RADICALIZATION IN INDIA: DIAGNOSIS AND REMEDIES
Dissertation submitted in part fulfilment for the requirement of the Degree of
LL.M.
Submitted by: Supervised by:
ANKIT KAUSHIK PROF. (DR.) G. S. BAJPAI
NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
DELHI (INDIA)
2019 DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE
I hereby declare that the dissertation entitled “Radicalization in India: Diagnosis and Remedies,” submitted at is the outcome of my own work carried out under the supervision of Prof. (Dr.) G. S. Bajpai, Professor and Registrar, National Law University, Delhi.
I further declare that to the best of my knowledge the dissertation does not contain any part of work which has been submitted for the award of any degree either in this University, or any other institutions without proper citation.
Ankit Kaushik (19LLM18)
National Law University, Delhi
Place: New Delhi
Date: 15-05-2019
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CERTIFICATE OF SUPERVISOR
This is to certify that the work reported in the LL.M. Dissertation entitled
“Radicalization in India: Diagnosis and Remedy” submitted by Mr.
Ankit Kaushik at National Law University, Delhi is a bona fide record of his original work carried out under my supervision.
Prof. (Dr.) G. S. Bajpai,
Professor and Registrar,
National Law University, Delhi
Place: New Delhi
Date: 15-05-2019
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
First and foremost, I would like to thank my mentor and Supervisor – Prof. (Dr.) G. S. Bajpai for his immense guidance and support during the research and writing of this dissertation. I am extremely grateful to him for introducing me to this research area and providing me with the opportunities and encouragement to further my understanding of the complexities and particularities of this topic.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Mr. Atul Chandra Kulkarni, Former ADG, Maharashtra ATS and other staff of the Maharashtra ATS for giving me insights into several focal points pertinent to this study. In the same vein, my gratitude is also reserved for Mr. Baksharaj Kaushal, Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Police Research and Development, for according me the opportunity to attend the ‘Symposium on Bridging the Gap Between Community and Police – A Step Towards De-Radicalization,’ which greatly furthered my understanding of the responses of the State towards the threat of radicalization.
I am highly indebted to the faculty and administration of NLU Delhi in general for providing me with the resources – both material and immaterial, as well as the opportunities to hone my research skills without which this dissertation would not have been made possible. In this regard, I am also thankful to the library staff for making the resource based infrastructure accessible and creating an environment that greatly encouraged me in this endeavour.
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my parents, my sister and my brother-in-law. Without their continual support and understanding, the outcomes of this dissertation would not be the same.
Ankit Kaushik (19LLM18)
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ATS: Anti-Terrorism Squad
BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party
CCCPV: Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence
CPI(M): Communist Party of India (Maoist)
CrPC: Criminal Procedure Code
GTI: Global Terrorism Index
HM: Hizbul Muzahideen
HuM: Harkat Ul Mujahideen
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
IEP: Institute for Economics and Peace
IM: Indian Mujahideen
IPC: Indian Penal Code
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JeI: Jamaat – e - Islami
JeM: Jaish – e – Mohammad
J&K: Jammu and Kashmir
JNU: Jawaharlal Nehru University
LeT: Lashkar – e – Taliba
LWE: Left Wing Extremism
MHA: Ministry of Home Affairs
NAP: National Action Plan
NIA: National Investigation Agency
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RSS: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SATP: South Asian Terrorism Portal
SC: Supreme Court
SIMI: Students Islamic Movement of India
SLL: Special and Local Laws
UAPA: Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
UN: United Nations
UNCTITF: United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE PG. NO. Declaration by the Candidate ii Certificate of Supervisor iii Acknowledgment iv List of Abbreviations v Chapter 1 1 Introduction 1 1.1. International Efforts Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism 3 1.2. Terrorism and Violent Extremism in India 5 1.3. Strategies to Combat Terrorism and Violent Extremism in India 6 Chapter 2 7 Literature Review 7 2.1 Radicalization 7 2.2. The Progression of Radicalization 9 2.3. De-Radicalization 11 2.4. Process of De-Radicalization 13 Chapter 3 16 Radicalization in India 16 3.1. Islamic Extremism 16 3.1.1. Nature and Extent 17 3.1.2. Causes 19 3.1.2.a. Socio-Economic Conditions 20 3.1.2.b. Identity Crisis 21 3.1.2.c. Majoritarian Nationalism 22 3.1.3. Actors 23 3.1.4. Manner of Propagation 25 3.2. Cross Border Terrorism in J&K 26 3.2.1. Nature and Extent 26 3.2.2. Causes 28 3.2.3. Actors 30 3.2.4. Manner of Propagation 32
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3.3. Majoritarian Radicalism 33 3.3.1. Nature and Extent 33 3.3.2 Causes 34 3.3.3. Actors 36 3.3.4. Manner of Propagation 37 3.4. Left Wing Extremism 39 3.4.1. Nature and Extent 39 3.4.2. Actors 41 3.4.3. Causes 42 3.4.4. Manner of Propagation 43 Chapter 4 45 Policy Based Remedial Measures 45 4.1. Responses of the Indian State 45 4.1.1. Surrender Cum Rehabilitation Policies 45 4.1.2. Counter Narratives 47 4.1.3. Development 47 4.2. Policy Responses in Other Countries 49 4.2.1. Canada 49 4.2.2. Denmark 50 4.2.3. Saudi Arabia 51 4.2.4. Singapore 52 4.3. Policy Recommendations 53 Chapter 5 57 Legislation Based Remedial Measures 57 5.1. Definitions 57 5.1.1. Radicalization 58 5.1.2. De-radicalization 59 5.1.3. Counter Radicalization 60 5.1.4. Anti Radicalization 60 5.1.5. Disengagement 60 5.2. Theory of Punishment 61 Chapter 6 63
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Conclusion 63 Bibliography x Books x Reports x Articles xii Websites xv Newspapers/Magazines xvi Appendix A – List of Offences Under IPC and UAPA xxi Appendix B – List of Fundamental Rights Requiring Consideration xxv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In an alternative narrative, Steven Pinker highlights how the Homo Sapiens, as a specie, are living in one of the most peaceful eras of their history. “In earlier decades,” Steven Pinker notes, “a man’s willingness to use his fists in response to an insult was seen as a sign of respectability. Today it is the sign of a boor, a symptom of impulse control disorder, a ticket to anger management therapy.”1 According to this narrative, man has been tamed; toned down to imbibe peacefulness – both psychologically and physically. Violence, today, in any form, is frowned upon by society at large.
Yet, our newspapers are filled with harrowing accounts of death and despair – of men intentionally inflicting pain, of men maiming and killing their fellow beings. In March 2019, a white supremacist massacred fifty one men who had congregated peacefully in a mosque.2 In the video streamed online, the attacker could be seen going from room to room, shooting the panicking individuals dead and then shooting again at the piles of bodies to ensure that no one survived the onslaught. His calmness and composure while committing the atrocity shocked the conscience of the otherwise peaceful country of New Zealand as well as the world at large.
A month later, eleven thousand kilometres away in Sri Lanka, purportedly to avenge the Christchurch massacre detailed in the preceding paragraph,3 a man walked into a Zion church on Easter Sunday and detonated a bomb, killing twenty nine persons – most of whom were children. Concurrently, five other suicide bombers set off explosions at other churches and tourist hotels in several places in Sri Lanka leaving behind the charred and unrecognizable remains of over 290 victims.4 The credit for the orchestration of the attack was claimed by ISIS.
1 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED, (2011) 2 Julia Hollingsworth, Christchurch Terror Attack Death Toll Rises to 51, CNN, (May 02, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/02/asia/nz-christchurch-attack-death-toll-intl/index.html, (last visited on May 13, 2019) 3 Press Trust of India Colombo, Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Bombings a Revenge Attack for Christchurch Bombings: Minister, The Hindu Businessline, (April 23, 2019), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/sri-lankas-bombings-carried-out-in-retaliation-for- christchurch-mosque-attacks-minister/article26919777.ece, (last visited on May 13, 2019) 4Sugam Pokharel, Euan McKirdy, Bombs Tear Through Sri Lankan Churches and Hotels, Killing 250 People, CNN, (April 25, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/21/asia/sri-lanka-explosions/index.html, (last visited on May 13, 2019) 1
These two examples make it amply clear that no country is immune to such violence in the age of information and globalization. It is estimated that the economic impact of terrorism globally, amounted to USD$108 billion in 2014, USD$89.6 billion in 2015, USD$84 billion in 2016 and USD$52 billion in 20175 even as the true economic impact is much higher in all likelihood.6 The resulting loss of lives attributed to terrorism related violence stood at 29,376 in 2015,7 25,673 in 20168 and 18,814 in 2017.9 It is not surprising, therefore, that policy makers and administrators around the globe are struggling to get a handle on the reality of terrorism and violent extremism. 107 countries across the world suffered at least one terrorist attack of which 77 countries suffered at least one casualty in 2016.10
1.1. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AGAINST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT
EXTREMISM It is pertinent to note at this juncture that there is no consensus internationally on the definition of terrorism itself. To make matters worse, often, the terms violent extremism and terrorism are used interchangeably. The Secretary General of the UN has warned against this conflation of the terms in as many words:
“Violent extremism encompasses a wider category of manifestations and there is a risk that a conflation of the two terms may lead to the justification of an overly broad application of counter-terrorism measures, including against forms of conduct that should not qualify as terrorist acts.”11
Even so, the first attempts at an international collaboration to combat terrorism, date back to 1937, when the League of Nations attempted to draft a convention on the prevention and
5 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 6 Ibid 7 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 8 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%202017%20%284%29.p df (last visited on 13-05-2019) 9 Supra Note 5 (GTI 2018) 10 Supra Note 8 (GTI 2017) 11 Report of the UN Secretary General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 (December 24, 2015), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 2 punishment of terrorism.12 The draft was never adopted, but served as the basis for future discourse on terrorism.13 Efforts were made later in the UN as well as other international organizations and since 1963, a total of thirteen legal instruments have been enacted for the prevention of terrorism.14
Javier Ruparez identifies three phases of development in this regard. In the first phase between 1972 and 1991, while the focus was on prevention of terrorism, there was still much disagreement between member States as to whether international cooperation was actually required to prevent and suppress terrorism through a removal of the root causes.15 In the second phase between 1993 and 2001, the focus shifted from prevention to human rights violations, reflecting an emerging consensus among the member States.16 In the third phase 2001 – present, the spotlight is now upon the concept and terminology for the measures required for elimination of terrorism.17
Spurred by this context, there is an emerging academic discourse centred around answering the question of why people commit such acts of aggression. Finding an answer to this question is pertinent if one seeks to find an answer to the question – how do we prevent and/or suppress it? The academic interest in the search for the solutions to these questions piqued particularly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Centre in New York.18 This academic discourse bases its discussion on terrorism related violence and violent extremism in terms of ‘radicalization.’19
Even so, the threat perception of member States with respect to terrorism remains uneven resulting in three fatal flaws in this international collaboration.20 Firstly, there is a lack of unanimity on what constitutes terrorism; secondly, there is a lack of compliance and enforcement mechanism; and lastly, progress related to de-radicalization and counter radicalization is lacking majorly in countries that either do not have the resources or the
12 Javier Ruparez, The United Nations in the Fight Against Terrorism, Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, un.org, January 26, 2006, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp- content/uploads/2017/01/2006_01_26_cted_lecture.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15 Ibid 16 Ibid 17 Ibid 18 Jonathan Githen-Mazer, The rhetoric and reality: radicalization and political discourse, Intl. Pol. Sc. Review, Vol. 33 No. 5 (November, 2012), pp. 556-567 19 Ibid 20 Council for Foreign Relations, The Global Regime for Terrorism: Issue Brief, cfr.org, August 31, 2011, https://www.cfr.org/report/global-regime-terrorism, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 3 expertise to engage in such programmes. These flaws directly impact the state of terrorism and violent extremism in the domestic jurisdiction of the member States including India negatively.
1.2. TERRORISM & VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN INDIA As per one estimate, in India alone, a total of 51 terrorist groups were responsible for carrying out at least one terrorist attack in 2017, and 25 groups were responsible for causing at least one death.21 A previous edition of the same study quantifies the number of terrorist related incidents at 929 leading to 340 causalities and leaving 636 persons injured.22 It is estimated by the IEP that between 2001 and 2017, 8123 persons lost their lives to such violence in India.23
The IEP attributes these acts of terrorism primarily to Naxalites through their political front – the CPI(M) and Islamic terrorist groups such as LeT, JeM and HM.24 However, if one is to pay heed to the warning of the Secretary General that terrorism and violent extremism are not be confused with one another, any observant researcher is bound to find multiple forms of violent extremisms in existence in the country.
In February 2016, Mohammed Sirajuddin, an employee of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited was arrested by the NIA from Jaipur for perpetuating and promoting the ideology of ISIS. As per the chargesheet, “in furtherance of larger criminal conspiracy and supporting activities of the ISIS created, (Siraj) invited others to join and himself joined various telegram groups and channels, and actively supported… and promoted activities of ISIS by... influencing others by disseminating incriminating contents… and glorifying the terrorist acts of ISIS.”
In November 2018, a grenade was lobbed at Nirankari Bhawan in Amritsar killing three persons and injuring twenty more.25 After a swift investigation, the police arrested Bikramjit Singh after it was found that the blast was orchestrated by the Khalistan Liberation Force at the behest of the ISI. The same module is also suspected to have committed a string of assassinations of RSS and Shiv Sena members, as well as a Christian pastor in 2016-17.26
21 Supra Note 5 (GTI 2018) 22 Supra note 8 (GTI 2017) 23 Supra note 5 (GTI 2018) 24 Ibid 25 Scroll Staff, Punjab: Amritsar Grenade Attack Being Treated as an Act of Terrorism, Say Police, Scroll.in (November 18, 2018), https://scroll.in/latest/902580/punjab-at-least-three-dead-10-injured-in-blast-at-a-spiritual- organisation-in-amritsar, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 26 Special Correspondent, One Arrested in Amritsar Grenade Attack Case, The Hindu (November 21, 2018), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/one-arrested-in-amritsar-grenade-attack-case/article25557969.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 4
In 2015, as a team of the Indian Army was out patrolling the roads of Manipur, a group of insurgents belonging to the NSCN (Khaplang) faction ambushed them with assault weapons and rocket propelled grenades.27 As many as twenty soldiers were martyred and eleven others were wounded in the attack.28
Also in 2015, in the Dadri village of Uttar Pradesh, a mob of fifteen hundred people gathered in front of the house of Mohammed Akhlaque Saifi.29 The crowd suspected that he had slaughtered a calf and stored it’s meat in his house. The mob broke into his house and mercilessly beat Akhlaque to death. His son wasn’t spared either and suffered grievous injuries.30
The incidents recounted above have occurred in the past four years and have been highlighted to show the various hues of violent extremism that threaten to tear asunder India’s constitutional and social fabric. The phenomenon of violent extremism in India is not limited to Cross Border terrorism or Naxalism and the robustness of Indian democracy requires preservation from several ideologies – religious, economic and political.
1.3. STRATEGIES TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN INDIA At an international level, India has been consistently pushing for a zero tolerance policy on terrorism through the development of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized that there should be no distinction between good terrorism and bad terrorism.31It not only seeks to form a global consensus on terrorism, but also seeks a “denial of funds, safe havens, arms and technologies.”32
At a domestic level too, the approach of the policy makers has been rather security centric; ranging from a strengthening of intelligence apparatus to outright coercive measures involving
27 Press Trust of India, 20 Soldiers Killed in Manipur Militant Ambush, The Hindu (June 04, 2015), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/10-soldiers-killed-in-manipur-militant- ambush/article7282201.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 28 Ibid 29 Mob Lynching in Dadri: A Report, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50 No. 72, 17-10-2015 30 Ibid 31 Shruti Pandalai, Introduction: India’s Quest for a Global Convention on Combating Terrorism, in SHRUTI PANDALAI (ED.), COMBATING TERRORISM: EVOLVING ASIAN PERSPECTIVES, (2019) 32 Ibid 5 the State’s security forces. To illustrate, one source estimates that there are approximately 3,37,000 Army men deployed in the J&K alone.33
However, this strategy betrays a compartmentalized mindset where a more holistic and comprehensive perspective is required. While this security centric response may be enough to combat terrorism in the short term, a long term response requires strategies aimed at preventing violent extremism by suppressing radicalization itself. In 2014, the UNSC held that “(a)ddressing the threat … requires comprehensively addressing underlying factors, including by preventing radicalization to terrorism, stemming recruitment… countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, countering incitement to terrorist acts motivated by extremism or intolerance, promoting political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, ending and resolving armed conflicts, and facilitating reintegration and rehabilitation.”
It is necessary, therefore, that measures pertaining to the prevention of violent extremism need to enter the lexicons and arsenals of the policy makers and legislators. Towards this aim, the MHA instituted a Counter Terrorism and Counter Radicalization division in November 2017.34 One of the main objectives of the division is to handle matters and devise an Action Plan to combat radicalization through counter radicalization and de-radicalization.35
However, if the policy makers and legislators are to make an informed decision regarding such measures, they must first be guided by an academic discourse on the issue. Whereas such academic discourse is fast gaining traction in the more developed parts of the world, it is conspicuous only in its absence in India. In the next chapter of the dissertation, the researcher seeks to conduct a literature review in order to understand the state of the academic discourse on radicalization and de-radicalization, globally as well as domestically.
33 Praveen Swami, Kashmir: Fewer Troops, More Peace, The Hindu, (January 21, 2014) https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/kashmir-fewer-troops-more-peace/article5597916.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 34Press Information Bureau, Press Release: Creation of CTCR and CIS Divisions in MHA, (February 07, 2018) http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1519500, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 35 Ministry of Home Affairs, Allocation of Work of Counter Terrorism and Counter Radicalization Division, mha.gov.in, https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/CTRC_AllocationWork.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 6
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. RADICALIZATION At the outset, it is important to understand that the use of the term radicalization in various literatures has been rather subjective with a different connotation in differing contexts. Michael G. Schatzberg36 uses the term to encapsulate a series of measures taken by the Mobuto administration in the erstwhile Zaire, Africa, which sought to bring about a change in the very society itself. These measures came to be known as ‘radicalization of the revolution.’ Similarly, Akin L. Mabogunje,37 has used the term radicalization in an African perspective wherein he refers to ‘institutional radicalization’ as changing the system from the roots in order to understand how civil societies deal with development.
The use of the term – radicalization in the abovementioned literature invokes a docile image. This form of radicalization largely wanders within the confines of societal and legal systems even as it may look for an opportunity to change them. It can be conceded however, that the image of radicalization conjured above runs counter to the perception of the term as used in common parlance.
Post 9/11, media, politicians and academics were quick in their appropriation of the term – radicalization in context of Islamic extremism emanating from the middle-east.38 Jonathan Githen-Mazers notes that as of 2011, there were 107 books, journal articles, government documents, working papers, think-tank reports and publicly available post graduate thesis of relevance to radicalization, of which 63 percent mentioned referred to Islam, Islamism, Muslim and Jihad in the title while 73 percent refer to radicalization in context of Muslims or Islam.39
Such an appropriation of the term may be referred to as a ‘causal definition’ of the problem. The users of such definitions believe that radicalization occurs as a reaction triggered by poor governance or a push for societal change.40 Defining radicalization in the reference of
36 Michael G. Schatzberg, The State and The Economy: The ‘Radicalization of the Revolution’ in Mobuto’s Zaire, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 14 No.2, 1980, pp. 239-257 37 Akin L. Mabogunje, Institutional Radicalization, the State and Development Process in Africa, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 97 No. (25) (December 05, 2000), pp. 14007-140014 38 Supra Note 18 (Jonathan Githen-Mazers) 39 Ibid at p. 558 40 Ibid 7 contextual violence brings with it a risk of researchers being limited by a tunnel vision. Violent radicalization isn’t the sole preserve of the Islamic extremism of the present day. To exemplify, Chares Demetriou,41 studies the link between radicalization and violence in Palestine (1920- 1948), Cyprus (1850-1921) and Ireland (1914-1959) identifying the cause of such radicalization to be primarily political. Thus, radicalization must be studied as a global phenomenon which can affect any ideology – political, cultural or religious.
Keeping in view the same, the European Commission while avoiding the attribution of any radicalization to any religion defines the same as the phenomenon of people embracing opinion, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism.42In this context, most policy analysts and academicians have a broad consensus on the definition of radicalization as a process whereby individuals or groups develop, over time, a mind-set that can—under the right circumstances and opportunities—increase the risk that he or she will engage in violent extremism or terrorism.43 Wilner and Dubouloz determine radicalization to mean a process wherein “individuals adopt extreme political, social and/or religious ideals and aspirations, where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence”44
From the above ‘process definitions,’ two aspects emerge in common – firstly, the study of radicalization as a process, and secondly, the consequential violence that emanates from such radicalization. Though the thought that radicalization increases the potential for violent action but does not de facto necessitate violence45 is present in the western academic discourse; it is the aspect of violence upon which the primary focus lies. It can be surmised that the same exposes the security centric pre-disposition of the discourse. For this reason, it is submitted, the discourse cannot be preventative in the truest sense of the term, but only remedial. Further, the absence of any definitions of radicalization, tailor made to the Indian scenario, is also conspicuous.
41 Chares Demetriou, Political Radicalization and Political Violence in Palestine (1920-1948), Cyprus (1850- 1921) and Ireland (1914-1959), Social Science History, Vol. 36 No.3 (Fall 2012), pp. 391-420 42 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning Terrorist Recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization, Brussels, COM (2005) 313 final 43 Lindsay Clutterbuck, Deradicalization Programmes and Counter Terrorism: A Perspective on Challenges and Benefits, Middle East Institute, (June 2015) http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalization-programs-and- counterterrorism-perspective-challenges-and-benefits (last visited on 13-05-2019) 44 Alex S. Wilner & C.J. Dubouloz, Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization, Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 22:1, p. 33-51 45 Lindsey Holtsgraves, The Politics of Identity: The Roots of Radicalization and Home-Grown Terrorism Amongst Second and Third Generation Immigrants in Europe, Ph.D Thesis, University of North Carolina, (2012), https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:65b0a5f0-3ba1-4a2e-ab4a-0f7ac37ecc41 (last visited on 13-05- 2019) 8
The above definitional problems were remedied by Bajpai and Kaushik46 when it was proposed that radicalization should be defined as ‘the process whereby an individual abandons societal standards and accepts the ideas, opinions and values that seek to challenge the existent societal norms and replace them with norms that would ordinarily be deemed unacceptable in a society that seeks to promulgate rational thoughts, humanity and scientific temperament.’ Through the above definition, the authors addressed the problem of the focus on violence by widening the scope to include the flouting of acceptable societal standards, rationality and scientific temperament. The focal point of the definition, therefore, becomes the process by which an individual becomes radicalized. The same also brings those individuals who are not yet radicalized enough to engage in violence but are going through the process of radicalization into the ambit of any attempts to defeat radicalization. Another important benefit of the definition is that it adheres to the ideals and standards set by the Indian constitution thereby ensuring that the definition caters to the Indian context.47
2.2. THE PROGRESSION OF RADICALIZATION Once the term has been defined as a process, it becomes easier for academics and researchers to systematically study and categorize the stages of progression in radical thought. The discourse however, has been dominated heavily by the western academia and is primarily focussed on either home-grown extremism and terrorism or religious terrorism emanating from the Middle-East and Africa. Studies in the South Asian context too focus on terrorism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and South East Asia while only cursory attempts have been made to systemically study the threat of radicalization in India. Nevertheless, the existing literature does provide a starting point for such a study in understanding the what, where, how, who and why of radicalization.
Fathali M. Moghaddam48 paints the image of a multi-storeyed building with a narrowing staircase. At the ground floor, where most of the practising Muslims reside, perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation dominate the process. One may climb up to the first floor of the building by seeking ways to improve their situation and secure justice. Where the possibility of individual mobility is lacking, the individual climbs further to the second
46 G. S. Bajpai, Ankit Kaushik, Thwarting Radicalization in India: Lacunae in Policy Initiatives, Journal of National Law University Delhi, Vol. 4, 2016-17, p. 4 47 Clause (h) of Article 51A, Constitution of India, 1950 casts a Fundamental Duty on every citizen to develop scientific temper, humanism and a spirit of inquiry and reform. 48 Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration, America Psychologist, Vol. 60, No. 2, February – March, 2005, pp. 161-169 9 floor where they experience anger and frustration and are misguided by leaders to focus their energy on an enemy. Those who climb on to the third floor see terrorism as a justified and moral response. While this metaphor may satisfy to some extent the ‘why’ aspect of our enquiry, it fails to differentiate between radicalization and terrorism. Further, it also doesn’t explain ‘who’ the actors are.
Silber and Bhatt,49 systemize the process of radicalization into four stages. Firstly, at the ‘pre- radicalization’ stage, the individual becomes vulnerable to the radical message due to a variety of demographic, social and psychological factors. At the second stage of ‘self-identification,’ the individual begins to strongly identify himself with ‘Salafi Islam’ and moves away from his previous identity. The third stage is that of ‘indoctrination’ where the individual solidifies his belief in the ‘Jihadi-Salafi’ ideology and in the last stage of ‘Jihadization,’ the individual accepts his religious duty to participate in Jihad and self designates himself as a religious warrior. This progression is however problematic in that – firstly, the authors have limited their observations only to ‘Salafi Islam;’ secondly, they have based their observations on a handful of terrorist attacks in the west and thirdly, the progression fails to explain why the individual progresses from one stage to the next.
Tore Bjørgo,50 creates a typology of individuals who engage in militant extremism by categorizing them into three major groups – first are the ‘ideological activists’ who play a leading role; second are the ‘drifters and followers,’ for whom social acceptance is the primary value and third are the ‘socially frustrated youths’ who face real or perceived discrimination and unfair competition for scarce resources. Bjørgo however, warns against a strict classification for the purpose of identification of potential extremists and advocates that such categorization must only be done for the purpose of dis-engagement. However, if classifications of individuals can’t be made in a preventive context, the same may lead to entire communities being brought under the scanner (for e.g. the British PREVENT programme), which would in turn lead to further mistrust and breed further radicalization. In this context, Bjørgo doesn’t provide any alternatives.
In 2010, the European Commission under the European Union sponsored Project SAFIRE51 to ‘improve the fundamental understanding of the radicalization process and develop principles
49 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, New York: NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007 50 Tore Bjørgo, Dreams and Disillusionment: Engagement in and Disengagement from Militant Extremists Groups, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 55, Issue 4 (2011), pp. 277-285 51 Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators of and Responses to Radicalization 10 to improve interventions designed to prevent, halt and reverse the radicalization process.’52 The project found that the radicalization process is very diverse and always has multiple determinants and processes occurring simultaneously. It further posits that radicalization cannot be limited to any single type of individual and can happen to anyone under the right circumstances, life-experiences and support from influential others. With respect to the examination of the question as to why individuals progress from ‘non-violent radicalization’ to ‘violent radicalization and terrorism,’ it found three primary factors to be responsible – background factors (those factors in play before a person exhibits observable radicalized behaviour); proximate factors (those factors which influence the consideration of the individual to engage in violent extremism or terrorism) and immediate factors (those factors which influence the decision of the individual who is ready to commit acts of terror or violence).53
2.3. DE-RADICALIZATION The understanding of ‘radicalization’ is subject to much dispute and disagreement. By corollary, the understanding of ‘de-radicalization’ is bound to be quite debatable as well. There is, however, an emerging consensus among counter terrorism analysts that in order to defeat the threat posed by violent extremism and terrorism, there is a need to go beyond the use of intelligence and security approaches and take measures to prevent the radicalization of susceptible individuals and rehabilitation of those who have already embraced the radical ideology.54
While broadly discussing the various ways to achieve the abovementioned aims, the academic discourse on the subject uses different terms in differing contexts – disengagement; de- radicalization; counter radicalization; counter narratives; anti-radicalization and so on. These terms have been used interchangeably leading to a large degree of confusion. Fortunately, some studies have created distinctions between the abovementioned terms and have tried to remove the ambiguities surrounding their use.
52 European Commission, Objective – SAFIRE, Community Research and Development Information System, available at https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/94537_en.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 53 Marret, Feddes, Mann, Doosje and Young, An Overview of the SAFIRE Project: A Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators and Responses to Radicalization, Journal EXIT-Deutschland, August 2/2013, ISSN 2196- 8136, available at http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/viewFile/26/41, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 54 RABASA, PETTYJOHN, GHEZ AND BOUCEK, DERADICALIZING ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS, (2010), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1053.html (last visited on 13-05-2019) 11
Demant et. al.55 define de-radicalization as the process whereby the person becomes less radical in both behaviour and beliefs. For the authors therefore, de-radicalization includes disengagement. According to John Horgan56 however, the above two terms are two very different processes. Rabasa et. al.,57 dedicate an entire chapter of their monograph to distinguish between de-radicalization, counter radicalization and disengagement. They defined de-radicalization to mean the process of abandoning the extremist world view and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to effect social change. Disengagement, according to the authors, refers to bringing about the change in behaviour (refraining from violence) but not a change in the belief system. Further, they accept the UNCTITF definition58 of counter radicalization which defines it to be the policies and programs aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. There is no distinction however between counter radicalization and anti-radicalization, and both have been broadly grouped under the head of counter radicalization.
Clutterbuck59 elaborates on this distinction between counter radicalization and anti- radicalization in terms of the type of behaviour targeted, main aims of the programme, main objectives of the program and conditions under which the program must be implemented. The same be understood with the help of the following table:
Table 2.1: Clutterbucks’ Typology
Type of Type of Main aims of Main Conditions Program Behaviour the Program objectives of under which Required Targeted the Program program in implemented
De- -Insurgency -Rehabilitation -Cessation of -Post Surrender radicalization Violence -Terrorism -Post Detention -Reintegration -Post Conviction
55 Demant, Slootman, Buijs and Tillie, Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of the Process of De- radicalization, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, (2008), p. 13 56 John Horgan, De-radicalization or Dis-engagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counter Terrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2 No. 4 (February, 2008) pp. 3-8 57 Ibid 58 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes, New York: UN/CTITF, (September 2008), p. 5 59 Supra Note 43 (Lindsay Clutterbuck) 12
Counter -Transition to -Disengagement -Pre Conviction Radicalization Terrorism -Mitigation -Reintegration -Pre Detention -Violent Extremism -Rehabilitation -Active Radicalization Anti -Vulnerability -Detection -Pre- Radicalization to risk from -Prevention Radicalization radicalization -Deterrence and violent -Early extremism Radicalization
While the above model may differentiate between counter radicalization and anti- radicalization, a problem with the above-stated model is the overlap between de-radicalization and counter radicalization. The same is attributable to the lack of a definite point when the individual completes the process of radicalization and transitions to violent extremism or terrorism. Another problem in this particular model, is that objectives of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization remain more or less the same. Consequently, while such a distinction may be attractive in theory, however, it needs to be refined for a practical application.
Another term that is fast gaining popularity is - ‘counter narratives.’ Silverman et. al.,60 defined counter narratives to mean a message that offers a positive alternative to extremist propaganda, or alternatively aims to deconstruct or de-legitimize extremist narratives. By this definition, counter narratives can be considered to be a subset of anti-radicalization strategies.
2.4. PROCESS OF DE-RADICALIZATION According to Porges,61 there can be no universal formula for de-radicalization and any attempts must be highly tailored to the needs of the country, the individual and the environment into which the individual is released, post de-radicalization. Barring a few exceptions, most literature in the field proceeds with this assumption and tries to either formulate or assess the efficacy of a de-radicalization process within specific contexts only. For example, Rabasa et.
60 Silverman, Stewart, Amanullah and Birdwell, The Impact of Counter Narratives: Insights from a Year Long Cross Platform Pilot Study of Counter Narrative Curation, Targeting, Evaluation and Impact, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016 available at https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Impact-of-Counter- Narratives_ONLINE_1.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 61 Marisa L Porges, Reform School for Radicals, The National Interest, Vol. 6 No.6 (July 01, 2011), available at: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/07/01/reform-school-for-radicals/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 13 al.,62 have dedicated separate chapters in their monograph to address the processes of de- radicalization in the Middle East, Europe and South East Asia respectively.
Similarly, Amir, while describing the process of de-radicalization based on the desired approach and outcomes writes specifically in the context of the Swat Valley in Pakistan. The same can observed through the following table:63
Table 2.2 Amir’s De-Radicalization Strategy
Approach Focus Strategy Objective Security Detainees Rehabilitation Reducing security threats Societal Vulnerable Engagement Developing Communities moderate tendencies Ideological Clergy Highlighting Developing counter religion’s emphasis arguments/ on peace narratives Political Society at large Winning hearts and Neutralizing security minds threats
It is also important to question if the process of de-radicalization is a direct reversal of the process of radicalization. Demant et. al.64 believe that the same is indeed the case. However, Moghaddam65 contradicts the above through an example of ‘an individual who has been influenced by a separatist goal and a charismatic leader to become radicalized may become de - radicalized by a different set of factors, such as a changed political climate and a sharp drop in popular support for his group among the local population.’ Moghaddam further posits that the strategies required to thwart radicalization depend largely on the stage at which the individual has reached in the radicalization process.
62 Supra Note 54 (Rabasa et. al.) 63 Muhammed Amir Rana, Swat De-Radicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating Militants, Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 4 No. 2, (Apr-Jun 2011) p. 5, http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=209.pdf (last visited on 13-05-2019) 64 Supra Note 55 (Demant et. al.) 65 Supra Note 48 (Fathali M. Moghaddam) 14
According to Horgan and Braddock,66 another problem with de-radicalization programmes is that there is no consensus as to what constitutes success. According to them, it is practically impossible to ascertain what is implied by, and expected from such programs, because no such programs have formally identified valid and reliable indicators of successful deradicalization in terms of culture, psychology etc.
However, as Kruglanski et. al.67 have demonstrated, the efficacy of de-radicalization programs is indeed verifiable. In one of the first instances of primary research on de-radicalization using quantifiable and systematic methods, they studied the efficacy of the de-radicalization programs in the context of LTTE in Sri Lanka. They used two variables of embeddedness of the individual within the organization and the degree of their support for armed struggle. It was observed that the support of armed struggle within the detainees fell at a greater rate amongst those who were a part of the de-radicalization program than the control group. The same happened both over time and in terms of attitude.
From the above, it can be summarized that while the literature on de-radicalization and its associated strategies is fast gaining ground in terms of being deemed as the ‘best’ method to find a permanent solution to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, the discourse is still only in its preliminary stages. Further, minimal attention has been paid to the processes of radicalization and de-radicalization in the Indian context. This dearth of literature has left policy makers and law enforcement agencies without any defined parameters or direction which is a sine-qua-non for any comprehensive policy in this regard. Indeed, Bajpai and Kaushik,68 have pointed the same out while assessing the policy initiatives which guide administrative actions in the Indians context.
66 Horgan and Braddock, Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, (2010), pp. 267-291 67 Kruglanski, Gelfand, Belanger, Gunaratna and Hettiarachchi, De-radicalizing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Some Preliminary Findings, Chapter 13 in ANDREW SILKE (ED.), PRISONS, TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM: CRITICAL ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT, RADICALIZATION AND REFORM, (2014), pp. 183-196 68 Supra Note 46 (Bajpai et. al.) 15
CHAPTER 3
RADICALIZATION IN INDIA
It becomes clear from the literature pertaining to radicalization as reviewed in the previous chapter, that even though significant advances have been made in the global discourse on the topic, it is far less than what is desirable, both quantitatively and qualitatively, if one seeks to come up with a comprehensive policy aimed at combatting and preventing radicalization itself. Furthermore, given the absence of any international consensus through conventions on the issue, the UN has left the same to subjective devices and contextual understanding of the member States.69 It has been posited by the UN, however, that such devices and understanding must be in consonance with the international obligations of the members States, particularly the international instruments on human rights.70 India, being at the forefront of all attempts at forging such a consensus, must lead by example. Unfortunately, it lags far behind the global developments.
There is much to be learned about firstly, how radicalization should be legally defined for statutory and executive purposes; secondly, what the various dimensions of radicalization are; thirdly, what is the aim and scope of such radicalization; fourthly, what are the causes and drivers of such radicalization; fifthly, what the process of such radicalization itself is; sixthly, identifying the radicalizers; seventhly, who are more likely to be radicalized and finally, but not least – how to thwart it. These questions must be analysed in and their solution must be tailored to the context of the Indian geo-political, socio- economic and societal circumstances.
In this chapter, the researcher hopes to answer some of the queries raised in the preceding paragraph. For this exercise, the researcher has identified four sources of radicalization to be studied, namely – 1) Islamic Extremism; 2) Cross Border Terrorism in J&K; 3) Majoritarian radicalism and 4) Left Wing extremism. This chapter examines the abovementioned sources of radicalization which pose a threat to the Indian democracy from the perspectives of national security, society, economy and polity. The chapter is structured around the extent of influence of such radicalization; causes of such radicalization; actors of such radicalization and finally, the manner of propagation of the radical ideology.
69 Supra Note 11 (Report of Secretary General) 70 Ibid 16
3.1. ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
3.1.1. NATURE AND EXTENT:
India shares a 3,323 and 4,096.7 kilometres long border with Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively,71 both of which are Muslim majority states. Moreover, significant portions of the population in other neighbouring countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives too, profess Islam. Overall, almost one third (31.1 percent) of all people who profess Islam reside in South Asia.72
India’s geographical location makes it particularly vulnerable to the aggressions of Islamic Extremism. In fact, it has been bearing the brunt of terrorism emanating from such extremism since much before 9/11 attacks which caught the attention of the world.73 The nature of such extremism has been changing and evolving rapidly in the past three decades, and as such may be divided into three phases.
In the first phase, terrorist attacks were carried out mainly in retaliation to disruption of communal harmony by religious politicking. In 1993, thirteen bombs exploded in Mumbai resulting in 257 deaths and over 700 injured.74 The explosions were masterminded by Dawood Ibrahim and Yaqub Memon in retaliation for the destruction of Babri Masjid by majoritarian fundamentalists and the loss of Muslim lives in the riots that ensued.
Post 9/11, in the second phase, India witnessed a surge of terrorist activities committed by homegrown terrorist organizations such as SIMI and IM. To illustrate, in 2006, more than 216 persons were killed and more than 700 were injured when pressure cooker bombs went off in seven crowded local trains in Mumbai. The responsibility for the same was later claimed by the IM.75 Throughout the year 2008, IM orchestrated a string of attacks throughout the length and breadth of the territory of India including urban centres such as Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Surat and New Delhi. This phase can be differentiated from the first phase in that,
71 Ministry of Home Affairs, Introduction: International Land Borders, mha.gov.in, https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BMIntro-1011.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 72 Pew Research Centre, Demographic Study – The Future of Global Muslim Population – Region: Asia-Pacific, pewforum.org, (January 27 2012), https://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim- population-regional-asia/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 73 Adil Rasheed, Jihadist Radicalization in India: Internal Challenges, External Threats, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 12 No. 2, 2018 74 The 1993 Mumbai Blasts: What Exactly Happened on March 12th That Year, news18.com, (June 16, 2017), https://www.news18.com/news/india/the-1993-mumbai-blasts-what-exactly-happened-on-march-12-that-year- 598045.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 75 Mateen Hafeez, IM Man’s Confession Puts ATS in a Tough Spot, Times of India, (February 28, 2009), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/IM-mans-confession-puts-ATS-in-a- spot/articleshow/4201005.cms?referral=PM, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 17
SIMI and IM were home grown organizations whose members weren’t retaliating against any immediate proximate cause, but were acting due to perceived injustices against Muslims throughout the country.
Since the inception of ISIS however, the nature of the threat has changed drastically. As the arrest of Mohammed Sirajuddin detailed above in the introduction goes on to show, radicalization through the internet which is based on ISIS propaganda is gaining traction and finding support amongst the local Muslim population in India. In December 2018, NIA arrested ten individuals from Delhi and Uttar Pradesh belonging to Harkat-ul-Harb-e-Islam, a module inspired by the ISIS76 before they could carry out bombings and fiyadeen (suicide) attacks in Delhi. These arrests illustrate how the propagation of the ISIS ideology in the Indian subcontinent has the potential to culminate into violent extremism and terrorism. To illustrate a definite act of violence, four men from Madhya Pradesh were arrested and charged by the NIA in August 2017, for exploding a low intensity bomb onboard a train from Ujjain to Bhopal.77 The men had reportedly taken the Oath of Allegiance to ISIS and had earlier attempted to travel to Syria.78
One news report from 2016 puts the number of people under surveillance for being influenced by the ISIS ideology at 350.79 Another source claims that till 31st December 2017, a total of 261 ISIS sympathizers were present in the country of which 60 were under detention and 88 have travelled abroad to join the fight in Syria.80 This number may seem trivial in proportion to the Muslim population in India which is pegged at 172 million.81 However, given the manner of operation of ISIS, and especially the trend of Lone Wolf terrorism witnessed by Europe, the threat posed by such trivial number too has the potential of assuming gargantuan proportions.
This may be referred to as the third phase of Islamic Extremism in the country. It differs from the first two phases in that the influencing ideology comes from abroad and is facilitated by the
76 ET Bureau, NIA Busts ISIS Inspired Module, Arrests 10 People from UP and Delhi, Economic Times, (December 27, 2018), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/nia-searches-16-places-in-delhi-up- over-new-is-module/articleshow/67252785.cms?from=mdr, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 77 Press Trust of India, Bhopal – Ujjain Train Blast: NIA Chargesheets Four Men Linked to ISIS, Hindutan Times, (August 08, 2017), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bhopal-ujjain-train-blast-nia-chargesheets-four- men-linked-to-isis/story-RJLCpytEw5URGB8DnJl0TJ.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 78 Ibid 79 Tufail Ahmed, The Radicalization Series: Analyzing the Threat to Muslim Youths in India, First Post, (August 25, 2016) http://www.firstpost.com/india/the-radicalisation-series-analysing-the-threat-to-muslim-youths-in- india-2969838.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 80 SATP, Islamic State in India (updated till 31st December, 2017), 2018, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/ISIindia.htm, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 81 Religion census 2011, https://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 18 increased internet and social media usage. Secondly, whereas the first two phases concentrated on the perceived injustices against Muslims in India, this third phase expands the geo-political scope of the perceived injustices i.e. it invokes the imagery of the persecution of Muslims across the globe to mobilize local extremism. This section of the chapter will analyse this third phase.
3.1.2. CAUSES:
At the outset, it is pertinent to state that a majority of Muslims in India have, by and large, rejected the extremist mutations of Islam. Several reasons have been posited for this rejection. The first check, as Hussain Haqqani notes, is that the nature of democracy in India has prevented the spread of radical and extremist ideologies, since it gives the conservative and orthodox sections of the community a voice through political power.82
Another reason could be the nature of Indian secularism. Traditionally, secularism has been seen as a strict separation between the Church and the State. As a product of the Treaty of Westphalia, this is indeed the Western model of secularism. Countries such as France expressly reject any visibility of markers of religious identity in public life. However, this understanding of secularism is often wrongly attributed to India as well. Rajeev Bhargava posits in this context that the Indian version of secularism does not seek to separate the Church from the State, but seeks to maintain a ‘principled distance.’83 This requires the State to evaluate and balance the claims of the individuals, vis-à-vis the community, without banishing religions to private spheres of human lives.84 To a great degree, this nature of secularism allows the State to assuage the apprehensions any particular community might have.
A third reason for such resilience of Indian Muslims is that their decision to stay in India post partition in 1947 is seen as their commitment to the Indian national cause.85 Furthermore, the fact that predominantly Muslim countries which neighbour India such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Maldives have failed to establish themselves as prosperous and developing countries does not incentivize such radicalization either.86
82 Hussain Haqqani, India’s Islamist Groups, Hudson Institute, (February 16, 2006), http://www.hudson.org/research/9803-india-s-islamist-groups, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 83 Rajeev Bhargava, The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism, in T. N. SRINIVASAN (ED.), THE FUTURE OF SECULARISM, (2006) 84 Ibid 85 Supra Note 73 (Adil Rasheed)
86 Ibid 19
However, there is an inherent pitfall in looking at the problem from the perspective of ‘why are the majority of Indian Muslims immune to radicalization?’ A difficulty with respect to an underlying assumption of this question, is that all Muslims are prone to radicalization and extremism, given the requisite conditions.87 This generalization cannot be said to be the case. The need is therefore to find an answer to the query – ‘why do some Muslims in India get radicalized?’
It is often a culmination of factors, all acting concurrently, that leads to radicalization of an individual. This subsection covers three causal factors of socio-economic conditions, identity crisis and majoritarian nationalism as factors conducive to radicalization. However, there is another important causal factor of ideology, which is co-related to the actors of radicalization and has been covered in sub-section 3.1.3.
3.1.2.a. Socio-Economic Conditions
As identified by the Report of the UN Secretary General, one of the primary factors affecting radicalization are the socio-economic conditions. “Citizens may consider weak development outcomes as confirmation of the lack of a government’s legitimacy,” the report states “making state institutions less effective in responding to violent extremism when it arises.”88 As per the Human Development Report of the UNDP, in 2018, India ranked 130 out of 189 countries with a Human Development Index score of 0.64 – far lower than the world average of 0.72.89
The Sachar Committee Report highlighted the inequalities in the development of India’s largest minority community vis-à-vis other communities.90 It noted that Muslims were worse off than other groups in terms of – child undernourishment; literacy and education; worker population ratio and employment opportunities as well as access to social and physical infrastructure in terms of housing, medical infrastructure etc.91 The Misra Commission Report too found that as
87 Manu Joseph, India’s Devout Muslims Show Our Assumptions are Wrong, Live Mint, (March 4, 2019), https://www.livemint.com/opinion/columns/opinion-india-s-devout-muslims-show-our-assumptions-are-wrong- 1551633417208.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 88 Report of the UN Secretary General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 (December 24, 2015), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 89 Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update, Briefing Note on for Countries on the 2018 Statistical Update: India, United Nations, Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/IND.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 90 Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Social, Economic and Educational Status of Muslims in India: A Report, (November 2006), http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/sachar_comm.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 91 Ibid 20 compared to 7.01 percent of Hindus, only 3.6 percent of the Muslims graduated from college.92 It was also observed that Muslims fared much worse than other minorities in terms of house ownership and in the quality of the accommodation.93
These findings were corroborated by the Kundu committee report94 which observed that more Muslims were gravitating towards self-employment due to the lack of other wage labour employment opportunities.95 The percentage of children who did not attend school or participate in the work force amongst the Muslims was also found to be high.96 In terms of consumption expenditure in urban areas, Muslims came out at the bottom with a high degree of inequality between Muslims and Non-Muslims being observable.97 It was also found that the average home area for Muslims was 387 sq. ft. as compared to the national average of 422 sq. ft. and Hindu average of 419 sq. ft.98
It can be deduced from the above that even as India as a whole doesn’t perform well in terms of socio economic indicators, inequality and disparity is further exacerbated in terms of Muslims vis-à-vis other communities. This inequality has the potential to translate into radicalization and violent extremism against the State. As the Report of the Secretary General succinctly states: “Countries that fail… to improve equality… in line with their human rights obligations, are more prone to violent extremism and tend to witness a greater number of incidents linked to violent extremism.”99
3.1.2.b Identity Crisis
Closely linked to the socio-economic disparities noted above, is the problem of identity crisis. In the context of second and third generation immigrants in Europe, many scholarly writings have emerged to indicate that the identity crisis amongst these immigrants often leads directly to radicalization and violent extremism.100 However, the manner in which an identity crisis acts as a condition conducive to radicalization in India is vastly different from how it operates in Europe.
92 Ministry of Minority Affairs, Report of the National Commission for Religious and Minority Rights, (May 2007), http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/volume-1.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 93 Ibid 94 Ministry of Minority Affairs, Post Sachar Evaluation Committee, (2014), http://iosworld.org/download/Post_Sachar_Evaluation_Committee.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 95 Ibid 96 Ibid 97 Ibid 98 Ibid 99 Supra Note 88 (Report of UN Secretary General) 100 Supra Note 45 (Lindsey Holtsgraves) 21
The Sachar Committee report notes how Muslims are often branded as ‘Anti Nationals.’101 Quite often, in cases of similar offences, the special laws relating to terrorism, such as TADA, POTA and the UAPA are invoked only against the Muslims, whereas the provisions of the IPC are used for their Hindu counterparts.102 The Sachar committee also recognizes that:
“Markers of Muslim Identity — the burqa, the purdah, the beard and the topi — while adding to the distinctiveness of Indian Muslims have been a cause of concern for them in the public realm. These markers have very often been a target for ridiculing the community as well as of looking upon them with suspicion. Muslim men donning a beard and a topi are often picked up for interrogation from public spaces like parks, railway stations and markets. Some women who interacted with the Committee informed how in the corporate offices hijab wearing Muslim women were finding it increasingly difficult to find jobs.”
This discrimination, perceived or actual, creates an identity crisis, since the disparity in their treatment is closely linked to their identity as Muslims. The above creates conditions favourable for the radical ideology to take root.
3.1.2.c. Majoritarian Nationalism
An aggravating factor for the identity crisis mentioned above is the rising trend of Hindu nationalism in the country which causes the Muslims feel further marginalized.103 It is not helpful that often, the State itself is perceived to be inactive in matters pertaining to atrocities committed by the Majority upon the Minority.104
In this context, it is relevant to take note of the UN Secretary General’s reports which warns against this form of majoritarian discrimination in the following words:105
“Diversity in and of itself does not lead to or increase a country’s vulnerability to violent extremism. However, when a country experiences insecurities such as scarce resources, and when one group, whatever its demographic weight, acts monopolistically in political and economic sectors at the expense of other groups, the
101 Supra Note 90 (Prime Minister’s High Level Committee) 102 Julia Eckert, Theories of Militancy in Practise: Explanations of Muslim Terrorism in India, Social Science History, Vol. 36 No. 3 (Fall 2012), p. 330, see also Discrimination in Conduct of Justice, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 45 No. 31 (July 31-Aug 6, 2010) p.7 103 Christrophe Jaffrelot, The Sense of a Community, Outlook, 23-07-2012, http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-sense-of-a-community/281642, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 104 Irfan Ahmad, The Secular State and the Geography of Radicalism, Economic & Political Weekly. Vol 44 No. 23, (Jun. 6-12, 2009) p. 36 105 Supra Note 88 (Report of the UN Secretary General) 22
potential for intercommunal tensions… increases... This, in turn, may incite those who feel disenfranchised to embrace violent extremism as a vehicle for advancing their goals.”
3.1.3. ACTORS
The question nevertheless remains as to what the radicalizing ideology is and who its ideologues are. At the same time, it is rather important to place these ideologies and actors in a historical and geo-political context for a comprehensive perspective to emerge. The insecurities of the minority community cannot be attributed merely to the actions and inactions of the modern Indian State. The roots of these insecurities go back to the establishment of the British colonial state, the rise of which is inversely proportional to the importance of Muslims in the Indian political scenario. The Deobandi School of Islam was established in India in 1886, to counteract this expansion of the British Colonial State.106 It identified two threats to Islam in that era – firstly, the influence of Christian Missionaries upon the Indian population, and secondly, the decline of Muslim influence due to the English educational system which deprived the Muslims of job opportunities.107 Another reason forwarded was that Islam in India took on a syncretic form which corrupted their religion by imbibing an assortment of habits from Hinduism.108
A second school of thought – JeI (Hind), is widely thought to be the fountainhead of organizations such as SIMI and IM.109 This school was founded in 1941 under the tutelage of Abu Ala Mawdudi, who is said to have theorized the establishment of an Islamic State in a modern sense110 prior to the partition of India. In many ways, the role of the JeI has been
106 Evidence of this may be found in the introduction on the website of the school wherein it is stated:
The time when the Darul Uloom Deoband, was established, the old Madaris in India had almost become extinct, and the condition of two or four that had survived the ravages of time was not better than that of a few glow-worms in a dark night. Apparently it so looked at that time as if the Islamic sciences had packed up their kit from India. Under these circumstances, some men of Allah and divine doctors, through their inner light, sensed the imminent danger.
Darul Uloom Deoband, A Brief Introduction, http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/english/, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 107 Darul Uloom Deoband, Efforts for Preservation of Religion, http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/english/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 108 Supra Note 82 (Hussain Haqqani) 109 Anshuman Behera, The Student Islamic Movement of India: The Story So Far, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 1-7, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 213-228, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_7_1_AnshumanBehera.pdf, accessed on 12-05-2019 110 Supra Note 82 (Hussain Haqqani) 23 considered similar to the role of the RSS, with the former patterning it’s activities on the lines of the latter.111
At the same time, it is pertinent to mention here, that even though both these schools have influenced radical ideology, they have overtly encouraged adherence to the democratic ideals of the modern Indian State.112 To illustrate, in April 2019, Syed Sadatullah Hussaini, the newly elected president of JeI (Hind), made a call to the youth for strengthening their relations with other communities and becoming assets for the nation and not a liability.113
Post partition, the JeI split into three factions – Pakistan, Hind and J&K. Whereas, the Hind faction has taken a somewhat moderate line, finding a place within India’s democratic setup, the Pakistani and J&K factions have acted as force multipliers of radicalization and have been dealt with in the next segment on Cross Border terrorism.114 Nevertheless, the nature of religious instruction imparted in the seminaries run by these schools is definitely a cause for concern.115
A third ideological threat in the context of Islamic extremism, comes from the Salafist- Wahhabi school of thought which has become a dominant influence in the Middle Eastern countries. ISIS is perhaps a more extreme version of this school of thought. 116 In the era of globalization, it is not uncommon for ideologies to spread at lightning speeds facilitated by the exponentially faster medium of communication. Wahhabism has reached Indian shores as well.117
111 Farzand Ahmed, No Less than Establishment of Islamic Order: Jamaat – e – Islami Hind, India Today, (May 15, 1980), https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/special-report/story/19800515-no-less-than-establishment-of- islamic-order-jamaat-e-islami-hind-806687-2014-01-30, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 112 Ibid 113 Community News, Newly Elected Jamaat – e – Islami Chief Wants Muslim Youth to Become Assets for the Nation, The Milli Gazette Online, (April 09, 2019), http://www.milligazette.com/news/16642-newly-elected- jamaat-e-islami-hind-chief-wants-muslim-youth-to-become-assets-for-the-nation, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 114 Ajai Sahni, Vulnerabilities and Resistance to Islamist Radicalization in India, Middle East Institute, (2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/map/vulnerabilities-and-resistance-islamist-radicalization-india, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 115 Supra Note 73 (Adil Rasheed) 116 Mohammed Al-Jarman, The Intersection of Wahhabism and Jihad, Global Policy Opinion, (July 06, 2017), https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/06/07/2017/intersection-wahhabism-and-jihad, (last visited on 13-05- 2019) 117 Sushant Pathak, Jamshed Adil Khan, Exposed: Kerala’s Madrasas Teaching Wahhabism, Saudi Sponsored Creed Linked to Terror, India Today, (January 10, 2018), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/kerala- wahhabism-madrasas-isis-saudi-arabia-1131272-2018-01-10, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 24
Apart from seminaries and certain ideologues funded from the Middle East,118 individuals propagating such ideology form the backbone of the global operations of ISIS. Indeed, the ISIS leadership think of their media work as equivalent to the physical manifestation of jihad on the battlefield.119 Recruitment of others to the fold of the ISIS, is given the status of a religious duty120 and consequently, several media operatives scour social media looking for persons to radicalize and recruit.
3.1.4. MANNER OF PROPAGATION
ISIS has an elaborate media division churning out radical content to propagate its ideology. The propaganda is structured so as to “glamourize its fighters, preachers and leaders as role models, warriors and defenders of Islam.”121The propaganda material is tailored to the particular circumstances of the State in which the material is to be disseminated.122 The material includes videos which glorify the content ranging from battlefield combat to funeral of martyrs which are edited to include music with original content.123
This propaganda material was earlier circulated on social media platforms including Facebook and Twitter. Both of these platforms are today embroiled in a cat and mouse game to take down the material, amongst other things, as soon as it is detected. However, much of the propaganda material is available on the Dark Web, the links to which are disseminated through decentralized instant communication platforms with end-to-end encryption technology such as Telegram.
At this juncture, it is also pertinent to note the process of ISIS related radicalization in India since it is closely related to the manner of propagation of the ISIS ideology. As per the conversations held with senior police officials of the Maharashtra ATS in the course of the
118 Indo-Asian News Service, Zakir Naik’s Fortunes and Loss of Saudi Clout, Business Standard, (August 05,2016), https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/zakir-naik-s-fortunes-and-loss-of-saudi-clout- comment-special-to-ians-116080501555_1.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 119 Charlie Winter, Media Jihad: Islamic State’s Doctrine of Information War, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2017, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report- Media-Jihad-The-Islamic-State%E2%80%99s-Doctrine-for-Information-Warfare.pdf, (last visited on 13-05- 2019) 120 Ibid 121 Nico Prucha, IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious Identity Through Telegram, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. X issue 6, (2016), https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/governance-and-global-affairs/isga/perspectives-on- terrorism/2016-6.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 122 Craig Whiteside, Lighting the Path: The Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-2016), International Centre for Counter Terrorism -The Hague, (November 2016), https://icct.nl/wp- content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media- Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 123 Ibid 25 research, a lucid pattern of radicalization emerges. The first point of contact of a person with the ISIS ideology, comes not from the internet, but from the mainstream media which regularly depicts news pertaining to ISIS. The curiosity pertaining to these developments, leads the person to social media platforms where the comments and questions of the person are flagged by the recruiter.
The recruiter approaches the person only after they are sufficiently satisfied that the person’s mind-set can be altered as per the ISIS ideology, in the medium to long term. The recruiters answer the queries of the person – often in radical tones. The person is also introduced to various perspectives all of which culminate into a narrative of a global persecution of Muslims.
The person is also brought into contact with others who have a better knowledge of the particularities of the geo-political and socio-economic conditions, of the nation to which the person belongs. Gradually, the person is exposed to radicalizing ideology till he asks the question – ‘what can I do to help?’ The recruiters then ask the person to travel to the Caliphate and fight for ISIS and if that is not possible, they are asked to represent ISIS and fulfil their religious duty within their own nation.
3.2. CROSS BORDER TERRORISM IN J&K
3.2.1. NATURE AND EXTENT
This form of radicalization is closely linked to Islamic extremism detailed above, but differs widely in its aims which are overtly political in nature; with the religious ideology being an undertone. Post the partition of India into two countries, the erstwhile princely States were granted the opportunity to join either of the two unions. Most princely States decided to join the country which bordered them. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, however, was faced with a dilemma; Kashmir bordered both India and Pakistan. He was reluctant to join India because of his wariness of the Congress’s closeness with Sheikh Abdullah and did not want to join Pakistan because it was a Muslim state.
The conundrum was multiplied several fold by the fact that the demographics of J&K were predominantly Muslim – but the Shia and Ismaili sects of Islam were numerically superior in contradistinction to the Sunni dominance in Pakistan.124 Given the circumstances, Hari Singh chose to remain independent. In October 1947, however, Kashmir was invaded by tribals from
124 RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER GANDHI, (2008), p. 60. 26 the North West Frontier Provinces in Pakistan.125 This aggression forced Hari Singh to sign the Instrument of Accession with India. The Indian Army were sent in and the invaders were pushed back to what is known today as the Line of Control.
The location of Kashmir attributes to it a strategic importance that is far greater than its demographics can claim.126 It is hardly surprising then, that the vale of Kashmir has been a permanent bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Including the conflict mentioned above, India and Pakistan have fought four wars since their independence.
Given the disparity between the military forces of the two nations,127 however, Pakistan has adapted its strategy towards India, to one largely based upon an asymmetrical war aimed at giving India a ‘death by a thousand cuts.’128 In the late 1980s, Pakistan began to support insurgent groups such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) at a time when the valley was experiencing anti-Indian sentiments due to perceived unfairness in electoral politics of the state.129 The JKLF recruits were trained and equipped across the border in Pakistan and were sent back to Kashmir to engage the Indian security forces stationed in Kashmir.130 However, there was a divergence between the goals of the Pakistani State and that of the JKLF with the latter being equally opposed to Pakistani rule in Kashmir as it was to the presence of the Indian State.131
Therefore, over the next two decades, Pakistan diversified it’s support to include other terrorist organizations such as the HM, Harkat Ul Ansar (which later became HuM), LeT and JeM. This change was significant because these organizations were ‘rabidly’ Islamist132 as opposed to the JKLF which had overtly political goals.
In terms of their operational area, while a bulk of their activities are targeted towards Kashmir, these organizations haven’t shirked away from committing acts of terrorism in other parts of India. To exemplify, the grotesque 26/11 Mumbai attack in which more than 165 persons were
125 Ibid at p. 64 126 Ibid at p. 60 127 With India securing a Global Firepower Rank of 4 as compared to 17th rank secured by Pakistan according to the Global Firepower Index. Available at https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison- detail.asp?form=form&country1=india&country2=pakistan&Submit=COMPARE, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 128 Kriti M. Shah, Pakistan’s Use of Terror as a Tool, in Harsh V. Pant and Maya Mirchandani (ed.), 26/11: A Decade After, Observer Research Foundation Special Report, (December, 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/12/ORF_Special_Report_77.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 129 JOHN R. SCHMIDT, THE UNRAVELLING: PAKISTAN IN THE AGE OF JIHAD, (2012), pp 80-82 130 Ibid 131 Ibid 132 Supra Note 73 (Adil Rasheed) 27 killed was masterminded by the LeT133 with the terrorists being Pakistani nationals who received arms and training in Pakistan itself. Similarly, the audacious attacks on the Parliament of India in 2001 were orchestrated by the JeM.
As per the SATP, as many as 14,895 civilians, 6,511 security personnel and 23,696 terrorists have lost their lives to terrorist related violence between 1988 to the present.134 While the total of number of fatalities had gone down from 3,022 deaths in 2002 to 117 deaths in 2012, the figures show a rising trend again with 267 deaths in 2016, 358 deaths in 2017, 451 deaths in 2018 and with 148 deaths already till May 2019.135
3.2.2. CAUSES
Whereas it may be surmised from the preceding subsection, that a majority of the infrastructure required for the organizations to operate is provided for by Pakistan, the fact remains that none of the ‘successes’ of these organizations would be possible without the favourable sentiments of some sections of the local population. The causes which lead to such radicalization in terms of the conditions conducive to it, therefore must be examined.
In July 2016, the security forces successfully killed Burhan Wani, a commander of the HM in an encounter. Wani was an extremely popular 21-year-old local from Tral who had become the poster boy of militancy in Kashmir.136 To the surprise of the State administration, sporadic protests erupted against the killing in various parts of the state which soon culminated into widespread stone pelting against the security forces. The forces clamped down upon the protesting crowds. In the ensuing violence, 82 people137 were killed and over 11000 persons were injured.138
133 Harsh V. Pant and Maya Mirchandani (ed.), 26/11: A Decade After, Observer Research Foundation Special Report, (December 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ORF_Special_Report_77.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 134 Fatalities in Terrorist Violence: 1988-2019, South Asian Terrorism Portal, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 135 Ibid 136 Press Trust of India, Hizbul Mujahideen Terrorist Burhan Wani Killed in J&K Encounter, Economic Times, (July 13, 2016), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/hizbul-mujahideen-terrorist-burhan-wani- killed-in-jk-encounter/articleshow/53126071.cms, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 137 Indian Express, Kashmir Unrest: Girl Succumbs to Injuries, Death Toll rises to 82, Indian Express, (September 19, 2016), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/kashmir-valley-unrest-death-toll-3039260/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 138 Pakistan Formenting Trouble, But Modi will Solve Kashmir Issue: Mehbooba Mufti, Times of India, (August 27, 2016), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-fomenting-trouble-but-Modi-will-solve-Kashmir- issue-Mehbooba-Mufti/articleshow/53886822.cms, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 28
This episode is perhaps the best illustration of the sentiments of the local populace against the continued and overwhelming presence of the Indian armed forces in the state. In fact, crowd management is as important a task of the security forces as the operations themselves. Often, entire villages are cordoned off before an encounter to prevent protestors from interfering with the operation.
As the frequency of attacks and the presence of the terrorist groups in the state increased, so did the presence of the armed forces in the state.139 Military bunkers, checkpoints, encampments, barbed wire etc. became symbols of the Indian State in Kashmir.140 The army’s response to being attacked by terrorists consisted of ‘rousting nearby villages and neighbourhoods,’ often whisking away suspected collaborators and sympathizers for ‘interrogation.’141 To exemplify, in March 2002, after a terrorist attack which led to the death of two soldiers, the residents of Tawheed Gunj locality in Baramullah were gathered by the army and beaten up.142 Almost a hundred locals were injured and required hospitalization.143 This strategy has fostered a sense of distrust amongst the Kashmiri population towards the armed forces.
A report of the Human Rights Watch titled ‘Everyone Lives in Fear’ documents the extra judicial killings and the human rights violations by the security forces in Kashmir in great detail. “Suspicion and fear continue to permeate the Kashmir valley,” the report states “A knock on the door late at night sends spasms of anxiety through households, afraid that a family member will be asked by the security forces or militants to step outside for "a minute" and then never return..”144
The trust deficit amongst the Kashmiris has also translated into a democratic deficit in the state. For the past year, the State was under Governor’s rule at first and has since been under President’s Rule.145 In Shopian and Pulwama districts, only 2.81 percent of voters turned up to vote for the General Elections to the Parliament of India, 2019 while Srinagar saw a voter
139 Supra Note 129 at p. 84 (John R. Schmidt) 140 Ibid 141 Ibid at p. 85 142 Shujaat Bhukhari, Farooq ‘Upset’ with Army Over Baramullah Incident, The Hindu, (April 06, 2002), https://www.thehindu.com/2002/04/06/stories/2002040602201100.htm, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 143 Ibid 144 Human Rights Watch, Everyone Lives in Fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir, hrw.org, (September 11, 2006), https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/09/11/everyone-lives-fear/patterns-impunity-jammu- and-kashmir, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 145 India Today Web Desk, President’s Rule Imposed in Jammu and Kashmir After 22 Years, India Today, (December 19, 2018), https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/president-rule-jammu- kashmir-22-years-6-months-governor-rule-1412710-2018-12-19, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 29 turnout of 14 percent.146 The same figures for Anantnag and Kulgam stood at 13.63 percent and 10.3 percent respectively.
The State’s high handedness as well as the democratic deficit provide fertile grounds to recruiters and radicalizers. As the Report of the UN Secretary General notes:147
“Violent extremism tends to thrive in an environment characterized by poor governance, democracy deficits, corruption and a culture of impunity for unlawful behaviour engaged in by the State or its agents. When poor governance is combined with repressive policies and practices which violate human rights and the rule of law, the potency of the lure of violent extremism tends to be heightened. Violations of international human rights law committed in the name of state security can facilitate
violent extremism by marginalizing individuals and alienating key constituencies, thus generating community support and sympathy for and complicity in the actions of violent extremists. Violent extremists also actively seek to exploit state repression and other grievances in their fight against the state. Thus, Governments that exhibit repressive and heavy-handed security responses in violation of human rights and the rule of law, such as profiling of certain populations, adoption of intrusive surveillance techniques and prolongation of declared states of emergency, tend to generate more violent extremists.”
The fact that Pakistan and India have been at loggerheads with each other over Kashmir for over seven decades since independence, acts as a further cause for radicalization. The prolonged conflict has given the extremists and separatists the opportunity to use the grievances of the local population for their own gains148 by fostering sentiments against the Indian state.
3.2.3. ACTORS
Burhan Wani personified a new wave of militants in the valley in many ways.149 He joined militancy at the age of 15 after he witnessed his brother being beaten up mercilessly by the
146 Hakeem Irfan Rashid, Dismal Voter Turnout Continues in Kashmir with 2.81% in Anantnag; 63 percent in Ladakh, Economic Times, (May 07, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/lok- sabha/india/dismal-voter-turnout-continues-in-kashmir-with-2-81-in-anantnag-63-in- ladakh/articleshow/69209921.cms, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 147 Supra Note 88 (Report of the UN Secretary General) 148 Ibid 149 Gautam Navalakha, Kashmir: When Ignorance Begets Tragedy and Farce, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 51 No.2, (August 06, 2016) 30 army for being a suspected recruiter.150 He was killed in an encounter in 2016 aged 21 years. His death has been termed as a ‘watershed moment’ by the former National Security Adviser – M. K. Narayanan.151
Similarly, Naseer Ahmad Pandit, was a constable in the J&K Police with a stable and secure job who found out that the police itself was hand in glove with drug traffickers.152 This, coupled with the mistrust of the State, pushed him towards militancy. In 2015, he disappeared with his service rifle and his whereabouts became known only after the HM issued a statement to the press that he had joined its ranks. Naseer was killed in an encounter in April 2016.153
The two cases have been highlighted to show that apart from the ideologies and ideologues mentioned in the Sub-Section 3.1.1., more local youths are gravitating towards militant organizations. Marking a change in the trend, most of those individuals who joined the ranks of militants in the past four years have mostly been young Kashmiri locals154 who now outnumber foreign militants in Kashmir.155 As per some sources, 191 locals picked up arms against the state in J&K in 2018 as opposed to just 16 locals who joined militant outfits in 2013.156
Apart from the above, the issue of terrorism in Kashmir is also closely linked to religion. In February 2019, the central government banned JeI (Kashmir) for ‘being in close touch’ with militant outfits.157 This offshoot has long been considered to be a dominant force of radicalization in J&K158 and of being a political front of HM159 even though it distanced itself
150 Harinder Baweja, Kashmir’s Disturbing New Reality, Hindustan Times, https://www.hindustantimes.com/static/the-young-militants-of-kashmir/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 151 M. K. Narayanan, The Warning Signs Are Loud and Clear, The Hindu, (December 15, 2018), https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-warning-signs-are-loud-and-clear/article25746136.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 152 Mail Today, Battle of Hearts and Minds in Kashmir, India Today, (June 26, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/father-refuses-to-attend-jandk-militants-funeral-16299-2016-06-26, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 153 Ibid 154 Shuja-Ul-Haq, Number of Listed Militants in J&K Rises to 300 in 10 Years, India Today, (September 04, 2018), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/number-of-listed-militants-in-j-k-rises-to-300-in-10-years-1332105-2018- 09-04, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 155 Supra Note 150 (Harinder Baweja) 156 Jammu & Kashmir: Assessment 2019, South Asian Terrorism Portal, https://www.satp.org/terrorism- assessment/india-jammukashmir, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 157 FP Staff, Jamaat – e – Islami Ban: 77-Year-Old Organization Accused of Terror Links Has Been Politically Active in J&K, First Post, (March 02, 2019), https://www.firstpost.com/india/jamaat-e-islami-ban-77-year-old- islamic-organisation-accused-of-terror-links-has-been-politically-active-in-jk-6178831.html, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 158 Supra Note 114 (Ajai Sahni) 159 Supra note 157 (FP Staff) 31 from the HM in 1997.160 Syed Salahuddin, thought to be the founder of HM, fought the elections on behalf of the Jamaat in 1987 before being disillusioned by electoral politics and turning to terrorism.161
The role of the JeI Kashmir, has not only been political, but has led to a change in the very nature of Islamic and social ethos in the Kashmir valley.162 This has been achieved by the setting up of schools that incorporated theology in their modern educational curriculum and the holding of massive religious congregations. The ultimate aim of the Jamaat is to create an Islamic hegemonic order in Kashmir.163
3.2.4. MANNER OF PROPAGATION
The new wave of tech savvy militants uses social media platforms to their advantage. The militants shoot videos of themselves at leisure and play164 and encourage people to continue their protests against the State.165 Protestors too, often shoot videos of themselves clashing with the State forces, in real time, and upload them on instant communication and social media platforms, where they go viral instantaneously.166
On Facebook, applications such as a personality quiz answering the question – ‘which rebel best suits your personality?’ are wildly popular amongst the youth.167 The quiz involves answering a set of questions, on the basis of which an algorithm decides if a person is more like Burhan Wani or Sabzar Bhat or Abu Dujana etc. The videos and the creative use of social media in general has had an effect upon the psyche of the Kashmiri youth who spend a disparate amount of time viewing and circulating them.168
160 Scroll Staff, Centre Bans Jamaat – e – Islami J&K Group, Declares it Unlawful Association, Scroll.in, (March 01, 2019), https://scroll.in/latest/914994/centre-bans-jamaat-e-islami-group-declares-it-unlawful-association, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 161 Basharat Ali, Keeping the Faith: How the Jamaat – e – Islami Chronicles the Failure of Mainstream Politics in Kashmir, The Caravan, (April 06, 2019), https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/how-jamaat-e-islami-chronicles- failure-mainstream-politics-kashmir, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 162 Ibid 163 Ibid 164 Abhishek Saha, Let’s Talk About Kashmir: Social Media has been a Game Changer, and Militants Have a Head Start, Hindustan Times, (July 07, 2017), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/let-s-talk-about- kashmir-social-media-has-been-a-game-changer-and-militants-have-a-head-start/story- YYem7Pqmq9xayvvf6eaF3L.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 165 Boom (channel on YouTube), Hizbul’s New Commander, Zakir Rashid Bhat, Has a Message for India, youtube.com, (August 18, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WT0ShF_oIag, (last visited on 13-05- 2019) 166 Supra Note 164 (Abhishek Saha) 167 Peerzada Ashiq, The Unlikely Social Media Heroes of Kashmir, The Hindu, (December 30, 2017), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/the-unlikely-social-media-heroes-of- kashmir/article22335064.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 168 Supra Note 150 (Harinder Baweja) 32
The killing of the terrorists too, inculcates a sense of solidarity amongst the Kashmiris. In Burhan Wani’s funeral procession alone, almost 40,000 persons were in attendance, making it impossible for the security forces to intervene when the ‘colleagues’ of the slain commander gave him a twenty-one-gun salute at the funeral.169 His death was glorified and equated to martyrdom.170 A few days after his funeral, a video of his accomplices singing a Kashmiri folk song in his honour and that of his family’s, struck an emotional chord with many Kashmiris.171
The primary response of the Indian State in the face of this social media campaign has been to impose restrictions upon internet usage.172 In addition to the same, the State has sought to clampdown upon social media by asking group administrators to register their Whatsapp groups with the authorities.173 Anyone found glorifying militancy on Whatsapp can be subjected to two years of imprisonment under the UAPA.174
3.3. MAJORITARIAN RADICALISM
3.3.1. NATURE AND EXTENT
In December 2017, in a grotesque display of violence, Shambhulal Regar, a resident of Jodhpur lynched a migrant Muslim labourer from Bengal with an axe before burning the body. The heinous act was recorded by his teenage nephew and uploaded to YouTube where it was widely viewed and disseminated.175 The video purports that the act was committed in name of stemming the phenomenon of ‘love jihad.’
While the act itself was deplorable and condemnable, making matters worse, the attack garnered condonation from various right wing quarters. Funds running into Lakhs of Rupees were collected and transferred to an account belonging to Regar’s family within a few days.176 Supporters of Regar who were protesting his arrest, climbed atop the Sessions Court where he was scheduled to be produced and unfurled a saffron flag.177 A few months later, on the
169 Supra Note 149 (Gautam Navalakha) 170 Qadri Inzamam and Haziq Qadri, The Funeral of Burhan Wani and the Unrest that Followed, The Caravan, (July 10, 2016), https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/funeral-burhan-wani-unrest-followed-kashmir, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 171 Supra Note 164 (Abhishek Saha) 172 Ibid 173 Supra Note 167 (Peerzada Ashiq) 174 Ibid 175 Mohammed Iqbal, Video Shows Killing and Burning of Migrant Labourer in Rajsamand, (December 07, 2017), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/man-hacks-migrant-labourer-to-death-in-rajasthans- rajsamand-shoots-video-of-murder/article21288302.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 176 T. K. Rajalakshmi, Living in Fear, Frontline, (January 19, 2018), https://frontline.thehindu.com/social- issues/living-in-fear/article10008394.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 177 Ibid 33 occasion of Ram Navami, in a religious procession a tableau was placed in honour of Regar who was depicted by a man wearing clothes similar to what Regar was wearing in the video with a pickaxe in his hand.178
This was not an isolated incident of lynching. As has been noted in the introduction, Mohammed Akhlaque had been the victim of a murderous mob out to avenge the alleged killing of a calf in 2015. In April 2017, Pehlu Khan was transporting his cows after purchasing them at a cattle fair when he was attacked by a mob and lynched in the Alwar district of Rajasthan. Pehlu Khan died while receiving treatment for his injuries two days afterwards.179 In June 2017, Alimuddin Ansari was brutally murdered in Ramgarh (Jharkhand) by a mob on the suspicion that he was transporting beef.180
While India’s society may prima facie seem to be harmoniously plural, these incidents point towards hidden fault lines that require the urgent attention of policy makers and legislators. This fault line refers to the nature of Indian culturalism which is undergoing a massive overhaul; engineered by majoritarian Hindu fundamentalists.
This change is inextricably linked to the nature of Indian nationalism itself. Many of the issues regarding nationalism date back to the ideals of the freedom struggle. Mahatma Gandhi thought of India as a ‘harmonious collection of communities all placed on an equal footing.’181 The founders of the Congress believed that Indianness should be defined in accordance with a ‘territorial criterion’ and not on ‘cultural features.’182 Hindu Nationalism, however, rejected both these forms of nationalisms.183
3.3.2. CAUSES
In contrast to Gandhi’s version or the Congress version of nationalism, Hindu nationalists believe that Hinduism is the source of Indian identity.184 It was a result of a rise in communal
178 Special Correspondent, A Tableau on Mohammed Afrazul’s alleged killer Shambhu Lal Raigar, The Hindu, (March 27, 2018), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/in-jodhpur-a-tableau-on-mohammed- afrazuls-alleged-killer-shambu-lal-raigar/article23367080.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 179 Mohammed Iqbal, Civil Rights Groups Outraged by Pehlu Khan Case Closure, The Hindu, (September 14, 2017), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/rights-groups-outraged-over-probe-closure-in- pehlu-khan-case/article19681978.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 180 Press Trust of India, 11 Convicted of Lynching Jharkhand Meat Trader, The Hindu, (March 17, 2018), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/11-convicted-of-lynching-ramgarh-meat- trader/article23275553.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 181 CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, HINDU NATIONALISM: A READER, (2007) p. 4 182 Ibid 183 Ibid 184 SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA, (2016), p. 151 34 consciousness, spurred by the transformation of the Indian society under the British rule.185 This view is evident from the writings of M. S. Golwalkar who stated that:186
“applying the modern understanding of ‘Nation’ to our present conditions, the conclusion is unquestionably forced upon us that in this country, Hindusthan, the Hindu race with its Hindu Religion, Hindu Culture and Hindu Language (the natural family of Sanskrit and her offsprings) complete the Nation concept.”
For these nationalists, Hindu culture was to be the central pillar of the Indian culture even as the minorities would have to pay allegiance to the majority.187 A Hindu, according to them, is anyone who regards India as a Fatherland and as the Holyland – excluding thereby Christians, Muslims and Jews from the folds of Hindus.188 This view, however, is problematic because it conflates the concept of a nation and its people. A nation refers to “people as a unity capable of political action, with the consciousness of its political distinctiveness and the will to political existence.”189 In contrast, a people are “somehow only something that belongs together ethnically or culturally, but it is not necessarily a bonding of men existing politically.”190
Given the popularity of the Congress in the Indian freedom struggle, the Congress’s idea of secular nationalism based upon a principled distance won. The Constitution that was established post-independence imbibed these core values in the form of guaranteeing religious freedoms as fundamental rights, as well as equality of treatment irrespective of one’s religion. The idea of Hindu nationalism is not diametrically opposed to other religions, but to this idea of secular nationalism.191
Nevertheless, the idea of Hindu nationalism survived and is today staging a comeback. The fact that the upon of the death of one of the accused in the Mohammed Akhlaque lynching case, his body was draped in the Indian National flag (a custom reserved for security personnel who
185 BIPIN CHANDRA, INDIA’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, (2016), p. 402 186 M. S. GOLKWALKAR, WE OR OUR NATIONHOOD DEFINED, (1939) extracted from CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, HINDU NATIONALISM: A READER, (2007) p. 116 187 Supra Note 181 (Christophe Jaffrelot) 188 Milan Vaishnav, Religious Nationalism and India’s Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (April 04, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/religious-nationalism-and-india-s-future-pub- 78703, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 189 CARL SCHMITT TR. JEFFREY SEITZER, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, (2008), p. 127 190 Ibid 191 Juli Gittinger, Saffron Terror: Splinter or Symptom?, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLVI, No. 37, (September 10, 2011) 35 are martyred in the course of their duty) is evident of this revival.192 Post the 2016 JNU incident where members of the JNU Student’s Union were charged with the offence of sedition in light of alleged pro-Pakistan sloganeering, the Hindu nationalists, emboldened by the BJP being in power, appropriated the term nationalists for themselves while anyone opposing them automatically became an ‘anti national.’193
3.3.3. ACTORS
That majoritarian radicalization is rampantly rising on the grounds of religious nationalism can hardly be questioned. Amongst the primary actors of such radicalization are prominent leaders of the ruling party – the BJP. To exemplify, in June, 2016, the words of a Union Minister R. S. Katheria that “saffronization in education will happen, whatever is good for the country will be done, whether it is saffronization of sanghwaad,” were met with thunderous applause by the party cadres.194
Similarly, post the JNU incident mentioned above, O. P. Sharma, a sitting legislator of the BJP, entered the Court complex where the members of the JNU student union were to be produced and thrashed them with impunity. He was later quoted as saying: “The problem of this country at present is that terrorism and being anti-national are considered being progressive. And JNU is promoting this kind of ideology and producing anti nationals. JNU should be sealed.”
Secondly, off late, dissident extremist groups comprising of religious authority figures and those Hindu nationalists who are disillusioned by the mainstream are increasingly finding acceptance in India.195 In August 2018, the Maharashtra ATS arrested three men belonging to the Sanatan Sanstha for planning ‘disruptive activities’ in the state.196 Explosives and other material for making bombs were seized from their premises.
192 Press Trust of India, Dadri: Family of Akhlaqs murder accused drapes his body in tricolor, refuses to cremate, Indian Express, (October 7, 2016), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/dadri-on-edge-family- of-murder-accused-refuse-to-cremate-body-3069280/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 193 Nivedita Menon, Why Our Universities are in a Ferment, The Hindu, (February 15, 2016), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/why-our-universities-are-in-ferment/article8237580.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 194 Firstpost, Saffronization and Sanghwaad are inevitable says Union minister R S Katheria, First Post, (June 19, 2016), http://www.firstpost.com/politics/saffronisation-and-sanghwad-are-inevitable-says-union-minister-rs- katheria-2843654.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 195 Christophe Jaffrelot, Gilles Dorronsoro, From Hindu Militias to Hindu Terrorism? Resisting and Emulating the Islamists in India, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (September 28, 2009), https://carnegieendowment.org/2009/09/28/from-hindu-militias-to-hindu-terrorism-resisting-and-emulating- islamists-in-india-event-1394, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 196 Special Correspondent, Explosives Seized From Sanatan Man, The Hindu, (August 11, 2018), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/explosives-seized-from-sanatan-man/article24660676.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 36
The Sanatan Sanstha promotes the Hindutva agenda in Maharashtra and Karnataka and through its affiliate – the Hindu Janjagruti Samiti – aims to establish a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ by 2023.197 Both the Sanatan Sanstha as well as the Hindu Janjagruti Samiti are under the scanner of investigation agencies of multiple states concerning the murder of rationalists – Govind Pansare, Narendra Dabholkar and Gauri Lankesh.198
In April 2007, a blast ripped through a Sufi shrine in Ajmer killing three persons and injuring fifteen. As the investigations began, the role of an organization named Abhinav Bharat began to emerge. The organization was also allegedly involved in the execution of several other acts of terrorism such as the Samjhauta express blasts and the Malegaon blasts. In August 2018, two ex-RSS Pracharaks (literally – promoters or propagandists) were convicted for the blast on the basis of circumstantial evidence.199
However, none of this would be possible without the RSS, which is the fountainhead of the Hindu nationalist ideology. The fundamental idea of the RSS is made amply clear by the following words of K. B. Hegdewar, the founder of RSS:
“It is therefore clear that if Hindusthan is to be protected, we should first nourish the Hindu culture. If the Hindu culture perishes in Hindusthan itself, and if the Hindu society ceases to exist, it will hardly be appropriate to refer to the mere geographical entity that remains as Hindusthan… It is therefore the duty of every Hindu to do his best to consolidate the Hindu society. The Sangh is just carrying out this supreme task. The present fate of the country cannot be changed unless lakhs of young men dedicate their entire lifetime for that cause. To mould the minds of our youth towards that end is the supreme aim of the Sangh.”
3.3.4. MANNER OF PROPAGATION
Traditionally, the Sangh ideology has been propagated through the conduct of Shakhas (training camps). RSS’s own vision and mission document details the activities in the Shakas as follows:
197 Anupam Katakam, Double Standards, Frontline, (September 28, 2018), https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover- story/article24924145.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 198 Abhiram Gadhyalpatil, Inside the Hypnotic World of Sanatan Sanstha, Live Mint, (September 12, 2018), https://www.livemint.com/Politics/s9kuMJdW2dwqANcIlMQe1J/Inside-the-secret-world-of-Sanatan- Sanstha.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 199 Hamza Khan, Ajmer Blasts Case: Life Term for Two Ex-RSS Pracharaks, Indian Express, (August 20, 2018), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/ajmer-blast-case-two-rss-pracharaks-sentenced-life-imprisonment- 4580944/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 37
“A saffron flag (called the Bhagawa Dhwaj) flutters in the midst of an open playground. Youths and boys of all ages engage in varieties of indigenous games… There are exercises... sometimes training in skilfully wielding the ‘Danda’… The physical-fitness programmes are followed by group singing of patriotic songs. Also forming part of the routine is exposition and discussion of national events and problems. The day’s activity culminates in the participants’ assembling.. in front of the flag.. and reverentially reciting the prayer ‘Namaste Sada Vatsale Matrubhoome’ (My salutation to you, loving Motherland). The prayer verses, even as the group leader’s various commands are all in Samskrit.”200
Secondly, initially, the internet became the ‘chosen medium’ for Hindu nationalists working in technological fields201 but late came to be used by all shades of Hindu nationalists who found the internet to be an unoccupied space free from the liberal and secular ‘biases’ of the print media quite early on.202 The BJP was the first political party to successfully adapt its political campaigns around social media and it’s IT cell evolved into a dedicated wing of the party itself.203
More than one lakh volunteers 204 of the IT cell are engaged dedicatedly towards spreading the Hindu nationalist agenda. In doing so, they often engage in debates on issues of current import such corruption, jobs, startups, women empowerment, safety, terrorism, Kashmir, Naxalism etc.205 It is not however, as innocuous as the above. These volunteers also seek to discredit the opposition parties and historical figures, often resorting to fake news and propaganda.206 The online volunteers frequently troll anyone that dares to take a line of thought different than their own. In her book titled ‘I am a Troll,’ Swati Chaturvedi narrates in harrowing detail, the death and rape threats that she and other distinguished personalities often receive from anonymous and fake twitter accounts.207
200 Vision and Mission, www.rss.org, http://rss.org//Encyc/2012/10/22/rss-vision-and-mission.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 201 ROHIT CHOPRA, TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONALISM IN INDIA; CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS FROM COLONIALISM TO CYBERSPACE, (2008), p. 11 202 Sahana Udupa, The Wannabe Victims: India’s Online Right, Live Mint, (February 15, 2019), https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/the-wannabe-victims-india-s-online-right-1550165952378.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 203 Sahana Udupa, Enterprise Hindutva and Social Media in Urban India, Contemporary South Asia, (November 22, 2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09584935.2018.1545007, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 204 Supra Note 202 (Sahana Udupa – Livemint) 205 Ibid 206 Rohit Chopra, Fake News, History and Memory, News Laundry, (September 13, 2017), https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/09/13/amit-shah-fake-news-bjp, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 207 SWATI CHATURVEDI, I AM A TROLL: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF BJPS DIGITAL ARMY, (2016) 38
The fake news spread by these accounts has the potential to stoke communal passions. To exemplify, in 2016, on the festival of Holi, Dr. Pankaj Narang was murdered. A widely popular volunteer of the IT cell who went by the twitter handle ‘bhak_sala’ tweeted that the doctor had been lynched by Muslims because his son had thrown colours on the latter.208 The Delhi Police had to intervene and clarify that the same was not the case before riots broke out.209
The volunteers don’t shirk away from extreme speech either. Extreme Speech can be defined as the stretching of boundaries along the axis of both civilty/incivility and truth/falsity.210 In a study conducted by the Observer Research Foundation, it was observed that nearly 19 to 30 percent of all hate speech was centred around religion, 15 to 25 percent of the hate speech was regarding nationalism while 44 to 53 percent incited bodily harm and 25 to 43 percent incited mass violence.211 Given that the change in the nature of the speeches were centred around political developments at the time of the collection of data (Burhan Wani’s encounter and Junaid Khan’s lynching respectively),212 it becomes clear that such hate speech was mostly the handiwork of majoritarian radicals.213
3.4. LEFT WING EXTREMISM
3.4.1. NATURE AND EXTENT
India has had a long and troubled history of conflict in its heartlands with the Left Wing Extremists (known in the popular lexicon as the Naxalites) and their political front – the CPI(M). The conflict erupted in 1967 when an otherwise peaceful village of Naxalbari in northern West Bengal rebelled against the draconian and exploitative practises of landholders in the tea-estates. The rebellion was organized by two leaders – Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal, both of whom later went on to start an armed rebellion against the Indian state itself,
208 Ibid 209 Ibid 210 Sahana Udupa, India Needs a Fresh Strategy to Tackle Online Extreme Speech, Economic and Political Weekly, ISSN (Online): 2349-8846 211 Maya Mirchandani, Dhananjay Sahai, Ojasvi Goel, Encouraging Counter Speech by Mapping the Contours of Hate Speech on Facebook in India, Observer Research Foundation, (March 13, 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/research/encouraging-counter-speech-by-mapping-the-contours-of-hate-speech-on- facebook-in-india/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 212 Ibid 213 Maya Mirchandani, Digital Hatred, Real Violence: Majoritarian Radicalization and Social Media in India, Observer Research Foundation, (August 29, 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/research/43665-digital-hatred-real- violence-majoritarian-radicalisation-and-social-media-in-india/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 39 even as the uprising in Naxalbari itself was swiftly repressed. Similar uprisings erupted in other states such as Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Odisha.214
Between 2007 and 2019,215 LWE related violence is thought to have led to 6,812 deaths of which 2,543 were civilian casualties, 1,719 security personnel and 2,405 insurgents.216 As of 2018, more than 106 districts across 10 states were affected by such violence.217 In one of the deadliest attacks by Maoists insurgents on the security forces, in 2010, Naxalites ambushed and killed 76 personnel belonging to the CRPF in a highly coordinated and well planned attack that occurred in Dantewada district of Chattisgarh.218 In the Sukma district of Chattisgarh alone the Indian state has suffered severe losses across a period of five years – 25 people, including senior Congress party leaders, were killed in 2013,219 25 men from the CRPF were martyred in 2017220 and another 9 were martyred in 2018.221
The 2019 attack on police forces in the Gadhchiroli district of Maharashtra showcases the audacity and tenacity of the insurgents. At 2 A.M. on 1st May, the insurgents set fire to 27 vehicles involved in road building activities in the district. Knowing that the agencies are likely to come and investigate the incident, they laid down an IED on the road.222 As the Quick Response Team of the state police made its way to the scene of the incident, the IED exploded
214 Adrija Roychowdhary, 51 Years of Naxalbari: How a Peasant Uprising Triggered a Pan-India Political Movement, Indian Express, (May 25, 2018), https://indianexpress.com/article/research/51-years-of-naxalbari- how-a-peasant-uprising-triggered-a-pan-india-political-movement-5191046/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 215 As on 13th May, 2019 216 South Asian Terrorism Portal, Yearly Fatalities: Maoist Insurgency, satp.org, https://www.satp.org/datasheet- terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-maoistinsurgency, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 217 Press Information Bureau, Government’s New Policy Paying Dividends in Containing Left Wing Extremism, Ministry of Home Affairs, (April 16, 2018), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=178704, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 218 Press Trust of India, 76 CRPF Personnel Killed in Naxal Attack, India TV News, (April 07, 2010), https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/76-crpf-personnel-killed-in-naxal-attack-2390.html, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 219 Amit Chaturvedi, Chattisgarh Naxal Attack: Top State Congress Leaders Among 25 Killed, NDTV, (May 26, 2013), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/chhattisgarh-naxal-attack-top-state-congress-leaders-among-25-killed- 523359, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 220 India Today Web Desk, Sukma Attack: 25 CRPF Jawans Killed, Worst Naxal Attack in Years, India Today, (April 24, 2017), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/naxalites-attack-crpf-camp-chhattisgarh-sukma-jawans- 973250-2017-04-24, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 221 Ritesh Mishra and Rajesh Ahuja, Sukma Attack: 9 CRPF Jawans Killed in Encounter With Maoists After IED Blows Up Truck, Hindustan Times, (March 13, 2018), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/8-crpf- jawans-killed-in-blast-by-maoists-in-chhattisgarh-s-sukma/story-En00ju2Ta6si6hBYjqpgCL.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 222 Rashmi Rajput, Naxal Attack in Gadchiroli Leaves 15 Security Personnel Dead, The Economic Times, (May 02, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/possible-naxal-attack-in-gadchiroli-leaves- several-security-personnel-injured/articleshow/69127641.cms, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 40 and killed all 15 members of the team. In the same district, in April, the Naxalites had detonated an IED as the voting for the General Elections was underway, injuring a CRPF jawan.223
Whereas these instances depict the direction of violence against State agencies, officials and security personnel, often, the local population in the districts with LWE presence, too are victimized. In January 2019, Naxals executed three tribals suspected of being police informers.224 Similarly in June 2018, the Naxals entered the home of Ganga Madkami in Odisha, dragged him out and shot him thrice for being a suspected police informer, leaving behind a poster claiming the responsibility for the murder.225
Often, they hold Jan Adalats (People’s Courts) to punish those tribals and villagers who are accused of not toeing their line or being police informers. The accused are not given any legal counsel, independent judges or right to appeal226 and the execution of the sentence passed is carried out on the spot. To exemplify, in April 2016, three villagers were abducted and beaten to death in two separate Jan Adalats in Chhattisgarh.227
3.4.2. ACTORS
Both Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal were adherents of the Maoist strand of communist thought and sought to emulate the results of the communist movement in China, in India. For this ideology, violence is an inevitable by-product of a class struggle, so much so that Charu Mazumdar is credited to have said that “(h)e who has not dipped his hands in the blood of class enemies can hardly be called a Communist.”228
Initially, the Naxalbari movement found great support in the urban youth belonging to the upper middle classes. For these youth, the movement was their way of bringing about a change similar
223 Press trust of India, Day After Chattisgarh Attack, Naxals Target Election Officials in Maharashtra, India Today, (April 10, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/crpf-jawans-ied-explosion- naxals-dantewada-gadchiroli-1498891-2019-04-10, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 224 Mritunjay Bose, Maoists Kill Three Tribals in Maharashtra, Deccan Herald, (January 22, 2019), https://www.deccanherald.com/national/maoists-kill-three-tribals-714378.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 225 Asian News International, Tribal Villager Killed by Naxals in Odisha, Business Standard, (June 22, 2019), https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/tribal-villager-killed-by-naxals-in-odisha- 118062200467_1.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 226 Human Rights Watch, Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime: Government, Vigilante and Naxalite Abuses in India’s Chhattisgarh State, hrw.org, (July 14, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/14/being-neutral-our- biggest-crime/government-vigilante-and-naxalite-abuses-indias, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 227 South Asia Terrorism Portal, India Maoist Assessment: 2016, www.satp.org, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/Assessment/2016/indiamaoistassesment2016.htm, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 228 John Harriss, What’s Going on in India’s ‘Red Corridor’? Questions About India’s Maoist Insurgency – Literature Review, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 84 No. 2 (June, 2011) p. 313 41 to when their parents had stood up against the colonial rule.229 Many left their comfortable lives to join the insurgency, until the State began a crackdown.230 The base of recruitment of the Naxals then shifted towards the hinterlands of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Orrisa and Andhra Pradesh.
Presently, their strategy231 is to mobilize women, dalits, tribals and minorities towards their ‘revolutionary movement.’232 The Naxal cadres are mostly comprised of these groups. Often the cadres are recruited while they are still young i.e. at the age of 6-12; they are taught the Maoist ideology and given basic arms training in non-lethal weapons.233Children aged above 16 are given battle training and are used in armed skirmishes against the State forces.234
3.4.3. CAUSES
The primary cause of LWE is the Maoist ideology itself. Based on this ideology, the party programme released by the CPI(M) in 2004 highlights four contradictions in the modern Indian State – firstly, between imperialism and Indian people; secondly, between feudalism and the masses; thirdly, between capital and labour; and fourthly, contradictions amongst the ruling classes themselves.235 The programme goes on to call the Indian independence of 1947 as a farce and calls for the seizure of power through armed struggle.236 It further seeks to support the various separatist movements in other parts of India and to ultimately create a People’s Democratic Federal Republic of India.237
Despite the government crackdown on Naxalism, they have largely been able to retain their cadres for reasons of – firstly, norm compliance by Maoist cadres or aspirants; secondly, poverty makes the life of a guerrilla fighter more appealing; thirdly, the Maoists have a strict recruitment process and being inducted as a Maoists gives a sense of recognition; lastly, the
229 Supra Note 214 (Adrija Roychowdhary) 230 Ibid 231 Titled ‘Strategies and Tactics of Indian Revolution’ 232 Sandeep Kumar Dubey, Maoist Movement in India: An Overview, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, (2013), http://www.idsa.in/system/files/BG_MaoistMovement.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 233 Supra Note 226 (Human Rights Watch) 234 Ibid 235 South Asian Terrorism Portal, Maoist Documents: Party Programme, www.satp.org, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/partyprogram.htm, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 236 Ibid 237 Ibid 42 threat of violence against the person and family of an individual who defects or resists recruitment.238
Of these factors, poverty is perhaps the most precipitating factor of them all. It can be stated that no other political party has fought for the cause of the rural poor with the determination of the CPI(M).239 It is not a coincidence that Naxals have been able to establish strongholds in those pockets and states where the fruits of development are yet to percolate down to the lowest levels.240According to Bela Bhatia, the issues of the tribals, which are taken up by the Naxals, relate to their basic minimum needs and aspirations namely, land rights, minimum wages, common property resources and housing.241 However, a difference can be found between the goals of the tribals and that of Naxals in that the former seek the fulfilment of a short term goal while the latter seek to carry on an armed rebellion.242
The findings of Bhatia’s research have been corroborated by the findings of an Expert Committee which was constituted to study the causes of LWE in May 2006. The committee observed that “(t)he failure to provide infrastructure and services as per national norms is one of the many discriminatory manifestations of Governance here. These disparities result in non- available/poorly provided services.” It listed out the causes for LWE as landlessness, non- implementation of land reforms, monopolizing of common property resources by the rich, inequalities in income and wealth, discrimination against tribals and lower castes, the threats to the conventional lifestyles of the tribals etc.
3.4.4. MANNER OF PROPAGATION
A crucial difference between LWE and other forms of extremism in India, is that the Naxals have not adopted modern means of communication for their propaganda or even otherwise for their own internal use. Their distrust in modern technology is not without good reason either.
238 Uddipan Mukherjee, Catch Them Young: Patterns of Naxal Recruitment, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Issue Brief No. 253, http://www.ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/IB253-Uddipan-Naxal-Edited.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 239 Tilak D. Gupta, Maoism in India: Ideology, Programme and Armed Struggle, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 41 No. 29 (July 22-28, 2006) p. 3174 240 Sagar, Spring and Its Thunder, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 41 Issue 29, 22-07-2006 p. 3176 241 Bela Bhatia, The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40 No. 15 (April 9-15, 2005) p. 1542 242 Ibid 43
In Jharkhand alone, 42 Naxals were arrested in 2008 based on cell phone usage.243 Consequently, cell phone towers are often destroyed to deter informants.244
Instead, the Naxalites have found creative means to forward their propaganda. According to one news report, the Naxals organize dance programmes deep inside the forests for the tribal youths, post which the commanders explain the Maoist ideology in the hopes of influencing them.245
More conventionally, magazines such as “People’s March” act as mouthpieces of the Maoist revolution.246 The magazine, which was banned by the Central Government in 2007,247 frequently published Naxal eulogies– signifying a propaganda centred around martyrdom.248 On the ground, memorial stones erected by the Naxals in honour of their dead comrades line the landscape randomly.249 Another method of spreading the Maoists ideology is through the medical camps which are held in inaccessible areas.250 The Naxals also graffiti the walls of government schools in areas dominated by them, so as to introduce young minds to the basic tenets of Maoism.251 Around election times, the Naxals often put up posters asking people to stay away from polling booths and boycott the elections in order to discourage voting.252
243 Santosh K. Kiro, Naxalites Target Mobile Towers, The Telegraph, (December 24, 2008), https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/jharkhand/naxalites-target-mobile-towers/cid/517383, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 244 Press Trust of India, Naxals Target Mobile Phone Towers to Cut-Off ‘Informers,’ Economic Times, (May 01, 2009), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/naxals-target-mobile-phone-towers-to- cut-off-informers/articleshow/4472428.cms, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 245 Jitendra Bahadur Singh, Rattled by Success of Operation Prahar, Prahar II, Naxals Make Tribal Youths Dance to Their Tune in Odisha, India Today, (May 11, 2018), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/naxals-red-army- tribals-dance-brainwash-odisha-1231872-2018-05-11, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 246 Indian Vanguard, People’s March, https://indianvanguard.wordpress.com/peoples-march/, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 247 Ibid 248 Bert Suykens, Maoist Martyrs: Remembering the Revolution and its Heroes in Naxalite Propaganda (India), Terrorism and Political Violence, June 2010 249 Ibid 250 First Post, Medical Camps, Lal Salaam and School Propaganda, firstpost.com, (October 18, 2011), https://www.firstpost.com/politics/medical-camps-lal-salaam-and-school-propaganda-32673.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 251 Ibid 252 Press Trust of India, Chhattisgarh Polls: As Fear of Naxals Looms Large, Here is How EC Plans to Ensure Voting, India Today, (November 08, 2018), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/chhattisgarh-assembly-polls- poster-war-not-only-among-parties-but-also-between-naxals-and-election-commission-1384480-2018-11-08, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 44
CHAPTER 4
POLICY BASED REMEDIAL MEASURES
Having sketched out the contours of radicalization in India, it is equally important to highlight the difference between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ the response of the policy makers towards such radicalization. As has been observed in Chapter II, there is an emerging global discourse on stemming radicalization through de-radicalization and preventing violent extremism through counter radicalization, anti-radicalization and counter narratives. Except beefing up security in the affected areas and shoring up the intelligence apparatus, the response of the Indian State has been uncoordinated and compartmentalized – often depending upon the subjective understanding of the bureaucrats in charge of the operation253 and their ability to convince their political masters about the need of the measures. This chapter analyses the non- security centric policy based responses to categorize them while juxtaposing them with the efforts in other countries in order to offer practicable policy recommendations.
4.1. RESPONSES OF THE INDIAN STATE
4.1.1. SURRENDER CUM REHABILITATION POLICIES
Several states have come up with policies to incentivize the surrender of violent extremists before the State agencies. In the context of LWE, this entails an immediate cash disbursal ranging from Rs. 1.5 Lakh to Rs. 2.5 Lakh in addition to a monthly stipend of Rs. 4000 for a period of three years.254 A similar policy is being enforced in J&K under the auspices of the state government.255
The objective of these schemes however is not reformation or achieving an ideological break from the radical idea, but disengagement and dis-incentivizing recidivism.256 This shifts the focus upon the surrender part of the policy, rather than rehabilitation. The same is evident from
253 G. S. Bajpai, Ankit Kaushik, How Does India Deal with Radicalization? An Official De-Radicalization Policy is Urgently Needed, Times of India, (March 09, 2019), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit- page/how-does-india-deal-with-radicalisation-an-official-de-radicalisation-policy-is-urgently-needed/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 254 Press Information Bureau, Surrender cum Rehabilitation Policy, pib.nic.in, (November 25, 2014), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=111815, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 255 Ministry of Home Affairs, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1030, mha.gov.in, 2017, https://mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2018-pdfs/ls-24072018-English/1030.pdf, (last visited on 13-05- 2019) 256 Ministry of Home Affairs, Guidelines for Surrender cum Rehabilitation of Naxalites in Naxal Affected States, mha.gov.in, https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/surrrenderPolAendments070909_0.pdf, (last visited on 13-05- 2019) 45 the fact that while records are maintained as to the surrender of extremists, no such record is available with the government with respect to the rehabilitation aspect.257
Another problem with this policy is the lack of security of the surrenderee and the Central government plays no role in providing the same.258 This factor, coupled with the unmonitored and improper implementation of the policy itself has led to much discontent amongst the surrendered militants. Take the case of Abdul Munaf Malik, a former commander of HM who had convinced several cadres of HM to surrender before surrendering himself.259 Post surrender, his family was targeted by the militants – the houses of his father and brother were set alight and his brother and sister were brutally beaten up.260 With respect to the cash incentives, Malik says that he received only Rs. 18,000 as against the Rs. 2,00,000 and the monthly stipend that was promised to him. He did not receive any vocational training either.261
A third problem with the policy is that it focusses only upon those individuals who are engaged in violent extremism, ignoring those who are still undergoing radicalization. Lessons to overcome this can be taken from the ‘de-radicalization programme’262 of the Maharashtra ATS under which almost 114 individuals undergoing radicalization have been reformed.263 This programme systematically relies upon a four prong strategy focussed upon family, individual, religion and psychology.264 Conversely, this programme does not cover those individuals who have crossed the boundary of law under the influence of the radical ideology.265 Lastly, the programme focuses solely upon the threat of Islamic extremism and ISIS, and does not take into consideration other sources of radicalization.266
257 Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 906, loksabhaph.nic.in, 2017, http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=46865&lsno=16, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 258 Ibid 259 Ravi Krishna Khajuria, Lok Sabha Elections 2019: Given ‘Raw Deal,’ Surrendered Militant Feels Cheated, Hindustan Times, (May 06, 2019), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/lok-sabha-elections-2019-given- raw-deal-surrendered-j-k-militant-feels-cheated/story-NFuqBXJCSmUe50vLPPPcIO.html, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 260 Ibid 261 Ibid 262 This is a misnomer – the programme would fall under the category of a ‘counter radicalization’ programme instead since the individual is still only undergoing the process of radicalization and hasn’t completed it. 263 Namrata Biji Ahuja, No Guarantee That De-Radicalization Will Always Work, The Week, (August 05, 2018), https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2018/07/26/no-guarantee-that-de-radicalisation-will-always-work.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 264 Ibid 265 Supra Note 253 (G.S. Bajpai and Ankit Kaushik) 266 Ibid 46
4.1.2. COUNTER NARRATIVES
The importance of counter narratives has been recognized across the world. In 2017, the Chair of UNSC addressed a letter emphasizing upon the need to develop an international covenant on counter narratives.267 Similarly, in September 2018, Gen. Bipin Rawat emphasized on the need to establish a Directorate General of Information Warfare to counter the propaganda of the extremists.268
Several programmes have been launched towards this end. In the LWE affected districts of Bastar, for example, the police under the leadership of the Superintendent of Police Arif Shaikh launched the Amcho Bastar Amcho Police campaign to involve the community in policing and removing the distrust between the local population and the police.269 Similarly, the Maharashtra ATS developed a set of videos to promote tolerance, increase vigilance by citizens and to educate the public on the need to rationally analyse messages received by them on the social media.270 It also emerged from the conversation of the researcher with the ATS officials that it has involved religious clerics and community leaders to the inform the general public about the inconsistencies in the IS ideology. Messages based upon these inconsistencies are under development so as to be disseminated amongst the youth.
4.1.3. DEVELOPMENT
The Report of the UN Secretary General recognizes the importance of development in the fight against violent extremism.271 Development, in and of itself, is perhaps the best anti- radicalization strategy. A prima facie analysis of the policies of the various state governments and expert committee reports suggests that the Indian policy makers are aware of this requirement. To illustrate, the State Development Report on J&K published by the Planning
267 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 26 April 2017 from the Chair of Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2017/35 268 Parjanya Bhatt, Building Effective Counter Terror Narratives in Kashmir, Observer Research Foundation, (September 18, 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/44307-building-effective-counterterror- narratives-in-kashmir/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 269 Press Trust of India, Bastar Cops to Get Award for Community Policing Initiatives, Outlook, (August 18, 2017), https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/bastar-cops-to-get-award-for-community-policing- initiative/1126353, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 270 Mustafa Sheikh, To Check ISIS Radicalization Online, Maharashtra ATS Comes Up with a Video, India Today, (June 21, 2017), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/maharashtra-ats-video-to-check-isis-online-radicalisation- 983896-2017-06-21/, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 271 Report of the Secretary General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, A/70/674 (December 24, 2015), https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 47
Commission in 2014 stressed upon the need to develop potential sectors such as “horticulture, handloom and handicrafts, biotechnology, tourism and information technology.”272
Similarly, in the Expert Committee appointed by the Planning Commission to study the causes of LWE suggested that “(t)he basic steps required in this direction include establishment of credibility and confidence of government; keeping a continuous vigil for fulfilment of people’s vision; effective protection, peace and good governance; rejuvenating tribal economy including social services; sustainable development with equity in tribal areas; holistic planning from below in scheduled areas; and negotiating crises by focussing on ending of confrontation….”273
To this end, the then MHA devised a four pronged National Policy and Action Plan which focussed upon: security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities and management of public perception.274 However, for some reason, this policy has since been diluted by the subsequent government and the focus has reverted back to the security centric approach. Of all the initiatives listed currently on the MHA website, five initiatives pertain to strengthening of security apparatus, one initiative pertains to counter narrative and only three relate to infrastructure development.275 Even within these three infrastructural initiatives, two relate to road building and one relates to mobile tower installation.276 No mention is made therein about development pertaining to primary concerns of tribals such as land reforms, ownership of common property resources, housing and shelter, food security, education or healthcare.
With respect to Islamic extremism, only the State of Maharashtra has recognized the importance of development in this context. The ‘de-radicalization’ programme of the Maharashtra ATS has been developed under the umbrella of a government resolution titled “Issue of guideline principles for measures to adopted for Economic, Social and Educational Progress of the Youth of Minority Community and for bringing about positive changes.”277 As
272 Planning Commission, Jammu and Kashmir Development Report: Executive Summary, (September 18, 2014), http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/stateplan/index.php?state=sdr_jandk.htm, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 273 Rajat Kumar Kujur, Naxal Movement: A Review of the Planning Commissions Expert Committee Report, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (June 18, 2008), http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxal- movement-a-review-of-the-planning-commissions-expert-committee-2599.html, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 274 G. S. Bajpai, Ankit Kaushik, Thwarting Radicalization in India: Lacunae in Policy Initiatives, Journal of National Law University Delhi, Vol. 4, 2016-17, p. 4 275 Ministry of Home Affairs, Left Wing Extremism Division, mha.gov.in, https://mha.gov.in/division_of_mha/left-wing-extremism-division, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 276 Ibid 277 Govt. Resolution No. M.D.D.2015/C.R. 275/D-5 48 the name suggests, this resolution of the government seeks to engage various departments such as that of school and sports; higher and technical education; skill development; urban development; minority development etc. to come up with mechanisms to ensure the mainstreaming of the minority community within the larger socio-economic-political apparatus.
4.2. POLICY RESPONSES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
4.2.1. CANADA
Even though the threat of violent extremism in Canada is exponentially lesser than that in India, the Canadian government has taken several concrete steps to counter and prevent it. In 2016, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police released a guidebook detailing the various contours of radicalization that pose a threat to Canada.278 The guide was released with the intention to help ‘first responders, parents, colleagues or friends’ of a ‘person at risk’ to understand radicalization in order to help prevent it.279
In 2015, the Prime Minister allocated a budget of CAD$ 35 Million to establish the CCCPV, under the auspices of the Minister of Public Safety.280 This Centre was tasked with giving policy guidance; promoting coordination and collaboration to prevent radicalization to violence; funding research to advance the understanding of radicalization and to provide funding to initiatives engaged in prevention of radicalization.281
In December 2018, the Centre released a National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence which represents the Canadian governments’ official approach on countering and preventing radicalization.282 The strategy follows a three pronged process focussing upon firstly, building a knowledge base; secondly, addressing online radicalization and thirdly, promoting interventions.
For the first prong, a Community Resilience Fund has been established to support research and planning on topics such as understanding the pathways to radicalization to violence, the causes
278 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Terrorism and Violent Extremism Awareness Guide, (June 2016), http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/terrorism-and-violent-extremism-awareness-guide, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 279 Ibid 280 Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence, Government of Canada, (2018) 281 Ibid 282 Public Safety Canada, Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/cc/index-en.aspx, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 49 of far right extremism as well as potential of groups to adopt violence. Emphasis has also been supplied to the study of the correlation between hate crimes and radicalization to violence.
The second prong involves the development of ‘digital literacy guidelines’ as well as ‘alternative narratives’ to online radicalization. The government seeks to partner with technology companies to monitor and remove violent content online. Finally, the government seeks to promote research into the manner in which online space is used by extremists in order to counter the same.
In the third and final prong, the government seeks to create an environment conducive to interventions by front line workers at the various points in the process of radicalization. This is to be done by building the capacity of the workers to assess and intervene through proper training. For this purpose, the government shall provide funding for interventions at a local level.
4.2.2. DENMARK
Between 2009-2012, Denmark, in collaboration with the European Union introduced de- radicalization programmes on a pilot basis to examine the effect of such programmes upon individuals.283 For this purpose two projects were introduced, namely ‘De-radicalization – Targeted Intervention’ and ‘De-radicalization – Back on Track.’284 The first project was aimed at preventing individuals from joining extremist organizations as well as assisting the individuals who wanted to leave them.285 The second project was aimed at assisting prisoners who had been convicted of terrorism or charges with commission of hate crimes.286
The Danish government learnt from the experiences and repeatedly calibrated its Actions Plans until the latest version was released in 2016.287 Whereas the plan is largely based upon the two projects mentioned above, the plan identifies nine initiatives to tackle extremism and radicalization. The plan creates a structure of authorities tasked with acting upon the initiatives
283 Ministeriet For Flygtninge Indvandrere Og Integration, Demark’s Deradicalization Efforts: Fact Sheet, (August 2011), https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/8A7278CB-EFAD-43CC-B6E4- EE81B8E13C6D/0/factsheetderadicalisation.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 284 Ibid 285 Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan, Deradicalising Returning Foreign Fighters: Lessons from Denmark, RSIS Commentary, No. 175, (October 23, 2018), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/CO18175.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 286 Ibid 287 The Danish Government, Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalization: National Action Plan, (October 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we- do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/docs/preventing_countering_extremism_radicalisation_en.pdf, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 50 and lays down guidelines for the manner in which authorities are to act in different circumstances in great detail.
It devolves the duty of case handling and risk assessment to the police who shall undergo a training programme to equip them to help the individual exit the extremist environment. The municipalities are required to create their own action plans and collaborate with associations. Further, the plan creates a Special unit for removal of extremist material online and calls for development of not only counter narratives but such educational material which promotes critical thought as well. It calls for stricter measures against radicalization in prisons and makes is mandatory for convicts of extremist offences to undergo the Exit programme in order to be released on parole. Finally, whereas on the one end it requires the involvement of local communities, on the other end it calls for international collaborations to thwart extremism and radicalization.
4.2.3. SAUDI ARABIA
After Saudi Arabia came under a wave of terrorist attacks in the 2000s, it responded by launching a ‘soft counter terrorism’ policy.288 This policy is based upon a PRAC strategy – an acronym that stands for Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare.289 It appoints the Ministry of Interior as the nodal agency to coordinate the programs covered under the plan.290 Overall however, the plan decentralizes the campaign to fight against extremism by involving Ministries of Islamic Affairs; Higher Education, Culture and information; Labour; and Social Affairs.291
For prevention, the programs are implemented to counter radicalization by educating the public about Islam and the ulterior motives of the extremists who use Islam for their own purposes.292 The children are warned of the dangers of extremism at a young age and the parents and families are enlightened through the distribution of books, pamphlets and other materials distributed at schools events.293 Activities are planned to keep the children busy and away from extremist and radical elements.294
288 RABASA, PETTYJOHN, GHEZ AND BOUCEK, DE-RADICALIZING ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS, 2010 289 Christopher Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counter Terrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare, Carnegie Papers, Middle East Program No. 97, (September 2008) 290 Ibid 291 Ibid 292 Supra Note 288 (Rabasa et. al.) 293 Supra Note 289 (Christopher Boucek) 294 Ibid 51
For rehabilitation, the Saudi Arabian government changed its perception of terrorists and extremists from that of criminals, to victims.295 It embarked on a mission to impart religious re-education to those who were misled; it was particularly effective because Saudi Arabia holds a special place in Islamic culture given that the two Holy cities of Mecca and Medina are situated within its territory.296 A primary component of the Saudi Arabian rehabilitation strategy is the ‘counselling program’ which is centred around “religious discussion and debate, extensive social support and implicit family obligation.”297
The aftercare strategy requires that post release, the former detainees check in with authorities and keep in touch with the scholars they met during their rehabilitation.298 The released detainee is monitored both overtly and covertly.299 Additionally, the government provides for expenses to help settle the individual down such as paying for weddings and furnishings etc.300
4.2.4. SINGAPORE
The Singapore government’s strategy is perhaps the world’s best example of how community engagement can act as a central pillar to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. Given the ethnic and religious diversity of Singapore, the strategy revolves around strengthening social resilience to prevent racial and religious conflict.301 To maintain religious harmony, Singapore has developed measures such as ‘counter ideology; terrorist rehabilitation and re-integration; and community engagement.302
In the context of Islamic extremism, the government left the task of policing to the community itself and relies on it to ensure proper interpretation and propagation of religion.303 For this purpose, the government has enlisted the help of religious and other non-governmental organizations. To exemplify, the Singapore Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) has taken upon itself to produce religious sermons which raise awareness about extremism and counters their
295 Ibid 296 Andreas Capstack, De-radicalization Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study, Middle East Institute, (June 2010), http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalization-programs-saudi-arabia-case-study#_ftn3, (last visited on 13- 05-2019) 297 Supra Note 288 (Rabasa et. al.) 298 Ibid 299 Ibid 300 Ibid 301 Sabariah Hussin, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: The Singapore Approach, in ECHLE, GUNARATNA, REUPPEL AND SARMAH, COMBATTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN ASIA AND EUROPE: FROM COOPERATION TO COLLABORATION, (2018) 302 Ibid 303 Supra Note 288 (Rabasa et. al.) 52 propaganda.304 In 2005, the MUIS launched a scheme titled the ‘Asatizah Recognition Scheme’ which seeks to ensure that religious teachers are duly qualified and trained for counselling and resolving terrorism related inquiries.305 In May 2018, the MUIS started both on ground and online services for such support and guidance to the youth.
Singapore’s programme also focusses upon religious rehabilitation wherein the extremists are engaged by mainstream scholars so as to make them aware about the inaccuracy in the extremist versions of Islam.306 For this purpose, in 2002, a group of Islamic clerics came together to form the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) which seeks to counsel terrorists as well as their families in conjunction with the psychologists and counsellors.307 Since then, the RRG has expanded its scope to include publication of counter ideological material and conduct of educational programmes for Muslims.308
In a broader context, in order to shore up social resilience, Singapore invested in creation of Inter-Racial Confidence Circles at a municipal level (which was renamed as ‘Inter Racial and Religious Confidence Circles’ in 2007) and Harmony Circles at a micro level in schools, work places etc.309 The purpose of these circles is to build relationships and trust between the communities at peace times so that in times of crisis, these relationships can act as a safety net.310 Similarly, in 2006, the Singaporean government started a ‘Community Engagement Programme’ so as to strengthen the bonds between communities, in order to allow the communities to deal with communal tensions after any untoward incidents.311
4.3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS It is clear from the examination of the responses of the Indian state vis-à-vis the responses of other countries to the threat of violent extremism and radicalization that India lags far behind the global discourse on the issue. Several other States have a well-planned trajectory in the form of National Action Plans (NAP) to counter and prevent radicalization. It is also observable that other countries follow an unambiguous top-down structure in their respective plans. Often,
304 Supra Note 301 (Sabariah Hussin) 305 Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, Keeping the Asatizah Recognition Scheme Updated, Government of Singapore (February 11, 2019), https://www.mccy.gov.sg/about-us/news-and-resources/parliamentary- matters/2019/feb/keeping-the-asatizah-recognition-scheme-updated, (last viewed on 13-05-2019) 306 Supra Note 288 (Rabasa et.al.) 307 Supra Note 301 (Sabariah Hussin) 308 Ibid 309 Gavin Chua Hearn Yuit, Singapore’s Approach to Counter Terrorism, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2 Issue 12, (December 2009) 310 Ibid 311 Stefanie Kam, Singapore’s Approach to Counter Terrorism and Extremism, in GORAWANTSCHY ET.AL (ED.), COUNTERING DAESH EXTREMISM, (2018) 53 the plan itself is centralized at the top or policy level and decentralized at the ground or implementation level. The Indian response, on the other hand, is marked by haphazardly implemented and highly uncoordinated ventures of individual states and/or State agencies.
In light of these and several other deficiencies which have been pointed out throughout the course of this dissertation, it becomes clear that a NAP on countering and prevention of radicalization and violent extremism needs to be formulated. The plan should be preceded by the creation of dedicated fund to finance the research into aspects of radicalization and the remedial measures required to thwart it. The plan itself must be based upon extensive and in depth research into the dimensions, causes, factors, actors of radicalization and the manner of propagation of radical ideology in India as pointed out in chapter III of this dissertation.
The NAP should be clear about the point of interventions in the radicalization process as well as the type of intervention required in accordance to the stage of radicalization at which the individual is situate. This however, comes with a caveat that the design of the interventions should be made keeping in mind the fundamental rights of the individuals under the Constitution (Appendix B). The intervention can come in the form of a de-radicalization programme if the individual has already committed unlawful activities, terrorist act, offences against public tranquillity and offences against the State (Appendix A). Such a programme must address the need of re-education, reformation and reintegration with the objective of rehabilitation. Another intervention can come through counter radicalization programmes when the individual is not radicalized enough to commit the offences (under Appendix A) but is in the process of radicalization. The response of the State in these cases should include re- education, rehabilitation and reintegration with the objective of mitigation.
A third type of intervention can be through anti-radicalization programmes where the objective is prevention of radicalization. These measures can range from development and dissemination of counter narratives to the mainstreaming of communities at risk of radicalization through socio economic development and education. However, this intervention must be based upon the precepts of community engagement including help from religious clerics, moderate organizations and the civil society in general. Even though the primary task of detection of radicalized individual remains with the police, the NAP should work towards training front line professionals such as doctors, teachers and social workers as well as the parents, partners, uncles and aunts etc. to recognize the symptoms of radicalization. Further, the NAP should establish Cultural and Religious Councils in districts comprised of eminent and respectable
54 personalities of the local communities for the purpose of strengthening social resilience and maintaining harmony.
The NAP must create a superstructure of authorities responsible for implementing the plan and must devolve the primary responsibility to authorities at a district level. Further, it must delegate the responsibilities to the respective authorities in meticulous detail i.e. the composition, role, responsibility, function, procedure and powers of the authorities must be expressly provided for within the NAP.
In order to assess if an individual is radicalized or not, or to judge the extent of radicalization and to set the machinery created under the NAP in motion, a District Committee comprising of District Judges and/or judicial magistrates, psychologists, psycho-social workers, sociologists and criminologists can be created in each district.
Another authority that can be created is that of a District Board consisting of psychologists, psycho-social workers and criminologists trained in the counselling of individuals who fall within the purview of de-radicalization and counter radicalization programmes. The District Board would be in charge of the implementation of the de-radicalization and counter radicalization programmes, both within prisons and outside, respectively. The District Board should tailor the programmes in accordance with the type of radical ideology the individual subscribes to after considering the opinion of the Cultural and Religious Council in the district.
The judiciary must be empowered to refer an individual to the District Boards for the administration of the de-radicalization programme in cases where the offence has already been committed. Where the offence has not been committed, the police, doctors, psychologists and teachers must be empowered to refer an individual exhibiting symptoms of radicalization to the District Committee after whose clearance, the counter radicalization programme can be administered under the supervision of the District Board.
It is equally important that the victim of an offence (under Appendix A) be rehabilitated effectively and efficiently. For this purpose, the NAP must also establish a relief fund for such victims as well as the creation of a district authority dedicated to provide short term, medium term and long term relief – both material and psychological to the victims of such crimes. This will work to ensure that such victimisation doesn’t lead to further radicalization and polarization in the society.
55
The NAP must also create a nodal centre to coordinate between the authorities and monitor the implementation of the NAP. In order to ensure that the provisions of the NAP are implemented in each state, the States must be encouraged to adopt and implement the NAP through incentives. Legislative changes must be made in the Criminal Justice System to facilitate the application of the NAP by the states. The nodal centre must be empowered with provisions to impose penalties upon errant states governments and/or district officers.
The Nodal centre should also be in charge of data collection with respect to the successes and failures of the programmes implemented under the NAP. The data should be collected at regular intervals and should be shared amongst the various states as well as with researchers in order to facilitate the creation of a common pool of resource to fill the lacunae in the knowledge base. At the same time, the privacy of the individuals undergoing the de-radicalization and counter radicalization programmes should be respected.
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CHAPTER 5
LEGISLATION BASED REMEDIAL MEASURES
Currently our legislations provide for a number of offences under the IPC as well as the SLLs which make punishable certain offences that fall under the purview of the dissertation by being in the nature of extremism, violent extremism or terrorism. The list of the offences and the remedies available to the state in terms of punishment for a varying degree and nature of offences has been annexed with the dissertation as ‘Appendix A.’
If the policy recommendations made in the preceding chapter are to find a practical implementation in India, they must be complemented by structural changes in the criminal justice system. It becomes clear from a perusal of the nature of offences and the punishment laid down in the list of offences (Appendix A) that the object behind the sentencing policy seems to rely overwhelmingly upon the principles of deterrence and/or retribution.
Radicalization, however, cannot be tackled by merely this approach. Given the nature and scope of the problem of radicalization, the thrust of the legislations should be upon the principle of reformation and rehabilitation of the individual. For this purpose, the researcher offers two solutions that must inform any legislation based reformation of the criminal justice system.
5.1. DEFINITIONS In order to achieve uniformity in the legal understanding of radicalization across the country, it is imperative that the term ‘radicalization’ must be defined statutorily in the UAPA or preferably, through dedicated Act of the Parliament. It should however be noted that radicalization in and off itself should not be considered to be a punishable offence given that a radicalized individual is entitled to hold a particular view till the time he does not cross the boundaries of enumerated by law (Appendix A). Radicalization is a process that leads to adoption of an extremist world view. It acts more as a catalyst than an offence.
Furthermore, the definition should avoid being vague and should specify the nature of radicalization in value neutral terms by avoiding the mention of particular ideas and ideology given that India is plagued by varied forms of radicalization. At the same time, the definitions should keep in mind that no constitutional or fundamental right (Appendix B) is violated through such definition.
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In light of these considerations, the researcher submits that the following definition of radicalization should be enacted:
5.1.1. RADICALIZATION
‘Any process that, through the use of personal, electronic or any other modes of communication by any radicalizer, results in exposure to and imbibing of a set of ideas by an individual or a group, and devolves into the promotion of or manifest acts of – unlawful activities, terrorism, violent extremism, offences against the state and offences against public tranquillity; or increases the likelihood thereof.’
Explanation 1: The term ‘radicalizer’ refers to any person or organization that promotes the use of personal, electronic or any other form of communication for the purpose of radicalization through creation and/or dissemination of a set of ideas.
Explanation 2: The phrase ‘set of ideas’ includes regional, cultural, religious, political ideas or any other ideas which devolve into the acts mentioned in the definition.
Explanation 3: The definition of term ‘unlawful activities’ is in pari materia with the definition of the term under section 2(o) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as amended in 2013,
Provided that the term ‘disaffection’ used in the definition has the same meaning as that under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Explanation 4: The term ‘terrorism’ has the same meaning as the term ‘terrorist act’ as defined in Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as amended in 2013.
Provided that production, smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency or coin under Section 15(iii)(a) shall not be included in such definition.
Explanation 5: The term ‘violent extremism’ includes forms of ideologically motivated violence which fall short of the act of terrorism.312
Explanation 6: The phrase ‘offences against the state’ includes all offences under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 except sections 127,128,129 and 130.
312 United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. A/70/674 (December 24, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674, accessed on 13-05-2019 58
Explanation 7: The phrase ‘offences against public tranquillity’ includes all offences under Chapter VIII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Explanation 8: The phrase ‘increases the likelihood’ refers to the preparation and/or conspiracy for commission of unlawful activities, terrorism, violent extremism, offences against the state and offences against public tranquillity as defined above.
Provided that no individual or group shall be deemed to be radicalizers, radicalized or at risk of radicalization on grounds only of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, culture, caste, place of birth or residence unless accompanied by the promotion of or manifestation of acts mentioned above or an increased likelihood thereof.
Provided further that no individual or group shall be deemed to be radicalizers, radicalized or at risk of radicalization on the grounds only of non-conformity with moral, social, cultural, religious or political values prevailing in the society unless accompanied by the promotion of or manifestation of acts mentioned above or an increased likelihood thereof.’
Provided further that no individual or group shall be deemed to be radicalizers, radicalized or at risk of radicalization on the mere apprehension of the same without corroboration by material evidence admissible in a court of law.
This definition should be read in light of the other provisions seeking to counter and prevent such radicalization Therefore, the remedies to thwart and prevent radicalization should be defined concurrently in order to reinforce the rehabilitative and/or preventative nature of the provisions. This entails a statutory definition of ‘de-radicalization’, ‘counter radicalization’, ‘anti-radicalization’ and ‘disengagement’. The following definitions may be considered for the purpose:
5.1.2. DE-RADICALIZATION
‘All processes, which through programmes, policies and other measures, aim at severing the ideological commitment of the radicalized individual and positively changing the radical belief system of the radicalized individual through reformation; re-education; rehabilitation and reintegration – after surrender, after being remanded to judicial custody or after conviction.
Explanation 1: The term – ‘radicalized individual’ refers to the person who commits any of the acts mentioned in the definition of radicalization.
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Explanation 2: The term – ‘ideological commitment’ refers to – firstly, the attachment of the radicalized individual to the group, wherever applicable; and secondly, the attachment of the radicalized individual to the set of radical ideas.
Explanation 3: The term – ‘re-education’ refers to exposure of the radicalized individual to moderate sets of ideas in line with constitutional values.’
5.1.3. COUNTER RADICALIZATION
‘All processes, which through programmes, policies and other measures, aim at mitigation of the radicalization process through re-education, rehabilitation and reintegration of the individual undergoing radicalization prior to their conviction, remand to judicial custody or preventive detention.
Explanation: The phrase ‘individual undergoing radicalization’ refers to the person with an increased likelihood of commission of acts referred to in the definition of radicalization.
Provided that no individual shall be subjected to any such programmes, policies and measures without an advice to such effect by a District Committee consisting of district judges or judicial magistrates, sociologists, criminologists, psycho-social workers headed by a qualified clinical psychologist appointed for the purpose.’
5.1.4. ANTI RADICALIZATION
‘All processes, which through programmes, policies and other measures, aim at prevention of radicalization process through constructive deterrence at the pre radicalization stage or at the early stages of radicalization.
Explanation: The phrase ‘constructive deterrence’ refers to positive interventions by the legislature and the executive which are aimed at – constructing and consolidating the trust between the “Indian state” and “the individual, the communities, the associations and other classes of citizens”; development and dissemination of counter narratives to counter radical ideas; dissemination and promotion of constitutional values and other such measures which aim to prevent radicalization.’
5.1.5. DISENGAGEMENT
‘All processes, which through programmes, policies and other measures, aim at cessation of violence and other such changes in behavioural outcomes of the radicalized individual.
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Explanation: The term – ‘radicalized individual’ refers to the person who commits any of the acts mentioned in the definition of radicalization.’
5.2. THEORY OF PUNISHMENT As is observable from the punishments provided for in the list of offences (Appendix A), the judges are left with little or no scope to refer the individual charged with the commission of an unlawful activity; terrorist act; offences against the state; and offences against public tranquillity to a de-radicalization programme given that the statutes provide only for punishments such as death sentences, imprisonment and fine.
However, the current academic discourse as well as pragmatic experiences of other jurisdictions suggest that relying solely on deterrence or retribution, does little to break the ideological commitment of the radicalized individual to the group.313 Similarly, punishments such as solitary confinement within prison usually only work to reinforce the beliefs of the individual.314
As far back as in 1980, SC in the case of Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr.315 had observed that:
“It is true that there appears to be a modern trend of giving punishment a colour of reformation so that stress may be laid on the reformation of the criminal rather than his confinement in jail which is an ideal objective. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that such an objective cannot be achieved without mustering the necessary facilities, the requisite education and the appropriate climate which must be created to foster a sense of repentance and penitence in a criminal so that he may undergo such a mental or psychological revolution that he realises the consequences of playing with human lives. In the world of today and particularly in our country, this ideal is yet to be achieved and, in fact, with all our efforts it will take us a long time to reach this sacred goal.”
It is necessary, therefore, to amend the IPC, SLLs as well as the CrPC to reflect the value of reformation by allowing the judges the power to order for an individual to be administered de- radicalization programmes supervised by the District Boards after taking the opinion of the
313 C. Jones, When Foreign Fighter Return: Managing Terrorists Behind Bars, The Conversation, (September 02, 2014), https://theconversation.com/when-foreign-fighters-return-managing-terrorists-behind-bars-31054, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 314 Ibid 315 AIR 1980 SC 2147 61
District Committee. These forms of sentences can run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment or when the individual has been remanded to judicial custody. It may also form a condition for the grant of parole or bail to the offender.
Further, in the Maru Ram case itself, the SC went onto warn that “while reformation of the criminal is only one side of the picture, rehabilitation of the victims and granting relief from the tortures and suffering which are caused to them as a result of the offences committed by the criminals is a factor which seems to have been completely overlooked while defending the cause of the criminals for abolishing deterrent sentences.” Therefore, it is imperative that the judges should also be empowered statutorily under section 357, CrPC, to order for the relief to the victims of the offences, in the form of access to justice, assistance, rehabilitation and compensation.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In May 2010, the then Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, remarked that Naxalism was the single greatest threat to India’s internal security.316 It is not Naxalism, or for that matter any other terrorist or extremist organization, however, which in and of itself presents the threat. Instead, it is the process of radicalization that makes an individual a Naxalite. Throughout the dissertation it has been emphasized that the problem of radicalization cannot be tackled through the conventional theories of criminalization and punishment. The nature of concern highlighted here points towards an integration of national security concerns and the criminal justice system.317
In this context, Lucia Zedner warns us that “the growing importance of risk assessment and prudentialism whose coalescence in the ‘new penology’ or actuarial justice has signified a marked shift away from the largely retrospective orientation of the criminal justice process.”318 She claims that it’s led us instead to a pre-crime and pre-punishment society.319 This strand of thought proffers that the ‘preventive’ framework of counter terrorism laws seek to criminalize conduct and use the criminal justice process, as well as the coercive sanctions, by labelling the conduct as being related to terrorism without paying any heed to the aspect of harm or intention.320
It is imperative to clarify at this juncture, that the nature of the discourse should not be to ‘criminalize’ radicalization or even to use the coercive nature of criminal law as a preventative tool. To the contrary, it is the ideological process that underlines the decision making process leading up to the offence that the discourse on radicalization seeks to understand. The focus, therefore, should not be upon the actual or potential offence.
316 Press Trust of India, Naxalism Biggest Threat to Internal Security: Manmohan, The Hindu, (May 24, 2010), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Naxalism-biggest-threat-to-internal-security- Manmohan/article16302952.ece, (last visited on 13-05-2019) 317 Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering, Pre Crime and Counter Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in the War on Terrorism, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 49 No. 5, Criminology and the War on Terror, (2009), pp. 628-645 318 LUCIA ZEDNER, SECURITY, 2009, p. 1 319 Lucia Zedner, Pre Crime and Pre Punishment: A Health Warning, Criminal Justice Matters, Issue 87, March 2012 320 Supra Note 317 (Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering) 63
Understanding the ideological process enables and empowers the State to both intervene strategically to prevent the commission of the act as well as reduce the chances of recidivism if the act has already been committed. In this sense, the strategic interventions proposed by the researcher are not in the nature of criminal sanctions similar to detention or preventive detention, but pertain to the ideals of rehabilitation and reformation with the aim to target the ideological process.
Lastly, the proposed strategic interventions rely heavily upon community engagement with respect to the measures that the interventions must incorporate. Unlike criminal sanctions which often gain legitimacy based on the premise that they are enacted by the representatives of people, the proposed measures rely on a more direct form of citizen participation which can prevent the measures from becoming a coercive tool in the hands of the State. That the proposed measures require the solutions to come from within the communities themselves, also works to minimize the social stigma attached to traditional criminal sanctions.
In conclusion however, it must be stated that the while the proposed measures outline the requirement of a coordinated approach and strategy, the actual strategy itself requires much more inter disciplinary research than the scope of this dissertation permits. There is an urgent need for further in depth research into the pathways of radicalization and the manner in which the de-radicalization, counter radicalization and anti-radicalization programmes from the perspective of philosophy, psychology; sociology; economics; politics; criminology; victimology, penology and law.
Word Count: 23,651 words (including footnotes, but excluding ancillary pages)
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF OFFENCES UNDER IPC AND UAPA
S. NO. LAW SECTION NATURE OF OFFENCE PUNISHMENT
NO. 1. IPC 121 Waging, Attempting to Wage Imprisonment for life or or Abetting war against the Death and/or Fine Government of India 2. IPC 121A Conspiracy to commit offence Imprisonment for life or under s. 121 Imprisonment up to ten years and/or fine 3. IPC 122 Collecting Arms with the Imprisonment for life or intention of waging war Imprisonment up to ten years and/or fine 4. IPC 123 Concealment of design to Imprisonment up to ten wage war years and/or fine 5. IPC 124A Sedition Imprisonment for life or Imprisonment up to 3 years and/or fine 6. IPC 125 Waging war against an Asiatic Imprisonment for life or power in alliance with India Imprisonment for up to 7 years and/or fine 7. IPC 126 Depredations on territories of Imprisonment for up to 7 Power at peace with India years and/or fine 8. IPC 141-143 Unlawful Assembly Imprisonment for up to six months and/or fine 9. IPC 144 Unlawful Assembly with Imprisonment for up to deadly weapon two years and/or fine 10. IPC 145 Joining Unlawful Assembly Imprisonment for up to knowing that it has been two years and/or fine commanded to Disperse
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11. IPC 146-147 Rioting Imprisonment for up to two years and/or fine 12. IPC 148 Rioting armed with deadly Imprisonment for up to weapon three years and/or fine 13. IPC 153A Promoting enmity between Imprisonment for up to different groups on grounds of three years and/or fine religion, race, place of birth, residence etc. and acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony 14. IPC 153A Acts specified if committed in Imprisonment for up to a place of worship five years and/or fine 15. IPC 159 Affray Imprisonment for up to one month and/or fine 16. IPC 300-302 Murder Death or Imprisonment for Life and fine 17. IPC 299+304 Culpable Homicide Not Imprisonment for Life or Amounting to Murder Imprisonment up to ten years and/or fine 18. IPC 307 Attempt to Murder Imprisonment for Life or Imprisonment up to ten years and/or fine 19. IPC 308 Attempt to commit culpable Imprisonment for homicide up to three year and/or fine Imprisonment for up to seven years and/or fine (where hurt has been caused) 20. IPC 376(2)(g) Rape during communal or Imprisonment for ten sectarian violence years or imprisonment for the remainder of a
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person’s natural life and fine 21. UAPA 10(a) Being a member of an Imprisonment for up to unlawful association two years and/or fine 22 UAPA 10(b) Being a member of an Death or Life unlawful association and Imprisonment and/or fine doing an act or promoting the (where death results due object of the association while to the act) being in possession of Life Imprisonment or unlicensed firearm, Imprisonment for five ammunition, explosive or years and/or fine substance of mass destruction. (In all other cases) 23. UAPA 11 Dealing with funds of an Imprisonment for up to unlawful association despite three years and/or fine prohibitory orders 24. UAPA 13(1) Unlawful activities Imprisonment for up to seven years and/or fine 25. UAPA 13(2) Assistance of unlawful Imprisonment for up to activity by an association five years and/or fine declared unlawful 26. UAPA 16 Terrorist act Death or Imprisonment for with and/or fine. (where death results due to the act) Imprisonment for Life or Imprisonment for up to five years and/or fine (In all other cases) 27. UAPA 17 Raising funds for terrorist act Imprisonment for Life or Imprisonment for up to five years and/or fine
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28. UAPA 18 Conspiracy Imprisonment for Life or Imprisonment for up to five years and/or fine 29. UAPA 18A Organizing terrorist camps Imprisonment for Life or Imprisonment for up to five years and/or fine 30. UAPA 18B Recruitment of person for Imprisonment for Life or terrorist act Imprisonment for up to five years and/or fine 31. UAPA 19 Harbouring or attempt to Imprisonment for Life or harbour or conceal a terrorist Imprisonment for up to three years and/or fine 32. UAPA 20 Being a member of a terrorist Imprisonment for a term gang or organization up to Life and/or fine 33. UAPA 21 Holding proceeds of terrorism Imprisonment for a term up to Life and/or fine 34. UAPA 22 Threatening witness Imprisonment for up to three years and/or fine
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REQUIRING CONSIDERATION
i. The Right to equality through bridled and un-arbitrary use of state powers as well as non-discrimination on the basis only of reasonable classification. (Article 14) ii. The Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression (Article 19(1)(a)) subject to reasonable restrictions on grounds only of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency and morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence under (Article 19(2)). iii. The Right to Freedom of Assembly (Article 19(1)(b)) subject to reasonable restrictions on grounds only of sovereignty and integrity of India or public order (Article 19(3)). iv. The Right to Freedom of Association (Article 19(1))c)) subject to reasonable restrictions on grounds only of sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality (Article 19(4)). v. The Right to Freedom of Association (Article 19(1)(d)) subject to reasonable restriction on grounds of interest of general public (Article 19(5)). vi. The Right Against Expost Facto Law, Double Jeopardy and Self Incrimination (Article 20) vii. All facets of the Right to Life and Personal Liberty (Article 21) as determined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. viii. The Right to Protection Against Arrest and Detention in certain cases (Article 22). ix. The Right to Freedom of Conscience and Free Profession, Practise and Propagation of Religion subject to public order, health and morality (Article 25). x. The Right of Freedom to Manage Religious Affairs subject to public order, morality and health (Article 26). xi. The Right of Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions maintained out of state funds. (Article 27) xii. The Right to Protection of Interests of Minorities (Article 28). xiii. The Right of Minorities to establish and administer educational institutions (Article 29).
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NOTES:
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