The Indochinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Security Expectations and Outcomes
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Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 71–88, March 2005 The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: security expectations and outcomes Ralf Emmers The article examines the extent to which Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have gained from their participation in ASEAN. To assess the security and diplomatic benefits of their membership, it identifies three expectations held by the Indochinese states—enhanced international status, improved security and relations vis-a`-vis other ASEAN members, and more room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The study demonstrates, however, that while Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are less isolated internationally after joining ASEAN, the actual benefits in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members as well as non-member states have been more ambiguous. With ASEAN in mind, the article concludes by discussing the possible costs and drawbacks of enlargement that can transform any international organisation into a less influential and cohesive institution. Introduction Since its establishment in August 1967, the original members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had hoped to unite the entire Southeast Asian region under its auspices1. The end of the Cold War made this possible. While the Association had first been enlarged to include Brunei in January 1984, its post-Cold War expansion started with Vietnam in July 1995. Laos and Myanmar joined ASEAN in July 1997 while Cambodia gained its full membership in April 1999. The absence of specific political and economic conditions for admission enabled the candidates to rapidly enter the regional grouping. The Association that they joined in the second half of the 1990s was in some respects not comparable to the one that had been transformed by the Cambodian conflict (1978–1991) into an institution well-respected by the international community. During the 1980s, ASEAN had succeeded in enhancing its international reputation as a regional organisation by successfully opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia at the United Nations (UN). However, by the time of its enlargement, ASEAN’s effectiveness and cohesion had been undermined by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and the loss of Indonesian leadership after the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998. ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/05/010071-18 q 2005 Australian Institute of International Affairs DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000332057 72 R. Emmers Still, the new members anticipated that ASEAN would continue to operate as a diplomatic instrument promoting peace and stability in Southeast Asia. This study examines the security and diplomatic benefits of the Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN, focusing on the perspective of the new members. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have historically represented a geo-political area and it is therefore relevant to examine how each of these states might have gained from their participation in ASEAN. The article first addresses the initial resistance of the Indochinese states to ASEAN before discussing their turnaround leading to their eventual membership in the Association It then assesses how they may have gained from the Association by analysing the expectations of the Indochinese states. While the latter might have seen ASEAN as a successful economic club2, the analysis concentrates on the security and diplomatic dimensions of enlargement. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could expect to gain from their participation in terms of enhancing their international status, improving their security and relations vis-a`-vis other ASEAN members, and extending their room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The article demonstrates however that while the Indochinese states have gained from ASEAN in reducing their regional and international isolation, the actual benefits of membership in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members and non-member states have been more ambiguous. ASEAN-Indochinese relations: from resistance to membership North Vietnam did not join the Association when it was first established in August 1967. Leifer explains that for Hanoi ‘ASEAN was a political fraud’ (Leifer 1993: 271). Seen as a reformulation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) created in February 19553, ASEAN was considered by Hanoi as part of an American policy of containment. After its reunification in April 1975, Vietnam refused the repeated invitations to attend ASEAN gatherings as an observer. It also criticised the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), a declaration signed by the ASEAN states in November 1971 that registered a call for regional autonomy, and demanded instead in 1975 the promotion of ‘independence, peace and genuine neutrality in Southeast Asia’. Despite its hostile position, the ASEAN countries invited Vietnam to adhere to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed at the first ASEAN Summit of heads of state and government in Bali in February 1976. The TAC constitutes a norm-based code of conduct that enunciates ASEAN’s core principles, including the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states4. Vietnam refused to adhere to the TAC and thus thwarted ASEAN’s attempt to establish a new regional order in the region. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 caused ASEAN- Vietnamese relations to deteriorate drastically. The Association’s wariness towards Hanoi had been increased just before the invasion by a Soviet- Vietnamese Friendship Treaty signed in November 1978. The occupation of The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 73 Cambodia led to the establishment of a pro-Vietnamese puppet government in Phnom Penh, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). It terminated ASEAN’s hopes of establishing stable relations with Hanoi and violated its core principles, namely, respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states. Moreover, it altered the strategic environment in mainland Southeast Asia by removing Cambodia as Thailand’s traditional buffer state against Vietnam. In response, ASEAN condemned the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and sponsored yearly resolutions at the UN General Assembly during the 1980s that demanded a cease-fire in Cambodia and the withdrawal of all foreign troops and called for the right to self-determination for the Cambodian people. The two other Indochinese states also opposed the Association diplomatically. The Lao People’s Democratic Party took power in Laos in late 1975 and signed with Vietnam a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1977. Laos did not recognise ASEAN as a diplomatic entity and regarded the arrangement with hostility due to its anti-communist ideology. Laos refused to adhere to the TAC in 1976 despite the fact that it had been made open to accession to all the Southeast Asian nations. Cambodia’s initial response to ASEAN was influenced by concerns of neutrality. After independence in 1953, King Norodom Sihanouk had adopted a foreign policy of non-alignment. Cambodia declined the offer to take part in ASEAN in 1967 as it regarded the arrangement ‘as a pro-US regional organisation and thus had no reason to upset its policy of neutrality’ (Kao 1999: 2). The Khmer Rouge takeover of Phnom Penh in April 1975 led to the emergence of a radical regime eventually overthrown by the Vietnamese. As a puppet regime of Hanoi, the PRK replicated Vietnam’s hostile approach towards ASEAN. The turnaround of the Indochinese states towards ASEAN derived from domestic economic considerations and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. The Sixth National Party Congress in Vietnam announced in December 1986 the policy of Doi Moi (Economic Renovation). Its objective was to end the decline of the Vietnamese economy by initiating a transition from central planning to a market-orientated economy. Doi Moi was dependent on the resolution of the Cambodian conflict5 and on an improvement in Vietnam’s relations with regional states. Changes also occurred within ASEAN. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan transformed his country’s stand on the Cambodian issue in 1988 by calling for the need ‘to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a market place’. Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in September 1989 and the settlement of the conflict was reached at the International Conference on Cambodia in Paris in October 1991. During that month, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet visited Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and indicated his country’s desire to sign the TAC as a step towards becoming a member of the Association. Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam signed the TAC in July 1992 during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and was invited to participate as an observer at future meetings6. It thus took Hanoi 16 years to sign a treaty that the original members had drawn up ‘to act as a political bridge 74 R. Emmers between the Association and Vietnam’ (Williams 1992: 73). Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN was made official at the AMM of July 1995. The end of the Cold War and the loss of Soviet economic support led Laos to improve its relations with China and Thailand, which contributed to a diplomatic rapprochement with ASEAN. Laos acceded to the TAC at the 1992 AMM. Together with Vietnam, its new relations with ASEAN were driven ‘by economic imperatives and also by those of national security shaped by greater strategic latitude enjoyed by China as a consequence of the end of the Cold War’ (Leifer 1993: 273). Despite having signed the TAC in the same year as Vietnam, Laos adopted a ‘slow boat’ approach in seeking its membership. Its foreign minister only expressed his country’s intention to join ASEAN at the 1995 AMM. At an informal summit in December 1996, the ASEAN leaders announced that Laos would be admitted together with Cambodia and Myanmar in July 1997. The formation of a Cambodian coalition government after the 1993 general elections led to a new foreign policy outlook that abandoned the country’s pre- war isolationist stand.