult to maintain. One author who did distinguish between the two was Temple Henry Croker, in his Complete Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1766). He defined natural religion as

that knowledge, veneration, and love of God, and the practice of those duties to him, our fellow-creatures, and ourselves, which are discoverable

5 Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale, Farmington Hills, MI. 6 The Christian Magazine was edited by Rev. William Dodd, and published in yearly volumes between 1759 and 1767. 7 See John Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1795); N. Bailey, The New Universal Etymological English Dictionary (London, 1760); Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1760). 79 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

by the right exercise of our rational faculties, from considering the nature and perfections of God, and our relation to him and to one another.8

Theology, on the other hand, is “a science which instructs us in the knowledge of God, or divine things,” and natural theology is that “which comprehends the knowledge we have of God from his works, by the light of reason alone.” Thus, if there is a distinction between natural theology and natural religion, it is that the first deals with religious doctrines, while the second is concerned with religious duties.9 However, in practice, this distinction is rarely upheld. As mentioned above, and as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, there is little material difference between Matthew Barker’s Natural Theology and John Wilkins’ Natural Religion.

This brief study demonstrates that it is not always easy or straightforward to identify natural theological works. The boundaries between natural philosophy, theology and natural theology were changeable and negotiable. Existing methods are either too narrow (relying on the terms appearing in titles, which the study above demonstrates to be inadequate) or too vague, relying on some kind of assumed recognition. The model to be presented in this chapter attempts to reconcile what historians call “natural theology” or “natural religion” with what people were actually doing. If natural theology is considered to be an intellectual tradition that sits in between natural philosophy and theology, and which is engaged in making articulations between the two, it will be possible to refer to natural theological arguments or discussions that might be found in works of natural philosophy or theology, or in separate treatises. Through the course of this chapter, it will become clear that natural theology is any kind of talk that sits between theology and natural philosophy, but more importantly, that this “talk” attained the status of an intellectual tradition in the seventeenth century, as viewed and evaluated through the terms of the model. The model is presented here as a way of identifying natural theology that will be

8 Temple Henry Croker, The Complete Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, vol. III (London, 1766). 9 This reflects Margaret Osler’s distinction between theology and religion. See Margaret J. Osler, “Mixing Metaphors: Science and Religion or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe,” History of Science 36 (1998): 92. 80 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

demonstrated, through a series of case studies, to align with the way historians intuitively identify these works.

Although this chapter is dedicated to a careful study of natural theology with a view to developing a theoretical model, it will be helpful to begin with one of the more sophisticated existing definitions. The following description of natural theology from Richard Olson provides a good starting point, although it is not without its own problems:

Since the time of the earliest Church Fathers there has been an important tradition which proclaims that knowledge of God, the Scriptures, and of our Christian duties can be discovered at least in part through the exercise of natural reason upon the materials of the natural world.10

One advantage of Olson’s definition is that it is broad enough to incorporate many of the aspects of natural theology considered in the previous chapter.11 For example, both the argument from design and other arguments from what might be termed “pure” reason can be encompassed in the expression “the exercise of natural reason upon the materials of the natural world.” Further, Olson recognises that natural theologians were not simply concerned with demonstrating the existence of God, but also specific aspects of Christian doctrine, such as religious obligations and the validity of Scripture. Finally, Olson situates seventeenth-century natural theology within a broader tradition, emphasising the particular importance of natural theology at that time, while acknowledging that it was not without precedent. However, Olson’s definition is insufficient.

The model of natural theology to be developed in this chapter shares some key points with Olson’s definition, but also differs in significant ways. For example, Olson describes knowledge of God as being “discovered” through reason applied to the natural world. As will be discussed further below, seventeenth-century

10 Richard Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power: The Interplay between Organic and Mechanistic Imagery in Anglican Natural Theology—1640-1740,” in Approaches to Organic Form, ed. Frederick Burwick (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), 3. 11 Compare this to other definitions such as that of Millard J. Erickson: “The core of natural theology is the idea that it is possible… to come to a genuine knowledge of God on the basis of reason alone.” Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Michigan: Baker Books, 1998), 181. 81 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

natural theology was primarily an apologetic discourse, engaged in supporting or establishing existing knowledge claims. More importantly, strictly speaking, natural theology did not exist as an intellectual tradition prior to the seventeenth century. Although the Protestant Reformation was, of course, well under way in the middle and later sixteenth century, the defining features of the process commonly termed “the Scientific Revolution” did not occur in England before the second generation of the seventeenth century. Both sets of developments were necessary to lead to the creation of that space between post- Reformation theology and the newer natural philosophical initiatives of the seventeenth century in which natural theology could take place.

Thus, the “tradition” identified by Olson as dating back to the Church Fathers is best seen as a constellation of fragmentary resources embedded in theological and natural philosophical literatures. Although this earlier “natural theology” was not an intellectual tradition or field in the strong sense employed in this thesis, it provided some resources and starting materials for the participants in the classic seventeenth-century natural theological tradition. Therefore, it is possible to “translate” Olson to provide the following historical point: since the time of the earliest Church Fathers there have been outcroppings of utterances dealing with the issue of the knowledge of God being established through natural reason, but these earlier outcroppings do not amount to a tradition, in the sense that seventeenth-century natural theology may be considered a tradition.

To return to the terminological question at hand, natural theology was a tradition (to be modelled in detail below) engaged in making articulations between theology and natural philosophy. A work may be considered natural theological if it can arguably be recognised as belonging to this tradition. More specifically, natural theological arguments belong to a type of discourse that presented arguments in favour of, or discussions of, religious doctrine or practice, using the tools of reason and natural knowledge. However, this definition alone does not provide a full picture of natural theology: it is just the tip of the iceberg. To fully appreciate the complexity of seventeenth-century natural theology, and to understand how it functioned as a space of hotly

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contested articulations between theology and natural philosophy, it is necessary to develop a detailed model that can then both guide and be tested against empirical case studies, leading to improvements in the model. It is to this that we now turn.

3. Theoretical Dimension: Modelling Natural Theology

In Chapter 1, we saw that natural philosophy needs to be carefully modelled in order to correctly understand its relationships with other disciplines during the Scientific Revolution. In a similar way, a detailed and comprehensive, “revisable but initially defensible,”12 model of natural theology needs to be developed to avoid the common misconceptions and misunderstandings discussed in Chapter 2. In some popular treatments of the issue, natural theology is viewed as the part of theology not dependent on revelation or as the attempt to establish the existence of God from evidence of design in nature.13 As a first approximation, this is not wrong, but serious historians need to go farther and deeper. To do this, a detailed model is required, both to ground historical inquiry and to be refined as a result.

It is helpful to employ the conceit of an iceberg to understand the difference between the historical actors’ and the historians’ usages of the terms natural theology and natural philosophy.14 The actors’ use of the term may be seen as the tip of the iceberg, while the massive, submerged and thus invisible bottom is the historians’ use of the term. It is this submerged part of the iceberg that needs to be carefully thought through, and modelled in the following way. While the historical actors did not employ the following model, historians may use this to develop a better understanding of what lies beneath the actors’ use of

12 This phrase is taken from John A. Schuster’s discussion of the need for a careful model of natural philosophy. See Chapter 1, Section 3a. 13 See, for example, the accounts discussed in Chapter 2. 14 The iceberg metaphor is drawn from two papers by John A. Schuster: “From Natural Philosophy to Science(s): Transformations (Intended and Unintended), Not Ruptures, in Early Modern Knowledge Networks—The Disputed Case of the Early Royal Society” (paper presented at the first international conference of the ARC Network of Early European Researchers, University of Western Australia, July, 2007); and “How to Write (and Not Write) about Key Players and Plays in the Scientific Revolution,” (paper presented at the History and Philosophy of Science research seminar, University of New South Wales, 3 April, 2007). 83 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

the term. In particular, we will examine the larger and deeper patterns, rules and dynamics of natural theological discourse that participants tried to follow, even though none of them ever fully explored or articulated the tradition or field in which they were engaged. a. What Natural Theology Was

i. Natural Theology as an Apologetic Discourse

Natural theology was not aimed at generating new knowledge. It was not like natural philosophy, which searched for the causes of things; or theology, which developed the understanding and application of religious doctrines; or natural history, which sought detailed descriptions of the natural world. Natural theology was instead an apologetic discourse, which aimed to produce arguments for existing knowledge claims, or engaged in discussions of the attributes of God and other religious doctrines, in part by using resources drawn from natural philosophy and natural history. Some historians acknowledge that this approach dates back to medieval thought. For example, in his account of Thomas Aquinas’ views, Nicholas Wolterstorff stated:

The sacred theologian engages in natural theology for apologetic and polemical purposes—that is, for the purpose of quieting the unbeliever’s objections to what is revealed and of getting him to accept as much of it as he can.15

Recall also the discussion of the views of Reformation theologians in Chapter 2. The Reformed perspective, as articulated in the Westminster Confession of Faith of 1646, was that whatever knowledge of God could be gained from natural theology or general revelation, it was not enough for salvation. However, once a person already believes in God on the basis of special revelation, such as the Bible or the teachings of the Church, they are now in a

15 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Migration of the Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics,” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 71. 84 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

position to see God revealed in nature, and, more importantly, to share this knowledge with others. The Psalmist, knowing God through divine revelation, could tell others of how the heavens declare the glory of God. The natural theologian can view nature through his spectacles of faith (or, as we shall see below, through his “kaleidoscope”) and tell others about how God can be seen in his Creation.

The word “apologetic” derives from the Greek word “apologia,” meaning “to make a defence.” In contemporary Christianity, “apologetics” refers to the branch of theology concerned with defending the Christian religion. A typical modern definition reads as follows:

Apologetics attempts to render the Christian faith persuasive to the contemporary individual. For unbelievers, it is belief forming; it helps to defuse attacks upon Christianity, and to establish Christianity as credible by giving intellectual support to the explanatory value of a biblical world view. For believers, it is belief sustaining; it nurtures Christian faith by calling believers to love the Lord with their minds.16

“Apologetic” may not be a word with which seventeenth-century natural theologians were familiar, but they were certainly familiar with the concept, as we shall see throughout the case studies.17 Natural theology can be distinguished from other forms of Christian apologetics by the type of arguments that are in use, although, as the case studies will establish, these were many and varied. Natural theology is commonly characterised by its use of arguments derived from reason applied to the natural world. This will not be disputed, but the mistake some historians have made is to assume that this produced knowledge of God, rather than providing arguments for existing knowledge.

In this way, the seventeenth-century tradition of natural theology was not discontinuous with the earlier outcroppings of natural theological arguments.

16 Walter A. Elwell, ed., Evangelical Dictionary of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 82. 17 See, for example, George Hakewill, An Apologie of the Power and Providence of God (London, 1627). 85 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

As John J. Collins writes of early Christian authors, they did not arrive at their knowledge of God simply by philosophical reasoning:

Rather, they appealed to natural theology for confirmation of what they affirmed on the basis of tradition or of what they held to be divine revelation. Evidently, their use of philosophy had to be selective, but they could at least claim that their beliefs were compatible with a respected philosophical position.18

Natural theologians might talk about knowledge of God being available in nature, but the key point is that the natural theologians themselves already had this knowledge from revelation. In a society so saturated with religion, it is highly unlikely that any of the natural theologians of the seventeenth century or their opponents were not exposed to “special revelation.” There was no need to go out and seek knowledge of God from nature, in the same way that natural philosophers sought knowledge of nature, because access to the Scriptures was not restricted to a privileged few. Rather, these natural theologians were responding to those who did not accept the authority of the Scriptures, but who did accept the authority of human reason and the natural world. Further, the employment of natural philosophical resources within the discourse of natural theology did not mean that natural philosophy was necessary for discovering knowledge about God, but that it was useful for illustrating and supporting existing religious doctrines.

Due to the apologetic function of natural theology, a distinction between particular arguments and the commitment or belief that they served could be maintained. This meant that if the discourse of natural theology failed in any way, this would not affect any fundamental doctrines of Christianity. For example, if a particular argument used to demonstrate the existence of God was discredited, this would not mean that God does not exist. It would simply mean that a better argument would be needed to convinced critics and sceptics. This distinction could only be upheld if the aim of natural theology is to provide arguments, not to generate new knowledge.

18 John J. Collins, “Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 60 (1998): 8. 86 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

This distinction also ameliorates Andrew Cunningham’s concern with the definitions of natural philosophy and natural theology. As discussed in Chapter 1, Cunningham argues that a more precise definition of natural theology is needed, because historians “have hitherto given to natural theology the role of relating nature to God its creator, and of fighting perceived atheism—that is, the roles of natural philosophy.”19 Natural philosophy could still be considered to be about God—seeking knowledge about God from his creation, as we can see in the idea of the natural philosopher as a priest of nature20—but natural theology could be viewed as taking knowledge gained about God from nature and applying it in support of existing knowledge claims about religion. Of course, it is by no means clear that Cunningham’s definition of natural philosophy holds for the seventeenth century—we have already seen how the boundaries of natural philosophy and theology were continually being negotiated and redefined—but it is interesting to note that considering natural theology as an apologetic pursuit circumvents this issue. ii. Natural Theology as a Loose Intellectual Tradition Situated

Between Natural Philosophy and Theology

Some of the aspects of John Schuster’s model of natural philosophy, which was discussed in Chapter 1, may be employed to describe natural theology. The most crucial is that natural theology can be understood as an intellectual tradition, in which the natural theologian produced arguments using resources derived from human reason and natural knowledge in support of religious doctrines previously known from revelation. These arguments are the articulations between theology and natural philosophy, as the actors were making connections between, or statements about, the relation between theology and natural philosophy in the process of creating arguments from nature in support of theological doctrines. This reflects the key difference between natural theology and natural philosophy or theology. Actors engaged

19 Andrew Cunningham, “How the Principia Got its Name; Or, Taking Natural Philosophy Seriously,” History of Science 29 (1991): 386. 20 See the Third Historical Interlude, on John Ray, below. 87 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

in natural theology were not pursuing new knowledge about God or the world he created, but were instead developing arguments in favour of knowledge already gained from revelation.

As an intellectual tradition, however, natural theology was distinct from the other intellectual traditions of natural philosophy and theology. As already noted in the previous chapter, a number of scholars focus on the influence of Newtonianism on natural theology. Both John Gascoigne and Neal C. Gillespie follow Margaret Jacob in aligning natural theology with the Newtonian philosophy. Jacob, along with her mentor Henry Guerlac, points to the Boyle Lectures as a vehicle for disseminating latitudinarian natural religion as a device for maintaining social stability in imitation of the Newtonian universe. Larry Stewart, by contrast, argues that the Newtonians were just one group within a wider spectrum of views. While Newtonianism influenced one particular brand of natural theology, there were many different versions, associated with a variety of theological and natural philosophical ideas. Throughout the seventeenth century, natural theology had been associated with organic as well as mechanical imagery, while in the early eighteenth century, Hutchinsonian natural philosophy provided high-church Anglicans with an alternative to the Newtonian philosophy adopted primarily by latitudinarians.

Not all natural theologians were natural philosophers, although most were trained clergy or theologians. For example, the Boyle Lectures, one of the key moments in the history of natural theology, were supposedly the place where natural philosophy was used in support of religion.21 Boyle’s will specified that the lecturer be a clergyman, but did not require a natural philosophical qualification to be met. Additionally, not all the arguments employed in the lectures could be strictly considered natural philosophical. William Derham’s Physico-Theology lectures were classic examples of the argument from design— using examples of apparent design in nature, drawn from the growing field of

21 See, for example, John J. Dahm, “Science and Apologetics in the Early Boyle Lectures,” Church History 39 (1970): 172-186; Henry Guerlac, and Margaret C. Jacob, “Bentley, Newton, and Providence (The Boyle Lectures Once More),” Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969): 307-318. See also Chapter 6. 88 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

natural history, to establish the existence of God.22 Other lecturers such as Samuel Clarke and Thomas Burnet relied on metaphysical arguments.23 Natural philosophy, though invoked by some, was not the only resource available for use by natural theologians of the time.

Further, natural theology was not restricted to any one type of theology. As the case studies will show, natural theologians of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries hailed from a variety of religious backgrounds, reflecting the range of religious opinions thrown up by the turmoil of the Protestant Reformation. Indeed, natural theology could be, and was, employed to argue for particular understandings of Christianity, as well as for the existence and attributes of God. iii. Natural Theology as a Dynamic Discourse

As an intellectual tradition separate from, but situated between, natural philosophy and theology, natural theology could employ resources from either in order to achieve its aims. In a sense, the tradition of natural theology, like natural philosophy, may also be viewed as competitive and creative. People were competing with one another’s natural theological arguments. Natural theologians competed through attempts to co-opt “discoveries” or “matters of fact,” as well as their supposed use of reason. While in natural philosophy before the late seventeenth century the production of novel phenomena was not strictly necessary, natural theology was not concerned with the production of novel knowledge claims at all. Rather, natural theology involved the appropriation of resources from natural philosophy and theology to produce novel arguments for existing theological or religious doctrines.

From this perspective, the character of any given natural theological work depended on the natural philosophical and theological presuppositions of its

22 William Derham, Physico-Theology: or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from the Works of Creation (London, 1713). 23 Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (London, 1705); Thomas Burnet, The Demonstration of True Religion, in a Chain of Consequences from certain and undeniable Principles (London, 1726). 89 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

author. Discoveries or “matters of fact” from natural philosophy and theological doctrines were conceptual resources that were available for use by natural theologians. However, availability was not the only factor that determined which conceptual resources were incorporated into natural theology. Natural philosophical or theological ideas did not themselves determine the internal workings of natural theology. Instead, they were brought in deliberately. The natural theologian chose from the available resources those that would be of the most use in the arguments he wished to make, and those that best fitted his existing theological and natural philosophical presuppositions. 24 In her classic paper on “Mixing Metaphors,” Margaret Osler suggests using the metaphors of appropriation and translation “to emphasize the conceptual influence and interaction between theology and natural philosophy.” Osler’s view is that “natural philosophers sometimes appropriate ideas developed in religion or theology, translate them into the language of natural philosophy, and use them to solve problems in the new context.”25 In a similar way, natural theologians could appropriate resources from natural philosophy and theology and use them for an apologetic purpose.

Different natural theologians could use the same resources to produce different arguments in support of different conclusions. This even dates back to New Testament times, when the apostle Paul used an altar inscribed “to the unknown god” to explain Christianity to the Greeks at the Areopagus in Athens.26 A key example in the seventeenth century was the dispute between Henry More and Robert Boyle concerning More’s use of Boyle’s air pump experiments, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The reason that the same resources could be used to produce a variety of arguments was that individual actors had differing motivations for using particular resources. Recalling Margaret Jacob’s view of Newtonian natural theology, it could be said that the natural theologian would choose the resources which best suited his political objectives. However, the key

24 This is not to say that the natural philosophical and theological presuppositions of a natural theologian were static and unchanging. Rather, the natural theologian chose resources for his natural theological work depending on his natural philosophical and theological views at that particular time. 25 Osler, “Mixing Metaphors,” 101. 26 Acts 17:22-34. 90 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

point is that political motivations were not the only ones in play. For example, as we will see in Chapter 4, Henry More’s motivations may be traced back to his enduring distaste, developed as a teenager, for Calvinist theology.

The dynamics of the discourse of natural theology also meant that a variety of arguments were generated and employed. English natural theology of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has often been equated with the argument from design, as though it were simply a precursor to William Paley’s famous work. Some natural theological works, such as William Derham’s Boyle Lectures and John Ray’s Wisdom of God, involved comprehensive lists of examples of design.27 However, there was a wide variety of arguments in the natural theologian’s arsenal. One common argument, perhaps most famously associated with René Descartes, was drawn from the very idea of God.28 The Cambridge Platonist Henry More has gained a reputation for being “credulous” by arguing for the existence of God from the occurrence of various supernatural events and encounters. Even the one natural theologian could employ a range of arguments. For example, John Hancock, Boyle Lecturer in 1706, invoked a variety of arguments, from the universal consent of mankind and the writings of ancient Greek philosophers, to accounts of extraordinary phenomena such as miracles, and the apparent design of the natural world. Thus, while the argument from design undoubtedly played an important role in natural theology, it was not the sole tactic by which natural theologians sought to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God. b. The Grammar of Natural Theology: A Kaleidoscopic Model

An integral part of John Schuster’s model of natural philosophy is his focus on the “grammar” of the tradition. These underlying rules were what unified the tradition of natural philosophy—they are the element that historians could identify as being common to all natural philosophical texts. This idea of grammar plays an equally important role in the current model of natural

27 Derham, Physico-Theology; John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (London, 1691). 28 See especially Chapter 4 on the Cambridge Platonists and the Second Historical Interlude on Walter Charleton. 91 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

theology. As mentioned above in Section 2, it is difficult to identify works of natural theology. However, if an underlying grammar or rules of production can be determined, this task of identification will be made easier.

A helpful way to explore the production of natural theological arguments is to use a kaleidoscope as a metaphor. A kaleidoscope consists of several parts that work together to produce a picture. Firstly, at one end there is a compartment containing pieces of coloured glass. This provides the raw material for the picture. As the kaleidoscope is turned or shaken, the pieces of glass are jostled about, so that some will end up taking more prominence in the final picture than others. Secondly, inside the kaleidoscope there is an arrangement of mirrors of a certain size and shape, and subject to the laws of optics. Light entering the kaleidoscope through the compartment with the coloured glass is reflected and refracted to produce the picture. Thirdly, there is the picture itself. A single kaleidoscope can produce an infinite number of pictures, depending on the positioning of the pieces of coloured glass, but they are all recognised as kaleidoscope pictures, not some other kind, so they all belong to the same “tradition” or “discourse of kaleidoscopy.” Finally, if the mirrors inside were to be rearranged, or if the pieces of glass were changed, the outcomes would also be very different.

According to this model, natural theology is not a single kaleidoscope. Rather, an individual kaleidoscope represents the natural theology of one person, but every person doing natural theology will own and use a kaleidoscope of this sort. This is indeed what it means to do natural theology. Imagine that a person in the late seventeenth century decides that he wishes to engage in the discourse of natural theology. He begins with a cylindrical tube, some mirrors and a collection of pieces of coloured glass. The pieces of coloured glass represent the conceptual resources that are available for this natural theologian to choose from. These could include “matters of fact” or new discoveries from natural philosophy, or various theological doctrines. These resources are not in the kaleidoscope when the natural theologian picks it up. Instead, he chooses which conceptual resources he wishes to bring into his natural theological discourse, in response to a variety of factors. These factors include the availability of the

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resources, the kinds of arguments he wishes to make, the audience he is hoping to address, and even the prior use of the resources by other natural theologians whom he wishes to support or defeat. The conceptual resources, of course, do not remain fixed in position. External factors, such as debates within the Church, challenges to orthodox religion, natural philosophical developments and so on, will jostle the contents of the kaleidoscope about, causing the conceptual resources to shift. As a result, certain conceptual resources will take more prominence at times than others. However, it is important to realise that these external factors do not determine the internal workings of natural theology. It is the natural theologian who decides which resources to bring into his discourse in the first place. More importantly, it is the natural theologian who decides to pursue natural theology by making a kaleidoscope in this manner.

The mirrors inside the kaleidoscope represent the position that this natural theologian takes on a number of issues such as the respective roles of reason and revelation, the relations between natural philosophy and theology, the relevance of natural philosophy to religious argument, what counts as “orthodox belief,” “theism,” “enthusiasm,” and so on. In a kaleidoscope, the positioning of the mirrors affects how the pieces of coloured glass are combined into a picture. In natural theology, the views of the practitioner on a variety of issues will affect how he interprets and combines the conceptual resources to develop a natural theological argument. The setting of the mirrors within certain parameters represents the underlying rules or grammar of natural theology. Some conceivable settings would produce non-natural theological arguments, or an argument so odd or radical as to be rejected by virtually all other participants, such as a setting that produced atheism, a denial of human reason, a view of history or nature as random or dominated by evil, and so on.

Finally, the outcomes of the kaleidoscope—the pictures or patterns—represent the various arguments that can be developed by this particular natural theologian, given these conditions and choices. These arguments depend on the conceptual resources that are selected by the natural theologian, and how these are interpreted and combined to produce an argument. While different actors

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might be responding to similar circumstances and accessing the same conceptual resources, the output of their kaleidoscopes will be different.

Of course, the actor’s play with his kaleidoscope does not represent perfectly the nature of natural theological discourse. One of the core differences is that the outcomes of a physical, optical kaleidoscope are essentially random. The natural theologian, however, is able to exert a measure of control over his “kaleidoscope.” Further, the mirrors inside a kaleidoscope remain fixed, while in this model, it is imagined that the mirrors will move as the natural theologian changes his mind about certain issues. Also, he is able to open up the kaleidoscope at will to change the conceptual resources he wishes to use, and he is able to decide which should take precedence in the “picture” that represents the outcome. Despite these difficulties, the kaleidoscope provides a useful model for imagining what natural theological discourse was like in the seventeenth century.

The tradition of natural theology, then, can be viewed as the set of kaleidoscopes and the rules for making them and for generating allowable natural theological “pictures.” The game of making these kaleidoscopes, using a certain range of cultural resources, and a particular set and setting of the required mirrors, is the game of natural theology. The audience does not see the internal workings of natural theology. When a person looks into a physical kaleidoscope, she does not see the pieces of glass or the mirrors, but only the picture. When a person looks at an individual’s work of natural theology, she will not immediately, or without considerable analysis, see the range of conceptual resources, the views of this individual on different topics, or the contextual challenges to which the natural theologian was responding, but, at first, only the arguments or utterances that are produced. From these utterances, she may infer the natural theologian’s other views, or what resources he was drawing from, but these inferences are not guaranteed. Different people may infer different things from the one work of natural theology. The case studies in the second half of this thesis will be examining the “utterances” of a number of seventeenth and early eighteenth-century theologians and natural philosophers who wrote natural

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theology, seeking to infer the views, conceptual resources and opportunities or challenges behind the arguments.

In contrast to the approaches of most historians, natural theology is not viewed here as simply being a discipline concerned merely with gaining knowledge of God from nature. Natural theology did not have a conceptually definable essence, as it varied for each person who engaged in this way of arguing. Thus, natural theology was a complex discourse which changed and developed in response to specific challenges, and which incorporated particular resources that were chosen by the practitioner from those available at the time. These resources did not, by themselves, determine the outcome. Rather, the natural theologian interpreted and combined these according to his existing natural philosophical and theological presuppositions. For these reasons, natural theology could be used by a wide variety of people to make arguments designed to achieve any number of purposes.

There are several advantages to this way of looking at natural theology. First of all, this illustration hints at one of the problems of existing historical approaches. Some historians have chosen one particular kaleidoscope, frozen at one position, and defined natural theology as that outcome. By contrast, in this model, natural theology is viewed as the set of kaleidoscopes and the rules of usage, or the historical actors’ actions in making and using these kaleidoscopes. Natural theology is not a singular outcome, but a set of processes over time. Thus, the variety of natural theological positions can be considered as multiple outcomes of different kaleidoscopes. Finally, this kaleidoscope model provides a concrete way of understanding how natural philosophy and theology were negotiated and articulated by the historical actors. While natural theology is viewed as a tradition situated somewhere between theology and natural philosophy, used to achieve a variety of relations and articulations between these two fields, the kaleidoscope metaphor demonstrates the underlying grammar. Natural theology can be thought of as holding natural philosophy and theology in tension, keeping them separate but related. By incorporating aspects of both, the dual concerns of the book of nature and the book of Scripture could be balanced. However, this balance was not set once and for all.

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Natural theology was not a single solution to the problem of how to properly relate theology and natural philosophy. These were both fluid and contested fields, and natural theology was, by its very nature, a dynamic tradition. Natural theology involved a culturally accepted29 situation of fluid and negotiable relations between theology and natural philosophy.

4. Historical Dimension

In the previous chapter we saw that historians of religion and science differ in their treatment of the seventeenth century in their accounts of natural theology. While historians of religion tend to overlook the place of the seventeenth century in the history of natural theology, historians of science often date the beginning of natural theology to that time. However, as Richard Olson has pointed out, natural theology was an important theme in Christian writing from the time of the earliest Church Fathers. Further, most historians of religion agree that systematic Christian natural theology began with Thomas Aquinas. Although opinions differ as to whether or not Aquinas was presenting proofs of God’s existence (or merely illustrations of his “essence”), his work would certainly fall under the umbrella of arguments for, or discussions of religious doctrine based on reason. This apparent conflict between the views of historians of religion and historians of science may be resolved by understanding that natural theology emerged as a full-blown intellectual tradition (that is, a tradition that can be modelled in the way that has just been outlined) in the seventeenth century, but this tradition was not without precedents.

The emergence of the English tradition of natural theology in the seventeenth century can be explained in historical terms once the model of natural theology is understood. Since natural theology was an intellectual tradition occupying the contested space in between natural philosophy and theology, it required the upheaval in these two fields provoked by the Scientific Revolution and the Protestant Reformation. Figures such as the Reformers may be considered as early exemplars or harbingers of this tradition of natural theology. While

29 That is, a recognised concern in the Protestant societies of the day. 96 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

Luther and Calvin were not themselves engaged in natural theology, some of their key concerns were also issues for seventeenth-century natural theologians. However, the writings of these harbingers, as well as earlier examples of apparent natural theological discourse, did not amount to an intellectual tradition. The tradition of natural theology, as modelled above and tested below, was a product of the particular theological and natural philosophical context of seventeenth-century England. As Amos Funkenstein discussed in his iconic work, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, a secular theology, “conceived by laymen for laymen” emerged around this time.30 John Henry has argued more recently that the impetus for this new secular theology was the proliferation of new natural philosophies competing with scholastic Aristotelianism.31 Since Aristotelian natural philosophy had long been considered the handmaiden of theology, the natural theologians of the seventeenth century had to either separate natural philosophy from theology (as we will see, to a certain extent, in the case of Walter Charleton) or show how their new philosophy was a better handmaiden. This we shall see in the cases of both the Cambridge Platonists and the proponents of the mechanical philosophy, including Charleton.

In addition to the historical point about the emergence of natural theology as a tradition, this model also enables a proper recognition of the ongoing trajectory of natural theology. The nature of natural theology as a dynamic discourse responding to contextual challenges and drawing upon resources from natural philosophy and theology meant that there were certain times in history when the output of natural theological utterance increased. These nodes or inflection points occur at moments of natural philosophical, theological and politico- religious turmoil and debate. The case studies presented in this thesis each reflect a particular inflection point. 32 Firstly, towards the end of the reign of

30 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 31 John Henry, “Voluntarist Theology at the Origins of Modern Science: A Response to Peter Harrison,” History of Science 47 (2009): 81-82. 32 This is not to say that all natural theological works will be confined to the inflection points. Rather, these represent moments of increased density of natural theological utterance. The three larger case studies deal with three such moments. The fact that the natural theologians discussed in the shorter historical interludes do not fit neatly into the larger case studies does 97 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

Elizabeth I, tensions in the Elizabethan Settlement and the continued rise of Puritanism led to an increased amount of debate on issues surrounding reason and Scripture. We see these issues in the work of Richard Hooker, the subject of the First Historical Interlude. Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity contained some elements of natural theological utterance, but since the natural philosophical upheaval of the seventeenth century was still to come, this was not yet natural theology in the full sense. The first serious outcropping of natural theological discourse in the seventeenth century came with the Cambridge Platonists, to be discussed in Chapter 4, who were concerned not only with theological issues, but also with the new natural philosophical ideas that were emerging in a generation of heightened natural philosophical turmoil. Walter Charleton, who will be considered in the Second Historical Interlude, was writing at around the same time, but taking quite a different stance from Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, the key Cambridge Platonists. This point nicely demonstrates the dynamics of natural theology, in that natural theologians responded to similar challenges in a variety of ways, depending on their theological, natural philosophical and political predispositions.

The next point at which an upsurge of natural theological discourse occurred was after the Restoration of the Established Church and the Stuart Monarchy. The upheaval of the Scientific Revolution was beginning to settle down as the mechanical and experimental philosophy became dominant, as attested to by the formation of the Royal Society of London in 1660. The continued success of the new philosophy provided ample resources for use in natural theological discourse, while the rise of groups such as the Socinians and Deists prompted many writers to defend the Christian Scriptures on rational grounds. The natural theology of the Restoration period, particularly as exemplified in the work of John Wilkins and Matthew Barker, will be analysed in Chapter 5. The final major inflection point to be studied in this thesis is the Boyle Lectureship, established by a codicil to the will of Robert Boyle, who died in 1691. The main course of the Boyle Lectures ran from 1692 to 1731, and occurred in the aftermath of the so-called “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, as well as the

not mean that they cannot be encompassed by the model. Instead, as we shall see, they illustrate very nicely the dynamics of natural theological discourse. 98 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

ascendency of Newtonian natural philosophy. This node has already been thoroughly studied and debated, and is often identified as the key site of English natural theology. However, in the larger history of natural theology, the Boyle Lectures may be seen as a moment when natural theological discourse was particularly concentrated, due to the conjunction of various theological challenges, and the emergence of new natural philosophical resources available for use. John Ray, one of the most famous English natural theologians of the seventeenth century, published his popular work, The Wisdom of God, the year before the Boyle Lectures began. Intriguingly, however, this work was based on sermons preached at the chapel of Trinity College, Cambridge, in the 1650s. The timing as well as the location suggests that Ray could be considered part of the node associated with the Cambridge Platonists, although the date of publication puts him in company with the Boyle Lecturers. Thus, like Walter Charleton, Ray does not fit neatly into any of the three major case studies of this thesis, and so he will be considered separately, in the Third Historical Interlude.

5. Natural Theology in Practice

We come now to examine the aims that natural theology could be used to achieve. Firstly, the natural theological arguments themselves had explicit goals, which included establishing the existence of God and the duties of religion on natural grounds. Secondly, there were other aims that could be achieved by choosing to participate in the discourse of natural theology. These involved a variety of negotiations and articulations of natural philosophy and theology. First, we will consider the aims of particular natural theological arguments or utterances, then deal with the purposes of the discourse itself. a. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments

The most obvious purpose of natural theological argument was to demonstrate the existence of God by means other than the Christian Scriptures. As natural theology was an apologetic discourse, however, the point was not to replace revelation as an authority. Instead, the natural theologian was engaged in providing arguments for a doctrine already known from revelation.

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Natural theology is frequently viewed as an attempt to prove the existence of God using human reason applied to the materials of the natural world. For this reason, natural theology has sometimes been dismissed as being insufficient to establish the validity of Christianity, as it can only demonstrate, at best, the existence of some kind of Supreme Being, but not the Christian God in particular. However, while natural theology could be used to “prove” the existence of God from reason, this was not its only use. Indeed, for many seventeenth-century natural theologians, it was necessary to establish the particular attributes of the God understood in Christianity.33

In addition to demonstrating the existence and attributes of God, natural theological arguments could be used to establish the duties of religion. Natural theologians were not only concerned with demonstrating the correct conception of God, but also the correct response mankind was to have towards him. This can be seen particularly in the work of John Wilkins, for whom natural theology provided support for belief in the existence of God, an increased understanding of his attributes, and an appropriate response towards him. In addition, for John Ray, an increase in natural knowledge led to a better understanding of God’s creation, and therefore to a better understanding of how we are to worship him.

As an apologetic discourse, natural theology, far from being opposed to revelation, could be used to provide arguments in support of the Christian Scriptures. One of the key seventeenth-century examples of this came from John Williams, the Boyle Lecturer for 1695 and 1696. In addition, natural theology could be used to bring people to a point where they were able to accept revelation. We even see an example of this in the Christian Scriptures, in Acts 17:16-34. Here, the apostle Paul was addressing Greek philosophers in the Areopagus. He began by appealing to what they already believed: “Men of Athens, I perceive that in every way you are very religious. For as I passed along and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with this inscription, ‘To the unknown god.’” From here, Paul attempted to lead them to the one true God, understood from a Christian perspective:

33 See especially the discussion of John Wilkins in Chapter 5, and of Samuel Clarke in Chapter 6. 100 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

What therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim to you. The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in temples made by man, nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything.34

Paul then appealed to the evidence of natural theology, and the general knowledge of God that is available to all:

And he made from one man every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having determined allotted periods and the boundaries of their dwelling place, that they should seek God, in the hope that they might feel their way toward him and find him. Yet he is actually not far from each one of us, for ‘In him we live and move and have our being;’ as even some of your own poets have said, ‘For we are indeed his offspring.’35

Paul continued, demonstrating the true knowledge of God that is available from special revelation in the person of Jesus Christ, as well as what a correct response to this God entails, that is, repentance:

Being then God’s offspring, we ought not to think that the divine being is like gold or silver or stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of man. The times of ignorance God overlooked, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent, because he has fixed a day on which he will judge the world in righteousness by a man whom he has appointed; and of this he has given assurance to all by raising him from the dead.36

Despite the multitude of uses to which natural theological arguments could be put, there was no unified position on the limitations or the efficacy of natural theology. This, along with many other factors, depended on presuppositions of the natural theologian. On the one hand, there was no doubt among natural theologians that the existence of God and some of his primary attributes could be known from creation. Indeed, this is a necessary condition for the pursuit of natural theology. The overriding assumption in the Boyle Lectures, for example, was that the Christian religion could be clearly demonstrated by appeal to reason, authority and physical evidence, and thus there is no excuse

34 Acts 17: 23b-25. 35 Acts 17: 26-28. 36 Acts 17: 29-31. 101 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

for infidelity or atheism. Similarly, in The Darkness of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature (1652), Walter Charleton suggested that it is impossible not to see God in creation, if one looks properly. b. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse

We have already considered some of the aims of natural theological arguments, such as establishing the existence of God and the validity of revelation. The next step is to ask what was gained by the attempt to defend religious doctrines on natural grounds, and why people chose to engage in natural theology. Was it simply to convert followers to Christianity, or were there other goals to be achieved? Considering this issue will help us to understand why natural theologians sometimes squabbled amongst themselves about the best way to pursue natural theology. There was more at stake than simply establishing the existence of God. As a dynamic discourse, natural theology could be used in a variety of ways to articulate the relations between theology and natural philosophy. Again, this is a key way in which the emerging natural theological tradition of the seventeenth century differed from the earlier, scattered outcroppings of natural theological utterance. Examining the purposes of the discourse of natural theology will also contribute to our understanding of what exactly natural theology was, as well as how it functioned in the contested space between natural philosophy and theology.

The interactions between natural theology and the neighbouring discourses of natural philosophy and theology were complex and varied, and shifted over time and from actor to actor. Thus, natural theology was not simply a single attempt to stabilise the boundaries between theology and natural philosophy. Natural theology was a field of discourse situated somewhere between theology and natural philosophy, which could be used to achieve a variety of relations and articulations between these two fields. In part, it was the ambiguity of the boundaries between natural philosophy and theology that made it possible for natural theology to be pursued. If there had been a clear separation, it is unlikely that the two could have been brought together in natural theology. Natural theology occurred where there was a contested space between and

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around theology and natural philosophy. That is, both natural philosophy and theology were contested traditions, and the space between them was also contested.37 As discussed above in Section 4, the theological and religious upheaval of the Protestant Reformation combined with the natural philosophical crises of the seventeenth century led to a space being created between theology and natural philosophy. However, the exact shape of this space, and the connections (or lack thereof) between theology and natural philosophy were open to negotiation. John Hedley Brooke expresses it in the following way: “as long as apologists both for science and religion linked scientific knowledge to the proof of design, the basis existed for connections between scientific and religious discourse to be made and remade rather than severed.”38 Natural theology is not only defined by its occupation of the space between natural philosophy and theology. It may also be defined as a tradition of contested boundary drawings and linkages between these two disciplines.

As we saw in Chapter 1, natural philosophers engaged in two routine manoeuvres: drawing or enforcing boundaries, and making or defending linkages. These manoeuvres were also routine in positioning natural theological arguments in relation to other enterprises such as theology, natural philosophy and natural history. However, rather than establishing or enforcing boundaries between natural philosophy and theology, natural theologians were more concerned with demolishing such boundaries, or at least redistributing subject matter between the two.39 Natural theologians had to maintain that there was no strict boundary, because a strict separation between theology and natural philosophy would preclude natural theology altogether, given its nature of bringing the two together. In this way, natural theology is indeed the process of making and defending linkages between theology and natural philosophy. It also includes efforts to undermine others’ attempts at bounding and linking. For example, natural theologians frequently disagreed with each other about

37 In this way, the model of natural theology presented here extends John Hedley Brooke’s “complexity thesis,” which points to the many and varied interactions between science and religion. Natural theology provided an arena in which the relations between theology and natural philosophy could be mediated, but there was no single solution or relationship. 38 John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 196. 39 See particularly the discussion of Walter Charleton in the Second Historical Interlude, below. 103 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

what kinds of natural philosophical resources could be employed in support of religious doctrines, or about the theological conclusions drawn from natural philosophical arguments.40

As suggested earlier, since the discourse of natural theology was neither exclusively scientific nor theological, it could incorporate aspects of theology and natural philosophy, and be used to support either. Since it could do this in various and contested ways, it was itself a contested, dynamic and essence-less field and tradition. We have already noted that natural theology may be thought of as holding natural philosophy and theology in tension, keeping them separate, but related. By incorporating aspects of both, the dual concerns of the book of nature and the book of Scripture could be balanced. However, this balance was not set once and for all. Natural theology was not a single solution to the problem of how to properly relate theology and natural philosophy. These were both fluid and contested fields, and natural theology was, by its very nature of consisting in attempts to strike balances and relations, a dynamic tradition. Hence, to reiterate what was said above at the end of Section 3, natural theology involved a culturally accepted situation of fluid and negotiable relations between theology and natural philosophy.

This situation meant that natural theology could relate natural philosophy and theology in a multitude of ways. For example, natural theology could employ natural philosophy in defence of religion, or validate the pursuit of natural knowledge by demonstrating its theological pay-offs. The dynamics of natural theology also meant that it could be brought closer to either natural philosophy or theology, depending on the need. For example, a clergyman seeking to avoid chastisement for pursuing natural philosophy could claim that he was practising a type of theology.41 Natural theology could also be used to encourage further enquiry into nature, as William Derham suggested in his Boyle Lectures,

40 An excellent example of this can be seen in the Cambridge Platonists’ limited acceptance of the Cartesian natural philosophy, as well as the disputes between Henry More and Robert Boyle concerning the use of Boyle’s air-pump experiments. These will be discussed in Chapter 4. 41 Peter Harrison, “Priests of the Most High God, with Respect to the Book of Nature,” in Reading God’s World: The Vocation of Scientist, ed. Angus Menuge (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2004), 59-84. 104 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

Physico-Theology.42 In addition, natural theology could establish certain propositions that were in turn essential to the pursuit of natural knowledge. For example, for Ralph Cudworth, the right conception of God is what makes knowledge of nature possible. If God is not “essentially good,” we have no guarantee that we will not be deceived.43 Thus, it is necessary for a person to have a correct understanding of God not for the purpose of salvation alone, but also for the pursuit of natural philosophy to be at all possible.

Natural theology was a dynamic discourse and those who participated in the discourse were engaged in making and defending linkages between theology and natural philosophy. By employing natural philosophical resources in support of religious doctrines, natural theologians were doing more than simply trying to convince others of the truth of Christianity. Participating in the discourse of natural theology enabled these actors to achieve other goals, such as supporting the pursuit of natural philosophy.

6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation

At first glance, natural theology appears to be quite distinct from revealed theology. After all, these writers were attempting to demonstrate the existence of God from human reason, seemingly without any reference to the Scriptures. In contemporary philosophy of religion, natural theology is often regarded as “the part of theology that does not depend on revelation.”44 In Chapter 2 we saw that both Stephen J. Dick and John Gascoigne argue that natural theology

42 As P. B. Wood noted in his discussion of Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society: “Natural theology both vindicated the study of nature, insofar as it revealed God’s providential design, and undermined the basis of atheism and materialism.” “Methodology and Apologetics: Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society,” The British Journal for the History of Science 13 (1980): 15. 43 This point reveals the influence of Descartes on Cudworth’s ideas. For Descartes, God provides the foundation and guarantee for all knowledge. God cannot be a deceiver, because this would indicate a defect and God is, by definition, perfect. As Descartes put it, “By ‘God’ I mean the very being the idea of whom is within me, that is, the possessor of all the perfections which I cannot grasp, but can somehow reach in my thought, who is subject to no defects whatsoever. It is clear enough from this that he cannot be a deceiver, since it is manifest by the natural light that all fraud and deception depend on some defect.” Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 35. 44 Keith Ward, “Natural Theology,” in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel Vrede van Huyssteen (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2003), 2: 601. 105 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

became increasingly attractive in the seventeenth century as an alternative to revealed theology.45 However, it is not clear that seventeenth century writers universally acknowledged such a neat distinction between natural and revealed theology. The use of arguments from reason and nature did not mean that religious doctrines could not be known and accepted from revelation alone.

It is vital to understand natural theology in the context of seventeenth-century discussions about reason and revelation. The Reformation and the rise of Puritanism in England did lead to debates about the interpretation of Scripture in the seventeenth century. Dick argues that as a result, the authority of revelation was weakened, and a Christianity centred on God’s works in nature became increasingly attractive.46 However, for most theologians, debates about how to interpret Scripture did not lead to a rejection of revelation in favour of reason, but rather an application of reason to the interpretation of Scripture. Also in the seventeenth century, groups such as the deists and the Socinians were rising in prominence. These groups tended to emphasise the role of reason in religion, with some rejecting Scriptural revelation entirely. Orthodox Christian natural theologians needed to use arguments based on reason in order to address their opponents, but they also needed to retain a central role for revelation to avoid charges of unorthodoxy.

For seventeenth-century natural theologians, there was a dual purpose in showing that the existence of God could be proved by natural reason. Firstly, it demonstrated the validity of reason as a means for understanding God and the natural world. Secondly, they were arguing for the existence of God and the truth of Christianity against those who rejected the Scriptures. Since the audiences these theologians were seeking to address did not accept the authority of the Scriptures, alternative arguments were needed, if only to bring these people to the point where they could accept revelation. Thus, natural theology was not intended as a replacement for revelation. Rather, natural and

45 Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chapter 6; John Gascoigne, “From Bentley to the Victorians: The Rise and Fall of British Newtonian Natural Theology,” Science in Context 2 (1988): 219-256. 46 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, chapter 6. 106 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

revealed religion reinforced the prestige of each other. Natural religion was established by proving its essential identity with revealed religion, while the validity of revelation was sustained by the witness of natural religion. That is, orthodox theologians argued that the doctrines contained within the Scriptures were the same as those discovered through natural reason, and the evidence of natural reason could be employed to defend the Christian revelation. By asserting the simultaneous necessity of natural and revealed religion, natural theologians were able to articulate a balanced position between enthusiasts, who focused on the role of the Holy Spirit, and deists, who over-emphasised the powers of human reason.

On the other hand, there were those who emphasised the limits of natural theology and thus the necessity of revelation to provide complete knowledge. For example, Matthew Barker argued that human knowledge of God was partly lost in the fall, and that the “Light of Nature” consisted only of “dark and weak reminders of this Image.”47 Further, the apologetic purpose is key to seeing how natural theology did not entail a rejection of revelation. As we have already seen, contrary to the belief of some historians, natural theologians were not setting their work in opposition to revelation in the Scriptures. Reason was not viewed as a competing authority to revelation, but rather as a means of interpreting and understanding the Scriptures. Thus, natural theology was an apologetic demonstration of doctrines previously known from revelation, not merely an attempt to discover knowledge about God aside from the Bible.

7. Conclusion

Natural theology was not a simple discipline concerned merely with gaining knowledge of God from nature. There was no single body of doctrine or utterance in “natural theology”—it was different for each person who engaged in

47 Matthew Barker, Natural Theology, or, The knowledge of God from the works of creation accommodated and improved, to the service of Christianity (London, 1674). Gerard Reedy has pointed out that “Only in the case of a few doctrines such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul do these authors consider that natural reason can and should fully prove that the individual contents of Scripture are fully true. By the “reasonableness of Christianity” these authors primarily meant that Scripture can reasonably be shown to come from God.” The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth-Century England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 141. 107 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 3

this way of arguing. In the senses modelled above, natural theology was a tradition or field of discourse occupying a crucial space of linkage and boundary marking between the highly contested domains of theology and natural philosophy of the seventeenth century. This rather loose tradition was held together by the largely implicit goals and rules of utterance adhered to by the historical actors who chose to engage in natural theology. It was also a complex, contested and evolving discourse which changed and developed in response to specific challenges, and which incorporated particular resources that were chosen by each practitioner from those available at the time. These resources did not, by themselves, determine the outcome; that is, the content of any particular natural theological utterance. Rather, the natural theologian interpreted and combined these according to his existing natural philosophical and theological presuppositions. For these reasons, natural theology could be used by different people for a number of purposes, from supporting the authority of the Christian revelation to justifying the pursuit of natural philosophy. The metaphor of the kaleidoscope illuminates how natural theologians could choose and combine resources to develop an array of arguments to achieve a variety of goals. This metaphor also reminds us that all these natural theological utterances were part of one family. Hence, natural theology in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries may be considered an intellectual tradition, even though there certainly was no single essence, nor was there even agreement among natural theologians regarding the particular content of any one kaleidoscope. The remainder of this thesis will be concerned with illustrating and testing this model against a series of case studies, highlighting key examples of early modern natural theology. Firstly, however, we will consider the case of Richard Hooker, who was not strictly a natural theologian himself, though he may be considered an early exemplar or harbinger of the natural theological tradition.

108 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

FIRST HISTORICAL INTERLUDE

RICHARD HOOKER (1553/4-1600)

The lawe of reason doth somewhat direct men how to honour God as their Creator, but how to glorifie God in such sort as is required, to the end he may be an everlasting Saviour, this we are taught by divine law, which law both ascertayneth the truth and supplyeth unto us the want of that other law.

Richard Hooker, Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie.1

8. Introduction

Richard Hooker has a complex and contested identity within the history of the English church. Sometimes designated as the founder of modern Anglicanism, he is widely acknowledged as one of the most important defenders of the Elizabethan Settlement and the fledgling Church of England.2 Very occasionally, his name crops up in relation to natural theology, and it is in this context that he will be discussed here. With respect to the model of natural theology advanced in this thesis, Hooker may be considered an early exemplar or harbinger. That is, although he was not himself a natural theologian, he was concerned with some similar issues and challenges, particularly the roles of reason and revelation in religion. However, historians do not universally agree upon Hooker’s views on these issues. Thus, in order to properly understand Richard Hooker’s place in relation to the tradition of natural theology, it is necessary to sift through layers of historiographical debate concerning his views on reason and revelation.

1 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, I.xvi.5, Folger Library Edition, ed. Georges Edelen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 1:139. 2 For a brief overview of historical debates surrounding Hooker, see the introduction to Robert K. Faulkner, Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). 109 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

Although Hooker lived and worked in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, he was too early to experience the upheaval in natural philosophy that characterised the high tide of the Scientific Revolution in England. If he had been born a generation later, it is possible that he might have been engaged in similar pursuits to the Cambridge Platonists Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, though he may still have exhibited little interest in natural philosophy, like their colleagues Benjamin Whichcote and Nathaniel Culverwell. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that Hooker was working within a particular historical and cultural context. Like the natural theologians who came later, Hooker’s writing was a response to the challenges of his time, employing resources and ideas he deemed suitable for his task. This historical interlude will examine Hooker’s place in the natural theological tradition, particularly with regard to his views on reason and revelation, since these are why he is sometimes associated with natural theology.

Today, Richard Hooker is best known for his monumental work, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, although he also had a public career as a preacher. Although the beginnings of the Lawes were conceived during his time at the Temple church in London, Hooker retired to a quieter living in 1591, serving as rector of Boscombe, Wiltshire, where he had the time and peace to focus his attention on this work. The first four books were published in 1593, and the fifth in 1597, while the others did not appear in Hooker’s lifetime. While he was not known for entertaining preaching, Richard Hooker’s prose has been ranked among the best in the English language. For example, there were more citations of Hooker in the first volume of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary than of any other author except John Locke.3

3 Conal Condren, however, has pointed out that Hooker was accused of “having an unnecessarily difficult style, marked by arrogance, overblown eloquence and a lack of balance and moderation,” particularly in his Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Polity. “The Creation of Richard Hooker’s Public Authority: Rhetoric, Reputation and Reassessment,” The Journal of Religious History 21 (1997): 38. 110 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

9. Richard Hooker and Natural Theology

Although there are only two historians who explicitly connect Richard Hooker with natural theology, the claim made about his place in this tradition is strong enough that it needs to be considered. Peter Hess argues that Hooker’s Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie exerted a profound influence on seventeenth century natural theology, which was built on the foundation of the classical, medieval and Reformation traditions, surveyed, articulated and transmitted in part by Hooker. As Hess puts it,

Interpreting sacred scripture and venerable tradition through the light of reason, Hooker developed a treatment of theological questions that struck what he perceived to be a balance between the stagnation of reactionary Rome and the radicalism of Geneva.4

Similarly, Richard Olson, upon whose work Hess draws, points to Richard Hooker as the beginning of the English natural theological tradition:

Hooker’s argument for the simultaneous necessity and sufficiency of natural and revealed religion, taken together, defines the Anglican tradition of natural theology during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.5

Olson and Hess do acknowledge that, on their own criteria, Richard Hooker was not actually a natural theologian.6 However, Olson still maintains that Hooker argued for the central importance of natural theology in Anglican theology, and

4 Peter M. Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God in English Natural Theology from Hooker to Paley,” (PhD dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, 1993), 28. 5 Richard G. Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power: The Interplay between Organic and Mechanistic Imagery in Anglican Natural Theology—1640-1740,” in Approaches to Organic Form, ed. Frederick Burwick (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987): 9. Note that Olson’s concept of a “tradition” of natural theology is very different from the one advocated by this thesis. At the end of Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3, we saw that Olson views natural theology as a tradition dating back to the earliest church fathers, and he argues that this tradition was intensified by Richard Hooker, thus marking the beginning of the uniquely Anglican tradition of natural theology. 6 Hess, for example, observes that “Hooker assumes rather than attempts to prove the existence of God,” taking this as indicative of not practising natural theology, while Olson directly concedes that “Hooker was not himself a natural theologian in the usual sense.” See Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God in English Natural Theology,” 30 and Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power,” 9. 111 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

“he also suggested certain key lines of argument that gave Anglican natural theology a distinctive shape.”7

It will be argued here that while Hooker was concerned with some of the same issues that preoccupied later natural theologians, he was not himself engaged in natural theology, nor was he concerned with establishing an Anglican tradition of the same. It is not even clear that he exerted any kind of influence on the pursuit of natural theology by other English writers. Although natural theologians frequently referred to others who had written similar works, the name of Richard Hooker rarely, if ever, appears. The Cambridge Platonists, who would seem the most likely to continue on a tradition begun by Hooker, never mention him.8 Further, a closer look at the ideas of Hooker on issues surrounding reason and revelation, identified by Olson as setting a precedent for Anglican natural theology, show that his purpose was very different. Rather than justifying the pursuit of natural theology as a necessary supplement to revealed theology, as Olson would argue, Hooker was concerned with finding a way to support aspects of Church of England government and worship not directly mentioned in the Bible, in the face of the Puritan appeal to Scripture alone. For this purpose, Hooker articulated a complex position on the relations of reason, revelation and authority. It is necessary to appreciate the nuances of his views in order to fully understand his place in the history of natural theology.

10. Richard Hooker on Reason, Revelation and Authority

It is Hooker’s views on reason and revelation, outlined in his Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie (1593), that prompt Olson and Hess to consider him as beginning the uniquely Anglican tradition of natural theology. These views

7 Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power,” 9. 8 Edmund Newey points out that “The Laws remained relatively obscure during the first half of the seventeenth century… and are not cited by the Cambridge school, for whom Scripture, the Fathers, and the Platonic and Neo-platonic philosophers are the chief authorities.” “The Form of Reason: Participation in the Work of Richard Hooker, Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth and Jeremy Taylor,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 10. Peter Lake also notes that it was not until after the Restoration of 1660 that Hooker began to emerge as one of the founding fathers of “Anglicanism.” “Business as Usual? The Immediate Reception of Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 52 (2001): 456. 112 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

emerged in the context of conflict within the English Church towards the end of the sixteenth century. The Established Church was dealing with challenges on two fronts: residual Roman Catholicism and increasingly radical Puritanism. Men such as John Knox and Thomas Cartwright spent time in Geneva, and developed strong Calvinist leanings while they were there. Back in England, they fought to replace the polity of the Established Church with a Presbyterian form of governance. In addition to abolishing the episcopacy, Cranmer’s Book of Common Prayer and various ceremonial aspects of the church also came under attack. a. The Accusation: Natural Theology as a Necessary Supplement to

Scripture

According to Richard Olson, Hooker’s task was to defend the Anglican Church and justify its doctrine, liturgy and mode of governance in such a way as to convert rather than alienate Puritans. In Olson’s view, Hooker chose to build his argument around an intensification of the existing natural theological tradition. In doing so, Hooker reintegrated natural morality and natural theology, arguing that some of God’s laws could be discovered in nature by humans without scripture, in contrast to the Puritan insistence that God’s commands are to be known only from Scripture. Hooker was breaking with earlier tradition by saying that natural theology is a necessary supplement to revealed theology, rather than simply complementary. Roman Catholics also viewed Scripture as insufficient, but they argued that it should be supplemented with tradition. Thus, Hooker denied both the Puritan focus on Scripture and the Catholic focus on tradition. Olson argues, “Hooker was telling his readers that even full attention to Scripture was insufficient for salvation without the supplemental awareness brought to man through natural reason and the observation of nature.”9

In support of his case, Olson quotes a passage from Hooker, which he claims shows Hooker’s insistence on the inadequacy of Scripture and the necessity of natural theology:

9 Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power,” 8. 113 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

There is in scripture… no defect, but that any man what place or calling soever hee holde in the Church of God, may have thereby the light of his naturall understanding so perfected, that the one being relieved by the other, there can want no part of needfull instruction unto any good worke which God himselfe requireth, be it naturall or supernaturall, belonging simplie unto men as men, or unto men as they are united in whatsoever kinde of societie. It sufficeth therefore that nature and scripture doe serve in such full sort, that they both jointly and not severallye eyther of them be so complete, that unto everlasting felicitie wee neede not the knowledge of any thing more then these two, may easily furnish…10

Olson’s interpretation of Hooker is the same as that of his Puritan critics, who attacked the Lawes anonymously in A Christian Letter (1599). The authors of this work contended that Hooker had departed from authorised theology of the English church, as expressed in the Articles of Religion of 1562. According to the authors of A Christian Letter, Hooker has departed from the official position of the Church of England that the Scriptures contain all things that are necessary to salvation:

Although you exclude traditions as part of supernaturall trueth, yet you infer that the light of nature teacheth some knowledge naturall whiche is necessarie to salvation, and that the Scripture is a supplement and making perfect of that knowledge.11

Significantly, both Olson and the authors of A Christian Letter chose the same passage to support their view of Hooker. However, as we shall see in the next section, both cut the quotations short, losing vital indicators of the context and of what Hooker was actually arguing.

If these interpretations of Hooker, from both his Puritan critics and Richard Olson, are correct, then it would certainly seem that Hooker was making a radical break with pre-existing forms of natural theological utterance. Further, if this necessary addition of natural to revealed theology did indeed characterise Anglican natural theology from this point on, then Olson’s claim could be upheld. However, a closer examination of Hooker’s views shows that both his Puritan critics and Richard Olson have misunderstood him. In addition, as the

10 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, I.xiv.5, 1:129. Quoted in Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power,” 8. 11 A Christian Letter of certaine English Protestants (1599), 7. 114 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

rest of the case studies in this thesis will demonstrate, natural theology was not considered by any other major natural theologians of the seventeenth century to be a necessary addition to scriptural revelation. In fact, most theologians emphasised its limitations compared with the knowledge to be gained from the Scriptures. b. The Defence: Richard Hooker and the Reformed Tradition

While numerous historians agree with Olson that knowledge of God from nature was an important theme for Hooker, none (except Peter Hess) take the line that natural theology was a necessary addition to Scripture. For example, John Gascoigne considers Hooker’s view to have been that natural knowledge was merely a supplement to revealed knowledge, rather than, as Hooker’s Puritan critics believed of him, the other way around. Gascoigne interprets Hooker as saying that God’s will could be discovered through the laws of God implanted in nature as well as through the text of Scripture: “Consequently, though scriptural revelation was the highest form of knowledge, it could be supplemented by the use of the human intellect reflecting on Creation.”12 However, the crucial point was that Scriptural revelation, an act of grace on the part of God, would bring that knowledge from nature to perfection. Even knowledge of God gained from nature was considered an act of gracious revelation on God’s part. As Hooker put it, nature “is nothing else but God’s instrument.”13 It is not due to anything inherent in nature or human ability that there is any knowledge of God to be derived from the natural world, but only because God chose to reveal something of himself in this way.14

It is perhaps telling that Olson’s view is much the same as Hooker’s contemporary critics. The ecclesiastical historian W. J. Torrance Kirby emphasises the importance of distinguishing between what Hooker actually argued, and what his critics thought he was saying. Kirby acknowledges that Hooker’s views on natural law were taken by his critics as “an affirmation that

12 John Gascoigne, “Church and State Unified: Hooker’s Rationale for the English Post- Reformation Order,” The Journal of Religious History 21 (1997): 27. 13 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie, I.iii.4, 1:68. 14 This relates to the concept of general revelation discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2a. 115 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

the ‘light of nature’ teaches a knowledge necessary to salvation and that scripture, therefore, is merely a supplement to the natural knowledge of God,”15 a viewpoint that is similar to Olson’s. However, like Gascoigne, Kirby does not think that this was what Hooker was actually arguing. Rather, he suggests Hooker’s view was that while some knowledge of God is attainable through a contemplation of the splendour of creation, this does not constitute an alternative route to salvation. On the one hand, emphasising the authority of revelation was not intended to diminish the knowledge of God that could be gained from nature: “To uphold the doctrine of sola scriptura is not to denigrate the authority of the light of reason.”16 On the other hand, reason alone could not lead to salvation. In fact, for Hooker, a complete reliance on reason would make salvation unattainable, as it logically pointed to “works.” Unfortunately, as religious historian Nigel Atkinson notes in his study of Hooker’s Reformed heritage, works “were, in this sphere, corrupted by sin and could not aid mankind in securing the gift of eternal life.”17 As Hooker himself put it, no one can claim to have “pure” ways; that is, to have only performed good works. As “all flesh is guiltie of that for which God hath threatened eternallie to punish, what possibilitie is there this way to be saved?”18 Indeed, there could be no way to salvation “if God him selfe had not revealed it extraordinarily.”19

Also, according to Hooker, the “law of reason” does not contain all the laws to which mankind is bound, but rather only those “which all men by force of naturall wit either do or might understand to be such duties as concerne all men.”20 Christians, by contrast, are obliged to obey particular laws, but only after entering into a special covenant with God: “these are lawes which we tye our selves unto, and till we have so tyed our selves they binde us not.”21 Since

15 W. J. Torrance Kirby, “Richard Hooker’s Theory of Natural Law in the Context of Reformation Theology,” Sixteenth Century Journal 30 (1999): 686. 16 Ibid., 702. 17 Nigel Atkinson, Richard Hooker and the Authority of Scripture, Tradition and Reason (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 17. 18 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie, I.xi.5, 1:116. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., I.viii.10, 1:91. 21 Ibid., I.xv.1, 1:130. 116 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

these laws are not obvious to all mankind from nature, they must be discovered in the special revelation of God. Thus, the only route to salvation is the “supernaturall way,” which was “given to mankind by the gracious act of God in revealing his son Jesus Christ in the Holy Scriptures.”22

The question remains as to why this misunderstanding has occurred. Recall the quotation cited above, employed by both Richard Olson and Hooker’s Puritan critics to show that Hooker believed natural theology to be a necessary supplement to revelation in Scripture:

There is in scripture… no defect, but that any man what place or calling soever hee holde in the Church of God, may have thereby the light of his naturall understanding so perfected, that the one being relieved by the other, there can want no part of needfull instruction unto any good worke which God himselfe requireth, be it naturall or supernaturall, belonging simplie unto men as men, or unto men as they are united in whatsoever kinde of societie. It sufficeth therefore that nature and scripture doe serve in such full sort, that they both jointly and not severallye eyther of them be so complete, that unto everlasting felicitie wee neede not the knowledge of any thing more then these two, may easily furnish…23

However, the quotation has been cut off abruptly and prematurely. Hooker continued,

…wee neede not the knowledge of any thing more then these two, may easily furnish our mindes with on all sides, and therefore they which adde traditions as a part of supernaturall necessarye truth, have not the truth, but are in error.24

There are three main issues raised by this quotation. Firstly, the comment regarding “they which adde traditions” suggests that Hooker is concerned with the role of tradition in religion. Secondly, Hooker is considering here the role of Scripture in providing “needfull instruction unto any good worke which God himselfe requireth.” For a full understanding of this issue, it is necessary to take into account the distinction between works required for salvation, and works

22 Atkinson, Richard Hooker, 17. 23 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, I.xiv.5, 1:129. Quoted in Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power,” 8. 24 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, I.xiv.5, 1:129. 117 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

required as a result of salvation. Finally, we need to determine just what Hooker meant by “nature” in this quotation. Specifically, did he mean “natural theology,” as defined by Richard Olson? i. The Role of Tradition in Religion

To begin with, Hooker was concerned with arguing against the need for tradition (that is, Roman Catholic tradition) in addition to what we may know from Scripture and nature, not with the necessity of natural theology for salvation. The context of the quotation indicates that Hooker was convinced that all knowledge necessary for salvation was contained in the Scriptures. The title of the chapter from which this quotation is taken is “The sufficiencie of scripture unto the end for which it was instituted,” and Hooker expressly considered the issue of “whether all things necessary unto salvation be necessarilie set downe in the holie scriptures or no.” He declared that “onely those things be necessarye, as surely none else are, without the knowledge and practise whereof it is not the will and pleasure of God to make any ordinarie graunt of salvation.”25 That is, everything that a person needs to know or do in order to be saved is contained within the Scriptures. Hooker was thus defining the authority of Scripture in terms of its purpose; that is, salvation. This was in sharp contrast to the Puritans who emphasised the authority of Scripture in all realms of life, but it does not mean that Hooker believed that natural theology was necessary for salvation.26

Further, we must note that one of the key issues at stake in the early Church of England concerned the roles of tradition and Scripture. For the Roman Catholic, authority in matters of religion resided in the Church: ultimately in the Pope, but in the priest at the congregational level. For Puritans, authority derived from the Bible, and some claimed to draw all their doctrine and practice

25 Ibid., I.xiv.1, 1:125. 26 On the purpose of Scripture for salvation, see Bruce Kaye, “Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture in Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,” The Journal of Religious History 21 (1997): 87. 118 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

entirely from that source. The position of the Church of England was somewhere in between:

It respected the authority of both Church and Bible without deferring so exclusively to one or the other as did its opponents. It claimed the need to use God-given reason as a means of interpretation. In this it left room for individual judgment, but at the same time it accepted the authority of the Church in its government by bishops.27

The issue at stake was not whether reason should replace revelation, or even whether reason could be an authority in its own right, but rather how reason should be used to interpret revelation: “Our natural capacity and judgment must serve us only for the right understanding of that which the sacred Scripture teacheth.”28 With regard to the issue of whether “all things which are necessarye unto salvation” are contained in Scripture, Hooker argued that these are not necessarily set “downe in plaine tearms,” but rather “by reason we may from thence [that is, Scripture] conclude all things which are necessary.”29 Some doctrines, such as the Trinity and the duty of infant baptism, are not to be found in Scripture “by expresse literall mention, only deduced they are out of scripture by collection.”30 It is here that reason has a role in “collecting” these truths. As Peter Lake articulates,

[E]ven within its own sphere of ‘saving knowledge’ the very nature of scripture as a written message implied the active involvement of human reason in distilling and applying the divine truths concealed and contained in the sacred text.… In short scripture was a message encoded in terms expressly designed for rational creatures. It presupposed the powers and autonomous action of human reason to decode its message. Admittedly those powers were themselves a divine creation, but that was Hooker’s whole point.31

27 Arthur Pollard, Richard Hooker (London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1966), 13. 28 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, II.iv.7, 1:157. 29 Ibid., I.xiv.2, 1:126. 30 Ibid. 31 Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 151-152. 119 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

However, even tradition remained an authority in determining what counted as reason.32 It was clear that Richard Hooker did not want to reject the views of those whom God had endowed with reason:

But whom God hath indued with principall giftes to aspire unto knowledge by, whose exercises, labours, and divine studies hee hath so blest, that the world for their great and rare skill that way, hath them in singular admiration; may we reject even their judgement likewise, as being utterly of no moment? For mine owne part, I dare not so lightly esteeme of the Church, and of the principall pillars therein.33

This perspective on the wisdom of those who had come before derived from Hooker’s immersion in a university culture where the argument from authority was frequently employed. This form of argument endured throughout the seventeenth century in various works of natural theology.34 ii. Two Types of Works

The second issue with regard to the passage quoted by both Richard Olson and the authors of A Christian Letter involved the distinction between works or duties required for salvation, and those that follow once a person is living as a Christian. The former, for Protestants, involves only a belief in Christ and acceptance of his work of redemption, while the latter include all the particular practices of worship within the Church of England. It seems that Olson (and perhaps also Hooker’s Puritan critics) overlooked this distinction, and, as a result, conflated matters of doctrine and polity. Hooker’s point was not that natural theology is required for salvation, but that it is not a sin to base Church practices on an authority other than Scripture, for the revelation provided for us in the Bible simply does not cover every issue of Church government or ceremony. Rather than creating a three-fold authority of scripture, tradition and reason as the basis of deciding doctrinal questions, Hooker’s view was, as MacCulloch has expressed it, “In such matters that did not affect salvation, the

32 As Lake explains, the dictates of reason “could best be established by asking the most learned human authorities in whom human reason had reached its peak.” Anglicans and Puritans?, 152 33 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, II.vii.4, 1:179. 34 See, especially, the discussion of John Wilkins in Chapter 5. 120 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

criteria for making decisions were as much the weight of collective past experience and the exercise of God-given reason as the commands of scripture itself.”35 In Hooker’s words:

What scripture doth plainlie deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever anie man can necessarily conclude by force of reason; after these the voice of the Church succeedeth.36

In this, Hooker was treading the path forged by the Continental Reformers. For example, as Kirby describes Martin Luther’s view, natural law “imposes no soteriological necessity upon the believer justified by faith but does establish an ethical measure for the good works which proceed from the ‘indicative’ of divine grace.”37 Hooker followed Luther in distinguishing between two uses of law: divine use or salvation, and natural use or moral action:

The lawe of reason doth somewhat direct men how to honour God as their Creator, but how to glorifie God in such sort as is required, to the end he may be an everlasting Saviour, this we are taught by divine law, which law both ascertayneth the truth and supplyeth unto us the want of that other law. So that in morall actions, divine lawe helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to guide mans life, but in supernaturall it alone guideth.38

This view, Kirby points out, was also taken by Calvin: “To know God as Father requires the revelation of the divine law whereas the divine existence, eternity, and power are accessible to the unaided power of human reason.”39 In understanding Hooker’s work as a continuation of the Reformed tradition, it is necessary to take into account the two realms of knowledge and law:

Just as for Calvin, the Lord reveals himself both through the creation of the world and by the revelation of the redeeming Grace of Christ, so also

35 Diarmaid MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,” English Historical Review 117 (2002): 778. Similarly, Rudolph Almasy argues that Hooker sought to define the authority of the church to interpret and direct human affairs where Scripture is silent. “The Purpose of Richard Hooker’s Polemic,” Journal of the History of Ideas 39 (1978): 258. 36 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, V.viii.2, 2:39. 37 Kirby, “Richard Hooker’s Theory of Natural Law,” 693. 38 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, I.xvi.5, 1:139. 39 Kirby, “Richard Hooker’s Theory of Natural Law,” 698. 121 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

Hooker’s eternal law manifests itself in the realm of creation as natural law and in the realm of redemption as divine law.40 iii. “The Light of Naturall Understanding”

Finally, we need to consider just what Hooker meant by “nature” or the “light of naturall understanding” in the passage in question. If he was referring to “natural theology,” in the sense defined by Richard Olson as a “tradition which proclaims that knowledge of God, the Scriptures, and of our Christian duties can be discovered at least in part through the exercise of natural reason upon the materials of the natural world,”41 then Olson’s case for the necessity of natural theology in Hooker’s view might hold. A closer reading does indeed show Hooker’s perspective on Scripture was that it contained everything necessary for salvation that could not be known by other means:

Scripture do professe to conteyne in it all things which are necessarye unto salvation; yet the meaning cannot be simplye of all things that are necessarye, but all things that are necessarye in some certaine kinde or forme; as all things that are necessarye, and either could not at all, or could not easily be knowne by the light of naturall discourse; all things which are necessarye to be knowne that we may be saved, but knowne with the presupposall of knowledge concerning certaine principles whereof it receaveth us already perswaded, and then instructeth us in all the residue that are necessarie.42

Clearly, there is some other kind of knowledge aside from Scripture possessed by human beings. However, it is by no means clear that natural theology is what Hooker had in mind. Natural theology, as defined by Olson, implies some sort of active pursuit on the part of the human being to seek out knowledge of God by employing natural reason to the natural world. Hooker seems to be referring more to a kind of knowledge already possessed by the readers of Scripture. This is most likely general revelation, something that was touched upon briefly earlier in this thesis.43 While related to the concept of natural theology, general

40 Ibid., 699. 41 Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power,” 3. 42 Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, I.xiv.1, 1:126. 43 See Chapter 2, Section 2a. 122 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology First Historical Interlude

revelation implies a more passive reception of knowledge rather than an active pursuit. To say that Scripture contains all knowledge necessary for salvation that is not known by other means is not to say that natural theology (defined as the pursuit of knowledge about God from nature and reason) is necessary for salvation. A person can be saved by the knowledge presented in Scripture, along with any knowledge he or she might already possess, without the need to pursue a natural theological study of the world.

11. Conclusion

Hooker’s Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie was not a natural theological text. Hess comments that Hooker assumed rather than attempted to prove the existence of God, but this is perfectly understandable. Hooker’s aim was not to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, as later natural theologians would do. He was not even attempting to establish the reasonableness of Christianity as a religion against the critiques of “notorious infidels.”44 His concern was to defend the practices of the Established Church and to ease the consciences of those who had difficulty accepting the Elizabethan Settlement. Simply put, Hooker was not doing natural theology because it would not have solved the problems with which he was concerned.

However, much of what Hooker had to say must have resonated with later natural theologians who were concerned with some of the same issues. Discussions of the roles of reason and revelation continued throughout the seventeenth century, although the immediate contexts and the arguments employed differed. Even some of Hooker’s methods of argument, in particular his appeal to authority, endured. For these reasons, he may be considered a harbinger of the natural theological tradition: someone who was concerned with similar issues as they were beginning to emerge, but who was still too early to be a part of the full thrust of natural theological discourse. We turn now to consider our first major case study, and some of the earliest exponents of English natural theological discourse: the Cambridge Platonists.

44 This was Robert Boyle’s turn of phrase. We touched on the Boyle Lectureship, which was instituted to prove the Christian religion against “notorious infidels,” briefly in Chapter 2 and we will consider it in detail in Chapter 6. 123 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

CHAPTER 4

THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

The Spirit of a Man is the candle of the Lord, Lighted by God, and Lighting us to God.

Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and Religious Aphorisms.1

1. Introduction

The Cambridge Platonists followed in Hooker’s footsteps, most particularly with regard to the roles of reason and revelation in religion. However, while they were dealing with some of the same issues, this took place in a distinct historical context. The Cambridge Platonists were exposed to the first fruits of the Scientific Revolution in England, as well as deepening crises in church and state, and this led to their own particular ideas and agendas.

The Cambridge Platonists, also referred to as “Christian Platonists” or the “Cambridge School,” were a group of theologians and philosophers, educated and active at Cambridge University during the 1630s and following decades. In his seminal work on rational theology and Christian philosophy, John Tulloch argued that, due to their affinities of thought, the Cambridge Platonists were bound “together into one of the most characteristic groups in the history of religious and philosophical thought in England.”2 More recently, historian of science and religion Peter Harrison has described them as a “group of seventeenth-century English theologians and philosophers who were distinguished by their veneration of Plato and Plotinus, their opposition to religious fanaticism, and their preaching of a reasonable religion of holiness.”3

1 Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and Religious Aphorisms (Norwich, 1703), 129. 2 John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century, Volume II: The Cambridge Platonists, 2nd ed. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1874), 6-7. 3 Peter Harrison, “Religion” and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 28. 124 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

As we will see, this emphasis on reasonableness and holiness led to a unique type of natural theology.

Several different academic disciplines have dealt with the Cambridge Platonists, including theology, philosophy and the philosophy of religion. For the most part, however, they have been overlooked in the history of science.4 This is perhaps due to their focus on theological matters, or their tendency towards mysticism. Sterling Lamprecht, for example, highlighted the prime importance given to ecclesiastical matters by the Cambridge Platonists: “These men were first of all Churchmen, and their theory of knowledge aimed above all else at a wide and moderate settlement of the quarrels into which the Church had been plunged.”5 Even historians who acknowledge the interest of the Cambridge Platonists in natural philosophy tend to downplay their contribution to the development of modern science, portraying them as somewhat backward. A. Rupert Hall, a relatively recent biographer of Henry More, concedes that it does not make sense to compare the Cambridge Platonists with the “brighter lights” of the seventeenth century, such as Galileo and Newton, as their problems are too different. However, he does suggest that “in the last reckoning one cannot conceal the fact that so far as natural philosophy [is] concerned, the Cambridge Platonists were at the end of the road.”6 An even harsher perspective came from Alexandre Koyré who wrote that “Henry More enjoys a rather bad reputation among historians of philosophy, which is not surprising… [as he was] lost in the disenchanted world of the ‘new philosophy’ and fighting a losing battle against

4 The literature on the Cambridge Platonists tends to be primarily from an history of philosophy perspective. See, for example, the selection of essays on “The Cambridge Platonists: Philosophy at Mid Century” in Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England, 1640-1700, ed. Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft and Perez Zagorin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Scant references to Cudworth and More appear in Richard Westfall’s canonical texts Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973) and The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1971). Key texts in the history of science that do address Cambridge Platonism include Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1924) and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). In the former, the Cambridge Platonists are again treated in the context of seventeenth-century philosophy rather than “science.” 5 Sterling P. Lamprecht, “Innate Ideas in the Cambridge Platonists,” The Philosophical Review 35 (1926): 553. 6 A. Rupert Hall, Henry More: Magic, Religion and Experiment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 80. 125 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

it.”7 Even so, Koyré still acknowledged that “it was Henry More who gave to the new science—and the new world view—some of the most important elements of the metaphysical framework which ensured its development” because he “succeeded in grasping the fundamental principle of the new ontology, the infinitization of space, which he asserted with an unflinching and fearless energy.”8

Although studies of the Cambridge Platonists have been produced sporadically ever since Tulloch’s comprehensive work, the last few decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the school. In philosophy, Sarah Hutton and Robert Crocker have led the charge, particularly with regard to Henry More, although a number of papers have also been written on his colleague Ralph Cudworth.9 In his introduction to a recent collection on the Cambridge Platonists, Jean-Michel Vienne wrote that “the Cambridge Platonists were at the heart of the formation of modern thought, and many of their questions are still our own, even if their solutions are no longer accepted.”10 Historians of science are also beginning to take more notice of this group of thinkers.11

The Cambridge Platonists provide fertile ground for investigation of these interactions, as their interests were broad. In particular, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth were interested in both theological and natural philosophical issues. John Henry has argued that although More was a theologian, he is still relevant to the history of science, as much of his writing challenged contemporary ideas in natural philosophy, and hence drew the attention of “brighter lights” like

7 Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 125. 8 Ibid., 126. Note that Koyré is speaking this way because of his emphasis on the issue of the move to the infinite universe as a necessary metaphysical framework for any possibility of “modern science” emerging. 9 In particular, see Robert Crocker, Henry More, 1614-1687: A Biography of the Cambridge Platonist (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003); Sarah Hutton, ed., Henry More (1614-1687): Tercentenary Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990); and G. A. J. Rogers, J. M. Vienne, and Y. C. Zarka, eds., The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics and Religion (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997). 10 Jean-Michel Vienne, “Introduction,” in Rogers, Vienne, and Zarka, The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context, ix. 11 Robert Crocker has attributed this awakening of interest to our “quest to understand in more detail the interaction between religion, philosophy and science, or more properly, ‘natural philosophy’ in the period.” Crocker, Henry More, 1614-1687, xix. 126 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke and Isaac Newton.12 Further, More and Cudworth both corresponded extensively with natural philosophers such as Descartes and Boyle, indicating their keen interest in the natural philosophical debates of the day. In addition, both Cudworth and More were elected as fellows of the Royal Society of London, in 1662 and 1664 respectively. Today, it may seem strange for theologians to become members of a scientific society, but given the close connections between theology and natural philosophy in the early modern period, it is not at all out of the ordinary. Having a primary occupation of, or even a high degree of interest in theology did not preclude a learned academic from also taking a keen interest in natural philosophy. As John Hedley Brooke has poetically expressed of Henry More,

He had welcomed the Copernican innovation, his spirits trembling at the prospect of an infinite universe. He had facilitated the spread of an atomic philosophy of nature by insisting that in its pristine formulation it had not been atheistic. He had unleashed the Cartesian philosophy before perceiving all its dangers; and he may even have been instrumental in advertising the work of Galileo.13

The astute reader will surely have noticed that only two names have appeared so far: Henry More and Ralph Cudworth. The group designated as “The Cambridge Platonists” did, of course, encompass several other theologians. In addition to Cudworth and More, the group is typically said to include Benjamin Whichcote, Nathaniel Culverwell and John Smith, although occasionally John Worthington, Peter Sterry and George Rust are also included.14 Cudworth and More, however, stand out from the rest due to their much stronger interest in natural philosophy. Thus, these two will feature in this chapter much more prominently than the rest. However, Whichcote, Culverwell, Smith and Sterry also wrote and preached on topics intimately connected with natural theology.

12 John Henry, “More on More,” review of Henry More, 1614-1687: A Biography of the Cambridge Platonist, by Robert Crocker, Metascience 14 (2005): 225. 13 John Hedley Brooke, “Immaterial Beings or Substantiated Experiments?” review of Henry More: Magic, Religion and Experiment, by A. Rupert Hall, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 47 (1993): 143. 14 A. Rupert Hall, for example, suggests in Henry More (62) that these five—Cudworth, More, Whichcote, Culverwell and Smith—were the only ones who could be said to be serious figures in English intellectual history, although only Cudworth and More could be considered philosophers. 127 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

Like Richard Hooker, these divines were concerned with issues of reason and revelation, although also like Hooker, they were not particularly interested in natural philosophy.

Despite there being some affinities of thought amongst the Cambridge Platonists, they were by no means a homogeneous group. Each member had his own particular interests, and his own peculiar response to the issues and challenges of this time. Thus, Cudworth and More were not merely two members of a unified school of thought, but were instead two theologians and philosophers who engaged in a pursuit we now call natural theology, and who were associated by time, place and some common ideas with a group we now identify as “The Cambridge Platonists.” Of these two important figures, Henry More is most often associated with natural theology. Hall goes so far as to suggest that “More may be reckoned the pioneer, even the founder, of the English version of natural religion,”15 while John Henry considers More to be one of the most important philosophical theologians to have engaged in natural theology.16 However, we will see that Cudworth was also engaged in this endeavour, although these two Cambridge Platonists represent only one particular example of the wider discourse of natural theology.

2. Historical Dimension

The Cambridge Platonists are being studied here as representatives of one of the times in history that witnessed an upsurge in natural theological discourse, for reasons associated with the surrounding cultural context. Thus, it is necessary to consider briefly the historical and cultural context of the Cambridge Platonists to see why the production of natural theology intensified at this time. Further, with this context in mind, the arguments presented by the Cambridge Platonists can be understood as responses to specific issues and challenges from the surrounding culture.

15 Ibid., 119. 16 John Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism: Henry More and the Concept of Soul,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 49 (1986): 172. 128 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

The “Cambridge” in the title of this group refers to the academic affiliation of the group with the University of Cambridge—predominantly, but not exclusively, with Emmanuel College. Established in 1584 with the express purpose of “perpetuating Puritanism,”17 Emmanuel College and the influence of its members peaked during the political disruptions of the mid-1640s. Although some historians have viewed the Cambridge Platonists as ivory-tower academics, little concerned with what was going on around them, G. A. J. Rogers argues that we should see them as keenly aware of the political landscape. Indeed, it was inevitable that any person at Cambridge during the Civil War and Interregnum would be in touch with the wider political world. However, for the Cambridge Platonists, any political concern was still closely linked with religion:

It was [their] wider view of the role of the church, as essentially providing the vehicle in which the individual Christian could practice his religion without fear or intimidation that provided the ultimate political dimension to the beliefs of the Cambridge Platonists.18

Indeed, it was the religious dimension, combined with the more practical difficulties of the political situation, which particularly shaped their natural theology. The Cambridge Platonists were working within an intellectual context extensively defined by religious and political conflict. English Puritans had been agitating for further reform of the Church of England for decades, and tension with the more conservative Anglicans had begun to emerge by the end of the reign of Elizabeth I. These tensions grew more pronounced during the reign of James I, as he distrusted the now increasingly emerging republican tendencies of Puritanism linked with Calvin’s Geneva. With the ascent to the throne of the even more anti-Puritan Charles I, the monarchy was seen as dangerously hostile. In 1642, civil war broke out between the Parliament, which was generally aligned with Puritanism, and the Anglican royalists. Charles was captured in 1646, and tried and executed in 1649, marking the abolition of the

17 James Deotis Roberts, Sr., From Puritanism to Platonism in Seventeenth Century England (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 209. 18 G. A. J. Rogers, “The Other-Worldly Philosophers and the Real World: The Cambridge Platonists, Theology and Politics,” in Rogers, Vienne, and Zarka, The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context, 13. 129 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

monarchy and the beginning of a Puritan republic under Oliver Cromwell. While other academics were being forced out at this time, the Emmanuel fellows retained their positions and gained promotions. Even Ralph Cudworth did well at this time. 19 Despite his Royalist connections, Cudworth was a friend and confidante of John Thurloe, Secretary of State to both Oliver and Richard Cromwell, though this did not prevent him from making peace with the Restoration. However, the turmoil of the Civil War and Interregnum did mean that the academic livelihoods of the Cambridge Platonists were uncertain for quite some time. It is not surprising, then, that these divines were prompted to respond to the extremes of both sides in the religious and political conflict.

The response of the Cambridge Platonists to their historical circumstances can be most clearly seen in their pursuit of a middle ground between the “enthusiasm” of Puritanism and the strict focus on creedal conformity of Laudian Anglicanism. On this point, Cudworth and More had goals similar to those of the other Cambridge Platonists such as Whichcote and Culverwell, as well as Richard Hooker.20 Where Cudworth and More differ is in their considerable interest in natural philosophical developments, and their employment of such developments for the achievement of their goals, and this is what brings their work more obviously into the category of natural theological discourse. Cudworth and More, being a generation younger than Hooker, had greater access to what might be called the first fruits of the Scientific Revolution.21 On the one hand, this provided them with resources to be used in natural theology, and on the other, with challenges calling for a response. Just as Cudworth and More were concerned to counter enthusiasm in religion, so they were also opposed to the “enthusiasm” in natural philosophy, which supposedly exemplified the Paracelsians.22 In addition, both writers opposed

19 As Sarah Hutton notes, he was “deemed suitable for academic office (and therefore theologically sound) by the regimes of the interregnum.” Sarah Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” in Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe, ed. Robert Crocker (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 61. 20 Of course, Richard Hooker was not concerned with Laudian Anglicanism, but he was dealing with what he viewed as the problem of Puritanism, by trying to accommodate Puritans within the Elizabethan Settlement. 21 See Chapter 1 for a brief overview of natural philosophy and the Scientific Revolution. 22 For a discussion of the upsurge of Helmontian and Paracelsian followers in England in the 1640s and 1650s, see Theodore Brown, “The College of Physicians and the Acceptance of 130 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

the materialist philosophy of Hobbes, and both exhibited a qualified acceptance of Cartesian philosophy.

This combination of religious conflict and proliferation of natural philosophical ideas combined to set the scene for an outpouring of natural theological discourse. The Cambridge Platonists, especially Cudworth and More, were situated in a particular historical context, which threw up certain challenges to be addressed, as well as resources that could be employed to do so. In the next section, we will see how the theoretical dimension of our model of natural theology illuminates just how this occurred.

3. What Natural Theology Was

We come now to consider the theoretical dimension of our model of natural theology as applied to the Cambridge Platonists. Keep in mind that this thesis is not intended to provide a complete account of Cambridge Platonism, or even a detailed analysis of the natural theological works of Ralph Cudworth and Henry More. Rather, we will be taking a thematic approach, considering how the work of the Cambridge Platonists, particularly Cudworth and More, can be better understood by applying the new model. Reciprocally, this approach will also serve as historical empirical evidence that provides support for the model. a. Natural Theology as an Apologetic Discourse

While arguing for Henry More’s status as an important natural theologian, John Henry defines natural theology as the attempt “to prove the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and other principles of faith on ‘natural’ grounds.”23 Although it might not be exactly what Henry had in mind, this emphasis on

Iatromechanism in England, 1665-1695,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 44 (1970): 12-30; P. M. Rattansi, “Paracelsus and the Puritan Revolution,” Ambix 11 (1963): 24-32; idem., “The Helmontian-Galenist Controversy in Restoration England,” Ambix 12 (1964): 1-23; idem., “Some Evaluations of Reason in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Natural Philosophy,” in Changing Perspectives in the History of Science, ed. Robert Young and Mikuláš Teich (Dordrecht: Reidal, 1973), 148-166; Charles Webster, “English Medical Reformers of the Puritan Revolution: A Background to the ‘Society of Chymical Physitians’,” Ambix 14 (1967), 16-41; idem., From Paracelsus to Newton: Magic and the Making of Modern Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 23 Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism,” 172. 131 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

“proving” rather than “discovering” dovetails very nicely with the first point of the model, which designates natural theology as primarily an apologetic enterprise. After all, the Cambridge Platonists were all part of the Established Church of England, with access to the Holy Scriptures. Even if knowledge of God could be found in nature, these theologians had prior access.

Ralph Cudworth identified the three fundamental doctrines of true religion to be: that there is a God, an omnipotent, understanding Being presiding over all; that this God is by nature essentially good and just; and that we are accountable for our actions.24 Historian of science Richard Olson has argued that Cudworth believed all these essentials of religion could be established by natural reason without appeal to Scripture. For Olson, this provides evidence that for Cudworth, natural theology was “not simply necessary for the Christian but that it is even sufficient as an alternative to rather than as a supplement to Scriptural revelation.”25 However, there is nothing in Cudworth’s work to suggest that he himself discovered these doctrines outside of the Church and the Scriptures. In support of these three essentials he quoted the biblical book of Hebrews—“He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him out.”26 Cudworth did state that these three essentials “taken all together, make up the Wholeness and Entireness of that, which is here called by us, the True Intellectual System of the Universe,”27 and this perhaps gives the

24 In Cudworth’s words, “…these Three Things, namely, That all things do not Float without a Head and Governour; but there is an Omnipotent Understanding Being Presiding over all: That this God, hath an Essentiall Goodness and Justice, and That the Differences of Good and Evil Morall, Honest and Dishonest, are not by meer Will and Law onely, but by Nature; and consequently, That the Deity cannot Act, Influence, and Necessitate men, to such things as are in their Own Nature, Evil: and Lastly, That Necessity is not Intrinsecall to the Nature of every thing; But that men have such a Liberty, or Power over their own Actions, as may render them Accountable for the same, and Blame-worthy when they doe Amiss; and consequently, That there is a Justice Distributive of Rewards and Punishments, running through the World.” Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), unpaginated preface. 25 Richard Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom, and Power: The Interplay between Organic and Mechanistic Imagery in Anglican Natural Theology—1640-1741,” in Approaches to Organic Form, ed. Frederick Burwick (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), 22. See also the discussion of Olson’s views on Richard Hooker in the First Historical Interlude. 26 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, unpaginated preface. Hebrews 11:6—“And without faith it is impossible to please him, for whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him.” 27 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, unpaginated preface. 132 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

impression of the use of reason rather than revelation. However, the point made here about natural theology is not that it does not make use of reason. Rather, we are concerned to identify the original source of the doctrines discussed or argued for in natural theology. For people such as the Cambridge Platonists, this is Scripture.

We can see evidence of an apologetic focus in the words of Henry More who described himself as “a Fisher for Philosophers, desirous to draw them to or retain them in the Christian Faith.”28 More’s language here recalls that of Jesus when he called his first disciples, the fishermen Simon Peter and Andrew. He said to them, “Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men.”29 By this he meant that instead of collecting fish, they would be luring and catching men; that is, drawing people to Jesus. The context of More’s comment about being a “Fisher for Philosophers” is that he was defending his belief that the resurrected body would be ethereal not terrestrial on the grounds that neither Ptolemaic nor Copernican philosophers would accept a resurrected earthly body, as it would not fit with their natural philosophies.30 A solid material body would not be able to pass through the crystalline spheres described by Ptolemaic-Aristotelian philosophy, while the “subtile and piercing” fluid of the Copernican heavens “would nimbly take a-pieces and consume to Atomes any such Terrestrial consistency of flesh and bloud as is here spoken of.”31 Presumably More was concerned that an interpretation of resurrection that required the resurrected body to be material would lead such philosophers to reject the doctrine altogether, and by extension, reject the Christian religion itself. Thus, More was

28 Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism,” 190. The quotation is from The Apology of Dr. Henry More, Fellow of Christ’s College in Cambridge; Wherein is contained as well A more General Account of the Manner and Scope of his Writings, as A Particular Explication of several Passages in his Grand Mystery of Godliness (London, 1664). This was originally contained in his A Modest Enquiry into the Mystery of Iniquity (London, 1664), 477-567. Unfortunately, the only copy of A Modest Enquiry available through Early English Books Online is missing the Apology. 29 Matthew 4:9. 30 Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism,” 190. In describing More’s intended audience as “Ptolemaic” and “Copernican” philosophers, Henry is most likely echoing More’s diction. If More was concerned just with astronomical theories (that is, mathematical models), there would have been no issue. Thus, he obviously meant Ptolemaic-Aristotelian and realist Copernican philosophers. 31 More, The Apology of Dr. Henry More, 495. Quoted in Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism,” 190. 133 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

attempting to explain and defend a doctrine of revealed theology (the resurrection of the body, as outlined, for example, in 1 Corinthians 15) in such a way that people would not be turned away from Christianity.32

Sarah Hutton, a historian of philosophy who has done extensive work on both More and Cudworth, has also commented on the apologetic focus in their work:

Unifying all the various dimensions of More’s thinking is the fact that he was a theologian, concerned to defend religion by recourse to philosophical argument and to combat heretical views which threatened Christianity.33

Note here the idea of defending religion. Natural philosophy was employed in natural theology primarily as a means of providing arguments in support and defence of religious doctrine, not as a way of finding out new knowledge about God. Similarly, in relation to Ralph Cudworth, Hutton writes:

The True Intellectual System exemplifies rational religious apologetics in action: the erudite fashioning of arguments drawn from the whole of history, including antique atheism and contemporary natural philosophy to beat the unbeliever ‘at his own weapon.’34

Again, the emphasis is not on gaining new knowledge of God from nature, but on producing arguments to support religious doctrines, to argue against the enemies of Christianity, or to figure out the true system of philosophy that is compatible with Christianity. By explaining religious doctrines in a manner

32 This point appears to be physico-theological, in the sense of Robert Boyle’s Physico- Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection (London, 1675), in that it is an application of the methods of physics to a theological doctrine. See Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 173. It should also be noted that More’s insistence on an immaterial resurrection body is not inconsistent with the description in passages such as 1 Corinthians 15. The Apostle Paul describes the resurrection body as “imperishable” and “spiritual,” as opposed to the “perishable” and “natural” body that humans possess during life on earth. 33 Sarah Hutton, introduction to Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), ix-x. 34 Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 61. As Cudworth wrote in his True Intellectual System, “And this is the Reason why we insist so much upon this Philosophy here, not only because without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheists at their own Weapon; but also because we doubt not but to make a Sovereign Antidote against Atheism, out of that very Philosophy, which so many have used as a Vehiculum to convey this Poyson of Atheism by.” True Intellectual System, 19. 134 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

compatible with natural philosophical ideas, Christianity could be made more attractive to philosophers who may have otherwise rejected it, and, as we shall see below, the pursuit of natural philosophy itself could also be justified.

The apologetic focus of Cudworth’s work was also reflected in his own introduction to the True Intellectual System, where he wrote that science could support faith:

For the Scripture faith is not a mere believing of historical things, and upon inartificial arguments or testimonies only; but a certain higher and Divine power in the soul, that peculiarly correspondeth with the Deity. Notwithstanding which, knowledge of science added to this faith, according to the Scripture advice, will make it more firm and stedfast, and the better able to resist those assaults of sophistical reasonings, that shall be made against it.35

Further, Cudworth acknowledged that some people might consider his work to be a waste of time, since there are not any real atheists. In response, Cudworth wrote that his book was also “for the confirmation of weak, staggering, and sceptical Theists;” that is, for supporting the beliefs of those who are already in the Church. This was a necessary endeavour for Cudworth, because no one is completely without doubt concerning religion:

And unless these exploders of Atheists will affirm, also, that all men have constantly an unshaken faith and belief of the existence of a God, without the least mixture of a doubtful distrust or hesitancy… they must needs grant, such endeavours as these, for the confirming and establishing of men’s minds in the belief of a God, by philosophic reasons, in an age so philosophical, not to be superfluous and useless.36

For both Cudworth and More, natural theology reflected the modern concept of apologetics. Some theological doctrines can be established by recourse to reason and the natural world, and in this way, natural theology can be “belief

35 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 64. 36 Ibid., 68. 135 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

forming” for atheists. For people who already believe in Christianity, natural theology can be “belief sustaining,” by providing support for existing beliefs.37 b. Natural Theology as a Loose Intellectual Tradition Situated

Between Natural Philosophy and Theology

While doing natural theology, the Cambridge Platonists were pursuing neither natural philosophy nor theology exclusively. Although all the Cambridge Platonists were theologians by training, the two most interested in natural theology, namely Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, were also extremely interested in the natural philosophical debates of the day. Natural theology provided an arena in which these scholars could relate their interests in both theology and natural philosophy.

The nature of natural theology as an intellectual tradition separate from natural philosophy and theology meant that it was not tied exclusively to any particular system of natural philosophy or theology. While many historians have followed James and Margaret Jacob in associating English natural theology with Newtonian natural philosophy and low-church Anglicanism, the writings of the Cambridge Platonists demonstrate the limitations of this view. At the most basic level, Cambridge Platonist natural theology pre-dated Newtonian natural philosophy. However, as interested as Cudworth and More were in natural philosophical debates of the day, their own ideas were quite different from the prevailing tide of mechanical and experimental philosophy, advocated by such predecessors to Newton as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Thus, their natural theology, as we shall see, was quite different from the better known “Newtonian variety.”

With regard to their religious views, the Cambridge Platonists are often considered the beginning of the latitudinarian movement, and indeed the term “the Latitude Men” originated as a description of this school.38 However, it

37 Recall the definition of apologetics in Chapter 3, Section 3a. 38 See Marjorie Nicolson, “Christ’s College and the Latitude-Men,” Modern Philology 27 (1929): 35-53. 136 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

should not be assumed that their religious views and motivations were identical to the latitudinarians described by the Jacobs. While there were similarities, there were significant differences, particularly with regard to reason. Henry More and Ralph Cudworth shared with the later latitudinarians their desire to comprehend all Christians by focusing on matters that united rather than divided them. In 1656, More wrote, “I am a true and free Christian; and what I write and speak is for the Interest of Christ,” a statement that mirrored Richard Baxter’s description of himself as a “meer Christian.”39 The fullest statement of More’s theological latitudinarianism appeared in An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness, published in 1660 with a preamble welcoming the return of the king and confirming More’s own commitment to the Church of England. In this work, More proposed a minimum set of essential doctrines as a conciliatory means of restoring a national church. In another work, The Apology of Dr. Henry More, More took the opinion that dissent among sincere believers over “things indifferent” should be tolerated, as long as it did not contravene moral law.40 As G. A. J. Rogers has suggested,

More’s justification of toleration arose from his conception of man sharing with his Creator the properties of reason and free will. Within his understanding of man was the conception that man must have liberty to realise himself, to free himself from the shackles of the mundane world which was ultimately alien to his true nature. In short it was a state of liberty, but not a state of license.41

This emphasis on reason was characteristic of latitudinarianism, although it should not be assumed that all latitudinarians had the same view of reason. John Henry has pointed out that the Cambridge Platonists, particularly More, took a distinctly different perspective on the role of reason in religion than other latitudinarians. For many Restoration Anglican leaders, hard-line rationalist “proofs” of the dogmas of Christianity were perhaps helpful, but not necessary.

39 “I am a CHRISTIAN, a MEER CHRISTIAN, of no other Religion; and the Church that I am of is the Christian Church, and hath been visible where ever the Christian Religion and Church hath been visible.” Richard Baxter, Church-History of the Government of Bishops and their Councils Abbreviated (London, 1680), sig. b1. Richard Baxter will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 40 Crocker, Henry More, 1614-1687, 96. 41 G. A. J. Rogers, “More, Locke and the Issue of Liberty,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), 195. 137 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

Their main focus was a call for a broad Church and doctrinal minimalism and, as Henry puts it, “The role of reason in this was merely to show that the doctrines of revealed religion were not incompatible with ‘common sense’ or ‘reasonableness’.”42 By contrast, More believed that reason was an essential means of establishing the articles of faith. As he himself once explained it, More was convinced that only his rational approach could provide “the succours that Philosophy affords to Religion in the points of the existence of God and Immortality of the soul.”43 The difference in these perspectives on reason led to a marked difference in the natural theology produced by these theologians. As we shall see below, More’s and Cudworth’s natural theology was more focused on proving religious doctrines from reason than that of John Wilkins and Matthew Barker, which we will consider in Chapter 5. This difference derived from the differing perspectives on reason employed by each theologian. c. Natural Theology as a Dynamic Discourse

The nature of natural theology as an intellectual tradition separate from theology and natural philosophy meant that Cudworth and More were not constrained to the use of any one system of natural philosophy. They were not merely conditioned by either Neoplatonism or the mechanical philosophy. Rather, they were able to pick and choose ideas from a variety of systems— whatever best suited their purposes. In particular, Cudworth and More made use of some aspects of the Cartesian, mechanical and experimental philosophies, although they could not reconcile a wholesale acceptance of any of these with their theological views. Further, the use they made of these philosophies throughout their careers differed depending on their individual agendas at particular times.

The ability to pick and choose resources from natural philosophy for use in natural theology is most clearly seen in the responses of Cudworth and More to Descartes’ natural philosophy. Both Cudworth and More played an important

42 John Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle: The Spirit of Nature and the Nature of Providence,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), 58. 43 Henry More, “Letter to a Learned Psychopyrist,” in Joseph Glanvill, Saducismus Triumphatus (London, 1682), 239. Quoted in Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle,” 59. 138 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

role in introducing Descartes’ work to Cambridge and appreciated some aspects of his thought, but both had theological reservations, particularly concerning Cartesian voluntarism and the denial of final causes in nature.44

Along with Cudworth, Henry More was one of the first Englishmen to show an interest in Cartesianism, and even apparently coined the term.45 While he was a proponent of Descartes’ natural philosophy during the 1640s, he later became aware of the “atheistic” implications of Cartesian dualism. However, More believed that Descartes’ philosophy was the “best assistance to Religion” because of its delineation of the extent and limits of the mechanical power of matter. This made it possible to see which phenomena are purely mechanical and which require the supernatural agency of God and spirit, thus providing evidence for the presence and providence of God. Robert Crocker, a recent biographer of More, believes that it was More’s need to define body as really and intellectually distinct from spirit that led him “to a sympathetic interest in the thought of the ancient atomists, and in that of Descartes, whom he regarded at

44 Historians disagree with regard to whether or not Descartes was indeed a voluntarist. Margaret J. Osler argues that he was an intellectualist, while Peter Harrison defends the voluntarist appellation, citing a considerable range of historical literature in support. See Osler, Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 146-152; and Harrison, “Voluntarism and Early Modern Science,” History of Science 40 (2002), 65-66. The issue here seems to derive from a subtle difference in definition of the relevant terms. Osler defines voluntarism and intellectualism both with respect to the relative emphasis placed on God’s will and intellect, and to whether the creation is considered absolutely contingent on God’s will or contains some elements of necessity. With regard to the first definition, Descartes might be considered a voluntarist, as he strongly emphasised God’s will. With regard to the second, he could be considered an intellectualist, as he believed that once God created “eternal truths,” he could not override them. This suggests that the categories of voluntarism and intellectualism are complex and slippery, and in any case, it is not the point of this thesis to make a decision one way or the other. It is sufficient to note that Ralph Cudworth, at least, identified Descartes as a voluntarist in the sense of emphasising God’s will above his intellect. Cudworth attributed to Descartes the view that “the nature and essences of all things, and consequently all verities and falsities” depend upon “the arbitrary will of God.” Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (London, 1731), 27 (Book I, Chapter III, Section I). 45 Alan Gabbey, “Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata: Henry More (1646-1671),” in Problems of Cartesianism, ed. Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas and John W. Davis (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982), 171. For a range of perspectives on the Cambridge Platonists and Descartes, see Peter Harrison, “The Influence of Cartesian Cosmology in England,” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster and John Sutton (London: Routledge, 2000), 168-192; Sterling P. Lamprecht, “The Role of Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England,” Studies in the History of Ideas 3 (1935): 181-240; Marjorie Nicolson, “The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England,” Studies in Philology 26 (1929): 356- 374; and Danton B. Sailor, “Cudworth and Descartes,” Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962): 133-140. 139 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

first as their most impressive modern Christian representative.”46 Strikingly, Crocker echoes in his discussion some of the key language of our model: that of the adoption of resources and the apologetic purpose of natural theology:

One significant effect of this adoption of some of the concepts and language of Cartesian physics was that it allowed him to incorporate for apologetic purposes a mechanical, even mathematical, account of natural phenomena within a broadly vitalist Platonic metaphysic. Arguments drawn from the growing literature of the new experimental mechanical philosophy could be taken up as supporting, subsidiary arguments in a new kind of systematic ‘rational’ natural theology.47

Similarly, Alan Gabbey argues that More’s gradual estrangement from Cartesian philosophy cannot be accounted for in terms of an initial “acceptance” turning to a final “rejection.” Rather, “this estrangement should be seen in terms of the role of Cartesian ideas within More’s own philosophical and theological development, of the uses he found for these ideas at different times, and of the purposes motivating their treatment in his successive publications.”48 Thus, More was free to employ particular resources drawn from Cartesian philosophy, as they suited his purposes at particular times. For example, in his Antidote against Atheism, More employed Descartes’ vortex theory as an example of the limitations of mechanism, and thus the necessity for spirit, and therefore of the existence of God. Mere matter in motion could not produce the “variety of appearances” seen in nature. Without the intervention of a “superintendent,” the sun, stars and all the planets would be oblong, not round, “because the matter recedes all along the Axis of a Vortex, as well as from the Centre.” Thus, “this round Figure we see them in, must proceed from some higher principle then the meer Agitation of the Matter.”49 As Gabbey explains:

While Descartes’s own mechanical philosophy was not of atheistic inspiration, it seems clear that for More it was sufficiently ‘Epicurean’ to

46 Robert Crocker, “The Role of Illuminism in the Thought of Henry More,” in Rogers, Vienne, and Zarka, The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context, 136. 47 Ibid. We will see in the next section how these arguments were employed in natural theology. 48 Alan Gabbey, “Henry More and the Limits of Mechanism,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614- 1687), 21, emphasis mine. 49 Henry More, An Antidote Against Atheism, or, An Appeal to the Naturall Faculties of the Minde of Man, Whether There Be Not a God, 2nd ed. (London, 1655), 67. 140 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

make it an inappropriate weapon with which to beat off the monster of ungodliness, particularly when it was that very philosophy that in impure and unskilful hands had provided new sustenance for the continued growth of the beast.50

The use of some aspects of Cartesian philosophy fitted More’s aim in the Antidote, which was to prove the existence of God by any means necessary. However, as More became increasingly established as a philosopher with his own independent ideas (his correspondence with Descartes ceased with the latter’s death in 1650) and an increasing focus on theological matters, Cartesianism became less useful and more of a liability.

Cudworth’s opposition to Cartesian natural philosophy stemmed from his theological views about morality and the soul. He was concerned that Cartesianism led to Hobbism, which he believed destroyed the basis of morality. For Cudworth, “Descartes is in some respects worse than the ancient pagans since he did not recognize the argument from design, but obstinately refused to see the hand of the deity in the orderly universe he described.”51 Cudworth’s development of the “Plastic principle,” akin to More’s “Spirit of Nature,” can be viewed as a fundamental revision of Cartesian mechanism, and an attempt to restore to Nature a vitality it lost in Descartes’ account.52 As J. E. Saveson has expressed, this shows that Cudworth was indebted to Descartes, but the debt did not survive the final cosmological and psychological incompatibilities Cudworth found between Descartes and Neoplatonism.53

With regard to mechanical natural philosophy, particularly Cartesian mechanism, More pointed out its shortcomings and proposed a “mixed mechanical philosophy” consistent with his philosophical and religious outlook.

50 Gabbey, “Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata,” 201. 51 Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 72. 52 For an excellent overview of Cudworth’s concept of the “Plastic Nature,” see Sarah Hutton, “Aristotle and the Cambridge Platonists: The Case of Cudworth,” in Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle, ed. Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1999), 337-349. On More’s “Spirit of Nature,” see Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle;” and Robert A. Greene, “Henry More and Robert Boyle on the Spirit of Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962): 451-474. 53 J. E. Saveson, “Differing Reactions to Descartes Among the Cambridge Platonists,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960): 561. 141 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

He had serious reservations about the limitations of mechanism as a source of explanations of natural phenomena, and denied that there was nothing in nature for which a mechanical explanation could not be given. Initially More argued that not all natural phenomena could be explained in mechanical terms. For example, in his Antidote against Atheism, More pointed to the tilt of the earth’s axis which causes the seasons, without which there would have been great inconveniences to human life, and an even greater incompatibility with God’s plans for Man as part of His creation. Examples such as this were intended to demonstrate that “meer Motion of the universal Matter” could not account for many aspects of the visible universe. However, by the time More published the Divine Dialogues in 1668, he believed that there were no purely mechanical phenomena in the whole universe, meaning that some kind of spiritual action was involved in every corporeal interaction. For More, this was the Spirit of Nature, or “the vicarious power of God upon the Matter.”54 Again, this increasing strictness in his views is likely the result of his awareness of how materialism could lead to irreligion.

Similarly, Cudworth argued that certain features of the world—such as gravity, the human heart and diaphragm, and the rotation of the earth on an inclined axis—were inconsistent with mere mechanical causes. For Cudworth, it was indisputable that God’s purposes could be recognised in created things. Intriguingly, this was a statement that all English natural theologians would agree with, even those more attuned to the mechanical philosophy, and in a sense, it lay at the heart of natural theology. However, this example demonstrates that natural theologians could develop different arguments for the one conclusion. For someone such as Robert Boyle, proof of God’s existence and purposes could be found in Creation’s likeness to a designed machine. For Cudworth and More, on the other hand, this kind of argument served to banish God from the universe, and a more direct spiritual involvement in earthly matters was required to prove his presence. According to Cudworth, theists subscribing to mechanical philosophy exhibited “the greatest Insensibility of Mind, or Sottishness and Stupidity,” since they did not “take the least notice of the Regular and Artificial Frame of things, or of the Signatures of the Divine Art

54 Henry More, The Immortality of the Soul (London, 1659), unpaginated preface. 142 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

and Wisdom in these.”55 By neglecting to understand the world properly, “These Atomick Theists utterly Evacuate that grand Argument for a God, taken from the Phenomenon of the Artificial Frame of Things, which hath been insisted on in all ages.”56 Indeed, they were even worse than atheists. According to Sarah Hutton,

This is because the atheists never supposed that nature exhibited regularity and orderliness. Theistic mechanists, by contrast, insist on the orderliness of nature, but neglect to make the right inferences about guiding providence.57

As we will see in more detail below, this idea about deducing the right kind of knowledge of God from nature was of vital importance to Cudworth’s and More’s natural theologies.

In addition to Cartesian and mechanical philosophy, Henry More was also critical of experimentalism. His belief was that reason had to come first, although experiments could be used to support rational arguments. Indeed, he praised Descartes for advancing knowledge without experiments. While Robert Boyle believed that experiments reveal a rational underlying structure in creation, even though divine omnipotence means that mankind cannot completely understand God and his purposes,

To pretend that experiments could tell their own philosophical story unaided by human reason, and the innate ideas on which the processes of rational thought were founded, was for More a dangerous illusion, leading almost inevitably to atheism or enthusiasm. Experiments belonged to a lower level of endeavour than metaphysics, and only gained value when placed within a rational, philosophical and theological context.58

However, More’s views on experimentalism did change throughout his career. As Alison Coudert puts it, “As the importance of the experimental philosophy became increasingly clear to him, More realised that he would have to back his

55 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 684. 56 Ibid., 683. 57 Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 72. 58 Robert Crocker, “Henry More: A Biographical Essay,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), 4. 143 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

metaphysical beliefs with physical evidence.”59 This was partly demonstrated by More’s collection of “empirical” examples of witchcraft and supernatural events in the Antidote. More also made unauthorised use of some of Robert Boyle’s experiments to support his metaphysics in Enchiridion Metaphysicum (1671), sparking a controversy with Boyle over the role of metaphysics in the process of gaining knowledge. As John Henry has argued, this dispute represented a clash of fundamental beliefs concerning theories of matter, which reflect deeper differences about the nature of God and divine Providence.60 While More employed a strict dualism in which matter was necessarily inert and all activity had to be attributed to a spiritual or immaterial operator, Boyle believed that God could endow matter with “essential modifications” which included motion and “seminal rudiments or principles.” Where Boyle argued that the fact that the world can be explained in mechanical terms points to the existence of an omnipotent God, More believed that purely mechanical explanations actually negated the role of God in Creation. These differences might have been tolerated by Boyle if More had not co-opted Boyle’s own experimental results to support his point of view. In Henry’s view,

When More appropriated Boyle’s hydrostatic experiments as ‘proof’ for the existence of the Spirit of Nature, therefore, Boyle judged it to be unsafe to turn a blind eye to More’s endeavours. This was a time when religious beliefs were perceived to have marked social and political consequences, so Boyle had to register his disagreement with More and to distance himself and his new philosophy from More’s unacceptable theology.61

This clash between More and Boyle provides a neat illustration of the kaleidoscopic nature of natural theology. While More and Boyle had a similar ultimate goal (namely, supporting the doctrines of Christianity, particularly the existence of God), their differing theological presuppositions led them to employ the same experimental results in pursuit of different ends. While the

59 Alison Coudert, “Henry More and Witchcraft,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), 123. 60 Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle.” See also Greene, “Henry More and Robert Boyle on the Spirit of Nature;” and Jane E. Jenkins, “Arguing about Nothing: Henry More and Robert Boyle on the Theological Implications of the Void,” in Rethinking the Scientific Revolution, ed. Margaret J. Osler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153-179. 61 Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle,” 56. 144 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

resources employed in the particular natural theological argument were the same, the unique kaleidoscopes of these two natural theologians led to very different arguments being produced.62

Not only did different natural theologians draw upon different natural philosophical resources, but even the one natural theologian could use ideas from a wide range of sources—whatever served to advance the argument. Gabbey, in his excellent study of More’s use of Cartesian philosophy, points out that Descartes is “only one of innumerable aids in the service of More’s overriding aim: the establishment of God’s existence at all costs, and by whatever means.”63 Similarly, Hutton points to the variety of resources used by Cudworth, suggesting that he examined the texts he quoted “with the eye of a philosopher, pillaging them for doctrines and arguments from which to construct the taxonomy of true and false philosophy which constitutes The True Intellectual System.”64

What we see here is that More and Cudworth had religious reasons to employ resources from various natural philosophies, but not all natural theologians in the seventeenth century had the same religious motivations or the same solution to similar problems. While Henry More had educational and religious perspectives similar to contemporaries such as Robert Boyle, he had quite divergent interests. This shows that a common background, education and access to the same resources are insufficient for people to develop the same arguments of knowledge claims.65 This is demonstrated, for example, in More’s

62 This dispute may also be viewed in terms of Margaret Osler’s metaphors of appropriation and translation. More appropriated Boyle’s experimental results and translated them into his spirit- filled philosophy. By showing how appropriation and translation could take place within natural theology, the kaleidoscopic model advanced in this thesis extends Osler’s earlier work on the complex relations between natural philosophy and theology. See Margaret J. Osler, “Mixing Metaphors: Science and Religion or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe,” History of Science 36 (1998): 91-113. 63 Alan Gabbey, “Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata,” 203. 64 Sarah Hutton, “Cudworth, Boethius and the Scale of Nature,” in Rogers, Vienne, and Zarka, The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context, 93. For more detail on Cudworth’s employment of resources from ancient Greek philosophy see Gunnar Aspelin, Ralph Cudworth’s Interpretation of Greek Philosophy: A Study in the History of English Philosophical Ideas, trans. Martin S. Allwood (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1943). 65 The idea that the contents of a natural philosophy need not be directly correlated with some ideological cause or commitment was first articulated by Steven Shapin in two classic articles: “The Social Uses of Science,” in The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of 145 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

interest in mysticism and metaphysics.66 More shared with Boyle a rejection of Calvinist dogmatism in favour of a few doctrinal “essentials,” as well as the seeking of religious peace in a millenarian vision of intellectual and spiritual expansion. Both were eager to sweep aside traditional scholastic learning and to search for new, more emphatically “Christian” ways of gaining and classifying knowledge. However, unlike Boyle, More’s rejection of scholasticism did not end in a rejection of metaphysical thinking itself, but in a reassessment of metaphysics and its relationship with theology and natural philosophy. We have already noted that the approach of Cudworth and More was very different from that of the later Newtonians who are often taken to represent English natural theology. Another example is that Cudworth was attracted to mechanistic matter theory as it pointed to the existence of a spiritual substance, but he applied stricter limits to mechanical explanation than did other natural philosophers. The attraction of mechanistic matter theory for both Cudworth and More was that it pointed towards the existence of spiritual substance.67 For Cudworth, “neither can Life and Cogitation, Sense, and Consciousness, Reason and Understanding, Appetite and Will, ever result from Magnitudes, Figures, Sites and Motions, and therefore they are not Corporeally generated and Corrupted.”68 As we shall see below, for both More and Cudworth, the existence of spirit was a necessary first step for establishing the existence of God.

4. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments

We have seen that natural theology was primarily an apologetic discourse, designed to produce arguments to support doctrines originally derived from revelation. These included the existence of God, as well as the immortality of the soul and the various duties of religion. The Cambridge Platonists were not only concerned to establish the existence of God, but of the Christian God in

Eighteenth-Century Science, ed. George S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93-139; and “Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes,” Isis 72 (1981): 187-215. 66 On More’s mysticism, see Robert Crocker, “Mysticism and Enthusiasm in Henry More,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), 137-155; idem., “The Role of Illuminism in the Thought of Henry More.” 67 See, for example, Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 66. 68 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 36. 146 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

particular, and their own peculiar conception thereof. Further, they were not only aiming to convince atheists of the truth of Christianity, but also fellow Christians of the true version of Christianity, and providing intellectual support for the Church of England. The main two works we will be considering in this section are Henry More’s Antidote against Atheism (1653) and Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678).69 a. The Existence of God

Perhaps the most fundamental religious doctrine to be dealt with in natural theology was the existence of God. In the dedication to Lady Anne Conway of his Antidote against Atheism, Henry More stated that the existence of God is as clearly demonstrable as any theorem in mathematics,70 but in the second chapter, he admitted that he did not believe it possible to make absolutely certain arguments, or those that “are so convictive, that a mans understanding shall be forced to confesse that it is impossible to be otherwise then I have concluded.”71 More was not convinced that anything could be demonstrated to this degree, and even suspected that mathematical evidence could be “a constant undiscoverable delusion.”72 However, he argued that absolute certainty was not necessary in order for assent to be given, and that his arguments, though not “demonstrations,” might still be “effectuall for winning a firm and unshaken assent.”73

69 For a concise overview of Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System, see Meyrick H. Carré, “Ralph Cudworth,” The Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953): 342-351. On Henry More, see Crocker, Henry More, 1614-1687. While Cudworth’s True Intellectual System was published more than thirty years after More’s Antidote, there is evidence that Cudworth was considering the themes of his work as early as 1644. His eighteenth-century biographer Thomas Birch pointed out that two theses Cudworth defended for his B. Div later became part of his True Intellectual System: “Dantur boni et mali rationes aeternae et indispensibles” (A thesis in which are supplied concepts, eternal and indispenable, of Good and of Evil) and “Dantur substantiae incorporae suâ naturâ immortals” (A thesis in which are supplied Substances that are incorporeal, immortal by their nature). An Account of the Life and Writings of R. Cudworth, D. D., in Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, ed. Thomas Birch (London, 1820). 70,More, An Antidote Against Atheism, unpaginated dedication. 71 Ibid., 4. 72 Ibid., 1. 73 Ibid., 7. 147 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

In the Antidote, More used three main types of arguments, corresponding to the three parts of the work. As Robert Crocker has expressed,

[More] argued for the existence of God successively from an intellectual perspective (from the existence of the ‘idea’ of God in the mind), from a rational perspective (from the intelligent design visible in Nature), and from a sensual perspective (from the supposedly physical effects of the actions of spirits on their occasional victims).74

Although Crocker is concerned with the “Platonic” or “Cabbalistic” hierarchical structure of More’s work, he provides a neat summary of the kinds of arguments used by More. We will consider each of these in turn, including as well similar arguments made by the other Cambridge Platonists, particularly Ralph Cudworth. i. Intellectual Perspective

Firstly, Henry More argued for the existence of God from what Robert Crocker calls an intellectual perspective. Here, More was concerned only with ideas of God—not with any evidence from the external or physical world. He began by defining God, arguing that even atheists need to know what it is to which they are denying existence. More defined God as “An Essence or Being fully and absolutely perfect,” where “to be fully and absolutely perfect is to be at least as perfect as the apprehension of a man can conceive, without a contradiction.”75 More stated that it is undeniable “that there is in man an Idea of a Being absolutely and fully perfect,” and that “this notion is naturall and essentiall to the soul of man,” and thus cannot be done away with as long as the mind has “the ordinary use of her own faculties.”76 Several of More’s colleagues shared the claim that this idea of God was innate. For example, as David Pailin has pointed out of John Smith, “The reality of God and the nature of virtue in

74 Crocker, “Henry More,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), 6. Here, the term “sensual” is being used in the sense of relating to the physical senses rather than the intellect. 75 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, 9, 10. 76 Ibid., 10. 148 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

particular are so ‘clear and perspicuous’ that they ‘display themselves with less difficulty to our Reflexive Faculty than any Geometrical Demonstrations’.”77

From this idea of God, More drew two arguments for the existence of God. Firstly, if this idea of God is true, then he must exist. Secondly, the very fact that we have this idea in our minds suggests that he must exist. In a similar way to the branding of cattle and sheep by their owner, we were made by God, “and therefore there was no better way then by sealing us with this Image to make us acknowledge our selves to be his, and to do that worship and adoration to him that is due to our mighty Maker and Creator, that is to our God.”78 In addition, the universality of religious worship indicates that God must exist, for that which all men admit as true is “undoubtedly to be termed true according to the Light of Nature.”79

Ralph Cudworth employed similar arguments in his True Intellectual System of the Universe, particularly with regard to the universality of belief in God. One whole chapter (out of five, in the first edition) was devoted to an account of pagan polytheism, in order to counter the objection against the naturalness (or in Cudworth’s terminology, “naturality”) of the idea of God. To begin with, Cudworth noted that there are words for “God” in several languages, but the same notion or conception of the word is understood by each. This, for Cudworth, pointed to the existence of an idea of God.80 Even atheists must have an idea of God, otherwise they would be denying the existence of nothing. In turn, the presence of the idea of God implies his actual existence, for, as Lydia Gysi put it, “If God did not exist, the soul would have formed the idea of an impossible Being, and this is inconceivable.”81 This argument also related to the logical axiom that nothing can come out of nothing: “Were there no perfect mind, viz. that is an omnipotent being comprehending it self, and all

77 David A. Pailin, “The Confused and Confusing Story of Natural Religion,” Religion 24 (1994): 200; quoting John Smith, Select Discourses (London, 1660), 13. 78 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, 42. 79 Ibid., 48. 80 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 192ff. 81 Lydia Gysi, Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1962), 86. 149 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

possibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing.”82 Logically, this is impossible. An idea of God, and indeed the very possibility of knowledge and comprehension, must derive from God. ii. Rational Perspective

In the second book of the Antidote, Henry More took a “rational” perspective, arguing for the existence of God from the intelligent design visible in Nature. Although we have established that natural theology is not limited to the argument from design, it was one argument or resource available for use by natural theologians, and one of which More made extensive use. There are three main aspects to More’s argument from design: the limits of the mechanical hypothesis, the fitness of natural things for serving the purposes of man, and the nature of man himself.

More began by inviting the atheist to “walk with me awhile in the wide theatre of this outward world, and diligently to attend to those many and most manifest marks and signs that I shall point to in this outward frame of things, that naturally signify to us that there is a God.”83 He argued that the universal matter of the world could not be ordered without the superintendency of a God. The phenomena of day and night, the seasons, the rising and setting of the sun, moon and stars: “all these are signs and tokens unto us that there is a God, that is, that things are so framed that they naturally imply a principle of Wisdome and Counsel in the Author of them. And if there be such an Author of external Nature, there is a God.”84 According to More, the mechanical hypothesis does not admit to matter any kind of specificity from which such order would arise. As an example, he mentioned Descartes’ vortices, arguing that without God, they would be oblong, not round. The reason he gave for this was that “matter recedes all along the Axis of a Vortex, as well as from the Centre.” As a result,

82 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 872. 83 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, 37-38. 84 Ibid., 64. 150 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

“the Space that is left for the finest and subtilest Element of all, of which the Sun and Stars are to consist, will be long, not round.” More was not doubting that “the Motions of those Aethereall Whirle-pooles” were indeed round; instead, he believed that the intervention of God was necessary to make them round rather than oblong, as they would have been had mere matter in motion been responsible.85

More also discussed the fitness of things to their purposes, but this also supported his argument concerning the limitations of mechanism. For example, he argued that there are many things in nature, such as stone, timber, metals, minerals and magnets, that are useful to man, given his particular nature, and that this means that matter was not left to itself, but was guided by God. Man is “the flower and chief of all the products of Nature upon this Globe of the Earth” and “there are designs laid even in the lowest and vilest products of Nature, that respect Man the highest of all,” so “you cannot deny but that there is an Eye of Providence that respecteth all things.”86 Finally, More argued that the structure of the human body, the passions of the mind and the fitness of the whole man to inhabit the universe are “unavoidable arguments for divine providence.” Even Galen was so taken with the human body “that he could not but adjudge the honour of a hymn to the wise Creator of it.”87

More closed the second part of his Antidote with a classic statement of the argument from design, an argument that he also employed at the very beginning of the discourse. He argued that if some coins or pottery were dug up from the earth, it would be most natural and reasonable to conclude that they were the work of humans, not nature:

Wherefore the whole Creation in general and every part thereof being so ordered as if the most exquisite Reason and Knowledge had contrived

85 Ibid., 67. 86 Ibid., 80. 87 Ibid., 142. Strictly speaking, these arguments demonstrate the existence of providence rather than directly proving the existence of God. However, for More, the existence of providence and evidence of “divine counsel” established the existence of God. He stated that in examining “things discoverable in the world,” we shall find “those things which do so manifestly favour of Design and Counsel, that we cannot naturally withhold our assent, but must say there is a God” [79]. 151 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

them, it is as natural to conclude that all this is the work of a wise God, as at the first sight to acknowledge that those inscribed Urns and Coyns digg’d out of the Earth were not the Products of unknowing Nature, but the Artifice of Man.88

Cudworth did not employ the argument from design to the same extent as Henry More, although the metaphor of the “book of nature” made a significant appearance in A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, which was published posthumously in 1731. For Cudworth, the most important message to read in the book of nature is that it has an author. As Sarah Hutton has articulated, “It is from the orderliness of nature that we deduce the guiding hand of the creator. Such a conclusion can be reached by any observer by virtue of the fact that nature is intelligible.”89 iii. Sensual Perspective

The third part of More’s Antidote consisted of sixteen chapters describing and providing evidence for a variety of events and encounters that More designated as “extraordinary and miraculous.”90 More believed that such examples “cannot but move indifferent men to an acknowledgement of divine Providence, and a superior Power above and different from the Matter.”91 It was not only useful, but also necessary to establish the existence of spirit to establish the existence of God: “nullus spiritus, nullus Dei was one of More’s favourite maxims.”92 Ralph Cudworth agreed with More concerning the importance of proving the existence of the supernatural in order to demonstrate the existence of God: “If there be once any Invisible Ghosts or Spirits acknowledged as Things Permanent, it will not be easie for any to give a reason why there might not be one Supreme Ghost

88 Ibid., 157. 89 Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 62. 90 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, 158. 91 Ibid., 159. 92 Greene, “Henry More and Robert Boyle on the Spirit of Nature,” 451. “No Spirit, no God,” were the closing words of More’s Antidote Against Atheism (p. 278), though the Latin translation seems to have entered into posterity. See also Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy 2:471-472. 152 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

also, presiding over them all, and the whole world.”93 The stories recounted by More in Book 3 of the Antidote covered a wide variety of instances, including the use of “charms” to move objects and perform healings, and examples of exorcisms. Witchcraft was discussed in particular detail.94

According to Peter Hess, this part “shows More at his most credible and least scientific.”95 However, More was not simply accepting every account of a supposedly miraculous or supernatural event. Instead, he set out three criteria for determining the truth of a miracle account:

First, if what is recorded was avouched by such persons who had no end nor interest in avouching such things. Secondly, if there were many Eye- witnesses of the same Matter. Thirdly and lastly, if these things which are so strange and miraculous leave any sensible effect behind them.96

Although Hess concedes that More’s efforts “are not devoid of scientific rigor as he conceives it,” he accuses More of being “willing to interpret scientific evidence in whatever fashion necessary to demonstrate that the universe is spirit-filled and God-directed.”97 Fifty years before Hess, in response to this kind of attitude, theologian and historian Charles Raven provided a cogent reminder of the worldview of the seventeenth century, and the danger involved in judging it according to our own:

93 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 701. 94 For an excellent discussion of Henry More’s views on witchcraft, see Coudert, “Henry More and Witchcraft.” 95 Peter M. Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God in English Natural Theology from Hooker to Paley” (PhD dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, 1993), 123. 96 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, 163. 97 Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God in English Natural Theology,” 123. This attitude is not uncommon in literature on the Cambridge Platonists, particularly the older literature. More than a century before Hess, John Tulloch, expressed a similar (albeit slightly more charitable) view in his famous work on rational theology: “Their ignorance of natural causes they shared with their generation. Their credulity as to ghosts and apparitions was the inheritance of generations of credulity. It was almost a part of the common faith of the Church… But it may be fairly urged against them that they so little appreciated either the nature of evidence on the one hand, or the true character of the supernatural on the other hand, as to suppose that such stories of apparitions could possibly convince intelligent minds of the existence of spirits, in opposition to the materialism which they saw rising around them.” Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, 2:484. 153 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

And if anyone suggests that More was a Christian and not a scientist, he may fairly be reminded that More was a close disciple and correspondent of Descartes and an original member of the Royal Society: and moreover that the whole contemporary world of scientists and theologians, believers or sceptics, were agreed in their acceptance of the ‘novity’ of the world, of creation as a sudden fact, and of the fiery cataclysm which would bring the story to a close.98

Further, it seems that Hess may have fallen victim to the trap described by Simon Schaffer in his classic paper on “Godly Men and Mechanical Philosophers.” Schaffer articulated the problem as follows: “Philosophies of nature lacking signs of mechanism have commonly been seen as utterly inimical to progress, and then branded as too occultist or too lowly to have had the status of science.”99 Schaffer’s argument, by contrast, is that spirit and the soul occupied the central place in English Restoration natural philosophy. Of course, More wrote his Antidote Against Atheism twenty years prior to the period Schaffer focuses on (the 1670s), but the supernatural remained an important theme for More and his colleagues Ralph Cudworth and Joseph Glanvill throughout this time. The main difference between More’s approach to the supernatural and that of fellows of the Royal Society such as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke was in the way the information was collected. For Boyle and Hooke, collection of instances of spiritual activity had to take place in the experimental laboratory. As Schaffer states, “collective witnessing allowed the production of secure matters of fact.”100 More and Boyle, in particular, fought over this issue:

More had argued that his stories must be recognised by the experimenters; Boyle replied that this would be possible only if the stories were collected under the experimenters’ control. While supporting More’s “grand and laudable design,” Boyle demanded that More play the right game: he must do experiments for himself, rely on

98 Charles E. Raven, Science, Religion, and the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 23. 99 Simon Schaffer, “Godly Men and Mechanical Philosophers: Souls and Spirits in Restoration Natural Philosophy,” Science in Context 1 (1987): 56. 100 Ibid., 59. 154 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

properly witnessed trials, and never “deny the matter of fact to be true.” More held that these were tyrannical conditions.101

In the section on miracles in his Antidote Against Atheism, More dismissed the rejection of accounts that met his criteria as “meer humour and sullenness:” “For it is to believe nothing but what he seeth himself: From whence it will follow that he is to read nothing of History, for there is neither pleasure nor any usefulness of it, if it deserve no belief.”102

Ralph Cudworth also argued for God’s existence from the evidence of supernatural events such as visions, miracles and prophecies, though he did not provide a wealth of empirical accounts of strange happenings. His discussion was more general than particular, outlining the various types of apparitions, miracles and prophecies. This difference in approach can perhaps be explained by way of Alison Coudert’s observation that as the experimental philosophy gained in influence, More saw the need to back up his metaphysical beliefs with physical evidence.103 This is an example of how the varying challenges addressed by natural theologians affected the way they constructed particular arguments.

Not all of More’s and Cudworth’s colleagues shared their confidence in this kind of argument for God’s existence. As Hess describes of John Smith,

Superstition acts as an incitement to atheism for those who cannot find the way to true religion, and one who is terrified by the ‘spectres and ghastly apparitions,’ the temples and groves and altars and other ‘idle toys to please these deities with’ is driving to seek refuge in the ‘strong fort’ of irreligion.104

101 Ibid., 75. Boyle did accept testimonial accounts on occasion, as long as they did not contradict what he had learned by experiment. See “A Letter concerning Ambergris” in The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas Birch (London, 1772), Vol. III, 731-732; also discussion of this point in Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 212-218. 102 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, 163. 103 Coudert, “Henry More and Witchcraft,” 123. See also section 3.c, above. 104 Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God in English Natural Theology,” 110-111; quoting John Smith, “A Short Discourse of Atheism,” in Select Discourses Treating Theological Topics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1673), 46. 155 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

Once again, this shows the dynamics of natural theological discourse. While More and Cudworth viewed accounts of alleged supernatural activity as suitable resources for use in their kaleidoscopes to produce arguments for God’s existence, Smith saw the possible superstitious consequences as reason enough to leave these accounts alone. b. The Cambridge Platonist Conception of God

Natural theologians were not concerned with proving the existence of a god, but rather the Christian God, and indeed particular versions thereof.105 Henry More and Ralph Cudworth both had certain conceptions of God that they attempted to establish against the views of their Christian contemporaries. It was not enough simply to believe in the God of Christianity. It was just as important to have the correct knowledge of God. In fact, according to Cudworth and More, some of their fellow Christians were on the verge of atheism, simply by virtue of not having a correct view of God.106

Cudworth’s conception of God contained a number of elements, but was primarily focused against the Calvinist view that good and evil were based in God’s will.107 For Cudworth, notions of good and evil came from God, but were not arbitrary. To begin with, God’s goodness and wisdom necessarily and logically take priority over His omnipotence, and it is these attributes of wisdom and goodness that are immediately apparent in creation. Here, Cudworth employed an argument from design. As we saw above, Cudworth believed that the orderliness and intelligibility of nature allowed any observer to deduce the guiding hand of a rational creator. This argument is similar to others that we will cover in more detail later in this thesis. For some natural theologians or natural philosophers, the fact that God is creator means that nature is

105 As an aside, a common modern criticism of natural theology is that even if it can establish the existence of God, it cannot tell us what this God is like or how he should be worshipped. This was clearly not a problem for Cudworth and More, or indeed any of the natural theologians discussed in this thesis. 106 As Sarah Hutton rightly observes, “In setting out to expose the potential atheism of so many so-called theists, Cudworth is concerned to demonstrate not only that God exists, but that there is a right conception of God.” “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 62. 107 John Calvin may not have expressed this view exactly, but Cudworth attributed such a view to Calvinist voluntarism and predestination. See ibid., 63. 156 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

intelligible, and hence that natural philosophy is a possible pursuit. Here, the reverse applies: we observe that nature is intelligible, and hence deduce that there must be a God.

However, Cudworth did not stop here. The orderliness and harmony of nature did not happen by chance—it was planned. The created world was conceived by God. The intelligibility of nature demonstrates that there was not only a great power behind creation, but also a rational mind. It is here that Cudworth’s opposition to Calvinist theology becomes most clear. As Hutton explains, “To privilege divine will above divine goodness and understanding is to destroy the rationality of creation, to remove the order of things, to open the way for scepticism and therefore atheism.”108 Thus, an emphasis on God’s free will, particularly to the extent that his decisions could be arbitrary, was not only wrong, but also dangerous. For Cudworth, the world demonstrates not only that there is a God, but also what this God is like. Of course, it is important to remember at this point that Cudworth already had this knowledge of God before going out to look at nature. However, nature provides evidence for theological doctrines that Cudworth wished to support.

Similarly, More had a particular conception of God that he was concerned to uphold: a view that was intellectualist or necessitarian. He was convinced that it is possible to discover the true principles of the world by a process of pure reasoning. For More, this led “to a theological necessitarianism in which God was constrained to create the world as it is in accordance with certain absolute necessities in the nature of things.”109 Further, More was necessitarian with respect to both God’s absolute and ordained power. God’s absolute power is what it is theoretically possible for him to do, providing it does not involve a logical contradiction, while God’s ordained power is what God actually chose to do in establishing the present order, and how he is now governing it in accordance with the way he created it. More explicitly stated that God is constrained by mathematical truths that stand outside his creative freedom. More rejected both the deistic idea that God created the world to continue on its

108 Ibid., 64. 109 Henry, “A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism,” 186. 157 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

own, and the idea that God needed to continually intervene in the world.110 Finally, More’s view of the pre-existence of the soul was also designed to emphasise God’s goodness. As Robert Crocker expresses, “It was advanced in the firm belief that it would promote the supremacy of the divine goodness amongst God’s attributes, and thus convince all of the rational coherence and benignity of a personal providence.”111 c. The Immortality of the Soul

Henry More dealt with the topic of the immortality of the soul at the end of the first book of his Antidote Against Atheism. Along with the existence of God, the immortality of the soul is the topic most commonly associated with natural theology.112 According to More, the two eminent properties of the human soul are the capacity for understanding and the ability to move corporeal matter:

That which impresses Spontaneous Motion upon the Body, or more immediately upon the Animal Spirits, that which imagines, remembers, and reasons, is an Immaterial Substance distinct from the Body, which uses the Animal Spirits and the Brains for Instruments in such and such Operations: and thus we have found a spirit in a proper Notion and signification that has apparently these faculties in it; it can both understand and move Corporeal Matter.113

For More, the proper conception of the soul is not only important as a doctrine in itself, but also to assist in understanding the existence and attributes of God. The soul of man, according to More, is like a little model of God, and thus can

110 Margaret J. Osler, “Triangulating Divine Will: Henry More, Robert Boyle, and René Descartes on God’s Relationship to the Creation,” in Stoicismo e Origenismo nella Filosofia del Seicento Inglese, ed. Marialuisa Baldi (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1996), 83. 111 Robert Crocker, “Henry More and the Preexistence of the Soul,” in Crocker, Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe, 83. 112 As John Henry has noted, “Natural theology was developed… in order to prove the existence and attributes of God and the immortality of human souls by recourse only to reason and the phenomena of the creation. Proofs of the immortality of the soul were held to be crucially important elements in this natural theology since the fear of post-mortem punishments was regarded as the only guarantee of morality and, therefore, of social and political stability.” “The Matter of Souls: Medical Theory and Theology in Seventeenth-Century England,” in The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Roger French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 87. 113 More, Antidote Against Atheism, 60-61. 158 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

teach us about God. If there is a spiritual substance in ourselves that can move corporeal matter, we can conceive of a spiritual substance

…that is able to move and actuate all Matter whatsoever never so farre extended, and after what way and manner soever it please, and that it has not the knowledge only of this or that particular thing, but a distinct and plenary Cognoscence of all things; and we have indeed a very competent apprehension of the Nature of the Eternal and Invisible God, who like the Soul of Man, does not indeed fall under sense, but does every where operate so, that his presence is easily to be gathered from what is discovered by our outward senses.114

Both Cudworth and More dealt directly and explicitly with the latest medical opinions in their discourses on the immortality of the soul, something that was rare in the anti-atheistic literature of the day. According to Henry, this reflects that their theological concerns were different from those of their fellow theologians. The rejection of Calvinism and the rationalist theology of the Cambridge Platonists “depended on a strict ontological dichotomy between matter and immaterial spirit,” and thus it was important to deny that any mental or vital events could be accounted for solely in material terms.115 While the immortality of the soul was a popular theme in natural theology, Cudworth and More had a further motive in establishing this doctrine: it tied in with their particular views on matter and spirit.

While these two Cambridge Platonists shared a belief in the immortality of the soul, Cudworth rejected More’s doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul.116 This doctrine, Robert Crocker has argued, played a significant role in More’s rational theology by supporting the more central and orthodox doctrines of the soul’s immortality and a personal divine providence. It was also part of a sustained polemic against theological voluntarism: “If the soul had pre-existed in another, ‘middle’ state before its incarnation, then one could assert that all souls had indeed been created in the beginning by God, and created in perfection.”117 By

114 Ibid., 61-62. 115 Henry, “The Matter of Souls,” 113. 116 Cudworth believed that souls were “Created by God immediately, and infused in Generations.” True Intellectual System, 43. 117 Crocker, “Henry More and the Preexistence of the Soul,” 80. 159 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

their own will, some of these souls had separated from this state of perfect union with God, and thus had entered this world. Crocker points to the apologetic role of this doctrine: “It was advanced in the firm belief that it would promote the supremacy of the divine goodness amongst God’s attributes, and thus convince all of the rational coherence and benignity of a personal providence.”118 After all, if these souls had chosen to remove themselves from perfect union with God, condemnation and punishment would not be merely the result of the capricious whim of a vengeful God, as More and Cudworth both understood the Calvinist doctrine of predestination.119 d. The Duties of Religion

For the Cambridge Platonists, reason could demonstrate more than just the theological doctrines of Christianity. Reason, as the candle of the Lord (a concept that will be discussed in more detail below) could also illuminate the correct way for a man to act. As Benjamin Whichcote wrote, “This is the Rule in all things, That a Man act according to Reason, which is the Candle of the Lord set up in him; and by this, he should be directed, and see his way before him.”120 For Nathaniel Culverwell, reason was “the leading and guiding power of the soul.”121 As Daniel Walker Howe suggests in his study of the Cambridge Platonists, reason was “the divine light vouchsafed to guide humanity through the pitfalls of this life.”122

One of the duties of religion is worship of God, and for Whichcote, reason could even provide a model for correct worship. In a discourse directed against Roman Catholics, Whichcote rejected their use of images in the worship of God, arguing that it is far better to worship God by purity of mind,

118 Ibid., 83. 119 More’s doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul could also be viewed as a way of dealing with the problem of evil. See Osler, “Triangulating Divine Will.” 120 Benjamin Whichcote, “The Deceitfulness of Sin,” in Several Discourses (London, 1701), 294. 121 Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, London, 1652, ed. Robert A. Greene and Hugh MacCallum (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 147. 122 Daniel Walker Howe, “The Cambridge Platonists of Old England and the Cambridge Platonists of New England,” Church History 57 (1988): 471. 160 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

[B]ecause a spirit is best acknowledged by the reason of a man’s understanding, and the thought of his heart: for this is the worship most suitable to an immaterial being; and it is the use of that in us, which is the highest and noblest faculties. For the spirit in man is the candle of the Lord, lighted by God, and a light to direct us unto him.123

While Cudworth and More did not deal explicitly with the duties of religion in their works of natural theology (by contrast, for example, to John Wilkins’ Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, which will be discussed in Chapter 5), it remained a theme in their other writings, particularly for Cudworth. For example, in a sermon before the House of Commons on March 31, 1647, Cudworth argued that authentic Christian faith was not found in assenting to doctrine, but in keeping Christ’s commandments in virtue, holiness and love.124 True religion is demonstrated by how people live, not by acquaintance with religious systems or ritual performances. As G. A. J. Rogers has expressed, Cudworth’s argument was that “In matters of religion the politicians should be concerned first with the salvation of their own souls through keeping God’s commandments rather than attempting to determine and impose specific matters of doctrine.”125 As Edmund Newey has put it, “The divine light is given not to enable us to define more precisely the content of Christian truth, but to help us see its form, so that we may avoid the obstacles of sin and walk in the ways of holiness.”126 e. “True” Christianity and the Church of England

The Cambridge Platonists, particularly More and Cudworth, were not only concerned with convincing atheists of the truth of Christianity. They also aimed to convince other Christians of the “true” version of Christianity. Most significantly, the Cambridge Platonists were opposed to Puritan enthusiasm, as

123 Benjamin Whichcote, “The Malignity of Popery,” in The Works of the Learned Benjamin Whichcote, DD, Vol. I (Aberdeen, 1751), 172. 124 Ralph Cudworth, “A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons at Westminster, March 31, 1647,” in Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, ed. Charles Taliaferro and Alison J. Telpy (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 55-94. 125 Rogers, “The Other-Worldly Philosophers and the Real World,” 8. 126 Edmund Newey, “The Form of Reason: Participation in the Work of Richard Hooker, Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth and Jeremy Taylor,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 12. 161 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

well as certain tendencies of high-church Anglicanism that they viewed as leaning too closely to Roman Catholicism.

Richard Olson has described Cudworth’s True Intellectual System as a “latitudinarian apologetic,” parallel to Hooker’s Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity, which was designed to convince and convert adherents of Puritan Calvinism and high-church Anglicanism, two of the three doctrines (the other being atheism) that threatened the principles of the Church of England, as Cudworth understood them. While the Cambridge Platonists did not cite Richard Hooker, they did develop a similar reason-based solution to a similar problem, albeit in a different historical context. As we have seen, the context in which the Cambridge Platonists were writing was marked by religious conflict that resulted in civil war and heated debate concerning the doctrines, government and very existence of the state church, and it is not surprising that they would endeavour to address this problem. Unlike Hooker, however, Cudworth had a much greater interest in natural philosophy, both ancient and modern, and he was able to employ this to make his argument. We have already seen, for example, how Cudworth used the argument from design and the metaphor of the book of nature to establish his conception of God as being characterised by reason and goodness, as opposed to the Calvinist emphasis on power and will.

Henry More was also clearly concerned with helping other Christians, not just atheists, or those who had never belonged to the church. In the first chapter of the Antidote, he outlined his reasons for writing this work. One reason he gave was that some men may only have adhered to religion out of blind obedience to the authority of the church, and thus when the authority of the church is damaged or broken, such men may easily lose their faith, and be led astray by “the Tempter.”127 More was seeking to demonstrate that there is a God, by means other than human authority, in an effort to reclaim such people to the faith. This faith, for both Cudworth and More, was not simply defined by adherence to the Church of England. The Cambridge Platonists were characterised by latitude and toleration in matters of religion, and as we have

127 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, 1. 162 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

already seen, emphasised Christian conduct and the virtues of holiness and love rather than strict compliance to a set of dogmas and rituals.

5. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse

While some historians have dismissed Ralph Cudworth and Henry More as being interested in natural philosophy only so far as it advanced their religious agendas,128 the situation at the time was not so clear-cut. There was no simple answer to the question of how to relate theology and natural philosophy, and Cudworth and More articulated quite complex relations between the two.129 We will now consider some of their negotiations of the relationship. These included articulations of how knowledge of God could lead to the possibility of doing natural philosophy, and how knowledge of nature could aid in understanding God and religion. This two-way relationship meant that natural philosophy and theology could be mutually supporting through natural theology. a. Knowledge of God leading to Knowledge of Nature

Knowledge of God belongs to the realm of theology, while natural philosophy was the pursuit of knowledge of nature. In natural theology, the two of these could be brought together. For example, natural theology could support knowledge of God, which in turn made natural philosophy possible. For Cudworth, knowledge of nature could only be gained within the context of a correct conception of God:

All those Theists who suppose, God to be a meer Arbitrary Being, whose Will is not determined by any Nature of Goodness or Rule of Justice, but it self is the first Rule of both, (they thinking this to be the highest Perfection, Liberty and Power) can never be reasonably Certain, of the Truth of any thing, not so much as that Two and Two are Four; because so long as they adhere to that perswasion; they can never be assured, but

128 See, for example, Lamprecht, “Innate Ideas in the Cambridge Platonists,” 572. 129 This point reflects the language of John Hedley Brooke’s “complexity thesis,” noted earlier in this thesis. See, for example, Chapter 1, Section 2c and Section 4. 163 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

that such an Arbitrary Omnipotent Deity, might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their Clearest Perceptions.130

The reason, for Cudworth, was that free will without wisdom and goodness would lead to arbitrariness: “To privilege divine will above divine goodness and understanding is to destroy the rationality of creation, to remove the order of things, to open the way for scepticism and therefore atheism.”131 Cudworth’s solution was to emphasise God’s goodness and understanding: “By subordinating divine will to divine wisdom, Cudworth removes the sceptical implications of voluntarism, by removing the arbitrariness of power which would otherwise destroy the very grounds of certain knowledge.”132 If God is not “essentially good,” we can have no guarantee that we will not be deceived in our pursuit of knowledge. Here, Cudworth was referring to the evil demon argument from Descartes’ Meditations. Cudworth insisted that it is only if God’s will is governed by goodness and justice that we can have certain knowledge, even of something as simple as two plus two being four. Thus, it is necessary for a person to have a correct understanding of God not only for the theological purpose of salvation, but also for the possibility of doing natural philosophy.

Henry More held a similar view. His rejection of voluntarism led him to dismiss the notion that God might continually intervene in his creation. Instead of understanding the workings of nature as being constantly manipulated by the divine hand, More argued that God’s providence could be seen in the creatures designed to be self-sufficient.133 As we saw above, natural theology could be used to establish this correct conception of God, which in turn was used to support natural philosophy. In this way, natural theology acted as a kind of mediator between theology and natural philosophy, in the sense that the correct

130 Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 717. 131 Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 64. See also the discussion of debates surrounding divine will in Chapter 1, Section 2a, and earlier treatment of Cudworth’s and More’s views in this chapter, Section 4b. 132 Ibid., 73. 133 As Margaret Osler explains, “More considered divine foresight in designing creatures a far better way of explaining how creatures are prepared to deal with accidents than an explanation couched in terms of continual and unpredictable divine intervention.” Osler, “Triangulating Divine Will,” 83. 164 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

knowledge of God, derived in part from natural theology, provided a foundation for knowledge of nature. b. Knowledge of Nature leading to Knowledge of God

Conversely, knowledge of the natural world derived from natural philosophy could be used to enhance and deepen knowledge of God. For example, nature testifies to particular attributes of God, such as his wisdom and goodness. As John Henry has aptly stated, “More’s particular brand of philosophical theology led him to consider not only God’s relationship to the world but also the nature of the world itself as a creation of God and as something which could lead us to knowledge of God.”134 The metaphors of the book of nature and the priest of nature were particularly important here. We have already seen how Cudworth employed the concept of the book of nature to argue that the intelligibility of nature points to the existence of a divine, rational creator. Involved in metaphor was the idea that the natural world was a revelation from God, parallel to the written Scriptures but accessed in a different way. Just as priests interpret and explain the Scriptures to their parishioners, so priests of nature share knowledge of God gained from the natural world with their fellow mankind. For Henry More, mankind had a special place among the rest of God’s creatures to act as a priest in the temple of nature, in the same way that religious priests were called from among men to minister:

As there are particular Priests amongst Men, so the whole Species of Mankind being indued with Reason and a power of finding out God, there is yet one singular end more discoverable of his Creation, viz. that he may be a Priest in this magnificent Temple of the Universe, and send up prayers and praises to the great Creator of all things in behalf of the rest of the Creatures.135

In this way, knowledge of God derived from the study of nature could be used to enhance the prayers and praise of mankind towards their creator.

134 Henry, “More on More,” 225. 135 More, An Antidote against Atheism, 156-7. A similar sentiment was expressed by More’s colleague John Smith: “A Good man finds every place he treads upon Holy ground; to him the World is God’s Temple.” Select Discourses (London, 1660), 434. 165 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

Intriguingly, More claimed that natural philosophy could be used not only to understand God and his creation, but also to understand Scripture.136 In this way, the study of nature led to a richer appreciation of religion. Indeed, More believed he had shown that the Copernican system and the pre-existence of the soul were part of the Mosaic revelation. This demonstrated that Christianity could not be contradictory to reason or natural knowledge, since the truths that natural philosophers were discovering in the seventeenth century had been articulated by Moses thousands of years earlier:

Therefore to prevent all contempt and cavil against the Sacredness of Christianity, as holding anything against the solid truths of approved Reason and Philosophy, I thought it necessary, and an indispensable duty of that Faithfulness I owe to the Christian Church, publickly to declare that, if any one presume that he has found such points of Cartesianisme or Platonisme as I have applied to the Mosaick letter to be really true upon th[o]rough examination, I dare confidently pronounce to him, that if they be so, those truths were ever lodged in the Text of Moses, and that no Philosopher has any the least pretence to magnify himself against Religion and the Church of God, wherein such rich theories have been ever treasured up, though men have not had, for these many Ages, the leisure or opportunity of unlocking them till now. Which consideration, I think, is of main importance for the stopping the mouths of Atheistical Wits, and conciliating unspeakable Honour and Reverence to Religion and the Church in those who are knowing and ingenuous.137

136 The use of natural philosophy to aid in the interpretation of Scripture dates back to Augustine. In The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Augustine drew on a wide range of knowledge, both human and divine, to exegete the literal meaning “as it is set forth by the author” (11.1.2). For example, he explained the natural order of creation as described in Genesis by reference to the four elements “generally supposed to make up the world” (3.3.4). Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, translated by John Hammond Taylor, 2 vols. (New York: Newman Press, 1982). See also Kenneth J. Howell, God’s Two Books: Copernican Cosmology and Biblical Interpretation in Early Modern Science (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 186-193. 137 Henry More, A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (London, 1662), “Preface General,” p. xix, quoted in Richard H. Popkin, “The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway,” in Hutton, Henry More (1614-1687), 106. This view is in line with the argument developed by Church Fathers such as Clement of Alexandria and Renaissance scholars like Ficino that the classical learning of the Greeks had been largely derived from the Jews, or indirectly from Egyptians who had been greatly influenced by the Jews. See, for example, John Gascoigne, “‘The Wisdom of the Egyptians’ and the Secularisation of History in the Age of Newton,” in The Uses of Antiquity: The Scientific Revolution and the Classical Tradition, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 171-212; and Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964). 166 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

For More, the new natural philosophy enhanced knowledge of things that were originally revealed in Scripture, but not fully understood until that time. In this way, natural philosophy could lead to a more complete knowledge of God.

While a correct conception of God underlay the possibility of doing natural philosophy, and the study of the natural world could contribute to understanding of God, it is not possible to define this connection between natural philosophy and theology as a one-way relationship in either direction. Instead, natural philosophy and theology were mutually supporting and reinforcing, and this took place through the discourse of natural theology.

6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation

Historians have often viewed natural theologians as elevating reason above revelation, treating it as a firmer foundation for religion than the Scriptures. Indeed this was the case for some groups of thinkers in the seventeenth century, such as the Deists and Socinians. As the Cambridge Platonists in general are well known for their emphasis on the role of reason, one might be tempted to place them in the same category. However, once we examine the views of the Cambridge Platonists on reason and revelation in closer detail, a very different picture begins to emerge. It is undeniable that reason was important to the Cambridge Platonists, and that it played a crucial role in their natural theology.138 However, in a sense, this observation is trivial. It is more important to determine just what “reason” actually meant for the Cambridge Platonists.

138 Many historians see the emphasis on reason as one of the defining characteristics of Cambridge Platonism, and even what made this group “Platonic.” For example, G. A. J. Rogers has argued that “the shared commitment to the central place occupied by reason in intellectual enquiry” was firmly based in Platonic philosophy. “The Other-Worldly Philosophers and the Real World,” 4. Similarly, Robert Greene and Hugh MacCallum point to the Cambridge Platonists’ “new emphasis on the central importance of reason in religious thinking.” Introduction to Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, ed. Robert A. Greene and Hugh MacCallum (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), xii. For more on the Platonism of the Cambridge Platonists, see D. W. Dockrill, “The Heritage of Patristic Platonism in Seventeenth-Century English Philosophical Theology,” in Roger, Vienne, and Zarka, The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context, 55-77; and Howe, “The Cambridge Platonists of Old England and the Cambridge Platonists of New England.” 167 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

a. Reason as the Candle of the Lord

Several of the Cambridge Platonists identified reason as the “Candle of the Lord.” This phrase has come to be associated with the Cambridge Platonists to the extent that one major study of the group had that title.139 Here, these theologians drew upon the Christian Scriptures, specifically Proverbs 20:27: “The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, searching all the inward parts of the belly.”140 Although this metaphor is frequently associated with the Cambridge Platonists, actual references to Proverbs 20:27 are surprisingly limited in their published works. While Whichcote and Culverwell made serious and extensive use of it, Ralph Cudworth never mentions it and John Smith and Henry More quoted it only in passing.141

The phrase “the Candle of the Lord” was explored most comprehensively by Nathaniel Culverwell. Proverbs 20:27 set the theme for his major work, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature. This verse was quoted as the epigraph to the work: “The understanding of a man is the Candle of the Lord.” In fact, the work is a discourse on what it means for reason to be “the Candle of the Lord,” as well as what the light of this candle is like. Benjamin Whichcote also frequently alluded to the concept, though he never articulated it in any sustained fashion. Comments such “The Spirit of a Man is the candle of the Lord, Lighted by God, and Lighting us to God,”142 appear frequently in his sermons and discourses, but are not explored in much detail. The term was mentioned only twice in passing by Henry More. In An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness, he stated that enthusiasts would find true religion if they sought for truth with “that candle of the Lord, the Spirit that he has lighted in them.”143 In An Exposition of the Seven Epistles to the Seven Churches, More wrote of “those native Truths and Notions which God of his

139 W. C. de Pauley, The Candle of the Lord: Studies in the Cambridge Platonists (London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1937). 140 King James Version (public domain). 141 This can be demonstrated from a full text search of Early English Books Online and Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 142 Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and Religious Aphorisms (Norwich, 1703), 129. 143 Henry More, An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (London, 1660), 533. 168 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

infinite mercy and faithfulnesse has implanted in the minds of all men that have not done violence to that innate Light, the Candle of the Lord searching all the parts of the belly.”144 John Smith only mentioned the verse once, in his discourse “Of the Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion.” He wrote that “Unreasonableness or the smothering and extinguishing the Candle of the Lord within us is no piece of Religion, not advantageous to it: That certainly will not raise men up to God, which sinks them below men.”145

Peter Sterry, a theologian and nonconformist minister sometimes associated with the Cambridge Platonists, also identified reason with “the candle of the Lord.”146 In fact, Sterry was the only one who did not take for granted that “the candle of the Lord” was, in fact, reason. He alone went further in explicating the passage:

The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, searching out the hidden parts of the belly… You will more clearly see this Spirit of man to be the Principle of Reason, planted by nature in man; if you compare this expression of Solomon’s with that of St. Paul, which seems to have some glance towards this Proverb, I Cor.2ch.11. No man knows the things of a man, but the spirit of man, which is in man.147 The things of a man are all the things of this creation, visible, invisible; man is the summe of them all; all are subject to man; God hath, set this whole world in the heart of man, to search it out; these are the hidden things of his belly: And thus farre the spirit of man, the candle of Reason, spreads his beams, to enlighten this world of nature.148

Here, Sterry identified the “spirit of man” of Proverbs 20:27 with the “spirit of man” from 1 Corinthians 2:11. The “spirit of man” searches out earthly or

144 Henry More, An Exposition of the Seven Epistles to the Seven Churches (London, 1669), 93. 145 John Smith, Select Discourses (London, 1690). 146 Peter Sterry is included among the Cambridge Platonists in Sarah Hutton, “The Cambridge Platonists,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/cambridge-platonists (accessed 13 July 2009); and Mark Goldie, “Cambridge Platonists (act. 1630s–1680s),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/theme/94274 (accessed 13 July 2009). 147 1 Corinthians 2:11a: “For who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him?” 148 Peter Sterry, The Spirit Convincing of Sinne. Opened in a Sermon before the Honorable House of Commons (November 26, 1645), pp. 10-11. 169 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

natural things, while the “Spirit of God” (in the second half of the verse, not quoted here by Sterry), knows the “things of God.”149

For Peter Sterry, reason as the candle of the Lord or the spirit of man, was one of three “principles of truth,” or means of gaining knowledge. The others were “sense,” referring to the eyes and ears, which can judge things that can be seen or heard, and “spirit,” by which he meant the spirit of God, which reveals deeper divine things.150 This point was also illustrated by a reference to 1 Corinthians 2:11-13, where the Apostle Paul wrote,

For who knows a person’s thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might understand the things freely given us by God. And we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual truths to those who are spiritual.151

Every man has the capacity of reason, but it is only after receiving the Spirit of God that a man can understand divine things, or spiritual truths. For Sterry, it also seems that one cannot be fully aware of the divine knowledge that comes from the Spirit of God until he has explored the depths of his own self:

Hast thou not made a Retreat into thine own Depths? Hast thou not seen the Beauties, that shine in this Glass? Then art thou far from the Depths of the Divine Spirit, and the Glories that disclose themselves in that Glass. Solomon tells us, Prov. 20.27. That the Spirit of Man is the Candle of the Lord in his Bowels: if the Spirit of Man within be but a Candle; what then is this Sensual State without? Neither Life, nor Death; nor Light, nor Darkness: but Shadows of Life, and Death between

149 1 Corinthians 2:11b: “So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God.” 150 Peter Sterry, The Spirit Convincing of Sinne, 10-11. 151 Peter Sterry would most likely have used the King James Version: “For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God. Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual.” 170 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

both. But who can think he hath receiv’d the Beams of the Sun, when yet he hath not seen a Candles Light?152 b. Reason and God

One of the key aspects of the Cambridge Platonist perspective on reason illuminated by the metaphor of the “candle of the Lord” is that reason comes from God. A candle, in order to give light, must first be lit, and the candle of the Lord was lit by God. The human ability to reason is a gift from God given, according to Whichcote, at the moment of creation.153 Culverwell made a similar point, writing:

God hath breathed into all the sons of men Reasonable souls which may serve as so many Candles to enlighten and direct them in searching out their Creatour, in the discovering of other inferiour beings, and themselves also.154

However, for the Cambridge Platonists, the faculty of reason was more than just a gift from God: it was also a means of participating in the divine nature. Edmund Newey argues that the term “reason” as used by these theologians, as well as earlier writers such as Richard Hooker and Jeremy Taylor, can only be understood in the context of participation through the embodiment of divine reason in Christ. These theologians viewed this participative union with the Creator God as the origin and the end of all created human beings. Culverwell also took this view, when he argued that light does not originate in the candle, which is only “a weak participation of something that is more bright and glorious.”155 In this way, human reason is not just a reflection of the divine

152 Peter Sterry, The Rise, Race, and Royalty of the Kingdom of God in the Soul of Man (London, 1683), 25. 153 Benjamin Whichcote, “The Worth of Religion, and Suffering for it,” in Several Discourses, Vol. II (London, 1702), 342. As Robert A. Greene has put it, “The idea that the “candle of the Lord” was res illuminata [that is, lit by God] was of particular importance to Whichcote; to him, it means that God was the source and author of man’s capacity, given to him at creation, to understand the self-evident moral principles governing his relation to God, his fellow men and himself.” “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis,” Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (1991): 633. 154 Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, 19. 155 Ibid., 88. As Edmund Newey has put it, “If read in this light, ‘reason’ in their work cannot be separated from God’s loving disposition towards us in his Son, the incarnate Logos, who is both 171 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

mind, but also a type of participation in the divine God himself. For Cudworth, this participation also enabled a fuller understanding of the natural world. The book of nature, when observed with the senses alone, appears to contain merely “Inky Scrawls,”

But the Mind of Intellect, which hath an Inward and Active Participation of the same Divine Wisdom that made it… will not have only a Wonderful Scene and large Prospect of other Thoughts laid open before it, and Variety of Knowledge, Logical, Mathematical, Metaphysical, Moral displayed; but also clearly Read the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, in every Page of this great Volume, as it were written in large and legible Characters.156

That is, the human mind can understand the world only because God has already supplied the necessary foundation. “For to know a Thing is nothing else but to comprehend it by some Inward Ideas that are domestick to the Mind, and actively exerted from it.”157 These ideas exist eternally in the mind of God, which is “an Infinite Eternal Mind necessarily Existing, that actually comprehends himself, the Possibility of all Things, and the Verities Clinging to them.”158 Our human understanding of the world flows from “Derivative Participations of a Perfect, Infinite and Eternal Intellect.”159 As Sarah Hutton has articulated, “The mind can make sense of the eternal world because it already contains the concepts needed,” which it has been furnished with “by virtue of its participation in the mind of God.”160

As a participation in the mind of God, reason was linked with divine revelation. Edmund Newey has explained it in the following way: “one cannot simply identify revelation with God and reason with humankind, but rather each participates in the other, supremely in the person and work of Christ.”161 As we

the form of reason, and the only means of its true realisation in us through the Spirit.” Newey, “The Form of Reason,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 4. 156 Cudworth, Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, 186-187. 157 Ibid., 244. 158 Ibid., 250. 159 Ibid., 255. 160 Hutton, “Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature,” 69. 161 Newey, “The Form of Reason,” 11. 172 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

will see below, the Cambridge Platonists did not elevate reason above revelation, nor did they reject revelation in favour of reason. This is not at all surprising when their conception of reason as deriving from God, like Scriptural revelation, is fully grasped. c. The Purpose of Reason

For the Cambridge Platonists, reason had a variety of roles. Most broadly, reason was the way to seek out the truth. In his 1660 work, An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness, Henry More urged Enthusiasts to seek the true religion using reason, and he was convinced that they would find it:

I do not despair but if there be that sincere Zeal to Truth and Holiness that is pretended, that it will redound to the safety of these melancholy Wanderers that look up and down for Truth with that candle of the Lord, the Spirit that he has lighted in them.162

The existence of God is the most obvious example of the truth that is discovered by reason. We have already seen that this was one of the key themes in the natural theology of the Cambridge Platonists, but it is worth revisiting the issue from a slightly different angle here. For Whichcote, any man with reason must see that God exists—it is simply not possible to not do so. He wrote, “if a Man do but use Reason; he must see, and acknowledge God,”163 and “no Man hath Mind and Understanding, but he may as naturally know, that there is a God upon whom he depends, as he may know there is a Sun in the Firmament, if he will open his Eyes.”164

In fact, the primary purpose of reason is to show the way to God. As Whichcote proposed, the candle of reason served this purpose: “to discern and discover God.”165 The very nature of reason as the candle of the Lord demonstrates this:

162 Henry More, An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (London, 1660), 533. 163 Benjamin Whichcote, Select Sermons (London, 1693), 449. 164 Benjamin Whichcote, “Whatsoever Things are True,” in Several Discourses, Vol. IV. (London, 1707), 9. 165 Whichcote, Select Sermons, 449. 173 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

A Candle is a thing first lighted, then lighting: So that Mind and Understanding is first made Light, by Divine Influences; and then enlightens a Man, in the use thereof, to find out God, and to follow after him in Creation, and Providence.166

And the Employment, and proper Business of Mind and Understanding is, to follow after God, and find him out in his Works, and to make acknowledgement to him of his Goodness; and this is the Employment and proper function of Mind and Understanding in Man.167

Thus, mankind has “an obligation of Duty to God, because God hath made him capable to know that he is, and to know that he himself arises from other Causes greater and more good than himself.”168 Similarly, Culverwell wrote that reason both came from God and will return to God. It is the true purpose of reason to seek after God, not just earthly knowledge:

This Candle of the Lord may shine here below, it may and doth aspire, and long for happinesse; but yet it will not come neere it, till he that lighted it up, be pleased to lift it up to himself, and there transforme it into a Starre, that may drink in everlasting light and influence from its original and foundation-light.169 d. The Importance of Reason

There were several motivations for the Cambridge Platonist emphasis on reason. To begin with, reason was used to defend “true religion” against the challenges of atheism and enthusiasm.170 For example, while many leaders of the Church of England did not believe that “proofs” of religious doctrines were necessary for salvation, Henry More was convinced that only his rational

166 Benjamin Whichcote, “The Illustrious Manifestations of God, and the Inexcusable Ignorance of Men,” in Several Discourses, Vol. III (London, 1703), 290. 167 Benjamin Whichcote, “The Miserable Degeneracy of Man through their Affectation of Atheism, and Practice of Wickedness,” in Several Discourses, Vol. III (London, 1703), 330. 168 Benjamin Whichcote, “Whatsoever Things are True,” in Several Discourses, Vol. IV (London, 1707), 9. 169 Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, 198. 170 Lotte Mulligan, “‘Reason,’ ‘Right Reason,’ and ‘Revelation’ in Mid-Seventeenth-Century England,” in Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 386. 174 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

approach could provide “the succours that Philosophy affords to Religion in the points of the existence of God and Immortality of the soul.”171

“Enthusiasm” was a pejorative term, whose meaning is not always carefully delineated. Isabel Rivers suggests that by “enthusiasm” the latitudinarians, including the Cambridge Platonists, “meant any manifestations of Puritanism that divorced faith from reason or stressed faith at the expense of works.”172 For Cudworth and More, this would have included the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, with its emphasis on the will of God in salvation rather than on the role of works by mankind, as well as the related voluntarism that prioritised God’s free will and power above wisdom and goodness. More was also concerned more particularly with “philosophical enthusiasm,” as typified by his controversy with the Oxford Platonist and hermeticist Thomas Vaughan. Although there were similarities in the views of these two scholars, More was concerned to distance his own Platonism from the more mystical variety espoused by Vaughan. While both supported the idea of knowledge deriving from illumination, for Vaughan this was a kind of direct experience of the “mysterious union” between God and nature, while for More, it was a divinely assisted extension of the consciousness of the perceiving intellect.173 The slipperiness of the concept of enthusiasm may be seen, however, in the fact that More himself was accused of enthusiasm by the Church of England bishop Samuel Parker.174

The Cambridge Platonists also emphasised the calming effects of reason against the enthusiasm that seemed to have been a key factor in the turmoil of the time. They were writing in a time characterised by great religious and political conflict, and it is not surprising that they would seek a way to ameliorate this conflict. Nathaniel Culverwell believed that the use of reason could prevent such conflict:

171 Henry More, letter to Richard Baxter. Quoted in Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle,” 59. 172 Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1:34. 173 Crocker, Henry More, 1614-1687, 51. 174 Ibid., 116. 175 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

[I]f men were tun’d and regulated by Reason more, there would be more Concord and Harmony in the world… if men could always hush and still those clouds that soil and discolour the face and brightnesse of [reason]… would there be such fractions and commotions in the State, such Schisms and Ruptures in the Church, such hot and fiery prosecutions of some trifling opinions?175

The most important example of this attempt to cure the religious conflict of the time was the attempt to find a via media between two religious extremes. For the Cambridge Platonists, as for Richard Hooker before them, reason had an important function in establishing a middle ground between Puritanism and Roman Catholicism or the High Church of England. However, as with Hooker, historians have often viewed reason itself as the middle ground; that is, religion being based on reason rather than on Scripture or church tradition. As Sterling Lamprecht argued,

That sound religion should be based on reason, that all men are to some degree possessed of reason and some men are highly endowed therewith, and that reason is a more than natural faculty and so is specially fitted to penetrate into the truths of the religious realm—these positions enabled the Cambridge Platonists to announce a via media in the troubled ecclesiastical world of seventeenth-century England, to oppose the arbitrary resort to creedal symbol or Scriptural letter or church tradition, and to set aside the Protestant doctrines of the total corruption of human powers and of the total bondage of the human to the divine will.176

However, what needs to be kept in mind is that rather than reason being viewed as an alternative to Scripture as a foundation for religion, reason was seen as the best way to understand Scripture and, more importantly, to decide between competing interpretations. While Puritans appealed to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and Catholics relied on church tradition, the Cambridge Platonists advocated a more significant role for reason.177 We can see an example of this in the work of Henry More. As Popkin has explained,

175 Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, 157. Reason and the passions was a common theme in seventeenth-century literature. See, for example, the collection of essays in The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (London: Routledge, 1998). 176 Lamprecht, “Innate Ideas in the Cambridge Platonists,” 563-4. 177 It must be acknowledged that the Puritan view of reason was not as negative as is sometimes portrayed. Scholars such as William Haller and Perry Miller have stressed the intellectualism 176 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

In view of the sad history of the Church, the mere claim to tradition is not sufficient, so one has to rely on rightly circumstantiated sense and reason and Holy Writ for any certainty of faith, and the assistance of the Spirit of Life and of God. This, presumably, will keep one from being either an enthusiast or a Roman Catholic, and will lead one to be a true follower of Primitive Apostolick Christianity.178

Thus, while More retained a role for the Holy Spirit in religious knowledge, the work of the Spirit, which was what the enthusiasts overplayed, was tempered by reason.

Another motivation for the Cambridge Platonists’ emphasis on reason was their opposition to the Puritan view of total depravity. While the Puritans believed that human sin had completely corrupted human nature and reason, the Cambridge Platonists believed that something of true human nature was retained. As Greene describes the view of Whichcote, “Man’s mind and understanding have a natural affinity for the truth, in Whichcote’s view, because man’s natural nobility and dignity have not been entirely compromised by his fall from innocence.”179

It was not only human reason that the Cambridge Platonists emphasised. They also opposed Puritanism by emphasising God’s reason. For Cudworth,

Arbitrary will does not become moral by being thought of as omnipotent. Rather God would be a moral deity only if he were guided in his will by reason. And similarly man can be held subject to moral standards only if he has a reason independent of his passions and will.180 e. The Limits of Reason

For all the emphasis the Cambridge Platonists placed on reason, they still viewed it as a limited faculty. This point is made by Hall in his study on Henry

and role for reason in the work of the Puritan elite in England and in New England. See William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938); and Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939). 178 Popkin, “The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway,” 107-8. 179 Greene, “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis,” 630. 180 Lamprecht, “Innate Ideas in the Cambridge Platonists,” 562. 177 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

More: “The candle of the Lord was, after all, but a feeble glim (sic) compared with the effulgent splendour of the Redeemer himself, and this was to be found shining in the pages of Scripture.”181 We can see this view of the limitations of reason most clearly in the work of Peter Sterry and Nathaniel Culverwell. As Sterry put it: “Though the candle of Reason excel in the light the Glow-worms of sense; yet it is but a candle, not the Sun it self; it makes not day; only shines in the darknesse of the night.”182 The sun is the Spirit of God, as opposed to the spirit of man, which is able to seek out deeper divine things. Similarly, Culverwell wrote that “A Candle has no such goodly light, as that it should pride and glory in it… How farre distant is it from the beauty of a Starre? How farre from the brightnesse of a Sun?”183

Interestingly, Culverwell believed that reason was a limited faculty even before the noetic effects of the Fall: “God never intended that a creature should rest satisfied with its own candle-light, but that it should run to the fountain of light, and sunne it self in the presence of its God.”184 Despite this, he asked, “is it not better to enjoy the faint and languishing light of the Candle of the Lord, rather then to be in palpable and disconsolate darknesse?”185 Further, he argued that in its proper sphere of operation, the light of reason is a certain light: “Though it be but a limited and restrained light, yet it will discover such objects as are within its own sphere with a sufficient certainty.”186 f. Reason and Faith

The Cambridge Platonists were writing in opposition to people they believed had rejected reason’s role in religion. For example, Culverwell wrote that some people are so prejudiced against reason that “they look upon it not as the Candle of the Lord, but as on some blazing Comet that portends present ruine to the

181 Hall, Henry More, 67. 182 Peter Sterry, The Spirit Convincing of Sinne, 10. Quoted in Greene, “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis,” 637. 183 Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, 118. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid., 12. 186 Ibid., 136. 178 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

Church, and to the soul.”187 Culverwell and his colleagues emphatically rejected this view. Culverwell pointed out that people such as Socinus and his followers (who came to be known as Socinians) had elevated reason above faith, and thus “by their meer pretences to Reason, have made a shipwrack of Faith, and have been very injurious to the Gospel.”188 Similarly, Henry More wrote that atheism and enthusiasm were mutually reinforcing, since the atheist’s “pretence to wit and nature reason” makes the enthusiast sure that reason is no guide to God. However, the misuse of reason by some does not mean that we should not use it. As Culverwell asked, “because Socinus has burnt his wings at this Candle of the Lord, must none therefore make use of it?”189 Further, the enthusiast’s rejection of reason gives succour to atheists:

The Enthusiasts boldly dictating the careless ravings of his own tumultuous fancy for undeniable principles of divine knowledge, confirms the Atheists that the whole business of religion and notion of a God, is nothing but a troublesome fit of over-curious Melancholy.190

Thus, the Cambridge Platonists encouraged the use of whatever degree of reason man still possessed.191

In emphasising the role of reason, the Cambridge Platonists were not rejecting the concept of faith. Instead, they were attempting to strike a delicate balance and set of relations between the two. For example, the preface to Culverwell’s Elegant and Learned Discourse stated that the design of the work was to vindicate the use of reason in matters of religion, but also to critique those who elevate reason above faith. The Cambridge Platonists were convinced that the Christian religion was reasonable, and that there could be no conflict between faith and reason. As Whichcote explained, “natural light” or “principles of

187 Ibid., 11. 188 Ibid., 11. 189 Ibid., 15. 190 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, unpaginated preface. 191 As Sterling Lamprecht put it, “The Cambridge Platonists were not reckless optimists; they had no illusions which led them to postulate the natural excellence of man or the infallibility of all his judgments.… But they were so far from any assertions of total depravity or original sin or complete helplessness of man’s judgment. And they were eager to urge the utilization of whatever degree of reason every man possessed or still retained.” “Innate Ideas in the Cambridge Platonists,” 558. 179 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

reason” were not inconsistent with conscience, or an awareness of sin. According to Whichcote, those who “call upon Men to Use, Employ, and Improve the principles of Gods Creation” are not undervaluing God’s grace.192 Rather, it is a “very profitable work to call upon Men… to be throughout Rational in what they do; for these things have a Divine Foundation.”193 Similarly, More tried to show that the certainty of faith presupposed both the certainty of both sense and reason, but that faith cannot be opposed to either sense or reason: “Any reasonable unprejudiced person can tell that the Bible was dictated by the Spirit of God.”194 The problem here lies in determining just what is meant by “reasonable and unprejudiced.” As we shall see in the case of John Wilkins in Chapter 5, there does not seem to be any way to judge this beyond the person drawing the “correct” conclusions. g. Reason and Revelation

The Cambridge Platonists’ emphasis on reason should not in any way be considered a rejection of revelation. Even when reason was acknowledged as a source of knowledge apart from Scripture, there was no indication that revelation was unnecessary or surpassed. In the preface to his Antidote against Atheism, Henry More wrote that he was not insisting on sacred History, not because it was unreliable but “mainly because I know the Atheist will boggle more at whatever is fetch’d from establish’d Reason, and flie away from it.”195 This again ties in to the above discussion of reason as a means of interpreting Scripture. As a way to decide between competing interpretations, reason is preferred to human testimony of divine inspiration or historical church tradition, but here reason is being applied to revelation, not against it. In this way, for the Cambridge Platonists in general, reason was exalted above human testimony and tradition, but not above revelation.

192 Benjamin Whichcote, “The Exercise and Progress of a Christian,” in Several Discourses, Vol. II (London, 1702), 150. 193 Ibid., 151. 194 Popkin, “The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway,” 107 (my italics). 195 More, An Antidote Against Atheism, unpaginated preface. 180 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

For the Cambridge Platonists, reason was required to understand revelation, but even reason itself was understood in some sense as a divine revelation. As Sterling Lamprecht has described it, reason “was not simply the means by which man reached forward to knowledge of God: it was also the means by which God came down into the life of man.”196 Joseph Glanvill, a later follower of the Cambridge Platonists, carried on this view: “Reason is, in a sense, the Word of God, viz. That which he hath written upon our Minds and Hearts; as Scripture is that which is written in a Book.”197 While Scripture “is the Word, whereby he hath declared his Will to the Church and his peculiar People,” reason is “That Light, whereby Christ hath enlightened every one that cometh into the World, John 1.9. And, that Law whereby the Consciences of the Heathen either accuse, or excuse one another, Rom. 2.15.”198

More’s concern with keeping biblical exegesis under the control of “right reason” is also seen in his disagreement with the Oxford Platonist Thomas Vaughan. More disagreed with Vaughan’s use of the Bible as a central text for the study of philosophy. As Mulligan explains, “More was clear that this enterprise of abstracting philosophical principles from the Bible was based on a total rejection of reason.”199 However, it does seem that More was concerned with what he viewed as the rashness of Vaughan’s conclusions, rather than the practice of using the Bible for philosophical ends: “This quarrel was about which biblical exegesis was most in keeping with right reason.”200 More was resentful of Vaughan’s claim to be a Platonist, and afraid that the readers of his own work might associate his Platonism with Vaughan’s alchemical and hermetic version.201 Thus, the controversy between these two scholars was a fight to

196 Lamprecht, “Innate Ideas in the Cambridge Platonists,” 562. 197 Joseph Glanvill, Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion (London, 1676), 20. 198 Ibid., 20. 199 Mulligan, “‘Reason,’ ‘Right Reason,’ and ‘Revelation’,” 387. 200 Ibid., 388. 201 Crocker, Henry More, 1614-1687, 45. 181 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

appropriate both reason and Platonism: a “squabble between two close relatives struggling to engross for themselves some common family property.”202

For Nathaniel Culverwell, reason was subordinate, but not opposed, to divine revelation:

Reason being above humane testimony and tradition, and being subordinate to God himself, and those Revelations that come from God; now ‘tis expresse blasphemy to say that either God, or the Word of God did ever, or ever will oppose Right Reason.203

Anything that does oppose the word of God cannot be “the Candle of the Lord,” but rather “some shadow and appearance of it.”204

Reason and revelation have their own spheres of operation. While the “candle of the Lord” cannot discover some truths, which must be revealed by God, neither does it oppose them. For example,

As the Unity of a Godhead is demonstrable and clear to the eye of Reason, so the Trinity of persons, that is, three glorious relations in the one God is as certain to an eye of Faith. ’Tis as certain to this eye of Faith that Christ is truly God, as it was visible to an eye both of Sense and Reason that he is truly man. Faith spies out the resurrection of the body; as Reason sees the immortality of the soul.205

Without revelation, only the very wisest people would have been saved, for while “Nature and Reason triumph in the Law, Grace and Faith flower out in the Gospel. By vertue of this wise and free dispensation, weak ones chiefly receive the Gospel, for they are as well able to believe as any others.”206

Similarly, Benjamin Whichcote advocated the use of both reason and revelation:

202 Mulligan, “‘Reason,’ ‘Right Reason,’ and ‘Revelation’,” 387. 203 Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, 156. 204 Ibid., 14. 205 Ibid., 164. 206 Ibid., 168. 182 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

God has set up Two Lights, to enlighten us in our way: The light of Reason, which is the Light of his Creation; and the Light of Scripture, which is after-Revelation from him. Let us make use of these two Lights, and Suffer neither to be put out.207

This would indicate that natural theology, in so far as it uses reason to support religious doctrines, could not be considered as a strict alternative to revealed theology. Reason was not set up as an authority in its own right, but was considered as something that could be used alongside revelation in Scripture.

7. Conclusion

The Cambridge Platonists, especially Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, represent the first major inflection point in the tradition of natural theology that emerged in England in the seventeenth century. While they dealt with some of the same issues as Richard Hooker, whom we have already considered as a harbinger of the tradition, their exposure to the first fruits of the Scientific Revolution meant that they could fully participate in natural theology, which occupied a space between theology and natural philosophy. The Cambridge Platonists were concerned with challenges unique to their time and place, such as Puritanism and the proliferation of natural philosophies at odds with each other and with the hegemonic Scholastic Aristotelianism. While other natural theologians were concerned with similar issues, the Cambridge Platonists addressed them in a unique manner. This can be understood as a result of the particular settings of the natural theological kaleidoscopes used by these theologians. Their own understanding of the nature of God as well as their reaction against sectarian and philosophical enthusiasm meant that natural philosophical resources were interpreted and employed in certain ways, resulted in arguments that differed markedly from other natural theologians of the seventeenth century. Indeed, many contemporaries of the Cambridge Platonists were quite scathing towards their natural theological arguments, even though their goal, namely supporting true Christianity, was the same.

207 Whichcote, Moral and Religious Aphorisms, 19. 183 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 4

For the Cambridge Platonists, natural theology was primarily an apologetic enterprise. While reason could be used to establish some essential doctrines of religion, these doctrines were originally known from the Christian Scriptures. By employing arguments from reason in support of such doctrines, their goal was to support existing believers as well as to convert new ones. However, the use of reason in natural theology was not intended as a replacement for revelation. Indeed, the Cambridge Platonists considered Scripture as extremely important, and even viewed reason itself as a type of revelation from God.

The natural theology of the Cambridge Platonists provides a marked contrast to the more popularly known “Newtonian” variety that emerged in late seventeenth-century England, and thus supports the contention that natural theology was a dynamic tradition, characterised by a multitude of approaches. Before moving on to examine the next major inflection point—natural theology in Restoration England—we will consider the case of Walter Charleton, a contemporary of the Cambridge Platonists who took a much more favourable view of the new mechanical philosophy.

184 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

SECOND HISTORICAL INTERLUDE

WALTER CHARLETON (1620-1707)

…the Evidence of Reason, superannexed to that of Faith, must of necessity if not augment, yet Corroborate it: and that happy soul must, doubtlesse, have a much clearer perception of the verity of Supernatural Objects, who speculates them both by the Light of Nature, and of Grace.

Walter Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism.1

1. Introduction

Walter Charleton wrote some of the earliest examples of English natural theology, including The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature and Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltonia, which were published in 1652 and 1654, respectively. Although Charleton was a contemporary of the Cambridge Platonists, he was responding to the same religious and political context in a very different way. While Henry More and Ralph Cudworth proposed the existence of some kind of deputy carrying out God’s ordinary providence—the “Spirit of Nature” or “Plastic Principle”—Charleton was sceptical of any view that seemed to detract from God’s omnipotence and direct interaction with Creation. Where the Cambridge Platonists emphasised the rationality of God’s actions, Charleton argued for the absolute freedom of God, completely unconstrained by any external considerations. He also exhibited many affinities with the natural theologians of the Restoration period, who will be discussed in Chapter 5, in particular their interest in the new mechanical natural philosophy. Some of these theologians, most notably John Wilkins, also started writing natural theology during the Civil Wars and Commonwealth. However, Charleton’s natural theological works were all published in the 1650s, while his writings after this time are predominantly concerned with medical

1 Walter Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism dispelled by the Light of Nature: A Physico- Theologicall Treatise (London, 1652), unpaginated preface. 185 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

topics.2 By contrast, the vast majority of natural theological writings by people such as John Wilkins, Robert Boyle and Joseph Glanvill were published between 1660 and 1690.

Consequently, although Walter Charleton is crucial to the history of natural theology, he does not fit neatly into the categories of the Cambridge Platonists or the Restoration natural theologians. He does, however, provide a very apt illustration of the kaleidoscopic model of natural theology, along with its associated historical claims. We will see that Charleton’s natural theological works could not have been written prior to the seventeenth century, since they were a direct response to upheaval within both natural philosophy and Christianity. On the one hand, Charleton was concerned with “Christianising” atomism: that is, providing theological justification for the preferred version of a natural philosophy able to replace the hegemonic neo-Scholastic Aristotelianism. On the other, Charleton was reacting to the crisis in the Church, occasioned by the Civil Wars, by proposing that the natural philosopher take over the role of overcoming “heresies” and “enthusiasms.” In addition, while he was providing apologetic arguments against atheism in order to convince infidels of the truth of Christianity, he also acknowledged the use of his work in supporting existing believers. Finally, although he was concerned with the compatibility of atomism and Christian belief, Charleton was not trying to reconcile theology and natural philosophy. Instead, he was working to separate them, and to outline who were the proper authorities in each. With his own natural theological kaleidoscope, and its particular settings, Charleton participated in seventeenth-century articulations of theology and natural philosophy in a unique manner. a. Charleton’s Background

Walter Charleton was a physician, which meant that he had a profession outside the Church or universities, unlike many natural theologians of the seventeenth

2 For an annotated bibliography of the works of Walter Charleton, see Emily Booth, “A Subtle and Mysterious Machine”: The Medical World of Walter Charleton (1619-1707) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 223-242. 186 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

century.3 Medicine, by contrast with natural philosophy, was a recognised vocation at this time, and Charleton depended on his medical career for income. He was appointed as physician-in-ordinary to Charles I in 1643,4 and given the honorary status of travelling physician in Charles II’s court in 1650. After the Restoration, he was confirmed as physician-in-ordinary to the monarch.5 Throughout the Civil Wars and Cromwell’s Republic, Charleton remained loyal to the monarchy, and never sought favours from the Commonwealth, though he did seek patrons. Despite his illustrious appointments (or perhaps because of them, given the political situation of the time) the path of Charleton’s career was far from smooth. In 1650, he was elected as a candidate to the College of Physicians, but in 1655 he failed to gain a fellowship. This was undoubtedly a result of his loyalty to the exiled monarchy, as his fortunes changed after Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660. He was made an honorary fellow in 1664, and finally a full fellow in 1676, from which time he was a prominent member.

Spiritus Gorgonicus, Charleton’s first work published in 1650, dealt with “the stone,” while A Ternary of Paradoxes, published the same year, was a translation of, and commentary on, Van Helmont’s ideas about sympathetic medicine. His three most explicitly natural theological works, The Darknes of Atheism, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana and The Immortality of the Human Soul were all published within five years of each other, also during the 1650s.6 The vast majority of Charleton’s works after the Restoration were

3 For an overview of Charleton’s early life, education, and entry into the medical profession, see Booth, “ A Subtle and Mysterious Machine,” 4-11. 4 As Humphry Rolleston put it, “Charleton’s appointment at such an early state [of his career] has been regarded as rather a gracious act to a promising member of a loyal University than as a serious provision for medical emergencies, especially as William Harvey (1575-1657) was in attendance on Charles I from 1642 to 1646 at Oxford.” “Walter Charleton, D.M., F.R.C.P., F.R.S.,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 8 (1940): 404. 5 Ibid., 405. Rolleston concluded that “travelling physician” to Charles II was an honorary appointment since Charleton never left England, but there is some indication that he may have visited Paris on occasion. See Lindsay Sharp, “Walter Charleton’s Early Life 1620-1659, and Relationship to Natural Philosophy in Mid-Seventeenth Century England,” Annals of Science 30 (1973): 325-327. 6 Walter Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism; idem., Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo- Charltoniana, or, A Fabrick of Science Natural, upon the Hypothesis of Atoms Founded by Epicurus, repaired [by] Petrus Gassendus, augmented [by] Walter Charleton (London, 1654); idem., The Immortality of the Human Soul, Demonstrated by the Light of Nature. In two dialogues (London, 1657). 187 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

medical in nature, although he did publish a biography of the restored monarch: A Character of His Most Sacred Majesty, Charles the Second (London, 1661). b. Charleton’s Natural Philosophy

Despite his primary career being in medicine, Walter Charleton was actively involved in the natural philosophical debates of his time, and was elected an original fellow of the Royal Society of London in 1663. 7 John Henry notes the significance of Charleton’s involvement in this way:

Although outdated by the time of his death, his early work in natural philosophy was pioneering in its day, and is known to have been an important influence on greater thinkers, such as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton.8

While Charleton’s most popular work in his own lifetime concerned Stonehenge,9 he is today best known for his Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo- Charltoniana, a translation and paraphrase of Pierre Gassendi’s Epicurean natural philosophy. This was the work that gave Charleton the reputation of being a mechanist, as it was the first major contribution in England setting out the Epicurean theories of atomism purified of their atheistic connotations.10 Its purpose was to popularise the doctrines of Epicurean atomism, while establishing its theological orthodoxy.11

7 He carried out grafting experiments with Robert Hooke, and was nominated “to investigate the velocity of a bullet shot out of a musket” in 1664. See Rolleston, “Walter Charleton,” 407. For an overview of Charleton’s involvement with the Royal Society, see Booth, “A Subtle and Mysterious Machine,” 18-19. Booth points out that while Charleton was involved in a wide range of activities with the Society, his writings made very little reference to the experiments that he performed. Booth argues that this is because he desired the status of a “learned physician” rather than an “empiric.” [19] 8 John Henry, “Charleton, Walter (1620-1707),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5157 (accessed 7 February 2008). 9 Walter Charleton, Chorea gigantum, or, The most famous antiquity of Great-Britain, vulgarly called Stone-Heng, standing on Salisbury Plain, restored to the Danes (London, 1663). 10 It should be noted that Charleton’s adoption of mechanism was preceded by an interest in Helmontian philosophy. See Nina Rattner Gelbart, “The Intellectual Development of Walter Charleton,” Ambix 18 (1971), 149-168. 11 See Robert Kargon, “Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle, and the Acceptance of Epicurean Atomism in England,” Isis 55 (1964): 186. 188 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

Charleton’s natural theological works, of which the Physiologia is but one example, showed a great familiarity with, and indebtedness to, recent works in the new mechanical philosophy, particularly those of Sir Kenelm Digby, René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi and Thomas Hobbes. Even his dialogue on The Immortality of the Human Soul (London, 1657), was notable for the extensive records of contemporary scientific endeavour it contained. The most explicitly natural theological work, however, was his 1652 publication, The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature, and it is on this work that the following section will focus.

2. Charleton’s Natural Theology a. Natural Theology as an Apologetic Discourse

The Darknes of Atheism, subtitled A Physico-Theologicall Discourse, was an explicitly apologetic work with a dual purpose: demonstrating the key doctrines of religion by “the Light of Nature,” a means acceptable to those outside the Church; and corroborating the existing faith of Christians using evidence from reason. This covered what are now viewed as the two main types of Christian apologetics: belief-forming and belief-sustaining.12 Charleton stated that Christians can believe on the basis of faith, which is given by God, but infidels (non-believers) need to be convinced by the light of reason, which he describes as a universal criterion. Thus, his work aimed to aid in this process of belief formation by providing arguments for the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and other related beliefs. However, The Darknes of Atheism was not aimed only at unbelievers. It was also intended to be of use to Christians, as evidence from reason can support faith for believers:

As it is indispensably Necessary, in respect of Infidels; so it is not Unnecessary, in respect to Believers, to prove the Certitude of these two main Pillars of all Religion, and Morality: since the Evidence of Reason, superannexed to that of Faith, must of necessity if not augment, yet Corroborate it: and that happy soul must, doubtlesse, have a much

12 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of these terms. 189 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

clearer perception of the verity of Supernatural Objects, who speculates them both by the Light of Nature, and of Grace.13

While evidence from reason is essential for non-believers who do not accept the authority of faith or revelation in Scripture, it can also be helpful for those who already believe. Working together with faith, reason can provide a more complete and certain foundation for belief in the major doctrines of the Christian religion. In The Darknes of Atheism, Charleton was concerned primarily with the existence of God and the relationship of God to the world, both as Creator and Sustainer. b. Demonstrating the Doctrines of Religion

i. The Existence of God

Unlike many other natural theologians, who employed a wide variety of arguments for the existence of God, Charleton primarily engaged in arguing from the “light of Nature,” as opposed to “Nature” itself. “Light of Nature,” for Charleton, referred to a process of reasoning, as opposed to empirical investigation of Nature.14 He outlined “a vast and irreconcilable disparity between the Dictates of these two Informers.” Things known by the light of Nature, such as “that I am, because I doubt, that 2 and 3 make 5,” cannot be doubted, whereas “Inclinations, or Propensions naturall” may be mistaken.15 It is not surprising, therefore, that Charleton argued for the existence of God from a process of strict reasoning, rather than from design evident in nature. This was the only way to achieve certainty, in Charleton’s reckoning. Although he waxed lyrical at times about the intricacy and beauty of nature, the rational arguments for God dominate his discourse.

13 Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism, unpaginated preface. 14 The passages dealing with the “light of Nature” in Charleton’s work are not as clear as the historian may wish. In this interpretation, I am following Margaret J. Osler in “Descartes and Charleton on Nature and God,” Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 445-456. 15 Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism, 7. 190 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

Thus, the first chapter of The Darknes of Atheism, which dealt with the existence of God, consisted of a discussion of the nature of ideas in general, and of the idea of God in particular. Charleton’s arguments for the existence of God, then, followed the general pattern of those of Descartes, focusing on the idea of God and his attributes. Charleton defined God as follows:

By the name God, I understand a certain substance, infinite, independent, omnipotent, omniscient, from which as well my own, as all other dependent natures were derived; by whose incomprehensible Wisdome, Power and Goodness, the universe was created, according to the admirable Idea formed in his own eternall intellect; and is constantly conserved in the same perfect order, and exquisite harmony, which in the beginning he was pleased to institute.16

This idea of God, Charleton argued, is too “great and noble” to have arisen from “so mean, frail, and imperfect a being” as any human, and thus must have come from God himself:

For though all the works of God carry, in the front of their distinct Forms, some certain Signatures or Characters, that undeniably attest their Creation by an Efficient infinite in Power and Wisedom; and in that respect may be properly enough said, to shew forth the glory of their Maker… the Favorite, man, he holds a clear and distinct idea of the Nature of God.17

Charleton’s choice of argument reflected not only his desire to demonstrate the existence of God with certainty, but also his views on the nature of knowledge and reasoning.18 However, Charleton did not stop here. It was not enough to merely establish God’s existence. Like his contemporaries, Charleton was concerned with a particular conception of God, and he made this clear through his discussion of God’s relationship with Creation.

16 Ibid., 13. 17 Ibid., 166. 18 This will be discussed further in Section 3 below. 191 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

ii. God: Creator and Sustainer of the World

Like the Cambridge Platonists, Walter Charleton was concerned not only with the existence of God, but also with a correct understanding of the nature of God. In particular, it was Charleton’s view that God created the universe ex nihilo and continues his creative activity by constantly maintaining its existence. The belief that God created the world followed directly from the existence of God:

The Existence of God being amply Demonstrated, ‘tis a natural consequence, that the whole World, and all things existent therein besides himself, were Created by him. For those Attributes, Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Independence, which are particularly, and in association required to that great Act of Creation, are all (together with all other Perfections, that lie in the ken of mans Cogitation) comprised under the Idea, which we hold of his Essence.19

Similarly, God’s ongoing providence was derived from the fact of his creation. For Charleton, to suppose that God created the world and then left was simply foolish:

Since God made the World… it cannot but be absurd to imagine, that he instantly deserted it, or having once imprest a virtue of motion upon the greater wheels of this vast machine, immediately withdrew his hand from action… For though he made all things Perfect (i.e.) omitted nothing requirable to the integral accomplishment of each Creature, in suo genere: yet since himself is the Universal Soul, that both Materiald and Informed each particle of this great body; in strictest consequence, nothing can have existence longer than he shall please, in every minute of its duration, freshly to create it, or (to speak the interest of Providence) to conserve it in being.20

If God were to abandon his creation, everything would fall apart. Just as light disappears when the sun descends below the horizon,

so also must the World disappear and be lost in adnihilation (sic), when God shall please to discontinue his influx of minutely Creation, or (to

19 Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism, 39. 20 Ibid., 111. 192 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

speak more conform [sic] to our present scope, though it signifie the same thing in height of truth) to intermit his Providence.21

This view of God’s ongoing providence is very different from the Cambridge Platonist conception of God. As discussed in Chapter 4, Cudworth and More proposed the existence of an intermediate force—the “Plastic Principle” or “Spirit of Nature”—which acted as God’s deputy in creation, carrying out the general tasks involved in running the universe. By contrast, Charleton stressed God’s continuous activity, rather than merely his role as first cause. Indeed, one of the reasons Charleton and other natural philosophers, such as Robert Boyle, adopted mechanical philosophy was that it required the ongoing involvement of God in creation.22 It is one of the key characteristics of natural theology at this time that the actors employed different methods to achieve similar goals, in this case the providence of God, and this provides a very cogent example.

However, Charleton was not only concerned with preserving God’s autonomy over creation; he was also arguing against particular natural philosophies. As Margaret Osler has explained,

In stressing the primary creative act of God, Charleton took an explicit stand against the views of Aristotle, Epicurus, and [his take on] Descartes, according to whom God, the Prime Mover, having once set the universe into motion and having endowed its component parts with appropriate laws of motion, no longer participates in the ongoing activity of the universe.23

21 Ibid., 113. This idea may also be found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas: “For the esse of all creaturely beings so depends upon God that they could not continue to exist even for a moment, but would fall away into nothingness uness they were sustained in existence by his power.” Summa Theologiae Ia. 104. 1 (London: Blackfriars, 1967), 39. Also, “Since it is God’s nature to exist, he it must be who properly causes existence in creatures, just as it is fire itself sets other things on fire. And God is causing this effect in things not just when they begin to exist, but all the time they are maintained in existence, just as the sun is lighting up the atmosphere all the time the atmosphere remains lit” [Ia. 8. 2]. 22 For Boyle’s views on how the mechanical philosophy conformed with religious doctrines concerning the continuing actions of God in the universe see J. R. Jacob, Robert Boyle and the English Revolution: A Study in Social and Intellectual Change (New York: Burt Franklin & Co., 1977), 159-161; and idem,, “Boyle’s Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism,” Social Studies of Science 8 (1978), 211-233. 23 Osler, “Descartes and Charleton on Nature and God,” 452. This is not necessarily a correct representation of Descartes’ theology, but it was a popular view at the time. Presumably Osler is explicating Charleton’s view of Descartes, rather than Descartes’ own opinion. One of the earliest commentators to appreciate this point was Martial Gueroult. For an exposition of his 193 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

In this way, natural theology could be used not only to establish the existence of God, but also a particular conception of God, one that was consistent with the author’s natural philosophical outlook. Natural theology, then, was not only a religious discourse, but also a response to the natural philosophical upheaval of the seventeenth century.

Thus, we see that like the Cambridge Platonists, Charleton was concerned with establishing the “correct” conception of God, although his view differed from that of Cudworth and More. In particular, he emphasised the freedom of God’s power and will against what he took to be Descartes’ intellectualism. For Charleton, God’s will is primary: he is not restricted by anything, not even the laws of nature that he himself instituted. As Charleton wrote in various places throughout The Darknes of Atheism, God’s “Will is infinite Power;” God “is, by infinite excesses, above all other Efficients;” and “Such was the Freedom of his Will, that no necessity could constrain him to the production of any thing.”24 Even events that seem casual or unexpected to us were determined by God.25 Further, God’s will did not have to be limited by external considerations such as reason or goodness: the actions “of the First Cause are Elective and Arbitrary.”26

Nature, of course, is bound to act according to the laws determined by God, who “made Nature her self, and prescribed her rules to act by: from which she cannot vary, without a miraculous dispensation.”27 However, God himself was free to contravene these laws:

For most certain it is, that God never limited his free Omnipotence, by any fixt law, or bound up his own hands with the same settled Constitutions, whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his Creatures: it being the Prerogative of his Nature, to know view in English, see Martial Gueroult, “The Metaphysics of Physics of Force in Descartes,” in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press Ltd, 1980), 196-229. See also Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 263-266. 24 Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism, 71, 73, 79. 25 Ibid., 124. 26 Ibid., 136. 27 Ibid., 71. 194 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

no Impossibility, but to be able to act either above, or against the statutes of his Deputy, whensoever, and upon what subject, and to what end soever he pleases.28

Such a “miraculous dispensation” would be easy for God: “nothing can be a miracle to him, to whom all things are not only of equal possibility, but of equal facility also.”29 For Charleton, it was a “manifest contradiction” to believe God capable of creating the natural world, yet unable to change the laws of nature at will.30 Charleton pointed to the historical incidence of miracles, such as the Noachian flood and the darkening of the sun as Jesus Christ was being crucified, as evidence that

God hath, in times prelapsed, frequently manifested his prerogative of causing effects not only superior, but also contradictory to the ordinary and establisht Laws of Nature, his ordinary instrument, when such effects seemed either necessary, or expedient to his Providence.31

Consequently, it would be foolish to think that God could not do this at any time he wished.

Thus, Charleton’s views, contrasted with those of other Christians such as Descartes and the Cambridge Platonists, nicely demonstrate the kaleidoscopic nature of natural theology. The different settings of the multiple kaleidoscopes result in various arguments all aimed at the same purpose—to defend Christianity and a “true” conception of God.

28 Ibid., 237. In this quotation, God’s “Deputy” refers to nature, or perhaps more correctly, the laws of nature. God’s providence is acted out in the natural world by the laws of nature, which he himself instituted. However, as this quotation suggests, while nature itself is bound by these laws, God is free to contravene them at any time. 29 Ibid., 113. 30 “It remains indisputable upon consequence… to believe him to be the Author of that mighty and difficult miracle, the Creation, and yet doubt the supremacy of his Power, by conceiving that he cannot turn Natural Agents out of their common road… must be a manifest Contradiction, and an Absurdity that stabs it self.” Ibid., 136-7. 31 Ibid., 152. 195 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

c. Use of Resources

Like all natural theologians, Charleton employed a variety of resources in his discourse, selecting those that he felt best suited his purposes. His style, even in his natural philosophy, has been labelled as “eclectic.”32 He employed aspects of the Cartesian philosophy, most notably Descartes’ rationalist proofs of God’s existence and the immortality of the soul.33 He referred to the work of Copernicus and Galileo for evidence of God’s wisdom in creation. As Eric Lewis suggests, Charleton’s way of arguing sought “to find truths from multiple sources, none of which should be privileged by association to their authors.”34 Once again, the importance of the natural philosophical context is seen: it provided resources to be employed in response to the particular religious context. Further, Charleton’s “eclecticism” can be viewed as a “unique attempt to solve the problems of social, religious, and intellectual discord,” a solution that was found palatable by the founders of the Royal Society.35 By drawing from a wide range of sources, and privileging none on the basis of authorship alone, Charleton was attempting to rise above the sectarian controversy that characterised mid-seventeenth-century England.

3. Articulating Natural Philosophy and Theology

Since natural theology occupied a contested space between natural philosophy and theology, it was an arena in which articulations and negotiations of these two disciplines could be played out. Three main types of negotiations can be seen in Walter Charleton’s natural theology. Firstly, like some of the Restoration natural theologians who will be discussed in the next chapter, Charleton attempted to establish a theological justification for the ancient atomic philosophy that had been recently revived as an alternative to

32 See, for example, Eric Lewis, “Walter Charleton and Early Modern Eclecticism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001): 651-664. “Eclectic” was a common early-modern philosophical term. For an overview of literature on philosophical eclecticism, see Ulrich Johannes Schneider, “Eclecticism Reconsidered,” Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (19981), 173-182. 33 Eric Lewis describes Charleton’s use of Descartes as a loose translation of the Meditations. Ibid., 659. 34 Ibid., 664. 35 Ibid., 653. 196 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

Aristotelian natural philosophy and Renaissance naturalism. Secondly, he provided a theological foundation for his philosophy of nature, more broadly considered. Finally, Charleton desired to place true Christianity on a natural foundation, which he considered firmer than that currently provided by the theologians. a. Christianising Atomism

In addition to its apologetic purpose of providing support for doctrines such as the existence of God, Charleton’s natural theology also served to justify and popularise atomic philosophy, as revived by the French philosopher Pierre Gassendi.36 In the Physiologia, Charleton responded to objections against atomic philosophy made by the Cambridge Platonist John Smith, who stated that “Epicureanism is but Atheism under a mask.” Smith attacked three main concepts: “that motion is inherent in matter, that the soul is material and divisible, and that the world could be formed and could subsist without a divine artificer.”37 In response, Charleton took a three-fold approach to defending atomism. He tried to demonstrate that modern Epicurean atomism was purged of the heresies which admittedly contaminated the pagan formulations, specifically the view that the soul is material and moral, and that motion is inherent in matter; he attempted to dissociate the atomic doctrine of Gassendi from classical atomism by joining the assault on the latter; and he showed how powerful the doctrine of atomism could be in promoting piety by demonstrating that it is a very effective proof of God.38

It is the last point that is particularly relevant to natural theology. Demonstrating the existence of God is perhaps the most fundamental part of natural theology, and certainly the most common. In chapter 15 of his Physiologia, Charleton summarised his views on the mechanical philosophy into three “General Laws of Nature, whereby she produceth All Effects”:

36 As noted above, Charleton’s most enduring work, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo- Charltoniana, published in 1654, was a translation and paraphrase of Gassendi’s philosophy. 37 Kargon, “Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle, and the Acceptance of Epicurean Atomism in England,” 185. 38 Ibid., 185-186. 197 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

(1) That every Effect must have its Cause; (2) That no Cause can act but by motion; (3) That Nothing can act upon a Distant subject, or upon such whereunto it is not actually Praesent, either by it self, or by some instrument, and that either Conjunct, or Transmitted; and consequently, that no body can move another, but by contact Mediate, or Immediate.39

These tenets clearly demonstrate God’s creation of the universe. Since natural causes can only act upon existing matter, God must have been the first cause that created this matter, and set it in motion.40 By employing atomic philosophy in arguing for God’s existence and providence, Charleton was providing a theological justification for this way of viewing nature. b. A Theological Foundation for the Philosophy of Nature

Charleton’s natural theology also served to establish a theological framework for his system of nature. This was explicitly set out in the “Preparatory Advertisement to the Reader” from his Darknes of Atheism:

…having not long before proposed to our selfes to erect an intire Fabrick of Physicall Science upon Principles which seem to our judgement to be the most solid and permanent, because most Demonstrable, at least most Verisimilous, as to the Solution of all Natures Phaenomena; and firmly embraced that Axiom of the Schoolmen, Nulla res qualiscumque est, intellegi potest, nisi Deus prius intelligatur—that no one thing in Nature can be known, unlesse the Author of Nature be first knowne: we conceived it not only no Apostasie from our First Resolution, but a more opportune and advantageous prosecution of them, to beginne at the Demonstration of the onely Perfect Ens, and so many of his Properties or Attributes, as relate to the Universe in generall, and Humane nature in speciall, and this, as a Foundation, that must not only support, but ennoble and facilitate our future superstructions.41

Thus, it was Charleton’s view that knowledge of nature should be based upon knowledge of the Author of Nature (that is, God) and those of his attributes,

39 Charleton, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletonia, 343. 40 See also Richard G. Olson, “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power: The Interplay between Organic and Mechanistic Imagery in Anglican Natural Theology—1640- 1740,” in Approaches to Organic Form, ed. Frederick Burwick (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), 16. 41 Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism, unpaginated preface. See also Osler, “Descartes and Charleton on Nature and God,” 452. 198 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

which relate to the universe in general and human nature in particular. As Lewis puts it,

The Darkness of Atheism argues for a foundational science that can be constructed on certain fundamental principles of natural theology and claims that qualified practitioners are philosophers, not men of the cloth.42

However, Charleton’s argument was not only that natural philosophy should rest on theological doctrines, but also that the natural philosopher himself, not the theologian, is qualified to establish this foundation. c. A Natural Foundation for Christianity

In a similar way, Walter Charleton advocated a natural foundation for the Christian religion, one developed by natural philosophers rather than theologians. In addition to proving the key doctrines of Christianity, Charleton was responding to the undermining of the sacred authority of the Church by the Civil War, as well as schisms caused by theological disputes. For example, he pointed to debates concerning the will of God as one cause of division within the Church:

Problems, about which not only the gravest Philosophers have stretched the membranes of their brains, and with great anxiety hack’t and slash’t for many ages together; but even the Church her self hath disputed so hotly, that she hath rent her seamless coate of Faith into such numerous and wide Schismes, that we her sonnes may sooner expect the conversion of the Jews, then a full reconciliation and reunion of all her Sects.”43

The “sacred Authority of the Church” had been “shatter’d and undermined by our Fatall Civill Warre,” leading to the invasion of heresies and enthusiasms, “without any considerable Opposition from those, who are, by the duty of their Place and Function, obliged to bee the publick Champions of all sacred Truths.” With regard to the “Necessity of Naturall Theology,” Charleton stated that the existence of God and the immortality and immateriality of the human soul were

42 Lewis, “Walter Charleton and Early Modern Eclecticism,” 658. 43 Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism, 205. 199 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

“Principall among those Verities, which are to be demonstrated by Philosophers, rather then Divines.”44 Although Christians may believe these on faith, the “meer Naturall man” needs to be convinced by reason, from the infallible criterion of the Light of Nature.45 Since the Church and State are in disarray, for which Charleton blames the Civil War, the non-divine philosopher (that is, Charleton himself) must take up the role of overcoming “heresies” and “enthusiasms.” Clearly Charleton thought that religious authorities had not done enough to deal with these problems—perhaps because they were so caught up fighting among themselves—so the natural philosopher must take over. As Lewis expresses it,

While Charleton initially faults the Civil War for the breakdown of religion and the rise of atheism, his desire is nothing short of placing the foundation of Christian belief in the hands of natural philosophers, despite the theologian’s ‘contracted browes.’46

In this way, Charleton’s aim was not to reconcile theology and natural philosophy as such, but actually to separate them and outline who were the proper authorities in each.

4. Conclusion

Although many of his contemporaries spoke of natural philosophers being priests in the temple of nature, Walter Charleton was more concerned with delineating boundaries. Articulations and negotiations between theology and natural philosophy involved not only connections, but also separations, and Charleton was negotiating a boundary. This is further evidence of the way in which the various natural theologians responded to their particular historical contexts in their own unique manner. Charleton was not only engaged in

44 It might be noted that Christ is seemingly absent from Charleton’s foundation for Christianity. However, this does not mean that Christ is absent entirely from Charleton’s Christianity itself. Rather, Charleton was dealing here with more fundamental doctrines; that is, doctrines that philosophers can establish that are necessary to accept prior to accepting Christ, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. If there is no God, there would be no need for the relationship between Him and humankind to be reconciled through Christ, and if the human soul was not immortal, there could be no fear of future punishment nor desire for future reward. 45 Charleton, Darknes of Atheism, unpaginated preface. 46 Lewis, “Walter Charleton and Early Modern Eclecticism,” 658. 200 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Second Historical Interlude

establishing a theological justification for the atomic philosophy he adopted from Gassendi, but also in dealing with the challenges to authority thrown up by the religious upheaval in seventeenth-century England. In the 1650s, it seemed necessary for him to replace the shattered authority of the religious establishment with that of the natural philosophers. After the Restoration, however, England enjoyed a period of relative calm. During this time, natural theologians had other challenges with which to engage. It is to this period that we will now turn.

201 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

CHAPTER 5

RESTORATION NATURAL THEOLOGY

In this dark and degenerate state into which Mankind is sunk, there is great want of a clearer light to discover our duty to us with greater certainty.

John Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion.1

1. Introduction

The Restoration of the Stuart monarchy and the Church of England in 1660 marked the beginning of a new era in English history. Although the strife of the previous two decades was not forgotten, the return of the King and the Established Church were accompanied by hope for a united England. While it was not the beginning of the tradition, it was a time of great interest in natural theology. We have already seen that the Cambridge Platonists and Walter Charleton were active participants in the natural theological tradition during the Civil Wars and Interregnum, and many of the Restoration natural theologians were also active at this time. However, there was a marked increase in natural theological output after the Restoration, particularly during the 1670s. Given the particular context and challenges of the time, there were key differences between the natural theology of the Restoration period and that of the earlier Cambridge Platonists and later Boyle Lecturers. Thus, the Restoration represents another inflection point in the historical trajectory of natural theology. It was a time when significant advances in natural philosophy coincided with religious and cultural challenges, creating a fertile ground for natural theological discourse.

During the Restoration period, there was a multitude of people from various backgrounds writing natural theology. The variety of perspectives and styles

1 John Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (London, 1675), 394-5. 202 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

means that these actors cannot be categorised as easily as the Cambridge Platonists or the Boyle Lecturers. Although only two were singled out as having a particular interest in natural philosophy, the Cambridge Platonists were associated by their connection with Emmanuel College and with the principal member of the group, Benjamin Whichcote, as well as by holding some views in common. The Boyle Lecturers are even easier to justify as a grouping: they were all elected to the Boyle Lectureship. The situation with the Restoration natural theologians is much more complex. The most significant institutional grouping during this time was the Royal Society of London, founded informally in 1660 and given royal charters by the restored monarch himself in 1662 and 1663.2 Many of the most well known natural theologians of the period were members of the Royal Society, but it was not the Society itself that shaped the natural theology of the period. In addition, an exclusive focus on members of the Royal Society would neglect an important strand of natural theology from the time: one that employed natural philosophical resources, even though the author himself was not actively involved in the pursuit of natural philosophy.3 Thus, after a brief discussion of the upsurge in natural theological discourse at this time, this chapter will focus on two natural theologians who may be seen as representative of two different types of natural theology. On the one hand we have John Wilkins, a Church of England clergyman and bishop who was intimately involved in the natural philosophy of the day as a prominent member of the Royal Society. On the other hand we have Matthew Barker, who was an independent clergyman with no involvement in the Royal Society or any other natural philosophical sub-culture, although he made use of natural philosophical ideas in his natural theology.4

2 Peter Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and its Ambitions, 1500-1700 (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 117. 3 Of course, it must be acknowledged that not all members of the Royal Society were involved in its activities, whether they were natural theologians or not. Even some members who pursued scientific interests elsewhere did not necessarily participate in the Society. See, for example, Michael Hunter, Science and Society in Restoration England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 46-47. 4 Technically, natural theology in the Restoration period could be divided into four types. In addition to the two mentioned here, we could consider Church of England natural theologians who were not involved with natural philosophy, and nonconformists who were. However, for the present thesis, it will be sufficient to consider just the two variations, which cover the vast majority of Restoration natural theological works. In future investigations, I hope to address to 203 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

While there are key differences between the natural theologies of Wilkins and Barker, there are also significant similarities. For example, we will see that while Wilkins continually employed arguments drawn from the history of philosophy and current advances in natural philosophy, such resources received only limited use by Barker. However, both Wilkins and Barker were convinced that although natural theology can provide some knowledge of God and religious duty, the clearer light of revelation is absolutely indispensable for a full understanding of the Christian religion.

2. Historical Dimension a. The Restoration

In this chapter, the phrase “Restoration natural theology” is used to refer to natural theological works produced between the Restoration of 1660 and the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688-9. Although the Restoration was in one sense a singular event that took place at a specific time, there is a precedent for using the term to refer to a period. For example, historian John Spurr uses the term to cover the period between 1646 and 1689, while historian of science Michael Hunter employs it to refer to the years between the return of the Stuarts in 1660 and the end of the seventeenth century.5 i. Politics and Religion

The restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660 was met with a general reaction in favour of conservatism and royalism, as well as a reversal of the liberalising tendencies of the earlier regime in politics, law and society. All legislation that had been passed without royal assent was expunged from the Statute Book. full spectrum of Restoration natural theology in the light of the model developed in the present study. 5 See John Spurr, The Restoration Church of England, 1646-1689 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), xiii; and Hunter, Science and Society, 2. Spurr’s usage acknowledges that many of the leaders of the Church of England after the Restoration began their ministry careers in the decade prior to 1660. The same holds true for many of the natural theologians of the seventeenth century, although we will see that the Restoration of the monarchy and Church of England in 1660 marked the beginning of a particular inflection point for natural theology. 204 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

However, the Civil War failed to solve constitutional issues between the King and the Parliament, resulting in an enduring political instability that culminated in the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688-9.

The Church of England did not disappear during the Civil War and Interregnum, although it was, as Thomas Fuller put it, “distracted.” While the Parliament was distracted from a full reform of the national church by the civil wars, the Church of England was deprived of its head, the King, its bishops and pastors, liturgy, cathedrals, courts and revenues. However, the parish and the parochial ministry survived. As John Spurr has explained, “The Church of England emerged from the 1640s and 1650s with a distinct doctrinal, ecclesiological and spiritual identity, which was subsequently tempered by the challenges and disappointments of the next three decades.”6 In particular, the Anglican identity was dissipated by the Glorious Revolution, the Toleration Act of 1689 and the schism of the Nonjurors, who refused to swear allegiance to William and Mary.

In the time immediately following the Restoration, attempts were made to ensure an identity for the Church of England. Perhaps the most crucial of these was the Act of Uniformity. This act received the royal assent on 19 May 1662, and became effective on St. Bartholomew's day, 24 August 1662. From that date, only ministers who had received Episcopal ordination could hold benefices in the Church of England, and the Act also required the use of all the rites and ceremonies in the Book of Common Prayer in services. As a result, nearly two thousand clergymen left the Established Church in what became known as the Great Ejection. This included Matthew Barker, as well as a number of other nonconformist natural theologians. A decade later, Charles II issued the Declaration of Indulgence on 15 March 1672. This declaration suspended the execution of “all manner of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical, against whatsoever sorts of nonconformists or recusants.” Public worship was allowed for nonconformists if their ministers and meeting places were licensed, and Roman Catholics were allowed to worship in private. However, the Church of England was to be preserved as “the basis, rule and standard of the general and

6 Spurr, The Restoration Church of England, xvi. 205 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

public worship of God.”7 Matthew Barker accepted this indulgence and was licensed as a Congregationalist minister. Unfortunately, this situation of tolerance did not last, and Charles was forced by Parliament to revoke the declaration in 1673.

Despite these difficulties, and by contrast with the context of the Cambridge Platonist natural theologians, the situation during the Restoration seems to have settled down a little, politically and religiously, amongst mainstream Protestants at least. Rather than employing natural theology to establish a true conception of Christianity, as Cudworth and More did against the Puritans, the natural theologians of the Restoration period were concerned less with differences between Anglicans and Puritans and more with the challenges of deism and atheism. As we shall see in this chapter, the Anglican bishop John Wilkins was not trying to convert non-conformists to the Church of England, and the independent clergyman Matthew Barker was not attempting to undermine the Established Church.8

As with the Cambridge Platonists, atheism remained a major challenge addressed by Restoration natural theologians, although the actual extent of non-belief in the existence of God at the time is difficult to determine. Barbara Shapiro notes:

While it is difficult to find an atheistic movement, seventeenth-century rational theologians were convinced that both theoretical and practical atheism were at hand. The shadow atheism they perceived was concocted of bits of Hobbes, Aristotle, and the new atomism, mechanism, and materialism in science.9

Strictly interpreted, “atheism” did refer to a denial of the existence of God, but it was also taken to mean any doubt of an active deity constantly at work in the universe, as well as attitudes and behaviour that were thought to accompany an

7 Ibid., 61. 8 It must be noted, of course, that religious tolerance extended only to Protestant dissenters, and not to Roman Catholics. For a discussion of the continued polemics between Protestants and Roman Catholics, see Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 101-104. 9 Ibid., 83. 206 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

irreligious outlook.10 It was recognised at the time as a concern: for example, Matthew Barker had been told that his natural theological work might be useful in the present age, “wherein Atheisme is secretly insinuating it self into the Hearts of Men.”11

This looser definition of atheism could also be applied to deism, something that was perhaps a greater threat to orthodox religion than atheism. According to Harrison, the deists “secularised the Platonists’ views of religion. Through their ministrations, reason ceased to be another mode of divine revelation, becoming instead a legitimate source of knowledge in its own right.”12 However, while deism had been present in England since the writings of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who died in 1648, the movement did not take strong hold until the later part of the century. We will see, in Chapter 6, that deism was an even more important problem for the Boyle Lecturers than for the Restoration natural theologians. ii. Natural Philosophy

Michael Hunter has outlined the importance of Restoration England for the development of natural philosophy.13 England was arguably the most prolific contemporary centre for natural philosophy, and the Restoration period witnessed the chief productive years of Newton, Boyle, Hooke and a host of other exponents of the “new” experimental philosophy. Hunter states that “Restoration science was characterised partly by its very tolerance of diversity, which was itself a unifying factor.”14 This tolerance of diversity, echoing the religious toleration of the restored Church of England, was crucial, because the

10 Hunter, Science and Society, 163-164. 11 Matthew Barker, Natural Theology, or, the Knowledge of God, From the Works of Creation; Accommodated, and Improved, to the Service of Christianity (London, 1674), preface. 12 Peter Harrison, “Religion” and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 60. This is similar to the way in which, as noted in Chapter 1, Section 2b, the concept of the laws of nature was eventually separated from its theological origin. 13 Hunter, Science and Society. 14 Ibid., 20. 207 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

experimental philosophy was not the only natural philosophy in play. Both the “chemical philosophy” of Paracelsus and the “Hermetic” tradition, which attributed significance to occult forces, remained throughout this period, and these views were frequently combined with the Baconian empiricism of the experimental philosophy. Baconianism became a crucial part of the pursuit of natural philosophy in the wake of the political and religious turmoil of the Civil War and Commonwealth years. As Hunter points out,

In these circumstances, the Baconian flavour of English science was enhanced as part of a wider ideology which stressed the advantages of science in reconciling warring factions by appealing to all reasonable men, and, at the same time, in offering improved knowledge of the natural world from which technological aids might derive, in contrast to the fruitlessness of earlier intellectual traditions.15

Particular developments in natural philosophy during this period included Robert Boyle’s experiments in hydrostatics and pneumatics, John Ray’s biological classification of plants and Isaac Newton’s construction of a fully mathematicised physics and celestial mechanics within the framework of a novel, “post-mechanist” philosophy of nature. However, one of the most significant developments in natural philosophy in this period was institutional rather than theoretical: the founding of the Royal Society of London. Many natural theologians of this period were associated with the society, including John Wilkins and others discussed in this thesis, such as Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, Walter Charleton, John Ray and a few of the Boyle Lecturers.16 Peter Dear has argued that the Royal Society “can be taken as a symbol of particular conceptions of natural philosophy in the period, especially of cooperative natural philosophy.”17 The charter of the Royal Society explicitly stated that political and theological matters had no place in the society, which was recognised as a body devoted to a form of natural inquiry that had adherents

15 Ibid., 29. 16 It was not uncommon for clergyman to become members of the Royal Society, though not all were active participants. Rogers B. Miles identifies and studies fifty-three clergyman who were elected to the Royal Society between 1663 and 1687 in his Science, Religion and Belief: The Clerical Virtuosi of the Royal Society of London, 1663-1687 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1992). 17 Peter Dear, “Totius in verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society,” Isis 76 (1985): 146. 208 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

throughout Europe. Although the Royal Society deserves credit for enhancing the social respectability of natural philosophy by recruiting eminent public figures to its ranks, Hunter has pointed out that it was never the chief centre of research even for men with scientific interests who lived in London. However, the Royal Society did meet “a real need in organising the science of the day—in gathering information and stimulating, co-ordinating and publicising the research of scientists who, despite the Society, continued to work on their own.”18

Natural philosophy was vulnerable to accusations of atheism, given its close association with the stress on simplified, rational religion and its rise to popularity in the Interregnum, which coincided with the flourishing of heterodox ideas. Further, the preoccupation of the new natural philosophy with secondary causes also contributed to this problem. As Michael Hunter has pointed out, “Ralph Cudworth found in Bacon’s rejection of final causes ‘the very spirit of atheism and infidelity.’”19 The atheistic reputation of natural philosophy was also inflamed by the fact that the most notorious heterodox philosophers, specifically Hobbes and Spinoza, were themselves interested in it.

By contrast with this reputation for atheism, natural philosophers of the Restoration period were concerned for the most part with combining their science with their religion, focusing on moderation in each arena. This was a trend begun at both Oxford and Cambridge during the Interregnum, where scientists were generally moderate and hostile to radical extremes. John Wilkins, one of the natural theologians to be considered in this chapter, exemplified this approach. Along with his Oxford associates, he “espoused an undogmatic theology, which stressed the need for consensus, piety and good works.” Significantly, “this was combined with the conviction that the study of the natural world made manifest God’s glory,”20 a point of view that is necessary for the pursuit of natural theology.

18 Hunter, Science and Society, 49. 19 Ibid., 170. 20 Ibid., 28. 209 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

b. An Upsurge of Natural Theological Discourse

The significant advances in natural philosophy during the Restoration combined with the various threats to religious orthodoxy to produce a fertile ground for natural theological discourse. Of course, as we have already noted, this was not the beginning of the natural theological tradition, but it was a revival “stimulated by the scientific movement and by the search for common religious principles that would bind the wounds inflicted by the recent religious strife.”21 The natural theologians of the Restoration period are too numerous to discuss, but a very brief overview will set the scene for the more detailed studies to follow.

The natural theological texts of the Restoration can be divided into two main groups: the works produced by those who conformed to the Church of England, both clergy and laymen, and those produced by dissenters. The latter group is much smaller than the former, perhaps reflecting a lack of opportunity for engagement in the natural theological tradition. Aside from Matthew Barker, who will be considered in detail below, the main nonconformist writers of natural theology were Richard Baxter and his associates William Bates and John Howe.22 These were all ejected ministers who published works of natural theology during the Restoration period. Baxter began his natural theological career before the Restoration with two works concerning the role of reason in religion: The Unreasonableness of Infidelity and The Arrogancy of Reason Against Divine Revelation, Repressed, both published in 1655. In 1667, he published The Reasons of the Christian Religion, one of the earliest dissenting works on the topic of natural theology and the evidence for Christianity. John Howe wrote The Living Temple (1675) as a treatise against Epicurean atheists, though it was also intended to support those who accepted religion but wanted to examine its “fundamental grounds.” William Bates, ejected from the Church

21 Barbara J. Shapiro, John Wilkins, 1614-1672: An Intellectual Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 233. 22 Richard Baxter was arguably the most important representative of the Presbyterian wing of Puritanism during the Civil War and Commonwealth, and after the Restoration. In Chapter 1, we briefly noted Baxter’s appearance in Merton’s famous thesis concerning Puritanism and the rise of science. For Merton, Baxter virtually stood in for everything Merton understood by “Puritan,” which, of course, led to problems. 210 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

of England for refusing to employ the Book of Common Prayer in church services, published two classic natural theological works in 1677: Considerations of the Existence of God, and of the Immortality of the Soul and The Divinity of the Christian Religion, Proved by the Evidence of Reason and Divine Revelation.23

Church of England clergymen and divines wrote a significant proportion of conformist natural theology during the Restoration period. We have already discussed Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, both of whom published natural theological works after the Restoration. Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe was published in 1678, even though the ideas it contained had been percolating for several decades, and More published his Divine Dialogues in 1668. A number of prominent clergymen engaged in natural theological discourse at this time, including John Wilkins and Samuel Parker, who both advanced to the position of bishop under the rule of Charles II and James II respectively. Wilkins’ Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion was published in 1675, three years after his death, while Parker’s A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature and of the Christian Religion was published in 1681. Other prominent natural theologians included Gilbert Burnet and Edward Stillingfleet, both of whom were appointed bishops by William III after the Glorious Revolution. A Rational Method for Proving the Truth of the Christian Religion, as it is Professed in the Church of England by Burnet and Stillingfleet’s Origines Sacrae: Or, A Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith were published in 1675 and 1680 respectively. Not all natural theologians were members of the clergy, however. Some of the most important works on the relations between natural philosophy and theology, and the rationality of the Christian faith, were written by Robert Boyle, a gentleman scholar. His works on these topics included Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy (1663), The Excellency of Theology, Compar’d with Natural Philosophy (1674), some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion

23 For a discussion of nonconformist natural theology, see Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., “Natural Theology Among the Dissenters: Richard Baxter and His Circle,” in American Society of Church History Papers (Portland: Theological Research Exchange Network, 1993), 1-38. 211 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

(1675), and Some Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection (1675).

What these two streams of natural theology—Anglican and nonconformist—had in common was an insistence that the Christian faith could be established on reasonable grounds, and that the opponents of Christianity were therefore irrational. It would be possible to include both under the general heading of “latitudinarian,” although this term is most often associated with low-church members of the Church of England. As Barbara J. Shapiro has pointed out, “A major characteristic of all latitudinarians was their emphasis on the distinction between the fundamentals and the nonfundamentals of religion, and their enlargement of the scope of non-essentials,”24 and this description applies to both the conformists and moderate dissenters such as Richard Baxter and his circle. c. Two Natural Theologians

While there were many natural theologians publishing during the Restoration period, there is insufficient space in this thesis to discuss them all in detail. Much has already been written about the life and work of figures such as Robert Boyle and Richard Baxter,25 but this chapter will be considering two less well- known figures. Although John Wilkins appears frequently in discussions of natural philosophy and religion during the Restoration, there is not a great deal of literature on his natural theology,26 and there is very little on Matthew Barker at all. However, these two figures may be taken as representative of the two

24 Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 107. 25 On Robert Boyle, see Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 165-183; Rose-Mary Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Jan W. Wojcik, Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). On Richard Baxter, see Geoffrey F. Nuttall, Richard Baxter (London: Nelson, 1965); N. H. Keeble, Richard Baxter: Puritan Man of Letters (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982); and Wallace, “Natural Theology Among the Dissenters.” 26 Shapiro’s John Wilkins remains the only book-length study of John Wilkins. This is surprising, given the major role he played in the formation of the Royal Society of London and the latitudinarian movement. Another significant study is Dorothy Stimson, “Dr Wilkins and the Royal Society,” The Journal of Modern History 3 (1931), 539-563. 212 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

streams of natural theology mentioned above: Wilkins, the Anglican bishop who was also a keen member of the Royal Society, and Barker, the independent minister. i. John Wilkins (1614-1672)

John Wilkins’ primary career was as a clergyman and bishop in the Church of England, but he was also keenly interested in the natural philosophical debates of his time. He was not a major scientific innovator, though he published several works popularising the “new science.” Barbara Shapiro has described him as “England’s single most influential and effective organiser and purveyor of the scientific culture,” in the period during and after the Civil War, and John Hedley Brooke considers him “England’s most conspicuous Copernican” at the time.27 In addition, he played a similar role in the organization of religion, devoting his later career to the latitudinarian movement and a natural theology designed to eliminate the issues dividing Anglicans and Puritans. Wilkins’ views on religion were characterised by moderation, which was demonstrated by his ability to adapt easily to changes in religion and politics. Brooke has aptly described the fine line he walked: “Willing to side with Parliament against Charles I, he had not wished to see the king executed. Wishing to rid the Anglican Church of the influence of Archbishop Laud, he would not go along with more zealous reformers who wished to break away.”28 During the Civil Wars, Wilkins joined with the Parliament and took the Solemn League and Covenant. He was ordained at Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, in 1638 and served as warden of Wadham College from 1648 to 1659. As Chancellor of the university in 1657, Wilkins was Oxford’s closest advisor to Richard Cromwell, and his connection to the Cromwell family was also strengthened by his marriage to Robina, Oliver’s younger sister. His connection with Cromwell did not prevent him, however, from supporting those with Anglican and Royalist sympathies. Wilkins was appointed as Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, by

27 Shapiro, John Wilkins, 2; John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 108. 28 Brooke, Science and Religion, 115. 213 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

Richard Cromwell in 1659, although he was ejected after the Restoration. Aside from this setback, and despite his active involvement in Cromwell’s Protectorate, Wilkins had no trouble adjusting to the Restoration of the monarchy and the Church of England. He accepted the Act of Uniformity in 1662 and tried to persuade other moderate dissenters to conform. Wilkins became vicar of the influential St. Lawrence Jewry, London, in 1662 and Bishop of Chester in 1668.

While serving as warden of Wadham College, Oxford, Wilkins gathered around himself a group of like-minded individuals who were all keen pursuers of natural philosophy, including John Wallis, Seth Ward, Christopher Wren, William Petty, Thomas Willis and Robert Boyle. Michael Hunter credits this group with performing scientific investigations “which did much to give English science an international reputation, preparing the way for the achievements of the Restoration in mathematics, statics, optics, astronomy and chemistry.”29 This group again demonstrates Wilkins’ moderation and toleration of those with views different from his own. Although Wilkins himself was nominated to his position by Parliament, Willis, Ward and Wren were royalists. Further, he seemed to have had a remarkable ability for arousing enthusiasm for natural philosophy among those around him. As Barbara Shapiro has noted, “Wherever he was—in London in the early 1640’s, in Oxford from 1648 to 1658, in Cambridge in 1659-60 and again in London in the formative years of the Royal Society—it was there that the nation’s most creative and active scientific circle came into being.”30 In London after the Restoration, Wilkins was one of the founders and most active members of the Royal Society of London.

Wilkins published a range of works during his lifetime, including popularisations of natural philosophy and a variety of works concerned with religion.31 The Discovery of a New World (London, 1638) presented reasons why astronomy should be studied. In addition to pleasure and helpfulness to

29 Hunter, Science and Society, 23. 30 Shapiro, John Wilkins, 125. 31 For an overview of Wilkins’ major works, see E. J. Bowen and Harold Hartley, “The Right Reverend John Wilkins, F. R. S. (1614-1672),” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 15 (1960): 47-56. 214 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

navigation, these included proving the existence of God and Providence, and contemplating nature in order to develop a closer appreciation of God and a more religious life. His most significant natural philosophical project involved an attempt to classify all knowledge in taxonomic form and develop an artificial “philosophical” language based on the order of things. This was intended to relieve religious disputes by removing verbal ambiguities. Although Wilkins published An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language in 1668, the project was never completed.32

One of Wilkins’ most popular published sermons, A Discourse Concerning the Beauty of Providence, was intended to comfort those adversely affected by the events of the civil wars. Essentially this work was a plea to accept the recent upheavals in Church and State because God had ordered them. As Shapiro has put it, “The doctrine of Providence made men cheerful and thankful in times of mercy; in times of suffering it should make them patient and submissive.”33 While this work was natural theological in the sense that it dealt with the concept of Providence, a key doctrine in this tradition, John Wilkins’ most significant work of natural theology was titled Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, first published in 1675, three years after his death. The first twelve chapters were written during his lifetime, while the remainder was compiled from papers left to John Tillotson. As with his scientific works, “Here again Wilkins was the popularizer, who by an orderly and simplified treatment of what was being discussed in advanced intellectual circles, hoped to convey these ideas to a broader public.”34 The lack of original arguments did not make Wilkins’ work any less influential, and as we shall see below, other natural theologians quoted it approvingly, although it was later lampooned by the critic David Hume.

32 See R. Lewis, “The Publication of John Wilkins’s Essay (1668): Some Contextual Considerations,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 56 (2002): 133-146. 33 Shapiro, John Wilkins, 70. 34 Ibid., 233. 215 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

ii. Matthew Barker (1619-1698)

Matthew Barker is relatively unknown today, but intriguingly, he wrote the only natural theological work of the seventeenth century to be actually titled Natural Theology.35 Barker was a nonconformist, independent minister. Like Wilkins, his moderation earned him favour during the Civil War and Interregnum. He was an avid parliamentarian who was invited to preach before the House of Commons on 25 October 1648, and was made an assistant to the London Commission in 1654. Unlike Wilkins, Barker found himself unable to accept the Act of Uniformity of 1662. However, he accepted the indulgence of 1672, which allowed for the licensing of non-conformist ministers, and was licensed as a Congregationalist. After 1688, Barker put his efforts into promoting unity among non-conformists. Edmund Calamy described him as

A man of considerable learning, great piety, and universal candour and moderation. No lover of controversies, but an hearty promoter of practical godliness, without laying stress on little things; in which he was sensible others were as much at liberty to differ from him as he was from them.36

Barker’s other works were all religious in theme. In his early career, he preached several sermons before the House of Commons, including one on October 25 1648 entitled “A Christian Standing and Moving upon the True Foundation,” which was an encouragement for Christians to stand firm on Jesus Christ, the foundation of the Christian religion. In 1691 Barker published Flores Intellectuales, a collection of advice to young scholars entering the ministry. This ministerial focus is also reflected in his Natural Theology, with his concern for the state of other believers and his desire to support them in their faith and encourage them in their religious duties.

35 Barker, Natural Theology. 36 Edmund Calamy, The Nonconformist’s Memorial; Being an Account of the Lives, Sufferings, and Printed Works, of the Two Thousand Ministers Ejected from the Church of England, chiefly by the Act of Uniformity, Aug. 24, 1662, 2nd ed., ed. Samuel Palmer (London, 1802), 1:120. 216 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

3. The Nature of Natural Theology

We turn now to the theoretical dimension of our model of natural theology. Once again, this is not intended as a complete and authoritative account of Restoration natural theology, or even of the writings of John Wilkins and Matthew Barker. Instead, we will be considering Wilkins’ and Barker’s natural theology according to a number of themes designed to illuminate the kaleidoscopic model. a. Natural Theology as an Apologetic Discourse

The apologetic focus of natural theology may be seen in the way that both Wilkins and Barker set out their aims. Neither was producing new knowledge about God, but rather arguments in favour of existing knowledge. Wilkins did not even claim to be producing new arguments: instead, he employed what he viewed as the most convincing of the old ones. He acknowledged that the subject of natural religion “both in former and later times hath been so largely discussed by several Authors,” and stated that he “shall not pretend to the invention of any new arguments, but content my self with the management of some of those old ones, which to me seem more plain and convincing.”37 Similarly, Barker’s purpose was not to discover new insights about God, but to remind people of the nature of God and to promote the duties of Christianity.

While both Wilkins’ and Barker’s natural theological works are apologetic in nature, the two reflect different types of apologetics. Wilkins’ may be viewed as “belief forming,” in that he aimed to convince his readers of the reasonableness and credibility of the principles of natural religion. To this end, he employed arguments that would be acceptable to people who did not submit to the authority of the Church or the Scriptures. A significant proportion of his work is taken up by appeals to the testimony of ancient philosophers, who were considered “wise men.” This strategy was echoed by many of Wilkins’ contemporaries, including the dissenting natural theologian Richard Baxter. Baxter acknowledged that his infidel opponents would not accept Christian

37 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 40. 217 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

authorities, and so classical authors were useful to demonstrate that even the wisest heathens recognised the reasonableness of religion.38 This concept of employing strategies appropriate to the audience is a key component of Christian apologetics, both then and now.

By contrast, Barker focused on the other strand of apologetics: “belief sustaining.” His target audience consisted primarily of people who were already believers in God, but had perhaps lost their way, and required some support for their faith and reassurance of their religious duties. In this way, Barker considered his Natural Theology a work of “practical divinity.” He wrote that “though high Speculations may please best the Fancy, yet Practical Writings do best tend to make a better World.”39 This approach seems to be characteristic of nonconformist natural theologians, as Wallace has noted with regard to Richard Baxter and his circle. By contrast with other forms of natural theology, dissenting natural theological works “were much more than intellectual exercises, being also treatises of practical and affectionate divinity intended for the edification of their readers.”40 b. Natural Theology as a Loose Intellectual Tradition Situated

Between Natural Philosophy and Theology

In a similar vein to the other case studies, by producing natural theological works, Wilkins and Barker were participating exclusively in neither theology nor natural philosophy. While both were clergymen of a kind, Wilkins was more interested in natural philosophy, although Barker did employ some resources from this tradition in his arguments. Both produced theological works, and Wilkins also wrote on the topic of natural philosophy, but these kinds of writings can be clearly distinguished from the natural theological works written by each author. The purpose of natural theology was not to outline new knowledge about nature as a natural philosophical work would contain, nor was the truth of the Christian religion an assumed starting point, as it would be in a

38 Wallace, “Natural Theology Among the Dissenters,” 9. 39 Barker, Natural Theology, unpaginated preface. 40 Wallace, “Natural Theology Among the Dissenters,” 21. 218 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

theological discourse. Instead, both Wilkins and Barker were aiming to convince their readers of the truth of Christianity by employing resources such as the testimony of ancient philosophers and recent natural philosophical developments.

One of the most influential perspectives on natural theology has linked it with Newtonian natural philosophy and low-church Anglicanism, or latitudinarianism. On the latter point, John Wilkins could be considered a prime example. After all, he was one of the leading members of the latitudinarian movement. However, to assume that latitudinarianism defines natural theology as a tradition would be a mistake. Matthew Barker provides the perfect counterpoint: a natural theologian publishing at almost the same time who was not a latitudinarian, or, at least, not an Anglican latitudinarian. It must be noted that the nonconformists who engaged in natural theology shared certain views with the Anglican latitudinarians, most particularly that both groups sought a wider and more comprehensive Church of England. The Newtonian angle, on the other hand, does not work at all for this group of natural theologians. Newton’s Principia was published over a decade after the natural theological works to be discussed in this chapter, and fifteen years after Wilkins’ death. Along with the insights provided by the previous case studies, the examples of Wilkins and Barker demonstrate that this view of natural theology as an Anglican apologetic informed by Newtonian natural philosophy is untenable. Instead, natural theology was a dynamic discourse that could take a variety of forms. c. Natural Theology as a Dynamic Discourse

Since natural theology was not tied exclusively to any particular system of theology or natural philosophy, natural theologians could employ resources from either to produce their arguments in support of religious doctrine and practices. John Wilkins, as we shall see below, employed concepts and methodologies associated with the experimental philosophy of the Royal Society. Matthew Barker, on the other hand, made quite limited use of natural philosophical resources. Although natural philosophy was not entirely absent

219 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

from his discourse, he was much more likely to back up his points using Scripture. These differences reflect the kaleidoscopic nature of natural theology, and the element of choice on the part of the natural theologian is crucial. Although Barker and Wilkins were both responding to the challenges of atheism and scepticism, there was no compulsion to address these challenges in the same way. Rather, each natural theologian could decide for himself the best means of producing arguments for religious doctrine, and the most suitable resources to employ towards this purpose.

4. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments

Matthew Barker defined natural theology as “that knowledge of God, and our duty to Him, which the Light of Nature may lead Man up to, and which is concreat with his Soul.”41 Similarly, John Wilkins defined natural theology (or, as he termed it, “natural religion”) as that “which men might know, and should be obliged unto, by the meer principles of Reason, improved by Consideration and Experience, without the help of Revelation.”42 Barker believed that “There is enough written in the Book of God’s Creation, to declare his Being to us; though there was nothing written of it in the Book of the Scriptures.”43 This meant that “those that have no Books, and never were at any University of Learning, may in the Book of Nature, and the University of created beings, read and understand the Being of God.”44 For Wilkins, the principles of natural religion that can be known by reason alone included: “1. A belief and an acknowledgement of the Divine Nature and Existence. 2. Due apprehensions of his Excellencies and Perfections. 3. Suitable Affections and Demeanour towards him.”45 These principles are reflected in the structure of the first book in his Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion. After setting out the framework for the discussion with an epistemological prolegomenon, Wilkins dealt in turn with the existence of God, his attributes, and the proper religious response to

41 Barker, Natural Theology, 4. 42 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 39. See Chapter 2, section 4a for a discussion of the terms “natural theology” and “natural religion.” 43 Barker, Natural Theology, 14. 44 Ibid., 17. 45 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 40. 220 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

God.46 In the second book, Wilkins considered “the Wisdom of Practising the Duties of Natural Religion,” and concluded by “shewing the Excellency of the Christian Religion.” This structure provides a convenient framework for considering the natural theology of both Wilkins and Barker. As we shall see, the two natural theologians were concerned with many of the same issues, and employed some of the same arguments. a. Existence of God

The stated aim of Matthew Barker’s Natural Theology was to demonstrate the necessity of God’s being and his attributes. In line with modern historical doubts about the actual incidence of atheism in the seventeenth century, Barker acknowledged that there were not many people who explicitly denied the existence of God, but argued that there were many who were apathetic: “the Conviction of [the Being of God] upon their Hearts doth grow very weak and languid.”47 Thus, he aimed “to awaken their sleepy Souls, to a Practical acknowledgement of his Being,” and to recover “the very Light and Law of Nature, that preach a Deity to all Men,” by demonstrating God from the works of Creation. For John Wilkins, the existence of God was the first and most fundamental principle of natural religion, a point he supported by quoting from both the Stoic philosopher Seneca and the biblical book of Hebrews.48 Wilkins presented four main arguments, which will be considered in turn, along with those presented by Barker.

46 Wilkins’ epistemological framework will be discussed in section 6 of this chapter. 47 Barker, Natural Theology, preface. 48 “Primus est Deorum cultus, Deos credere” (Seneca), translated by Wilkins as “The most fundamental thing in Religion, is to acknowledge the Being of God.” In Latin, the quotation contained the plural form “gods” (“Deos credere” may be translated as “to believe in the gods”) but Wilkins has “corrected” Seneca by referring to the singular “God.” As we shall see below, Wilkins viewed the ancient philosophers as coming close to a concept of one God. “He that comes to God, must believe that he is” (Hebrews 11:6). The quotation from Hebrews also appeared on the title page of Barker’s Natural Theology. 221 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

i. The Universal Consent of Mankind

Wilkins’ first argument for the existence of God was from the universal consent of mankind. It is worth examining the basis for this in some detail, as it displays a mode of argument often employed by Wilkins. For example, in his discussion of the attributes and perfections of the deity, Wilkins frequently referred to the opinions of ancient, even pagan, philosophers. The basis for his appeal to human testimony is found in Aristotle, who laid down the proper way of “Reasoning from Authority:”

That what seems true to some wise men, may upon that account be esteemed somewhat probable; what is believed by most wise men, hath a further degree of probability; what most men, both wise and unwise, do assent unto, is yet more probable: But what all men have generally consented to, hath for it the highest degree of evidence of this kind, that any thing is capable of: And it must be monstrous arrogance and folly for any single persons to prefer their own judgments before the general suffrage of Mankind.49

That is, the more (preferably wise) men who agree on something, the more likely it is to be true. With regard to “wise men,” Wilkins relied primarily on the testimony of Cicero and Seneca, just two examples of the “best Authors that are extant.”50 He cited them as not only saying that they themselves believed in God, but also that all nations have believed in God. Each made statements to the effect that there are no men who have not had some kind of notion of a deity. Wilkins also appealed to the fact that no ancient lawgivers, such as the authors of the Christian Scriptures, had to persuade people of the existence of God, but only how to correctly worship Him. Wilkins concluded, “He that shall traverse over all this habitable Earth, with all those remote corners of it… may

49 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 41. Compare this with the words of Aristotle: “those opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise—i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them.” Aristotle, Topics, I, 1, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 1: 167. 50 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 42. 222 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

find some Nations without Cities, Schools, Houses, Garments, Coin; but none without their God.”51

Wilkins also addressed a number of objections to this point. The first objection Wilkins considered is that there simply is no such universal consent, to which he responded that there are exceptions to any rule. However, Wilkins argued, we cannot use people with defective judgment and reason as the best examples of human nature. Here is the flip side of the “wise man” coin. How are we to decide which are the wise men to be followed, and which are the ones with “defective judgment and reason?” It seems that for Wilkins, “defective judgment and reason” was defined as “disbelief in the existence of God.” He suggested that if there are men who declare a disbelief of the divine nature, they must be “monsters” with respect to their minds, in the same way that men born with physical deformities are considered “monsters” with respect to their bodies.52 However, Wilkins doubted that any man actually doubted the existence of God, though a man might wish that there were none.

The second objection Wilkins addressed was the idea that the universal consent argument may also prove polytheism and idolatry, ideas in direct contrast to the Christian religion. Wilkins avoided this problem by stating that the unity of God and the correct way to worship him are not as immediately obvious as his existence, and thus require deeper consideration and skilled reasoning. Of course, we have already seen that there are people with less capability in reasoning, and “The most considering and the wisest men in all Ages and Nations, have constantly differed from the Vulgar in their thoughts about these things, believing but one supreme Deity, the Father of all subordinate Powers.”53 Even the Greek and Romans, with their multitude of gods, acknowledge one Supreme Being, “Whom they called Jupiter or Jove, with plain reference to the Hebrew name Jehovah.”54

51 Ibid., 43. 52 Ibid., 48-49. 53 Ibid., 51. 54 Ibid., 51. 223 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

Wilkins also dealt with the issue of how mankind came to this belief in God. He dismissed the possibility that it was through an error of judgment, because consent is universal; through fear, because this is a consequence of belief, not a cause; and through policy, because even the greatest princes and politicians believe. The cause of the belief must be as universal as the effect, which is that all men believe in a deity. Wilkins attributed such a belief to “the very nature of our minds, which are of such a frame as in the ordinary exercise of their faculties, will easily find out the necessity of a supreme Being.”55 Again, how did Wilkins identify the “ordinary exercise” of a man’s faculties? Presumably, that it results in a belief in God. For Wilkins, the belief in God is “natural to the soul,” which means “That there is such a faculty in the soul of man, whereby upon the use of reason he can form within himself a settled notion of such a first and supreme Being, as is endowed with all possible perfection.”56 Like the Cambridge Platonists, Wilkins believed that this notion of the divine being was bestowed upon mankind by God himself, like a seal with his image:

And it seems very congruous to reason, that he who is the great Creator of the world, should set some such mark of himself upon those Creatures that are capable of worshipping him, whereby they might be led to the Author of their Being, to whom their worship is to be directed.57

Matthew Barker did not employ the argument from human testimony to nearly the same extent as Wilkins, though he did appeal to “the Light of Natural Conscience” as a means by which the being of God is made known to men. However, Barker took this argument in a different direction than Wilkins. While he noted that “all Nations have acknowledged, and worshipped a Deity,”58 he backed this up with quotations not from ancient pagan philosophers, but from the experiences of the Apostle Paul described in the Christian Scriptures. This likely reflects Barker’s more theological focus compared with Wilkins’ philosophical approach.59 Barker noted that wherever Paul went to preach the

55 Ibid., 55. 56 Ibid., 61. 57 Ibid., 55. 58 Barker, Natural Theology, 14. 59 The “Heathen philosophers” were not without mention, however. As we will see below, Barker appealed to Epicurus on the point that God should be honoured and magnified. 224 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

gospel to the Gentiles, he found the people worshipping some deity or another. This occurred amongst both learned and “barbarous” people. For example, the Book of Acts records the experience of Paul preaching to the Greek philosophers in the Areopagus. As Barker pointed out, Paul observed the “superstitious fear, and reverence of their Gods” that was evident among the Athenians.60 A similar case held for the “barbarous” men mentioned in Acts 14, who mistook Paul and his colleague Barnabas for gods. The polytheism of the Greeks is not an issue for Barker here: the more important point is that all nations have recognised the existence of some kind of deity. For Barker, this is evidence that “Man being made for God, he hath put a peculiar impression of his Being upon his Soul, which the brute Beasts have not.”61 This “Light of Natural Conscience” is one of three ways in which the existence of God is made known to men, along with the Scriptures and the works of Creation. However, it is the last of these that Barker is most concerned with in this work. Indeed, for both Wilkins and Barker, the very existence of the world points to the existence of a divine Creator. ii. The Origin of the World

In chapter 5, Wilkins considered the argument “From the Original of the World.” This argument would be familiar to readers of contemporary treatments of natural theology, where it is often referred to as the cosmological argument. In Wilkins’ words, “Nothing can be more evident, than that this visible frame which we call the World, was either from all eternity, or else that it had a beginning. And if it had a beginning, this must be either from Chance or from some wise Agent.”62 He placed the two alternatives, that the world is eternal or that it had a beginning, on an equal footing, supposing that neither was impossible nor implied a contradiction, and that neither could be infallibly

60 Barker, Natural Theology, 15. Acts 17:22-31 records the words that the Apostle Paul preached to the philosophers in Athens. He began from the observation that among the various objects of religious worship, the Athenians even had an altar inscribed “To the unknown God.” Paul then proceeded to proclaim this unknown God as the Christian God: “The God who made the world and everything in it,” and “the Lord of heaven and earth.” Intriguingly, this ties in with Wilkins’ observation that polytheism could be countered by more specific information about the unity of the Christian God. 61 Ibid., 14. 62 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 62. 225 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

demonstrated by the mere principles of reason. The question, then, was which was more credible. For Wilkins, there were two ways to consider this: testimony, or “the Tradition of the most Ancient times,” and reason, or “such Probabilities as do arise from the nature of the thing.” The weight of testimony that Wilkins presented came down firmly on the side of the opinion that the world had a beginning. According to Wilkins’ interpretation, Aristotle argued that the world was a necessary emanation from God, but acknowledged that the philosophers who came before him believed the world to have a beginning.63 Thus, Aristotle was rejecting the opinion of other “wise men,” and thus presumably going against his own rules that Wilkins quoted in his chapter 4. Counting against Aristotle were, of course, the Mosaic account of Creation in the Christian Scriptures, as well as general tradition amongst the nations of the world. In terms of reason, Wilkins wrote that the idea of the world being eternal simply had no sufficient argument to render it probable, while there were several arguments in favour of the world having a beginning. These included the idea that if the world were eternal or much older than generally thought, it is unlikely that there would be memorials to the beginning of the world, such as the Sabbath day and the division of time. Further, civilisation would have arisen earlier and everything would have been discovered and inhabited by now. Even if wars, famines and plagues arose regularly to keep the population in check, these would have to be ordered by a wise agent, which still supported Wilkins’ point.

Regarding objections to the idea of a wise agent creating the universe, Wilkins did consider Aristotle’s view that nothing could be created out of nothing. However, he argued that this only applied to natural generations, not supernatural acts. While the act of creating something out of nothing requires omnipotence, it does not entail a contradiction. As for the Epicurean idea of the world being created by chance, Wilkins stated “It is so extravagant and irrational, and hath been so abundantly confuted by others, that I cannot think

63 Aristotle argued that “the heaven as a whole neither came into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time.” On the Heavens II. 1, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 1:470. 226 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

it expedient to spend any time in the discussing of it.”64 Although Wilkins acknowledged that he had not presented strict demonstrations of his view, he argued that the nature of this topic meant it was not capable of demonstrations. All we may hope for are strong probabilities on one side, and Wilkins believed he had provided this.65

As noted above, Matthew Barker set out three ways in which the existence of God could be known, the third of which was from the works of creation. He outlined eight main arguments for the being of God, and the first, that it is impossible for creation to have given itself a being, falls under the heading of the origin of the world. Like Wilkins, Barker drew on philosophical principles, that “Operations do follow the Creatures Being, both as to time, and the manner of working,” and “Nothing is produced into actual being but by some Being that doth actually exist.” His conclusion was that “therefore this Creation must be brought into being by some actual Being that was before it: And what can that be but God alone.”66 Barker also considered the key opposing philosophical ideas, namely Epicureanism and Aristotle’s notion that the world was eternal. In opposition to the Epicurean idea that the universe was formed by “the fortuitous concourse of innumerable Atomes,” Barker pointed to the “exact Order of all things in Nature; which could not be so by some chance or accident.”67 Against Aristotle, whose view of the eternity of the world was based on his principle that nothing could be created from nothing, Barker took the same line as Wilkins: that this principle did not apply to supernatural acts. iii. The “Admirable Contrivance” of Natural Things

Wilkins presented a third argument in chapter 6, arguing for the existence of a deity from “the admirable contrivance of natural things.” This is the familiar argument from design, dealing with the elegance and beauty of natural things

64 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 77. 65 See section 6, below, for a further discussion of Wilkins’ views on demonstration and probability. 66 Barker, Natural Theology, 17. 67 Ibid., 18. 227 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

themselves, their regular order in relation to others, and their exact fitness for their purposes. All these considerations point to the notion that natural things are the production of some wise agent, so wise that “The most Sagacious man is not able to find out any blot or error in this great volume of the world.”68 Again, Wilkins drew on the authority of the ancient philosophers such as Cicero, who suggested that the elegance and order of the things of nature was enough to make belief in an “eternal and excellent being” necessary, and Galen, who, though “no great friend to Religion,” had to acknowledge a deity in considering the human body. In particular, Wilkins employed evidence derived from the recent invention of the microscope that demonstrated a great difference between natural and artificial things: “So vast a difference is there betwixt the skill of Nature, and the rudeness and imperfection of Art.”69 This argument, as we shall see in the historical interlude following this chapter, was quoted approvingly by John Ray in The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (London, 1691).70 On this point, Wilkins was especially concerned with the Epicurean hypothesis that everything in the universe was created by chance: “Though we should suppose both Matter and Motion to be Eternal, yet is it not in the least credible, that insensible Matter could be the Author of all those excellent Contrivances which we behold in these natural things.”71 For Wilkins, “These visible things of the world are sufficient to leave a man without excuse, as being Witnesses of a Deity, and such as do plainly declare his great Power and Glory.”72

Seven of Matthew Barker’s eight arguments for the existence of God fall under this heading. Firstly, he observed that everything in nature serves a rational

68 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 78. 69 Ibid., 80. Wilkins’ comparison of the “order and symmetry in the frame of the most minute creatures, a Lowse or a Mite” with the point of a fine needle, which under the microscope presents “as a blunt rough bar of iron” appears to be drawn from Robert Hooke’s Micrographia, or, Some Physiological Descriptures of Minute Bodies Made by Magnifying Glasses (London, 1665). Hooke described how the point of a needle was seen under a microscope to bear “many marks of the rudeness and bungling of Art” while the works of nature “shew us the greatest Excellencies” [2]. 70 See also Isabel Rivers, “‘Galen’s Muscles’: Wilkins, Hume, and the Educational Use of the Argument from Design,” The Historical Journal 36 (1993): 577-597. 71 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 83. 72 Ibid., 84. Here, Wilkins was citing Romans 1:20, Acts 14:17, and Psalm 19 (respectively, in italics). 228 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

end, and is “wonderfully fitted” for that purpose. For example, the sun provides light and warmth to the world, while the clouds and rain cool and moisten the earth. The natural conclusion is that a wise agent designed these things for their particular purposes. Here Barker did appeal to the testimony of the “Heathen philosophers,” and claims that even these pagans apprehended that the world had an intelligent maker. Secondly, Barker pointed to the harmony of creation and its suitableness for man. Again, Barker appealed to the testimony of Scripture as well as the ancient philosophers, demonstrating from Acts 17:26 that man was created by God to inhabit the earth.73 Thus, it is only reasonable that God would furnish the world appropriately. Thirdly, Barker argued that the natural principles of self-preservation and self-propagation must have been instituted by some form of reason, which in turn must be God’s reason. Fourthly, in the creation there are degrees of being and perfection, which suggest a chief being and a chief perfection, namely God. Fifthly, though there are creatures in the world that do not possess reason, they still act according to rules of reason. Here, Barker provided a series of examples drawn from the burgeoning field of natural history, although many of them would be observable to anyone who cared to look. For example, he mentioned bees making honeycomb, spiders spinning webs, birds making nests and beavers forming dams and “Houses in the Waters, consisting of several stories (as I have heard from Eye-witnesses).”74 These actions must all be governed by reason, which indicates some kind of guiding wisdom. Sixthly, there is an order in nature, by which all creatures serve some kind of end above themselves. As creatures with only a vegetative life (that is, plants) serve those with a sensitive life (animals), which in turn serve mankind, who has a superior rational life, thus mankind must also serve an end above himself, and this can only be God. Finally, Barker observed that all things in nature are bounded and limited in some way. While it is natural for all creatures to seek perfection in their beings, there is a limit beyond which their natures cannot extend. This limit must have been set by God, who is the first being, and the only unlimited one:

73 Acts 17:26: “And he made from one man every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having determined allotted periods and the boundaries of their dwelling places.” 74 Barker, Natural Theology, 28. 229 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

It is He that hath given the Earth its dimensions, and confined the Waters within their Banks, that comprehendeth the dust of the Earth in a Measure; that weigheth the Hills in Scales, and the Mountains in a Balance. It is He that hath meted out the Heavens with his Span, and appointed the number of the Stars, and calleth them all by name.75

The words in italics seem to be quotations from Isaiah 40:12, again indicating that for Barker, the Christian Scriptures are at least as valid and useful as natural philosophical resources for demonstrating the truth of religious doctrine.76 iv. Divine Providence in the Government of the World

The final argument John Wilkins presented for the being of God appeared in chapter 7, where he argued for the existence of a deity from “providence and the government of the world.” The providence of some wise and powerful being is evident, according to Wilkins, in both ordinary and special effects. Ordinary or common effects include rewards and punishments in this life, while extraordinary effects are instances of answered prayer and miracles. Wilkins’ main arguments here are drawn from our conscience or innate ideas of good and evil; that is, the Law of Nature that could only have been declared by some “Superior Power.” Although he admitted that the arguments he presented here are not infallible, he stated that it would be hard to imagine what other kind of evidence could be expected. Here, Wilkins referred back to the proposition he offered in chapter 3, that “indubitable certainty” may exist where there is no “infallible certainty.” The mere possibility of the contrary is not a sufficient cause of doubt, and given the risk of punishment in a future state, it is safer to believe in God than not.

While Matthew Barker did not specifically argue from providence to the existence of God, it was still a theme in his work. Barker noted that the same Light of Nature that declares the existence of God also declares his providence:

75 Ibid., 31. 76 Isaiah 40:12: “Who has measured the waters in the hollow of his hand and marked off the heavens with a span, enclosed the dust of the earth in a measure and weighed the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance?” 230 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

For that Light that declares to Man, There is a God that made the World, declares also a Providence, that he governs the World. If he governs the World he governs it in Wisdom; if in Wisdom, then every Creature is governed according to the respective Principles of their several Natures. And therefore Man must be govern’d as a rational Creature.77

From this, Barker inferred that man must be governed by a law enforced by rewards and punishments, and this law is found in Scripture.

The concept of providence also appeared in Barker’s discussion of the causes of atheism. He suggested that sometimes extensive observation of the course and efficacy of second causes may lead men to think that all things occur by nature and that there is no providence, and hence no God. Also, when men cannot see justice in the world, they may doubt the providence of God. However, “because Men cannot wade into the depths of God’s providence, shall they therefore conclude there is no Providence, and no God?”78 Of course, Barker’s answer is no. The Scriptures can provide a broader understanding of God’s providential action in the world, including how he can work through the sufferings of righteous people, and why the wicked may go unpunished for a time. For Barker, knowledge of God’s providence is clearly a consequence of belief in God himself. While it can be known from the Light of Nature, it is known more clearly from the Scriptures. b. Attributes of God

As well as the being of God, both Matthew Barker and John Wilkins were concerned with his particular nature. After establishing “a belief and an acknowledgement of the Divine Nature and Existence,”79 Wilkins devoted four chapters to exploring “the excellencies and perfections of the divine nature.” The key point in this discussion is that the attributes of God are the foundation of the duties of Religion. Like the Cambridge Platonists, Wilkins believed that it is better to have no God at all than to have unworthy notions of the true God. In chapters 8 to 11, Wilkins dealt with several different types of divine attributes,

77 Barker, Natural Theology, 69. 78 Ibid., 44. 79 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 99. 231 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

but for each attribute, his method of discussion was the same. Firstly, he explained what was meant by each attribute, and secondly, he sought to prove that the attribute must belong to a natural notion of God. He had four ways of accomplishing this: the consent of the wisest Heathens; the nature of the things themselves; congruity with the principles of Reason; and the absurdities that would follow from a denial of the attribute.

The first main division in the types of divine attributes Wilkins considered was between incommunicable attributes, those that belong to God alone, and communicable attributes, which are given in some degree to inferior beings. God’s incommunicable attributes include his absolute simplicity, essential unity, immutability and infiniteness, while his communicable attributes are divided further into perfections of understanding (knowledge, wisdom and providence), will (goodness, justice, and faithfulness), and acting (power, dominion, and distribution of future rewards and punishments).

To illustrate Wilkins’ way of establishing these divine attributes, consider the example of God’s absolute simplicity. Wilkins defined this as being freedom from any kind of mixture. To establish this as part of a natural notion of God (that is, it can be known by the light of nature, without revelation), he looked first to the “heathens,” such as Pythagoras, Plato and Plutarch, who viewed God as the first cause and the most simple being. Secondly, he considered the evidence of natural reason. For example, God cannot be a compound, because that would mean his parts would have been antecedent to him, which would mean that there was something in nature before God. This would be inconsistent with God being the first cause. In addition, Wilkins stated that the idea of spirit or immaterial substance was not a contradiction unless it could be proved that “substance” implies “corporeity.” Here, Wilkins was responding to Thomas Hobbes’ claim that the very notion of an immaterial substance was meaningless, like a “round Quadrangle.”80

80 Ibid., 105. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil (London, 1651), 19. 232 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

It is also interesting to note Wilkins’ comparison of God’s knowledge and human knowledge in his chapter 9. Knowledge is the first of the perfections belonging to the divine understanding, and is defined by Wilkins as the faculty of understanding and considering things absolutely, in their own natures, their powers, properties and differences. Knowledge is a communicable attribute, but it is communicated only in a lesser degree to inferior beings such as humans. For example, God’s knowledge is deep and intimate, reaching to the very essence of things, while ours is slight and superficial. God’s knowledge is clear and distinct, while ours is confused and dark. God’s knowledge is infallible, while ours is doubtful and prone to mistakes. From natural reason, Wilkins declared that it is obvious that knowledge is a perfection, and hence should be ascribed to a perfect being. Denying God’s perfect knowledge would imply many other imperfections in the divine nature, such as his wisdom, providence and dominion.

Another key point is that opposition to some of these ideas of divine perfection derives, according to Wilkins, from a misapprehension of God’s nature. For example, he mentioned that Epicureans believe that it is beneath God to care for inferior, earthly things, and hence they deny God’s particular providence, or his act of taking care of every individual thing in the world. This is because they have misunderstood the kind of knowledge belonging to God, which is infinite and absolutely perfect, and is thus not limited, “nor capable of any difficulty to be put upon it, by the nature or number of things.”81

Throughout this work, Wilkins exhibited a way of arguing from reason that alerts the reader to his fundamental assumptions about the nature of God. For example, in his discussion of God’s goodness, Wilkins wrote that a proof would be difficult: “It is so plain, so fundamental a notion, that Goodness must belong to God, that I know not how to go about the proof of it. ‘Tis the brightest ray of the Deity, the first and clearest notion we have of God.”82 Although this notion “is the foundation of all worship and Religion amongst men,”83 Wilkins was

81 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 131. 82 Ibid., 138. 83 Ibid., 138. 233 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

unable to provide any argument from reason but that it is impossible to imagine a God without goodness. For Wilkins, then, attributes such as goodness are so essential a part of God that demonstrations are unnecessary.

Matthew Barker also devoted a considerable part of his discourse to the attributes of God. Natural Theology was set out as a discourse on Romans 1:20—“For the Invisible Things of Him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and God-head, so that they are with excuse.”84 As Barker noted, this seems paradoxical, because invisible things cannot be seen. He explained this by arguing that while God himself is invisible, his attributes can be seen by the effects they have in the world. For example, God’s eternal power is seen in his creating the world, by his word, out of nothing. The eyes can see the visible world, but the mind can infer invisible things from the visible world. Other attributes of God that can be known from the creation include his self- sufficiency, his perfection and his all-sufficiency to his people. God is known to be self-sufficient, because he existed of himself before creation had a being, and creation added nothing to him. All fullness and perfection of being must exist in him, because the being of all creatures came out of God’s being, and whatever is in the effect must have pre-existed in the cause. Finally, since the origin of any good has the whole of that good in itself, we have all good things in God, and therefore he is all-sufficient to his people. These attributes of God commend him to us and add to our duty of admiration. However, admiration is just one duty we have towards God. Discussion of these duties played a major role in both Wilkins’ and Barker’s natural theologies. c. Duties toward God

For both Matthew Barker and John Wilkins, it is not enough to merely acknowledge the existence of God, or even to correctly understand his nature and attributes. Religion, even natural religion, is also about our response to God. Barker, in particular, took a practical approach in his Natural Theology, endeavouring to “reduce this Knowledge of God’s Being, arising from the light

84 Barker, Natural Theology, 1. 234 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

and Law of Nature, to the service of Christianity. For my design is for Practice rather than Speculation.”85 Thus, he wrote of improving the knowledge of God from the works of creation to the service of Christianity.

For Wilkins, the most important aspect of his discussion of God’s perfections was that our religious duties are based on them. Firstly, adoration and worship—the highest esteem and admiration of him in our minds—should derive naturally from consideration of the divine attributes, especially the incommunicable excellencies. This was attested to by the pagan philosophers Aristotle and Cicero as well as the Scriptures. Secondly, faith or “affiance” in God is one of our duties that is dependent on the divine understanding. That is, it is an acquiescence of the mind, supported against all unnecessary fears or doubts, on account of God’s knowledge, wisdom and providence. Wilkins identified three branches of affiance: faith, which is an act of judgment in assenting to all divine truths, whether discoverable by reason or revelation; confidence, the resting of the will in the Divine goodness; and hope, our expectation of some future god. We can have faith in God because of his perfect knowledge and wisdom, by which he understands our condition and knows how to help; by virtue of his unquestionable goodness, love and faithfulness, which means he is concerned for us and willing to take care of us; and in light of his sufficient power to relieve us in every condition. Thirdly, our duty to love God derives from his perfections belonging to the divine will. To love God is the root of all true religion. It is an estimation of the judgment and a valuing of the divine nature: as Wilkins pointed out, the devil knows that God is good, but does not love him. By contrast, we make a choice for God to be the only proper object of our happiness. Fourthly, our reverence and fear of God is derived from understanding the divine power. Reverence is defined as a humble regard of the divine nature, proceeding from due esteem and love of him, whereby we are unwilling to do anything that may be in contempt of him, or may provoke and offend him. The goodness of God is also involved here, as power without goodness may provoke terror, but not reverence and honour. Similarly, God’s infinite knowledge and wisdom means that he knows all our secret shortcomings, and is therefore to be feared. Finally, obedience is the duty

85 Ibid., 33. 235 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

required by God’s dominion over us. For Wilkins, there were two kinds of obedience: active, which is a readiness of mind to do what God asks; and passive, an acquiescence of mind under what God inflicts, including suffering. Active obedience requires knowledge of the laws we are to observe, whether discovered by revelation or the natural light, as well as consent to those laws being holy, just and good. Interestingly, Wilkins here referred to the true knowledge of the nature of things aiding in banishing superstition, which is destructive to the true nature of religion. The study of nature and philosophy will beget in men a veneration of God. Additionally, the practice of religious duty must be done out of obedience to Jesus Christ as well as from natural obligation:

And although, before God was pleased to make this Revelation of his Will to mankind, men were obliged to the practice of moral duties by the Law of Nature, and as the Apostle speaks, having not the Law were a Law to themselves, shewing the effect of the Law written upon their hearts [Romans 2:14-15]; yet now that God hath in so much mercy revealed his Will so plainly to mankind, it is not enough for us who enjoy this Revelation, to perform those moral duties which are of natural obligation, unless we also do them in obedience to Christ as our Lord and Lawgiver.86

Similarly, Barker was not only concerned with the being and attributes of God, but also what men owe to their Creator; that is, the duties evident from the Light of Nature, as well as those made known from supernatural revelation. For Barker, there were several ways in which natural theology could aid in the understanding of religious duty. Firstly, there were various effects brought about by belief in God, which could be established through reason applied to the natural world. Secondly, the Light of Nature aided in enforcing the authority of Scripture, and religious duty is prescribed through Scripture. Thirdly, there were a number of moral duties that could be known by the Light of Nature itself. We will now consider in turn each of these ways in which natural theology could shed light on religious duty.

Firstly, there were effects brought about by a belief in God. We have already considered the ways in which knowledge of nature could be used to establish the

86 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 395. 236 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

existence of God. A belief in God, once attained, would have a number of effects. For example, belief in God would bring people to Christ and to repentance. Although, for Barker, the works of creation cannot provide salvation knowledge, they might provide the first step. Further, Barker proposed that seeing God in creation as well as Scripture might help mankind to follow Christ’s example in “taking up the cross,” or enduring suffering. Secondly, the Light of Nature could be used as an aid in enforcing the authority of Scripture, and hence the religious duties outlined here. Natural theology tells man that there is a God who should be worshipped, something also known through the Scriptures. In this way, the truths of natural theology are the same as the truths of Scripture. However, Scripture can tell man much more, such as how to worship this God.

Finally, for Barker, there were a number of religious duties that could be known by the Light of Nature itself. Firstly, we can deduce that we should humble and debase ourselves before God. The greatness of his works is just a shadow of the greatness of his nature, which can be imagined by comparing the earth with the heavens. Advances in natural philosophy had shown just how small the earth is compared with the heavens, but the heavens are even smaller compared with God. Secondly, knowing that God made heaven and earth can teach us that he must be able to help us in any situation, and therefore we should be dependent upon him. Thirdly, we should have a holy awe and fear of God. After all, the God who created the whole world could do anything, either in our favour or against us. Above all else, we owe God praise and admiration: “It is the ultimate end of these Works of Creation that the Creator may be praised in them; and it is the ultimate end of Man to give Glory and Praise to him.”87 At this point, Barker engaged the testimony of the “heathen philosopher” Epicurus, who believed that God should be magnified, even though he did not acknowledge that God created the world. How much more should God be adored by us, who know that he made all things? Thus, for Barker as well as for Wilkins, natural theology can lead us towards the duties we should be performing in response to God, although, as we shall see below, Scripture is necessary to provide full knowledge of religious duty.

87 Barker, Natural Theology, 85. 237 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

d. The Wisdom of Practising the Duties of Natural Religion

For Wilkins, the duties of natural religion should not be practised only because they are instituted by God. Instead, he argued that there were eight main considerations by which the practice of these duties could be considered wise. Firstly, religion is conducive to our happiness. It distinguished man from the other creatures, and forms the basis for government and society. Secondly, religion is conducive to happiness and health. These would be powerful motives to make men religious, according to Wilkins, if they could be persuaded that religion is the proper means of attaining these. While there are exceptions, due to whatever God sees fit in terms of providence, observing the duties of religion does for the most part prove the most effective means of maintaining the health of our bodies. Thirdly, religion leads to liberty, safety and quiet, although religious persecution is an exception. Fourthly, religion leads to “riches,” or rather, sufficiency for a man’s need. These are not riches in the sense of great wealth, but rather the contented use and enjoyment of the things we have. Fifthly, religion leads to pleasure or cheerful enjoyment of outward blessings. While sin may seem pleasurable, it is only temporary, while religion has natural efficacy in promoting eternal pleasure. Sixthly, honour and reputation—the esteem and good opinion that men have concerning the person or the actions of another, together with external expressions of respect—are the reward for the virtue of being religious. Seventhly, religion leads to peace and tranquillity of mind, and finally, religion leads to happiness in the next world. Overall, religion is the essence of man, therefore the whole happiness and well being of man depends on it. From these considerations, Wilkins believed he had proved the “Reasonableness and Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion,” which are “in themselves of so great evidence, that every one, who will not do violence to his own faculties, must believe and assent unto them.”88

Matthew Barker, by contrast, was content to view the duties of religion as a natural and just response to God’s nature and actions in the universe. We respond to God not only because we are directed to do so, but because of our admiration for him. For Barker, our admiration of God leads us to love him, not

88 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 392. 238 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

only for what we know of him, but also for what is above our knowledge; to esteem him above all other things; to desire more knowledge of him, and to enjoy him. e. The Excellency of Christianity

The final chapter of Wilkins’ work provided an overview of the excellency of the Christian religion. Wilkins’ purpose in considering the credibility of the principles of natural religion and our obligation to the duties resulting from these was to show how firm and deep a foundation religion has in the nature and reason of mankind. The obligations to believe and practise the Christian religion consist in the evidence of its divine authority and the excellency of the Christian doctrine. Firstly, it is a “principle of nature” that God himself should prescribe the way of his own worship. It is improbable that any nation would have embraced the practise of religion unless they thought it came from divine revelation. After all, all founders of religions at least pretend to divine revelation.89 The Christian Old Testament, by general consent of all learned men, has all the marks of purest antiquity, and thus can be trusted. The New Testament is supported by its correspondence to the Old, and by the fact that the account of Jesus was accepted by the Romans and Jews. This provides “as good certainty as any rational man can wish or hope for.”90 Secondly, the Christian doctrine itself is acknowledged as “excellent.” Its chief reward is God, which is more sublime than any other possibility, and the means to attain this are suitable to the goodness and greatness of the end. As Wilkins stated, “The whole Systeme of its Doctrine being transcendently excellent, and so exactly conformable to the highest, purest reason,” demonstrates “The exceeding folly and unreasonableness of those men who are sceptical and indifferent as to any kind of religion.”91 Atheists will pretend to want “clear and infallible evidence” for Christianity, but “Do they expect Mathematical proof and certainty in Moral

89 Ibid., 399. 90 Ibid., 402. 91 Ibid., 406, 407. 239 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

things? Why, they may as well expect to see with their ears, and hear with their eyes.”92

Perhaps the greatest difference between Wilkins’ and Barker’s natural theology is the latter’s emphasis on Christ. While mentions of Jesus Christ are scattered throughout Wilkins’ work, Barker devoted a whole chapter to creation and Christ. This again reflects the aims of each natural theologian’s work. As Shapiro has noted, latitudinarians were “rarely willing to cite the fundamental doctrines revealed in Scripture,” believing that “the purpose of Scripture was to reform men’s lives and make them good.”93 For Barker, by contrast, the purpose of Scripture is to make man wise for salvation, and the purpose of natural theology is to aid man in accepting the message of Scripture. Thus, natural theology was not engaged to promote a merely “natural” religion, or a general concept of divinity, but the particular religion of Christianity.

5. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse

It is obvious that natural theology was designed to provide arguments in support of religious doctrines, but the more important question is why these actors chose natural theology to achieve this purpose. As we shall note below, any knowledge derived from natural theology was viewed as insufficient for salvation, so proving the existence of God and the duties of religion could not have been the only aim. For Wilkins and Barker, theology and natural philosophy could be mutually supportive. Although neither was concerned with a theological foundation for natural philosophy in the same way as Ralph Cudworth or Henry More, or even Walter Charleton, the simple act of employing natural philosophical resources for religious purposes gave credence to the pursuit of natural knowledge.

At the most basic level, natural theology was used to support religion. In the preface to Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, John Tillotson wrote that Wilkins’ work was “never more necessary than in this degenerate

92 Ibid., 408. 93 Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 107. 240 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

Age, which hath been so miserable over-run with Scepticism and Infidelity.”94 It is important to reiterate that the religion that was being supported by the works of natural theology discussed in this chapter was not just a general natural religion, but one focused on the Christian revelation and the foundation of Christianity on Jesus Christ. Although this theme was treated more extensively in Barker’s Natural Theology, it was also present in Wilkins’ Natural Religion. Both writers clearly viewed the Christian religion as the only true religion, and the Christian revelation as authoritative, although pagan philosophers could still provide useful insights.

By employing arguments drawn from natural philosophy, both Barker and Wilkins were providing implicit support for the pursuit of natural knowledge by virtue of its usefulness to religion. Wilkins also gave explicit arguments in favour of the study of philosophy and nature, stating that it would beget in men a veneration of God. Studying natural philosophy and gaining a true knowledge of the nature of things would, according to Wilkins, aid in removing superstition and profaneness:

They that penetrate more deeply into the nature of things, and do not look upon second causes, as being single and scattered, but upon the whole chain of them as linked together, will in the plainest things, such as are counted most obvious, acknowledge their own ignorance and a Divine power; and so become more modest and humble in their thoughts and carriage.95

Thus, although Barker and Wilkins were not always making explicit articulations between theology and natural philosophy, by their participation in natural theology, they were implying the usefulness of natural knowledge for religious purposes. In doing so, Barker and Wilkins were part of the same tradition of natural theology as the Cambridge Platonists and Walter Charleton, even though their particular arguments were quite different. Another unifying feature of this tradition was the close connection between reason and revelation, which we will now examine.

94 John Tillotson, unpaginated preface to Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion. 95 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 237. 241 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation a. The Reasonableness of Christianity

The purpose of Wilkins’ work, as set out in his chapter 4, was “to prove the Reasonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion.” Supposing men to be endowed with the natural principle of seeking their own preservation and happiness, and supposing them to be rational and capable of judging what will best help them reach this end, nothing would be more reasonable than accepting the evidence for religion. However, for Wilkins, Christianity has to be reasonable or probable rather than absolutely certain: “It would not be thank-worthy for a man to believe that which of necessity he must believe, and cannot otherwise chuse.”96 As Shapiro has explained,

That religious principles could not attain the same level of certainty as mathematics or physical truth was to Wilkins a positive rather than negative consideration. If assent to religious principles were philosophically necessary rather than voluntary, there would be no place for faith or ‘the freedom of our obedience.’97

To this end, Wilkins spent the first three chapters of his book setting up what might be called the “ground rules” of his argument, establishing a framework for religion to be accepted without mathematical certainty. It is worth examining these chapters in some detail, for they provide the context for Wilkins’ claims to have established “indubitable certainty,” that we noted previously.

Isabel Rivers has described these chapters as an epistemological introduction, concerned with defining different kinds of evidence and assent, as well as establishing what Wilkins called the “moral certainty” of the principles of religion.98 This introduction was crucial to the whole book, because it set up the criteria by which Christianity could be considered reasonable. In presenting

96 Ibid., 31. 97 Shapiro, John Wilkins, 232. 98 Rivers, “‘Galen’s Muscles.’” On moral certainty, see also Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630-1690 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 59ff; and Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 86. 242 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

these criteria, Wilkins followed the footsteps of Sebastian Castellio, a French Protestant theologian who had written nearly a century beforehand. Castellio “suggested that while there was no way of eliminating all doubts concerning the validity of religious knowledge, it was possible to arrive at an adequate assurance about basic truths.”99

In chapter 1, Wilkins dealt with the different kinds of evidence and assent. He wrote that he was aiming to produce arguments that would convince anyone with an ordinary capacity and an honest mind, and that he was cautious of weak arguments, which would harden and confirm men in their errors. Primarily, however, he was setting up a framework for religion to be accepted without mathematical certainty, in opposition to scepticism and infidelity. In chapter 2, he attempted to establish a series of natural and moral principles by setting out postulates, definitions and axioms. A key point here is that for Wilkins, the nature of man consisted in the faculty of reason whereby he is made capable of Religion, of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future state of rewards and punishments. This faculty is common to all mankind, “notwithstanding the utmost endeavours that can be used for the suppressing of them.”100 In going against his own nature in this way, man is doing something that no other creature in the visible world does. Further, the happiness of man consists in perfecting this faculty of reason, and pursuing divine favour. This is related to Wilkins’ views on the wisdom of practising the duties of natural religion, as outlined above. Thus, “It is most suitable both to the Reason and Interest of mankind that every one should submit themselves to him [that is, God], upon whom they depend for their well-being, by doing such things as may render them acceptable to him.”101

Chapter 3 concluded this section with a number of propositions “necessary for removing prejudice.” Throughout this section it can be seen that Wilkins’ goal in this work was not so much trying to provide more evidence for Christianity as arguing that the existing evidence is sufficient for any “reasonable” person to

99 Shapiro, John Wilkins, 228. 100 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 18. 101 Ibid., 20. 243 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

accept.102 Wilkins stated that all truths are equal (that is, certain propositions that are equally true), but may be proved by different kinds or degrees of evidence.103 Thus, it is irrational to deny the truth of something simply because it cannot be established by a kind of proof of which its nature is not capable. Things of different kinds may require different sorts of proofs, which all may be good in their kind.104 For example, a mathematician will not employ rhetoric, or “perswade with eloquence” as Wilkins put it, to convince his hearers that the sum of three and three is six. Conversely, it is not reasonable to expect a mathematical demonstration of matters concerning God or divine things, or of certain matters of fact in natural philosophy, but this does not mean that these things are not true or certain. The moral of this section was that men should be satisfied with the best evidence for something, and should not expect sensible proof or demonstration for such matters as are not capable of such proofs.105 Neither should men discount something because it is not fully understood. For Wilkins, it was sufficient that matters of faith and religion be established as highly credible rather than as mathematically certain. Indeed, he wrote that if assent were necessary, there would be no place for the virtue of believing or the freedom of obedience: rewards and punishments belong to free, not forced, actions. Further, in the absence of certainty, a man’s judgment must incline to the greater probabilities.106 It is important to keep an open mind to judge the evidence. In Wilkins’ view, credulity and incredulity are both vices. Finally, if the evidence on each side seems equal, men should favour the side that seems most safe and advantageous for their own interest.107 Even if one side seems less likely, but has not great hazard involved, but there is a great danger

102 Note that this ties in with his claim to be rehearsing the best existing arguments rather than producing new ones, as noted in Section 3a of this chapter. 103 Ibid., 22. 104 Ibid., 23. This point again shows Wilkins’ debt to Aristotle, as he is alluding here to the Nicomachean Ethics, I, 3: “it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs.” In The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2: 1730. Henry Van Leeuwen argues, however, that Wilkins was using as his source Grotius’ Truth of the Christian Religion, which cited Aristotle on this point, instead of Aristotle himself. The Problem of Certainty, 67, n. 57. 105 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 25. 106 Ibid., 34. 107 Ibid., 37. 244 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

associated with a mistake about the other side, a reasonable man will choose the side with the least danger. From Wilkins’ perspective, this means choosing Christianity, because the future judgment awaiting unbelievers will be worse than any consequence of mistakenly believing in God. b. The Insufficiency of Natural Theology

For both Matthew Barker and John Wilkins, natural theology alone is insufficient to achieve salvation. According to Barker, the natural light itself is deficient. In creation, we may see the existence of God, and many attributes and properties of his being, but only “darkly.” It is only in Christ that we may see God clearly. Since the nature of God is seen more clearly in Scripture, it would be absurd to reject Scripture in favour of relying solely on the Light of Nature. For Barker, there are numerous doctrines that may only be known from Scripture, including God’s plan of salvation; the role of Jesus Christ as mediator between mankind and God; the means by which we can be reconciled to God; true knowledge of sin; the everlasting covenant of God’s grace; how to worship God; how to be more like God; and the immortality of the soul, resurrection, judgment and future rewards. However, all men are “without excuse,” whether they have access to the Scriptures or not. As the Apostle Paul wrote in the Book of Romans, a verse that was closely associated with natural theology throughout the seventeenth century, “For the Invisible Things of Him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and God-head, so that they are without excuse.”108 Barker took this to mean that the Gentiles who did not have the Christian Scriptures yet had sufficient knowledge of God from the Light and Law of Nature to respond to God appropriately. Any punishment meted out to them by God could be considered just, “For God doth, and will manage his Judgments in such Righteousness towards all men, with respect to their several capacities and conditions in this World, that every man may be found without excuse that falls

108 Quoted in Barker, Natural Theology, 1. 245 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

under them.”109 However, Barker was not prepared to speculate on just how far towards salvation the Light and Law of Nature might lead a man.

In a similar way, Wilkins also outlined limits for the efficacy of natural theology. Although the purpose of his discourse was to show “how firm and deep a foundation Religion hath in the Nature and Reason of Mankind,” he did not intend “in the least to derogate from the necessity and usefulness of Divine Revelation, or to extenuate the great blessing and benefit of the Christian Religion.”110 Despite everything that may be known by natural religion, “in this dark and degenerate state into which Mankind is sunk, there is great want of a clearer light to discover our duty to us with greater certainty, and to put it beyond all doubt and dispute what is the good and acceptable Will of God.”111 This clearer light is the revelation God made to the world through Jesus Christ and the Christian Scriptures. Like Barker, Wilkins chose not to speculate on how far the Light of Nature might lead someone towards salvation, noting that the Church Fathers disagreed amongst themselves on this point. However, again in line with Barker, he was convinced that God treats all human societies justly. c. Reason and Revelation

Thus, we find in the natural theology of both John Wilkins and Matthew Barker a dual role for reason and revelation. The two are by no means in competition, and reason was not set up as an equal, alternative authority to revelation. Instead, reason and revelation complement each other, although revelation is the ultimate authority. While some knowledge of God and religious duty may be found by applying reason to the natural world, the Scriptures provide a much clearer understanding. In this way, natural and revealed religion are seen to be compatible.112 As we saw above, for Wilkins, the purpose of considering the

109 Ibid., 12. 110 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 394. 111 Ibid., 395. 112 As Barbara Shapiro has noted, “The ‘Duties of Natural Light’ were identical to those provided by God’s Grace, though Revelation provided a clearer statement of those principles and duties.” Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 94. 246 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

credibility of natural religion was to show how firm a foundation religion has in the nature and reason of mankind, not to reject the necessity and usefulness of divine revelation. Similarly, for Barker, since there are many doctrines that can be known only from Scripture, it would be absurd to cast off revelation and rely solely on the Light of Nature. The Light of Scripture is brighter than the Light of Nature in the same way that the light of the sun is above that of the moon: “Those that have no Scripture-Light, live under the Dominion of Nature’s Moon-Light, and are but in the Night, feeling after God, as Men in the dark. It is Scripture-Light, through the Spirit, that makes the Day.”113

Although the Scriptures provide a much clearer understanding of God and religious duty, this does not mean that natural theology is without use. For both Wilkins and Barker, knowledge gained from nature can lead someone towards the more complete knowledge derived from the Scriptures. As Wilkins believed, “Natural religion prepares the way for Divine Revelation and gives it a greater advantage and authority over the minds of men.”114 For Barker, the Light of Nature can aid us in believing the Scriptures, as it confirms certain doctrines known by revelation. For example, both the Light of Nature and the Scriptures declare that God made the world and governs it through providence. This belief that natural theology supported revealed theology was shared by many natural theologians of the Restoration period, including Richard Baxter and his circle: “For Baxter, Bates and Howe natural theology led up to supernatural or revealed theology, rendering the latter needed and plausible.”115

7. Conclusion

The Restoration period in England represents a second major inflection point in the tradition of natural theology, after that marked by the Cambridge Platonists, as discussed in Chapter 4. Continuing in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution, the natural theologians of this time were able to negotiate the relations of natural philosophy and theology through

113 Barker, Natural Theology, 126. 114 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 394-5. 115 Wallace, “Natural Theology Among the Dissenters,” 16. 247 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

the discourse of natural theology. Writers such as John Wilkins and Matthew Barker were concerned with challenges unique to their particular context, and addressed these by employing a variety of natural philosophical and theological resources. Unlike the Cambridge Platonists, Wilkins and Barker were not aiming to establish a specific version of Christianity above and against other viewpoints. This reflects the particular religious context of the Restoration period. In contrast to the upheaval of the Civil War and Interregnum, the Restoration was characterised by a widespread desire for tolerance and comprehension of a variety of views within the Church of England. However, the religion that Wilkins and Barker were arguing for was not a general or merely “natural” religion. Instead, it was the specific religion of Christianity, based soundly on the Christian Scriptures and the gospel of Jesus Christ.

Although both Wilkins and Barker were aiming to support the Christian religion against scepticism and atheism, each natural theologian sought to achieve this goal in a unique fashion, reflected in the setting of his own “kaleidoscope.” While Wilkins appealed extensively to ancient philosophers as well as recent natural philosophical developments, Barker was more likely to appeal to the authority of the Scriptures, even when he was concerned with knowledge that could be gained from nature. However, both kaleidoscopes were set with the view that natural theology had limits and deficiencies that could only be fully corrected by the brighter light of revelation in Scripture. This is in sharp contrast to some recent historical interpretations of natural theology as having been a rational alternative to revealed theology. For Wilkins and Barker, reason and revelation could work together, although God’s revelation in Scripture was the more authoritative of the two.

The similarities and differences between Wilkins’ and Barker’s natural theologies reflect the dynamic nature of natural theology. While both were responding to similar challenges, they employed different resources that ultimately resulted in distinct arguments. For this reason, the natural theological works discussed in this chapter differed markedly from each other, as well as from those produced during other inflection points. Unlike the Cambridge Platonists, Wilkins and Barker were not concerned with divisions

248 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 5

amongst Christians, but primarily with challenges to Christianity itself. In this, the natural theology of the Restoration period shared an important characteristic with the Boyle Lectures. Before moving on to examine this lectureship in our third major case study, we will consider another key figure in the history of natural theology: John Ray.

249 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

THIRD HISTORICAL INTERLUDE

JOHN RAY (1627-1705)

I know of no occupation which is more worthy or more delightful for a free man than to contemplate the beauteous works of Nature and to honour the infinite wisdom and goodness of God the Creator. John Ray, Flora of Cambridgeshire.1

1. Introduction

Like Walter Charleton, John Ray wrote one of the most significant examples of natural theology in seventeenth-century England, but he does not fit easily into any of the larger case studies of this thesis.2 The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation was based on a series of sermons Ray preached at the Trinity College Chapel in Cambridge in the 1650s. By virtue of this time and place, as well as some of the themes of his work, Ray had connections with the Cambridge Platonists and thus could be considered part of the Civil War and Commonwealth inflection point discussed in Chapter 4. However, he did not publish The Wisdom of God until 1691, a delay of more than thirty years. By publishing at this time, he was in good company with the Boyle Lecturers, and indeed it is a little surprising that he was not chosen to participate in the lectureship. In addition, Ray was an active member in the early years of the Royal Society, which connected him with others interested in natural theology such as Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle and John Wilkins, but he published his main natural theological work decades later.

1 John Ray, Flora of Cambridgeshire, ed. and trans. A. H. Ewen and Cecil T. Prime (Hitchin: Wheldon and Wesley, 1975), 26. Quoted in Scott Mandelbrote, “Ray [formerly Wray], John (1627–1705),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23203 (accessed 13 February 2008). 2 As noted in Chapter 3, this does not mean that Ray is not encompassed by the model of natural theology presented in this thesis. Rather, because his natural theology has connections with each of the larger case studies, it is more convenient to discuss him separately. 250 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

Ray was a reluctant clergyman who struggled with his preference for natural history over divinity, which makes him one of the most interesting examples of articulations between theology and natural philosophy. He also illustrates quite nicely the model of natural theology presented in this thesis, despite not fitting neatly into any of the larger case studies. With regard to the historical dimension of the model, Ray’s work was dependent on the particular natural philosophical context of the seventeenth century. He was intimately involved with the resurgence of natural history, and several of his arguments depended on knowledge of the vast range of new species discovered by voyages to the New World. In his own way, he was responding to the natural philosophical upheaval of the Scientific Revolution, drawing on ideas such as the Copernican hypothesis while rejecting what he viewed as an over-reliance on mechanical philosophy. The kaleidoscopic nature of natural theology is also well supported by the example of Ray. While he chose to employ primarily natural historical resources, he also drew on the work of many of his contemporaries. However, his natural philosophical presuppositions, combined with his particular conception of God, led him to develop a unique, though extremely popular and influential, version of natural theology.

2. Ray’s Background a. Religious Background

John Ray was the son of Roger Wray, a blacksmith, and Elizabeth, who was noted for her piety and knowledge of medicinal herbs. He was educated at the grammar school at Braintree, and afterwards at Trinity College and St. Catherine’s College, Cambridge. Ray received a minor fellowship of Trinity College in 1649, and afterwards held a succession of college positions. Ray was ordained in 1660, as demanded by his college, but he had hoped for a more comprehensive settlement of the church than was achieved at the Restoration. In 1662 he forfeited his fellowship, as he was unable to accept the Act of Uniformity. The Act stipulated, among other things, that clergy must agree to follow the established order of the Church, including the use of a newly revised Book of Common Prayer and subscription to the thirty-nine articles, and must

251 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

also repudiate the Solemn League and Covenant, the oath of loyalty to the Parliamentary regime. The Act resulted in the ejection of approximately one thousand clergymen from their livings. As one biographer wrote, Ray “could not in the Oath of Abjuration swear that he did believe it was binding to others.”3 This indicates that while Ray may have had no qualms about conforming to the Church himself, he did not believe that others should be forced to do the same.

Despite his refusal to take the Act of Uniformity, Ray remained committed to the Church of England and the Christian religion. His biographer, Mr Dale of Braintree, went to great lengths to convince readers of Ray’s piety and devotion, writing that “In his Life he was Charitable to the Poor according to his Ability; Sober, Frugal, Studious and Religious; allotting the greatest part of his Time to the Service of God, & his Studies,” and that in death, he was not unprepared, “being found in all the Duties of a good Christian, but relying upon the merits of his Saviour Jesus Christ in his Hope of Glory.”4 b. Natural Philosophical Background

John Ray was primarily concerned with natural history. His interests developed during the 1650s, particularly through the study of embryology and chemistry. Ray held a great interest in cataloguing and classifying botanical species, and his work was notable not only for its thoroughness, but also for the extensive medical and pharmacological notes that accompanied the descriptions of the plants. This was due to Ray’s conviction that the divine creation of plants implied a purpose to their existence, which might be discovered by putting them to use, and was also no doubt encouraged by his mother’s herbalist knowledge. Ray’s reputation for botanical classification made him a key resource for John Wilkins’ universal language project. Along with Francis Willoughby, his friend and sometime travelling companion, he worked on tables of plants and animals for Wilkins’ Essay towards a Real Character (1668). It was Wilkins who

3 “The Life of Mr Ray by Mr Dale of Braintree,” Bodleian Library, MS Rawlinson Essex 21, fol. 379. 4 Ibid. 252 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

proposed Ray for fellowship in the Royal Society of London, to which he was elected in 1667.

While The Wisdom of God was extensively natural historical in flavour, Ray also revealed his interest in and commitment to experimental philosophy and the mathematical sciences. For example, he wrote that he was “sorry to see so little Account made of real Experimental Philosophy in this university [Cambridge], and that those ingenious Sciences of the Mathematicks, are so much neglected by us,”5 and exhorted the young, especially gentlemen, to study them. His reasoning was that “They may possibly invent something of eminent Use and Advantage to the World; and one such Discovery would abundantly compensate the Expence and Travel of one mans whole Life.”6 Ray was also concerned with defeating natural philosophical ideas that he believed were detrimental to Christianity. While natural theology is often associated with the mechanical philosophy, particularly in its Newtonian incarnation, Ray leaned more towards the ideas espoused by Cambridge Platonists Ralph Cudworth and Henry More. As we will see below, he rejected Aristotelian, Epicurean and Cartesian philosophy in favour of a form of the “Plastick Principle” discussed by Cudworth in his earlier natural theological work The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678). c. Ray: The Overlooked Boyle Lecturer?

Given Ray’s training in divinity and ordination as a clergyman, his experience in natural history and natural philosophy, and his interest in using this in support of the Church, it is surprising that he was not chosen as a Boyle Lecturer. At first glance, it seems he should have been an ideal candidate. The simplest explanation might just be that Ray was no longer a clergyman. As Chapter 6 will discuss, Boyle’s will stipulated that each lecturer be a “learned divine, or preaching minister.”7 Although Ray still fitted this bill as a “learned divine,” it is

5 John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (London, 1691), 125-6. 6 Ibid., 126. 7 John Henry has alerted me to the fact that the terms of Robert Boyle’s will may have intended “learned divine” in a formal sense, meaning a divine as a professional theologian, employed at a 253 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

possible that his refusal to conform to the Established Church would have made him a controversial choice. He also would have been the oldest lecturer, six and nine years older than Richard Kidder and John Williams respectively. All the other lecturers were born from 1660 onwards, making the Boyle Lectureship a site of display for young, up and coming clergymen.

3. Ray’s Natural Theology

The Wisdom of God consisted of the sermons preached at Trinity College in the 1650s “enlarged” with some additional material written by others on the same subject in the intervening decades. The gap of some thirty years in between preaching the sermons and publishing the work is intriguing. While the sermons place Ray within the same context as the Cambridge Platonists, the publication date suggests a concern with some of the same issues as the Boyle Lecturers. On the one hand, Ray viewed The Wisdom of God as a return to his true profession of divinity, and a way of serving the Church “with my Hand by Writing.”8 It is possible that he simply decided it was about time he did so. On the other hand, the particular context of the early 1690s may have forced his hand. Isabel Rivers notes that the period of 1690 to 1730 witnessed “the publication of freethinking works which questioned the bases of both natural and revealed religion, sometimes turning the epistemological arguments of the orthodox against them.” The task of the natural theologian “came to seem much more pressing” at this time.9 Finally, although challenges to the Church of England and Christianity in general were always present, the particular nature of these challenges changed over time. John Ray did not seem to concern himself with controversies among Christians, much like Robert Boyle, and so perhaps did not feel the need to publish this work until serious challenges from outside the Church arose.

university. However, none of the Boyle Lecturers between 1692 and 1732 were employed as professional theologians at the time of their lectures. 8 Ray, Wisdom of God, unpaginated preface. 9 Isabel Rivers, “‘Galen’s Muscles’: Wilkins, Hume, and the Educational Use of the Argument from Design,” The Historical Journal 36 (1993): 582. 254 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

a. Natural Theology as an Apologetic Discourse

The Wisdom of God was clearly an apologetic discourse, as nothing he discovered in the natural world told him anything he did not already know about God from Scripture. Instead, what Ray learned by studying nature was used to illustrate the existence and attributes of God, particularly his divine wisdom and power, and to reinforce our religious duties.

In the Preface, Ray set out his reasons for writing this work. He first acknowledged that much had already been written on the topic, and thus his contribution could be considered superfluous. For example, he cited the works of Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, Edward Stillingfleet, Samuel Parker and Robert Boyle.10 It is likely that when the original sermons were given, Ray was already familiar with some of the work of these authors. For example, Henry More’s An Antidote to Atheism was published in 1653. However, the other works quoted by Ray were published later, such as Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) and Edward Stillingfleet’s Origines Sacrae (1662).

Ray described these authors as “the most Learned Men of our time” but did not comment here on the content of their work or their general ideas. It becomes evident through the course of this work that Ray was happy to offer excerpts from various authors in support of his views, even if he did not agree with the work as a whole. Intriguingly, Ray does not mention the work of John Wilkins in this list, although he quoted extensively from Wilkins’ Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675) throughout The Wisdom of God.

Despite these very learned men having already written treatises on natural theology, John Ray believed he had something to offer, and gave five reasons for

10 This is quite a diverse set of names to be listed together. The Cambridge Platonists More and Cudworth have already been discussed in this thesis. As will be seen below, their ideas on a “plastic nature” were adopted by Ray. Stillingfleet was a theologian and clergyman who published a work of natural theology entitled Origines Sacrae in 1662. At the time Ray published this work, Stillingfleet was Bishop of Worcester. Parker was a fellow of the Royal Society of London; like Ray, he was nominated by John Wilkins, but he was never an active member. Parker was known, however, for his critique of Platonism and his defence of the idea of natural law. Unlike the other four, Boyle was not ordained, nor was he a fellow of a university. Instead, he pursued the mechanical philosophy on his own as a gentleman. 255 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

his work. Firstly, he stated that there are some things that have not yet been considered by other authors, although he did not explain what these were. Secondly, he argued that even if he was mistaken on this point, that is, if his book was not as novel as he believed, his work might be “more suitable to some Mens Apprehension, and facile to their Understandings.” This is particularly likely to be the case in comparison with Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe, which Ray quotes a number of times, and which had a reputation for being extremely dense. Thirdly, Ray suggested that his work collected together many arguments that had previously been scattered through various works, so that readers will not have to work so hard to find them. Fourthly, he acknowledged that some of his friends, who normally would not read on the topic, might buy the book for his sake, and thus the work might do some good.

It is the fifth reason offered by Ray that is the most interesting and the most significant for this thesis. As discussed above, Ray favoured the life of a naturalist over that of a clergyman, and he forfeited his fellowship at Trinity College due to his inability to subscribe to the Act of Uniformity of 1662. It seems his choice may have come back to haunt him:

I suspect my self to be obliged to Write something in Divinity, having Written so much on other Subjects: For being not permitted to serve the Church with my Tongue in Preaching, I know not but it may be my Duty to serve it with my Hand by Writing.11

Ray felt qualified to write about the topics covered in this book, perhaps more so than traditional or strict theology. Although he was ordained, he spent more of his life in pursuit of natural, rather than supernatural, knowledge. However, he did believe that this work, despite being heavily natural historical in flavour, could be considered a work of divinity.

After the Preface, the book is divided into four main sections. The first two dealt respectively with celestial and terrestrial bodies, while the last two considered the Earth (the “terraqueous globe”) and the human body in more

11 Ray, Wisdom of God, unpaginated preface. See also Mordechai Feingold, “Science as a Calling? The Early Modern Dilemma,” Science in Context 15 (2002): 103, n. 3. 256 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

detail. In addition, Ray included a number of “divine reflections and conclusions” which are scattered throughout the work. b. The Argument from Design

Ray’s work, while being “the paradigmatic British treatise on natural theology,”12 is an example of what is traditionally referred to as “physico- theology” or the argument from design.13 For some historians, it testifies to Ray’s skill in constructing an account of nature that remained compatible with orthodox interpretations of Scripture, even though he was inspired by the less than completely orthodox Henry More.14 i. Existence of God

Ray stated that his main reason for writing this work was that a belief in a deity is the foundation of all religion: “Religion being nothing but a devout Worshipping of God, or an inclination of Mind to Serve and Worship him.”15 At this point he quoted from Hebrews 11:6—“For he that cometh to God must believe that he is”—a scriptural passage that was popular among seventeenth- century natural theologians, appearing in both John Wilkins’ Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675) and Matthew Barker’s Natural Theology (1674). Ray took this to mean that establishing a belief in God is a matter that needs to be firmly settled before anything else can be discussed. Further, this matter was not the purview of divinity, strictly considered, “For as all other Sciences, so Divinity proves not, but supposes its Subject, taking it for granted,

12 John Hedley Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor, Reconstructing Nature: The Engagement of Science and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 177. 13 Peter Harrison, for example, notes that it “has long been considered the most representative example of the genre” of physico-theology. See The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 172. 14 For example, Scott Mandelbrote writes: “Ray produced a coherent natural theology in which the evidence of the heavens, geology, botany, zoology, and human anatomy suggested the providential action of a benevolent deity who was responsible for the creation of all things. He was critical of those ancient and modern authors, including Aristotle and Descartes, whose work appeared to give succour to atheists or deists.” “Ray, John.” 15 Ray, Wisdom of God, unpaginated preface. 257 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

that by natural Light, Men are sufficiently convinced of the being of a Deity.”16 Just as natural philosophy does not seek to prove the existence of nature, so divinity does not seek to prove the existence of God, but rather treats it as a starting assumption. Thus, the task of demonstrating that God does, indeed, exist is one that scholars other than theologians should deal with.

While there are supernatural demonstrations of God’s existence, such as the person of Jesus Christ and God’s word written down in Scripture, these are not available to all people, and thus “Atheistical Persons” can dismiss them “as inward Illuminations of Mind.” Fortunately, the existence of God can be demonstrated by the Light of Nature and the Works of Creation, and such arguments are “not to be denied or questioned by any” and thus “are most effectual to convince all that deny or doubt of it.”17 In addition, these arguments are intelligible to those with the least understanding:

For you may hear illiterate Persons of the lowest Rank of the Commonalty affirming, that they need no Proof of the being of a God, for that every Pile of Grass, or Ear of Corn, sufficiently proves that. For, say they, All the men of the World cannot make such a thing as one of these; and if they cannot do it, who can, or did make it but God? To tell them that it made it self, or sprung up by chance, would be as ridiculous as to tell the greatest Philosopher so.18

This is the major theme of The Wisdom of God: showing that everything in creation is so complex and well formed for particular purposes that it must have been created by a wise and intelligent being. Before going into detail, however, Ray introduced an interlude on mechanical hypotheses. It was necessary for Ray to demolish any idea that the world could have been created by natural means or the workings of chance, as his natural theology depended on the argument that design could only come about through intelligence.

There is no greater, at least no more palatable and convincing Argument of the Existence of a Deity than the admirable Art and Wisdom that discovers itself in the make and constitution, the order and disposition,

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 258 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

the ends and uses of all the parts and members of this stately fabrick of Heaven and Earth. For if in the works of Art, as for example; a curious Edifice or Machine, counsel, design, and direction to an end appearing in the whole frame and in all the several pieces of it, do necessarily infer the being and operation of some intelligent Architect or Engineer, why shall not also in the Works of Nature, that Grandeur and Magnificence, that excellent contrivance for Beauty, Order, Use, &c. which is observable in them, wherein they do as much transcend the Effect of human Art as infinite Power and Wisdom exceeds finite, infer the existence and efficiency of an Omnipotent and All-wise Creator?19

Ray was concerned with “Atheistical Persons” who attempt to evade the force of this argument by providing alternative accounts of the origin of the world. Those in Ray’s sights here included the usual targets to which much of seventeenth-century natural theology was directed, most notably the Epicurean and Cartesian philosophies. Firstly, he dismissed Aristotle’s idea that the world existed from eternity, self-existent and unproduced. In this section Ray referred the reader to a printed sermon by John Tillotson as well as John Wilkins’ Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion. Secondly, Ray addressed the Epicurean hypothesis that the world was produced by chance from the two self- existent principles of space and matter. Again, he referred the reader to responses in existing works, including Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe and Edward Stillingfleet’s Origines Sacrae. However, he did offer some of his own arguments as well. In particular, he drew an analogy between the works of nature and the works of human art: “If the Works of Nature are better, more exact and perfect than the Works of Art, and Art effects nothing without Reason; neither can the Works of Nature be thought to be effected without Reason.”20 That is, just as works of human art and construction are acknowledged to have an intelligence or reason behind them, so too must the works of nature, because on close examination, the works of nature are even more beautiful and perfect than the works of human art.

This argument is again one that would not have worked as well before the seventeenth century. Seeing the sharp distinction between human and natural artifice relied on the microscope, which was not in common use before this

19 Ibid., 11-12. 20 Ibid., 17. 259 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

time. When Ray began to examine the works of creation in more detail, he quoted John Wilkins on how the microscope had shown the vast difference between natural and artificial things:

Whatever is natural beheld through that appears exquisitely formed, and adorned with all imaginable Elegancy and Beauty… Whereas the most curious Works of Art, the sharpest and finest Needle doth appeal as a blunt rough Bar of Iron, coming from the Furnace or the Forge: the most accurate engravings or embossments seem such rude, bungling and deformed Work, as if they had been done with a Mattock or a Trowel, so vast a different is there betwixt the Skill of Nature, and the Rudeness and Imperfection of Art.21

Ray considered this issue to be so straightforward that “A wonder then it must needs be, that there should be any man found so stupid and forsaken of reason as to persuade himself, that this most beautiful and adorned World was or could be produced by the fortuitous concourse of Atomes.”22 If the world was created by a divine designer, then God must indeed exist. ii. Correct Conception of God

However, Ray does not stop with the existence of God. His discourse also aimed to demonstrate some of God’s principal attributes, namely his infinite power and wisdom, from the variety, design and continuing sustenance of Creation. Thus, in his discourse on the mechanical philosophy, Ray also addressed the Cartesians, whom he accused of being “professed theists” with an incorrect conception of God, “who endeavour to disarm us of this decretory Weapon [the argument from design]; to evacuate and exterminate this Argument which hath been so successful in all Ages to demonstrate the existence, and enforce the belief of a Deity.”23 This is done by excluding all consideration of final causes from natural philosophy upon the pretence that they are undiscoverable by us, and “that it is rashness and arrogance in us to think we can find out God’s Ends

21 Ibid., 41. As noted in Chapter 5, Wilkins derived this argument from Robert Hooke’s Micrographia. 22 Ibid., 18. 23 Ibid., 20. 260 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

and be partakers of his Counsels;”24 and by pretending to solve all the phenomena of nature and to give an account of the production of everything by matter “so and so divided and moved.”25 Here, Ray referred the reader again to Cudworth’s True Intellectual System, quoting a lengthy passage that included a description of atheists “laughing in their Sleeves, and not a little triumphing to see the Cause of Theism thus betrayed by its professed Friends and Assertors, and the grand Argument for the same totally slurred by them and so their work done, as it were, to their hands.”26 Thus, like the Cambridge Platonists, Ray apparently thought it was worse to be a professed theist with a wrong conception of God than to not believe in God at all.

Against the Cartesian hypothesis, Ray asserted that there are phenomena in nature that cannot be explained or “salved” without consideration of final causes and the inclusion of some vital principle. In this list he included phenomena such as gravity, “or the tendency of Bodies downward;” the motion of the diaphragm in respiration; and the systole and diastole of the heart, “which is nothing but a Muscular Constriction and Relaxation and therefore not mechanical but vital.”27 Ray agreed with Cudworth that the pulse of the heart is a vital, not mechanical, motion, “because it is not under the command of the Will, nor are we conscious of any Power to cause or to restrain it, but it is carried on and continued without our knowledge or notice.”28

Even the great Robert Boyle came under attack by Ray for his mechanical hypothesis stating that the universe was created and is sustained by laws of motion acting on matter. Ray did not agree with this, believing instead that an intelligent being is necessary to execute the Laws of Motion. He argued that continual motion requires a continuing efficient cause, and that even if matter is divided into the subtlest parts imaginable, moving as swiftly as might be desired,

24 Ibid., 21. 25 Ibid., 23. 26 Ibid., 26. 27 Ibid., 26. 28 Ibid., 30. 261 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

It is but a sensless and stupid Being still, and makes no nearer approach to Sense, Perception, or vitail Energy than it had before… And as for any external Laws or established Rules of Motion, the stupid Matter is not capable of observing or taking notice of them; neither can those Laws execute themselves.29

Thus, for Ray, there needed to be something besides matter and law: either a quality or power in matter, or some external intelligent agent, being either God or some “plastic nature.” Ray dismissed the notion of an inherent quality in matter as “hard to conceive” and as for the external agent, he leaned towards the notion of the “Plastick Nature” for the reasons set out by Cudworth in The True Intellectual System. For example, he argued that it would not be fitting for God to do all the menial work in the universe without making use of subordinate agents, and any “errors and bungles” in nature cannot be accounted the work of God.

Ray also employed natural historical resources to illustrate God’s power and wisdom. Establishing the multitude of God’s works was the first and shortest part of Ray’s treatise. He began with the notion that the number of fixed stars is acknowledged to be infinite, and that each star, like our Sun, is circled by planets. Each planet, like the Earth, is furnished with a great variety of creatures. This argument would not have held the same force even just a hundred years earlier. As Ray acknowledged, the use of the telescope had shown just how many fixed stars there are, particularly as it showed the Milky Way to be composed of a great number of individual stars. Also, the idea of each star being a sun with circling planets depended on the Copernican hypothesis.30

Further, estimating the number of species of creatures on the earth, something Ray did in some detail over the course of several pages, would have been aided by the increasing popularity of natural history at this time, as well as information about previously unknown species coming from the voyages of discovery to the New World. This very large number of species was, for Ray,

29 Ibid., 33-34 30 Ibid., 1-11. 262 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

evidence of the power and wisdom of God. As he wrote, a human artificer is recognised to have greater skill if he can make more than one type of machine or “engine.” “If the number of Creatures be so exceeding great, how great nay immense must needs be the Power and Wisdom of him who form’d them all!”31 Additionally, God, in his power and wisdom, created not only a multitude of creatures, but also varying ways of accomplishing the one purpose. For example, birds have feathered wings in order to fly, but insects and bats achieve the same purpose through a different mechanism.

Even the limits of human knowledge were an advantage for illustrating God’s majesty. If our existing limited knowledge demonstrates the wisdom and power of God, much more so will the increase of knowledge in the future. For example, telescopes had shown the immense number of stars in the universe. Stronger telescopes invented in the future might show still more stars, further emphasising God’s immense power. Thus, if we may acknowledge God to be great on the basis of what is known at the present time, how much greater will he seem when we can fully understand his works? iii. Correct Response to God

However, proving the wisdom and power of God was not Ray’s final aim either. As with Wilkins, it is not enough to establish the existence and attributes of God unless this leads to the proper response of worship. Thus, Ray’s ultimate aim was to stir up and increase in his readers the “affections and habits of Admiration, Humility and Gratitude.” In this, Ray took his cue from the “Holy Psalmist,” who was frequently inspired to praise God when considering His works. This example, Ray believed, “may warrant me in doing the like, and justifie the denominating such a Discourse as this, rather Theological than Philosophical.”32

31 Ibid., 8. 32 Ibid., unpaginated preface. 263 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

This designation is curious. Although Ray began with a text from Scripture, and included theological reflections throughout, the work is thoroughly natural historical. Ray explained that he limited his selection of examples due to his own limitations (citing the opinion from Ecclesiastes 3:11, that no one can comprehend all the works of God) as well as the consideration of the reader, “which after a short confinement to one sort of Dish, is apt to loath it, though never so wholesome; and which at first was most pleasant and acceptable.”33 One may wonder, however, how long this work would have ended up being if Ray had given himself free rein. As it is, The Wisdom of God consists of two hundred and fifty pages of densely packed observations of nature.

However, Ray’s overall aim was to encourage worship, a pursuit surely belonging to divinity. He viewed the increase in natural knowledge as leading to a better understanding of God’s creation, and therefore to a better understanding of how we are to worship him. For Ray, the primary purpose of the creation is to bring glory to its Creator. Some may object that this is “selfish” of God, “to make the World and all the Creatures therein, only for his own Honour, and to be Praised by Man.”34 However, Ray believed that it was reasonable for God to intend his own glory: “For he being Infinite in all excellencies and Perfections, and Independent upon any other Being; nothing can be said or thought of him too great, and which he may not justly challenge as his Due.”35

Ray concluded his work with three practical inferences drawn from his discourse on the body of man. Firstly, we should “give thanks to Almighty God for the Perfection and Integrity of our Bodies.”36 Secondly, since God made our bodies, we should use them in service of him. Thirdly, we should “hence duly learn to prize and value our Souls.”37 If the body is so special, as Ray’s treatise demonstrated, how much more special is the soul? As Ray wrote, in the

33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 131. 35 Ibid., 133. 36 Ibid., 223. 37 Ibid., 239. 264 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

tradition of the Cambridge Platonists, “The body is but the dark Lanthorn, the Soul or Spirit is the Candle of the Lord that burns in it.”38 c. Reason and Revelation

As with the other natural theologians discussed in this thesis, revelation endured as a major theme for Ray. Although he was providing arguments for God’s existence and attributes drawn from nature, he did not neglect revelation. He was actually using his natural theology to support and explain Scripture.

Throughout The Wisdom of God, Ray included and elaborated on biblical passages. For example, he began the main body of his work with a text that set the scene for the whole book—“How Manifold are thy Works O Lord? In Wisdom hast thou made them all” (Psalm 104:24)—and then proceeded to illustrate this with detailed examples of the multitude of God’s works. Similarly, in making the practical inference about using our God-made bodies to serve him, Ray surveyed a number of scriptural passages concerned with serving God with our bodies, and using them for his service instead of for sin. For example, he cited Romans 6:13: “Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin, but as instruments of righteousness unto God.”39

4. Articulating Natural Philosophy and Theology: A Priest

of Nature

Ray is famous even today for his proclamation that “Divinity is my profession,” but he was reluctant to take up a clerical living. He argued that “I know of no occupation which is more worthy or more delightful for a free man than to contemplate the beauteous works of Nature and to honour the infinite wisdom and goodness of God the Creator.”40 Thus, even when a living was available that also offered attractive botanical opportunities, he was loath to “bid farewell to

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., 226. 40 John Ray, Flora of Cambridgeshire, ed. and trans. A. H. Ewen and Cecil T. Prime (Hitchin: Wheldon and Wesley, 1975), 26. Quoted in Mandelbrote, “Ray, John.” 265 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

my beloved and pleasant studies and employments, and give myself up to the priesthood.”41 However, he was eventually forced to do so. In 1658 he lamented that he “must of necessity enter into orders or else live at great uncertainties,” and resolved “to make it my business to execute the priest’s office.”42 As Peter Harrison has pointed out, Ray understood that this meant relinquishing his natural philosophical pursuits: “I shall bid farewell to my beloved pleasant studies and employments, and give myself up to the priesthood.”43 However, after his refusal to take the Oath of Uniformity, it seems that Ray turned to the study of nature as his profession. After declining the position of Secretary of the Royal Society in 1678, he wrote to John Aubrey:

True it is Sir, that Divinity is my Profession, yet not lately by me undertaken, but before I left the University, which is now more than 16 years agoe. The study of plants I never lookt upon as my businesse more than I doe now, but my diversion only; which yet since I am not qualified to serve God and my generation in my proper function, I have been more bold to bestow a good proportion of my time on.44

By the time Ray published The Wisdom of God in 1691, he had already exerted much effort in pursuit of natural knowledge, and, as we shall see below, firmly believed that there was sufficient time in a man’s life to pursue both divinity and natural history. He viewed this work as a return to his true profession of divinity.

In doing so, Ray was identifying himself as a “priest of nature,” in the tradition of Johannes Kepler and Robert Boyle, interpreting the book of nature for his fellow mankind. One key point about Ray’s natural theology, however, was the idea that arguments from nature are open to all—“these Proofs taken from Effects and Operations, exposed to every Mans view, not to be denied or

41 Susan McMahon, “John Ray (1627-1705) and the Act of Uniformity 1662,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 54 (2000): 163. 42 John Ray, Further Correspondence of John Ray, ed. J. E. B. Major (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), 16. Quoted in Feingold, “Science as a Calling?” 94-5. 43 Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 180. See also Feingold, “Science as a Calling?” 95. 44 Ray, Further Correspondence, 159. Quoted in Feingold, “Science as a Calling?” 103. 266 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

questioned by any, are more effectual to convince all that deny or doubt of it.”45 This seems to imply that evidence from the natural world is open to all people, and at fist glance might contradict Harrison’s ideas about the priest of nature being “ordained” through the study of natural philosophy:

From the outset, physico-theology was intended to represent a combination of natural philosophy and theology—a form of theologising, yes, but one that could only be conducted by those with expertise in natural philosophy and, increasingly, natural history.46

However, the two ideas need not be exclusive. After all, the Bible is available to all, but priests and other ministers of the Word are still helpful for explaining its meaning and application. A work like The Wisdom of God might then be a matter of equipping people to properly see God in the world. Further, the priest of nature could employ resources from the works of God to explicate the Word of God, as Ray did with regard to Scriptures detailing God’s manifold works and our Christian duty of worship.47

Ray even believed that the study of nature could be an integral part of that life after death to which Christians should look forward:

It may be (for ought I know, and as some Divines have thought) part of our business and employment in Eternity to contemplate the Works of God, and give him the Glory of his Wisdom, Power and Goodness manifested in the Creation of them. I am sure it is part of the business of a Sabbath-day, and the Sabbath is a Type of that eternal Rest; for the Sabbath seems to have been first instituted for a commemoration of the Works of the Creation, from which God is said to have rested upon the Seventh Day.48

At the very least, it is most certainly an act of divinity to study God’s works. Ray interpreted Psalm 111:2 as applying also to God’s work in nature: “The works of the Lord are great, sought out of all them that have pleasure therein. Which though it be principally spoken of the Works of Providence, yet may as well be

45 Ray, Wisdom of God, unpaginated preface. 46 Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences,” 180. 47 See Section 3c above. 48 Ray, Wisdom of God, 124. 267 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

verified of the Works of Creation.”49 He did not think those who are “designed to Divinity it self” should

fear to look into these Studies, or think they will engross their whole time, and that no considerable Progress can be made therein, unless men lay aside and neglect their ordinary Callings, and necessary Employments. No such matter. Our Life is long enough, and we might find time enough, did we husband it well.50

In this way, Ray articulated a particular relationship between theology and natural philosophy. Against critics who might argue that one could be devoted to either the study of God or the study of nature, Ray maintained that one lifetime provides ample opportunity for both, as long as one’s time is managed properly. Crucially, however, it was Ray’s natural theology that allowed him to make such a statement. By showing how the study of nature could be employed to illustrate the existence and attributes of God, as well as the religious duties required of mankind, Ray provided a cogent argument for the importance and validity of the pursuit of natural knowledge. As Robert Markley has put it, “Ray’s argument is unambiguous: natural philosophy is valuable precisely because it provides a more efficient means than mere theological speculation ‘to trace the Footstep’s of [God’s] Wisdom in the Composition, Order, [and] Harmony’ of the world.”51

5. Conclusion

Although John Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation was one of the most significant natural theological treatises of the seventeenth century, it was not simply a rehearsal of the argument from design. While Ray applied his vast natural historical expertise to the task of illustrating God’s existence and attributes, he went much further than this, articulating a particular connection between theology and natural philosophy. Ray’s natural theological kaleidoscope was set with the presupposition that the pursuit of

49 Ibid., 125. 50 Ibid., 127. 51 Robert Markley, Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian England, 1660- 1740 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 121. 268 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Third Historical Interlude

natural knowledge was a fitting activity for any Christian, even one who was ordained in the Church. Further, he believed that the mechanical philosophy, when taken to its logical conclusion, served to exclude God’s activity from the universe. The resources Ray employed were coloured by these presuppositions, even if he had drawn them from people with differing perspectives on these issues.

The example of Ray serves to illustrate the model of natural theology presented in this thesis. The Wisdom of God was a response to issues arising from the intersection of theology and natural philosophy, and the turmoil within each of these disciplines. The particular natural philosophical context of the seventeenth century provided not only an impetus to Ray’s work, but also many resources for him to employ. Although he was not responding directly or explicitly to the theological and religious conflicts that characterised seventeenth-century England, these nevertheless impacted on his work, if only to the extent that he was freed to pursue his natural historical interests. While the initial prompt for the ideas presented in The Wisdom of God was the context of Interregnum Cambridge, the publication of the book in 1691 indicates that Ray was also responding to challenges to Christianity thrown up at that time. By publishing at this time, Ray was in company with the clergymen who presented in Robert Boyle’s lectureship, and it is to this group that we now turn.

269 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

CHAPTER 6

THE BOYLE LECTURES

For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse.

Romans 1:20 (King James Version).

1. Introduction

The Boyle Lectures are commonly viewed as the paradigmatic example of seventeenth-century English natural theology, which, in turn, is seen as a platform for a Newtonian legitimation of the post-1688 social hierarchy. Margaret Jacob, along with her mentor Henry Guerlac, points to the Boyle Lectures as a vehicle for disseminating latitudinarian natural religion as a device for maintaining social stability in imitation of the Newtonian universe. John Gascoigne and Neal C. Gillespie both follow Margaret Jacob to some extent in aligning natural theology with the Newtonian philosophy. Gascoigne writes that although natural theology could take a number of different forms, it was especially popular when linked with Newton.1 Gillespie argues that during the 1680s and 1690s, natural history and natural theology “were merged into a single powerful instrument of religious and social apologetics” as part of the formation of what Jacob has called the “Newtonian ideology.”2 Similarly, Peter Hess writes that “not only did Newtonianism become a key ingredient of the political theory and social structure of Augustan England, but it strongly affected the arguments advanced for the existence of God by students of his

1 John Gascoigne, “From Bentley to the Victorians: The Rise and Fall of British Newtonian Natural Theology,” Science in Context 2 (1988): 219-256. 2 Neal C. Gillespie, “Natural History, Natural Theology, and Social Order: John Ray and the ‘Newtonian Ideology’,” Journal of the History of Biology 20 (1987): 3. 270 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

physics.”3 Writing with regard to the Boyle Lectures in particular, Hess argues that

By comprehending the full significance of the Newtonian paradigm change and appropriating it to theological use, they completed the process begun by Charleton in “baptizing” atomism and by Wilkins in including Copernicanism and probabilistic reasoning within the scope of natural theology. Whereas the Caroline divines had sought defense from the theoretical spectre of atheism in Aristotelian cosmology, the Boyle lecturers were fortifying their ramparts with Newtonianism.4

Other historians have cast doubt on this Newtonian appellation traditionally bestowed on the Boyle Lectures. Larry Stewart, for example, exhibits some sympathy for Jacob’s thesis, but acknowledges that not all the Boyle Lecturers were Newtonian.5 Christopher Kenny, in the most thorough treatment of the Boyle Lectures to date, has demonstrated that even those lecturers usually designated as Newtonian were not promoting a Newtonian social ideology, but were instead employing specific resources in defence of religion.6 While these resources included, at times, natural philosophical concepts, the range of resources was by no means limited to Newtonian physics.

More importantly, the model of natural theology presented in this thesis encourages a re-examination of the Boyle Lectures that is sensitive to the diversity of approaches among the different lecturers, taking into account the particular challenges to which each was responding, and the resources that were drawn upon in each case. This is not inconsistent with the case put forward by

3 Peter M. Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God in English Natural Theology from Hooker to Paley,” (PhD dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, 1993), 192. 4 Ibid., 229-30. By “Caroline divines,” Hess is referring to natural theologians during the reign of Charles I, as well as his predecessor James I, whom he identifies as being primarily Aristotelian. See Hess, “The Natural Theology of the Early Stuart Period: Aristotelianism Ascendant,” chapter 2 in “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God.” 5 Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain, 1660-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Stewart argues that “The early adherents of Newton soon seized the opportunity of this annual series of eight sermons,” [64] but note that this statement indicates an employment of the lectureship by some of Newton’s followers, rather than a wholesale adoption of Newtonianism by all of the lecturers. Further, Stewart points out that the Newtonian lecturers were an “impressive minority:” “For the most part, however, many of the Boyle lectures had very little scientific content, often merely referring to the common argument from design.” [65] 6 Christopher Joseph Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy in Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth-Century Britain,” (PhD dissertation, The University of Leeds, 1996). 271 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Kenny, but rather extends his argument to consider natural theology, and the Boyle Lectures, more broadly. Not only are the Boyle Lectures themselves not “Newtonian” in character, but English natural theology as a whole cannot be identified with Newtonian natural philosophy either. We are well placed to acknowledge this at present, having examined case studies of two quite different brands of English natural theology that pre-dated Newton’s Principia.

The four Boyle Lecturers most commonly dealt with in the history of science are Richard Bentley, John Harris, Samuel Clarke and William Derham. These four are the ones who could be considered natural philosophers as well as clergymen (along with William Whiston, who is sometimes left out of treatments of the Boyle Lectures since his sermons concerned biblical prophecy rather than natural philosophy) so it is not surprising that historians of science have focused on them. However, taking these four out of the context of the whole group leads to a distorted perspective on the Boyle Lectureship, such as the Newtonian focus mentioned above. It is not possible to make judgments about “The Boyle Lectures” by considering just a few lecturers who seem, on the surface, to conform to some pre-established ideal of Newtonian or latitudinarian natural theology. After all, in the first forty years of the Boyle Lectures, twenty-one clergymen presented thirty-one series of sermons.7 By taking into account all of the Boyle Lectures presented during this time, a very different picture begins to emerge. Rather than a platform for promoting a Newtonian socio-political hierarchy, the Boyle Lectures represent a continuation of the tradition of natural theology. These lectures form yet another example of what we have termed an inflection point in the history of English natural theology: a time when, for various reasons that will be outlined below, there was a fairly concentrated outpouring of natural theological discourse, aimed at a variety of enemies and challengers of the Established Church and the Christian religion, and employing

7 There is some indication that Richard Bentley was appointed as Boyle Lecturer for a second series in 1694 (John J. Dahm, “Science and Apologetics in the Early Boyle Lectures,” Church History 39 (1970): 174), but the topic of these sermons is unknown, and the lectures were not published, nor were they included in Gilbert Burnet’s abridged edition of 1737 or Sampson Letsome and John Nicholl’s collected edition of 1739. 272 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

a range of theological and natural philosophical resources chosen for specific purposes by each lecturer.8

2. Historical Dimension a. Religion and Politics after the Glorious Revolution

By contrast with the toleration and push for comprehension of the early Restoration period, the later 1670s and early 1680s witnessed the rise of a group of clergy zealously committed to the unity of the Church of England and the Stuart monarchy. These clergy were generally High Church in terms of religion and Tory in politics. However, there was still a low-church faction in favour of toleration and comprehension for moderate dissenters. One thing the two groups had in common was that since the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy, Anglican clergymen had preached the twin doctrines of divine right and passive obedience. This worked well as long as the monarch remained an Anglican, committed to the Church of England. In 1685, Charles II was succeeded by his Catholic brother James, and it became apparent to the clergy that loyalty to the Church would place them in opposition to the King. As Margaret Jacob has put it,

After 1685 churchmen could not reconcile their insistence on divine right and passive obedience with their abhorrence of Rome, and increasingly they found themselves preaching against Catholic doctrine and practice while at the same time avowing their support for James II’s legitimate political authority.9

The replacement of James II with the Protestant William and Mary had a profound effect on the Church of England. Both Charles II and James II preferred to appoint bishops with High Church principles. After the Revolution,

8 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of the Boyle Lectures are from A Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion: Being a Collection of the Sermons Preached at the Lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq; (From the Year 1691 to the Year 1732), ed. Sampson Letsome and John Nicholl (London, 1739), 3 vols. Citations will be given by author name, volume and page number. A full list of all the Boyle Lectures from 1692 to 1732 is provided in the appendix. 9 Margaret C. Jacob, The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 73. 273 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

a large number of bishops were unable to take the oaths to the new regime, which provided William and Mary a unique opportunity to reshape the Church by appointing a group of men with distinctly low-church views. Many of these men had been part of the various campaigns for comprehension and toleration during the Restoration, as well as opponents of Catholicism during the reign of James II. These low churchmen argued that the Church had no particular authority over political allegiance, and supported comprehension for moderate nonconformists and toleration for others. They also placed a greater emphasis on social reform and morality than on doctrine.10

Despite the upheaval of the Revolution, the natural theology of the post- Revolution period bears remarkable similarity to that of the Restoration. Natural theologians were still overwhelmingly concerned with defending Christianity against attacks from the outside rather than being concerned with a particular version of Christianity. As we shall see below, there were some works directed against members of the church who were thought to be providing succour to challenging groups such as the deists and Socinians, but even this seems to indicate that preserving Christianity as a religion was more important to natural theologians than the specific Church of England. This trend is also observed among the Boyle Lecturers. Of course, these natural theologians were forbidden by the terms of Boyle’s will to descend to controversies among Christians, but they obeyed this order so assiduously that they did not even attack Catholics, although atheists and deists received much vitriol. b. Natural Philosophy and the Rise of Newtonianism

Like the Restoration period, natural philosophy in post-Revolution England was part of the “consolidation” period of the Scientific Revolution identified by John Schuster. In the period from 1650 to 1690, a loose consensus had formed around the experimental corpuscular-mechanical natural philosophy. The Royal Society of London continued to function as a meeting-ground for scientifically minded individuals who sought to further their understanding of

10 For an overview of the Glorious Revolution, see Steve Pincus, “The Glorious Revolution,” History Compass 1 (2003), BI 003, 1-6; and John Spurr, The Restoration Church of England, 1646-1689 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), especially 80-104; 274 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

the workings of the natural world. However, there was one key difference, and that was the advent of Newtonianism.

Perhaps the greatest problem in physical astronomy in the seventeenth century was the problem of the planetary orbits. While Copernicus, Brahe, Galileo, and Kepler had removed the planets from their crystalline spheres and argued that the earth revolved around a stationary but rotating sun, the orbits of the planets could not yet be explained in mathematical terms. Several members of the Royal Society—Robert Hooke, Christopher Wren and Edmund Halley—had speculated that there must be a measurable cosmic force holding the planets in elliptical orbits around the sun, but they were not able to provide a mathematical demonstration. Halley turned to Isaac Newton for help in 1684, and although he claimed to have calculated gravity’s force years earlier, Newton had apparently mislaid his papers and so spent the next three years retracing his steps in working out the mathematical proof for the law of universal gravitation. 11 Drawing on the work of Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, and Gassendi, Newton provided a whole new framework for understanding the physical world, based on a mathematical explanation of the behaviour of all moving objects in space, whether on earth or in the heavens. With his law of universal gravitation, Newton had succeeded in replacing the Aristotelian dual system of the heavens and the earth with a unified physics. His results were published in 1687 in Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy). This was a great achievement, but Schuster cautions us against viewing Newton as the pinnacle of the Scientific Revolution:

Newton, it is true, redefined the consensus of the third stage whilst building upon it, with his post-mechanical philosophy of nature, reintroducing immaterial forces and powers, and with his dazzling re- working of the existing mathematical sciences—optics, mathematics and celestial and terrestrial mechanics—which he unified. But the fact of

11 See, for example, James R. Jacob, The Scientific Revolution: Aspirations and Achievements, 1500-1700 (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1998). 275 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Newton does not in itself prove that he was the teleological goal of the Scientific Revolution.12

However, Newton did play a major role in post-Revolution politics and natural philosophy. During the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, he was “undoubtedly the most influential figure in the official scientific, philosophical, and technological affairs of the nation.”13 From 1669 he was Lucasian professor of mathematics at Cambridge, and he served as one of this university’s two members in the first post-Revolution Parliament, to which he was re-elected in 1701. In 1703 he was elected president of the Royal Society of London, and he was knighted by Queen Anne in 1705. Newton also served as an advisor to the crown on mining, navigational and astronomical matters.14

Clearly, Isaac Newton was an important figure in late seventeenth-century English society, both natural philosophical and political. However, as we will examine in more detail below, we should regard with caution any attempt to characterise natural theology as Newtonian in nature. The Boyle Lectures have been particularly susceptible to this kind of interpretation, as we will see in Section 3b below, but Christopher Kenny has convincingly refuted this viewpoint. I will be building on Kenny’s work to show that the Boyle Lecturers presented a wide variety of arguments for Christianity, only a small proportion of which may be considered Newtonian.15

One further point regarding natural philosophy in the late seventeenth century that should be noted concerns its increasingly public persona. The experimental focus of the Royal Society emphasised the collective witnessing of

12 John A. Schuster, “The Scientific Revolution,” in Companion to the History of Modern Science, ed. R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie and M. J. S. Hodge (London: Routledge, 1990), 240. 13 Steven Shapin, “Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes,” Isis 72 (1981): 190. 14 For a brief overview of Newton’s life, see Peter Ackroyd, Isaac Newton (London: Vintage Books, 2007). For an excellent discussion of the various interpretations of Newton’s life and works, see Patricia Fara: Newton: The Making of Genius (London: Macmillan, 2003). 15 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy.” The purpose of Kenny’s thesis is to show that even the lecturers most commonly designated as Newtonian (namely, Richard Bentley, John Harris and Samuel Clarke) were not engaged in a systematic propagation of a Newtonian ideology. My thesis considers the Boyle Lecturers as a whole group in light of the kaleidoscopic model of natural theology. 276 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

results as well as presentation of the new “science” to the wider society by way of public lectures.16 The Boyle Lectures are unique amongst the various types of natural theology discussed in this thesis for being presented orally in the first instance, and only afterwards published in text form, both individually and collectively. Just as the rise of natural philosophical lectures indicates a move towards a public articulation of natural knowledge, the Boyle Lectures reflect Robert Boyle’s desire for a public demonstration of the validity of Christianity. c. Post-Revolution Natural Theology

While this chapter is focusing on the Boyle Lectures, these were not the only examples of natural theology published in post-Revolution England. The Boyle Lectures have traditionally been associated with Newtonian and low-church Anglican views, though this is a simplistic assessment that fails to take into account the wide range of perspectives represented by the lecturers. However, we will also see that natural theology more broadly considered was not universally associated with Newtonian natural philosophy or latitudinarianism.

There were a number of natural philosophers who wrote natural theological works at this time, and some of these were influenced by Newtonianism. For example, George Cheyne published Philosophical Principles of Religion, Natural and Revealed in 1715. Cheyne was a physician, but he was interested in Newtonian natural philosophy. John Ray and Nehemiah Grew, who were both primarily engaged in botanical research, also wrote significant natural theological works. We examined John Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691) in the Third Historical Interlude. Grew’s Cosmologia Sacra, or, A Discourse of the Universe as it is the Creature and Kingdom of God (1701) consisted of an elaborate proof of God’s existence on natural philosophical grounds, as well as a defence of the divine revelation of the Christian Scriptures. A dissenting voice from the natural philosophical consensus came from Robert Greene, whose A Demonstration of the Truth and

16 On experimentation, see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). On the public articulation of natural philosophy more broadly, see Stewart, The Rise of Public Science. 277 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Divinity of the Christian Religion (1711) and The Principles of Natural Philosophy (1712) both aimed to undermine the claims of theologians who downplayed the role of the Church as interpreter of Scripture, and aimed to replace the dominant mechanical philosophy, which he viewed as promoting materialism.

Robert Greene was a Tory in his political views, the party associated with opposition to the Glorious Revolution. Engagement with natural theology was not limited to the Whigs or the low churchmen who supported the change in monarch. Works of natural theology by nonjuring clergymen included An Explication of the Gospel-Theism and the Divinity of the Christian Religion, Containing the True Account of the System of the Universe, and of the Christian Trinity (1706) by Richard Brocklesby and two works by Robert Jenkin: The Reasonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion (1696) and A Brief Confutation of the Pretences Against Natural and Revealed Religion (1702). Finally, there was a significant work by John Cockburn, which even rated a mention by William Derham in his Boyle Lectures: An Enquiry into the Nature, Necessity, and Evidence of Christian Faith, in Several Essays (1696). Derham described this work as pursuing a kind of “physico-theological” approach, though only in a piecemeal fashion.

While there were a variety of natural theological works published in post- Revolution England, the Boyle Lectures provide an interesting and convenient case study. In a sense, they are like a microcosm or a sub-culture of the broader natural theological tradition at this time. Once we examine the lectureship as a whole, we will see that the Low Church and Newtonian designation does not hold, as Christopher Kenny has also argued. Instead, the Boyle Lecturers were characterised by a variety of approaches to one task: proving the Christian religion against “notorious infidels.” d. The Founding of the Boyle Lectureship

The Boyle Lectures were named after the devout Christian natural philosopher Robert Boyle. In a codicil to his will dated 28 July, 1691, Boyle established a provision for an annual series of sermons “for proving the Christian religion 278 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

against notorious infidels, viz. Atheists, Theists, Pagans, Jews and Mahometans, not descending lower to any controversies, that are among Christians themselves.”17 Boyle died on 31 December 1691, and though he was apparently aware of his failing health, the description of the lectureship makes it clear that he intended it to begin within his lifetime.18

Boyle’s religious and natural philosophical views are well known today,19 and they were recognised by the clergymen selected to participate in his lectureship. Several of the lecturers commented on Boyle’s piety, his views on the relations of theology and natural philosophy, and his motivation for instituting the lectureship. Samuel Clarke described Boyle as “a Person no less zealously solicitous for the Propagation of true Religion, and the Practice of Piety and Virtue; than diligent and successful in improving Experimental Philosophy, and inlarging our Knowledge of Nature.”20 In his sermons on The Incomparable Excellency of the Christian Religion, Josiah Woodward was concerned that “mentioning the tremendous Name of God” always be marked with “awful Veneration,” something that was notable about Robert Boyle, “whom I never observed to mention that Great and Holy Name, even in common Discourse,

17 Robert Boyle, The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas Birch (London, 1772), 1:clxvii. By “theist,” Boyle seems to have meant what would be now referred to as “deist.” This point is borne out by the preface to Samuel Bradford’s Boyle Lectures of 1699. He quoted this part of Boyle’s will, but replaced “theist” with “deist,” which he defined as “those who are not sunk so much below human Nature, as to call into Question the Author of their Beings, or to deny that Providence by which the World is governed, and themselves and all Things in it preserved and taken care of: But yet pretend to disbelieve, or at least doubt concerning the Christian Revelation.” Samuel Bradford, 1:429. For a detailed analysis of this point, see Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 56-60. Kenny suggests that the term “theist” could also “apply to any view which implied a threat to God’s supreme control and government of the universe.” 18 For example, Boyle stated that he intended to settle an amount of money on the lectureship “in my life-time,” and while the trustees would choose the church at which the lectures would be preached, it was only after Boyle’s death that they would select the lecturer. See Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 46-47. 19 See, for example, Peter Harrison, “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy, ed. Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 165-183; idem., “Priests of the Most High God, with Respect to the Book of Nature,” in Reading God’s World: The Vocation of Scientist, ed. Angus Menuge (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2004), 59-84; Jan W. Wojcik, Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Rose-Mary Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), especially Part 2: “Being a Christian Virtuoso.” 20 Samuel Clarke, 2:60. 279 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

but with a most awful and observable Reverence.”21 Several lecturers also noted Boyle’s conviction that natural philosophy and theology could benefit each other. According to Samuel Clarke, it was Boyle’s “settled Opinion, that the Advancement and Increase of Natural Knowledge, would always be of Service to the Cause and Interest of true Religion, in Opposition to Atheists and Unbelievers of all sorts.”22 Additionally, Samuel Bradford described Boyle as “a Person who convinced the World, that Christianity is consistent with excellent natural Parts, and great Learning.”23 Boyle’s piety and views on the important relations between theology and natural philosophy were recognised as instrumental in his decision to institute the lectureship. For Clarke, Boyle’s opinion that natural knowledge would always be of service to Christianity meant that “he, in his Life-time made excellent Use of his own Observations to this purpose, in all his Writings; and made Provision after his Death, for carrying on the same Design perpetually.”24 John Clarke took particular notice of Boyle’s recognition that “the whole Creation was not only made, but is still governed, by an infinitely wise and good Being; who, according to the different Circumstances of Things and Conditions of Persons, regulates them in the best Manner possible for the Benefit of the Whole.” Boyle’s “great Skill in natural Philosophy, and thorough Knowledge of the sacred Writings of revealed Religion” rendered him an able judge on this issue, and according to Clarke, “He instituted these Lectures on purpose to have this Point clearly proved, and the Objections of all Sorts of Persons fully answered.”25

It is important to keep Robert Boyle’s views in mind with regard to the founding of the lecture series, but it would be a mistake to assume that all the lecturers continued in exactly the same vein as Boyle. As Christopher Kenny points out, the lectureship originated from Boyle’s piety, but this was not the motivating force of the subsequent lectures. Thus, it was not necessary for every lecturer to employ natural philosophy in the service of religion, as Boyle characteristically

21 Josiah Woodward, 2:502. 22 Samuel Clarke, 2:60. 23 Samuel Bradford, 1:429. 24 Samuel Clarke, 2:60. 25 John Clarke, 3:215. 280 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

did. Instead, the lecturers each brought their own speciality to the lectureship. For this reason, a wide variety of topics were covered by the lectures. While William Derham was aiming for “the Improvement of Philosophical Matters to Theological Uses,”26 Samuel Bradford aimed to “represent the Christian Revelation, that it may appear by its own Light,” as he believed that the best way of establishing truth was to make a fair and just representation of it, as truth is always discernible to the mind.27 Whereas lecturers such as Richard Bentley and John Harris employed natural philosophical resources to counter atheism, others such as John Williams and Offspring Blackall were concerned to support the Christian revelation on its own merits. These differences reflect the varying interests of the Boyle Lecturers, and the variety of ways in which they chose to fulfil Boyle’s brief to prove the Christian religion against its enemies.

Although the Boyle Lectures continued into the nineteenth century, albeit sporadically, the term generally refers to the lectures presented in the first forty years of the lectureship, from 1692 to 1732, which were published together in 1737.28 This includes the most famous Boyle Lecturers, the so-called Newtonians, Richard Bentley, John Harris, Samuel Clarke, William Derham and William Whiston, but also many lesser known lecturers. It is necessary to consider the whole range of lecturers to get the most accurate picture of the series as a whole.

In this chapter, we are considering the Boyle Lecturers as a group of natural theologians, tied together by their participation in the Boyle Lectureship. This is not meant to imply that there was any kind of established and sustained programme of natural theology or natural religion presented in the Boyle Lectures. In particular, as has been amply demonstrated by Christopher Kenny against the claims made by Margaret Jacob, there was no sustained programme of Newtonian natural theology. However, the lecturers did share a firm conviction that there is sufficient evidence, even aside from revelation in

26 William Derham, dedication to Physico-Theology, 2:559. 27 Samuel Bradford, 1:427. 28 The Boyle Lectures were re-established at St Mary-le-Bow in 2004, and now take place annually. 281 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Scripture, for the existence and attributes of God, as well as the duties of religion, so that all men are without excuse.29

3. What Natural Theology Was

It is not necessary to engage in a detailed analysis of the three lecturers generally considered to be the most significant in the history of science; that is, Richard Bentley, John Harris, and Samuel Clarke. Christopher Kenny has already provided a critical study of these stereotypically “Newtonian” lecturers, demonstrating that they were not seeking to present a coherent Newtonian socio-politico-religious system. Neither is there sufficient space here to present a full study of the other, often neglected sermons. Instead, we will consider the Boyle Lectures in light of the kaleidoscopic model of natural theology: drawing out general points from the lectures that illustrate the model, and seeing how the model in turn illuminates the lecture series in itself, and as a part of the broader tradition of English natural theology. We will see that rather than being a systematic programme of Newtonian natural religion, the Boyle Lectures were characterised by a diversity of approaches, in which each lecturer applied himself to Boyle’s brief in his own way, employing resources to deal with particular challenges in whatever way he saw fit. a. Natural Theology as an Apologetic Discourse

From Gilbert Burnet’s introduction to his 1737 edition of the first forty years of sermons, it is clear that the Boyle Lectures were considered apologetic. He wrote that his intention in producing this abridged collection was so that people “may be better enabled to give a Reason of the Faith that is in them, and be provided with proper Weapons for the Defence of it.” This echoes the words of the Apostle Peter, who exhorted Christians as follows: “in your hearts regard Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to make a defence to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you.”30 This idea of defending or providing reasons for Christian hope is at the very heart of the whole enterprise

29 This concept of all men being “without excuse” will be discussed further in Section 4, below. 30 1 Peter 3:15. 282 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

of apologetics, and has also been recognised by Christopher Kenny as characteristic of the natural theology of the Boyle Lectures, who described them as “an appeal to nature-acting-as-a-witness for the defence.”31

As we saw in Chapter 3, there are two major types of apologetics: belief forming, for unbelievers, and belief sustaining, for those who already believe. Although the Boyle Lecturers were providing arguments in support of Christianity, it is likely that their audience consisted primarily of people who already believed. The lecturers often commented on the usefulness of their work for Christians, and Gilbert Burnet edited his abridged collection of the lectures in order to aid Christians in giving a reason for their hope. Bentley wrote that his aim in refuting atheism was not only to convert unbelievers to Christianity, but also to support the beliefs of Christians. He argued that it is “expedient that we put to silence the ignorance of these foolish men, that Believers may be the more confirmed and more resolute in the Faith.”32 Kenny convincingly argues that Boyle, in outlining the brief for his lecturers, was particularly concerned with “the weaker sort of Christian, easily seduced by alien concepts and easily shaken in an ungrounded faith by the ‘proofs’ of alien theologies.”33

By considering the variety of topics upon which the Boyle Lecturers preached, it is clear that the vast majority of them were doctrines originally derived from the Christian Scriptures. For example, George Stanhope, one of the most celebrated preachers of his day, was concerned with Scriptural doctrines such as salvation through Christ, the Trinity and the Incarnation, and he described his aim as defending the Christian religion “as represented to us in the New Testament.”34 John Turner, in his 1708 lectures The Wisdom of God in the Redemption of Man, dealt with the reasonableness of God’s plan of salvation. He identified the doctrine of salvation and forgiveness through Christ’s sacrifice and mediation, as revealed in the Scriptures, as the foundation of the Christian religion.35

31 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 190. 32 Richard Bentley, 1:5. 33 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 68. 34 George Stanhope, 1:737. 35 John Turner, 2:353. 283 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

In his lectures on the confutation of atheism, John Harris explicitly identified the doctrines he dealt with as being found originally in divine revelation: “We are taught by the Scripture, those Sacred Volumes of his Will, to believe that He at first Created the World, and all things that are therein, to display his Goodness and Kindness to his Creatures.”36 However, the status of nature as the creation of God, as well as the existence and attributes of this God, could also be determined by investigating nature, as a contemplation of the “Works of Nature” must convince anyone “that they were the Products of a Divine and Almighty Power.”37 Thus, the employment of natural philosophical resources in natural theological arguments could provide an apologetic defence of doctrines originally known by revelation.

The apologetic focus of the Boyle Lectures can also be seen in the methods chosen by the lecturers to present their arguments. For example, a number of lecturers, including Richard Bentley and Samuel Clarke, explicitly stated that they were not employing arguments derived from the Christian Scriptures, since their opponents had no reason to accept the authority of the revelation. Instead, it was necessary to argue for the Christian religion based on some kind of common ground, whether the testimony of respected ancient philosophers, the use of reason, or evidence drawn from natural philosophy. This idea of using methods appropriate to the audience is also central to Christian apologetics.38 b. Natural Theology as a Loose Intellectual Tradition Situated

Between Natural Philosophy and Theology

The Boyle Lectureship, or the natural theology of the post-Revolution period more broadly considered, was not the beginning of natural theology. Instead, it was one more inflection point in the historical trajectory of natural theology,

36 John Harris, 1:379. 37 John Harris, 1:380. 38 1 Corinthians 9:21-23: “To those outside the law I became as one outside the law (not being outside the law of God but under the law of Christ) that I might win those outside the law. To the weak I became weak, that I might win the weak. I have become all things to all people, that by all means I might save some.” 284 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

which was hinted at in the work of Richard Hooker but began to take ground more firmly with the Cambridge Platonists. Additionally, the sermons of the Boyle Lectureship were neither exclusively natural philosophical nor theological in nature. Some were more theological than others, while some made more extensive use of natural philosophy, but this reflected the various ways in which the lecturers applied themselves to their task. It is also important to note that Robert Boyle’s will specified that the lecturer be a theologian or clergyman (a “learned divine, or preaching minister”), but did not require a natural philosophical qualification to be met. Thus, not all the Boyle Lecturers were natural philosophers, let alone Newtonian natural philosophers, and not all were particularly interested in natural philosophical arguments. Only three— Richard Bentley, William Derham and John Harris—were fellows of the Royal Society of London. Also, Bentley, one of the so-called Newtonian lecturers, was known more for being a classical scholar than a natural philosopher.

Further, the Boyle Lectures were not exclusively connected with any particular system of natural philosophy or theology, such as Newtonianism or latitudinarian religion. To begin with, the Lectures were not designed to be specifically Anglican in character, let alone restricted to any one faction of the Established Church. Boyle carefully referred only to “Christianity” in his provision for the lectureship, and he was notorious for his avoidance of religious controversy. Moreover, the trustees appointed to oversee the lectureship were not all adherents of the Church of England, let alone Low Church in their views. Among the four trustees, only Thomas Tenison was ordained. Henry Ashurst and John Rotherham were dissenting laymen, who were thus excluded by statute from official recognition by the established church authorities. John Evelyn was a staunch Anglican with Royalist sympathies, who “always maintained an ambiguous attitude towards the appropriation of the throne of England by an invading Monarch.”39 This can hardly be considered a united latitudinarian governance of the lectureship.40 Moreover, even if the Boyle Lectures themselves could be characterised as latitudinarian, this would not

39 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 77. 40 It is not even clear that “latitudinarian” makes a useful label in general, let alone for the Lectureship. See, for example, John Spurr, “‘Latitudinarianism’ and the Restoration Church,” The Historical Journal 31 (1988): 61-82. 285 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

mean that natural theology more broadly considered could be designated as such. After all, the Boyle Lectures, though significant, were just one part of natural theology during this period.

The Boyle Lectures have also been viewed as the paradigmatic example of Newtonian natural theology. The past few chapters have unequivocally shown that natural theology was not universally identified with any one type of natural philosophy, and even the Boyle Lectures themselves cannot be regarded as purely Newtonian in character. This perspective on the Boyle Lectures is most commonly associated with Margaret Jacob, one of its most vocal proponents.41

In an important treatment of the Boyle Lectures, Christopher Kenny has convincingly challenged Margaret Jacob’s Newtonian thesis. For example, he argues that Jacob’s approach is based on the unfounded assumption that the Trustees, Lecturers and the educated laity who formed the audience for the lectures would recognise the Newtonian worldview and appreciate its relevance to the social order. However, Kenny argues that there was no definite “Newtonianism” by 1692, the year of the inaugural Boyle Lectures, just five years after the publication of the Principia and twelve years before the publication of the more accessible Opticks.42 Even if there were an established “Newtonianism” by the time of the later lectures, this still would not help Jacob’s case, as it is not the later lectures that are generally identified as Newtonian.

While some of the lecturers did employ particular arguments drawn from Newtonian natural philosophy, not all the lecturers were interested in natural philosophy and some, such as John Turner, were fed up with the speculations of Newton’s followers, particularly concerning theological issues.43 Even the lecturers with special interest in Newtonianism did not necessary bring this into their lectures. William Whiston provides a particularly interesting case to consider here. He was a mathematician and natural philosopher, a close

41 The Jacob thesis was discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3b. 42 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 12. 43 Stewart, The Rise of Public Science, 66. 286 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

associate of Isaac Newton, and his eventual successor as Lucasian professor of mathematics at Cambridge. If the Boyle Lectures were indeed a platform for the promotion of Newtonian natural theology, it stands to reason that Whiston’s lectures would have been part of this. Instead, Whiston chose to defend Christianity by appealing to the accomplishment of prophecies contained within the Christian Scriptures.

Richard Bentley, the inaugural Boyle Lecturer, is often held up as one of the key instances of a Newtonian influence on the lectureship. For example, Peter Hess identifies Bentley’s arguments in the last three sermons as the first popular exposition of what Jacob called “theological Newtonianism,” and argues that “it constitutes his most original contribution to English natural theology, since the ‘Newtonianism’ he espoused had to forge its acceptance in the face of Cartesianism persisting even in eighteenth-century Cambridge.”44 However, not all historians agree that Bentley was promoting a systematic Newtonian natural philosophy. For example, Larry Stewart states that while Bentley was deeply interested in the theological consequences of the new philosophy, “the Newtonian philosophy was [just] one more weapon in the campaign against irreligion.”45 Also, as Kenny points out, Bentley’s Boyle Lectures were a contribution to the re-appropriation of ancient atomism by Christian philosophers who considered themselves the rightful custodians of the atomic hypothesis. While Newton’s Principia was utilised in that re-appropriation, it was not the raison d’être driving Bentley’s Boyle Sermons.

Thus, although Hess claims that “Bentley’s theological legitimation of Newtonian science would influence the thought of most of his successors in Boyle’s pulpit,” Christopher Kenny warns

The eventual success of Newton’s work and its incorporation within later natural theology ought not to be used retrospectively to characterise

44 Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God,” 214. 45 Stewart, The Rise of Public Science, 66. 287 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Bentley’s Sermons, which fitted a traditional genre—confuting irreligion by means of any strategy which ensured victory.46 c. Natural Theology as a Dynamic Discourse

By employing the model advanced in this thesis, the Boyle Lectures may be viewed as an example of the dynamic discourse of natural theology, rather than simply evidence of a low-church Newtonian natural theology. Newtonianism, though invoked by some, was simply one resource available for use by natural theologians, and therefore was not crucial to either the Boyle Lectures or to natural theology more broadly considered. It is true that a number of the Boyle Lecturers were interested in, and key players in the dissemination of, Newtonian natural philosophy. However, this does not mean that their own Boyle Lectures, let alone the lectureship as a whole, were designed as a Newtonian polemic.

This is a point that is commonly overlooked by historians of science, who see the use of Newtonianism in the Boyle Lectures as evidence of the institutionalisation of a particular natural philosophy being used in the service of religion. For example, Peter Hess describes the founding of the lectures as an important watershed:

Heretofore in the seventeenth century the connection between theology and natural philosophy had been a haphazard affair, in which Wilkins or More or Cudworth might appeal to a scientific idea to advance a particular point. In contrast, systematic public articulation of natural theology in light of the new science became institutionalised in the England of the 1690s.47

Hess is correct in identifying the Boyle Lectures as an important inflection point in the history of natural theology, but not in his view that they were exemplary of a systematic connection of theology with natural philosophy. As noted above, the Boyle Lectures might be considered symptomatic of the increasing focus on the public articulation of knowledge towards the end of the seventeenth century,

46 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 172. 47 Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God,” 205 (my italics). 288 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

but the lectureship was not exclusively concerned with natural philosophy in the service of theology. Hess suggests that earlier natural theologians “might appeal to a scientific idea to advance a particular point,” a notion that fits nicely with the idea of appropriation of resources within natural theology. However, this description also applies to the Boyle Lectures, given that not all of the lecturers employed natural philosophical resources in their arguments.

In this context, Kenny’s emphasis on the use of Newton is particularly apt. As an illustration, consider Samuel Clarke. Clarke was particularly well known for mastering and disseminating the thought of Isaac Newton. For example, he was one of the earliest people to understand Newton’s Principia. John Ellis, tutor at Caius College and a friend of Newton, asked Clarke to translate Jacques Rohault’s Traité de Physique into Latin for the use of students at Cambridge. Clarke did so, including Newtonian notes to correct the original Cartesian views, and this work played a major part in the eclipse of Cartesianism within Cambridge and its replacement by Newtonian natural philosophy. Clarke was also a close friend of Newton himself, famously engaged in a dispute of letters with Leibniz on Newton’s behalf. Although Newtonianism played a central part in Clarke’s natural philosophical career, Newton did not fulfil the central function attributed to him by Jacob and others in the Boyle Sermons. Instead, “Natural philosophy was a ‘Topick’—a place—from which proofs might be drawn in order to support the a posteriori argument for the wisdom and providence of God.”48

Further, Newtonian natural philosophy was not the only resource that Clarke employed in his natural theology. Kenny points to Clarke’s two-fold use of ancient authors: “firstly, to support by the best of the human authorities, acceptable to all, the existence of natural religion, and secondly to illustrate, by means of copious quotations, that these authors had acknowledged the insufficiency of natural religion.”49 A similar case held for Richard Bentley. Robert Schofield suggests that while Bentley was not a “scientist,” he was “a polemicist of rare power who recognised the value of drawing his arguments

48 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 264. 49 Ibid., 258. 289 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

from the last word in science.”50 The key point to draw here is that natural theologians could employ a wide variety of resources in constructing their arguments. We have seen that in the examinations of the other case studies, and by considering the arguments of the Boyle Lectures on the various topics they covered, this point will be reinforced. Each lecturer addressed Boyle’s brief to prove the Christian religion against notorious infidels in his own way.

4. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments

The Boyle Lectures, in keeping with the rest of the natural theological tradition of the early modern period, were a primarily apologetic discourse, designed to provide arguments in support of religious doctrines originally derived from the Christian Scriptures. In contrast to the views of many historians, the Lectures were not a systematic promotion of a social order based on the Newtonian worldview, although some lecturers chose to employ resources drawn from Newtonian natural philosophy in order to advance certain points. We turn now to examine in detail some of the particular arguments presented in the lectures.

While the Cambridge Platonists were concerned to establish a particular conception of God, and to convince even other Christians of the “true” version of Christianity, the Boyle Lectures tended to be more ecumenical. Thus, there was less division noted between different brands of Christians. This was decreed by Boyle’s will, when he wrote that the lecturers should not descend to controversies among Christians. However, this probably also reflects the views of the trustees who selected the lecturers. While John Evelyn was a staunch supporter of the Church of England, Thomas Tenison was known for his desire for comprehension, and Henry Ashurst and John Rotherham were dissenting laymen. Given these facts, combined with the terms of Boyle’s will, it is not surprising that the trustees would choose lecturers who could rise above factional squabbling and deal with challenges from the outside.

50 Robert E. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism: British Natural Philosophy in an Age of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 21. 290 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

As the Boyle Lecturers were concerned with proving the Christian religion against notorious infidels, we see a range of topics covered by the lectures. Against the atheists, some lecturers were seeking to establish the existence of God and the duties of religion. Against the deists, others were arguing for the validity of revelation and its Christian interpretation. Against those who would scoff and ridicule Christianity, several lecturers sought to establish the reasonableness of both the doctrines and practical precepts of this religion. Above all, the Boyle Lectures aimed to demonstrate the truth of the Christian religion. a. The Existence of God

The existence of God is perhaps the religious doctrine most commonly associated with natural theology, but in achieving their task of “proving the Christian religion,” not all the Boyle Lecturers were particularly concerned with it. There were only six lecturers for whom the existence of God was an explicit theme, and not all employed the argument from design that is classically associated with natural theology. Instead, the lecturers employed a wide variety of arguments. A range of arguments could even be used by the one lecturer, which can be seen clearly in the lectures given by John Hancock in 1706, “Arguments to Prove the Being of God.”

Hancock wrote that a belief in God is the foundation of both natural and revealed religion, and that this God is a most perfectly wise and powerful, self- existent and independent being, the maker and governor of all things. To establish this, he presented a vast array of arguments, including the universal consent of mankind, the notion that something must have existed from eternity, and the impossibility of an infinite succession of cause and effect. He also considered the works of God, including heavenly and animal bodies, paying particular attention to the harmony of the parts of the creation. He noted that the ends and uses of heavenly bodies illustrate the glory of God, while less noble creatures are subservient to the more noble creatures. Hancock also appealed to natural conscience, extraordinary phenomena such as apparitions, witches,

291 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

demons and prophecies, and finally to miracles as proofs of revelation, which in turn proves the being of God.

It was in the arguments for the existence of God, as well as his attributes, that natural philosophy was of most use to the lecturers. We may group the arguments for God’s existence drawn from natural philosophy under three main headings: the classic argument from design, the argument from the existence of spiritual substance, and the metaphysical argument. i. The Argument from Design

The classic argument from design did play a role in the natural theology of the Boyle Lecturers, as we saw from the brief consideration of Hancock’s sermons above, but it is by no means the only, or even the most important, argument in use. William Derham was the only lecturer to present a sustained argument from design, or what he referred to as “physico-theology.” His aim in his lectures, as he put it, was “to attempt a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in what I may call Mr Boyles (sic) own, that is a Physico- Theological, Way.” However, he pointed out that none of his predecessors in the Boyle Lectures had done this on purpose, but only in a casual, piece-meal manner. He identified several others who had “done something of this kind,” including “Mersenne on Genesis; Dr. Cockburne in his Essays; Mr. Ray in his Wisdom of God, &c. and I may add the first of Mr. Boyle’s Lecturers, the most learned Dr. Bently in his Boyle’s Lectures.”51

According to the important and largely correct thesis of Peter Harrison concerning relations between natural philosophy and theology in the early modern period, Derham’s “physico-theology” is worth considering in detail. Harrison has argued that the emergence of physico-theology as a hybrid

51 William Derham, Physico-Theology: Or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from His Works of Creation (London, 1716), unpaginated preface. The works to which Derham is referring are Marin Mersenne, Quaestiones Celeberrime in Genesim (Paris, 1623); John Cockburn, An Enquiry into the Nature, Necessity, and Evidence of Christian Faith, in Several Essays (London, 1696); John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (London, 1691); and Richard Bentley, A Confutation of Atheism (London, 1693). 292 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

discipline signalled an explicit attempt to address the issue of the place of theology in natural philosophy. As Harrison articulates, physico-theology involved not just the argument from design, but the systematic elaboration of divine purposes in the world, in the form of endless rehearsals of instances of organic “contrivances” designed to lead to the existence of a divine designer.52 John Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (1691), discussed in the Third Historical Interlude, was a key example of this genre, and Harrison’s description also fits Derham’s work very well. Derham argued that the works of God—“contrived with the utmost Sagacity, and ordered with plain wise design, and ministering to desirable ends”—are the most easy and intelligible demonstrations of the Being and Attributes of God, especially to those unacquainted with the subtleties of reasoning and argumentation. His Boyle Lectures consisted of detailed analyses of various parts of the natural world—from the “terraqueous globe” as a whole right down to the animals and plants that live upon it—designed to convince the reader of the existence of God. Like Ray, Derham was concerned not only with the existence of God, however, but also with his attributes. This, we shall see below, was a key theme for other lecturers as well. The natural world not only demonstrates to us that God exists, but also that he is an intelligent and beneficent designer who has organised the world according to rational principles and to fulfil wise purposes. In conclusion Derham argued:

Since it appears, that the Works of the Lord are so great, so wisely contrived, so accurately made, as to deserve to be enquired into; since they are also so manifest Demonstrations of the Creator’s Being and Attributes, that all the World is sensible thereof, to the great Reproach of Atheism.53

Peter Hess has described John Ray, William Derham and Richard Bentley as the three principal writers in the physico-theological genre. On closer examination, however, it becomes evident that Bentley did not engage in physico-theology in the same way as Derham or Ray. Rather than presenting long lists of instances

52 The most detailed explication of Harrison’s views on physico-theology is found in his “Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences.” Two other works that touch on the topic are “Priests of the Most High God, with Respect to the Book of Nature;” and The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 53 William Derham, 2:728. 293 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

of design, he was content to point out a few choice examples of how the bodies of men and other animals are excellently well fitted for life, motion and sensation, given how the individual parts are so well adapted and accommodated for their respective functions. Aside from Derham, however, Bentley was the Boyle Lecturer who made the most use of the argument from design.

Richard Bentley began his third Boyle Lecture by considering the structure of animal and human bodies. He argued that even if human bodies could have been produced by mechanical principles, this could not have taken place without God’s provision of gravity. Bentley thus rejected the notion of chance, stating that it was simply a name given to something with unknown causes: “any Effect among such Bodies ascribed to Chance, is really produced by Physical Agents, according to the established Laws of Motion, but without their Consciousness of concurring to the Production, and without their Intention of such an Effect.”54 In his final three sermons, Bentley dealt with three different aspects of the origin and frame of the world that demonstrate the necessity of a divine creator. Firstly, he argued that the world could not have existed from eternity, so it must have been created by God. Secondly, even if matter and motion had existed from eternity, those dispersed particles could never have convened into their present form, either by themselves or by any kind of natural motion. It was in this sermon, the seventh in the series, that Bentley made his famous appeal to Newton’s gravitational theory to prove that atoms in an Epicurean chaos could never convene by reciprocal attraction to form the present system. Peter Hess describes this appeal to gravity as typical of “the prompt appropriation of doctrines of the new science on the part of the Boyle lecturers for furthering their project of natural theology.”55 Bentley’s argument relied on Newton’s view that gravity is not inherent in matter, and thus must be governed by something else. Thirdly, Bentley used a form of the physico- theological argument. He argued that “the Order and Beauty of the systematical Parts of the World, the discernable Ends and final Causes of them… could not be produced by Mechanism or Chance but by an intelligent and benign Agent, that

54 Richard Bentley, 1:44. 55 Hess, “‘Nature’ and the Existence of God,” 214. 294 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

by his excellent Wisdom made the Heavens.”56 In doing so, Bentley proposed that we need not confine our consideration of the purposes of God only to human ends and uses. However, it was not absurd to Bentley “that such a vast and immense Universe should be made for the sole use of such mean and unworthy Creatures as the Children of Men.”57 He did concede that although all bodies were formed for the sake of intelligent minds, and that the earth was principally designed for the service and contemplation of man, it is possible that the other planets were created for the use of their own inhabitants.

John Harris, whose sermons, like Bentley’s, were concerned with defeating atheism, also appealed to the created order as evidence of the existence and attributes of God:

I am well assured that a thorough insight into the Works of Nature, and a serious Contemplation of that admirable Wisdom, excellent Order, and that useful Aptitude and Relation that the several Parts of the World have to each other, must needs convince any one that they were the Products of a Divine and Almighty Power.58

Here, he also cited the locus classicus of biblical natural theology, Romans 1:20, indicating once again that the Boyle Lectures were part of this broader tradition. ii. The Existence of a Spiritual Substance

The next major argument for the existence of God was derived from the existence of God and the distinction between matter and mind. This formed the topic of Richard Bentley’s second Boyle sermon. He began with a quotation from Acts 17:27: “That they should seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him, and find him; though he be not far from every one of us: for, in him we Live, and Move, and have our Being.”59 Bentley argued that there is an immaterial substance in us, essentially distinct from our bodies, which indicates

56 Richard Bentley, 1:75. 57 Ibid. 58 John Harris, 1:380. 59 Richard Bentley, 1:12. 295 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

the existence of a supreme and spiritual being. It is self-evident, according to Bentley,

That there is something in our Composition, that thinks and apprehends, and reflects and deliberates; that determines and doubts, consents and denies; that wills, and demurs, and resolves, and chooses, and rejects; that receives various sensations and impressions from external objects, and produces voluntary motions of several parts of our Bodies.”60

Bentley argued that faculties of sensation and perception could not be inherent in matter, because each atom of a complex being would then “be a distinct Animal, endued with self-consciousness and personal Sensation of its own.” A congregation of such atoms could not possibly form a single greater individual animal, “any more than a swarm of Bees, or a crowd of Men and Women can be conceived to make up one particular Living Creature compounded and constituted of the aggregate of them all.”61 Further, matter does not acquire sensation by modification or motion. Any properties of matter can only be perceived by something else. For example, blood and bones are not conscious of their own redness or hardness. Moreover, motion added to matter cannot produce any sense or perception, otherwise a moving ship would be intelligent. Motion is the effect, not the cause, of thought. All of this suggests that there must be some kind of spiritual substance in the world, that is, a kind of substance that is not purely material. As with the Cambridge Platonists, the existence of spirit is an important argument for the existence of God, the ultimate spirit. iii. The Metaphysical Argument

The final argument to be considered here is an argument from reason alone, or what Samuel Clarke referred to as “metaphysical” reasoning. The most significant treatment of this was in Clarke’s first series of lectures, although Thomas Burnet also made some use of this style of argument. In his 1704

60 Ibid., 1:15. 61 Ibid. 296 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

lectures, Clarke set out to establish the existence of God by strict and demonstrative argumentation. He stated that in order to avoid confusion,

I shall not at this time use any Variety of Arguments, but endeavour, by one clear and plain Series of Propositions necessarily connected and following one from another, to demonstrate the Certainty of the Being of God, and to deduce in order the necessary Attributes of his Nature, so far as by our finite Reason we are enabled to discover and apprehend them.62

To this end, he progressed through twelve propositions, arguing for each from reason. From these arguments, Clarke concluded that there is one unchangeable, independent, self-existent and eternal being, which is the supreme cause of all things. This being is infinite and omnipresent, intelligent, endowed with liberty and choice as well as infinite power. Although Clarke is one of the Boyle Lectures often labelled as “Newtonian,” his lectures make it clear that he viewed himself as a metaphysician. By choosing to make his argument in this way, Clarke was concerned with confuting Hobbes and Spinoza. As Kenny has pointed out, Hobbes asserted that by following “one continuous train of thought beginning with definitions and axioms and continuing via proper combinatorial procedures,” men could be assured of truth in whatever matter they were considering.63

From this very brief overview of some of the arguments for the existence of God, we can see here how the natural theology of the Boyle Lectures was not characterised by any one particular style of argument. Instead, each lecturer decided which “infidel” or enemy of Christianity to confute, and how best to achieve this aim. In Clarke’s case, he employed a metaphysical argument involving strict demonstration from first principles to argue against a particular enemy: Hobbes. By contrast, Derham was employing the most recent knowledge from the field of natural history to demonstrate the existence of a divine designer. Both lecturers were aiming to prove the existence of God, but approached this task in very different ways.

62 Samuel Clarke, 2:6. 63 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 242. 297 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

b. The Attributes of God

The lecturers who were concerned to prove the being of God were not solely occupied by his mere existence. Instead, it was their aim to demonstrate the attributes of God; that is, a correct conception of God. This has been a theme running through all the natural theologies we have considered in this thesis. As Dahm has pointed out, “all of the atheists, except for the ancient atomists, spoke of God as though he existed,” so “it was the nature of the deity which was the crucial point.”64 We have already noted Samuel Clarke’s metaphysical reasoning for the existence of God. When he did employ natural philosophical arguments, it was to establish, a posteriori, the attributes of God. To this end, he employed something like the argument from design—the “excellent Variety, Order, Beauty and Wonderful Contrivance and Fitness of all Things in the World, to their proper and respective Ends”65—not for the existence of God, but to prove that the self-existent and original cause of all things must be an intelligent being. Similarly, the infinite excellency of his work demonstrated that this intelligent being must also be infinitely wise. Here, Clarke referred to Galen and Cicero, who saw evidence of design in the human body and in the heavenly bodies, and suggested that the existence of a wise designer is even more evident from more modern discoveries, such as the circulation of the blood, the structure of the heart and brain, and the uses of glands and valves. c. The Duties of Religion and the Advantages of Christianity

The Boyle Lecturers were not only concerned with proof of the existence and attributes of God as an end in itself. They were also eager to establish the duties of religion, as well as the advantages of a religious life. Indeed, proving the existence of God was used by some, such as Francis Gastrell, as a means to establish religious obligation. After all, it is because God exists that we are obliged to behave in certain ways. Gastrell considered the nature of man and the attributes of God in order to support religious obligations such as worshipping God: “By Religion I mean, that Worship we are to pay to God, or

64 Dahm, “Science and Apologetics in the Early Boyle Lectures,” 180. 65 Samuel Clarke, 2:26. 298 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

are obliged to upon the Prospect of his Favour, or under the Penalty of his Displeasure in this, or a future State.”66 George Stanhope, as part of his lecture series on the truth and excellency of the Christian religion, dealt with the reasonableness of its practical precepts. Specifically, he was attempting to show that none of the practical precepts of Christianity, such as the virtues of humility, charity, forgiveness, and purity, were unreasonable.

Samuel Clarke, in his second series of lectures, examined in detail the nature of morality and its relations with the Christian revelation, and emphatically argued that morality accorded with the ultimate ordering of Creation rather than being the result of the arbitrary decree of God. He argued that Christian duties could be discovered by “right reason” if man were not in a corrupt state:

Tho’ the Necessity and Indispensableness of all the great and moral Obligations of Natural Religion, and also the Certainty of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, be thus in general deducible, even demonstrably, by a Chain of clear and undeniable Reasoning: Yet (in the present State of the World, by what Means soever it came originally to be so corrupted; the particular Circumstances whereof, could not now be certainly known but by Revelation;) such is the Carelessness, Inconsiderateness, and Want of Attention of the greater part of Mankind; so many the Prejudices and false Notions taken up by evil Education; so strong and violent the unreasonable Lusts, Appetites, and Desires of Sense; and so great the Blindness, introduced by superstitious Opinions, vitious Customs and debauched Practices, through the World; that very Few are able, in reality and effect, to discover these Things clearly and plainly for themselves: But Men have great need of particular Teaching, and much Instruction; to convince them of the Truth, and Certainty, and Importance of these Things; to give them a due Sense, and clear and just Apprehensions concerning them; and to bring them effectually to the Practice of the plainest and most necessary Duties.67

William Derham also considered the duties of religion in the practical inferences he derived from his survey of God’s works in nature. He argued that God’s works could be as serviceable to our spiritual interest as to our temporal interest, as consideration of nature reminds us of our religious obligations. Thus, God’s works ought to excite us to fear and obedience to God, and they remind us that we ought to pay God all due homage and worship, particularly by

66 Francis Gastrell, 1:282. 67 Samuel Clarke, 2:120 299 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

observing the Lord’s day. Finally, God’s works ought to excite us to thankfulness. Since God has provided everything for his creatures’ life, prosperity and happiness, thankfulness and praise is a reasonable and just debt. As Derham put it,

Let us but reflect upon the Excellence and Immortality of our Soul; the incomparable Contrivance, and curious Structure of our Body; and the Care and Caution taken for the Security and Happiness of our State, and we shall find that among the whole Race of Beings, Men hath especial Reason to magnify the Creator’s Goodness, and with suitable ardent Affections to be thankful unto him.68

Aside from the particular duties of the Christian religion, many of the Boyle Lecturers commented on the advantage of living a religious life, both in this world and the next. Thus, the precepts of religion should not be followed only because God has commanded us, but also because it will be better for us. For example, Richard Bentley argued that the promises of the Gospel give a Christian joy in this life, which Bentley described as “Heaven upon Earth, though the other should prove a Delusion.” The promises of atheism, on the other hand, are only “utter extinction and cessation.”69 Further, the practical rules and duties are conducive to temporal interest. For Bentley, it was entirely owing to religion that the world enjoys such things as law, community, the arts and sciences, literature, agriculture and navigation. d. The Doctrines of Evil and Salvation

In addition to the existence and attributes of God, the duties of religion and advantages of a religious life, and the validity of the Christian revelation, some Boyle Lecturers were concerned with particular Christian doctrines such as redemption and salvation through Jesus Christ. Of course, this doctrine is first known through revelation in Scripture, but two lecturers in particular provided arguments drawn from reason in its support. John Turner’s lecture series in 1708 was devoted to this topic, as indicated by the title, “The Wisdom of God in the Redemption of Man.” In these lectures, Turner aimed to demonstrate

68 Derham, 2:725. 69 Bentley, 1:7. 300 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

that the Doctrine of Man’s Redemption and Remission of Sins, by the Expiatory Sacrifice of the Blood of Christ, as deliver’d in the New Testament, is neither Unnecessary, nor Unreasonable, nor at all disagreeable to the Divine Perfections of God; but much for his Glory, and in which the brightest of his Divine Attributes are admirably and conspicuously display’d.70

He employed arguments from the authority of Scripture, but also from general considerations of reasonableness. Similarly, George Stanhope aimed to provide evidence for the truth and excellency of the Christian religion by demonstrating the reasonableness of its doctrines. Like Turner, he was primarily concerned with doctrines associated with salvation through Jesus Christ, and suggested that the success of the gospel is a proof of its divine authority. Stanhope also argued that Christian doctrines that are incomprehensible to us, such as the Trinity and the incarnation of the Son of God, are not so incredible as to be beyond belief.

The doctrine of providence was also a central theme for the Boyle Lectures, but not only in relation to the argument from design. John Clarke, brother of the more famous Samuel, presented two series of lectures on moral and natural evil in 1719 and 1720. In these lectures, he was concerned with preserving God’s providence and care of the world. He argued that defects and irregularities in the world, such as death, pain and other sufferings, are not inconsistent with natural notions of God. He also suggested that while the general design of Scripture is to recommend morality, and that men’s inclinations and passions are not naturally evil, evil does arise from free agents abusing these dispositions and affections. However, he did argue that man’s “natural” morality, such as that of the heathens, is insufficient due to original sin, and hence revelation is necessary to redeem men from evil. e. The Validity of Revelation and its Christian Interpretation

While some historians have viewed the Boyle Lectures as the paradigmatic example of natural theology replacing revealed religion, this view simply cannot be upheld once the whole series of lectures is taken into account. Revelation,

70 John Turner, 2:354. 301 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

defined as God making himself known over and above what he has revealed by the Light of Nature, endured as a major theme in the Boyle Lectures. While only six lecturers explicitly addressed the existence of God, nine were primarily concerned with revelation—either its credibility in general, or the Christian interpretation of the Scriptures. Clearly, revelation was important to these clergymen. William Berriman, for example, saw the deprecation of the Christian revelation as a way of propagating infidelity, so he was concerned with providing evidence for the reasonableness of the Christian system of religion. John Leng, in his 1717 and 1718 sermons on Natural Obligations to Believe the Principles of Religion, and Divine Revelation, made the connection between a mere belief in a god, and the particular religion of Christianity. He argued that belief in God leads to an obligation to enquire whether this God has made any revelation, and suggested that any serious enquirer would find reasons to believe the existence of revelation to be probable.

The most significant treatment of revelation came from John Williams, whose Boyle Lectures in the years 1695 and 1696 were entitled On Revelation. Williams’ overall aim was to show the adequacy of Scripture as a religious authority without the need of an infallible interpreter such as the Pope. He argued for the possibility, expediency, necessity and certainty of divine revelation, presenting four different types of evidence to prove his point. Firstly, he presented moral evidence. Since God is good, he would not have denied people a revelation necessary to their salvation. Revelation in Scripture was a voluntary act of grace and favour on the part of God. Secondly, Williams considered the natural evidence of speech and common notions. He argued that men cannot learn to speak without example, and therefore God must have spoken to Adam. Additionally, some notions, such as belief in a God and the essential difference between good and evil, do not develop with reason, and hence they must have been imprinted on our nature by an immediate and supernatural power. Thirdly, Williams argued that the practices of worship passed down by testimony provide evidence of an initial revelation, and finally that prophecy and miracles act as supernatural evidence for revelation.

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Williams also gave advice about how to be sure of any particular revelation, depending on how close one is to the source of the revelation. Firstly, those who receive the revelation directly can be certain because God can surely communicate himself to an intelligent being, such that the creature will know it comes from God. Secondly, those who receive the revelation from the inspired person should believe when there are sufficient motives for credibility, and when the subject matter is worthy of God, and designed for the advantage, satisfaction and happiness of mankind. Finally, those who live in the “After- Ages”—the time when direct revelation no longer takes place—must rely on testimony and moral evidence. However, they can also compare parts of the revelation to check for coherence, and test predictions against actual events. Interestingly, this is what William Whiston did in his own Boyle Lectures, presented in 1707 on “The Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecies.” His aim in these lectures was to establish the divine authority of the writings in which the prophecies were contained. He explained the fulfilment of the prophecies in Scripture in order to demonstrate the reliability of the Christian revelation.71

Other Boyle Lecturers drew upon different kinds of arguments to defend the Christian revelation. Samuel Bradford, in his 1699 lectures, “The Credibility of the Christian Religion, from its Intrinsick Evidence,” was concerned with the “excellency” of the Christian revelation. He suggested that the Christian revelation was supported by its very nature, in that it removes the guilty fears of sinners and their ignorance of God, it teaches us to know ourselves and our duty, it provides us with a perfect example in the life of Jesus, and it promises assistance and complete salvation to sinners.

Offspring Blackall, in “The Sufficiency of a Standing Revelation” (1700), argued that the present revelation in the Old and New Testaments is sufficient to persuade men to repentance. He employed arguments for the validity of Scripture drawn from the authority of its authors. Benjamin Ibbot, who presented two series of lectures in 1713 and 1714 on “The True Notion of Free-

71 For a broader discussion of the status of prophecy in this period, see Peter Harrison, “Prophecy, Early Modern Apologetics, and Hume’s Argument Against Miracles,” Journal of the History of Ideas 60 (1999): 241-57. Fulfilled prophecy was seen as a way to establish the credibility of the Christian Scriptures. 303 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Thinking,” was concerned with the relations of reason and revelation. He was arguing for the validity of the Christian revelation as well as for the role of reason in establishing and understanding it. He was also concerned with the ease of interpretation, and suggested that the difficulties in Scripture should induce Christians of different persuasions to unity among themselves, and to join in common defence against the enemies of Christianity. Brampton Gurdon argued for the validity of the Christian revelation from the evidence of miracles, as well as maintaining authority as a useful way of instructing the “lower” sort of people.72 Finally, Thomas Burnet devoted his second series of sermons in 1726 to the credibility of Scripture history, considering the origin, effects and consequences of sin, as well as God’s providential method of dealing with this through his covenant and promise of a saviour.73 f. Defending the Christian Religion

In addition to establishing the particular doctrines and duties of religion, the Boyle Lecturers were also concerned with defending Christianity against, in Boyle’s words, “notorious infidels.” For example, several of the Boyle Lecturers were attempting to demonstrate the superiority of the Christian religion to Judaism. Richard Kidder dealt with Jewish objections to Christianity in his 1693 lectures “A Demonstration of the Messias,” and both George Stanhope and William Berriman argued that the Christian interpretation of the Old Testament prophecies was superior to the Jewish. William Whiston’s lectures may also be considered as part of this category. The conversion of Jews was important to many people at the time, not only for the sake of the converts themselves, but also for defending Christianity: “The accomplishment of scriptural prophecies such as the conversion and restoration of the Jews [to Palestine] would provide empirical evidence for the credibility of sacred history.”74 The Christian religion shared with Judaism the history and theology outlined in the Old Testament.

72 Brampton Gurdon, 3:279-497. 73 Thomas Burnet, 3:498-583. 74 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 68. The conversion and restoration of the Jews were key themes in seventeenth-century English millenarianism. See Christopher Hill, “‘Til the Conversion of the Jews’,” in Millenarianism and Messianism in English Literature and Thought 1650-1800, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 12-36. 304 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Thus, these lecturers were attempting to argue for the validity of the Christian religion by employing common ground, a classic form of Christian apologetics.

However, most of the lecturers were concerned with the threats of atheism and deism. As Kenny has pointed out, terms such as “atheist” and “deist” were often used simply to cast a slight on an opponent, and as such, were not always carefully defined:

The aim of the Boyle Lecturers was not to present their audiences with precise definitions of what constituted the deistic or atheistic positions but to display the inherent weaknesses and failures of all argumentation which did not have the hallmark of righteousness as determined and defined by contemporary ecclesiastical and doctrinal authority.”75 i. Atheism

Atheism came under attack by several Boyle Lectures, most notably Richard Bentley, John Harris and Samuel Clarke. In his first series of lectures in 1704, Clarke distinguished between three types of atheists: men who are extremely ignorant and stupid, who have never considered things; men whose reason has been corrupted by a vicious and degenerate life; and men who pretend that the arguments against the being of God are strong and conclusive. He was only concerned with the third kind, the only ones, according to him, who were capable of being reasoned with. Underlying Clarke’s distinction here is the assumption that the arguments and evidence for the existence of God are so clear and evident that they can only be rejected by those who have never taken the time to consider them, or those whose faculty of reason has been affected by their manner of living. Any other kind of person must “pretend” that the arguments are unsound.76

75 Ibid., 49. 76 This was a common viewpoint in the seventeenth century. As Kenny has explained, “Atheism was seldom seen by Boyle and his contemporaries (without reservation) as a position arrived at via philosophical speculation… divines constantly reiterated the view that atheism can only be the product of a dissolute lifestyle and antinomian inclinations.” Ibid., 52. 305 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

This view was echoed by John Harris, who declared that the great causes of atheism are immorality and pride, not a lack of evidence for the existence of God. He was concerned with refuting atheistical objections to the existence of God, including the objections that we can have no idea of God and that the notion of God stems only from fear or policy. He also dealt with arguments against moral good and evil, and the atheistical notion of fate. His contempt for the reasoning abilities of atheists was clear:

And truly the Atheistical Writers do discover so poor a Knowledge in Philosophy, and so very little acquaintance with true Reasoning and Science; that ‘tis no wonder at all that they should not be able to conceive and comprehend a great many things which others are very well satisfied with.77

Richard Bentley also dismissed atheists as “foolish,” setting out his Boyle Lectures as a series of sermons on Psalm 14:1: “The Fool hath said in his Heart, There is no God; they are corrupt, they have done abominable works, there is none that doth good.” However, Bentley did not seem to think that there were any true atheists, in the sense of completely denying the existence of a God. Rather, he was addressing those “that believing in his Existence, do yet seclude him from directing the Affairs of the World, from observing and judging the Actions of Men.”78 That is, Bentley was concerned with people who do not actually doubt the being of a God, but who openly deny his providence. A denial of providence is an implicit denial of the existence of God. Bentley was particularly scathing of those who had been educated in the Christian religion, and thus, presumably, should know better. 79

77 John Harris, 1:391. 78 Richard Bentley, 1:2. 79 “What then, is Heaven it self, with its pleasure for evermore, to be parted with so unconcernedly? Is a Crown of Righteousness, a Crown of Life, to be surrendered with laughter? Is an exceeding and eternal weight of Glory too light in the balance against the hopeless death of the Atheist, and utter extinction?” Richard Bentley, 1:4. 306 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

ii. Deism

Deists also came under attack by several Boyle Lectures. While Samuel Clarke opened his first series of lectures with a discussion of the different kinds of atheists, he began his second by outlining the various types of deists. Firstly, there are those who “pretend” to believe the existence of God, but reject God’s ongoing providence. For Clarke, “this Opinion must unavoidably terminate in absolute Atheism.”80 The second kind of deist believes in the existence and providence of God, but rejects the notion of absolute moral good and evil, claiming that these depend “merely on the arbitrary Constitution of Humane Laws” and not on the will of God.81 The third type rejects the notion of the immortality of the soul, while the fourth believes that Christian obligations and doctrines can be discovered by reason alone, without revelation. This last variant, according to Clarke, is the only true type of Deist, a view echoed by John Harris:

For when you upbraid them with a Disbelief of Revelation, they will say, that ‘tis enough for any Man to live up to the Principles of Natural Religion, and to adhere inviolably to all things; for those are things that are Obligatory on all Mankind, and not like Revealed Truths, mere Political and Topical Institutions.82

The notion that so-called deists who reject providence are really atheists was also propounded by Richard Bentley, who classed “Modern Deists” as atheists in disguise:

They cover the most arrant Atheism under the mask and shadow of a Deity; by which they understand no more than some eternal inanimate Matter, some universal Nature, and Soul of the World, void of all sense and cogitation, so far from being endowed with Infinite Wisdom and Goodness.83

80 Samuel Clarke, 2:72. 81 Ibid., 2:74. 82 John Harris, 1:415. 83 Richard Bentley, 1:3. 307 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Similarly, John Harris argued that deists pretend to be sincere cultivators of natural religion, and to have profound respect for the supreme and almighty Being, but they actually have the most wicked and Blasphemous idea of the Deity:

For they make him either nothing but the Soul of the World, Universal Matter, or Natura Naturata, a God that is an absolutely necessary Agent, without any Rectitude in his Will; without any Knowledge, Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, Mercy, or Providence over his Works.”84

5. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse

The individual arguments in natural theology could be, and certainly were, used to achieve a variety of aims. However, the whole discourse of natural theology, more broadly considered, could also be employed to achieve different articulations between natural philosophy and theology. It is tricky to try to establish this with relation to the Boyle Lectures, because the lecturers were a varied group who were not all particularly interested in natural philosophy. However, in the lectures that did involve natural philosophical resources, we can clearly see how natural theology could be used to support the pursuit of natural philosophy.

Firstly, a natural theologian interested in natural philosophy could justify his interest by claiming that he was practising a type of theology. Interestingly, Christopher Kenny argues that while the Boyle Lectures involved an oratorical use of natural philosophy in defence of Christian doctrine, they were not intended as a public defence of natural philosophy. However, even if the defence of natural philosophy was not explicit, by employing natural philosophical resources in support of Christian doctrines, the lecturer is implicitly arguing in favour of the pursuit of natural philosophy. For example, as Larry Stewart has written of Samuel Clarke’s Boyle Lectures, “What began as an objection to the Epicureans and materialism in general became, in the

84 John Harris, 1:408. This reflected common usage of the term “atheist,” as defined in Chambers’ Cyclopedia as someone “who does not believe the Existence of God, nor a Providence, and who has no Religion, true or false.” Quoted in Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 57. 308 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

tradition from Sprat to Newton, a polemic for natural philosophy as the preservative of religion.”85

However, some natural theologians employed their discourse to explicitly encourage further enquiry into nature. The most notable Boyle Lecturer to do so was William Derham. At the end of his “cursory” survey of Creation, Derham outlined a number of practical inferences. Firstly, by studying the works of Creation we can see that God’s works are great and excellent. For Derham, this is a necessary observation not only against atheists, but also against all other careless, incurious observers of God’s works, because God’s works deserve to be sought out, enquired after, and curiously and diligently pried into by us. Secondly, Derham concluded that God’s works ought to be enquired into, and that such enquiries are commendable:

The Creator doubtless did not bestow so much Curiosity, and exquisite Workmanship and Skill upon his Creatures, to be looked upon with a careless, incurious Eye, especially to have them slighted or contemned; but to be admired by the Rational Part of the World, to magnify his own Power, Wisdom and Goodness throughout all the World, and the Ages thereof.86

Finally, the more we study God’s works, the greater and more glorious we find them to be, and hence the more we can proclaim the greatness of the creator.

As noted above, the Boyle Lectureship included a number of lecturers who were not involved in the pursuit of natural philosophy and who did not employ natural philosophical resources in their sermons. This included lecturers such as Richard Kidder and John Turner, who were concerned with the reasonableness of the doctrines of Christianity, as well as others like John Williams and Offspring Blackall who were aiming to demonstrate the reliability of the Christian revelation. Given the location of natural theology between natural philosophy and theology, we might wonder whether these lectures could even be considered natural theological. To answer this we need to recall some

85 Stewart, The Rise of Public Science, 76. 86 William Derham, 2:722. 309 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

basic points about our structural model of natural theology and how it relates to the trajectory of natural theological writings in the period.

We know that before the contested space of English natural theology opened between Protestant theology and natural philosophy in the seventeenth century, there had been outcroppings of natural theological discourse, but these were not concentrated enough to amount to the existence of a tradition. We have seen that even the work of Richard Hooker, around the turn of the seventeenth century, belongs to this pre-natural theology category, despite the fact that some historians have considered him as the founder of the English natural theological tradition. It follows that if the space for natural theology had not opened in the seventeenth century, then later writings, such as those by Kidder, Turner, Williams and Blackall, mentioned above, could still have eventuated. However, they would not have been seen as any more essentially natural theological than those of Hooker, Calvin and Luther in the sixteenth century, because these later writers did not rely upon natural philosophical resources in their natural theology-like discourses.

However, as I have argued in this thesis, that space of natural theologising did open in the seventeenth century, and major outcroppings of natural theology occurred at the inflection points considered in the case studies. Given this situation, even those later seventeenth and early eighteenth century utterances, such as those of Kidder, Turner, and others, that do not specifically appeal to natural philosophy, can still be linked to the main field of such natural theological utterances that did employ natural philosophical resources. Once the natural theological tradition, as envisioned in our model, actually existed, several kinds of marginal utterances could be related to it. By contrast, in the hypothetical absence of such a genuine natural theology tradition, these same utterances would have appeared in the historical record as more akin to the precursor or “proto-natural theological” utterances discussed earlier. It is the historical fact of the emergence of a natural theological tradition of the kind we have modelled that allows us (as well as contemporaries at the time) to classify

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the more marginal seventeenth century cases as natural theological; that is, as sufficiently similar in some senses to the more main line examples.87

Accordingly, if we then look at what we may term these “non-natural philosophical” Boyle Lectures, as well as the more “natural philosophical” lectures, we find important similarities amongst them. These similarities presumably led contemporaries to accept all these instances as appropriate examples of the Boyle Lectureship, and they arguably are sufficient to convince modern users of our model to classify all the instances as natural theological in character. The most significant similarity is the apologetic nature of the discourse in virtually every case. All the sermons in the Boyle Lectureship were aiming to support the Christian religion, although the lecturers chose various means to do so. Given a living natural theological tradition of the sort we have modelled, natural philosophy of course provided resources that could be employed by natural theologians, but there was no obligation to do so. Similarly, as such a tradition, natural theology could be used to mediate between theology and natural philosophy, but this was not its sole or necessary purpose in any given case. Still another similarity amongst the various Boyle Lectures, which they shared also with the larger natural theological tradition, was the close connection between reason and revelation.88 This is a very important topic, not only in general, given the apologetic aims of natural theology that we have observed in this thesis; but also in the present connection, because notions of reason, variously articulated, could play the role in natural theologising that our model more routinely and structurally assigns to natural philosophy. That is, evidence derived from the use of human reason, whether applied to the natural world, to revelation or to logical deduction from first

87 Prima facie evidence that contemporaries saw similarities is that such various species of natural theology were produced by actors invited to be Boyle Lecturers, and that these products were more or less accepted over time by the cohort of lecturers and their audiences as part of the Boyle Lectureship tradition. 88 As we shall see below, while the Boyle Lecturers were convinced of the reasonableness of Christianity, they universally viewed reason alone as insufficient for complete knowledge of God and salvation. Revelation was thus necessary. This acknowledgement on the limits of human reason suggests another possible connection between the natural theology of the Boyle Lectures and the neighbouring tradition of natural philosophy. Peter Harrison has recently argued for a link between discussions of the human capacity for knowledge, given the “fallen” status of mankind in Christian theology, and the adoption of an experimental methodology in natural philosophy. Peter Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 311 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

principles, provided resources for use by natural theologians. In this way, the lectures presented by clergymen such as Kidder, Williams, Turner and Blackall were not simply theological, but natural theological.89 Hence we turn in our last substantive section to the relations between reason and revelation in the Boyle Lectures.

6. Natural Theology, Reason and Revelation

Notwithstanding the common assumption that enough knowledge can be gained from nature so that all men are “without excuse,” the Boyle Lecturers tended to view natural theology as a limited pursuit that could lead to some knowledge of God and religion, but not so much as to render revelation superfluous. Although Christianity was universally considered to be a reasonable religion, and adherence to both its doctrines and practical precepts a mark of rationality, revelation in Scripture was still considered absolutely indispensable. a. All Men are Without Excuse

The main purpose of natural theological argument was to establish the truth of the Christian religion, and this was reflected in the language of Boyle’s will. The assumption underlying all the Boyle Lectures is that the Christian religion can be clearly demonstrated by appeal to reason, authority and physical evidence, and thus there is no excuse for infidelity or atheism. This is perhaps the fundamental religious truth argued for by the Boyle Lecturers: that all men are without excuse. In this, they were adopting the language of the Apostle Paul who declared that knowledge of God has been available to all men since the beginning of time, and hence there is no escaping God’s wrath for those who do not believe:

89 This classification of all of the Boyle Lectures as natural theological does rely on a much broader definition of natural theology than is generally adopted. In this thesis, I have tried to show that natural theology was indeed a broad and diverse discourse, but the particular place of non-natural philosophical forms of natural theology is something that I intend to consider more carefully in future research. 312 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.90

John Williams, who presented his Boyle Lectures On Revelation in 1695 and 1696, argued that “if the Heathens, who only had the Book of Nature to read, and a faltering Reason for their Guide, were yet so far inexcusable… How shall we escape if we neglect so great Salvation?”91 People are able to find enough knowledge about God from nature and reason that they are considered without excuse: Christians who have received revelation from God have even less excuse to fall back on. John Harris also took this line:

For the Existence of that Divine Being whom no Eye hath seen nor can see, is as plainly demonstrable from Reason and Nature, from his visible Works in the World, and from the inward Sentiments of our unprejudiced Minds, as the Being of our Own and Others Minds is from the power of thinking and reasoning that we find in our selves and them.92

Similarly, Samuel Clarke believed that all men were without excuse, since God has provided us with sufficient knowledge to perform our duty in this life and to achieve happiness in the next. John Turner likewise wrote that all modern believers are inexcusable, notwithstanding their pretended safety in sincere enquiry. Finally, William Derham argued that since God’s works are manifest to all, infidelity is unreasonable and all men are without excuse. All nations have inferred the existence of a Deity, he stated, although some are mistaken in their notions and conclusions about him. For this reason, an atheist is a rebel against human nature and reason, as well as against God. However, it is much worse to have studied God’s works and yet deny him.

90 Romans 1:18-20. This knowledge of God may be considered part of “general revelation,” as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2a. 91 John Williams, 1:163. 92 John Harris, 1:370. 313 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

b. The Limits of Natural Theology

Although studying God’s work in creation should lead any man to acknowledge the being and attributes of God, natural theology cannot provide complete knowledge of religious duty and salvation. Despite his conviction that he had proved the existence of God as absolutely certain, Samuel Clarke still acknowledged that revelation was necessary. In his second series of lectures, he aimed to demonstrate the universal presence of a natural scheme of order and virtue by providing evidence from the authority of the ancients. However, he established that even the most virtuous of the ancients were unable to discover their complete duty to God. As Kenny explains, “Without divine revelation, reason was simply insufficient to discover our proper relationship with a God of dominion, notwithstanding its power to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being.”93

In this, Clarke was following the viewpoint of John Williams, expressed in his earlier Boyle Lectures. Like John Wilkins and Matthew Barker, Williams acknowledged that while the light of reason can provide some knowledge of God and religion, this is yet insufficient:

But after all, so much is the Subject [that is, natural knowledge of God and religion] above our Reach, and so dark and intricate are all our Reasonings upon it, that the sagest Philosopher, in the Conclusion, is left as unsatisfied as the meanest Peasant: and perhaps more unsatisfied with his Knowledge, and the deep and unfathomable Abyss he sees before him, than the other is with his Ignorance.… So that there needs some brighter Light than that of Nature, to conduct us to Happiness, and bring us to a compleat and entire Satisfaction; and that is a Supernatural Knowledge, a Knowledge that is not to be obtained by the Ways aforesaid, by Enquiry and Observation, but by Inspiration and Revelation from Almighty God.94 c. The Reasonableness of Christianity

The Boyle Lecturers were not only convinced of the truth of Christianity, but also of its reasonableness. That is, Christianity need not be accepted by faith

93 Kenny, “Theology and Natural Philosophy,” 244. 94 John Williams, 1:155-6. 314 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

alone, but could also be assented to by the use of reason. At the most basic level, since Christianity has not been demonstrated as false, it is more reasonable to believe than not to believe, given the serious consequences of unbelief. As John Harris stated, it is foolish to risk eternal damnation without a conclusive demonstration that religion is false. Similarly, Samuel Clarke insisted that since God’s existence is desirable, even if it cannot be demonstrated conclusively, it is reasonable for men to live piously and virtuously. However, Clarke was convinced that he could show that “the Being and Attributes of God are not only possible or barely probable in themselves, but also strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced Mind from the most incontestable Principles of right Reason.”95

Further, there were specific arguments put forward to establish that Christianity, as a religion, is reasonable. As John Gascoigne puts it, Clarke “set out to demonstrate that Christianity was, of all religions, the most consonant with reason and morality as well as being supported by such internal proofs as the fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies in the person of Christ.”96 Richard Bentley also emphasised the reasonableness of Christianity in his discourse against atheism. He did this by first considering what he viewed as two possible rational reasons to reject religion. The first of these would be if religion entailed a contradiction; that is, if we were required to believe something “repugnant to Common Sense” or that would contradict “the universal Notions and indubitable Maxims of Reason.”97 If it were the case that to be saved a person had to subscribe to contradictory beliefs, this “would be a meer tantalizing of Rational Creatures; and the Kingdom of Heaven would become the Inheritance of only Idiots and Fools.”98 However, Bentley did not believe that Christianity was like this at all. He stated that he was willing to consider any “absurdities and repugnancies to our natural Faculties” that an atheist could show, and “either evince them to be Interpolations and

95 Samuel Clarke, “A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,” 2:5. 96 John Gascoigne, “Clarke, Samuel (1675–1729),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5530 (accessed August 12, 2009). 97 Richard Bentley, 1:5. 98 Ibid. 315 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Corruptions of the Faith, or yield myself a Proselyte to Infidelity.”99 On the surface, it might seem that Bentley was open to the possibility of changing his mind about the Christian religion, but on closer examination, this was not the case. Note how Bentley stated that he would convert to atheism if he could not demonstrate any supposed contradictions in Christianity to be “Corruptions of the Faith.” In practice, this meant that any alleged problems with Christianity could be dealt with. Additionally, what is, or is not, contrary to natural reason is a matter of conventional definition.

The second objection considered by Bentley was the notion that the hope of heaven might not justify the labour required to reach it. If a person judges that heaven and God’s blessings are not to be valued as much as the physical pleasures of this life, this might be a rational reason to dismiss the teachings of religion. Bentley rejected this idea, however, and stated that “Religion it self gives us the greatest Delights and Advantages even in this life also, though there should prove in the event to be no Resurrection to another.”100 Thus, regardless of whether or not the hope of a future life should be realised, it is still better to be religious in this life.

Finally, some of the Boyle Lecturers were engaged in defending Christianity against accusations of credulity and unreasonableness. For example, the second half of George Stanhope’s lecture series was concerned with Christian doctrines that seem incomprehensible, such as the Trinity, as well as the doctrine of salvation and the practical precepts of the Christian religion. Stanhope’s aim was to demonstrate that none of these are unreasonable. Similarly, Lilly Butler argued that there was nothing in religion, either in faith or in practice, of which Christians should be ashamed. When atheists and infidels accuse the religious man of “foolish Credulity,” they have the greatest reason to be ashamed of themselves.101

99 Ibid., 1:6. 100 Ibid. 101 Lilly Butler, 2:434. 316 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Butler was particularly concerned with those who engaged in scoffing at and ridiculing the Christian religion, concluding that this is the last resort of those whose reason has failed: “The Atheist Infidels of our Times, after the vain Attempts of so many Ages for the Destruction of Religion… seem to despair of reasoning it out of the World, but yet to have some hopes of jeering and laughing it out of countenance.” He argued “That whosoever is a true Christian, both in Faith and Practice, can have no Reason to be ashamed of his being so.”102 d. Reason and Revelation

Although historically natural theology has been associated with a rejection of revealed religion, we have seen that reason and revelation remained closely connected throughout the seventeenth century. The Boyle Lectures continued this trend, though placing an arguably even greater emphasis on the necessity and reliability of the Christian Scriptures than we have seen in earlier English natural theologians. It is important to recognise that the Boyle Lectures took place in the context of religious conflict and debates, most notably concerning the roles of reason and revelation. Around this time, groups such as the deists and the Socinians were rising in prominence. These groups tended to emphasise the role of reason in religion, with some rejecting Scriptural revelation entirely. Orthodox Christian natural theologians needed to use arguments based on reason in order to address their opponents, but they also needed to retain a central role for revelation, in order to avoid charges of unorthodoxy. This was an extremely difficult balance to maintain.

John Williams outlined three types of knowledge, depending on whether they could be known by the Light of Nature or by revelation. Firstly, “There are Things knowable by the Light of Nature, without Revelation; of this Kind is the Knowledge of God from the Creation of the World.”103 Here, Williams referred to the locus classicus of natural theology in Scripture: Romans 1:20—“For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been

102 Ibid. 103 John Williams, 1:157. 317 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.” Secondly, “There are Things of pure and simple Revelation, that are not knowable by the Light of Nature; of this Sort is the Salvation of the World by Jesus Christ.” To support this point, Williams cited the words of the Apostle Paul who, in his letter to the church at Ephesus, wrote:

To me, though I am the very least of all the saints, this grace was given, to preach to the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to bring to light for everyone what is the plan of the mystery hidden for ages in God who created all things, so that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places.104

The Apostle Peter, also quoted by Williams, made a similar point:

It was revealed to them [the prophets of Israel] that they were serving not themselves but you, in the things that have now been announced to you through those who preached the good news to you by the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, things into which angels long to look.105

These verses from Scripture were chosen here by Williams for their language of mystery and revelation: the gospel of salvation was hidden, even from the angels, until the Christian apostles were empowered by the Holy Spirit to reveal it. Finally, according to Williams, “There are things partly of Nature, and partly of Revelation, discoverable by the Light of Nature but imperfectly; of this Sort are a Future State, and eternal Rewards and Punishments.”106 This kind of knowledge, although knowable by reason, is taught much more clearly by revelation.

On this point, Williams was in agreement with many of his colleagues in the lectureship. John Harris, for example, stated that while natural religion tells us some things, Scriptural revelation gives much surer knowledge:

104 Ephesians 3:8-10. 105 1 Peter 1:12. 106 John Williams, 1:157. 318 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

And over and above all this, he hath also given us a clear Revelation of his Will in the Holy Scripture, that sure Word of Prophecy and Instruction, whereby we may, if we will, gain a yet plainer Knowledge of our Duty, be more perfectly instructed in the Method of Eternal Salvation, and find also much higher Encouragements, and much greater Helps and Assistances than we had before in the State of Nature.107

Similarly, while Samuel Clarke believed that the being and attributes of God are clearly demonstrable by reason, he argued that God’s revelation in Jesus Christ is “suited to every Capacity and Understanding… to Silence the Ignorance of Foolish, and the Vanity of Sceptical and Profane men.”108

Many of the lecturers argued that the Christian revelation was not only valid and reasonable, but also absolutely indispensable. For example, John Williams argued that while some knowledge of divine things can be attained by natural means, so much is beyond our reach that we need the brighter light of inspiration and revelation from God. Benjamin Ibbot outlined the importance of Scripture in regulating and assisting man’s reason. Although “where there is a Divine Revelation, ‘tis by the Use of Reason that we are to judge of the Proofs of this Revelation, and of the true Sense and Meaning of it,”109 we should not imagine that “our own Natural Reason and Sagacity (let them be never so great), without more particular Helps will sufficiently qualify us for the finding out the true Sense of the Scriptures.”110 John Clarke wrote that revelation is necessary to redeem men from evil, something that cannot be achieved by “the Light of Nature.”111

Secondly, the use of reason was not intended to imply a rejection of revelation. For example, Richard Bentley stated that he was not making an argument from Scripture since his opponents did not believe Scripture to have any divine authority. However, this does not mean that Bentley himself rejected the authority of Scripture, or that he believed revelation to be insufficient for

107 John Harris, 1:424. 108 Samuel Clarke, 2:55. 109 Benjamin Ibbot, 2:734. 110 Benjamin Ibbot, 2:737. 111 John Clarke, 3:233. 319 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Chapter 6

Christians. Rather, he recognised that as an apologetic for Christianity directed to those who do not yet believe, Scripture was not the best strategy. There was no reason for non-Christians or deists to respond to it. Instead, Bentley’s strategy was to present arguments that his opponents would accept, to help them reach a place where they could accept the Christian revelation. Similarly, Samuel Clarke explained that he was using arguments from reason because he was addressing unbelievers who would not accept evidence from Scripture. However, he himself did not reject the authority of the Bible, and even his heterodox beliefs concerning the Trinity were backed up by careful exposition of Scripture.

7. Conclusion

The Boyle Lectures are the last group to be considered in this thesis, but it should not be assumed that they were therefore the high point or the culmination of the early modern natural theological tradition. Natural theology continued beyond the Boyle Lectures; even the Boyle Lectureship itself continued beyond 1732, the year of the last set of sermons examined in this chapter. However, the collection of Boyle Lectures from the years 1692 to 1732 provide a useful case study for examining the dynamic discourse of natural theology in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Due to the historical context, the Boyle Lectures differ in significant ways from earlier versions of natural theology. Their focus on challenges from outside Christianity placed them in good company with Restoration natural theology, but in marked contrast with the Cambridge Platonists. Further, the public nature of the Boyle Lectures, being originally orally presented as sermons, reflects the increase in the public articulation of knowledge in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition, there are key differences amongst the Boyle Lectures themselves. While the lecturers had a common task—proving the Christian religion against notorious infidels—each lecturer applied himself to this task in a unique manner, applying his own skills and interests to the brief set out in Boyle’s will. In this way, each lecturer had his own natural theological kaleidoscope, which he used to provide apologetic arguments in defence of Christianity.

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Despite the differences amongst the Boyle Lectures, there were significant commonalities. For all of the lecturers, although enough knowledge of God was available from nature to render all men without excuse, revelation remained absolutely indispensable. While reason applied to the natural world can provide some evidence for the existence of God and his attributes, the particular Christian revelation in Scripture was still necessary to inform men of their full duty to the Creator and Saviour. With this in mind, we turn now to conclude the argument of this thesis by drawing together some of the major themes and considering how all the disparate forms of natural theology can be interpreted in terms of our kaleidoscopic model.

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CONCLUSION

According to many historians of science, natural theology began in seventeenth- century England, as Newtonian natural philosophy was employed by low- church Anglicans in order to maintain political stability. From a different perspective, historians of religion tend to view natural theology as a tradition dating back at least to the early Christian church fathers, if not to the Scriptures themselves. Historians from both disciplines frequently view natural theology as a competitor to revealed theology, with an emphasis on human reason and evidence from nature rather than from a supernatural source. This thesis has attempted to develop and demonstrate a model that reconciles these two sets of conflicting historical claims about the origins of natural theology, and accounts for the continued emphasis on revelation evident in many natural theological works from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

According to this model, English natural theology emerged as a tradition in the seventeenth century, though it was not without precedents. This tradition of natural theology was primarily an apologetic discourse, providing arguments in favour of religious doctrines originally derived from revelation by drawing upon a range of resources from both theology and natural philosophy, in response to a variety of contextual challenges. As there were many different versions of natural theology, conceived in conjunction with the varieties of natural philosophical systems and the assorted theological concepts in debate, natural theology was an arena in which the historical actors could debate what they saw as the correct relations between natural philosophy and theology. However, natural theology did not (and perhaps could not) fulfil this role as a static discipline, but rather did so as a dynamic discourse, able to be changed and adapted to the context and the available conceptual resources. This dynamic discourse may be represented by the metaphor of a kaleidoscope, in which the resources from natural philosophy and theology were combined and refracted according to the pre-existing views of the practitioner as well as the challenges to which he was responding. By examining the outcomes of the kaleidoscope,

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that is, the natural theological works, we can infer the views, conceptual resources and opportunities or challenges behind the arguments.

The thesis thus consisted of two separate, but related dimensions. The historical dimension was concerned with understanding how natural theology was developed and used in different ways over time, while the theoretical dimension sought to develop the detailed, conceptual model of natural theology. These two dimensions are inseparable, as how one models or conceptualises what natural theology was and how it worked is intimately linked to how one conceives and narrates its historical trajectory. Further, an historical understanding of the context in which a particular natural theological work was written provides the background for appreciating the challenges the natural theologian was responding to and the resources he was using, which are crucial aspects of the model. To conclude, we will revisit how these two dimensions have been developed throughout this thesis.

1. Historical Dimension

Chapter 2 demonstrated that one of the key differences between the two main accounts of natural theology concerns the historical origin of the discourse. While historians of religion view natural theology as a long-running tradition, dating back to the early church fathers, historians of science often date the beginning of natural theology at the end of the seventeenth century, with the advent of Newtonian natural philosophy. The model advanced in this thesis enables us to see that natural theology emerged as an intellectual tradition in the seventeenth century, though it was not without precedents. The explosion of natural theological discourse in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries indicates that something was happening that did not exist in the same way in earlier centuries; that is, the emergence of natural theology as a tradition rather than scattered outcroppings of natural theological-like discourse. Evidence for the increased interest in natural theology is provided by the sheer number of texts published in the seventeenth century with a dual focus on

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natural philosophy and theology, or an attempt to support the Christian religion by the use of reason.1

This perspective helps to resolve the apparent contradiction between these two existing approaches. Historians of religion have identified the precedents while historians of science have acknowledged the importance of the connection with natural philosophy, although many of them have mistakenly viewed natural theology as characterised by intimate articulation to Newtonian natural philosophy. This resolution of the historiographical contradiction is a direct result of the model of natural theology as an intellectual tradition separate from theology and natural philosophy. The location of natural theology between natural philosophy and theology meant that this space had to be open and contested in order for natural theology to exist as a tradition in any strong sense of the term. This space was opened by the theological upheaval of the Protestant Reformation and the natural philosophical conflict typical of the process termed the Scientific Revolution. This meant that both theology and natural philosophy were contested traditions, and hence the relationship between them could also be contested, resulting in the emergence of the tradition of natural theology.

The necessity of both the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution for the existence of a natural theological space and tradition was demonstrated by examining the case of Richard Hooker, who was discussed in the First Historical Interlude. He was working in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, but before the high tide of the Scientific Revolution, which can be located in the heightened natural philosophical contestation of the middle third of the seventeenth century. Writing late in the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, Hooker was responding to tensions in the Elizabethan Settlement caused partly by the rise of early Puritanism and the international threats to Reformed churches. He was reacting to debates about reason, revelation and religious authority, which stemmed from the Reformation, but he did not have access to the resources acquired by later writers from the flourishing and competition of

1 A quantitative survey was outside the scope of this thesis, but will be pursued in future research. 324 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

natural philosophies that characterised the early and mid-seventeenth century. Nor did he possess the motivation to establish a new natural philosophical system as a better handmaiden to theology than scholastic Aristotelianism. Thus, although his work contains hints of natural theological argument and a definite concern with some of the classic themes of the discourse, he was not a natural theologian. One may speculate, however, that if Hooker had been alive forty years later, he would have fitted in very nicely with the Cambridge Platonists.

Since Richard Hooker’s work contained only hints of natural theology, we designated him as a harbinger of natural theology. A harbinger is someone who was concerned with similar issues as they were beginning to emerge, but who was still too early to be a part of the full thrust of natural theological discourse. John Calvin and the other Protestant Reformers, discussed briefly in Chapter 2, may also be considered as harbingers or early exemplars of natural theology. They were examples of the earlier outcroppings of natural theological discourse that was not concentrated enough to amount to the intellectual tradition that emerged in the space opened between Protestant theology and the turbulent field of natural philosophising in the seventeenth century.

In addition to the emergence of natural theology as a tradition in seventeenth- century England, this thesis has shown that at various times, renewed theological and natural philosophical conflict led to increased output of natural theological utterance. From Hooker, we traced the historical trajectory of natural theology through several nodes or inflection points: times when natural theological discourse was particularly dense and tied to certain moments of natural philosophical, theological and politico-religious turmoil and debate. For natural theologians who were active towards the middle of the seventeenth century, the first fruits of the novel natural philosophical moves of the Scientific Revolution were available to be employed with respect to the growing crises in the Church of England. The Cambridge Platonists Ralph Cudworth and Henry More used a form of Neoplatonic natural philosophy against Calvinist determinism as well as materialist natural philosophies that they viewed as leading to atheism. Like Hooker, these theologian-philosophers were also

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concerned with establishing rational religion as a via media between the enthusiasm of the Puritans and the authoritarianism of the Roman Catholic Church and the High Church of England. However, Cambridge Platonism was not the only way of doing natural theology, although for these writers, their philosophy was the best assistance to religion.

Walter Charleton, the subject of our Second Historical Interlude, was a contemporary of the Cambridge Platonists but while he was responding to similar challenges, he chose a very different way of dealing with them. Instead of Neoplatonic philosophy, Charleton employed a form of Christianised atomism to argue for the existence of God. Further, his response to the turmoil of the Civil War was to set up natural philosophers as the true authorities in the matter of theological truth.

Although conflicts within the Church of England did not disappear with the Restoration of the monarchy and the Established Church, natural theologians began to turn more to challenges that Christians experienced in common, such as atheism and infidelity, more broadly considered. Thus, arguments for the duties of religion, as well as the doctrines, became more prominent, a point demonstrated by the works of John Wilkins and Matthew Barker, taken in our second case study as exemplary of Restoration natural theology

Although there were numerous texts identifiable as natural theological published towards the end of the seventeenth century, the Boyle Lectures, treated in our third case study, marked a significant turning point. Here, a series of annual lectures was set up for proving the Christian religion against “notorious infidels,” a purpose that could suitably be fulfilled with natural theological discourse. While the Boyle Lectures are commonly viewed as the paradigmatic example of natural theology, particularly in association with Newtonian natural philosophy, we have seen that they were simply one inflection point in the overall historical trajectory of the tradition.

John Ray provided an interesting case to consider. While his natural theological work was published in 1691, the year before the Boyle Lectures began, it was based on sermons preached at Cambridge before the Restoration. However, his 326 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

arguments would have been updated by the expansion of natural historical knowledge throughout the second half of the seventeenth century. Further, unlike the Boyle Lecturers, his natural theology was less a response to the politico-religious context than an attempt to justify the pursuit of natural philosophy as a religious activity. Hence he was treated in our Third Historical Interlude between the Restoration and Boyle Lectures nodes.

From these examples, we can see how natural theology emerged as an intellectual tradition and then changed over time. Natural theology was not simply a static discipline, but a dynamic discourse that developed in response to particular moments of theological and natural philosophical conflict. In contrast to the history of religion perspective, the various outcroppings of natural theological-like arguments dating back to the early Church Fathers were not concentrated enough to amount to a tradition. Pace the historians of science, natural theology did not emerge only in response to Newtonian natural philosophy, but rather as a result of the broader struggles of the process termed the Scientific Revolution, combined with the theological upheaval of the Protestant Reformation.

2. Theoretical Dimension a. The Kaleidoscopic Model of Natural Theology

This thesis has established that contrary to popular belief, natural theology was not pursued in order to make discoveries or to develop new knowledge about God or the natural world. Instead, it involved the apologetic demonstration of theological doctrines originally derived from revelation. Both the authors of the natural theological works and their audiences had access to the doctrines of the Christian religion through the Scriptures and the teachings of the Church of England. However, natural theological arguments enabled additional support to be given for these doctrines, reassuring the believer of both his own individual faith and the authority of the Christian religion. We saw that Henry More described himself as “a Fisher for Philosophers,” desiring to ease the way for philosophers to believe in Christian doctrine, as well as to establish a

327 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

rational foundation for the Church of England. For Walter Charleton, the evidence of reason corroborates the evidence of faith for those who already believe. With regard to Restoration natural theology, John Wilkins was not even inventing new arguments, let alone dealing with new knowledge, and Matthew Barker was seeking primarily to remind his readers of what they already knew. This apologetic focus continued into the eighteenth century, with Gilbert Burnet editing an abridged collection of the Boyle Lectures in 1737 so that people “may be better enabled to give a Reason of the Faith that is in them.”

Natural theology itself was neither theological nor natural philosophical, and it was not tied exclusively to a single system of theology or natural philosophy. Instead, natural theology was an intellectual tradition located in between theology, which dealt with knowledge of God, and natural philosophy, which dealt with knowledge of the natural world. As Chapter 1 established, natural philosophy and theology in the seventeenth century were characterised by a complex variety of negotiations and articulations, and it was precisely because there were no clearly defined boundaries that natural theology could exist. While most of the natural theologians considered in this thesis were both divines and natural philosophers of some kind, their natural theological work was in a separate category.

As it was not tied exclusively to one particular system of natural philosophy or theology, natural theology was a dynamic discourse. Aspects of natural philosophy and theological doctrines were brought into the discourse of natural theology, which could be used in turn to support different systems of theology or natural philosophy, depending on the historical context in which the natural theologian was working, and the particular challenges to which he was responding. This meant that different resources could be employed to reach the same conclusion. A good example is the difference between the Cambridge Platonists and Walter Charleton. Both were arguing for the existence of God and the truth of the Christian religion, but Charleton employed resources from atomic philosophy, which More and Cudworth were reluctant to adopt. The dynamics of natural theological discourse also meant that the same resources could be employed in different ways to reach opposing conclusions. This was

328 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

demonstrated by a consideration of the conflict between Henry More and Robert Boyle. More appropriated Boyle’s hydrostatic experiments to prove the existence of the Spirit of Nature, which More felt was essential to a correct understanding of God’s providence, and hence for the existence of God himself. Although Boyle was also concerned with maintaining belief in the existence of God, he had a different conception of God with no need for the Spirit of Nature, and thus was not impressed with More’s use of his experimental results.

The metaphor of the kaleidoscope was introduced as a means of understanding how natural theological arguments could be constructed. Conceptual resources drawn from natural philosophy or theology were adopted by the natural theologian and refracted in various ways depending on his existing views and agenda to produce a variety of arguments. While different actors might have been responding to similar circumstances and accessing the same conceptual resources, the output of the kaleidoscope was different. This model expands on the metaphors suggested by Margaret J. Osler for analysing relations between natural philosophy and theology. Resources are appropriated (brought into the kaleidoscope) and translated (refracted by the existing views of the practitioner) to achieve particular goals.2

The various possible settings of a natural theological kaleidoscope were seen throughout the case studies. Richard Hooker might be said to have had a kaleidoscope that did not contain any natural philosophical resources, but contained the assumption that the light of reason would not contradict knowledge from Scripture. The kaleidoscopes of Ralph Cudworth and Henry More included the belief that demonstrating the existence of spirit was the first step towards establishing the existence of God, resulting, for example, in More’s particular employment of Boyle’s hydrostatic experiments. Walter Charleton’s kaleidoscope was set with an understanding of God as a being completely free from any external considerations. As a result, he viewed a Christianised form of atomism as being the best way to support religion. For John Wilkins and Matthew Barker, a full knowledge of God may only be provided by the brighter

2 See Margaret J. Osler, “Mixing Metaphors: Science and Religion or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe,” History of Science 36 (1998), 91-113. 329 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

light of revelation in Scripture, and hence natural theology is a limited activity. John Ray’s kaleidoscope included the presupposition that the pursuit of natural knowledge was a fitting activity for any Christian, even one who was ordained in the Church, while the kaleidoscopes of the Boyle Lecturers were set with the fundamental assumption that there is enough knowledge of God available from creation that all men are without excuse. These varied settings all demonstrate the complexity of natural theology. It was not a single way of gaining knowledge about God from nature, but a dynamic discourse that could be employed in multiple ways to achieve a variety of goals. b. The Purpose of Natural Theological Arguments

The kaleidoscopic nature of natural theology meant that not only was there an almost infinite variety of natural theological arguments in the seventeenth century, but also that natural theology could be used for a wide range of purposes. This included the apologetic purpose of providing arguments in support of the Christian faith, but this was by no means the only use of natural theology. The discourse of natural theology also had a broader purpose, namely the articulation of natural philosophy and theology.

Natural theological arguments could be employed to establish a variety of religious doctrines and practices. While the existence of God was the most common theme, there were a number of arguments put forward. The argument from design was present in some form in nearly all the works considered in this thesis, but it was not the only argument in use. Writers such as the Cambridge Platonists and the Boyle Lecturer Samuel Clarke developed arguments from the idea of God, as well as from evidence of supernatural activity in the world such as witchcraft and miracles. Natural theologians were also concerned with a correct understanding of God’s nature, although they disagreed on the details. For the Cambridge Platonists, God’s goodness and wisdom necessarily and logically took priority over His omnipotence, whereas Walter Charleton emphasised the freedom of God’s will and power to the extent that God was free to act against the laws of nature at any time. John Wilkins and Matthew Barker offered a full account of the perfections of God, but not in a way that

330 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

emphasised one version of the Christian God above and against any other, while John Ray focused on God’s power and wisdom. The Boyle Lecturers were not as concerned with this issue, although they were keen to demonstrate that God must be an intelligent being.

In addition to the being and attributes of God, the duties of religion were also a theme in natural theology, though not equally emphasised by all natural theologians. For the Cambridge Platonists, keeping God’s commandments in virtue, holiness and love was more important than assenting to doctrine, but they did not spend a lot of time on the issue, and neither did Walter Charleton. This reflected the particular concerns of their historical context. At a time when different brands of Christians were fighting amongst themselves, it was more important to establish a correct conception of God and religion. However, the rhetoric that moral conduct is more important than doctrine was useful for encouraging unity amongst Christians.

Later in the seventeenth century, however, atheism and infidelity became a greater perceived threat, and it was also important to encourage Christians to stand firm in their religion. For John Wilkins and Matthew Barker, the duties of religion were a very important theme, but they were primarily considered as a response to both God’s nature and his actions in the universe. However, they were also considered a response to what is known from God in creation, such as his greatness and majesty. Several of the Boyle Lecturers also touched on this issue, arguing that none of the practical precepts of the Christian religion should be considered unreasonable.

The religion demonstrated by the natural theological works examined in this thesis was intended to be unique. The natural theologians were not aiming to establish a universal “natural religion,” but one that was distinctively Christian, and even, for some, a particular version of Christianity. Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, like Richard Hooker, were seeking a rational via media between what they viewed as Puritan enthusiasm and high-church Anglicanism. Walter Charleton was not as concerned with this issue, although he did seek a natural and rational foundation for Christianity. While John Ray’s main concern was

331 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

with worshipping God, it is clear from his frequent mentions of the Scriptures that he was talking about the Christian God. For John Wilkins and Matthew Barker, as well as many of the Boyle Lecturers, natural theology could provide evidence of the excellency of Christianity as a particular religion.

Thus, natural theology could be used to argue for more than just the existence of God. For most of the natural theologians of the seventeenth century, the correct conception of God was just as important. In addition, the duties of religion and the truth of Christianity were upheld. However, the key point to remember, and one that we have seen exemplified time and time again in this study, is that natural theology was not engaged in discovering these doctrines, but in providing arguments in support of knowledge originally gained from revelation. c. The Purpose of Natural Theology as a Discourse

It is obvious that natural theological arguments could be used to support a wide variety of religious doctrines and practices. While examining these arguments demonstrates the dynamics of natural theological discourse, the next step is to ask what was gained by the attempt to prove religious doctrines on natural grounds, and why people chose to engage in natural theology. Was it simply to convert followers to Christianity, or were there other goals to be achieved? All the natural theologians considered in this thesis wanted people to follow Christianity, but they disagreed about the best way to achieve this. The reason for this is that increasing the ranks of Christian believers was not the only goal of natural theology. Instead, natural theology could be used to support theology or natural philosophy, as well as particular versions of each, depending on the needs of the practitioner. For example, the Cambridge Platonists were supporting a version of Neoplatonism as the best way to defend religion, while Walter Charleton was arguing for a Christianised version of ancient atomism. In some cases, these differences could lead to open conflict, such as the one between Henry More and Robert Boyle, concerning More’s unauthorised use of the results of Boyle’s hydrostatic experiments. Natural theology involved arguments for religious doctrine, so in this way it supported theology. However,

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there were subtle differences between the theologies of the practitioners, as demonstrated by the range of views on the nature of God.

Natural theology could also be used to argue for the pursuit of natural philosophy in general. This is most evident in the works of John Ray and William Derham, who both viewed the study of nature as a way of worshipping God. Ray, who famously claimed that his profession was divinity, even after he had left his official role of clergyman, believed that natural knowledge is a fitting pursuit for a Christian. Similarly, Derham argued that the more we study God’s works, the greater and more glorious we find them to be, and hence the more we can proclaim the greatness of the creator. Further, natural theology could also be used to establish a theological foundation for natural knowledge, as demonstrated by the cases of Walter Charleton and the Cambridge Platonists.

In these various ways, natural theology acted as a mediator between natural philosophy and theology. Natural theology was an evolving site of articulations and negotiations between natural philosophy and theology, and provided an arena that historians may now explore to witness and study the efforts of seventeenth century natural philosophers and theologians to determine the proper relations between knowledge of the natural world and knowledge of God. Natural theology could be involved in balancing the dual concerns of the book of nature and the book of Scripture, but this balance was not set once and for all. None of the natural theologians provided the last word on the topic, but rather the issue continued to be debated. d. Natural Theology and Reason and Revelation

Debates raged throughout the seventeenth century over the roles of reason and revelation in religion, ensuring that natural theology remained an important endeavour. While the Cambridge Platonists argued that reason could be used to establish religious doctrines, they did not reject revelation. Later in the seventeenth century, groups such as the deists and Socinians were rising in prominence and emphasising reason as a replacement for revelation. In response, writers such as John Wilkins and Matthew Barker argued that natural theology was insufficient for a true knowledge of God, which meant that 333 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

revelation was still necessary. However, reason could not be done away with altogether. Orthodox Christian natural theologians needed to use arguments based on reason in order to address their opponents, while retaining a central role for revelation, in order to avoid charges of unorthodoxy. Attempts at achieving this delicate balance were particularly evident in the Boyle Lectures. The assumption underlying all these sermons was that since the Christian religion can be demonstrated by appeal to reason, authority and physical evidence, there is no excuse for infidelity or atheism. Nevertheless, revelation endured as a prominent theme, being the primary focus of several series of sermons. Even those lecturers who were not concerned specifically with the topic of revelation were certainly not rejecting it in favour of reason. Rather, these lecturers were seeking to address opponents for whom Scripture would not be an accepted authority. By arguing for the validity of Christianity on rational grounds, the Boyle Lecturers hoped to bring their opponents to the point of accepting the Christian revelation. For seventeenth and early eighteenth-century natural theologians, therefore, natural theology provided a means of balancing the dual concerns of reason and revelation.

3. Significance and Limitations of the Present Study

The approach developed in this thesis is important not only for understanding the history and nature of natural theology, but also can contribute significantly to debates about the wider issue of relations between natural philosophy and theology in seventeenth century England. It can be seen as endorsing, illustrating, and developing John Hedley Brooke’s “complexity thesis” in that it seeks to describe the complex set of relations between theology and natural philosophy rather than trying to force the historical data into a simplistic model.3 This thesis also helps with issues surrounding what natural philosophy actually was, particularly with regard to its connection with theology. While Andrew Cunningham argues that natural philosophy was fundamentally religious in aim, and thus has difficulty articulating a distinct role for natural

3 The “complexity thesis,” exemplified in John Hedley Brooke’s important study Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), was discussed in Chapter 1, Section 2c. 334 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

theology in this period, this model shows that natural philosophy could be used for religious purposes while the pursuit of the knowledge of nature itself was not necessarily a religious pursuit. The term “necessarily” is crucial here, however, as some actors did indeed frame their pursuit of natural knowledge in religious terms. The point is that there was no inherent religious purpose to the pursuit of natural philosophy, but rather a complex variety of interactions with theology. Further, as we have already noted, the model developed in this thesis provides a way of reconciling the conflicting accounts of natural theology found in the history of science and the history of religion. However, the present study has been subject to certain limitations.

By necessity, this thesis has offered an overview of the history and nature of natural theology, sketching the details of the texts only in very broad-brush strokes. To demonstrate the model, it was necessary to consider a wide variety of natural theological works, but constraints of space meant that this consisted of a very brief overview of both the texts and the historical contexts. There is much more work to be done in understanding the tradition of natural theology.

An obvious avenue for further research would be to develop any of these case studies in greater detail. Any one of the case studies could have been the subject of an entire thesis by itself. A detailed study of the individual texts involved, as well as their place in the career of the writers would add to the model. For example, the Boyle Lectures by themselves could provide a microcosmic case study of the complexity of natural theology. While the lecturers were unified in their belief in the reasonableness of Christianity, the resources they used to establish this and the particular challenges to which they were responding were quite varied. It would be informative to delve further into the correspondence of the trustees, to find out more about their decisions to appoint particular lecturers, and also of the lecturers, to find out about their motivations to preach on particular topics. It would also be useful to consider the responses and reactions to natural theological arguments, to gain an idea of how successful they were. Obviously they did not convince everyone to believe in God or to conform to the Christian church, because that would have meant that natural theology was no longer necessary.

335 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Conclusion

Another limitation of this study is that it has only considered the case of England in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This was not an unreasonable tactic. Historians of science widely agree that English natural philosophers played a major role in the Scientific Revolution and the development of modern science. Combined with the theological upheaval of the Reformation, the Civil Wars and the Restoration, seventeenth-century England provides a fertile ground for studying the relations of natural philosophy and theology. Further research could determine whether the model of natural theology presented in this thesis could apply to other countries, particularly Protestant ones, and also follow the historical trajectory of natural theology through the rest of the eighteenth century and beyond. It would also be instructive to study the earlier outcroppings of natural theological discourse in more detail, particularly with regard to the interactions between theology and natural philosophy in the work of theologians such as Thomas Aquinas.

However, this thesis has begun the process of discerning the historical and theoretical complexity of the tradition of natural theology. We have seen that although there were some precedents, natural theology only emerged as a tradition in the seventeenth century, as a result of the theological and natural philosophical turmoil of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. The contested nature of theology and natural philosophy, as well as the space in between, meant that natural theology was a dynamic discourse that could be used in various ways to achieve a wide variety of aims. This dynamic nature is nicely represented by the metaphor of a kaleidoscope, where the natural theologian selects particular resources that are combined and refracted according to his existing presuppositions, producing arguments tailored to his particular needs. In this way, the apologetic enterprise of supporting religion in the seventeenth century may be designated as kaleidoscopic natural theology.

336 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Appendix

APPENDIX – THE BOYLE LECTURES, 1692-1732

1692 Richard Bentley, A Confutation of Atheism.

1693 Richard Kidder, A Demonstration of the Messias.

1695, 1696 John Williams, The Possibility, Expediency and Necessity of Divine Revelation; The Perfection of the Evangelical Revelation.

1697 Francis Gastrell, The Certainty and Necessity of Religion in General.

1698 John Harris, Atheistical Objections Against the Being and Attributes of a God Fairly Considered and Fairly Refuted.

1699 Samuel Bradford, The Credibility of the Christian Revelation from its Intrinsick Evidence.

1700 Offspring Blackall, The Sufficiency of a Standing Revelation.

1701, 1702 George Stanhope, The Truth and Excellence of the Christian Religion Asserted against Jews, Infidels, and Heretics.

1704, 1705 Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God; A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Divine Revelation.

1706 John Hancock, Arguments to Prove the Being of God.

1707 William Whiston, The Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecies.

1708 John Turner, The Wisdom of God in the Redemption of Man.

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1709 Lilly Butler, A Discourse Proving, that the Faith and Practice of True Christians, are no Matter of Shame or Reproach.

1710 Josiah Woodward, The Divine Original and Incomparable Excellency of the Christian Revelation.

1711, 1712 William Derham, Physico-Theology: Or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from his Works of Creation.

1713, 1714 Benjamin Ibbot, On the Exercise of Private Judgment, or Free-Thinking.

1717, 1718 John Leng, Natural Obligations to believe the Principles of Religion and Divine Revelation.

1719, 1720 John Clarke, An Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil; An Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Natural Evil.

1721, 1722 Brampton Gurdon, The Pretended Difficulties in Natural or Reveal’d Religion no Excuse for Infidelity.

1724, 1726 Thomas Burnet, The Demonstration of True Religion, in a Chain of Consequences from Certain and Undeniable Principles.

1730, 1731, 1732 William Berriman, The Gradual Revelation of the Gospel.

338 Kaleidoscopic Natural Theology Bibliography

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Nicolson, Marjorie. “Christ’s College and the Latitude-Men.” Modern Philology 27 (1929): 35-53.

____. “The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England.” Studies in Philology 26 (1929): 356-374.

Nuttall, Geoffrey F. Richard Baxter. London: Nelson, 1965.

Oakley, Francis. “Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature.” Church History 30 (1961): 433-457.

Olson, Richard G. “On the Nature of God’s Existence, Wisdom and Power: The Interplay between Organic and Mechanistic Imagery in Anglican Natural Theology – 1640-1740.” In Approaches to Organic Form, edited by Frederick Burwick, 1-48. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987.

____. Science and Religion, 1450-1900: From Copernicus to Darwin. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

Osler, Margaret J. “Descartes and Charlton on Nature and God.” Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979): 445-456.

____. Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

____. “Triangulating Divine Will: Henry More, Robert Boyle, and René Descartes on God’s Relationship to the Creation.” In Stoicismo e Origenismo nella Filosofia del Seicento Inglese, edited by Marialuisa Baldi, 75-87. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1996.

____. “Mixing Metaphors: Science and Religion or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe.” History of Science 36 (1998): 91-113.

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Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991. Originally published as Systematische Theologie, band 1 (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988).

Pauley, W. C. de. The Candle of the Lord: Studies in the Cambridge Platonists. London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1937.

Penelhum, Terence. “Hume’s Criticisms of Natural Theology.” In In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment, edited by James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis, 21-41. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005.

Philipp, Wolfgang. “Physicotheology in the Age of Enlightenment: Appearance and History.” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 57 (1967): 1233- 1267.

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Plantinga, Alvin. “The Prospects for Natural Theology.” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 287-315.

Platt, John. Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982.

Pollard, Arthur. Richard Hooker. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1966.

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____. “The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway.” In Henry More (1614-1687): Tercentenary Studies, edited by Sarah Hutton, 97- 114. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.

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Rattansi, P. M. “Paracelsus and the Puritan Revolution.” Ambix 11 (1963): 24- 32.

____. “The Helmontian-Galenist Controversy in Restoration England.” Ambix 12 (1964): 1-23.

____. “Some Evaluations of Reason in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Natural Philosophy.” In Changing Perspectives in the History of Science, edited by Robert Young and Mikuláš Teich, 148-166. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973.

Raven, Charles E. Science, Religion, and the Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943.

Reedy, Gerard. The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth-Century England. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985.

Rivers, Isabel. Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780. Vol. 1: Whichcote to Wesley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

____. “‘Galen’s Muscles’: Wilkins, Hume, and the Educational Use of the Argument from Design.” The Historical Journal 36 (1993): 577-597.

Roberts, James Deotis, Sr. From Puritanism to Platonism in Seventeenth Century England. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.

Rogers, G. A. J. “More, Locke and the Issue of Liberty.” In Henry More (1614- 1687): Tercentenary Studies, edited by Sarah Hutton, 189-199. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.

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Rudwick, Martin. “Senses of the Natural World and Senses of God: Another Look at the Historical Relation of Science and Religion.” In The Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century, edited by Arthur Robert Peacocke, 241-261. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

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Saveson, J. E. “Differing Reactions to Descartes Among the Cambridge Platonists.” Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960): 560-567.

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Schneider, Ulrich Johannes. “Eclecticism Reconsidered.” Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (1998), 173-182.

Schofield, Robert E. Mechanism and Materialism: British Natural Philosophy in an Age of Reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

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Schuster, John A. “The Scientific Revolution.” In Companion to the History of Modern Science, edited by R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie and M. J. S. Hodge, 217-242. London: Routledge, 1990.

____. “Descartes Agonistes: New Tales of Cartesian Mechanism.” Perspectives on Science 3 (1995): 99-145.

____. “L’Aristotelismo e le sue Alternative.” In La Rivoluzione Scientifica, edited by D. Garber, 337-357. Rome: Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2002.

____. “How to Write (and Not Write) about Key Players and Plays in the Scientific Revolution.” Paper presented at the History and Philosophy of Science research seminar, University of New South Wales, 3 April, 2007.

____. “From Natural Philosophy to Science(s): Transformations (Intended and Unintended), Not Ruptures, in Early Modern Knowledge Networks – The Disputed Case of the Early Royal Society.” Paper presented at the first international conference of ARC Network of Early European Researchers, University of Western Australia, July, 2007.

____. Descartes Agonistes: Physico-Mathematics, Method and Corpuscular- Mechanism, 1618-37. Forthcoming.

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Schuster, John A. and Graeme Watchirs. “Natural Philosophy, Experiment and Discourse in the Eighteenth Century: Beyond the Kuhn/Bachelard Problematic.” In Experimental Inquiries: Historical, Philosophical and Social Studies of Experiment, edited by H. E. LeGrand, 1-48. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1990.

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____. “Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz- Clarke Disputes.” Isis 72 (1981): 187-215.

____. “Understanding the Merton Thesis.” Isis 79 (1988): 594-605.

____. A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Shapin, Steven and Simon Schaffer. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Shapiro, Barbara J. “Latitudinarianism and Science in Seventeenth-Century England.” Past and Present 40 (1968): 16-41.

____. John Wilkins, 1614-1672: An Intellectual Biography. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

____. Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Sharp, Lindsay. “Walter Charleton’s Early Life 1620-1659, and Relationship to Natural Philosophy in Mid-Seventeenth Century England.” Annals of Science 30 (1973): 311-40.

Spurr, John. “‘Latitudinarianism’ and the Restoration Church.” The Historical Journal 31 (1998), 61-82.

____. The Restoration Church of England, 1646-1689. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

____. English Puritanism: 1603-1689. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998.

Stewart, Larry. The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain, 1660-1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Stimson, Dorothy. “Dr Wilkins and the Royal Society.” The Journal of Modern History 3 (1931): 539-563.

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____. “Puritanism and the New Philosophy in Seventeenth Century England.” Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine 3 (1935): 360-630.

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Thiselton, Anthony C. A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: One World, 2002.

Tulloch, John. English Puritanism and Its Leaders. Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1861.

____. Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century. 2 vols. 2nd ed. New York: Burt Franklin, 1874.

Van Leeuwen, Henry G. The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630- 1690. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

Wallace, Dewey D., Jr. “Natural Theology Among the Dissenters: Richard Baxter and His Circle.” In American Society of Church History Papers for 1992 Meeting, 1-38. Portland: Theological Research Exchange Network, 1993.

Ward, Keith. “Natural Theology.” In Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, edited by J. Wentzel Vrede van Huyssteen, 2:601-605. New York: Macmillan Reference, 2003.

Webster, Charles. “English Medical Reformers of the Puritan Revolution: A Background to the ‘Society of Chymical Physitians’.” Ambix 14 (1967), 16-41.

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____. From Paracelsus to Newton: Magic and the Making of Modern Science. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Westfall, Richard. The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1971.

____. Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973.

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White, Andrew Dickson. A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1896.

Wilson, David B. “On the Importance of Eliminating Science and Religion from the History of Science and Religion: The Cases of Oliver Lodge, J. H. Jeans and A. S. Eddington.” In Facets of Faith and Science, Volume 1: Historiography and Modes of Interaction, edited by Jitse M. van der Meer, 27-47. Lanham: University Press of America, 1996.

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Wojcik, Jan W. Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “The Migration of Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics.” In Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright, 38-81. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Wood, P. B. “Methodology and Apologetics: Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society.” The British Journal for the History of Science 13 (1980): 1–26.

Wykstra, Stephen J. “Religious Beliefs, Metaphysical Beliefs, and Historiography of Science.” Osiris 16 (2001): 29-46.

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