“Active Measures” of Ussr Against Usa: Preface to Hybrid War

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

“ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR

Analytical report

Kyiv 2017 UDK 32.019.57+355.01(073:470+477) A43

Published in Ukraine. All information requests, please, address to Pyrohova, 7-a, Kyiv, 01030, Ukraine http://www.niss.gov.ua/

Authors : D. Dubov – Dr. (Political Science), Senior Research Fellow – Introduction, Chapters 1-4, Conclusions, Recommendations, Annex. A. Barovska – PhD (Public Administration) – research concept generation, Subchapter 3.3, Conclusions, Recommendations. T. Isakova – Introduction, Subchapter 3.1. I. Koval – Introduction, Research concept, Chapter 4, Annex. V. Horbulin – Doctor of Engineering Sciences, Professor, Academician of the National Academy of Ukraine – Introduction, Recommendations.

“Active measures” of the USSR against USA: preface to hybrid war : analytical report / D. Dubov, A43 A. Barovska, T. Isakova, I. Koval, V. Horbulin; General editorship of D. Dubov. – Kyiv: The National Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017 – 48 p. Includes Annex. ISBN 978–966–554–285–8

The work is dedicated to the topic of “active measures” application by the Soviet Union against the USA during the Cold War with the aim of achieving certain geopolitical goals. “Active measures” mentioned here included dissemination of deceptive information, using the agents of infl uence and cover organizations, media manipulations etc. Today, very similar methods are being used in the course of the hybrid war which is waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Studying the history of the USSR-U.S. standoff can help improve instruments and tools used in responding to contemporary challenges of the hybrid war. This study has been intended for the public offi cers, security & defense professionals, and also for wider public. UDK 32.019.57+355.01(073:470+477)

ISBN 978–966–554–285–8 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...... 4 RESEARCH CONCEPT...... 5 1. HOW AMERICAN RESEARCHERS AND EXPERTS SEE THE ISSUE OF “ACTIVE MEASURES” ...... 6 2. APPROACHES TO DETERMINING “ACTIVE MEASURES”...... 13 3. ACTIONS OF THE U.S. PUBLIC BODIES/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ...... 17 3.1 1947-1981: REFLECTING ON “ACTIVE MEASURES” ...... 17 3.2. 1981-1988: COUNTERACTING “ACTIVE MEASURES” ...... 21 3.3. 2014-2016: “ACTIVE MEASURES” AGAIN ON THE AGENDA ...... 24 4. “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF THE USSR AND HYBRID WAR OF RUSSIA: DETERMINING COMMON FEATURES ...... 28 5. CONCLUSIONS ...... 34 6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UKRAINE: MECHANISMS FOR COUNTERACTING “ACTIVE MEASURES” AND HYBRID WAR ...... 36 ANNEX. FORGERY CASES ...... 39 REFERENCES ...... 40 LIST OF FIGURES/TABLES ...... 47 “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR of hybrid threats during theSecondLebanon War (2006). Thus, forecasts andhypotheses (andconcept) evolved inthetheory 2 1 attributed itsspecifi strategic intervention, deployment etc.) measures.military Suchcombination ofvariousmeasures hasalready (political, information humanitarian,economic, (crisisregulation, andpsychological) cyber-, andmilitary statehoodor getundercontrol assuch.For Ukrainian this, theenemy hasbeenapplyingbothnon-military from full-scaleinvasion). These tools ofinfl years nearlyallpossiblemeansandtools ofinfl As oftoday, hasbeenwithstandingRussianaggression for Ukraine over three years. Duringthesethree INTRODUCTION dominance of the Americans in the military fi dominance oftheAmericansinmilitary trends ofwarmethods’ blurringandblending. This wasunderstood asapotential response to technological the defense analysts from Pentagon andalsofrom Corps theMarine Warfi andexplaintheoperationalcontentscounteraction of andforeign haveBoth Ukrainian already experts co rather useful. Till now, inthosecircles theterms “hybrid enemy” introduced andusedextensively muchearlier. At thesametime, we fi is fairenough,since indeed, larger share oftools andmethodsusedduringthecurrent hybrid warhave been Criticism mostlyconcerns the “novelty” sideofsuchphenomenonashybrid war. At fi paradigmalbecause there approach isnoexact attached to it. frequently. At thesametime, thisconcept remains to criticized, beratherdebatableandisoften mainly theconcept inUkraine actions With thelaunchofmilitary “hybrid war” hasbeeninusemore andmore extensively (Horbulin,2016). effi level ofcountry’salso certain integration into theworld economy. alltheeff Otherwise, infl the hybrid type. Besides, usingeconomic pressure of somestructures insuchahybrid warand/orsupporting which enablesconsolidating eff andeconomic potential (andalso, military importantly,with acertain withahighspecifi the enemy doesnotnecessarily meanthattheyare capableofwaging hybrid wars. Obviously, onlyastate (orgroup ofcountries) country to usesomemethodsortools particular, against of acertain In capacity thevery specifi methods’ ofcertain the separate facts and/ortools’ applicationandusingthesameunderconditions of Robert M. Gates "The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance," the Right Striking NationalDefense M.Gates "The Strategy: Robert Joint Force 2009),2-7;Leo (1stQuarter Quarterly William. J. Nemeth,USMC,Future War andChechnya: ACase for Hybrid Warfare, Monterrey, CA:Naval Postgraduate School, Maste aspx?transcriptid==4903. Remarks atthe Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, 11, 2011.Accessed DC,October athttp://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcri for NationalStrategic Studies. April2009. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing theEvolving Conflict,” ofModern Character Strategic Forum 240, Washington. DC:In Thesis, andFrank June2002;JamesN.Mattis Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats and theFour Block War Proceedings, September 2005;Frank ciency. uence assume not only certain level fi ofeconomicuence development assumenotonlycertain (andthus–certain cally ongoinghybrid war. 1 . Three U.S. Secretaries ofDefense, includingthecurrent DoDleadership, found thisconcept c features andeven gotanewname– “hybrid war”. orts due to strict hierarchy iscapable ofwaging dueto awarof strict ofdecision-making) orts uence were politicalagendaand/ supposedto changeUkrainian eld. Their forecasts were, confi actually uence have (apart beenalready appliedagainstourcountry 4 the notion “hybrid war”. Backintheearly2000salready ntributed alotto generalize theseexperiences of 2 and “hybrid policy” are beingusedrather propaganda. isanti-Syrian It by enemiesof Assad. measure"assessment isan"active of I cantell you thatthiskind language ofintelligence services Well, inaprofessional speaking n signifi nd President Vladimir Putin to CBS, noted the ghting Laboratory From ofRussian theinterview rmed in Southern Lebanonrmed inSouthern cn diff cant rst glance, thiscriticism nancial capacities)but orts would beoflittle orts c politicalsystem erences between erences January 2015 January nPanetta, stitute pt. r’s

Analytical report - 2017 cers. cers. . uence is uence 3 uence). uence). Quite If not, and in this case 5 on Ukraine, and total uence what is exactly the connection between dent step in the direction to understanding the understanding in the direction to dent step uence. De facto, the moment such a decision is such a decision the moment De facto, uence. 5 . However, there is an open question in this regard: question in this regard: is an open there . However, 4 connection is an obvious between there eld often state uence, quazi-civil organization and information pressure pressure quazi-civil and information uence, organization t in the 21st century along with the current technologies tion and the previous use of “active measures” during the measures” “active use of tion and the previous vo-frantsyy-povtorenye-ystoryy/ ers greatly from the Cold War period? War the Cold from ers greatly erent (though still interrelated) – then (though still interrelated) erent and their application war methods use of hybrid situational (ad-hoc) between erence erences in methods, tools and goals behind “active measures” from those applied in from measures” “active and goals behind tools in methods, erences cers – but more like the whole system of practices which includes, inter alia, “active measures”. measures”. “active alia, inter of practices which includes, like the whole system – but more cers nd the exact formula of hybrid way through understanding the essence of “active measures”, measures”, “active of understanding the essence through way nd the exact of hybrid formula

measures-russian-hybrid-warfare-brief-alan-malcher-ma https://ghall.com.ua/2017/04/13/sekretnyie-operatsyy-khb- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/kgb-active- from: Retrieved A Brief Comparison. Warfare: and Russian Hybrid Measures Active KGB Ibid. extrapolation of methods and tools used previously on today’s realia have already raised the question concerning raised the question concerning already have realia on today’s extrapolation used previously of methods and tools Besides, continuation of such research, in our view, has an obvious and immediate value for nowadays. The The nowadays. value for and immediate has an obvious in our view, of such research, continuation Besides, fi to attempts these notions are totally diff totally these notions are the diff What are them? and public power of the researchers considerations the relevant valuable are this, At war”. “hybrid concept this country the USA (since object be the central from used to of the USSR infl representatives counteract them. to and the ways measures” “active of been studying both the concept of them have many Answers to these questions may become yet another confi yet become these questions may to Answers the course of a hybrid war? of a hybrid the course All of the above forces the researchers pay much more attention to the idea of “active measures”. Mostly because measures”. “active the idea of to attention much more pay the researchers forces All of the above war. of ongoing hybrid in the course still being used today, are tools methods and of the related share a larger Until 2014 the “active measures” of Russia were only a simple tool of permanent infl a simple tool only of Russia were measures” “active Until 2014 the is also using this Russian Federation Today, war. being used upon us ended up in a hybrid of this tools ignoring at the same time. democratic countries against several scale, large and on a tool, 3 4 5

Soviet times. The strategic goal of “new active measures” remains essentially the same, and their use has already and their use has already essentially the same, remains active measures” “new goal of strategic The times. Soviet strategy hybrid the inseparable partbecome of Russia’s RESEARCH CONCEPT experts and professional in the fi American researchers the current hybrid war waged by Russian Federa war waged by hybrid the current Back in 2000 political power in Russia got those who used to be directly engaged in the “hidden war” against the “hidden war” be directly in the engaged in Russia got those who used to Back in 2000 political power certain mean not even politicians and/or we here “those” Under War. the whole Cold throughout West democratic offi intelligence offi generation of Russian intelligence in use of a younger already are these active measures now However, State approval of this decision triggers the mechanism of attack on the other state, and one of the means for and one of the means for the other state, triggers the mechanism of attack on of this decision approval State war the subjectof hybrid of infl the beginning before even However, war. is hybrid its implementation main with the general goal is the used against the other state methods of the set of pressure conformity This intelligence the times of Soviet it goes back to notion is also not new, This measures”. “active characteristic of of infl agents information, services, when deceptive very exactly often even in the same form. again on the agenda. Curiously, all these practices are And today, made (in case it becomes known to wider circles or in case this moment can be later reconstructed through through reconstructed be later this moment can or in case known circles wider case it becomes made (in to war declaration”. of “act sort as some be interpreted methods used) can of the of monitoring goal without direct use of military aimed at achieving the strategic using measures power. already be used. to tools common became quite “Encyclopedia of and the author of the intelligence general of Swiss the former Baud, Jacques by noted well As other services into it simply disintegrated did not disappear, the KGB services”, and secret intelligence Besides, there is a big diff is a big there Besides, military is an explicit there assumes latter The & in mind a certain idea. having strategic political en masse, the subject of infl the state, by approved political decision is the today’s hybrid war only a “reconstructed modern version of KGB active measures”, the contemporary active measures”, KGB of modern version “reconstructed war only a hybrid is the today’s fi the necessity to use of which is explained only by which diff and political climate socioeconomic “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR force ofarms, for theoverthrow ofthe intern International). This documentestablishedasitslong-term vision “the goaloffi measures” dates backto thetimeswhenComintern statute wasapproved (1919,Moscow’s Third Communist The Americanresearcher Stephanie K. Whittle (2015)isoftheopinionthatorigin oftheconcept “active 1. HOW AMERICANRESEARCHERSANDEXPERTS from “active measures” andwhatspecifi analyze theyreacted to how have those, exactly whatactions beentakento minimize the negative consequences governments andotherinstitutes have already similarchallenges. faced very toThus, studyand itisimportant experience of resisting to realize Russianaggression,Ukrainian thatpreviously, itisimportant otherstates, their the possibleways to andmechanismsofreaction thesemeasures. Andeven thoughwe already have ourown, directly and/orindirectly,directly to achieve theaimsof “active measures”. Namely, the theycreated and supported thisresearchIn under “front organizations” we understandthoseorganizations whichwere usedby theSoviets, measures” andmore specifi NovemberIn 1984theHeritageFoundation organized around tablefullydedicated to theproblem of “active measures” muchlater, in1984-1985only. However, attention ofAmericanresearch andprofessional communities wasdrawn to thetopic of “active seen(andquiteoften appropriately) predecessor asthedirect oftheKGB. for Combating Counter-Revolution, SpeculationandSabotage. foundedThe by Cheka, Felix Dzerzhinsky, is Commission –theAll-RussianExtraordinary Cheka withtheestablishmentofso-called connection in direct 1999) thinkthattheconcept “active measures” emerged slightlylater, duringthe1920s, anditsappearance was quote http://www.agitclub.ru/front/com/congress022.htm). from link: thedirect researchers Other (e.g., Bass, Republic” whichwassupposedto bethetransitionstageun tocounteraction Russia’s ways ofwaging hybrid war, whichtoday may beunderstood asbothlocalandworldwide. measures may become, anditsEuropean thesource for effi partners, Ukraine ofusefulinstrumentsfor further CIA experiences inthefi methods to which W. Casey referring wasoften to whenaccusing theSoviet Union. This iswhy studyingthe And today’s hybrid thesameaggressor warhasbeeninitiated andisbeingwagedwiththesame by thevirtually politicalprocessesbit hectic, inMexico related asinspired directly instability to theSoviet infl accused W. Casey, whenitcameto LatinAmericaissues, intheattempt to present ratherregular, even thougha a situationwhenoneoftheNIOs(nationalintelligence offi Third World countries, innearlyallevents inthesecountr William J. Casey [then-headoftheCIA] penetration oftheUSSRinto the wasespeciallyconcerned withlarge-scale CIA” fl [top-management The keysources for ourresearch are theunclassifi alliances,with itsvisionandvalues, NATO andalsopoliticalmilitary fi from theU.S.,dollars onthis. Apart another, ofinfl larger object theU.S.has beenattacking rathersystemically andinseveral atthesametime, directions spendingbillionsof case studyofSoviet-American standoff such, especiallysince thesecond halfofthe1970stillend1980s, becameprobably themostexplicit For ourdetailedresearch we have chosentheUSSR-USAstandoff referring to thestatements offormer CIAemploy interpretations duringthesameperiod. For Gates oftheCIAactivities Hearings…, n.d.) hasbeen example, (The USA) concerning thenature ofAmerican-Soviet relations duringthe1980sandsomeofratherambiguous We intentionally excluded from ourresearch scope quite intensive debates (whichtook place primarilyinthe as ways theminamuchwidercontext. ofcounteracting of theU.S. have beenalsousedalongwithresearch studies. This enabledusconsider “active measures” aswell SEE THEISSUEOF“ACTIVEMEASURES” eld of “active measures” andespeciallythemechanismselaborated to neutralize these oor] hadaclearvisionthat “the Russiansare coming!”, andtheyare coming globally. cally – to the so-called cally –to theso-called “front organizations”. cally has been done so that to avoid the open military conflcally hasbeendonesothatto avoid theopenmilitary withintensive useof “active measures”. Duringthosetimes, theUSSR ational bourgeoisie and thecreation Soviet oftheInternational ed documents of the CIA, 1947 to 1989. Other offi ed documentsoftheCIA,1947to 1989.Other ees who, inter alia,mentionedthat “the seventh fl 6 ies healways saw “the handofMoscow”. This even ledto cer, apositionintheNationalIntelligence Council) has til the absolute destruction ofthestate (translatedtil theabsolute destruction uence for theSoviets wasthewhole “evil” West duringtheCold War period. The Cold War as rst ofall. ghting, means, by even every by uence. cial materials ict. oor ofthe cient cient Analytical report - 2017 KGB KGB f the U.S. f the U.S. e minister e minister member cials from from cials rms from from rms uence in 1961 when the uence uential players at the information, at the information, uential players culture societies, fellowships, c societies, it was essential that the Soviet orts, all agreed 7 often they public support attracted broader etc., c progress nches because those are “symbols of Russia”, stories about “American “American about stories of Russia”, “symbols nches because those are ne the world order and agenda. The degree of Soviet success is greatly is greatly success of Soviet degree The and agenda. order ne the world (Soviet active measures and disinformation…, Reading room, https:// Reading room, and disinformation…, active (Soviet measures 7 ghts for Donetsk airport or about “members of private military of private fi “members Donetsk airportghts for or about rst . In West Germany they began acquiring greater infl greater they began acquiring Germany West . In parties. and/or Communist ective openly pro-Soviet than organizations 6 orts in Western Europe relies primarily on conscious collaborators and “useful “useful and collaborators primarily on conscious relies Europe Western orts in elds, serving the best interests of the Soviet Union. To “front organization” in organization” “front To serving Union. of the Soviet elds, the best interests rst separate research studies began to appear in an attempt to conceptualize “active “active conceptualize to appear in an attempt studies began to research rst separate Ethnos cer being burnt alive in Lviv (”My bez Rossii propadyom”…, from http://detector. from bez Rossii propadyom”…, (”My in Lviv being burnt alive cer ed boy from Slovyansk” is probably the best illustration of Russians’ capacity to “create events” events” “create capacity to the best illustration of Russians’ is probably Slovyansk” from ed boy ected by how well thought-out and steadfast the Western position is. Western thought-out well the ected how and steadfast by Union must not be allowed to defi to Union must not be allowed aff newspaper circulation West meekly accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall. The Soviets have failed, however, utterly in Italy, mainly in Italy, utterly however, failed, have Soviets The Wall. the erection meekly of the Berlin accepted West at that principally because all leading intelligentsia failed in France, and they also resolve, government due to moment very anti-Soviet. predominantly them such openings. given have clumsiness and inconsistencies However, contemporary Ukrainian experience proves this statement wrong, actually. The storyThe about actually. wrong, this statement contemporary Ukrainian proves experience However, the “crucifi and a plot slaves “two later: about stories more appeared There as such. factual background without any a story being about children Ukrainian for soldiers (Ukraintsy za…, http://censor.net.ua); voyuyut of land” taught at Ukrainian kill to schools bullfi taking part in the fi mercenaries” idiots”. Their exposure is helpful but not a panacea. The greatest Soviet strength is not in agents’ skills but in is not in agents’ strength Soviet greatest The is helpful but not a panacea. exposure Their idiots”. of the exact sure involved. funds money – although nobody is quite and of plentiful cadres the availability media) etc. the U.S.” (direct links for both at http://www.stopfake.org, see References at the end of this book), a story at the end of see References at http://www.stopfake.org, both (direct links for the U.S.” about special task offi of Greece. Experts classical and popularity (A influence of the Ethnos newspaper claim that he got this position mainly due to of Greece. https://www.cia.gov). from: disinformation…, working group on “active measures”. “active on working group he was the head o was not just a side observer Kux It and/or independent researcher, is important that D. keep in mind here to became the prim Papandreou a very in 1981 Andreas into convert specific political result: the USSR managed to And this control • the largest- they control where in Greece been most successful have Soviets the Of discussed, the regions 7 6 In 1985 the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace held a conference on Soviet “active measures” in measures” “active on Soviet held a conference and Peace Revolution War, InstitutionIn on 1985 the Hoover became part of a project conference The https://www.cia.gov). Institution conference, (Hoover Europe Western on undermining security and destabilizing situation in work their proxies’ and the Soviets’ elucidate to on how offi a range scholars and government quite by was attended event The West. the of various regions of the House Intelligence Committee…”. of the House Intelligence today of interest are held decades ago, that conference, from keynotes The too. Europe Western and the U.S. world. Western against the war of Russia hybrid the ongoing to relevance their absolute due to • eff of Soviet share larger The “I am happy to invite you to the second in our series of luncheon roundtables focusing on Soviet active measures. active on Soviet measures. focusing roundtables in our series of luncheon the second to you invite to “I am happy staff the discussion will be former Leading Organizations”. Front “Soviet session, on the subjectThis of • cloth. situations out of whole cannot create Soviets The • eff Soviet counter to how Although nobody knows precisely and thus became much more eff more and thus became much Chairman of the National Vice the Herb Mayer, alia, Mr. inter invited, table round Heritage Foundation The was directly mentioning both https://www.cia.gov) (Reading room, letter invitation The Council. Intelligence organizations”: “front and measures” “active organizational and political fi organizational promoting independent organizations non-aligned, be to pretended organizations all these Since clubs etc. scientifi disarmament, such as peace, good causes particular, belonged various non-governmental organizations, scientifi organizations, various non-governmental belonged particular, “legends” of Soviet spies, and they were also gradually becoming quite infl quite becoming also gradually were and they spies, of Soviet “legends” measures” neglecting though the terminology which came directly from the vocabulary neglecting which came directly from though the terminology intelligence. of Soviet measures” the fi was probably Dennis Kux At the same time roughly fi the same time roughly At Events on the related topics were held directly by the CIA as well. A good example in this regard is the Deception is the Deception A good example in this regard the CIA as well. held directly by were topics on the related Events https://www.cia.gov). Reading room, (Study proposals…, Conference • programme the U.S. Initiative) since Defense issue [as of 1985] is USSR using SDI (Strategic topical The “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR • forgery cases(for forgery more details, seeAnnex). • • disinformation; which, inhisopinion,canbeclassifi be examinedindetailunclassifi the West”. Further, theauthoralsonotes that measures ofactive hasonlyfairlyrecently“the subject begunto points from othermore detailedworks concerning thenature ofthewarSoviet Unioniswaging against oforiginal isnotaproduct research. was notmeantto isamodestcompilation be. ofsomeimportant It It “This a book measures,“Аctive quietwarandtwo socialistrevolutions”. notes L.Sulcnotes that hisintroductory In with over ofState. 20years 1985hepublished ofexperience In andlater alsotheassistantatDepartment Institute. Amongthose, thestudiesby Lawrence specialattention deserved B. Sulc–theformer CIAoffi “active measures” wasstudiedrathercomprehensively. Se Postgraduate published School “Soviet strategic deception” (Dailey, Parker, 1987),andinthatbooktheissueof Nonetheless, awholerangeofsubstantialresearch hasbeenpublishedonthistopic. For example, theNaval merely asdeceptive information dissemination. “active measures” have beenunderstood asonlyoneofthepossiblemethods, andeven more frequently – 9 8 implementation of “active measures”, diff www.cia.gov) to pay enoughattention to thisfact. Thus, hesuggested to on consider theSoviet practices involving communist fronts, foreign communist parties, “clandestine” radiostations assuch,thentrade, variousformsdiplomacy ofaidandalsoinformation work. “Gray” are those activities of foreign policy. “White” inhisinterpretation, activities, covered classicalforms including ofdiplomaticwork, Similar problems withtranslationandinterpreta Reading room, https://www.cia.gov). operationsprovidepsychological theclosestparallel” warfare measures (Soviet active anddisinformation…, diffi Eagleburger, theresearcher noted that “fi blurredbetween thosetwo isoften inreal life. Moreover, ofState Lawrence quotingthethen-Undersecretary According to Kux’ measures vision,active are either “gray” or “black” althoughthe borderline ofactivities, type disseminating forgeries andfakedocuments. operations: theuseofagentsinfl well whowasbehindthem.Andfi knew everybody outlets for disinformation.were Suchactivities to connected notdirectly theSoviet Union,however, nearly For more details see, for example: http://inosmi.ru/politic/20160728/237359416.html Clandestineradiobroadcasting isbroadcasting inthelanguageoftarget audience from astationwhichdoesnotadmitits transmission orwhichattempts to misleadlisteners aboutitsorigin (Foreign Affairs Note: Communist Clandestine Broadcasting… Russia” was presented Rosiyanadala…,www.eurointegration.com.ua). (Feiky zazvychkoyu: ofJustice intheHague,during thehearingofInternationalCourt 2017whenthe case against “Ukraine https://www.crowdstrike.com).(Bears intheMidst…, Fake dataand documentshave been alsodiscovered hackers’ group are beingmanagedby theGeneralStaff that inreal life thissite ismanagedby Russianhackers’ group APT28,ormaybe –boththe site andthe “Cyberberkut” postingsuchmaterials whichisactively and “documents”. oftheresearchers Some state Internet vianumerous sites andblogsespecially. The most obvious example inthisregard isthesite called Third World countries to “legalize” such “evidences” –today thisrole inbeingplayed primarilyby the of theirmoraldegradation etc. Andifsev confi ontheterritories ofDonetskandLuhanskelections oblasts. There alsoappeared numerous “obvious armylosses inmanpower aswell ofUkrainian as “intentions” authoritiesto circumvent ofUkrainian ofInformation Policy andotherstate institutionswere supposedly Ministry Ukraine, “confi of Defense, andDefense Council of onNationalSecurity Ministry ofUkraine, Service of theSecurity more frequent in thefi and individualswhichwere inoppositionto then-government ofthecountry. becameeven Suchpractices example, duringtheEuromaidan fake “documents” were politicalforces used massively againstcertain we isstillquite offorgery widelyspread, needto mentionthatthepractice inparticular, For inUkraine. Despite thetoday’s quite widetechnical capacitiesto checkanddoubleinformation anddocuments, cult… NophraseinEnglishconveys precisely measures. themeaningofactive Perhaps the World War II rmations” concerning theinappropriate oreven soldiers, criminalbehavior ofUkrainian “evidences” rst days ofCrimea’s occupation. Various forgeries ofseemingly “internal documents” ed sources”. Further L.Sulcexpandsthelistofpossibleactions inthetext ed as “active measures”, includingthefollowing, inter alia: uence, spreading falserumours, dupingpoliticiansandjournalists, erentiating between “white”, “gray” and “black” intheinterests activity nding anappropriate Englishphraseto measures describeactive is eral decadesagotheUSSRusedmostlymassmediafrom the tion have beenmentionedby otherexperts 8 nally, “black” involved activities genuinelyclandestine Main Intelligence Directorate Main ofRussianFederation veral works have beenpublishedby theNathanHale 8 , or well-known media , orwell-known 9 . Most frequently,. Most rming”huge origin of , 1982). cer Analytical report - 2017 how exactly they were taking exactlyhow use of it. Inter they were t to make references favorable in relation to the to in relation favorable make references t to 9 that later Soviet propaganda was able to refer to the to refer was able to propaganda Soviet that later This author states, inter alia, that this special status (the inter author states, This book describes in detail the large-scale penetration of Soviet nition of “active measures”. Most of them covered two basic two Most of them covered measures”. “active nition of (NGOs) and organizations non-governmental for responsible ces of the UN debates. nature the uenced included: in this regard uence cers were performing diplomatic work during that time, however, even even however, performing during that time, diplomatic work were cers cers”. cers”. airs” (that is, killings); (that is, airs” uencing” and “intelligence collection” (Sulc, 1986). (Sulc, collection” “intelligence and uencing” and other important of news ow information; uence; seeking the Secretariat; from advice which were uencing the delegates Soviet Union; Soviet UN documents as eligible grounding; UN documents as eligible Soviet front groups which, in turn, later infl which, in turn, later groups front Soviet cers, and obviously, in such cases were not free to refuse to cooperate when “asked”. when cooperate to refuse to not free cases were in such and obviously, cers, • materials; editing of conference • the fl over control The major typesThe of activities exert to the infl • infl • diplomats in their work; Soviet direct help to • supporting propaganda; Soviet • the UN Secretary documents for arranging General so tha • so the UN records pro-Soviet documents into entering Of course, not only intelligence offi not only intelligence Of course, that the key tasks performedIn mentioned book L. Sulc also noted servants Soviet the already by within the and defi scope to UN structures fully complied alia, the author claims that “approximately one-quarter Nations the United by nationals employed “approximately of the Soviet alia, the author claims that offi intelligence Soviet were He actually. this statement, confirmed Charles M. Lichenstein of the same problem, Another researcher unit in the in his especially sensitive civil servants” “international bloc “28 Soviet mentioned that out of (Lichenstein, assignments” or all of their duty at least 21 spent some UN Secretariat, hours on intelligence 1985). service the secret by monitored and events “measures” in involved frequently were diplomats professional offi “infl of activity:areas intelligence into the United Nations Organizations structures and Nations Organizations the United into intelligence In 1986 L. Sulc published one more book – “The KGB and the United Nations: Soviet subversion and intelligence and intelligence “The subversion Nations: Soviet and the United KGB In book – more 1986 L. Sulc published one The Secretariat”. Nations operations in the United Thus the resilience and readiness to respond extremely rigidly to any "active measures" remains the key the key remains "active measures" any to extremelyrigidly respond to and readiness the resilience Thus of a quick victory when the probability resistance, seems intense feels when Moscow instrument, whereas it retreats. impossible, • organizations; and front of political parties, the use groups insurgent • organizations; and non-government groups front international • of infl agents • acts of terror; • aff “wet the so-called other superweapon bomb or any the passion but is not the hydrogen West “The of the weapon ultimate will use that we the Kremlin is convinced Once it if necessary. die for to and the willingness freedom for of peace”. the best assurance will have we its will, to subjugating the world it from prevent to this weapon Further in the same book L. Sulc, referring to the ideas of the philosopher Sidney Hook, the ideas to described the major tool referring the same book L. Sulc, in Further as follows: measures” “active in counteracting Soviet • superpowers; acts;intrusion of two deception of the idea of the existence • (which includes primarily military and political deception); “maskirovka” the so-called warfare; • cultural • broadcasting; using foreign • sports and even events. one of NGO) for such organizations allowed their representatives participate in highly important their representatives in meetings, allowed such organizations for one of NGO) and SocialEconomic (UN Council). in the sittings of the ECOSOS particular, These and the related issues have been also studied well in the work by Juliana Geran Pilon (1986) “At the U.N., the U.N., “At (1986) Juliana Geran Pilon by in the work well been also studied issues have and the related These Organizations”. Nongovernmental As Pose Fronts Soviet • the UN offi personnel in of Soviet placement “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR International Department regarding to measures variousthemesofactive becarriedout. International Department andtheactivities measures’of active operations, according to the basicguidelinesitreceived from thePolitburo andthe AoftheKGB’s Service The so-called First ChiefDirectorate wasresponsible for theoverall implementation etc.) were by decidedonand crafted Department. theInternational actually measures’active apparatus. Thus, offoreign themainproducts fronts (suchasappeals, conferences, publications Politburo, andthen–to coordinate andimplement theseoperationswiththeassistance ofotherelements to withrespect measures active wasto function formulate measures andsuggestactive primary optionsto the oftheCentral C The Department International channels (e.g., Pravda itself. andLiteraturnaia aswell Gazeta) astheEmbassyInformation Department broadcasting (e.g., Moscow, Radio Peace Radio andProgress) andalsowellprinted media acknowledged those organs engagedinforeign propaganda anddisinformation, including: TASS, Novosti (APN) international oftheCentral CommitteeThe Information International Department oftheCPSUoversaw of the activities to thestrategic level andscale, wasratherstandard anddidnotdiff Overall, thisschemeofdecisionon “active measures” approval andimplementation,especiallywhenitcame operationswhichwere theresult ofastrategic decisionatthetop measures oftheSoviet active pyramid • • operations initiated anddesigned withintheKGB. measures”: ideaswould begenerated offi by residency 2) “Center” gives for strategic adisinformation go-ahead campaign; 1) usedby theKGBof actions andSoviet administration: order ofdisinformation organization, which,intheopinionsofAmericanintelligence offi For example, a2009volume oftheCIA’s professional journal, “Studies inIntelligence”,presents thefollowing their separate elements. organizational mechanismbehindinitiating, developing andimplementingcertain “active measures” oratleast Quite alotofstudiesAmericanresearchers have dedicated to theattempt the to determined whatwasexactly intelligence operationsinahostcountry.• supporting citizens ofthecountries to whichtheywere assigned and/orto whichtheyfrequently travelled; • spotting, assessingandrecruiting agents, both UNemployees andother withwhomagentscameincontact • gatheringinformation onthird countries; information• collecting especiallyearlywarningsofany ontheUNactivities, possibleUNactions; directions: Classical intelligence operationswithintheUNhasbeenalw Overall, CIA experts ofthosetimesdiff Overall, CIAexperts “Center”6) press outsidetheSoviet bloc-controlled to soughtto conceal launchastory typically Moscow’s 5) targeting; stillatthe “Center”,4) preparation involved disinformation specialistswritingintheirnative language, approvals “Center” would evaluate theideassuggested by theseoffi 3) encompassed many elementsoftheSoviet state (seeFigure 1). approvedand directly by thePolitburo. Suchcampaigns were usuallyplannedto lastseveral years and year; hundredsconducted every ofoperationswhichfell into thiscategory disinformation techniques suchasforgeries oragentsofinfl does notexperience any international isolationassuch(Horbulin,2016) preferences. At thesametime, Russia’s role active inBRICSandSCO iscreating theimageasifcountry the votes ofseparate Asian, African andLatinAmericancountries inexchange for economic andmilitary And today, returned initswork to Russiahasactually suchpractices withtheUN.For example, itmanipulates Soviet source, totally “foreign” source ofinformation. published abroad,by referring and propagate theSoviet mediawasableto itfurther pickupastory to anon- hand. This wasdonefrequently through anonymous inthe letters andnewspaper articles Third World. Once translationsinto theneededlanguages; by managers, andfurther for usedfor thematerials thedisinformation thatcould befurther purposes; erentiated between two categories cers assigned to read localpress, books, andmagazinessearching ommittee of the CPSU (further – International Department) –InternationalDepartment) ommittee oftheCPSU (further 10 These would usuallyemploy rathertraditional cers; ays performed underseveralays rathertraditional performed uence. Throughout itshistory, theKGB has er muchbetween thecountries worldwide. of operationsrelated to “active cers, wasthepattern Analytical report - 2017 c/tr/ cally, cally, NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO RESIDENCIES 10 COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY (KGB) STATE 10 rst attempt, but replaying the same was but replaying rst attempt, Publications 11 Front organizations Front foreign media assets, oral and written disinformation, disinformation, oral and written media assets, foreign c mechanisms used for this implementation. K.H. c mechanisms used for Hohol, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL Communist Party, U.S.A. Party, Communist International Fronts (UN) International Fronts Soviet Friendship Societies Friendship Soviet paramilitary etc. operations forgeries, uence, forgeries, the operation again. Many attempting from the Soviets this did not deter rst try, TASS WASHINGTON c methods in the course of “active measures” taken, namely – on documents’ forgeries. taken, namely – on documents’ measures” “active of c methods in the course Policies and Plans Coordinated at the Headquarters Coordinated and Plans Level Policies EMBASSY PRAVDA NOVOSTI IZVESTIYA DEPARTMENT INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT INFORMATION

INTERNATIONAL

in the United State United the in Representatives fulltext/u2/a223697.pdf Russian roulette: disinformation in the U.S. government and news media / Thomas NicholasThomas O'Brien URL : http://www.dtic.mil/dti media / and news government in the U.S. disinformation Russian roulette: often quite successful, thus making these distortions successful, often acceptable. quite more rumours, and clandestinely placed press items strained credulity at fi strained credulity items press and clandestinely placed rumours, 10 through his thorough analysis of the key techniques, reached quite meaningful conclusions concerning the the concerning conclusions meaningful quite reached of the key techniques, analysis his thorough through application of specifi structures (or those smaller which cyclicitythe KGB of the obvious to of persistence he noted In particular, the achieve case some individual operations failed to in the measures): for at some point responsible were on the fi result desired In 1988 yet another fundamental study was published – “Soviet Communication: Active Measures and Measures Active Communication: “Soviet Inanother fundamental study was published – 1988 yet context of active in detail the overall study analyzed This Keenan Harry by Hohol. Management” Information implementation along with the specifi measures’ A growing body of evidence suggests that a very the Kremlin of top-down evidence body of is still in use by similar system control A growing 2016). Propaganda…, (Beyond today and the relative success or failure of such operations. The Service A also prepared a daily bulletin on the progress Service a daily bulletin on the progress The A also prepared of such operations. or failure success and the relative International and the Department. Politburo the members of the for of active measures The Service A closely monitored all active measures operations, what agents were involved into them specifi into involved what agents were Service operations, The active all measures A closely monitored Thus, it was ultimately in charge of all manipulation with in charge it was ultimately Thus, Figure 1. Soviet apparatus used for implementation of “active measures” in the USA measures” “active implementation of apparatus used for 1. Soviet Figure operations with the agents of infl operations “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR 11 Once theCold War wasover, theU.S. eff clandestineradiobroadcasting. • friendship&culturalsocieties; • andtheirbranchesabroad; communist parties • international front organizations; • agentsofinfl • • documents’ forgery; manipulationsandcontrol over foreign media; • • disinformation; called them “classical”): hisopinion,allSoviet In “active measures” Hohol ratherlimited rested setofspecialmethods(K.H. onacertain, 4. The USSRCouncil for Religious Aff 3. The SpecialCommission for withForeign Contacts Religious Circles oftheSoviet Peace Committee. 2. The Foreign oftheMoscow Patriarchate. RelationsDepartment 1. The Moscow Patriarchate Church. oftheRussianOrthodox disposal for measures. active conducting measures…, https://www.cia.gov, Readingroom), The Soviets usedto have several organizations attheir However, situationwithreligious organization wasradicallydiff able to usetheeconomic interests of Western businessinits “active measures” somehow. closedandoverregulatedwith very economic life. This iswhy itisratherhard to imagine thattheUSSRwas predetermined ofSoviet agentsofinfl thevisionofperformance research on “active measures” have mostlyduringthe1980s, andthishistorical beenperformed fact of infl This schemeabove alsolacksbusinessandreligious organizations assuchwhichwere/are alsotheagents development. Sameconcerns politicalhomicidesasaspecialtool inawiderangeof “active measures”. or resistance movement inmostcasesmeansthatconfrontation hasalready moved to another level ofits However, operationsassuchwere Moreover, seldomusedinthiscontext. military more insurgency active At thesametime, S. operationsto thesystem of Whittle suggeststo includemilitary “active measures”. “active measures” witharatherspecifi iftakenastargeted activity attachéinembassiesand/orconsulates). of were Allofthese, ratherusual, ofactivities of military alsopart types relationsor ontheopposite, (including work orothertradelimitations),regular introducing military sanctions example, standard traditionaldiplomaticactivities, economic relations (for example, providing economic aid, the already mentionedabove D. Kux) which,nodoubt,were implemented alsoactively duringthosetimes. For particular,In itdoesnotmentionany ofthe “non-special” methods(“white activity”, usingtheterminology of scheme, inourview, hasseveral drawbacks. theschemeS. In Whittle describeswhatwasindeed “active measures” duringthe1980s, however, thisoverall measures” 2015)andshesuggests, interofthelatter alia,herown(seeFigure structuring (Whittle, 2). herstudyStephanie K. In Whittle compares theAmericanconcept of “unconventional war” withRussian “active concept of the very “active measures”. And today, scientistsstudyingtheseissues, againprimarilyfrom theU.S., optfor mostoften theresearch on measures…., from: http://americasurvival.org). the supporting “right” ideas, amongwhichfreedom ofreligion places hasoneofthetop (Soviet active priority in particular, to prove theyserved thattheSoviet state istheworld leaderofpeace movement andisthus All theseinstitutionsmentionedabove politicaltargets theexternal oftheUSSR, have to support beenworking 6. Others. 5. The USSRAll-UnionCouncil ofEvangelical Christian-Baptists. C.How PutinKincaid Uses KGB-style “Active Measures”. Retrieved from :http://www.aim.org/aim-column/how-putin-uses-kgb-style active-measures/ uence. Lackofbusinessorganizations here canbesomehow justifi uence; airs. orts on studying and counteracting onstudyingandcounteracting orts “active measures” were minimized 12 erent. According (Soviet active to theFBIreport c aim. uence asthosecoming from thecountry ed by the fact thatmostof ed by thefact Western 11 - . Analytical report - 2017 AD HOC ACTIVITIES DECEPTION BLACKMAIL POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS eld. To a great extent, these a great To eld. MEDIA ACADEMIA POLITICANS INTIMIDATION AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 13 nitions and notions of “active measures” which have which have measures” “active nitions and notions of WET SUPPORT ACTIVE RESISTANCE OPERATIONS MOVEMENTS MILITARY TO INSURGENCY/ TO MEASURES OPERATIONS nition of “active measures” and what they actually are? measures” “active nition of order. in the chronological nitions and interpretations FRONTS MASS SOCIETIES FRATERNAL FRIENDSHIP ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE “CLASSIC” MEASURES parties;le members of these communist policies in their implementation include: cial basic Soviet

societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses etc. – all those publishing houses etc. liberal magazines, cultural groups, social organizations, societies, get new agents; be the easiest to it would within which organizations PRESS RADIO Unoffi • parties of communist core in other countries; inner central • rank-and-fi • religious racial societies, organizations, women’s leagues, youth labor unions, national associations, APPROACHES TO DETERMINING APPROACHES TO “ACTIVE MEASURES”

STATIONS FORGERIES

PLACEMENTS CLANDESTINE understanding this phenomenon. the attitude of authorities to nitions reveal DISINFORMATION It would be quite logical to present these defi present to It logical be quite would In practical counteracting to Soviet “active measures” during the Cold War the public bodies of the USA often War during the Cold measures” “active In practical Soviet counteracting to also facing when analyzing and trying are counteract the to professionals which today’s the problem faced war: what is the most exactongoing hybrid defi this question it is important the defi answer present to To defi (http://www.trumanlibrary.org): Telegram” 1946 “Long 2. Despite all these drawbacks mentioned above, Whittle’s scheme can be still considered as the “core” one “core” as the considered scheme can be still Whittle’s mentioned above, all these drawbacks Despite “active newer to the USSR, and also in relation used by measures” “active of system while studying the overall “active further demonstrate will of as we system the in application to some additions, with however, measures”, contemporary used by Russia. measures” been already suggested by American researchers and practical professionals in the fi and practical professionals American researchers by suggested been already Figure 2. Structure/taxonomy of Soviet “active measures” (Whittle, 64) 2015, p. measures” “active of Soviet 2. Structure/taxonomy Figure “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR 1982 Public diplomacy document Public diplomacy power”“Soviet military (Readingroom, www.cia.gov): 1982 12 99 Defector andformer KGB offi 1979 91 JournalistArnauddeBorchgrave, whowas specializingininternational aff 1981 to theU.S. ofState Specialreport Department measures”:“Soviet active forgery, disinformation, 1981 Russia iscurrently runningasimilarcampaign against theNATO memberstates (seehttps://www.linkedin.com/pulse/kgb-activemeasures-russian-hybrid-warfare-brief-alan-malcher-ma). proxy forces; force allocationofmilitary outsidethelegalterritories oftheSoviet Union. to Included “active measures” are advisors’ thefollowing ones:armstrade;military useof performance; international organizations whichcanbeeasilypenetrated through theinfl • • russian Orthodox Church withitsforeign russianOrthodox branches, andthrough itsinfl • increased recruitment oftheagentsinfl • list ofwhat is “active measures” terror https://www.cia.gov): network…, (Soviet Unionsupports radio, press placement, andpoliticalinfl measuresSoviet active include:diplomacy, propaganda, agitation, disinformation, forgeries, clandestine measures” later explained (Speechfor the Air War College…, https://www.cia.gov): governments orgoverning groups Bulgarianand Soviet purposes, willingto suchasacting serve • • ofPan-Slavsupporters movements andothernationalmovements Armenia, (inAzerbaijan, spreading fakeinformation to drive awedge between theU.S. andEurope, andbetween theindustrial • sponsored covertly strikesanddemonstrations; • assassinationcampaigns to discredit Western leaders; • • political infl personalandeconomic; and blackmail, • clandestineradiobroadcasting; • andfront organizations; useofCommunist parties • • eff written orspokendisinformation; • “active measures” include: intended to aff The Soviets usetheblandterm “active measures” (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to refer to theoperations political operations” measures…, (Soviet active https://www.cia.gov): and underminethepoliticalresolve ofthe West to opposeSoviet encroachments. to isolate from friends, infl national components. Of special importance, inthisregard,national components. specialimportance, Of were international labourmovements; of the USSR. policiesoftheseregimesmachines butalsotheactual were placed extensively atthedisposal Yugoslav governments, Persian North regime, Chinesecommunists etc. Notonlypropaganda Turkmenistan etc.) which,withintheUSSR,were basedonracial/nationalfeatures; in general; West andthe Third World spoil therelations of Washington, DC,withBrussels. politicalestablishmentafter on Ukrainian Yanukovich fl of thecallwasmeantto demonstrate there concerning existed theU.S. aconspiracy infl government andusedstronga newUkrainian languageinregard to theEU. This publicposting situation inUkraine. V. Nuland wasdescribing thevariantsofoppositionleaders’ in participation State Geoff Victoria NulandwiththeAmericanAmbassadorinUkraine would bepostingontheInternet arecording of Secretary ofthetelephone callbetween Deputy friendlyrelations aimedatbreaking between thecountries exampleofactions A contemporary orts to control mediainforeignorts countries; uence operations. othernations’ect from policies, espionageandcounterintelligence. asdistinct Soviet uence publicopinionagainsttheU.S. programs andagainsttheCIA, military 12 . cer Stanislav Levchenko involved whousedto bedirectly in “active uence operations<…>Strategic are objectives to denigrate U.S., 14 uence in Western countries; ed thecountry, andalsoitwasmeant to uence – all Eastern Orthodoxy uence –allEastern Orthodoxy airs, suggested thefollowing rey Pyattconcerning the uence over theirvarious uence Analytical report - 2017 uence operations (Soviet operations (Soviet uence 15 used to broadcast from the Soviet Union and East the Soviet from broadcast used to ommunist partiesclandestine radio organizations; and front been changed/extended. have nition this list may opponents. or discredit leaders and institutions in foreign dence uence the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other between disrupt relations governments, the policies of foreign uence and exploit unwitting channels of communication private manipulate to uence Union; Christian in the Soviet Religion (subtopics: organizations religious uence defi nition to uence the arms’ control and disarmament movements (through: USA Communist USA Communist (through: and disarmament movements control the arms’ uence uence operations (e.g., Soviet Embassy Contacts Public Relations Firms). Relations Firms). Embassy Contacts Soviet Public operations (e.g., uence ng, as of 20 September 1983. And also document called “Spanish-Soviet relations” (both, relations” “Spanish-Soviet 20 September as of 1983. And also document called ng, uence on labor organizations and trade unions in the United States (World Federation of (World States and trade unions in the United Federation on labor organizations uence of NGOs); the system Nations (especially through in the United uence orts infl to uencing foreign media through controlled journalists, misleading articles, journalists, direct and forgeries; controlled media through uencing foreign Peace Conference); Peace Council); Peace and the U.S. Council Peace Trade Unions, Labor Research Association, USA Communist Party); USA Communist Association, Labor Research Unions, Trade political prisoners); in having U.S. contacts; Party, Soviet Intelligence Operations in the United States, The Generals for Peace Movement, The The Movement, Peace Generals for The States, the United Operations in Intelligence Soviet Party, Peace); Appeal for Peoples Germany territories; Germany CIA internal report mentioned above – “Spanish-Soviet relations” as of 16 October, 1986. In it, Spanish as of 16 October, relations” “Spanish-Soviet – reportCIA internal mentioned above partyCommunist which the Kremlin was through of Moscow is called one of the key instruments trying neutral side); direct Madrid a more to policies to student organizations; nitions of methods’ combinations mostly covered the methods and tools described in the “Long “Long described in the the methods and tools mostly covered combinations nitions of methods’ • World Friendship, of American-Soviet (National Council States in the United organizations front soviet infl • soviet • political infl soviet • the accusing e.g., making (mostly through certain trendy, topics media representatives use of Soviet • infl to campaign soviet • and Libya. in Cuba training and supporting groups and terrorist insurgent measures”: “active mentioned in the context of activities Soviet In were this document the following • forgeryoperations; soviet eff • soviet • soviet infl • soviet • using the agents of infl H. Stein: activities virtually by every involve measures“ party element of the Soviet “active and Soviet … Rather, with and closely coordinated supplement to, a regular as valuable, regarded structure and are state of media; written or control include manipulation measures” “active <…> Soviet traditional diplomacy. C use of foreign or oral disinformation; activities; economic militarybroadcasting; infl operations and other political https://www.cia.gov). Reading room, detailed… against U.S., measures” “active https://www.cia.gov): Reading room, include: measures” “active as Actions of the USSR which can be interpreted • is the supporting parties of interest 70 Communist and guiding the activities (in this regard of over • organizations; and local front ties with internal • various sorts and trying penetrating of leftist mass movements, manipulate parties, to labor and • infl • clandestine radio stations that operating four Intelligence Threat to the U.S.” (a national directive) formulate “active measures” as follows: measures” “active formulate directive) (a national U.S.” the to Threat Intelligence activities diplomacy traditional achieve used to beyond for term A Soviet are which Measures: Active services intelligence by carried out most frequently are policy measures Active objectives. foreign Soviet infl to intended and are confi undermine nations, Telegram”, however, from defi from however, Telegram”, The defi The Overall, attempts to determine the notion “active measures” were carried out in two major directions: 1) through major directions: carried out in two 1) through were measures” “active the notion determine to attempts Overall, aims. the description of activities’ used; 2) through of methods and tools a combination 1987 1986 report the FBI an updated by 1986-1987”, States in the United active “Soviet measures 1983 HPSCI briefi 1983 HPSCI 1983 the CIA Deputy of Director John words on Intelligence, Select Committee the Permanent Hearings at 1982 the Foreign “Detecting and Countering and also a scenario” policies: communications “International “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR 13 useoftheagentsinfl • during the1980senablesusto compile thefollowing list: methodsof Generalization ofthemosttypical “active measures” implementationagainstthe Western world • establishment, engagement and support ofinterna • establishment, engagementandsupport ones); (mostfrequently –variousleftist useofpoliticalparties • preparation anddisseminationofdisinformation; • diff Interestingly, theKGB itselfbackin1972 determined theaimsandessence of “active measures” somewhat • specifi “active measures” by Western states’ intelligence services: “establishment ofagentnetwork withinthe enemy’s suggested forMethods useinsuch “counterintelligence” fullycomply withthegeneralunderstandingof activity convenientthe direction for counterintelligence”. enemy would beforced to inthemostunfavorable follow andact conditions theinitiated aswell action asin prevent enemy’s atearlystagesandthusforce activities theenemy to exposehimselfsince insuchacasethe clear thattheycanbeidentifi ofcounterintelligence are thathere specifi describedasbeingpart alltheseactivities the fact prevent confuse undesirableactions, theenemy, steal theinitiative orruinenemy’s subversion plans”. Despite widerunderstandingofaims(for example, when “active measures” are interpreted as “exercising• infl major approaches within: The second variantofunderstanding “active measures” –thatis, interpretation through aims, also hadtwo murder, drugtraffi of theKGB’s half-million offi essence, In limitedof activities. onlyby thisterm theimagination embodiedarangeofactivities andcreativity of “active measures”, butmore by ofeven complexity theobjective theoretical determination ofallthesetypes ofmethodshasbeenpreconditionedSuch avariety ofauthors’ notasmuchby thevariety views ontheessence –however,outside own country thesemethodswere seldommentionedinthestudiesduring1980s. very separate casesresearchersIn alsomentionarms’ useofreligious organizations. • useoftheUNandotherinternational active structures; • of organization andsupport “peaceful” demonstrations; • events; usingsport • usingforeign mediafor own purposes; • • cultural standoff • political assassinations; spreading fakedocuments; • providing misleadinginformation to politiciansandjournalists; • • spreading rumors; • economic aid; insurgent andterrorist trainingandsupporting groups; • countries; advisorsto certain sendingmilitary • • political infl • blackmail; • clandestine broadcasting; fakestories’ disseminationthrough mediaofthe Third World countries; • mediamanipulations(includingown ones); • • front organizations; The quote istranslated from the open source: “Counterintelligence Dictionary”, oftheState Securit RedBannerSchool Higher pdf athttp://www.pseudology.org/Abel/KRSlovar2.pdf Council, 1972,however,under theUSSRMinistry itisimpossibleto prove thecredibility oftheonlineversion ofthisdiction infl manipulations withtheiractivities; the policiesofotherstates withtheuseofmeans, diff erently uence on publicopinion”). cation anddetalizationofaims(for example, “isolating ofattackfrom foreign theobject partners, 13 : “actions ofcounterintelligence whichenable itspenetrationinto theareas ofanenemy sothatto uence; cking, and the illicit support ofterrorism (Beyond andtheillicitsupport cking, Propaganda…, 2016). ; uence (inallspheres andfi cers, andcould have includedanything from simplepropaganda to kidnapping, ed as “off ed ensive” andalsolikethosethat “provide and to detect opportunity 16 supply, military operations and allocation of military bases supply, operationsandallocationofmilitary military elds); erent from spying andcounterintelligence”); tional movements andorganizations aswell as cally, itisstill ary available in ary y Committee uence on Analytical report - 2017 , U.S. Armed , U.S. the product orts the in y mentioning y mentioning ensive eff ensive regime ect of the Franco the downfall 17 an illustrative report “Communist threat to internal security internal to threat “Communist report an illustrative coordinated attempts immediately to destroy: immediately attempts coordinated 14 nancial institutions (in particular, the International Monetarynancial institutions (in particular, c methods used in the course of “active measures” implementation. measures” “active of course c methods used in the cial mentioning of Soviet “active measures” (though without using this notion directly, (though without using this notion directly, measures” “active cial mentioning of Soviet orts a very on some extent Ukraine. to to concentrated similar practice are in relation rst American offi

ACTIONS OF THE U.S. PUBLIC BODIES/ BODIES/ OF THE U.S. PUBLIC ACTIONS SERVICES INTELLIGENCE

A large share of Russian manipulations is aimed at stopping economic aid to Ukraine aid to the side of economic from at stopping of Russian manipulations is aimed share A large supporting fi and/or international countries country corrupted as a tremendously West Ukraine actions also aimed at presenting the These to are Fund). provide supposed to All these ideas are nor economic). help (neither political, any not deserve” “does which by directly orchestrated “Maidan-3”, furtherthe basis for implementation of projects like the notorious (Moskovskiy slid Koloradskogo zhuka…,Russian intelligence https://www.ukrinform.ua) Today Russian eff Today of cross-departmental intelligence conference, in which, apart of: the CIA, also participated from of cross-departmental the representatives FBI, G-2 conference, intelligence Army. of the U.S. office military and also special investigations navy and intelligence Forces, Strictly speaking, the authorship of this document was outside the CIA. In it is mentioned that it became its opening remarks of specifi exible interpretation During the 1950-1960s U.S. authorities and intelligence circles were mostly concerned, apart military regular mostly concerned, from were circles authorities and intelligence During the 1950-1960s U.S. party against the national the USSR capacity use the Communist by to side, the Soviet of the U.S. from threats in 1951 the CIA prepared Thus, security interests. by the breaking of diplomatic and commercial relations between Spain and other countries. In the UN, Soviet- Spain and other countries. between relations the breakingby of diplomatic and commercial action a threat for along these lines has been based on the allegation that Spain presents pressure inspired further another statement: have in the text of the same document we Interestingly, peace”. international to that believe to is good reason there regime, against the Franco of the USSR campaign “In of the ferocity spite with the isolation of coupled but his retention, objective Soviet Franco is not the elimination of the immediate of revolution”. the point roach conditions economic until political and aid, of foreign sources possible Spain from The 1947 documents of the CIA also contained some mentionings of the USSR actions which could have some mentionings of the USSR actions documents of the CIA also contained 1947 have The which could https://www.cia. room, (Reading report“Country on Spain” the Namely, measures”. “active as been interpreted the USSR reports the USSR and Franco, between “Despite of a rapprochement the following: mentioned gov) propaganda In own using its addition to conduct to a large-scalecontinues against General Franco. campaign parts bring in many to of the world groups traveller” “follow and Parties Communist it has mobilized resources, eff to of active measures in favor Governments on their respective pressure actually) as a mechanism to achieve the external political aims of the USSR contained the so-called “Long Telegram” Telegram” “Long the external the so-calledactually) political aims of the USSR contained achieve as a mechanism to Kennan, F. George 22, 1946, by sent on February, http://www.trumanlibrary.org) from: (full text in pdf is available actually have “long telegram” and message of this Contents in Moscow. the then-advisor in the American Embassy until the end of the 1980s. relations of American-Soviet the whole paradigm predetermined circumstances of a surprise attack, camp: the Communist the USSR has a very ally within our own circumstances formidable at 37,000. In of a surprise attack the estimated the event now are members of this organization The USA. Party, be expected make Apparatus may to Communist and resist, 1) our will to 2) our means of resisting. in the event of Soviet surprise attack” (Reading room, https://www.cia.gov). Inter alia, this report Inter emphasized https://www.cia.gov). (Reading room, attack” surprise of Soviet in the event and counter-off our defensive disrupt and frustrate to aid in its attempts “to that as of 1951 14 The veryThe fi the key methods and instruments used, not going though deep into a long list. This would strengthen the strengthen would This a long list. though deep into not going used, and instruments the key methods an opportunity as destructive activity also provide more and would for measures” “active understanding of fl MEASURES” REFLECTING ON “ACTIVE 1947-1981: 3.1. 3. In our view, it is most feasible to determine “active measures” through their aim, but also briefl their aim, but through measures” “active determine to feasible it is most Inview, our environment, carrying out operational wargames with the enemy using misleading information, compromising compromising carrying misleading information, using the enemy with environment, operational wargames out demoralization”. and materials “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR less obvious evidence. similaroperations, however, outvery days theKGB to carry wasalready trying thenstillsmall-scaleandwith today’s –withRussia’s situation(inparticular intheU.S. intrusioninpresidential elections in2016):duringthose Testimony ofL.Brittconcerning to theKGB connection during the1950-1960shasacuriousdirection activities whatto do,service, inorder to makeitlesseffi Parliament, positioninanenemy’s inaparliamentarian discussionoriftheyoccupy animportant intelligence from EastEuropeancan letinstructions Communist intelligence for services, instance, how in theyshouldreact Communist countries, orinParliament. positionsinthegovernment, whohave politicalparties important They infl operations oftheso-called are basedontheactivities audience ofthecommunist countries), infl are basicallythree ofoperations:disinformation, types “There propaganda (aimedprimarilyontheinternal hisstatement L.Brittclearlydistinguishedbetween thethreeIn components oftheDepartment’s activity: then useitasabasisfor wrong conclusions andmeasures”. parlance oftheintelligence itmeansto services, “feed” thattheywill themwithfalseinformation andexpect is deceiving countries, decision-makersofthenon-Communist andto bringthemto falsedecisions. the In opinion, to underminetheAmericanpositionsallover theworld. The second oftheseactivities direction infl infl disinformation, blackpropaganda andso-called Work L.Brittdescribedinthefollowing words: ofhisdepartment prepares andcarries out “Department 16 15 sabotage ofourvitalinstallationsandindustries. of ourArmedForces. To destroy ourmeansofresisting theattack Communists may to attempt beexpected the units andciviliancitizens andinsidiousweapons; by thesurrender meansofbothpowerful ofimportant military cities;theslaughter ofmillions and/orcapture ofimportant initial successes thedestruction oftheenemy; circulation, e.g. broadcasts over andrumorsconcerning: seized thestrength radiostationsoffalsereports and Psychological directed towards ofourwillto resist warfare thedestruction mighttaketheform ofwidespread Soviet intelligence, this department was called Department of wascalledDepartment Soviet intelligence, thisdepartment “active measures“) (thoughaccording headoftheDisinformation1964 hewasdeputy to Department theterminology ofthe escaping to theU.S., thismanusedto beaCzech intelligence offi testimony from Lawrence Britt(Testimony ofLawrence Britt…,Readingroom, https://www.cia.gov). Before On May, of theU.S. washearingthe 5,1971specialsub-committee Committee Senate ontheJudiciary communist propaganda” (Reading room, https://www.cia.gov). byof theexamplesinthisregard theForeign report canbetheweekly Broadcast Information Service “Trends in During the1960-1970sUSAmadefi Czech officer Ladislav BittmanbecamedefectorLamb, in1968(Schoen, 2012).Later, already hebecameProf asLawrence Martin, Examples are borrowed from theonlineresource “Mirotvorets” (translated asPeacemaker, https://myrotvorets.center/). However, www.cia.gov). adaptation (firstofall–psychological one)ofSoviet defectors (Letter to William J. Casey from William W. Geimer…, Reading The KGB andSoviet Disinformation: AnInsider's View. Later on,hewaseven invited to doresearch for theCIAonissuesre published abooktitled Czechoslovak Deception Game; Intelligence inSoviet Political“The Warfare”, andthenin1985anothero at Boston University andcontinued onthesametopic hisresearch to –counteraction disinformation activity campaigns. 1972 In issues today require aseparate research detailedandsystemic whichshouldbebased onmore statistical information. exact, illegal insurgent groups orgetting “posts” inthenewlyemerged “state institutionsofyoung republics” becamemembersofterroristEast representatives organizations, parties ofthelocalleftist forming various thesedays havein Ukraine beenimplemented inreal practice. From beginning oftheconfl thevery And whatAmericanintelligence andcounterintelligenc “Peace to Luganshchina” etc. called Donetsk/Luhansk People’s Republics:Luhansk Guardia, “Rule ofthePeople”, “Novorossia Society”, to becoming membersoftheirfamilies). They initiated numerous “political” and “social” intheso- projects They were alsoinvolved for themembersofinsurgent inpromotion groups andsocialsupport (up engaged inorganizations of “referendums” ontheseized territories ofDonetskandLuhansk regions. andProgressive oftheCommunist ofUkraine Members were Party ofUkraine alsodirectly Party Socialist uencing thesphere to world, deceive ofpublicopinionthenon-Communist theworld trying public rst attempts to tracksystemically andanalyze Soviet propaganda. One uence operations,which rare. are themostdemandingandvery These cient”. 18 uence operations. These operations, fi e, backin1951,treated asapurely theoretical problem, uence agents, Communist innon- agentsworking cer (since 1954),attherankofmajor. Since 16 . rst ofall, aimat ict on the onthe ict room, https:// 15 . lated to these essor ne – he Analytical report - 2017 uence uence liated to to liated lm world” world” lm ort popularize to et about Mr. Goldwater were were Goldwater Mr. et about icts. the Hollywood fi into ltration rst one – trying as a depict to the President as being uninterested in arms control agreements agreements in arms control as being uninterested 19 forms inside America intelligence service, however, of service, however, inside America intelligence forms show on discrimination was to nal aim of this very campaign intensive tried intelligence Britain, Soviet Great to defected who later and archivist cer ltrate the headquarters of the Republican and Democratic National Committees, popularize the slogan popularize the headquartersltrate National Committees, of the Republican and Democratic In the later course of the Cold War, until the end of the 1970s, mentions of “active measures” in the CIA in the CIA measures” “active mentions of until the end of the 1970s, War, of the Cold In course the later the press to mostly addressed mentioned – were and whenever rare, and more more become documents have phenomenon as a separate measures” “Active https://www.cia.gov). room, Reading come…, to (TheTime CIA: the CIA then-director by Bush 10, 1977, written George January, dated only in the later was again remembered the re to was dedicated letter This President. the U.S. to Since most of Kremlin information messages (then as well as now) were no more than an information play, after play, than an information no more were as now) messages (then as well most of Kremlin information Since being re-elected Union. with the Soviet relations adequate R. Reagan has set quite the USSR Academy of Sciences). The fi The of Sciences). the USSR Academy not deal with such Union simply could that the Soviet citizens and European) as Soviet the American (as well in case he expect to relations American-Soviet better be naïve it would as Ronald Reagan, thus, a “monster” elect. was still a President the President…, to (Letter Areas” Third “The Against Soviet Strategy be its annex titled us would for interest annex startedThe activities with the overview of the most prominent of https://www.cia.gov). Reading room, growing measures”, “active and number of advisers, transfers of arms’ increase including: large “enemy”, the direct military operations [in Afghanistan]. of allies/proxies, role However, Soviet toolkit was not limited to only these strategies. Moscow was ready to use any topic which topic use any to was ready Moscow toolkit Soviet only these strategies. to was not limited However, policy in Central U.S. election in particular, campaign, Reagan’s to been damaging have could potentially In was very television these operations Soviet spending on the militaryAmerica and/or increased sector. the Institute USA affi of the example, (for actively politicians and researchers used along with Soviet with the Soviet Union and having initiated an open-ended arms race to restore U.S. military superiority. U.S. an open-ended restore initiated to Union and having with the Soviet race arms In 1984 Manfred R. Hamm from the Heritage Foundation prepared another special report – “How Moscow Moscow “How another special report – prepared the Heritage Foundation In R. Hamm from 1984 Manfred dislodge failed to “Having alia, noted: inter (Hamm, 1984). In it, the author, Elections” West’s Meddles in the leaders and Britain in 1983, the Kremlin Germany West in the ballot box through incumbent governments made every Union the Soviet eff Namely, election”. interfere] in the 1984 presidential [began to (Soviet active measures…, http://americasurvival.org). active(Soviet measures…, military the idea that American worldwide) other countries and and foreign European themselves, (in the U.S. confl numerous thus leading to instability, world provoking policies were the Soviet this event, Just prior to Angeles Olympic Games. the Los boycott that it would Kremlin declared The and Reagan himself was portrayed the leaders of Nazi Germany to Administration the Reagan compared press Reagan’s ensure To secondary this was just discrimination. view, in Hamm’s Nazi. However, a top of as the crony fi The a two-pronged approach. has developed Moscow defeat, of and is the source on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe wanders who carelessly peace, international danger to was targeting approach second The domination. world impose U.S. because of his quest to tensions international portrayed which were House and Administration White the L. Britt was also recalling one of the propaganda operations targeted against Barry Goldwater, presidential presidential against Barry targeted operations the propaganda one of Goldwater, also recalling L. Britt was infl to an attempt it became thus, in racism, built on accusations was campaign The then-nominee. Lawrence Britt was not the only defector from the Soviet bloc, of course. The authors of the article “Active “Active authors of the articleThe of course. bloc, Soviet the from Britt was not the only defector Lawrence have example, for election in the 2016 interference and what lies ahead?”, – behind Russia’s What lay measures: In 2017). Mitrokhin particular, et al., (Osnos Vasiliy – defector Soviet of another the words to been referring elections in the the most recent intrusion in the similarity they state Russia’s between basing on his testimony, Vasiliy made by notes extensive to with the re-electionU.S. According the 1980s. of R. Reagan in campaign Mitrokhin, a high-ranking offi KGB “working and the with the FBI in collusion was also of such ideas, an active R. Reagan, as follower Moreover, infi Communist on Un-American Activities concerning House Committee directly the African-American voters. According to L. Britt, some facts L. Britt, to in the leafl According voters. directly the African-American attacking sensational ingredients with mixed were and they and newspapers American books from picked up the members of diplomatic bags by in States the United to mailed were letters These as a racist. Goldwater Mr. States. station in the United Czechoslovakian intelligence infi to as a supposedly McCarthyism and also being corrupt as the President and discredit War!”, “Reagan Means 2017). supporter et al., (Osnos “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR Reading room, https://www.cia.gov). of Soviet “active measures” against democraticcountries (How theSoviets fundedAmerican communists…, of CIAdepute director thelarger onoperationsJohnMcMahone, share ofwhichwasdedicated to theproblem Thus, itcameasnosurprisethatinFebruary 1980already theIntelligence Committee washearingthetestimony information to give usaboutSoviet strategic concept of “active measures” inallitsfullness”. War College classof1984,Readingroom, https://www.cia.gov): “He wasfi defected to theUSA.As itwaslater (in1984)remember by theCIAdirector William J. Casey (Speechfor theAir by oneevent whichhappenedoneyear before in1979–oneKGB theelections, offi Presidentelected andhisteam cameto the White House. To thisinterest extent, waspredetermined acertain The U.S. politicalauthorities becameinterested inthetopic of “active measures” onlywhenR.Reaganwas The CIAestimate for theoverall costs measures ofactive in1982 rose to $4billion. Not includedinthistableabove were theestimated expenditures ontheSoviet friendship andculturalsocieties. In 1981 theUSAfi In 3.2. 1981-1988: COUNTERACTING“ACTIVEMEASURES” like that(Hohol, 1988): above $3bln,and, according to theCIAestimations, oftheseexpenditures thestructure lookedapproximately Later in1979theCIAmadeanattempt to estimate theUSSRspendingon “active measures”. The overall sumwas and theU.S. (USIA). Information Agency Arms Control (ACDA andDisarmament Agency ofJustice (DOJ), –later folded(FBI), Department into theState), (DOD), Central (CIA), Intelligence Agency Defense (DIA), Intelligence Agency Federal Bureau ofInvestigation dated 1992). ofDefense The ofState Group (DOS),Department includedthestakeholdersfrom theDepartment First Active ofall, Measures Interagency Working Group (IAMWG)wasestablished in1981(itsfi evc fteKB50 200 100 63 100 50 50 700 200 200 TOTAL Special campaigns in1979,includinganti-NATO TNF modernizationcampaign to NationalLiberation Fronts Support 100 by Soviet residenciesCovert action AoftheKGB Service Subsidies to foreign Communist Parties CommunistInternational Fronts Clandestine radio broadcasts Press inSoviet Embassies sections Moscow foreignRadio service New Times andotherperiodicals lzvestia Pravda Novosti (APN) TASS CPSU International Department nally shifted fromnally shifted theproblem acknowledging to fi raiainAtvt Expenditures (mln$) Organization/Activity 20 nding mechanismsandtools for itssolution. rst offi cer, whohasgotalotofspecifi cer, Stanislav Levchenko, 3,313 200 250 500 550 is nal report c Analytical report - 2017 rnational red same red ivity of the Tom Polgar Tom cers were were cers orts, the more ed documents rst of which describes describes rst of which rst of all, served make rst of all, to with American (in ective compared for an interagency working group, and other an interagency workingfor group, rnal report dated October, 15, 1981 concerning concerning 15, 1981 rnal report October, dated viet disinformation. The group’s work encouraged encouraged work group’s The viet disinformation. 21 cial documents of the U.S. government which later which later government U.S. cial documents of the , CIA and FBI (mostly from their investigations). from , CIA and FBI (mostly eport of a truly turning point in the formation became eld. 17 ning the notion “active measures”, the fi measures”, “active notion ning the of the HPSCI frequently mentioned a draft of the HPSCI frequently of the Interagency Intelligence nalized one of the central offi one of the central nalized ed and circulated throughout the Interagency and to the press. The group also developed a also developed group The the Interagency throughout the press. and to ed and circulated . Inter this report alia, against mentioned that as of then the USA had very counterpose little to cial, visible. Besides that, it described in detail the very essence of “active measures” and what measures” “active Besides that, it described in detail the very of visible. essence cial, ces ces and staff 18 ections on the U.S. propaganda posture, Reading room, https://www.cia.gov), since then several then several since https://www.cia.gov), Reading room, posture, propaganda ections on the U.S. generally met on a weekly basis. Attendance varied and members rotated in and out based upon the in and out based and members rotated varied Attendance met on a weeklygenerally basis. jobs”. “day at their requirements unclassifi were services as host nation intelligence members and as well personnel at Embassies, help educate to show” “road raised awareness, the group By publishing their reports media. shows, and conducting road of host nations’ eff disinformation Soviet they publicized more The a virtuouswhich led to cycle of reporting. frequent and better reports they received from the fi from reports and better they received frequent from William J. Casey, Reading room, https://www.cia.gov), one can track that it was Thomas Polgar, a CIA officer, who got reti a CIA officer, Polgar, Thomas one can track that it was https://www.cia.gov), Reading room, Casey, J. William from 1981 year. U.S. governmental organizations under one program. It became part till 1977, and later Inte under one program. worked States organizations of the USICA – United governmental U.S. till 1999. In USIA, existed was again renamed 1982 USICA Agency. Communications Even though the report did not have a specifically indicated authorship, from one of the later declassified letters (Letter to (Letter declassified letters one of the later from authorship, a specifically indicated though the report did not have Even act information all foreign consolidate 1953 with the aim to was established in August Agency Information (USIA) States United this problem offi this problem active was the issue of more documents, also described in the related next in this regard, The step logical declassifi already Today’s side. the CIA from namely, measures”, “active Soviet counteraction to an inte contain organization of this American intelligence propaganda of Soviet the system improve to and possible ways of American propaganda state the current counteraction are their key methods and tools. The use of their application against the U.S. was demonstrated on the explicit was demonstrated use of their application against the U.S. The their key methods and tools. are became one of the political operations” disinformation, forgery, active“Soviet measures: on, Later examples. of journalists working on this problem. documents in the circles most cited The Active Measures Working Group became one of the most persuasive examples of interagency success. of interagency examples persuasive became one of the most success. Group Working Measures Active The unusual were achievements and substantive bureaucratic These document, fi The measures”. “active of the problem of the USA to attention systemic In October 1981 IAMWG fi 2. Analysis of the gathered information. This analysis took place in Washington, DC; the group members group DC; the Washington, in place took analysis This 2. information. of the gathered Analysis reportsThe 3. reports semiregular disinformation. on Soviet produced group The of a document. Formation 2012)). see (Shoen, Lamb, details, more (for success this group’s of note took later organizations political disinformation, forgery, active“Soviet measures: – measures” “active of the problem publicized r This https://www.cia.gov). (Reading room, operations” 18 17 Activities of this Working Group were organized in the following way: in the following organized were Group Working Activities this of 1. – USIA collection.Key sources Data and information The mission of the IAMWG was to identify and expose So identify was to mission of the IAMWG The the of the top to all the way reverberated that disinformation for a price Union pay made the Soviet allies and 2016). Propaganda…, apparatus (Beyond political Soviet Despite the interest and readiness of the security and defense organizational units to counteract “active “active counteract units to organizational of the security and defense and readiness the interest Despite Some offi questioning the seriousness of this problem. voices also separate were there measures”, Soviet “active measures” and that overall, “Soviet’s propaganda is more eff is more propaganda “Soviet’s and that overall, measures” “active Soviet theses: core two text contained The Union)”. popular than the Soviet of the fact is more spite States the United and hold public opinion and again identify the United capture to measures” “active needs their own the U.S. one – there and second with the issue of peace; “the pursuit of happiness”, with objectives, with positive States such implementing and monitoring coordinating, “planning, for system organizational adequate is a need for (Refl activities” was an obvious there various elements of such counteraction, thus, for departments responsible separate were lack of coordination. who Voy, Diane La example, factitious. For or even exaggerated was really of the opinion that the problem was actively against the idea of intensifying on Intelligence, Committee the Permanent was then working for of this phenomenon as such (Upcoming questioning the existence measures”, “active counteraction to between Correspondence https://www.cia.gov). Reading room, activeHPSCI hearing on Soviet measures, offi intelligence This Operations. Deputy for Director Memorandum of which was then-DDO, (IIM), one of the coauthors variants of defi several document contained “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR the political platform of Japanese Socialist Party: 10of theparty’s high-rankmembers werethe politicalplatform Soviet agentsof Party: ofJapaneseSocialist cabinet minister, Namely, andleadersofJapanesepoliticalparties. during the1970sKGB heavily infl measuresactive atonetimeoranother. These agents includedjournalists, membersofparliament, aformer Japan KGB hadover 200recruited agentsduringthe1975-1979 period. Many were usedfor anti-American above defector S.Levchenko usedto work for quite alongtime. particular, In heprovided evidence thatin Specifi 1983, Readingroom, http://www.cia.gov). cover to recruit foreign agentsandinfl wide access andfreedom oftravel thatitprovides. The KGB haslongrelied heavily onjournalistsandjournalistic targetaccess groups to particular inthehostsociety. Journalisticcover isespeciallyfavored becauseofthe embassies underdiplomaticcover, andnon-offi butothersusenon-diplomatic noted that: “KGB measures active offi “active measures”; what postsinembassieswere theseoffi the aimswere cross-coordinated andagreed; what authoritiesspecifi implemented were by theUSSR:whichKGB specifi departments it provides probably themostcomprehensive ofhow overview “active measures” were prepared actually and thatrequire activities covert theuseoftrainedintelligence personnel”. This documentisalsoofinterest because of thephenomenon,review alsonoted that “KGB’s out specialrole measures inactive isto planandcarry measures” oftheKGB init.Partially repeating andparticipation thealready by well then features acknowledged www.cia.gov). Oneofthesereviews, dated April1983,contained aclarifi from many otherdocuments,Apart theCIAwaspreparing Review”“USSR Monthly (Readingroom, http:// Soviet “active measures” onaworldwide basis”. specifi we believe itwould bemosthelpfulifCIAcould produce afullyclassifi to express appreciation already for given theconsiderable support by CIAto theseeff whichhasbeenmadeinheightening awarenessencouraged by the start ofSoviet “active measures” andwish ‘active measures” (Readingroom, http://www.cia.gov). The letter, inter alia,noted thefollowing: “We are director oftheCIAonoperationJohnH.Stein withaletterthe deputy titled “Heightening awareness ofSoviet onIntelligence andResearch to Assistant HermanJay 1982Deputy Secretary October CohenIn addressed specifi hearingswereoccasional gradually parliamentary turninginto more concrete andlaunchof decision-making threatssecurity ledto thesituationinwhichrather informationSuch anactive campaign ofanewnotioninto on introduction circulation inthefi measures” entitled…, (Newsweek becameacommon Readingroom, practice http://www.cia.gov). article innewspapers mediatrend. andothermass-mediamaterials on already Articles becameanimportant “active At thatstagemediacoverage ofthe “active measures” topic assuchwasalready moreover, ratherlarge-scale, it “active measures” ofState, CIAandUSICA. onthesideofDepartment establishing aseparate coordinating committee wassuggested for more integrated to counteractions Soviet chapters titled “Discussion” underlinedthatwiththeseaimsspecifi communications (International policies:ascenario…,activities Readingroom, https://www.cia.gov). Oneofits enemytaken oncounteracting propaganda andalsoonoptimizationofoverall coordination ofalltherelated On December, 12,1981,theCIApresented aclassifi Union to optfor amore defensive Readingroom, https://www.cia.gov). withJudgeClark…, strategy (Meeting Soviet “active measures” shouldgetmore aggressive promoted, becameactively andlater, iteven forced theSoviet Despite theexplicitpresence ofsuchaposition,atthebeginning ofthe1980sideathatU.S. attitudetowards there. ofSoviet activity was aspecialtype major reasons why D. La Voy wassoperemptory. herview, In ofIIMlacked evidences to thedraft prove there intelligence documentsonsixnon-classifi instrument ofSoviet foreign policy, from tradeto diplomacy, were andmostofsuchactions presented in “covert operations”. Ontheotherhand, “active measures” were defi alsooften countered systematically” –andDianeLa Voy noted thatthesedescriptionswere muchsimilarto regular very them as “an off c projects. cally onSoviet “active measures”. As indicated, itisourintention to increase publicattention directed at c examplesof “active measures” were presented on thecaseofJapanwhere thealready mentioned ensive instrumentofSoviet foreign policy” whichis “poorly understood andinfrequently cers abroad ofcover useavariety assignments. Many are assigned to uence foreign opinionintheSoviet interest” Review, (USSRMonthly April ed cases. Suchwidthofdefi 22 general discussions, correspondence interdepartmental and ed document concerning the necessary further steps to be further ed documentconcerning thenecessary cers assigned to etc. On thelatter itwasspecifi callyengagedandhow how theyinteracted; cally aProject Truth wasintroduced. Also, c intelligence offi cation regarding theconcept “active werenitions andlackofclarity the ed memorandumwhichisfocused cial assignments thatprovide ned to include virtually every every nedto includevirtually cers hadinthecourse of orts. In this connection, thisconnection, In orts. eld ofnational uenced cally Analytical report - 2017 sition. cer’s activities general concerned cer’s . Inter that American alia, it was mentioned 19 units. other intelligence from 23 cer / Foreign Deception and Intelligence Activity Deception (NIO/ and Intelligence / Foreign cer ldwide propaganda apparatus international fronts and local fronts apparatus international ldwide propaganda (USSR Monthlymagazine publishing and a monthly salaries uence in Japan was formation of a parliamentary group to promote parliamentary of a promote to formation in Japan was uence group orts on implementation of “active measures” were primarily focused on primarily focused were measures” “active orts on implementation of National Intelligence OffiNational Intelligence a planned objectives these through can achieve they believe Soviets The ective. cally to “active measures”, stated that “the CIA has estimated that if the United if the United that “the CIA has estimated that stated measures”, “active cally to orts detecting Department and counteracting the State for on developing program erent name – name – erent Judging from the weekly reports of this NIO, a larger share of this offi share a larger the weekly reports from Judging of this NIO, impact to with the aim the American arms policy. movement enthusiasts of the Peace and simply naïve uence uence. Another example of Soviet infl of Soviet Another example uence. or it was just a propo at the end, documents it is not exactly approved the analyzed clear whether this post was formally From In 1984-1985, such a post was indeed assigned with the system of National Intelligence Committee, however, however, Committee, of National Intelligence Inthe system with 1984-1985, such a post was indeed assigned under a slightly diff intelligence already recognized that “may be an equally dangerous threat in the mix of tactics the by threat implemented be an equally dangerous “may that recognized already intelligence support political subversion, mix of tactics of insurgencies, This include destabilization, terrorism, Union. Soviet https://www.cia.gov). Reading room, forces, (NIO/Irregular action, and other active measures” propaganda The reportThe eff that Soviet also noted FDIA). of United “Meeting the espionage challenge: a review report a comprehensive In 1986 the HPSCI prepared One of the chapters https://www.cia.gov). (Reading room, and security programs counterintelligence States in this report, specifi dedicated it would of the 1970s, bomb campaign” “neutron undertake to of the Soviet the size a campaign were States against U.S. campaign active of a major Soviet measures is evidence there $100 million. Currently, over cost Initiative (SDI)”. Defense of the Strategic development regions. positions in the related damage the U.S. to in the attempts countries World Third the coordination of actions, meetings with legislators and staff of actions, meetings with legislators coordination 19 American intelligence units were trying to react organizationally to the challenges posed by “active measures”. measures”. “active trying the challenges posed by to units were react organizationally to American intelligence of objectives list and a readymade 18, 1983, suggested May, dated the instructive materials example, For Force post – NIO/Irregular suggested a potentially authorities for The U.S. government’s concern with the problem of “active measures” also found its manifestation in the its manifestation found also measures” “active of with the problem concern government’s U.S. The became more one of the directions in these reforms In particular, sector overall. defense of the CIA and reforms support the CIA eff to https://www.cia.gov). Ronald Reagan…, Reading room, to (Letter measures” “active In September 1985 the White House requested both CIA and FBI to prepare a series of reports a (twice a week), prepare both CIA and FBI to House requested White In September 1985 the reporting for on external CIA was responsible The abroad. Measures Active highlighting examples of Soviet “I am also asking the report while FBI was supposed to USA: on those carried out inside the Measures, Active The a complementary produce bi-weeklyFBI to States. report in the United Measures Active noting Soviet bi-weekly (Request for meeting” until after the November and continue as soon as feasible should begin update the future these data for R. Reagan required then-President The http://www.cia.gov). Reading room, updates…, reports such on is no public data regarding There meeting with Mikhail same year). (November Gorbachov of these reports topics central became: SDI and arms The of those. several CIA prepared however, the FBI side, and disarmament. In particular, arms control summit on and the upcoming protection; human rights’ control; were audience Western to in relation machine types propaganda Soviet of actions then used by and events peaceful diplomatic gatherings, informal with media, conferences, communication tables, described: round the necessary spreading messages documents, in the UN headquarters, lobbying forging demonstrations, etc. organizations using front countries, World Third the the media of through series of arms control, and disarmament proposals that play on the sentiments of Western peace movements in movements peace Western the sentiments of on that play and disarmament proposals series of arms control, wor use of the Soviet concert with the systematic http://www.cia.gov). Reading room, in the area…, interest (Because of your partiescommunist and agents” within in instructing proxies the directly involved were agents data, the KGB the FBI to according Moreover, participated actions. in separate even and occasionally themselves these movements, The report contained quite an interesting statement in this regard: “This direct Soviet require […] does not in this regard: statement report an interesting The quite contained be eff or manipulation to control In August 1983 the U.S. Senate was hearing the FBI report entitled “Soviet Active Measures Relating to the U.S. the U.S. to Relating Measures Active “Soviet Senate hearing the FBI report was entitled 1983 the U.S. In August used their agents of the Soviets examples of how numerous contained document This Movement”. Peace infl infl helped Japanese-Soviet member, who was a parliament agent, A Soviet cooperation. and economic political staff funded its the KGB and this group, found to http://www.cia.gov). room, April 1983, Reading Review, “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR initiated a quarterly project project initiated aquarterly “Worldwide measures active andpropaganda alert”. This document SOVA to engagedinthe beactive started “active measures” research andinvestigations in1986.Sameyear it and methodsofinfl During 2014theU.S. Congressmen discussedover 40legislative initiatives concerning theinformation means biased translations oftheEnglish-languagestatements. aim wasto prevent allpossiblemisrepresentations takeplace ofthispositionwhichoften today dueto rather regarding specifi thecurrent situationinUkraine of providing more easilyavailable andmore specifi could have beeneven higherfor APN (Soviet propaganda apparatus, Readingroom, https://www.cia.gov). personnel are staff comes from working-level positionsinSoviet mediaandKGB. According of atleastone-third to thisreport, TASS of theinstrumentsandtechniques ofSoviet foreign propaganda. Muchoftheinformation usedinthispaper 24 23 22 21 20 “Progress for Ukraine” (inRussian)anditisstillsuccessfully functioning the ofState activated Since thebeginning theDepartment ofRussianaggressionTwitter inUkraine account stageU.S.At thecontemporary to counteraction “active measures” withfi started 3.3. 2014-2016: “ACTIVEMEASURES” oftheCIA,SOVA theearlydaysIn of1986onetheanalyticaldepartments (Offi prepared a80-pagereport States Department ofState to developStates astrategy Department for multilateral coordination procure to produce orotherwise On December, 4,2014theU.S. Congress approved aresolution whichcalledonthePresident andtheUnited uncensored sources ofinformation islimited, especiallyinCrimea. misinformation provided by Russianmedia. shallprioritize programmingThis activity to areas where access to credible, andaccurate, emphasize investigative andanalyticaljournalismto highlightinconsistencies and RL) aswell asthe Voice to provide to Ukraine news andinformation ofAmericaservice thatisaccessible, of theSoviet foreign policy. and allrelated engagementofwhich facts; “active measures” specifi term (upto oneyear). Descriptionofcampaigns wasalways following thesame logic: keytopic ofacampaign future events inashort andthecalendarwithmostimportant anoverview issue consisted oftwo parts: most probable future “active measures” (ontheregional levels aswell ofthewholeworld). asinthecontext Each to emphasize oftheSoviet Unionaswell inpropaganda onthekeydirections asto activities determine the Neighboring Regions” Available online:https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ96/PLAW-113publ96.pdf https://twitter.com/UkrProgress Several issuesare present inourReferences Readingroom, measures active https: andpropaganda listbelow (Worldwide alert…, wasnever declassified. ofthisreport OnlyabriefresumeThe ofthisdocumentisavailable. central part 1981theCIAreorganizationIn ledto includingoffice thedismantlingofseveral for departments, economic research, office f was SOVA. Available data provides grounds till1992. to wasfunctioning believe thisOffice analysis andoffice for strategic research. At thesame time, newoffices were introduced, now dividedontheregional basis. O cia.gov). Russian intelligence offi These mediaof “People’s Republics” are managedprimarilyby Russiancitizens happento whooften be ontheoccupied territories activities destructive aswell asontheterritories underAnti-Terrorist Operations. called mediaofDonetsk/Luhansk “People’s Republics” aswell asthestatusof journalists”“military for their responsible for information andpsychological waropera (Erlanger,K.G.B.? 2017). Very similartrends too. inrelation units, are to observed Ukraine Russianmilitary the problem quite explicitly, for example, The New York Times: Russia’s More BBCor IsIt Network: RT estimate theshare ofintelligence offi for abroad andRussianintelligence offi Today discussionconcerning between Russianlarge primarily possibleconnections mediaoutletsworking AGAIN ONTHEAGENDA employees oftheKGB orGRU, andsomeother, additionaldataindicated thatthenumber uence. The offi The uence. 24 , approved onApril, 3,2014,assumesinvolving Free (RFE/ Radio Europe/Radio Liberty cers atthesametime. 21 titled Soviet Foreign“The Propaganda Apparatus” dedicated to adetailedanalysis cial document “United States Programming International and to Ukraine inmedia,someofthe cers working Western headingsformulate ces isagainontheagenda.Andeven thoughnobodycanreally audience.cally for theRussian-speaking Anotherimportant 24 c information ofState stand concerning theDepartment tions against Ukraine, aretions againstUkraine, usingtheso- actively cally was serving which exactly objectives objectives whichexactly cally wasserving 23 . This account wascreated withtheaim ghtingRussianpropaganda. ce ofSoviet Analysis) 22 wassupposed ne ofthem or political //www. 20

Analytical report - 2017 U00- ” in which ” 27 “Intelligence “Intelligence cant Russian-speaking uence. The head of an The uence. uence’’ means activities means uence’’ for the assistance to counter Russian counter to the assistance for 26 tion of the related content and later to join these to and later content related tion of the Daniel S. Hamilton of Representatives) airs (House 25 ght against Russian aggression: cyber, and other programs that strengthen democratic that strengthen and other programs cyber, ; 25 and aggression. uence and Investment Partnership Geostrategic Implications Geostrategic Partnership and Investment (http://intelligence.house.gov). In this document, “active measures” were were measures” “active Inthis document, (http://intelligence.house.gov). the fi of nancial provision uence Fund (the Fund), and be made available to civil society and to organizations and be made available (the Fund), Fund uence uence; ensive counterintelligence; ensive cally: “The term ‘‘active measures by Russia to exert Russia to covert infl by measures ‘‘active “The term cally: uence a person or a government that are carried out in coordination with, or at the behest of, at the behest of, with, or carried out in coordination that are a person or a government uence uence and aggression in the countries of Europe and Eurasia, provided that such funds shall be referred to to such funds shall be referred that provided and Eurasia, of Europe in the countries and aggression uence ned very specifi for purposes of this section“. for broadcasting as well as on RFE/RL broadcasting in Ukrainian, Balkan, Russian and Tatar languages; Tatar in Ukrainian, as on RFE/RL broadcasting Balkan, as well broadcasting Russian and Russian-language programming for assigned were institutions and processes and counter Russian infl Russian and counter institutions and processes infl Russian Infl as the Countering media, law, rule of for countries other entities in these question. in orts region of the national governments with those of the SAHR244-AMNT.pdf Testimony on Ukraine before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2015/mar/238147.htm Committee. Affairs the House Foreign on Ukraine before Testimony Act, 2017 https://rules.house.gov/sites/republicans.rules.house.gov/files/115/OMNI/CPRT-115-HPRT-R Appropriations Consolidated Union and the USA. the European trade between on free – a planned agreement Partnership and Investment Trade Transatlantic presented his report “The Transatlantic Trade Trade Transatlantic “The his report presented In 2015, during the hearings of the Committee on Foreign Aff on Foreign In the hearings of the Committee 2015, during • 100 mln USD made available Congress 5, 2017 the U.S. on May, Later, in November 2016, the House of Representatives approved a legislative act under the title a legislative approved 2016, the House of Representatives in November Later, Even more attention the topic of “active measures” got in 2016. In May of that year the senators which were which were the senators got in 2016. In of that year May measures” “active of the topic attention more Even establish an interagency to committee President the U.S. called Committee members of the Senate Intelligence Bill, Authorization FY2017 Advances Committee (Senate Intelligence measures” “active Russian counter to http://www.feinstein.senate.gov). he, inter alia, noted: “For all these reasons, the Kremlin is conducting ‘’active measures’’ in Eastern Europe, and Europe, in Eastern measures’’ ‘’active the Kremlin is conducting all these reasons, “For alia, noted: inter he, and Trade [TTIPTTIP” Transatlantic derail the and intimidation, to including tactics – of pressure in the EU itself, http://docs.house.gov/meetings). Daniel S. Hamilton…, by (Testimony Partnership] Investment 2017” Year for Fiscal Authorization Act defi infl to intended has of the Russian Federation and the role political leaders or the security services of the Russian Federation including the following: been hidden or not acknowledged publicly, • group; establishment or funding of a front broadcasting; • covert manipulation; • media • and forgeries; disinformation • funding agents of infl the following: agency are set out under this subparagraph or department Government States of the United • of National Intelligence; Director The • Secretary The of State; • Secretary The of Defense; • Treasury; Secretary The of the • General; Attorney The • Secretary The of Energy; • of Investigation; Bureau of the Federal Director The • the President other agency by head of any designated or department The Government States of the United The document also explained the necessity to “established within the executive branch an interagency within the executive “established document also explained the necessity to The exert to covert infl the Russian Federation by active measures counter to committee • and off incitement • assassinations; acts. • terrorist 25 26 27 and distribute news and information in Russian language to the countries with signifi the countries to in Russian language and information news and distribute • of America Voice of 10 mln USD on the assumed additional funding in the amount 3, 2014, as of April, the law • which 23.3 mln USD to a decision according 4, 2015, approved on March, of Governors Board Broadcasting populations. The members of the House of Representatives recommended supporting recommended establishment of the of the House of Representatives members The populations. participation state with companies furtherprivate for genera eff active the fi has been also Quite “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR 31 30 29 28 will result inadefi the biggestintelligence failure thatwe’ve hadsince 9/11.IhopethatthisCommittee’s investigation bipartisan Committee DevinNunesunderlined: “…our to thePutin predict inability regime’s plansandintentions hasbeen note atthebeginning ofthehearingwhichtook place hisintroductory onMarch, 20,2017,theheadof In http://intelligence.house.gov). related to theIntelligence Community Assessment ofthesematters?” (Intelligence Committee Chairman…, to doto protect ourselves andouralliesinthefuture? What possibleleaksofclassifi Persons? What wastheU.S. Government’s response to measures theseRussianactive andwhatdowe need measures includelinksbetween Russiaandindividualsassociated withpoliticalcampaigns orany otherU.S. measures andotheractive wereactivity directed againsttheUnited States andits allies?DidtheRussianactive would helpbetter understandingoftheproblems withRussia’s infl particular,In itwasnoted thattheCommittee would liketo seeanswers to thefollowing questionswhich intrusion intheU.S. wasnearlyfullydedicated to theissuesaround elections the “active measures” problem. The following itpress release oftheIntelligence Committee (HouseofRepresentatives) concerning Russia’s 2016 (BurrStatement onDOJInvestigation…, https://www.burr.senate.gov). to launchaninvestigation concerning “active measures” ofRussianFederation campaign duringtheelection 2017 theSenatorRichardBurraddressed ofJustice withtherequest theAttorney GeneralandtheDepartment 2017thenotion In “active measures” hasalready become Americanpoliticalbuzzword. For example, onMarch, 2, measures” assuchandinrelation to Russia’s intrusion into thepresidential campaign 2016inparticular. American politiciansingeneral(primarilytheDemocrats)have campaign CEOonCovert 2016(Twitter Operations…, inSeptember https://www.hsgac.senate.gov). Another AmericanSenator, Tom Carper, wasalsorefe https://himes.house.gov/press-release).Passes Support…, HousewithHimes isreal,posed to globalsecurity andwe musttreat itwithahighlevel ofseriousness” (Intelligence Authorization the globe. That includesmediamanipulation,fundingfront groups, andspreading disinformation. The threat various intelligence agencies, dedicated to countering measures active by infl covert Russiato exert noted: isthecreation“One ofanewcommittee, ofthemosttimelyandnecessary madeupofmembersfrom Congressman JimHimes, amemberoftheIntelligence Committee onameetingdated December, 1,2016 States may notbepermitted to travel adistance inexcess of25milesfrom theirdiplomaticpostintheUnited States”. presidency. For example: “Accredited diplomaticpersonnelandconsulars oftheRussianFederation intheUnited issuesthedocumentiseven referringOn certain suggested to awhileago, thepractices duringtheR.Reagan’s of thisCommittee concerning Russia’s mustbeexpanded intrusionintheelections Rogers (director of the NSA – National Security Agency) Rogers (director oftheNSA–NationalSecurity On thesamemeetingCongressmen gave ahearingto JamesB. Comey (director oftheFBI)andalsoMike a proper investigation. Further inhisspeechtheCongressman Schiff as alegitimate fi andrepresentativeversus democracy government. sees ourpoliticalprocess Andinthisstruggle, ouradversary democracy. We are engagedinanew warofideas, notcommunism versus capitalism,butauthoritarianism propaganda likeRT. Butthere isalsoalotwe donotknow… The stakesare nothinglessthanthefuture ofliberal amplifi remarked: abouttheway measures alotabout theRussianactive they “We duringthe2016election, know Following ofthesameCommittee Member Adam Schiff thisandalsoinhisopeningstatement Ranking Chairman NunesOpeningStatement: https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/chm_opening_statement_final_version_3.20.2017.p http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/03/30/7139706 Open HearingonRussianActive Measures Investigation. Retrieved from: http://intelligence.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle. OpeningStatement Schiff DuringHearingonRussianActive Member Measures.Intelligence Committee Retrieved from: Ranking http aspx?EventID=769 active-measures schiff.house.gov/news/press-releases/intelligence-committee ed the damage their hacking anddumpingofstolen documentswascausingthrough theuseofslick ed thedamagetheirhacking eld ofbattle” nitive report on the Russian actions taken during the election campaign takenduringtheelection ontheRussianactions nitive report 29 . emphasized to onthenecessity establish aspecialcommittee for 26 -ranking-member-schiff-opening-statement-during-hearing-on-russian- rring to theuseof “active measures” duringthepresidential 30 to decidelater thatthe listofpeopleto testify infront beenalways inusingthenotion active “active uence on the elections: uence ontheelections: Russiancyber “What 31 ed information took place . 28 . uence across df ://

Analytical report - 2017 . g/ 34 man , during 32 committee- 20170309.pdf information" information" ectively” . 35 information" U.S. House of U.S. information" . The participantsThe of . 33 orts 1990s and in the ed – then gets distributed wing political parties in Europe, information attacks information wing political parties in Europe, 27 ” by Russia“ (Vershbow, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org). Russia“ (Vershbow, by ” several times during the U.S. presidential campaign when campaign presidential the U.S. times during several Russian Disinformation Aims: https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearin Russian Disinformation aduate Red Banner Institute, Vladimir Putin undoubtedly studied studied undoubtedly Vladimir Putin Red Banner Institute, aduate House of Representatives U.S. airs Committee, ring-nato-russian-disinformation-aims leaking and propaganda c examples of simultaneous use of of stolen and used them eff ortstechnologies harnessed new new – in that they have – and rms that Russian “new “active measures“ follow the very much familiar “Soviet style” (Schmitt, https:// style” “Soviet the very much familiar follow measures“ “active “new rms that Russian which two out of three speakers – Dr. Christopher S. Chivvis (from RAND Corporation) and Dr. Francis G. Hoff Francis and Dr. S. Chivvis RAND Corporation) Christopher (from – Dr. speakers out of three which two used by measures” “active a connection is indeed the between there stressed University) Defense National (from Warfare” “Hybrid warfare Russian (Understanding the hybrid the USSR and of contemporary Russian Federation http://docs.house.gov). Warfare…, of Hybrid Evolution The http://docs.house.gov; Be Done…, What Can And Aff the Foreign by and was organized Aims” this event were, inter alia, stressing that “Russian disinformation campaigns today are part are arsenal today of a broader campaigns “Russian disinformation that alia, stressing inter were, this event elements of Soviet core continued old – in that they are both are They on democracy. assault used in Putin’s eff measures” “active uence operations, disinformation and “active measures “active and disinformation operations, uence hearing-evolution-hybrid-warfare-and-key-challenges U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs\http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20170309/105674/HHRG-115- on Foreign Committee House of Representatives U.S. FA00-Wstate-BaerD-20170309.pdf hearing-undermining-democratic-institutions-splinte Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs\http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20170309/105674/HHRG-115-FA00-Wstate-BaerD- on Foreign Committee Representatives Russian Dis 9, 2017 hearing on "Undermining Democratic Institutions // March NATO: and Splintering Jr. / Daniel Baer Statement Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Undermining Democratic Institutions NATO: and Splintering https://armedservices.house.gov/legislation/hearings/full- from: Retrieved and Key Challenges. Warfare of Hybrid Evolution The Russian Dis 9, 2017 hearing on "Undermining Democratic Institutions // March NATO: and Splintering / Daniel Baer Jr. Statement Also, the experts discussing the specifi Also, were their stolen distribute to intelligence Russian “Wikileaks for platform the most well-known become has documents: it perhaps modifi some of some of it unadulterated, is dumped, Hacked material caches. The distributed. are stories propaganda which fully-formed a kernel around and used as alongside propaganda tactics two of the exposed was apparently coordination Wikileaks” on posted it was RT ran a story or Sputnik hours before several material based on hacked 2. The second one was titled “Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russia’s Disinformation 2. Russia’s Democratic Institutions“Undermining NATO: and Splintering one was titled second The 35 33 34 32 Two more hearing took place in March 2017: in March place took hearing more Two 1. Services on Armed in the House Committee Challenges” and Key Warfare “TheHybrid of Evolution F. Hill from the Brookings Institute is also referring to Putin’s personal experience with the KGB in this regard: “Through in this regard: with the KGB personal experience Putin’s to the Brookings Institute from is also referring F. Hill democracy-promotion eff U.S. considered in particular, Putin, the prism of his time in the KGB, Russia and the ongoing war there: also includes Syria measures” “active context Russian Federation’s of Today’s “active in the use of West blaming the is actively supporting and is currently of Bashar al-Assad the regime http://www.atlanticcouncil.org). Bombing…, Barrel against him (Syria: measures” The fact that Russia is back to the tactics of “active measures” is no news for the NATO either. During 2012-2016 either. the NATO for is no news measures” “active factThe the tactics Russia is back to that of the “in objectives the DeputyA. Vershbow, Secretary outlining the changed NATO General of this organization, against highly sophisticated in […] defending role should support a bigger NATO “Allies that emphasized era” Trump infl against measures” “active of quiver in Moscow’s among the arrows Angela Merkel are on German Chancellor Libicki, http://www.rand.org). (Courtney, West” (Hill, www.brookings.edu). War” the Cold from measures” “active so-called of the CIA’s be continuations 2000s to Furthermore, in the RAND Corporation analytical report titled “How to Counter Putin’s Subversive War on the War Subversive Putin’s Counter to “How analytical report in the RAND Corporation titled Furthermore, recent sport example, (for “cyberwar, Courtney and MartinWilliam Libicki, that today note its authors, West” state-sponsored right- aid to doping of Olympic athletes), The researcher Leon Aron from the American Enterprise Institute (one of the leading think tanks of today’s Institute think tanks of today’s (one of the leading Enterprise the American from Aron Leon researcher The is a long-standing and very too, news”, “Fake the following: in this regard wrote the U.S.) in “neoconservatives” the legitimacy Like hacking, it is aimed at eroding of democratic institutions and well-documented strategy. against the measures” “active key was one of the KGB’s Union, disinformatsia the Soviet During procedures. post-gr a student in the KGB’s <…> As West. www.aei.org). Therefore, after a nearly 20-year pause researchers and intelligence experts of the U.S. had to turn back to the turn back to had to experts and intelligence of the U.S. pause researchers after a nearly 20-year Therefore, 2014). Wood, 2015; Dayspring, 2016; Fleitz, (e.g., measures” “active of concept Institute, the same American Enterprise from colleague L. Aron’s https://www.aei.org). (Aron, these techniques” Advisory Intelligence Board, Foreign 1980s) member of the President’s L. Schmitt, be (during the used to who also confi “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR aims of the state as the subject ofinfl aims ofthestate asthesubject “Active measures” aimedat standfor theachievement theactivities andinternal ofexternal political well asfor more generalestimationoftoday’s Russian “active measures” potential. Thus: appropriate for today’s for context, practical measures” isnotyet fullyconceptualized. Therefore, we would liketo suggestourown defi Despite allAmericaneff however, mostofthesemethodsundertoday’s conditions are gettingnewcontents andmeaning. including agentsofinfl Russia today (andmany isusingquite known timesalready tools mentionedwithinthe text) andmethods, 36 their result? Taking into account thefi So, were theSoviet “active measures” successful? Didtheyachieve actually ofthesecond halfofthe20thcentury 4. However, effi doing businesswithRussia” (Courtney, http://www.rand.org). Libicki, Moscow’s provocative measures active causeforeign investors andinternational lendersto seehigherrisksin similarmannertoday aswell: inavery possible) suggestto act “Sunlight may remain thebestdisinfectant. times ofReagan’s Administration Soviet andtheircampaign aimedatmaking “active measures” aspublic referringmentioned above &Libicki, to the previous Courtney experience oftheUSA(during1980s, the on how to newattacksonthe counteract West from thesideofRussianFederation. For example, thealready However, alltheseanalysts are onlystating theobvious, not providing, unfortunately, specifi to these practices alreadyto thesepractices in2007-2008 thepausein speaking, machine. Strictly “active measures” uselasted around 15years, andtheRussians returned Experience andtools usedfor decadesintheSoviet Unionare now beingatfulldisposalofRussianpolitical for theassassinationofOlofPalme” or “CIA created theAIDSvirusinitssecret labs”). the massconsciousness, innumerous countries (themost common examplesare, probably, “CIA responsibility implemented by theKGB attheinternational level. Many ofthesefakenews andmisconceptions are stillshaping them separately. Moreover, we are stillfi be fairand/orreasonable enough,atleastbecausemany ofthese “active measures” were quite successful, taking only partially. However, estimating “active measures” onlyinrelation to thisfi but onthegloballevel too. concept usefulindescribingtherelations canbeextremely notonlybetween theUSAandRussianFederation, apauseof35years.again, after Americanresearchers theopinionofmany In contemporary andpoliticians, this Therefore, theconcept of “active measures” andalltherelated notionsare backto Americanpoliticaldictionary today forsanctions clearlydemonstrate thetruth. islooking thatnoteveryone businesses thatare searching for various(sometimesreally doubtful)ways to avoid and/orcircumvent Russian institutes ingeneral aswell politicaleff This negative infl to disorient theglobalpublic opinioninitsassessments ofthisstate’s policiesandactivities. ofthegovernmentand activities inthisstate, erode trusttoitspoliticalleadersandinstitutesaswell as negatively ofinfl thepublicopinioninstate whichistheobject There isabigquestionmarkregarding this “pause” assuch. Quotingoneofthedefectors from Russian intelligence to New Yor Tretyakov: itcantoday“Nothing haschanged. to Russiaisdoingeverything embarrasstheU.S.” (quote asof2008,from: Osnos DETERMINING COMMONFEATURES AND HYBRIDWAROFRUSSIA: “ACTIVE MEASURES”OFTHEUSSR ofsuch ciency “going public” campaign remain quite debatable. The numberof Western large uence fi uence, deception and use of media (own and foreign ones), front organizations etc. – uence, deception anduseofmedia(own andforeign ones),front organizations etc. – rst ofallmeansgeneralpopulation’s politicalauthorities, attitudeto political theacting to revealorts Soviet “active measures”, still, tilltoday, notionof thevery “active nal result oftheCold War (thatistheSoviet split),we canstate thatprobably orts inthefi orts ghting quite arangeofconsequences operations from Soviet large-scale 36 uence, are implemented sothat andtheseactivities toinfl . application to contemporary (in particular – Ukrainian) realia as –Ukrainian) (inparticular application to contemporary 28 elds ofeconomy, aff andmilitary diplomacy uence andalsotochangethepolicies nal geopoliticaloutcome would not nition whichismore c recommendations airs. et al., 2017).. k, Sergey k, uence Analytical report - 2017 borrow borrow uence has also got uence rmed by evidences. For example, one example, For evidences. rmed by , quite expectedly, note that the speed and that note expectedly, , quite uence on foreign governments. Besides that, governments. on foreign uence 29 Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate, mentioned here, are are mentioned here, Patriarchate, Orthodox Moscow Church, uence; 2) the need to do some “refreshing” taking into “refreshing” do some 2) the need to uence; airs Note…, https://archive.org). However, in today’s high-tech high-tech in today’s However, https://archive.org). airs Note…, re near Donetsk (Svyashchennyk UPC MP…, https://inforesist.org). https://inforesist.org). UPC MP…, near Donetsk (Svyashchennyk re , especially at early stages of Russian aggression, were providing the providing were , especially at early stages of Russian aggression, tion for separatism. Till now, among Ukrainian Orthodox there clergy now, Till separatism. tion for 37 rst countries to realize that Russian Orthodoxy realize to can be an agent of political rst countries uence use and clandestine broadcasting. The most obvious choice would be substituting the latter the latter be substituting would choice most obvious The broadcasting. use and clandestine uence uence, and under crisis conditions it was very quick to switch from “soft measures” to open support to of measures” “soft it was very from under crisis conditions and switch quick to uence, infl support Active the insurgency on the East of Ukrainethe pro-Russian for insurgents. on the side of Ukrainian been confi have Patriarchate Orthodox of the Moscow Church Ukraine was among the fi clergyman was adjusting the insurgents’ fi was adjusting the insurgents’ clergyman Other of the same Church clergymen Today Ukraine is having problems with clandestine broadcasting, which is mostly due to non-sanctioned which is mostly due to use of with clandestine broadcasting, Ukraine problems is having Today information In particular, republics”. “new in establishing illegal broadcasting Ukrainian for telecommunications TVTV towers and networks started centers, of with takeovers Republics” “People’s activity of Donetsk/Luhansk this can be In way, its own territories. occupied on the further programs for of their information broadcasting de-facto since it is non-sanctioned, and de-jure is also illegal. broadcasting” “clandestine as interpreted YouTube active and also have in social networks quite are of insurgents groups both territorial Besides, broadcasting. news channels for insurgents with housing, food etc. and we also agitating for joining the insurgency movement. Moreover, Moreover, joining the insurgency movement. for also agitating and we etc. food with housing, insurgents their own forming the arms and other militarythey consecrated were sometimes equipment or even In Slovyansk priests of the Ukrainian themselves. Orthodox insurgents thus becoming groups, terrorist seizure. among the most active participants were of the city’s Patriarchate of the Moscow Church Another important direction in anti-Ukrainian clergy activity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Patriarchy) (Moscow and agita propaganda was anti-state and supporting a lot of priests rejecting the fact quite heading in some are of Russian aggression (or even of Orthodoxy Popularization this context in is based on the ideology of movements. cases) the separatist calling mostly for publications of pro-Russian orientation are and church unityall-Slavic and commonness, price”. any “at on the Donbass peace Ukrainian and reaching mobilization to army boycotting from the site https://myrotvorets.center/ the site from of the Ukrainian Data on the activities representatives of separate 37 much larger scale. Today, Orthodox churches belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate in various countries of in various countries Patriarchate the Moscow to Orthodox belonging churches Today, scale. much larger of pro-Russian and the open platforms measures”, “active of providers the immediate becoming are the world fully supporting are directly while their clergy all Russian actions, even sometimes propaganda, anti-Western with military equipment in their hands. The use of religious organizations and their separate representatives as the agents of infl representatives and their separate organizations religious use of The Trying to compare Soviet “active measures” with the “active measures” of today’s Russia it would be reasonable be reasonable Russia it would of today’s measures” “active the with measures” “active Soviet compare to Trying the older Of course, of our research. beginning at the presented scheme already Whittley’s S. back to get to above described 1) the remarks to: related in particular, updates, changes and some require scheme would militaryconcerning and agents of infl operations brand of factors all globalization – emergence and especially context, changed namely, the today’s account expertsThe transmission. of information new methods and means functions of clandestine today Thus, is quickly and value as such. radio broadcasting conditions losing its role in other social streaming YouTube, being performed (especially social networks are mostly by broadcasting radio). Internet networks, Clandestine broadcasting used to be very much relevant and meaningful as part of Soviet “active measures” measures” “active be very and meaningful as part used to much relevant Clandestine broadcasting Soviet of in established in 1979 and broadcasting Yi, Radio century example, Ba in the middle of the previous (for in of Iran, broadcasting established in 1959 and Voice China; or the National Mandarin for language Aff on the territory of Iran) (Foreign Persian In Whittle’s taxonomy described at the beginning of this research an update would be required in terms of in terms required be would an update of this research described at the beginning taxonomy Whittle’s In of infl agents’ of cybermethods cyberattacks, include: cyberspying, etc.). cyberdiversion with a new group (which would the scale of contemporary Russian information campaigns are much larger, and so are the targets. And this has the targets. and so are much larger, are the scale of contemporary campaigns Russian information media in its variety social television, the capacities of the Internet, digital possible primarily due to become of infl levers of brand new economic as the emergence as well of both objectives and in the choice free it is more thus, of ideology, in terms limited Russia is less today’s http://docs.house.gov). Warfare”…, “Hybrid objectives these Russian (Understanding reach methods used to “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR Both “active measures” andhybrid warare ofanotherstate. oftheterritory annexingpart • strategic plan, providing resources (fi • aidto theinsurgents, ofwhichare offi thefacts military direct • the top, which isimplemented through the following actions: 38 comprehensive thefollowing classifi internal markets, luringthemwithpotential hyper-profi spheres ofinfl Moreover, theoverall numberofRussia’s economic agentsofinfl country’s on). muchmore (especiallysince proactive themiddleof2000sandfurther economic policy the capacitiesofSoviet Union,theuseofeconomic agentsofinfl thattoday’sDespite thefact economic capacitiesoftheRussianFederation are limited ascompared with called “alternative”actions logical step intheirdevelopment; theirupdate environment; dueto changesintheexternal orastheso- We canalsostate thathybrid war today becomes development of evolutionary “active measures”. measures” canbecome thebasisfor proper understanding ofthe “hybrid war”, ifthelatter istakenasan From &politicalthought,theconcept of military thetheoretical standpointofthecontemporary “active of infl ofhybridthe act war. availability factor ofmilitary The fact very “converts” theimplementation of “active measures” into operations. to military decades; andontheother–these “active measures” tillnow, are stillbeingusedagainstUkraine inparallel consequencedirect ofthe “active measures” for many ofourcountry years, useontheterritory ifnot aggression.globalization) issupplemented Ontheonehand, by military thisaggression hasbecome the development (mostlyrelated to theinformation revolution, technologies andalso spread ofmilitary andpsychological trends methodsaswellcyber oftheglobalworld useofothermostactual asactive above. At thesametime, thecurrent situationisradicallydifferent. Today, theemphasisonuseof itsstandoffagainsttheRussianFederationIn isfacingnearlyallofthesemethodsmentioned Ukraine generalizations, suggested by Americanbothresearchers andprofessionals intherelated fi Thus, into account taking thecurrent andsummarizingallalready context available defi the course of “active measures” andin implementation(bothinUkraine Western countries). fl exible legislation. Today these, already well established, are economic usedin connections beingactively A. Malcher, for example, states that “active measures” russian-hybrid-warfare-brief-alan-malcher-ma). Alan. KGB Active Measures andRussianHybrid Warfare: abrief comparison: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/kgb-active-measures- “separately ortailored to andmay fitvariousobjectives beculturally, religiously orpolitically specificfor theoptimumef waging military aggression; waging military actually fake (“My bezRossiipropadyom…”, fake(“My actually http://detector.media). Russian Federation. After athorough clearance ittur enterprises were Ukrainian publiclycallingforwhich certain restoring theeconomic relations withthe Namely,against Ukraine. outaninformation campaign within during2016-2017Russiawascarrying initsnumerous usingthiseconomicRussia isalsoactively factor information-psychological campaigns groups (ortheirseparate representatives). interested inRussia(andthus–mostdependentupontheaggressor) are thehugefi Russian Federation, andinsomecasestheseenterprises were noteven aware theywere beingused. Most topredetermined usethesebusinessesintheinterests theavailability ofthe ofvastopportunities well asnearlyabsolute large dependence enterprises ofseparate uponRussianmarkethave Ukrainian andRussiancompaniesVery whichhaslasted closecooperation for between Ukrainian decadesas uence methods. to reach through itsobjectives non-military uence: since 2007-2008 Russia has been actively attracting foreignuence: since attracting 2007-2008Russiahasbeenactively companies to enter Russian imposedby onestate againstanother, orby onestate against several otherstates. While thebeginning ofthishybrid warconfi nancial, economic, andadministrative) to diplomatic,thegroups military directly 38 ), butitsomehow “absorbs” on factor them, addingatthesametimemilitary cation of the contemporary cation ofthecontemporary “active measures” (Figure 3). and hybrid warare inseparableandalltheirelements may beusedtoget destructive infl destructive 30 not onlythecontinuation of “active measures” (thenext ned outthatalarger share ofsuchdeclarationswere ts and vast opportunities dueto ratherrelaxedts andvastopportunities and uences, toonecommon political subject cially deniedby thesideproviding thisaid; uence today islarger thanintheother rms the lack of capacities of the subject rms thelackofcapacitiessubject uence stillremain possibledueto the nancial-industrial eld, we fi ntos and nitions fect” (Malcher nd most her, Analytical report - 2017 uence uence NEW MEDIA SABOTAGE FORGERIES ATTACKS CYBER ACTIVITIESCYBER DISINFORMATION AD HOC ACTIVITIES PRESS ESPIONAGE DECEPTION ASSASSINATIONS BLACKMAIL INTIMIDATION PLACEMENTS CLANDESTINE BROADCASTING iendship have no reasonable alternative require require alternative no reasonable iendship have 31

I E E S E S T R V C A A U M CIVIL EVENTS PARTIES CULTURE SOCIETIES POLITICAL RELIGIOUS FRIENDSHIP DIPLOMACY MOVEMENTS TRADITIONAL RESEARCHERS ORGANIZATIONS uence) which are supposed to adjust the general course of a country (external, economic, of a country adjust the general course supposed to economic, (external, which are uence) AND CENTRES BROADCASTING INTERNATIONAL CULTURE COMMUNITIES CULTURE LEGAL ACTIVITIESLEGAL MEDIA FUNDS FIGURES ENTITIES ATTACHE MILITARY AGENTS OF INFLUENCE AGENTS POLITICAL RELATIONS ECONOMIC ECONOMIC FRONT ORGANIZATIONS FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS Before the actual implementation of “active measures” this more general political strategic plan must be plan must be general political strategic this more measures” “active the actual implementation of Before subjects of political infl the controlled power to include bringing it may example, For approved. Figure 3. Methods of contemporary “active measures” “active 3. Methods of contemporary Figure (the agents of infl While the minimum level. be the maximum control would This needed direction. in the cultural etc.) military, the by of an aggressor of a rather neutral perception include formation would in this regard level control of the needed public Formation “friendly relations”. local public opinion, with the emphasis on supposedly and fr attitude and imposing the idea that such cooperation In our view, implementation of “active measures” is a permanent activity, especially when it comes to the the to especially when it comes is a permanent activity, measures” “active implementation of In our view, with very of be neighbours of other states which happen to ambitious plans of expanding the sphere states the application of quite a variety of methods and tools from the “active measures” toolbox. measures” “active the a variety from the application of quite of methods and tools “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR • if the state which is the object ofaggression ifthestate whichistheobject isableto demonstrate rathereffi • iftheaggressor, obtainingtheminimum-level after control, decidesto gofor themaximum-level control • However, inreal life there maybe additional(pre)conditions theory,In fullimplementationof “active measures” strategic political planhasbeenachieved. meansacertain scenarioa destructive isbeingimplemented againstit. implieseff actually “active measures” beingused(oratleastwhatmeasures canbetakento minimize theconsequences). This taken to consolidate population,whatpreventive measures mustbeappliedto avoid themostaggressive of intelligence andcounterintelligence units’ andalsothequestionofwhatmeasures mustbe performance interest infl andofdirect hybrid war”, thatis, Russia’s waging hybrid waragainstthe West world assuch(Ed. Horbulin,2017).Hybrid would bealsofairandfeasibleIt localconfl to consider Ukrainian combination of “active measures” aggression. beingused againstitwithmilitary Therefore, we canstate isexperiencingthe hybrid thattoday warasaspecialform Ukraine ofstandoff war (seeFigure 4). Taking into account alloftheabove, we suggestthefollowing classifi situations. equipment, unpreparedness ofthelocalarmy to leadersto real face real tasks, war disinclinationofmilitary forcemakes hybrid ofinfl ofinternal military warpossibleisweakness oftheobject which againstwhichtheaggression factor isbeingused.political situationinthecountry Oneimportant preconditions forOne ofthenecessary initiatingahybrid waris overall negative socioeconomic and/or also provided –ranging from fi direct supply andalsosendingthequalifi maythe insurgents, have andthissupport many First aspects. aidthrough arms ofall, military thisisdirect –thisisthebeginning ofahybridintervention war. eff Major Using theprepared inadvance resource, ofinfl thesubject house.gov). be creating anartifi latter are noteffi influence isforced to wagea hybrid war hybrid warbecomes theonlyway of sense, to reach theobject thestrategic acertain politicalaim.In of incasethepolicy “soft power” hasfailed, • too; Warfare…, http://docs.house.gov). passengers aboard MH-17 isalsorepresentative Evolution ofHybrid asanadditionalhybrid threat (The toand economic control security localpopulation. Moreover, 217 accidental ofkilling catastrophic act employment ofpoliticalrepressions, control over food supplies andsuppression oflocalemployment drones, capabilities, warfare, Russian regulars electronic withadvanced rocket military launchers; forin theDonetskandLuhansk separatists, sendingown oblastsincludes:support specialforces and already andlater found itsfullmanifestation Fusion inUkraine. ofvariousforces andmeansemployed ofthisongoingconfl Hybridism (Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare”…, http://docs.house.gov). eff onbehalfofthisRussianminority. beaccompanied intervention would by almostcertainly the It military theEstonian governmentportrays asbeingrepressive andthenexploitingthisnarrative to justifyRussian likeEstonia, creatingdiscord anarrative Russianpopulationinacountry that between theminority elsewhere,to create actions suchasintheBalticstates. apretext for Russiamightseekto military foment Russia’s annexationofCrimeagenerated concerns that however,counteraction, thelatter isnotstrong enoughto declare obvious wininthestandoff to infl orts cient enough. The keytaskof “active measures” would atthestageoftransitionto hybrid warfare uence broader European andworld opinioninthe ways thatfavor Russia’s intervention orts must betakenonbuildinga orts “sustainable society” whichisableto restore after quickly cial trigger for open military actions (UnderstandingRussian actions cial triggerfor openmilitary “Hybrid Warfare”…, http://docs. uence. Suchgeopoliticalsituationputforward thequestionregarding theeffi hasbeendetermined byict thePentagon analysts intheearly2000 edstaff nancial infl because thisisthemostlogical continuation of “active measures” ifthe , mostlyfrom amongspecialforces offi ows to quazi-humanitarianaid. 32 the Kremlin mightseektothe Kremlin useahybrid strategy orts are of concentrated orts ongeneralsupport uence launcheslimited military butdirect ict in a wider context –thatof the inawidercontext ict “world cation ofmethods usedduringahybrid cers. Economic support iscers. Economic support uence, includingoutdate in ad persuasive and cient ; ciency ciency anda Analytical report - 2017 NEW MEDIA SABOTAGE FORGERIES RESTRICTED MILITARY ACTIVITY MILITARY ATTACKS CYBER ACTIVITIESCYBER DISINFORMATION AD HOC ACTIVITIES PRESS ESPIONAGE DECEPTION ASSASSINATIONS BLACKMAIL INTIMIDATION PLACEMENTS CLANDESTINE BROADCASTING MILITARY PROPAGANDA 33

I F E R R R Y B A A H D W MILITARY METHODS CIVIL EVENTS PARTIES CULTURE SOCIETIES POLITICAL RELIGIOUS ECONOMIC AND STAFF ECONOMIC FRIENDSHIP DIPLOMACY MOVEMENTS TRADITIONAL SUPPORT OF INSURGENTS RESEARCHERS ORGANIZATIONS AND CENTRES BROADCASTING INTERNATIONAL CULTURE COMMUNITIES CULTURE LEGAL ACTIVITIES MEDIA FUNDS FIGURES ENTITIES ATTACHE MILITARY AGENTS OF INFLUENCE AGENTS POLITICAL RELATIONS ECONOMIC ECONOMIC FRONT ORGANIZATIONS FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS MILITARY TECHNICAL MILITARY SUPPORT OF INSURGENTS Figure 4. Methods of hybrid warfare 4. Methods of hybrid Figure “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR or governments, whichare implemented incooperation withoruponthedemandofpoliticalleaders 2017, andinit,theupdated defi 2016 theHouseofRepresentativessince 2014.In approved theIntelligence Authorization for Act Fiscal Year 7. The topic of “active measures” and political communities intheUSA wasbackon theagendawithinexpert activity. use power incaseofany provocation; inrelations consistency withallies;andfi the USSR;overall inrelations rigidity withtheSoviet Union,fi American researchers mentionasthemostsuccessful thefollowing: eff publicthedestructive making tomethods usedincounteraction Soviet “active measures”, evaluation, dataonwhichisavailable for expert result oftheCold War, we may assumethatprobably, thesemeasures were successful enough.Amongthose measurescounteraction really were throughout the20thcentury. However, into fi account thevery taking hard would (ifnotimpossibleby bevery now)6. It to getthefairestimates ofhow effi along withSOVA –theOffi CIA,FBIwhichwere from sector: to regularly therelated the security subjects reporting Housecommittees measures” Active Measure includedtheInteragency counteraction Working Group aswell asseveral separate 5. Further on,theorganizational system whichwassupposedto fi counteraction. Council) formedthe CIAandalsoNationalSecurity thebasisfor thefuture system ofthe “active measures” ofState) andclassifi (onthesideofDepartment that, arangeofpublicreports “active measures” happenedonlyinthe1980s, whenRonaldReaganbecame theU.S. President. Onlyafter 4. However, oftheSoviet realthreat acknowledgement to thenationalinterests oftheUSAdueto theUSSR other democraticcountries too. was usingits “active measures” to infl got suffi Union andLawrence Brittfrom theAmericanintelligence Czechoslovakia) andpoliticalestablishmentfi materials. However, from arangeofdefections after thesocialisticcamp(Stanislav Levchenko from theSoviet be. endofthe1970sthistermTill hadbeenbarely thevery usedinlegaldocumentsand/orclassifi took quite awhilefor3. It theU.S. authoritiesto understandhow dangerous Soviet “active measures” can countries ofthe West, primarilyUSA,becameespeciallyrelevant andpopularamongresearchers. 2. Since theendof1970s–early1980stopic of “active measures” usedby theUSSRagainst severe standoff One oftheseperiodswastheCold War, primarilyitsfi on several historic periodswhich covered standoff andmany-aspect ratherlarge-scale 1. Finding therightpreconditions for theformation oftheconcept “hybrid war” requires athorough research 5. into onecommon, logically constructed,fields ofactivity chainofactions. the aggressor, since thiswould andsteps enabletheconsolidation from ofseparate actions various would allow optimizing(andsystematizing) themechanismswhichcanbeappliedwhilecounteracting Further conceptualization ofthenotion “hybrid warfare” into account taking thenotion “active measures” countries these “active measures” become more andmore aggressive. standoff most probable thisscenario gets. Ontheregional level of “Western world” (thatis, Europe andtheUSA) the as such.Moreover, theless Western states to react theaggressive behavior oftheRussianFederation –the to guarantee itselfthemaximumcontrol may have themostnegative consequences for theglobalorder evidences confi intrusion inSyria andincidentswith onnewterritories (Horbulin,2016).Military warfare Turkey are additional territories, ittends to develop further, anditsforms become more andmore diverse, thusspreading hybrid war asaform ofRussia’s ratheraggressive solvingofitsgeopoliticaltasksisnotlimited by Ukrainian CONCLUSIONS cient data on the nature of such Soviet activities andtheirrealcient dataonthenature scale. ofsuchSoviet activities Already thentheSoviet Union stillremains to beonthelevel of “active measures” only, however, even inthese, ratherdistanced, oftheSoviet and Western systems. rming that Russian hybrid warfare is quickly becoming global, andtheaggressor’s isquickly rming thatRussianhybrid warfare attempts ce ofSoviet Analysis. nition of “active measures” provided: wasdirectly infl actions uence thepoliticalprocesses, andnotonlyintheU.S., butinarangeof 34 nal part –the1980s, asthetimeofmostradicaland nal part rst ofall, demonstrationoftheU.S. readiness to nd therightmechanismsfor the “active nally –counterinformation ed reports (onthe sideof ed reports of theworld leaders. cient the Westernthe cient uencing people ed expert orts orts of nally nal Analytical report - 2017 elds of media, weak, are uence cers). ensive counterintelligence; ensive counterintelligence; the fi (in uence uence, forgeries of documents. of documents. forgeries uence, the leaders often become (the latter During the 1980s national securityDuring the 1980s national experts and uence is simply not able to reach the strategic the strategic reach is simply not able to uence uence we need to add the Church and business business and Church add the need to we uence 35 is radically transforming the information environment, environment, the information is radically transforming how only proves intelligence) Soviet members of the uences. uence; provocations and off provocations uence; uence has got the wrong impression – that the minimum control – that the minimum control impression has got the wrong uence uencing foreign media, using the agents of infl uencing foreign nancing the agents of infl nancing uence is imposed – the former would most probably try most probably impose also the maximum would to the former is imposed – uence uence). Inuence). some cases the subject of infl nancing of front groups; clandestine broadcasting; media manipulations; disinformation manipulations; disinformation media clandestine broadcasting; groups; front nancing of or at least not be hidden to remains of the latter the role while Federation, of the Russian ces uence. However, if the subject of infl However, uence. uence, according to a certain strategic political plan – e.g., getting control over another state – the object another state over getting control a certain to political plan – e.g., strategic according uence, circles. Besides that, the new generation of media today Besides that, the new generation of media today circles. new opportunities destructive infl thus providing for 11. The above list of methods does not fully match the today’s environment already. Namely, to the list of the list of to Namely, already. environment the today’s list of methods does not fully match above The 11. cyber add the methods used in to also need cyberattacks, (cyberspying, we space today measures” “active agents of infl the list of relevant to Also, etc.). cyberdiversion of infl “Classical” methods within “active measures” can be structures in the following way: spreading disinformation way:disinformation spreading can be structures in the following measures” “active methods within “Classical” of front use documents and/or clandestine broadcasting), in mass media, forging (via publishing materials using the agents of infl civil movements), (societies of friendship, organizations activities and politics), illegal science blackmailing, political assassinations etc.). intimidation, (deception, a but must also provide “renewed” must be not only measures” “active on the research 12. Nowadays war against hybrid and structure exact of Russia’s of the nature more determination basis for methodological the deep into going warfare”, “hybrid and measures” “active of the concept and comparison Ukraine. Analysis measures” “active Both determined. mutually that these notions are enables proving details of their content, which is the subject the state by of also initiated are both warfare destructiveand hybrid in nature, are infl the object of infl over on the side resistance (including strong consequences all potential often not assessing carefully control, of the object of infl of the insurgents since they are purposefully selected among the special forces offi purposefully selected among the special forces they are since of the insurgents of the object possible when the military war also becomes of infl a hybrid forces Waging 14. political will within is also lack of strong of public administration is dysfunctional and there while the system national political establishment. 9. Despite the large variety of “active measures” definitions and a long list of methods used for their their for and a long list of methods used definitions measures” “active variety the large of 9. Despite generalizations. can still make several implementation, we formalize, to be hard would measures” “active of applied in the course of the methods 10. Combination parties use of communist organizations, disinformation, the key methods belong: and front to however, infl clandestine broadcasting, which military to methods measures”, “active 13. Hybrid warfare of as the continuation must be understood still direct in capacities but military means limited This intervention and along with economic added. are diplomatic support supplying arms and military of the insurgents, staff relevant to the today’s context would be further detailed research and analysis of “active measures” and the and the measures” “active of be further and analysis context would research detailed the today’s to relevant these measures. to response be applied to mechanisms to potential “Soviet measures”: “active definition of the following mostly operating in the USA were officers defense of the targets reach of activity used to various forms outside traditional diplomacy, stands for which term services the intelligence by usually implemented are measures” “Active Union externalthe Soviet policy. between the relations at damaging governments, the policies of foreign aimed at influencing and are opponents’ through leaders and/or institutes among the foreign the nations and ruining the trust discreditation”. war begins. a hybrid – thus, powers”) “soft means of non-militarypolitical aim by loss of methods (due to 8. Similarity between 20th-century activities of the Soviet Union and that of today’s Russian Federation (in (in 8. Similarity Russian Federation 20th-century between activities and that of today’s Union of the Soviet staff former to belong powers which nearly all political political assassinations; actspolitical assassinations; of terror. and forged documents; fi documents; and forged intelligence offi intelligence namely: measures”, “active of potential the list presents the same document Moreover, acknowledged publicly. and/or fi founding “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR Splintering NATO: RussianDisinformation” House andtheU.S. Intelligence Community duringthe hearing and “Undermining DemocraticInstitutions –similarto mustbepubliclyavailable, whatwasrecommendedmonitoring report to atleastpartially the While tasks for thealready group working mentionedabove on Interagency “active measures” counteraction. The aswell asformsreports) (both formal ofdatacollection andinformal) mustbecome oneofthemosturgent Determining ofthismonitoring thestructure alongwiththeforms ofpresenting information (for example, (Decree ofthePresident ofUkraine threats to nationalinterests andnationalsecurity, according 5. Monitoring ofRussian “active measures” oftheoverall monitoring mustbecome of part againstUkraine group.create working aninteragency national defense to oncounteraction working “active measures” ofRussianFederation itwould befeasible to 4. For more effi 4. systemsecurity under theconditions ofpermanenthybrid challenges. resilience inallspheres for mustbecome thepriority higherfl vitalfor today’s function, anotherimportant developmentbut alsoperform ofnational situationinUkraine: resilience system whichissupposedto notonlycomplicate theimplementationof “active measures” for Russia, component ofthisreadiness isdevelopment nationalprotection. Animportant ofthenational plans for further inmind, anddefenseobjective nationalsecurity mustdevelop comprehensive multilevel andmultifunctional of any “active measures” useagainstthem,inparticular, inthecourse oftheongoinghybrid war. Keepingthis mustbeready undertheconditions to anddefense act inUkraine 3. Allunitsofthenationalsecurity sector development.possible scenarios ofthecurrent situation further invasion aggression direct isstillamongthe againstitsince stops large-scale themilitary until thecountry of waging wars. This doesnotmeanthattraditionalpr toto newlyemerging respond canberatherfarfrom quickly challengeswhichoften theconventional methods Forces,increasing oftheMilitary themobility theirequipmentwiththemosthigh-tech armsandtheircapacity more ofinspiringescalationby specialforces groups, thekeyeff Considering onRussiansidetoday operationsbut thatthelarger actions are share notlarge-scale ofpractical latter isthestrongest guarantee thatRussianFedera Forcesattention mustbepaidto ongoingmodernizationoftheMilitary since ofUkraine, highpotential ofthe 2. parallelto strengtheningIn thedevelopment ofnationalintelligence andcounterintelligence, special ofallrelatedstrengthening alsothelegalandeducationaspects processes. be seriouslystrengthened. This concerns notonlyincreasing theirfi overall,of itshybrid intelligence actions andcounterintelligence must thecapacitiesofUkrainian services Taking1. into thattoday account thefact “active measures” ofRussianFederation constitute thelargest share to RussianFederation counteract trying initstoday’s implementationof “active measures”. following recommendations canbealsousedinthecourse oftasks’ settingby otherstates whichare also development ofsimilarrecommendations for othercountries, alsosuff a specifi Federation Even againstUkraine. thoughthesepar andmeasures oftheRussian inter appliedto alia,theoptimizationofactions thehybrid counteract warfare developing anddefense alistofrecommendations ofnationalsecurity concerning, sector for theUkrainian 39 Thorough analysis oftheU.S. experience initsstandoff 6. Statement /Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. andSplintering NATO: //March 9,2017hearingon"UnderminingDemocraticInstitutions R HHRG-115-FA00-Wstate-BloomfieldL-20170309.pdf Disinformation" U.S. HouseofRepresentatives Committee onForeign Affairs: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20170309/105 “ACTIVE MEASURES”ANDHYBRIDWAR MECHANISMS FORCOUNTERACTING RECOMMENDATIONS FORUKRAINE: c situation ofRussianaggression they overall inUkraine, canbecome areasonable basisfor the cient information exchange andeff N47/2017, http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/472017-21374). 39 . 36 orts’ coordination and between theunitsofnationalsecurity tion willnotbeableto implementitsstrategic politicalplan. eparation of the national military forceseparation ofthenationalmilitary mustbestopped againsttheSoviet UnionduringtheCold War enables ticular recommendations have beenelaborated for to the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine ofUkraine ofInformation Security to theDoctrine exibility and better adaptability ofthenational andbetter adaptability exibility orts oftheopponentsmustbeconcentrated on orts nancial andtechnical capacitiesbut ering from similaraggression. The ussian 674/ Analytical report - 2017 c another verall, our verall, nanced” by by nanced” c application of cally – with exact ts and the state aggressor. Another aggressor. ts and the state to the formation of the environment of of the environment the formation to nanced, managed and/or controlled in other in other managed and/or controlled nanced, Ukraine between relations the cally to and the new challenges: ciently to nanced by the state aggressor with a specifi with aggressor the state by nanced 37 cial status of NGOs, movements, charity funds, charity funds, movements, of NGOs, cial status and defense experts in Ukraine. This limited set of the limited This expertsand defense in Ukraine. – fully performed nancing (most probably Russian by iend-or-foe division. The most relevant instrument to be be instrument to relevant most The iend-or-foe division. (acting) legislation, containing all standard democratic (acting) all standard containing legislation, This framework change would divide Ukrainian change would national framework This c features of national legislation application to the state the state application to of national legislation c features of Ukraine the relations must be applicable solely to with c legislation . It would be expedient to add legal norms on how to shutdown such shutdown to . It how add legal norms on be expedient to would 40 rmed that they are being fi rmed that they are Ukrainian between nancial relations residen exible interpretation of various methods used in the course of “active measures” measures” “active of the course of various methods used in exible interpretation Counteracting to the activities of such organization must rest on stricter the activities legal must rest to Counteracting of such organization ght against separate manifestations of “active measures” being implemented does not have much does not have being implemented measures” “active of manifestations ght against separate legislation overall into two large blocks: general large two into overall legislation applicable specifi norms and values – and special legislation, Norms of this specifi aggressor. state aggressors”. “state Rada be to of Ukraine declare Verkhovna would which the states the specifi and/or interpret measures the restrictive must introduce legislation related The process when it comes to universal human rights and norms of a truly democratic society. In attempt an society. rights and norms of a truly democratic human universal to when it comes process principles. the democratic from deviate risk to potential is also a there make society protected to better the fact war and also of the ongoing hybrid the conditions account must take into we same time, the At to be expedient it would In this regard, on a daily basis. measures” “active is using that Russian Federation the specifi “On legal act the framework approve aggressor” (or simply – “On the state aggressor”). the state “On (or simply – aggressor” the this must concern of all, First aggressor. with the state of relations general legal norms in the course fi over control strengthened important legal changes must be limiting certain ones) of direction in the related activities (professional on the territory of Ukraine, aggressor introduction including the the state of criminal from the citizens the not punishable as such or fall into are the activities which, under normal conditions, for responsibility media outlets which are to Similarly changed rules must be applied category liability only. of administrative functioning on the territory of Ukraine same time fi at but are etc.; its citizens and/or by aggressor the state from way purpose) and how to further to purpose) and how and/or law court take their management to in case counterintelligence fi “informally been have the organizations prove to enough evidence bodies have enforcement organizations (once it is confi (once organizations interpretation of their key aims and brief description of potential key methods (though this list should key methods (though this list should of their key aims and brief description of potential interpretation legal to contribute on the one hand, would, This updates). – open for be not limiting but on the opposite provide these activities of understanding and on the other – would entrenchment as destructive ones, opportunitiesmore fl for societies etc. cultural their fi their activities and especially over over control aggressor) the state Federation, implementation. The latter, in turn, would open up new opportunities in turn, would the actions and for of intelligence latter, The implementation. bodies in Ukraine. counterintelligence the offi which have organizations use of front The recommendations are universal in nature, thus, they can be applicable to any other country considered as the state aggressor by aggressor other country as the state any they can be applicable to considered thus, in nature, universal are recommendations country Here and further in our recommendations “the state aggressor”, “Russia” and “Russian Federation” are used as exact synonyms. O used as exact are synonyms. “Russian Federation” and “Russia” aggressor”, “the state and further Here in our recommendations

40 a) we need to acknowledge here that in some cases counteracting “active measures” can be a rather borderline can be a rather borderline measures” “active acknowledge cases counteracting that in some need to here we a) b) Ukrainian legislation in force must mention “active measures” directly and specifi measures” “active must mention Ukrainian in force legislation b) 7. It also seems to be appropriate by now to analyze the opportunities of Ukrainian analyze radical revision to now for by It be appropriate also seems to 7. bodies (and partially counterintelligence and of intelligence of expanding the authorities in terms legislation effi react bodies) so that they can more enforcement – also law 6. Another important element in “active measures” counteraction is strengthening information & information counteraction is strengthening measures” “active importantAnother in element 6. of truly European strengthening to contribute would This authorities. of all public capacities communication Ukrainian of the mass consciousness values in also and citizens mass better to contribute supposed to which are communications be strategic this aim would achieve used to as such. existence true values and sense of the state’s understanding of the understanding, openness and support based on these European values. Therefore, public opinion would rest rest would public opinion Therefore, and support openness values. understanding, European based on these not on some sort but fr interests on state of primitive prospect due to large scale and wide variety of the related activities of Russian Federation. However, the core the core However, activities scale and wide variety of Russian Federation. large of the related prospect due to set of methods/instruments which must be of a rather limited consists measures” “active Russian of today’s of the national security of attention in the center always 8. The 8. The fi most widely used methods/tools include: most widely used methods/tools • “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR 41 countries membersofthis Alliance. inclosecooperation ofNATO withsimilarinstitutionsinthestructure analyticalactivities and expert andinthe forbasis oftheNationalInstitute Strategic Research, acorresponding center research whichwould perform implementation by For publicauthoritiesofUkraine. thisma development ofscientifi Also usefulwould befurther 11. foraccount inthecourse thestaff oftrainingsandre-trainings 10. Samepotential spread scenarios to andcounteraction ofhybrid itshouldbealsotakeninto warfurther future identifi combinationsvariants ofcounteraction too, since theavailability ofreadymade combinations would simplify this warisrevealed through acombination ofvarious then –to develop thekeypotential counte scenarios for further outthe expedient to carry “inventory” ofthemethods 9. Keeping inmindthekeyaim–to increase the effi • •

Our translationofthequoaefrom: h by suchorganization. for theirstaff Russian Federation. Another off automatically ofitsleadershipmustbeinterpreted asthemostserious shutdown, andtheactions incourt been fi asagentsofinfl on politicalparties prohibited by providing by legislation, thislegalnormneedstoadditionalexplanation bere-emphasized canbesuchagents. fi Evenpolitical parties thoughinUkraine to whichapersonoranorganization canbenamed “the agentofRussianFederation infl such agents. For minimizationofpotential misusethestate toa necessity defi status ofsuch “agents”. Once thestatusofanagentinfl Financing andusingtheagents ofinfl demonstrate effi terms ofregulation andmonitoring. itselfwould thenearfuture mediacommunity not already If Ukrainian relations etc. insidethemanagementstructure mediaremains Internet to bethemostcomplicated in sector sponsors, whoisrepresented intop managementandinthe preconditions for controlled: broadcasting mustbestrictly fi contain aspecialblockofconditions concerning therelations withthestate aggressor. The following For themostpopularmediaoutlets(fi are already ratherrestricted, however, mechanismrequires thiscounteraction additionalsystematization. Manipulations andtheuseofmassmediaoutlets. but issomehow treated associallysuccessful. Andmedia,intentionally ornot,onlypromotes thistrend” frequent become thecaseswhen aggressive and/orobviously anti-socialbehavior isnotonly punishable state alsohasitsown reasons to imposethem,since quite undercurrent sociopoliticalconditions inUkraine regulation, mustdemandthestate introduces thecivilsociety normsofcontent muchstricter regulation. The community: media expert self- channelsare“Under conditionsnotcapableto whenUkrainian perform TV then thestate would have to intrudeinthissphere too. similaropinionare alsotherepresentatives Of ofthe ence. nanced by the state aggressor (and these facts must be presented in court), the party mustbenearly nanced by thestate aggressor theparty mustbepresented (andthesefacts incourt), cation oftheneededchainsactions. , for example, postsifapersonhasbeenrecently a5-year employed limitationonpublicservice cient enough forms and actions of self-organization andinternal infl ofself-organization cient enoughforms andactions ne the liability andalsoto of determinene theliability whatlimitationscanbeappliedto theactivities ttp://mediarada.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/17-01-IMC_STB_Shows-1.pdf mechanism to beappliedagainstsuchorganizations canbe “rights’ limitation” uence. are Once has presented thefacts proving thatapoliticalparty ofalicenserst ofall– channels)thetext for broadcasting must TV uence. 38 The keyissueinthisregard isdetermination ofthelegal and tool currently usedby theRussianFederation and to ofcounteraction hybrid war,ciency it would be elements, it is important to demonstrate thepossible elements, itisimportant Activities of Russia media on the territory of Ukraine ofUkraine ofRussiamediaontheterritory Activities c &analyticalgrounds for strategic communications’ uence isconfi tter, to establish,onthe itseemsto benecessary of national security anddefense ofnationalsecurity sectors. authorities must set the exact criteria accordingauthorities mustsettheexact nancial relations ofamediaoutletwithits raction. raction. Taking into account thathybridity of from abroad is nancing ofpoliticalparties Board, whatisthenature ofsubordination rmed by suffi cient evidence, there is uence onitsmembers, uence”. For example, 41 . Analytical report - 2017 cial ry, http:// ry, statistics on the Annex acute ering from ce box numbers in some box ce . a construction not words, rst two 43 cial correspondence, a Commerce a Commerce cial correspondence, as follows: y, a special report CIA prepared cient that the . According to the CIA data, some 150 anti- to . According 42 cial Herbert David Senator to Romerstein al in nature and conents – “Soviet active measures active“Soviet measures – and conents al in nature 39 opying the real blanks and signatures and later using and later blanks and signatures the real opying rnment documents”. Later, USICA distributed the same USICA distributed Later, rnment documents”. cials’ personal and offi personal cials’ uence political actionuence and public opinion in America and rmed the fact of forgery of Reagan’s letters’ to the King to of Spain letters’ rmed the fact of forgery of Reagan’s Union the Soviet rmed dead by Forgery cases Forgery eld manuals, and other U.S. Government documents. The most widely most widely The documents. Government and other U.S. eld manuals, cially confi cially cation. Quite quickly Quite cation. thus and indeed massive this phenomenon became rms’ correspondence, U.S. offi U.S. correspondence, rms’ c type of Soviet “active measures” became so effi became measures” “active c type of Soviet www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/law/crime-and-law-enforcement/document-forgery scale of the problem. dead and sick and the real in: Document Forge overview of this phenomenon as a factor on American politics is presented of influence an interesting Quite the actual hide the USSR was doing its best to life in real defamation, since case is also an illustration of preventive This Another CIA report, 23, 1983, confi March, dated a olympic athletes: world third to KKK death threats “Alleged a reportIn under the title 1983 the CIA prepared this report briefl was, situation preceding The activeSoviet measure”. a native by been written facts: have did not appear to was supported the letters conclusion the following This by the fi between with a hyphen Klux“Ku Klan” English speaker; spelled the letters between the correspondence mail which contained In American media outlets got anonymous 1986 several offi Agency Information (USIA) States (supposedly) United which originally was titled “Soviet forgeries of U.S. Gove of U.S. forgeries “Soviet titled was which originally www.cia.gov). https:// room, (Reading Manual” Field Forgeries “Soviet report, under the title already https:// www.cia.gov). room, Reading leaders, Western intimidate to attempts (Soviet the lives threatening letters received countries and African “The Asian of eleven National Olympic Committees Klux extremely the Ku Klan, by States were the United allegedly sent from letters, The of their Olympic athletes. the Soviet by and disseminated produced forgeries were letters the CIA believed The racist and violent in tone. reduce to security at the Olympics, guaranteed cannot be claim that athletes’ Moscow’s bolster to Union in order participation States“. the United discredit and to at the L.A. Games, World Third used in English; the story mailed very was of the letters quickly were media; the letters the Soviet up by picked which included post offi Committees, of National Olympic addresses the correct to such a threatening the Olympics received nations boycotting or Asian cases; none of the pro-Soviet African https:// www.cia.gov). Reading room, KKK death threats…, (Alleged letter April 29, dated letter, The Chairman of the Senate Select on Intelligence. former Committee F. Durenberger, plant nuclear power on the Chernobyl disinformation spread to 1986, described an alleged USIA campaign mention 2-3 thousand people suff was supposed to this disinformation In particular, disaster. radiation sickness of 29 offi instead In 1982 this specifi Department memorandum, U.S. Army fi Army Department memorandum, U.S. was photoc “documents” such create method to spread https:// www.cia.gov). Reading room, States…, in the United them in fake texts active (Soviet measures U.S. forgeries of suspected Soviet origin had surfaced since the end of World War II (USSR monthly review, review, II (USSR monthly War World had surfaced of suspected origin Soviet the end of forgeries since U.S. news Department the State included Pentagon cables, forgeries These https:// www.cia.gov). Reading room, fi business U.S. release, Slightly later the FBI also produced a report, gener more the FBI also produced Slightly later Analysis of this “letter” revealed that the signature of H. Romerstein had been “borrowed” from another offi from “borrowed” had been of H. Romerstein that the signature revealed “letter” of this Analysis USIA letter. reportThis www.cia.gov). https:// (Reading room, report – an updated the FBI” States by State in the United the FBI experts that the key aim of such forgeries In noted particular, too. forgeries of the problem concerned infl and its allies, States the United discredit was to abroad, and promote worldwide Soviet foreign policy goals. These forgeries were often designed to supply to often designed were forgeries These policy goals. foreign Soviet worldwide and promote abroad, other through advanced had already that Moscow the disinformation prove needed to “factual evidence” the 42 43 In the course of Soviet “active measures” implementation the USA were especially concerned with the large with the large especially concerned USA were implementation the measures” “active In of Soviet course the falsifi of documents’ volumes was causing serious consequences for the U.S. foreign policy foreign the U.S. for consequences was causing serious “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR sort of sort “secret idealisticwhistleblower”. Today “silent forgeries” are mostlyspread viatheInternetchannels, theinitialsource being, some mostoften, room, https://www.cia.gov). or publicationintheUnited States measures (Soviet active intheUnited Reading States –anupdated report, thereafter”. inanuclearwarandsurvival victory This second didnotreceive forgery widespread dissemination research program andthusestablishing “an eff States’ goalofstrategic dominationover theSovietUnionby with variousforeign countries. The forged theallegedUnited documentwasten pagesinlengthandreported sent to anumberofembassiesinthe Washington, D.C. area inanapparent eff “a paperonU.S. summary foreign approved Council policy by inFebruary theNationalSecurity 1985.” was It were never supposedto getpublic. Oneoftheexamplesucha “silent forgery” usewasspreading acopy of offorgeriesAnother type usedto infl initial “news story” basedonforgery. document, theSoviets believed thatthedenialwould never entirely off accounts intheirown media.Even whentheU.S. Government ofaforged issuesdenialsontheauthenticity theSoviets were media.If successfulin thenon-communist inthis, theyusuallythenreprinted thesenews countries aswell astheUnited States. The Soviets tried measuresactive operationsandpropaganda. Many Soviet forgeries were aimedatinfl uence foreign governments were theso-called “silent forgeries” which ective ective fi 40 rst-strike capability by theyearrst-strike capability 1995whichwould mean to getforgeries anddisinformation stories beprinted accelerating theStrategic Defense (SDI) Initiative set thedamagealready causedby the ort to damageU.S.ort relations uencing the Third World Analytical report - 2017 work-is-it-more-bbc-or-kgb.html work-is-it-more-bbc-or-kgb.html 41 tement-on-doj-investigation-on-russian-active-measures r-putins-subversive-war-on-the-west.html trusion-democratic-national-committee/

FAKE: V Donetske poyavilis amerikanskie nayomniki [FAKE: American mercenaries show up in Donetsk]. show American mercenaries amerikanskieV Donetske poyavilis [FAKE: nayomniki FAKE: http://www.stopfake.org/fake-v-donetske-poyavilis-amerikanskie-naemniki/ from: Retrieved FAKE: Ne stavshikh na koleni “berkutovtsev” vo Lvove sozhgli zazhivo [FAKE: Those special forces soldiers special forces Those [FAKE: zazhivo sozhgli Lvove vo “berkutovtsev” Ne stavshikh na koleni FAKE: from: Retrieved knee to in Lvov]. which refused burnt alive http://www.stopfake.org/fake-ne-stavshih-na-koleni-berkutovtsev-vo-lvove-sozhgli-zazhivo/ Erlanger S. (2017). Russia’s RT Network: Is It More BBC or K.G.B.?, The New York Times. March 8. Retrieved from: from: 8. Retrieved March Times. York New The RT Network: Is It BBC or K.G.B.?, More Erlanger S. (2017). Russia’s https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/europe/russias-rt-net Document Forgery. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved Document Forgery. http:// www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/law/crime-and-law-enforcement/document-forgery Courtney W, Libicki M. How to Counter Putin’s Subversive War on the West. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved West. on the War Subversive Putin’s Libicki Counter to M. How W, Courtney http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/08/how-to-counte from: Retrieved the U.S. to Threat Intelligence the Foreign Detecting and Countering reference/Scanned%20NSSDs/NSSD2-82.pdf https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/ Country report from: on Spain. Retrieved 10001-6.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-01617A0030000 a theory warfare: Naval of hybrid the Russian conduct of war during peace, Toward S. (2015). Dayspring 221 p. School, Postgraduate Communist threat to internal security in event of Soviet surprise attack. surprise of Soviet security internal in event to threat Communist CIA-RDP79S01011A000400040033-6.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ from: Retrieved https://books.google.com.ua from: Retrieved deception. strategic Soviet P. Parker Dailey B., Burr Statement on DOJ Investigation on Russian Active Measures. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved Measures. on Russian Active on DOJ Investigation Burr Statement burr-sta https://www.burr.senate.gov/press/releases/ Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia, Connections: in Putin’s Measures Active Soviet Propaganda: Beyond quarterlyThe N 1. 2016: 5–31. journal. Because of your interest in the area of national security and terrorism. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved of national security and terrorism. in the area interest Because of your CIA-RDP95B00895R000300040010-8.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved Bears in the Midst: Intrusion the Democratic National Committee. into https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-in Bass C. (1999) Building Castles on Sand: Underestimating the Tide of Information Operations. Operations. of Information Tide the on Sand: Underestimating Castles Bass C. (1999) Building 27–45. Summer, Journal, Airpower Aron L. Russian subversion of Western democracies is old news. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved is old news. democracies Western of L. Russian subversion Aron https://www.aei.org/publication/russian-hacking-subversion-of-western-democracies-old-news/ Alleged KKK death threats to third world Olympic athletes: a Soviet active measure. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved active a Soviet measure. Olympic athletes: world third to threats Alleged KKK death https://www.cia.gov/library/ readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00287R001400750001-6.pdf Active measures, quiet war and two socialist revolutions. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved socialist revolutions. and two quiet war measures, Active CIA-RDP90-00806R000200720008-2.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ A classical KGB disinformation campaign who killed Olof Palme? Retrieved from: from: Retrieved who killed campaign Olof Palme? disinformation KGB A classical CIA-RDP90-00806R000100640037-0.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ REFERENCES “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87 M01007R000100350006-3.pdf Letter to RonaldReagan from Dave Durenberger. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R00 1704340081-7.pdf Letter to Patrick J. Parker from William J. Casey. Retrieved from: https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88T00528R000100100001-0.pdf Letter E.Meyer. to Herbert Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84 B00049R001303350009-3.pdf International communications policies:ascenario. Retrieved from: Retrieved from: http://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=767 EstablishParameters Member Intelligence Committee for Chairman,Ranking RussiaInvestigation. https://himes.house.gov/press-release/ intelligence-authorization-passes-house-himes-support-0 Intelligence Authorization Retrieved Passes from: Support. House withHimes http://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfi Intelligence Authorization for Act Fiscal Year 2017.Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85B00263R0002001 70005-9.pdf HPSCI briefi https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R0002 01150001-3.pdf How theSoviets fundedAmerican communists. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/ library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87R00529R000100020015-6.pdf Hoover conference Institution measures onSoviet active in Western Europe. Retrieved from: Canada, 197p.of Alberta, (1988).Soviet Communication: ActiveHohol K.H. Measures andInformation Management, The University https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/ understanding-and-deterring-russia-u-s-policies-and-strategies/ F.Hill Understandinganddeterring Russia:U.S. policiesandstrategies. Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-moder viyna–chy vona vzagaliisnuye? war–doesitreallyHibrydna [Hybrid exist?]Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B0 0049R001303150008-6.pdf Heightening awareness ofSoviet ‘active measures’. Retrieved from: tyzhnya, March 25. Dzerkalo Horbulin V. pochynayetsya… viyna:vse tilky thisisonlyabeginning…], war: [Hybrid (2016).Hibrydna http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/ AS00/20170322/105746/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-Hoff Francis G.Hoff https://archive.org/stream/Communist ClandestineBroadcasting/ CommunistClandestineBroadcasting_djvu.txt Foreign Aff Press, 163p. Fleitz F. etal. (2016).Putin’s Reset: The BearisBackandHo http:// www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2017/03/7/7062660/ withtheforgedhabit: RussiasuppliedtheUNCourt evidences about squads”].“Ukrainian Retrieved from: RosiyanadalaSuduOONfalsyfi Feiky zazvychkoyu: airs Note: Communist ClandestineBroadcasting, December 1982.Retrieved from: ng, 20September 1983.Retrieved from: man (n.d.) The Evolution ofHybrid Warfare andKeyChallenges. Retrieved from: les/hr_6393_bill_text.pdf 42 kovani dokazy pro kovani dokazy “ukraiinskyh karateliv” [Fakes by the w AmericaMustRespond, Center Policy for Security n-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/UK/index.htm manF-20170322.pdf manF-20170322.pdf Analytical report - 2017 posture. propaganda ections on the U.S. -fronts-pose-nongovernmental-organizations 43 a J. (2017). Active measures: What lay behind Russia’s interference in the 2016 interference behind Russia’s What lay measures: (2017). Active a J. Reagan’s mx defeat and what will he dare call. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved call. and what will he dare mx defeat Reagan’s 00210001-1.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R0006 Pro rishennya Rady natsionalnoyi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy vid 29 grudnya 2016 roku “Pro Doktrynu “Pro 2016 roku Ukrainy vid 29 grudnya Rady bezpeky natsionalnoyi rishennya i oborony Pro National Security of Ukraine, for and Defense the Decision of the Council [On bezpekyinformatsiynoi Ukrainy” of of the President security the Doctrine Decree of Ukraine”], of information “On 29, 2016 as of December, http:// www.president.gov.ua/documents/472017-21374 Ukraine from: Retrieved #47/2017. Osnos E., Remnick D., Yaff Osnos E., Remnick D., from: Retrieved Organizations. Nongovernmental As Pose Fronts Soviet the U.N., At J. Pilon http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-un-soviet NIO/Irregular forces. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved forces. NIO/Irregular https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R001404060054-1.pdf 6, 40–55. March Yorker, New The election – and what lies ahead?, Newsweek articleNewsweek dirty-tricks entitled the Soviets from: Retrieved squad. 869R000200250003-5.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87S00 National Security Study Directive 2/82. Retrieved from: from: National Security 2/82. Retrieved Study Directive 70012-0.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86B01123R0001000 Na Donechchyni zatrymaly svyashchenyka UPC MP, yakyi voyuvav za DNR [A UOC MP priest has been arrested UOC MP priest has been arrested [A za DNR yakyi voyuvav zatrymalyNa Donechchyni svyashchenyka UPC MP, http://nbnews.com.ua/ua/news/157920/ from: Retrieved being a DNR insurgent]. for in the Donetsk area “My bez Rossii propadyom”: kak rabotaet novaya tekhnologiya vbrosov v ukrainskie kak tekhnologiya vbrosov rabotaet novaya will die without SMI [“We “My bez Rossii propadyom”: from: Retrieved work]. really news of fake technology this new How Russia”: http://detector.media/infospace/article/121718/2016-12-23-my-bez-rossii-propadem-kak-rabotaet-novaya- tekhnologiya-vbrosov-vukrainskie-smi/ Moskovskyi slid koloradskogo Zhuka, abo khto i yak gotuye “Maidan-3” [The of the Colorado trace Moscow “Maidan-3” Moskovskyi slid koloradskogo Zhuka, abo khto i yak gotuye from: “Maidan-3”]. Retrieved is preparing and how Who or beetle, 1948496-moskovskij-slid-koloradskogo-zuka-abo-hto-i-ak-gotue-majdan3.htmlhttps://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politycs/ Meeting with Judge Clark, from: 6 October 1982. Retrieved 800001-4.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R001102 Meeting the espionage challenge: a review of United States counterintelligence and security programs – and security programs counterintelligence States of United Meeting challenge: a review the espionage from: Retrieved Senate. report States United of the Select on Intelligence Committee 20001-1.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88G01116R0004004 Manfred R. Hamm (n.d.). How Moscow Meddles in the West’s Elections. Retrieved from: from: Elections. Retrieved West’s Meddles in the Moscow How R. Hamm (n.d.). Manfred bg369.pdf http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1984/pdf/ Lichenstein C. Soviet Espionage: Using the U.N. Against the U.S. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved the U.S. Against the U.N. Espionage: Using C. Soviet Lichenstein report/soviet-espionage-using-the-un-against-the-ushttp://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/ Letter to William J. Casey from William W. Geimer. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved Geimer. W. William from Casey J. William to Letter https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88G01332R001001170026-4.pdf Letter to William Casey from Senator Richard G. Lugar. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved G. Lugar. Richard Senator from Casey William to Letter 00539R001301650002-1.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87M Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83M00914R002100 120079-4.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83M00914R002100 from: Retrieved Letter to Tom Polgar from William J. Casey regarding paper entitled refl regarding Casey J. William from Polgar Tom to Letter Letter to the President from George Bush. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- from: Retrieved Bush. George from the President to Letter 40064-7.pdf RDP83T00966R0001000 “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR “DNR”]. Retrieved“DNR”]. from: https://inforesist.org/svyashhennik-upts-mp-korrektiroval-ogon-boevikov-dnr/ Svyaschchennyk UPCMPkorrektiroval ogonboevikov “DNR” priestofUOCMPwasadjusting the fi [The V.P. Horbulin.Kyiv, for NationalInstitute Strategic Studies, 2017, 496p. front:Svitova monographiya [W gibridna viyna:ukraiinskyi https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86M00886 R000600100001-7.pdf Study proposals inyour 4September 1984memo. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86M00886R002 800110002-1.pdf Speech for theAir War College classof1984.Retrieved from: https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T01017R000404410001-7.pdf Spanish-Soviet relations. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00806R00010067 0053-9.pdf terror Retrieved from: network. Soviet Unionsupports https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85M00364R001101610018-6.pdf power.Soviet military Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83M00914R002100110074-0.pdf Soviet forgeries Field Manual. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85M00364R001 001570031-7.pdf Soviet attempts to intimidate Western leaders. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP84B00274R000100040004-8.pdf measures:Soviet active forgery, disinformation, politicaloperations. Retrieved from: FBI_Rprt_Active_Measures.pdf http://americasurvival.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ measuresSoviet active intheUnited States 1986-1987.Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/ docs/CIA-RDP11M01338R000400470089-2.pdf measuresSoviet active intheUnited by States theFBI.Retrieved –anupdated report from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2.pdf measuresSoviet active anddisinformation: andassessment.Retrieved overview from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R0007 07350017-3.pdf Soviet ‘active measures’ againstU.S., detailed. Retrieved from: http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=389D5421-CD9A-4AA2-8D72-BABDE33995D0 Senate Intelligence Committee Advances FY2017Authorization Bill. Retrieved from: Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives, N 11,p. 155. F.,Schoen LambC.(2012).Deception, Disinformation, andStrategic Communication, for Institute National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives, N 11,155p. F.,Schoen LambC.(2012)Deception, Disinformation, andStrategic Communication, for Institute National therealist? Retrieved G.Kissinger Schmitt / from: https://www.aei.org/publication/kissinger-the-realist https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP87M00539R001301620002-4.pdf Request for updates measures. onSoviet bi-weekly active Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88B00443R00 1103940144-8.pdf Refl ections ontheU.S.ections propaganda posture. Retrieved from: 44 orld hybrid war: Ukrainian front: Ed. Monograph]. orld hybrid Ukrainian war: re re by Analytical report - 2017 carper-requests-information-from-twitter-ceo- 45 onbassa i kusok zemli – reportazh “Pervogo kanala” Rossii Rossii kanala” “Pervogo – reportazhonbassa i kusok zemli tsy_voyuyut_chtoby_poluchit_dvuh_rabov_iz_donbassa_i_ ghting to get two slaves from the Donbass and a piece of land – A broadcast story broadcast of land – A and a piece the Donbass of the from slaves get two ghting to Ustav Kommunisticheskogo Internastionala [The Kommunisticheskogo Internastionala from: Ustav Retrieved International]. of the Communist Statute http://www.agitclub.ru/front/com/congress022.htm USSR monthly review. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved USSR monthly review. 50002-2.pdf https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84T01083R0001000 Upcoming HPSCI hearing on Soviet active measures. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved active on Soviet HPSCI hearing measures. Upcoming B00274R000200280007-8.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84 Ukraintsy voyuyut, chtoby poluchit dvukhUkraintsy iz D chtoby rabov voyuyut, S. Chivvis. Christopher / Testimony Done About it: Be What Can And Warfare” “Hybrid Understanding Russian from: Retrieved http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170322/105746/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-ChivvisC-20170322.pdf on-covert-operations-of-russian-state-actors [The Ukrainians fi are kusok_zemli_reportaj_pervogo_kanala_rossii Twitter CEO on Covert Operations of Russian State Actors. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved Actors. Operations of Russian State CEO on Covert Twitter https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/senator- Tuman “hibrydnoi viynu”: chomu shkidlyvo myslyty hibrydno [The fog of the “hybrid war”:“hybrid is it harmful to why chomu shkidlyvo“hibrydnoi hibrydno myslyty viynu”: [The of the fog Tuman from: Retrieved way]. think in a hybrd http://commons.com.ua/uk/tuman-gibridnoyi-vijni-chomu-shkidlivo-misliti-gibridno/ from: of Russia]. Retrieved Channel” “First http://censor.net.ua/video_news/310035/ukrain Trends in communist propaganda. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved propaganda. in communist Trends 30021-9.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R0003000 The Soviets’ powerful political weapon. Retrieved from: from: powerful Retrieved political weapon. Soviets’ The 60018-8.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R0003025 The Soviet foreign propaganda apparatus. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved apparatus. propaganda foreign Soviet The 900003-2.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88G01116R000800 The KGB and the United Nations. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved Nations. and the United KGB The https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00806R000100470001-8.pdf The Gates Hearings: Politization and Soviet Analysis at CIA. Retrieved from: from: at CIA. Retrieved Analysis and Soviet Hearings: Politization Gates The https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000622792.pdf The CIA: Time to come in from the Cold War. Retrieved from: from: Retrieved War. the Cold in from come to Time CIA: The 20021-0.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP09T00207R0010000 Testimony of Lawrence Britt before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Retrieved from: https://www. from: Retrieved Security Internal the Senate Subcommittee. Britt before of Lawrence Testimony cia.gov/library/ readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP73B00296R000200170082-2.pdf Testimony by Daniel S. Hamilton, Executive Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins Relations, Transatlantic for Center Director, Executive Hamilton, Daniel S. by Testimony http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20150317/103161/HHRG-114-FA18- from: SAIS. Retrieved University Wstate-HamiltonD-20150317.pdf Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall, February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey File, Administration Truman 22, 1946. Harry February Marshall, George to Kennan S. George Telegram, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/ from: Retrieved Papers. pdf/6-6.pdf Syria: Barrel Bombing as an “Active Measure”. Retrieved from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ from: Retrieved Measure”. “Active an Bombing as Barrel Syria: menasource/syria-barrel-bombing-as-an-active-measure “ACTIVE MEASURES” OF USSR AGAINST USA: PREFACE TO HYBRID WAR https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP88T00706R000500420004-0.pdf Worldwide measures active andpropaganda calendar, 1,1987.Retrieved October from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/ docs/CIA-RDP87T00685R000300440001-8.pdf Worldwide November measures active andpropaganda 1,1986.Retrieved alert, from: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/ docs/CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2.pdf Worldwide February measures 1,1987.Retrieved active andpropaganda from: alert, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP88T00986R000100030002-9.pdf Worldwide August measures active 1, 1987.Retrieved andpropaganda from: alert, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP87T00685R000300420003-8.pdf Worldwide August measures active 1, 1986.Retrieved andpropaganda from: alert, Wood asystems (2014).Covert approach, action: Naval K. Postgraduate School, 163p. Academy,States unconventional United doctrine. States Military warfare West Point, New York. P. 112. Whittle S.(2015) “Conquest from within”: acomparative analysis measures between Soviet active andUnited the-trump-era http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosourc Vershbow A.ANewDealfor NATO? inthe theAlliance Indispensable Making Trump Era.Retrieved from: e/a-new-deal-for-nato-making-the-alliance-indispensible-in- 46 Analytical report - 2017

USSR'S EXPENDITURES FOR “ACTIVE MEASURES”...... USSR'S EXPENDITURES FOR “ACTIVE 20 LIST OF TABLES 4. METHODS OF HYBRID WARFARE ...... 4. METHODS OF HYBRID 33 1. SOVIET APPARATUS USED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF “ACTIVE MEASURES” IN THE USA ...... USED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 1. SOVIET APPARATUS 11 OF SOVIET “ACTIVE MEASURES”...... 2. STRUCTURE/TAXONOMY 13 “ACTIVE MEASURES”...... 3. METHODS OF CONTEMPORARY 31 LIST OF FIGURES LIST Наукове видання

«Активні заходи» СРСР проти США: пролог до гібридної війни: Аналітична доповідь

(англійською мовою)

Присвячено тематиці застосування Радянським Союзом «активних заходів» проти США під час холодної війни з метою досягнення власних зовнішньополітичних цілей. «Активні заходи» включали поширення дезінформації, використання агентів впливу та організацій прикриття, маніпулювання ЗМК та інші методи. Сьогодні ці самі методи застосовуються в межах гібридної війни, яку веде РФ проти України. Дослідження досвіду радянсько-американського протистояння дозволить поліпшити інструменти протидії сучасним викликам гібридної війни. Розраховано на державних службовців, фахівців сектору безпеки і оборони, а також на широкий загал.

Друкується в авторській редакції

Відповідальний за випуск: О.М. Романова

Макет та переклад підготовлено Центром стратегічних комунікацій StratCom Ukraine www.stratcomua.org

Формат 60x84/8. Ум. друк. арк. 5,58. Наклад 100 пр. Зам. № ___

ПП «Видавництво Фенікс» 03067, м. Київ, вул. Шутова, 13-б www.fenixprint.com.ua

Свідоцтво суб’єкта видавничої справи ДК № 271 від 07.12.2000 р.