Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 71–88, March 2005

The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: security expectations and outcomes

Ralf Emmers

The article examines the extent to which , and have gained from their participation in ASEAN. To assess the security and diplomatic benefits of their membership, it identifies three expectations held by the Indochinese states—enhanced international status, improved security and relations vis-a`-vis other ASEAN members, and more room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The study demonstrates, however, that while Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are less isolated internationally after joining ASEAN, the actual benefits in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members as well as non-member states have been more ambiguous. With ASEAN in mind, the article concludes by discussing the possible costs and drawbacks of enlargement that can transform any international organisation into a less influential and cohesive institution.

Introduction Since its establishment in August 1967, the original members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had hoped to unite the entire Southeast Asian region under its auspices1. The end of the Cold War made this possible. While the Association had first been enlarged to include in January 1984, its post-Cold War expansion started with Vietnam in July 1995. Laos and joined ASEAN in July 1997 while Cambodia gained its full membership in April 1999. The absence of specific political and economic conditions for admission enabled the candidates to rapidly enter the regional grouping. The Association that they joined in the second half of the 1990s was in some respects not comparable to the one that had been transformed by the Cambodian conflict (1978–1991) into an institution well-respected by the international community. During the 1980s, ASEAN had succeeded in enhancing its international reputation as a regional organisation by successfully opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia at the United Nations (UN). However, by the time of its enlargement, ASEAN’s effectiveness and cohesion had been undermined by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and the loss of Indonesian leadership after the downfall of President in May 1998.

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/05/010071-18 q 2005 Australian Institute of International Affairs DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000332057 72 R. Emmers

Still, the new members anticipated that ASEAN would continue to operate as a diplomatic instrument promoting peace and stability in Southeast . This study examines the security and diplomatic benefits of the Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN, focusing on the perspective of the new members. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have historically represented a geo-political area and it is therefore relevant to examine how each of these states might have gained from their participation in ASEAN. The article first addresses the initial resistance of the Indochinese states to ASEAN before discussing their turnaround leading to their eventual membership in the Association It then assesses how they may have gained from the Association by analysing the expectations of the Indochinese states. While the latter might have seen ASEAN as a successful economic club2, the analysis concentrates on the security and diplomatic dimensions of enlargement. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could expect to gain from their participation in terms of enhancing their international status, improving their security and relations vis-a`-vis other ASEAN members, and extending their room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The article demonstrates however that while the Indochinese states have gained from ASEAN in reducing their regional and international isolation, the actual benefits of membership in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members and non-member states have been more ambiguous.

ASEAN-Indochinese relations: from resistance to membership North Vietnam did not join the Association when it was first established in August 1967. Leifer explains that for ‘ASEAN was a political fraud’ (Leifer 1993: 271). Seen as a reformulation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) created in February 19553, ASEAN was considered by Hanoi as part of an American policy of containment. After its reunification in April 1975, Vietnam refused the repeated invitations to attend ASEAN gatherings as an observer. It also criticised the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), a declaration signed by the ASEAN states in November 1971 that registered a call for regional autonomy, and demanded instead in 1975 the promotion of ‘independence, peace and genuine neutrality in ’. Despite its hostile position, the ASEAN countries invited Vietnam to adhere to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed at the first ASEAN Summit of heads of state and government in in February 1976. The TAC constitutes a norm-based code of conduct that enunciates ASEAN’s core principles, including the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states4. Vietnam refused to adhere to the TAC and thus thwarted ASEAN’s attempt to establish a new regional order in the region. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 caused ASEAN- Vietnamese relations to deteriorate drastically. The Association’s wariness towards Hanoi had been increased just before the invasion by a Soviet- Vietnamese Friendship Treaty signed in November 1978. The occupation of The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 73

Cambodia led to the establishment of a pro-Vietnamese puppet government in , the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). It terminated ASEAN’s hopes of establishing stable relations with Hanoi and violated its core principles, namely, respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states. Moreover, it altered the strategic environment in mainland Southeast Asia by removing Cambodia as ’s traditional buffer state against Vietnam. In response, ASEAN condemned the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and sponsored yearly resolutions at the UN General Assembly during the 1980s that demanded a cease-fire in Cambodia and the withdrawal of all foreign troops and called for the right to self-determination for the Cambodian people. The two other Indochinese states also opposed the Association diplomatically. The Lao People’s Democratic Party took power in Laos in late 1975 and signed with Vietnam a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1977. Laos did not recognise ASEAN as a diplomatic entity and regarded the arrangement with hostility due to its anti-communist ideology. Laos refused to adhere to the TAC in 1976 despite the fact that it had been made open to accession to all the Southeast Asian nations. Cambodia’s initial response to ASEAN was influenced by concerns of neutrality. After independence in 1953, King Norodom Sihanouk had adopted a foreign policy of non-alignment. Cambodia declined the offer to take part in ASEAN in 1967 as it regarded the arrangement ‘as a pro-US regional organisation and thus had no reason to upset its policy of neutrality’ (Kao 1999: 2). The takeover of Phnom Penh in April 1975 led to the emergence of a radical regime eventually overthrown by the Vietnamese. As a puppet regime of Hanoi, the PRK replicated Vietnam’s hostile approach towards ASEAN. The turnaround of the Indochinese states towards ASEAN derived from domestic economic considerations and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. The Sixth National Party Congress in Vietnam announced in December 1986 the policy of Doi Moi (Economic Renovation). Its objective was to end the decline of the Vietnamese economy by initiating a transition from central planning to a market-orientated economy. Doi Moi was dependent on the resolution of the Cambodian conflict5 and on an improvement in Vietnam’s relations with regional states. Changes also occurred within ASEAN. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan transformed his country’s stand on the Cambodian issue in 1988 by calling for the need ‘to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a market place’. Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in September 1989 and the settlement of the conflict was reached at the International Conference on Cambodia in Paris in October 1991. During that month, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet visited , and and indicated his country’s desire to sign the TAC as a step towards becoming a member of the Association. Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam signed the TAC in July 1992 during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and was invited to participate as an observer at future meetings6. It thus took Hanoi 16 years to sign a treaty that the original members had drawn up ‘to act as a political bridge 74 R. Emmers between the Association and Vietnam’ (Williams 1992: 73). Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN was made official at the AMM of July 1995. The end of the Cold War and the loss of Soviet economic support led Laos to improve its relations with and Thailand, which contributed to a diplomatic rapprochement with ASEAN. Laos acceded to the TAC at the 1992 AMM. Together with Vietnam, its new relations with ASEAN were driven ‘by economic imperatives and also by those of national security shaped by greater strategic latitude enjoyed by China as a consequence of the end of the Cold War’ (Leifer 1993: 273). Despite having signed the TAC in the same year as Vietnam, Laos adopted a ‘slow boat’ approach in seeking its membership. Its foreign minister only expressed his country’s intention to join ASEAN at the 1995 AMM. At an informal summit in December 1996, the ASEAN leaders announced that Laos would be admitted together with Cambodia and Myanmar in July 1997. The formation of a Cambodian coalition government after the 1993 general elections led to a new foreign policy outlook that abandoned the country’s pre- war isolationist stand. Cambodia improved its relations with Laos, Vietnam and Thailand and reached out to ASEAN by signing the TAC at the 1995 AMM. The country indicated its wish to become an ASEAN member in March 1996 and was expected to join in July 1997. However, domestic political developments delayed its participation. Antagonism between the two Cambodian Prime Ministers, Norodom Ranariddh and , resulted in the latter seizing power on 5 July 1997. ASEAN postponed Cambodia’s membership, which represented a violation of its non-interference principle as it made Cambodia’s entry conditional upon domestic political change. This is significant as the Indochinese states expected ASEAN to be essentially a status-quo maintenance mechanism. Admittance into the Association had never been made dependent on domestic political conditions and Laos and Vietnam expressed their disappointment at the decision to delay Cambodia’s membership. Elections were organised in Cambodia in July 1998 leading to the formation of a new coalition government and the admission of the country was again discussed at the ASEAN summit in Hanoi in December 1998. Thailand, Singapore and the wanted to further delay its membership while Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos and Myanmar favoured its immediate participation. As host of the summit, Vietnam lobbied hard to guarantee the Cambodian entry. The country finally joined the Association during an official ceremony in Hanoi on 30 April 1999.

The security and diplomatic benefits of the indochinese enlargement of ASEAN The enlargement process institutionalised a process of reconciliation between the original ASEAN members and the Indochinese states (Leifer 1999). A key motivation for the new members was ‘to gain greater international political credibility and legitimacy’ (Gates and Than 2001: 11). By participating in a regional organisation, they could also expect to gain from increased sub-regional The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 75 stability, enabling them to pay closer attention to domestic economic development. Vietnam expected that membership would improve its diplomatic position and integrate its security with the rest of Southeast Asia, thereby promoting a favourable environment for domestic economic growth (Hoang 1993). Kao Kim Hourn also argues that ‘strategic interests have undoubtedly been the overriding motivation for Cambodia’s quest for ASEAN membership’ (Kao 1998: 15). With the benefit of hindsight, it is now possible to examine how the Indochinese members have benefited from their participation in the Association. In order to assess the possible gains of their membership, it is central to first identify the expectations of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which are based on ASEAN’s prior achievements7. The grouping could provide the Indochinese countries with three security and diplomatic advantages. First, ASEAN offers its members regional and international recognition. As mentioned above, the Cambodian conflict transformed the institution into an internationally respected arrangement. By the mid-1990s, ASEAN had also established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)8 and taken the initiative over the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The latter, inaugurated in in March 1996, brings together the heads of state and government from the Europe Union (EU) and ASEAN as well as from , and China. The Association has thus been recognised regionally and internationally as a diplomatic player with some clout. Consequently, membership offered to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia an opportunity to reverse decades of political isolation and to acquire regional and international recognition. This involved being recognised by and gaining access to foreign donors and international institutions as well as being better integrated diplomatically within the rest of Southeast Asia. Second, ASEAN seeks to avoid the occurrence of conflict among its members and thus contributes to the management of intra-mural relations. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Professor S. Jayakumar affirmed in 1998 that ASEAN’s primary role is ‘to manage relationships which have been and could otherwise still, all too easily turn conflictual’ (Jayakumar 1998). The Association has improved the climate of regional relations by containing peacefully, rather than solving, differences between its members. Its approach to conflict management has been characterised by the absence of concrete confidence-building measures. Instead, the regional grouping has relied on dialogue and consultation, the practices of self-restraint and consensus-building and on the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Critical to this approach has been the TAC. Hence ASEAN provided Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with a diplomatic instrument to enhance their security by registering their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In particular, membership offered the two smaller Indochinese states with a means to increase their security vis-a`-vis their mightier ASEAN neighbours. Any aggressive action towards them from another ASEAN member would violate the Association’s core principles and disturb its cooperative premises. 76 R. Emmers

Third, ASEAN provides its members with some diplomatic leverage and more room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The Association has succeeded to a certain extent in redefining relations with non-members by acting as a cohesive group. In addition to its managerial role in the ARF, the regional grouping has maintained diplomatic contacts with key external actors, including the , Japan and the EU, through the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC)9. In short, ASEAN provided the Indochinese countries with more leverage in their diplomatic dealings with non-member states. Vietnam in particular expected that its participation in ASEAN would internationalise its territorial dispute with Beijing over the and as a result lead to greater Chinese restraint towards the Vietnamese claims.

Vietnam Vietnam has since 1995 gained regional and international recognition from its participation in the Association. Its membership has ‘marked the end of its isolation in international politics and laid to rest its image as an intruder in regional politics’ (Singh 1997: 227). Vietnam was also one of the founding participants at the inauguration of the ARF held in Singapore in July 1993. ASEAN has given Hanoi an opportunity to integrate into mainstream international affairs and to diversify its external relations, especially with regional states. In that sense, membership has enabled the country to benefit from a greater freedom in the making of its ‘omni-directional’ foreign policy. Its more diversified foreign policy since the early 1990s has consisted of avoiding forming new alliances with any of the great powers, creating new friendships, and promoting economic and trade links. In short, Vietnam’s increased international recognition and regional integration has helped Hanoi in re-orientating its foreign policy ‘from its intense preoccupation with big powers, particularly China, to a more balanced position in which regional cooperation with other Southeast Asian states plays a significant role’ (Kim Ninh 1998: 454). The benefits of membership in terms of its management of relations with other ASEAN members have to some extent been forthcoming. Vietnam has taken part in the Association with the objective of securing a stable and peaceful security environment and guaranteeing its national security against external threats (Thayer 1997: 367). The Vietnamese participation has symbolised the institutionalisation of a process of diplomatic reconciliation between Hanoi and the original member states and strengthened the diplomatic cohesion of Southeast Asia. The original members were at first concerned about the attitude Vietnam would adopt in the Association. ASEAN’s informal process of interaction, the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ through which the members relate to each other, has been characterised by the practice of quiet diplomacy, a continuing process of dialogue, a willingness to exercise self-restraint, and the practices of consensus-building and conflict avoidance. With its long tradition of confrontation and intransigent diplomatic demands, many member states were The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 77 apprehensive that Vietnam would ignore the ‘ASEAN Way’ and behave as a disruptive actor. These fears have not materialised. Vietnam has adopted since 1995 an accommodating approach towards the Association, as indicated by Hanoi’s willingness to accept the joint ASEAN decision to postpone Cambodia’s membership after Hun Sen’s coup in July 1997 despite its support for Phnom Penh’s immediate entry. However, the ASEAN membership has not modified Vietnam’s security outlook towards some of the original members. Vietnam and Indonesia have continued to perceive each other as allies against China’s regional ambitions. has traditionally regarded Vietnam as a buffer state against China’s hegemonic aspirations in Southeast Asia and has therefore actively supported its participation in ASEAN. Due to geopolitical concerns and historical baggage, Vietnam has however continued to be in competition with Thailand over influence in Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi has been concerned with Bangkok’s search for economic and political leadership in mainland Southeast Asia. This competition with Thailand has been exacerbated under the leadership of the current Thai Prime Minister, . Thailand also ‘views Vietnam, not China, as its traditional rival for influence on the Indochinese peninsula’ (Zagoria 1997: 157). For Bangkok, the danger of Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina was realised during the occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s, which led to the deployment of hostile Vietnamese military forces along Thailand’s Eastern border. In short, Thai-Vietnamese mistrust and competition over influence in Indochina have continued, although in a non-military sense, despite Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN. Vietnam’s relations with some ASEAN members have also continued to be complicated by bilateral border disputes. For example, Vietnam and Malaysia are claiming overlapping continental shelf areas in different parts of the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the introduction of additional territorial disputes within the geographical boundaries of ASEAN has not been a significant development, as most disputes among the original members have remained unresolved since 1967. This highlights ASEAN’s shortcomings as a diplomatic instrument to resolve sources of conflict between its members. Rather than addressing these differences, ASEAN has contributed to their avoidance and management. Hence, rather than seeking their resolution, Vietnam’s membership has at least provided ‘for a situation which is conducive to the peaceful management of existing inter- states disputes and potential future disputes’ (Amer 2004: 21). For Vietnam, the third beneficial expectation of ASEAN, namely, the increased room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states, has also been important. Critical for Hanoi has been the desire to improve its bargaining power vis-a`-vis China and to constrain its actions towards the Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea10. Vietnam has hoped to transform its territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea into a multilateral dispute involving Beijing and ASEAN. Ang argues that ‘Vietnam’s best and perhaps only solution in order to pre-empt a fait accompli in the Spratlys is to depend on ASEAN support and to 78 R. Emmers

“internationalise” the issue as much as it possibly can’ (Ang 1998: 28). Together with the Philippines, Vietnam has been actively involved in negotiating a code of conduct on the South China Sea but Hanoi has remained doubtful whether ‘ASEAN is able to engender genuine cooperation with China’ (Odgaard 2003: 19). The ASEAN foreign ministers and China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh in early November 2002. The agreement was intended to prevent further tensions over the disputed territories and to reduce the risks of military conflict in the South China Sea. The parties agreed to resolve their territorial disputes by peaceful means and pledged to practise self-restraint in activities that could spark disputes, such as occupying still uninhabited features (ASEAN 2002). After years of ASEAN-China negotiations, the declaration represented a move away from the original ASEAN goal of reaching a binding code of conduct on the South China Sea. Moreover, Vietnam was forced to accept some important concessions. It had demanded that the declaration include a commitment not to build new structures on the islands, which was rejected by China. Vietnam had also insisted that the Paracel Islands be mentioned. The declaration eventually made no reference to its specific geographical scope, as China opposed any mention of the Paracels. Consequently, ASEAN has provided Vietnam with an institutional vehicle to internationalise its territorial dispute over the South China Sea with Beijing. Hanoi has therefore gained in bargaining power on this issue. Yet, the benefits of this multilateral process should not be overestimated. Hanoi has failed in the context of the Sino-ASEAN negotiations to include the Paracels, as demonstrated by its omission in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, and has thus lost room for manoeuvre on half of its territorial claims. Moreover, while the 2002 declaration ought to be seen as an ASEAN diplomatic exercise in socialising China and in promoting peaceful co-existence with Beijing, it falls short of Vietnam’s preference for a binding code of conduct. In particular, it offers no guarantees to Hanoi against the occurrence of new incidents over territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Laos The ASEAN membership has benefited Laos in terms of increasing its regional and international status. The country had a lot to gain from increased international exposure to enhance its ties with external donors and promote its economic development, which has remained highly dependent on foreign aid. After having adhered to the TAC in 1992, Laos also became one of the founding participants of the ARF. The Laotian Foreign Minister, Phoune Sipaseuth, attended, together with 17 other foreign ministers, its inauguration in July 1993. The Association has therefore relieved Laos from its state of international isolation. Laos’s participation in ASEAN was also an attempt to better integrate The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 79 the country economically and diplomatically with the rest of Southeast Asia as well as to strengthen its bilateral relations with individual ASEAN states. Laos has benefited from stronger ties with Malaysia, Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. For example, during the visit of the Laotian Prime Minister to Malaysia in 1998, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, , pledged in accordance with the ASEAN spirit to assist Laos in its nation-building efforts (Schneider 1999). Furthermore, the ASEAN participation has enhanced ’s political credibility. By including Laos regardless of its one-party system, ASEAN has enabled the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party to strengthen its political legitimacy abroad. Bourdet writes that a ‘tangible advantage of ASEAN membership is that it can make it easier for Laos to resist the pressures exerted by donor countries to make democratic reforms’ (Bourdet 1997: 156). However, Laos’s increased recognition has involved some substantial expenses due to ASEAN’s initial deposit of US$1 million and annual dues of US$700,000 as well as the costs of attending more than 200 meetings a year. Even more problematic for Laos has been the shortage of adequately trained personnel with the technical expertise and a good command of English to attend these numerous gatherings. For ASEAN and Laos itself, the benefits of membership in terms of intra-mural relations have been less evident. To discuss this point, it is important to examine Laos’s participation in the Association from the perspective of its bilateral relations with its immediate ASEAN neighbours. Laos is the only landlocked country in Southeast Asia and it shares borders with Cambodia, China, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Its security and economic development have thus been strongly influenced by its border relations (Nguyen 1996). Laos’s security and foreign policy-making are dictated by its geo-strategic reality. Like Cambodia, Laos has acted as a buffer state between its two mightier and more populated neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. Since the early 1990s, Laos has maintained close ties with Vietnam derived from strong ideological affinities and a common historical legacy. In contrast, Laos has continued to have ambivalent and volatile relations with Thailand. External influence in Laos shifted in the 1990s from Vietnam’s political and military dominance to Thailand’s cultural influence and economic leadership. Focusing on its own economic growth, Vietnam was not able to compete with Thailand in terms of economic leverage and presence in Laos. In March 1996, the Sixth Laotian Party Congress indicated, however, that Vietnam remained Laos’s primary partner (Zasloff 1998). Vientiane’s expression of its special relationship with Hanoi was made in the light of the need to balance Thailand’s rising influence in Laos (Bourdet 1997). The ASEAN membership was meant to put Laos on the same footing as its ASEAN neighbours. Laos expected its participation in the regional grouping to help it manage its relations with Thailand. In particular, Vientiane hoped that its membership would enable Laos to become less dependent on its neighbour. Stuart-Fox argued even before the Laotian entry in 1997 that ‘the need to 80 R. Emmers balance relations with Thailand by relations with the other states that share a common border with Laos must be seen as a factor in the LPDR’s eagerness to take part in subregional integration’ (Stuart-Fox 1995: 191–192). Ironically, Thailand’s influence in Laos was not reduced by the country’s entry into ASEAN but instead by the Asian financial crisis that the Association found itself incapable of responding to. The collapse of the Thai Baht in July 1997 caused a dramatic reduction in Thai investments in Laos. Rather than being an asset to the Association, Laos has largely been a liability, particularly to Thailand. Thailand’s reduced influence in Laos has not been followed by an improvement in relations. Thai-Laotian ties have remained difficult due to several issues despite their common membership in the Association. One important detrimental factor has been the question of the ownership of several disputed islands on the Mekong River, which delineates most of the Thai-Laotian border. Open conflict over this issue even seemed imminent in September 2000 (Lintner 2001). At the time, ASEAN was incapable of contributing to a more peaceful management of the dispute. Moreover, Thai- Laotian relations have been complicated by Hmong insurgency operations in Laos11. A Hmong offensive in early 2000 led to the deployment of Vietnamese military personnel to support the Laotian army. The presence of Vietnamese units in Laos alarmed Thailand (Lintner 2001). Bangkok’s reaction was unsurprising in light of Vietnam’s past military presence in Laos, which numbered more than 50,000 troops at the time of its withdrawal in 1987–88 (Stuart-Fox 1991). The destabilising events of 2000 indicated that Laos’s membership in ASEAN did ‘not seem to have brought the country any nearer to the notion of belonging to a harmonious family of nations in the region’ (Lintner 2001). By late 2002, Laos and Thailand had agreed, however, on most of their land border demarcation. In the meantime, bilateral relations have again been strained as a result of Thailand’s refusal to hand over 16 Laotian rebels allegedly involved in the attack on a Laotian check-post in July 2000 before taking refuge across the frontier (Freeman 2002: 152). In short, the intra-mural security benefits of Laos’s membership have been disappointing. So far, Laos’s entry has not modified the vulnerability of its relationship with Thailand nor has it contributed to an improvement in the climate of relations. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party has maintained its special ties with Vietnam but this has not been achieved through ASEAN but rather as a result of ideological affinities and a common historical legacy. A closer participation of Laos in ASEAN is therefore dependent on a significant improvement of ties between Bangkok and Vientiane and on at least a better and more peaceful management of their bilateral disputes and other differences. ASEAN itself is ill-equipped to solve sources of conflict or to deal with pressing matters between its member countries, as indicated by its non-interference in the Laotian-Thai border problems and also by ongoing bilateral mistrust and disputes between some of its original members. Singapore-Malaysian ties have continued, for instance, to be influenced by feelings of suspicion and The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 81 competition. ASEAN has never used its own dispute resolution mechanism, the High Council, included in the TAC of 1976 to mediate or settle conflicts among its member countries. At this stage, it seems best therefore not to be too optimistic about a more successful integration of Laos in the process of overall Southeast Asian community building. This brings us to a third anticipated advantage of membership. Contrary to Vietnam, it is unclear whether Laos had ever anticipated that its ASEAN participation would give it more room for manoeuvre in its diplomatic dealings with China. Instead, its decision in the mid-1990 s to join the Association may well have been a case of bandwagoning with a then prosperous ASEAN. Of significance, however, is how China has succeeded in the case of Laos to act as a more powerful balancer relative to the Association. China’s influence in Laos has risen since 1997, in contrast to the expectation by Indonesia and other original members that its entry into ASEAN would reduce outside intervention in the country and help in the development of an autonomous regional order in Southeast Asia. The lack of support for Laotian economic interests from the other members has pushed Laos further into the Chinese orbit. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 enabled China to increase its role in Laos’s domestic affairs. The country suffered economically from the consequences of the crisis and its currency, the kip, depreciated sharply. ASEAN was unable to make a substantial contribution to economic recovery. If Laos had expected to join a successful economic club, its expectation did not materialise in light of ASEAN’s response to the financial crisis. China on the other hand helped Laos stabilise its currency in 1999 by providing interest-free loans and export subsidies. Since the end of the financial crisis, China has become the leading foreign investor in Laos (Freeman 2004). One should expect China’s influence and presence in Laos to further increase if Beijing and ASEAN succeed in their attempt to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA)12. Despite its strong economic relations with China, Laos has not yet endorsed some form of Chinese patronage. Rather than regarding ASEAN as a countervailing factor to its growing reliance on China, Laos has instead continued to rely on its relationship with Vietnam.

Cambodia As with Vietnam and Laos, ASEAN has provided Cambodia with a means to increase its regional and international exposure. By taking part in multilateral diplomacy, Cambodia has succeeded in terminating its isolation. Besides its immediate Southeast Asian neighbours, the Association has also provided Cambodia with better access to other powers through forums like the ARF and the ASEAN-PMC (Kao 1998). Cambodia was admitted as a participant to the ARF in July 1995 during its second ministerial meeting in Brunei, even before becoming a member of ASEAN. In addition to increasing Cambodia’s international status, the process of regional integration has also contributed to 82 R. Emmers the country’s new foreign policy outlook. The latter has shifted since the early 1990s from a policy of non-alignment and bilateral diplomacy to a strategy ‘defined by an open door policy, integration and multilateral engagement’ (Kao 1999: 1). Cambodia’s membership in ASEAN has had some positive effect on the international relations of Southeast Asia. After the dramatic consequences of the Cambodian conflict, the ASEAN states had an obvious interest in seeing a stable, independent and peaceful Cambodia as part of their regional grouping. Even before its entry, Cambodia’s Foreign Minister, Ung Huot, had stated that his country regarded regional cooperation as ‘a first step in maintaining peace and stability’ (Ung Huot 1996: 200). Cambodia’s membership in 1999 also fulfilled the hope of the original members of uniting the entire Southeast Asian region under ASEAN auspices. Given the factors of geography and new foreign policy disposition in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian participation in the Association was a natural and logical consequence of its return to full sovereignty and territorial integrity. Membership has led to a better diplomatic integration of a previously isolationist country. This was indicated by its successful chairmanship of the Association from July 2002 to June 2003 and its hosting of the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002. Yet, it is questionable whether Cambodia’s membership has helped in promoting stability within the country. Political struggles between Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh and rising crime problems with transnational repercussions have concerned its neighbour- ing ASEAN members13. Due to its belief in the principle of non-interference, the regional grouping has not been in a position to address such issues directly or effectively. Cambodia has, to some extent, benefited from ASEAN in terms of managing its relations with other member states. Membership has put Cambodia ‘on the same playing field with other members’ (Kao 1998: 18). The grouping helps Phnom Penh increase its security from external interference. The TAC constitutes a form of diplomatic guarantee, as it operates as a regional code of conduct based on the respect for national sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Specifically, the TAC provides Cambodia with an instrument to manage its relations with both Thailand and Vietnam. Cambodia’s relations with its two larger neighbours have traditionally been strained by feelings of animosity, differences in ethnic identity, border disputes and historical legacy. Cambodia has been the victim of their struggle for dominance in Indochina and has continued to regard its mightier neighbours as potentially dangerous for its security. Cambodia’s strategic interest has thus been ‘to keep the two powers from expanding into its territory’ (Kao 1998: 15). This is precisely why the TAC and its standard principles are significant for Cambodia’s relations with its ASEAN neighbours. In contrast to Laos which has maintained its good relations with Hanoi independently from ASEAN, the importance of the TAC needs to be emphasised in Cambodian- Vietnamese relations, as it has functioned as a source of reciprocal constraint. The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 83

Nevertheless, as for Laotian-Thai relations, Cambodia’s participation in ASEAN has not modified the vulnerability of its bilateral ties with its direct neighbours. In that sense, Cambodia’s membership has generally failed to contribute to an improvement in intra-mural relations. Anti-Vietnamese feelings in Cambodia are still strong and regularly exploited by the political elite. Since the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989, relations with Hanoi have been strained by two outstanding issues: the demarcation of their common land and sea borders and the ethnic Vietnamese refugees living in Cambodia (Ang 2000). The question of border disputes with Vietnam is made more volatile politically due to accusations by the Cambodian opposition that Prime Minister Hun Sen is too closely linked to Hanoi (Marston 2002). A frightening illustration of the vulnerability of Thai- Cambodian relationships occurred in early 2003. Anti-Thai riots broke out in Phnom Penh on 29 January 2003 following comments allegedly made by a Thai movie star on the Thai origins of Angkor Wat and the required restitution of the archaeological site to Thailand. The riots led to the storming of the Thai Embassy and the destruction of Thai business interests in Phnom Penh. Thailand refused to normalise its relations with Cambodia until full compensation was paid. Although this represented the ‘worst episode in Cambodia-Thai relations for a decade’ (Tin 2004: 83), ASEAN did not get involved in the dispute and made no contribution to its resolution. This further questioned its ability to manage intra-regional disputes and deal with pressing matters between its members. Ironically, Cambodia was more the focus of ASEAN’s intervention in the 1980s and early 1990s than since becoming a member of the Association. Lastly, Cambodia’s membership may have changed its relations with non- members, particularly China. Under ASEAN, Cambodia has broadened its policy options beyond its traditional reliance on neutrality and/or a tacit alliance with a single great power. In that sense, it has been able to widen its diplomatic room for manoeuvre in international relations. The other ASEAN countries hoped that Cambodia’s membership would reduce the risk of Chinese intervention in the country or of Phnom Penh having to align itself once more with Beijing to guarantee its security. An isolated Cambodia left out of the Association could have been forced to develop new security links with Beijing, which would have had a destabilising impact on the broader Southeast Asian region. Cambodia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ung Huot had already announced in 1998 that if his country was not a member, it ‘would constitute a weak link for ASEAN, and it could be a channel or a source of outside intervention’ (Ung Huot 1998: 18). Hence, Cambodia was prevented from falling again into the Chinese orbit. Yet Beijing may still gradually succeed in acting as a more powerful balancer relative to the Association. China has sought to increase its influence in Cambodia since it joined ASEAN in 1999. Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited the country in November 2000, followed in 2001 by four separate visits of senior Chinese officials. At the ASEAN summit hosted by Cambodia in November 2002, China’s Premier, Zhu Rongji, announced that China had decided to write off 84 R. Emmers

Cambodia’s old debts to Beijing. As for Laos, a China-ASEAN FTA may further increase Beijing’s influence and presence in Cambodia. Cambodia’s participation in ASEAN has also led Vietnam and China to compete to exert superior influence over Phnom Penh. Cambodia’s warmer ties with Beijing ‘have not replaced Hun Sen’s close association with Vietnam, but China’s much greater power and capacity to offer aid have certainly qualified Cambodia’s relationship with its immediate eastern neighbour’ (Osborne 2003: 90).

Conclusion International institutions usually expand their membership to fulfil original ambitions and to reunite natural geographical areas as well as to increase their influence and diplomatic centrality at a broader regional and/or international level. These motives and ambitions can, for example, be found in the dynamics that led to the enlargement of the EU to include ten new member states in May 2004. Similar motivations existed in the case of ASEAN which, in addition to reuniting the ten Southeast Asian countries under its auspices, hoped to preserve its diplomatic position in the post-Cold War era and to increase its influence in East Asia. Of crucial importance was the need to further develop its stabilising role in Southeast Asian relations through its own expansion process and to avoid being excluded from a strategic architecture in East Asia that was primarily dependent on a Sino-Japanese-US triangle. The study of any expansion process demands a close examination of the motives and expectations of a new member state, as has been the focus of this article in the case of the Indochinese countries. Before their membership, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia may have expected to benefit from their ASEAN participation in terms of enhancing their international status, improving their security and relations vis-a`-vis other members, and extending their room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. Our analysis has indicated, however, that while the Indochinese states have gained from ASEAN in reducing their regional and international isolation, the actual benefits in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members as well as non-member states have been more ambiguous. Vietnam has succeeded in institutionalising its reconciliation with the original ASEAN members and in internationalising its territorial dispute with China over the Spratlys. Yet it has failed to include the Paracels in the Sino-ASEAN negotiations and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties has fallen short of its preference for a binding code of conduct on the South China Sea. Membership has put Cambodia and Laos on the same footing as their ASEAN neighbours. In particular, the standard principles of the TAC have provided the two Indochinese states with an instrument to constrain and manage their ties with Vietnam and Thailand. Relations with Bangkok have remained volatile, however, as demonstrated by the Laotian-Thai border problems in September 2000 and the anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh in January 2003. ASEAN did not get involved in these clashes and has generally failed to The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 85 modify the vulnerability of the bilateral ties or to contribute to an improvement in the climate of relations. Finally, despite their ASEAN participation, China has succeeded, in the case of Laos and to a lesser extent Cambodia, in increasing its influence in their domestic affairs and in acting as a more powerful balancer relative to the Association. Having discussed the mixed security and diplomatic benefits of ASEAN’s Indochinese enlargement from the perspective of the new members, it is important to stress that any expansion process brings costs and drawbacks that may transform an inter-state organisation into a less influential and cohesive institution. Enlargement can weaken the effectiveness of an international institution by complicating the process of consultation and decision-making as well as by damaging intra-mural relations due to an increased diversity of political views and the incorporation of additional rivalries. An expansion process can thus undermine the relative homogeneity in interests and affect an existing familiar atmosphere leading to the watering down of long-term aspirations. Many believers in a European federation view, for instance, an enlarged EU with 25 members or more as an end to their dream of establishing a strong political union. ASEAN has also been affected by its rapid expansion process. The latter has undermined the achievement of consensus that governs decision-making and questioned the applicability of the ‘ASEAN Way’. Together with Myanmar, the Indochinese states have also been resistant to institutional change, preferring the Association to remain a diplomatic arrangement reliant on a strict application of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Consequently, they have not been receptive to a recent Indonesian idea of forming an ASEAN Security Community and have criticised related proposals of establishing an ASEAN peacekeeping force and of promoting democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia. The Indochinese states have instead indicated their wish to maintain the status quo in ASEAN and to water down proposals presented by Indonesia, the largest and natural leader of the Association. Such debates may lead in the long term to a multi-layered and two-speed institution bringing together countries opting for the current level of inter-state cooperation and others moving the Association forward through incremental changes in specific areas.

Notes 1. The original ASEAN members were: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The offer to participate had been declined by Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos before the founding meeting in Bangkok in August 1967. 2. For discussions on the economic implications of the ASEAN enlargement, see Gates (2001) and Nesadurai (2003). 3. SEATO was the institutional structure of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty signed in Manila in September 1954 by the United States, Britain, France, , , Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. 86 R. Emmers

4. The TAC also mentions other principles of the UN Charter and the principles endorsed at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. 5. This was especially true after 1987 when Vietnam was no longer able to rely on Soviet assistance to fund its military activities in Cambodia. The Soviet attempt to reach de´tente with China after the coming to power of Mikhael Gorbachev had led to the cessation of Soviet support for the occupation. 6. The AMM is an annual gathering of the ASEAN foreign ministers. It is a key instrument of regional diplomacy where security matters are commonly discussed. 7. For example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that the three most important functions of ASEAN are to enhance regional harmony, to promote an autonomous regional order, and to act as an international bargaining tool, (Anwar 2001). 8. The ARF was inaugurated in Singapore in July 1993. Its initial participants were: Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the , Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, , the Philippines, , Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. Cambodia was admitted in 1995, and Myanmar in 1996, Mongolia in 1998, North Korea in 2000, and Pakistan in 2004. 9. The ASEAN-PMC takes place just after the annual AMM and consists of bilateral serial discussions with ASEAN’s dialogue partners that include Australia, New Zealand, EU, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Canada. 10. The overlapping territorial claims over the Spratly Islands represent a difficult case of disputed features between China, , Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. The Paracel archipelago has been under Chinese control since 1974 and is also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. Vietnam has laid claims on both the Spratlys and the Paracels based on historical claims of discovery and occupation. It has also established a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China views the South China Sea as an exclusive Chinese sea and claims nearly its entire territory. The territorial dispute has already led to military clashes between China and Vietnam in the Paracel archipelago in January 1974 and in the Spratlys in March 1988 resulting in Vietnamese casualties and the Chinese seizure of territory. 11. An indigenous ethnic group from Southern China, the Hmong are an ethnic minority in Laos and Vietnam. They played an important role during the Vietnam War by helping the Americans counter communist forces. Many left Laos after the communist take-over in 1975 and found refuge in Thailand, Australia, France and the United States. 12. The ASEAN-China FTA is expected to be a comprehensive agreement based on the progressive liberalisation of goods, services and investments. A Free Trade Area for Goods is to be established by 2010 among Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and China, and by 2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. 13. The 2003 general elections in Cambodia were followed by 11 months of political deadlock due to the failure of Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh and their respective political parties, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) to form a coalition government. Cambodia has also experienced a re-emergence of transnational crime in recent years and become a transit route for the trafficking of people.

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