Enhancing Anonymity of Anonymous P2P Content Sharing Systems Guanyu Tian
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Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2014 Enhancing Anonymity of Anonymous P2P Content Sharing Systems Guanyu Tian Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES ENHANCING ANONYMITY OF ANONYMOUS P2P CONTENT SHARING SYSTEMS By GUANYU TIAN A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Computer Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2014 Copyright c 2014 Guanyu Tian. All Rights Reserved. Guanyu Tian defended this dissertation on April 15, 2014. The members of the supervisory committee were: Zhenhai Duan Professor Directing Thesis Ming Ye University Representative Gary Tyson Committee Member Zhenghao Zhang Committee Member Zhi Wang Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii I dedicate this dissertation to my family. Without your support and encouragement, none of this work would have been possible. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge several people who have helped and guided me throughout my doctoral program. First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Zhenhai Duan for being my academic advisor and mentor. I am grateful that Dr. Duan has always been there for guiding me through this intensive training process. His constant support and encouragement play an important role in my academic growth. Besides, I would also like to thank my dissertation committee members, Dr. Gary Tyson, Dr. Zhenghao Zhang, Dr. Zhi Wang, and Dr. Ming Ye, for their reviews and comments. Special thanks to Daniel Clawson for helping me meet the deadlines of manuscipt submission and dissertation defense. Last but not least, I would thank all my professors who helped and prepared me with excellent training in the department of Computer Science at Florida State University. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ListofTables.......................................... vii ListofFigures ......................................... viii Abstract............................................. ... ix 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background and Motivation . 1 1.2 Contribution ....................................... 3 1.3 StructureoftheDissertation . 5 2 An Overview of Anonymous Networks 6 2.1 Anonymous Communication System Tor.............................................. 7 2.2 Anonymous Content Sharing System Freenet,GNUnet,andOneSwarm. 9 2.2.1 Freenet ....................................... 9 2.2.2 GNUnet . 13 2.2.3 OneSwarm ..................................... 15 3 Traceback Attack on Freenet 18 3.1 Introduction...................................... 18 3.2 Traceback Attack on Freenet . 20 3.2.1 ConnectingtoaFreenetNode. 20 3.2.2 Querying a Neighbor . 22 3.2.3 Identifying All Nodes Seeing A Content Request Message . 24 3.2.4 Difficulties in Identifying Originating Machine . 25 3.2.5 Identifying Originating Machine . 28 3.3 Performance Evaluation . 32 3.3.1 ExperimentalStudies .............................. 32 3.3.2 SimulationStudies ................................. 38 3.4 Discussion........................................ 42 3.5 RelatedWork........................................ 44 4 DynID: Thwarting the Traceback Attack on Freenet 45 4.1 Introduction...................................... 45 4.2 Background . 47 4.3 DynID to Thwart Traceback Attack . 49 4.4 Performance Evaluation . 57 4.4.1 Simulation Set-up . 57 4.4.2 Results ....................................... 58 v 5 ROL: Reroute-On-Loop in Anonymous P2P Content Sharing Networks 61 5.1 Introduction...................................... 61 5.2 Background . 63 5.2.1 Freenet ....................................... 64 5.2.2 GNUnet . 65 5.2.3 OneSwarm ..................................... 67 5.3 Reroute On Loop . 67 5.4 Performance Evaluation . 74 5.4.1 Simulation Setup . 74 5.4.2 SimulationResults ................................. 77 5.5 RelatedWork........................................ 86 5.6 Conclusion ......................................... 87 6 Related Work 88 7 Summary 91 Bibliography .......................................... 93 BiographicalSketch ..................................... 97 vi LIST OF TABLES 3.1 Resultsofexperimentalstudies. 34 3.2 Classification of messages successfully traced back. 34 3.3 Properties of message paths. 35 3.4 Resultsofsimulationstudies. 40 3.5 Classification of messages successfully traced back (simulation). 40 3.6 Properties of message paths (simulation). 41 4.1 Thenumberofsuccessfulcontentlookuprequests . 58 4.2 Properties of message forwarding paths. 59 5.1 Properties of the networks used in simulations. 77 5.2 Average routing path lengths of Freenet and ROL. 78 5.3 Number of messages in loops. 83 5.4 Average routing path lengths on hybrid networks with parameters of S2. 83 5.5 Average routing path lengths on hybrid networks with parameters of S3. 84 5.6 Average routing path lengths on hybrid networks with parameters of S11. 84 vii LIST OF FIGURES 2.1 HowTorworks........................................ 7 2.2 Circuit creation on Tor . 8 2.3 Freenetroutingscheme .............................. 11 2.4 Indirectingandforwarding ............................ 16 3.1 Illustration of the traceback attack. 23 3.2 Case 1: nj forwarding request to nk−1............................ 24 3.3 Case 2: nk−1 forwarding request to nj, but backtracked from nj. 24 3.4 Case 3: No message forwarding between nj and nk−1................... 24 3.5 Length distribution of linear paths. 37 3.6 Length distribution of linear reverse paths. 38 3.7 Length distribution of linear paths (simulation). 42 3.8 Length distribution of linear reverse paths (simulation). 43 4.1 Basic structure of the traceback attack . 47 4.2 A forwarding path with loop. 51 4.3 Can node j forward a message to node k if node h is more preferred? . 55 5.1 Forwarding of a content request message. 70 5.2 Implication of HTL operation. 71 5.3 Average routing path length (small-world networks). 79 5.4 Average routing path length (random networks) . 80 5.5 Distribution of routing path lengths (small-world networks). 81 5.6 Distribution of routing path lengths (random networks) . 82 5.7 Comparison of forwarding path lengths between Freenet and ROL (small-world net- works)............................................. 85 5.8 Comparison of returning path lengths between Freenet and ROL’s shortcut (small- worldnetworks) ....................................... 86 viii ABSTRACT Anonymous networks play a critical role in supporting free speech and user privacy on the Internet. Over the years, many fundamental algorithms and schemes have been proposed to facilitate the development of anonymous networks, including mix networks, onion routing, per-hop (source) address re-writing and message forwarding, and various cryptographic algorithms. In addition, many practical anonymous networks have been developed and some are deployed on the Internet. On the other hand, despite the adoption of these well-established high-level security schemes and algorithms in such networks, the fine-grained design and development decisions of such networks have not been thoroughly examined. As a consequence, vulnerabilities in existing anonymous networks have been continuously identified and existing anonymous networks have been constantly attacked. In this dissertation we take a pragmatic approach to investigate how fine-grained design and development decisions may affect the anonymity strength of anonymous networks, and more im- portantly, how we can develop proper fine-grained decisions to improve the anonymity strength of anonymous networks. Throughout the course, we focus on Freenet, a popular peer-to-peer anonymous content sharing network. In the first part of the work, we thoroughly investigate the fine-grained decisions made in the Freenet project, including methods to prevent routing loop of content request messages, the handling of various messages in Freenet, and mechanisms for a Freenet node to populate and update its routing table. An effective traceback attack has been developed that can identify the originating machine of a content request message. That is, the anonymity of a content retriever can be broken in Freenet, even if only a single request message has been issued from the corresponding machine. The traceback attack exploited a few fine-grained design and development decisions made in Freenet, including the unique identifier (UID) based mechanism to prevent routing loops of content request messages. In the second part of our work, we investigate mechanisms to improve the anonymity of Freenet. In particular, we have developed a simple and effective scheme named dynID to thwart the traceback attack on Freenet. In dynID, the UID associated with a content request message is dynamically changed at the beginning portion of the message forwarding path. As a consequence, an attacker can only trace back a content request message to the node where the UID value is last changed; it ix cannot uniquely determine the originating machine of the message. Importantly, dynID only has negligible impacts on the performance of Freenet in locating content on the network. For example, our simulation studies based on the original Freenet source code show that, for all content requests, we can successfully locate the corresponding requested content. DynID prevents an attacker deterministically