Evaluation of Dadaab’s Refugee Camp Closure Plan: A Comparative & Historical Analysis A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Community Planning in the School of Planning of the College of Design, Architecture, Arts, and Planning by Alyssa M. Wissel, B.A. International Affairs, French Minor, and Human Rights Certificate, University of Cincinnati April 2016 Committee Chair: David J. Edelman, Ph.D. Abstract Refugee camps shut down for numerous reasons including but not limited to lack of funding, security, peaceful resolutions, and compassion fatigue after decades of hosting. Often due to scarce resources, refugee camps close inefficiently or inhumanely. Kenya has long called for the closure of the Dadaab Refugee Camp, which as its peak in 2012 held 485,000 Somalis. Since its opening in 1991, Kenya has balanced between its sovereign will and international laws protecting refugees against forced repatriation. This thesis compares past camp closure policies to the current situation in Dadaab, Kenya, and evaluates the UNHCR’s camp closure-repatriation plan, Integrated Action Plan for Sustainable Return and Reintegration of Somali Refugees from Kenya to Somalia; Action Plan 2016-2017, using the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Camp Management Toolkit. Does the Dadaab Camp Closure Plan consider past camp closure best practices? Which precedents does this plan seem to neglect? Are there trending reasons for said neglected areas? ii Blank page for copyright notice iii Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. Adrian Parr for taking the time out of her busy schedule to participate on this thesis committee. Your work has been a great inspiration to me, connecting design to human rights and sustainability in a developing nations context. I would like to thank Dr. David Edelman for sharing his professional experience with me, being a mentor, and guiding me through the process of writing this paper. Your insight and wisdom in planning internationally and publishing has been extremely valuable. Lastly, I would like to thank my husband and family for encouraging me through my master’s degree and the tumultuous journey of writing a thesis. iv Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………….1 Camp Closure Complications…………………………………………………..2 Dadaab Camp Closure Controversy………………………………………..…4 Research Focus and Purpose………………………………………....…......17 Chapter 2: Literature Review………………………………….……………………………..8 Conflict Context………………………………………………………………….9 Current Dadaab Camp Closure Plans……………………………………….15 Historical, International Precedents……………………...…………………..20 Chapter 3: Methodology…………………………………………………………………….32 Chapter 4: Evaluation Results and Rationale……………………………………….…..37 Results Chart…………………………………………………………………..38 Rationale for Rankings………………………………………………………..39 Chapter 5: Discussion…………………………………………………………………...….48 Scoring Patterns……………………………………………………………….49 Monitoring and Evaluation………………………………………………….....51 Shifting Investment in Dadaab, Kenya to Somali Regional Planning….…53 Chapter 6: Recommendations and Conclusion…………………………..…………....57 Recommendations…………………………………………………………….58 Dadaab Camp Closure Justified?.............................................................60 Summation……………………...……………………………………………...61 Glossary………………………………………………………………………………………..62 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………......63 v List of Tables & Figures Figure 2.1 Somali Peoples Map…………………………………………………………….10 Figure 2.2 Older Camps in Dadaab…………………………………….………………......12 Figure 2.3 Newer Camps in Dadaab…………………………………………………....….13 Figure 2.4 Plan 16-17 Graphic……………………………………………………………...19 Table 3.1 Evaluation Criteria Table……………………………………………….……......36 Table 4.1 Rankings Table……………………………………………….……………….38-39 Figure 5.1 Scoring Distribution……………………………………………………………...50 Figure 5.2 Budget Distribution by Sector Table……………………….…………….…….54 Figure 5.3 Total Budget Distribution by Country……………………….…………….……55 vi Chapter 1: Introduction Camp Closure Complications Conflicts’ generational effects on refugees often derive from not just a crisis itself, but also poor transitional planning. When refugee camps shut down, frequently limited attention is given to the post-encampment of thousands of individuals, and the physical conditions of the structures left behind. For perhaps years, families are thoroughly protected under a siege of NGOs and the UN, and then abruptly dropped off to a presumably safe ‘homeland’. Typically, refugee camps close via three avenues: 1 refugees spontaneously return to their country of citizenship without outside motivation 2. Refugees are assisted by governments and NGOs by compensation and transportation to return home, integrate into host country, or resettle in a third country or 3. Refugees repatriate by force of landowners, or outside parties.1 There are countless reasons why camps close: some because of a peaceful resolution, others because refugees are eager to return home. However, not all camp closures are universally approved. Refugee camps close from lack of financial support and capacity to serve the demanded need. Lacking international sentiments of responsibility, media coverage, or geopolitical interest keep donor states apathetic to human need. The UNHCR estimates that in 2017, the budget necessary to meet demands was 7.963 billion dollars; however, its expenditure was 3.982 billion.2 At the end of a camps’ duration of existence, there are typically little resources or stamina left to effectively transition aid employees, the host country’s environment and economy, 1 UNHCR, EU Humanitarian Aid and Protection. 2014. “CCCM Cluster Supporting Disabled Communities Global CCCM Cluster Camp Closure Guidelines Provisional Release – March 2014.” https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/47942/Camp+closure+Guidelines/d3123d57- 02f1-4c01-ad8e-b6a09745652d (accessed September 5, 2017). 2 UNHCR. 2018.“Financials.” http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial (accessed February 4, 2018). 2 and the many refugees back into regular life. Although keeping refugee operations is logistically nearly impossible, the international community rebukes host governments who threaten premature camp closure by citing non-refoulement laws.3 According to the UNHCR’s executive committee’s 1985 conclusion on repatriation: The repatriation of refugees should only take place at their freely expressed wish; the voluntary and individual character of repatriation of refugees and the need for it to be carried out under conditions of absolute safety, preferably to the place of residence of the refugee in his country of origin, should always be respected;4 Despite these internationally agreed-upon standards, states ultimately and exclusively hold sovereignty over their domain. Although the UNHCR has the mandate to protect refugees, it can only operate in a country with the consent of the government and the ultimate protection of refugees still rests on the shoulders of the host government.5 Thus, at the end of the day, refugees’ fate rests in the willingness of host governments to follow these standards and work openly with the UN. There are plenty of motives for a host government to limit generosity. Countries often suffer consequences of security, financial, and environmental strain after years of hosting thousands of dependents. When political leaders decide to take on the humane task of hosting refugees, it is impossible to know exactly how long the camps will need to operate. One year? Five years? Twenty-five years? This question is further 3 Forced repatriation is when a host government coerces refugee to involuntarily moving back to their country of citizenship. 4 UNHCR. 1985. “Voluntary Repatriation No. 40 (XXXVI)” http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/exconc/3ae68c9518/voluntary-repatriation.html (accessed December 15, 2017). 5 Veney, Cassandra R. 2007. Forced Migration in Eastern Africa: Democratization, Structural Adjustment, and Refugees, 168. Palgrave MacMillan. 3 complicated if the host country has an adversarial history with the incoming refugee population. Dadaab Camp Closure Controversy Dadaab, Kenya is an over twenty-five-year refugee camp story. Refugee camps in Dadaab were originally built in 1991 for at maximum 90,000 residents; at its population- peak in 2012, it hosted 485,000 refugees.67 What started as a seemingly temporary solution exploded into an overwhelming and underfunded debacle. At this point, an entire generation of Somalis have grown up in the refugee camps in Dadaab, and after all these years, this population forever influences the northeastern region of Kenya. Thousands of mostly Somalis have claimed Dadaab as home since the 1990s and thousands more since then have married, had children, and have informally worked there for years. Since the 2001, September 11 attack in New York City, Kenya along with many other governments developed a conservative and suspicious attitude towards refugee and immigrant populations. These sentiments turned hostile after the 2013 Westgate Mall and 2015 Garissa University College al-Shabaab shootings compounded Kenyans’ growing Islamophobia.8 On multiple occasions, the Kenyan government threatened to close these camps in the name of national security. Haro Kamau, the Deputy Commissioner of Garissa 6UNHCR. 2017. “UNHCR Somalia Situation: Supplementary Appeal 2017”, 29. http://www.unhcr.org/591ae0e17.pdf (accessed September 3, 2017). 7 Edwards, Adrian. 2011.“UN High Commissioner for Refugees Applauds