DOCSLIB.ORG

The Role of Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning,” Cornell 38

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Role of Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning,” Cornell 38 Multidimensionality of Legal Singularity: Parametric Analysis and the Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning Dr. Lance B. Eliot Chief AI Scientist, Techbruim; Fellow, CodeX: Stanford Center for Legal Informatics Stanford, California, USA Abstract important parametric analysis of the Legal Singularity. Legal scholars have in the last several years embarked The final section, Section 5, covers additional upon an ongoing discussion and debate over a considerations and future research. potential Legal Singularity that might someday occur, involving a variant or law-domain offshoot leveraged This paper then consists of these five sections: from the Artificial Intelligence (AI) realm amid its • Section 1: Background of The Singularity many decades of deliberations about an overarching • Section 2: Legal Singularity and generalized technological singularity (referred to classically as The Singularity). This paper examines • Section 3: Autonomous Levels of AI Legal the postulated Legal Singularity and proffers that such Reasoning AI and Law cogitations can be enriched by these three • Section 4: Legal Singularity Multidimensionality, facets addressed herein: (1) dovetail additionally Alignment with LoA AILR salient considerations of The Singularity into the Legal • Section 5: Additional Considerations and Future Singularity, (2) make use of an in-depth and Research innovative multidimensional parametric analysis of the Legal Singularity as posited in this paper, and (3) align Since the word “singularity” is used in at least two and unify the Legal Singularity with the Levels of contexts within this paper, one context being an Autonomy (LoA) associated with AI Legal Reasoning overarching or grandiose kind of singularity, typically (AILR) as propounded in this paper. referred to as The Singularity, and the other being a Keywords: AI, artificial intelligence, autonomy, singularity specific to the field of law, known as the autonomous levels, legal reasoning, law, lawyers, Legal Singularity, the convention in this paper will be practice of law, The Singularity, Legal Singularity that whenever referring to the Legal Singularity this will be done by stating “Legal Singularity” or by the abbreviation of “LS,” while the larger The Singularity 1 Background of The Singularity will be referred to as the “singularity” or “AI singularity” or “Technological singularity,” and when In section 1 of the paper, the topic of The Singularity desiring to especially emphasize such a reference it is introduced and addressed. Doing so establishes the will be stated as The Singularity (such an emphasize is groundwork for section 2, covering a form of done solely for drawing attention to the matter and not singularity that has come to be known as the Legal due to suggesting any differences of meaning or Singularity (LS), considered to be an offshoot or a connotation). domain-specific variant of the overarching The Singularity. Section 3 indicates the Levels of 1.1 Understanding The Singularity Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR), which will be instrumental in the discussions A longstanding discussion and debate in the field of undertaken in Section 4. Section 4 then provides an in- Artificial Intelligence entails a controversy referred to depth analysis of the Legal Singularity as it relates to as The Singularity [9] [14] [28] [39]. Sometimes also the LoA of AI Legal Reasoning and lays out an 1 coined as the AI Singularity or the Technological Singularity, the concept underlying the matter is Here is Good’s [36] definition associated with the relatively ill-defined and has substantively varied in capabilities envisaged: “Let an ultra-intelligent details of its meaning and substance over the now machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass many years of its postulation (dating back to the all the intellectual activities of any man however 1950s). clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultra-intelligent machine Often first-traced to commentary by the famous could design even better machines; there would then mathematician and pioneering computer scientist John unquestionably be an intelligence explosion, and the von Neumann, here is what researcher Ulman [58] in intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus, the 1958 indicated had occurred in a conversation with first ultra-intelligent machine is the last invention that Von Neumann: “One conversation centered on the man need ever make.” ever-accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the appearance In this initial elucidation of the topic by Good, a key of approaching some essential singularity in the facet that has become inextricably woven into the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we singularity rubric is the speculative idea of an know them, could not continue.” intelligence explosion. In short, if mankind can craft an AI system to some threshold of intelligence, it is Essentially, the sentiment at the time was that presumed that the AI could then further progress, computers might eventually be able to achieve human essentially on its own accord, by using its core base of intelligence, potentially even eclipsing human intelligence to further produce more intelligence. No intelligence, and the result could be problematic for one as yet knows what this minimum threshold might humanity. Of course, similar exhortations have been be, and nor is there any viable means to anticipate how replete in science fiction, though typically proffered by far the presumed intelligence explosion might proceed imaginative writers with unsupported visions rather in terms of the upper limits of some unknown super- than by bona fide scientists that are making such intelligence, raising the perennial question of how high speculations based on their assessment of the is up, as it were. underlying technology and attempting to anticipate future outcomes. That’s not to suggest that those Pursuing for the moment the somewhat tangential but scientists will necessarily be on par with predicting the relevant question concerning the notion of an future, and there are many documented instances of intelligence explosion, let’s consider the ramifications scientists that were wildly off-the-target and baseless of such a phenomenon, if indeed possible (no one in their prophesizing. In short, expertise in a subject knows whether it is or not). Similar to questions that matter is a worthwhile basis for providing meaningful arose during the creation of the atom bomb, whereby predictions, nonetheless, that expertise can still be scientists were somberly worried that the ignition and misguided or mistaken as to what the future might exploding of an atomic bomb might somehow catch hold. hold and violently and rapidly spread across the globe in an unheralded conflagration, some assert that the In 1965, Oxford researcher Irving John Good [36] same might happen in the case of an intelligence published a cornerstone research paper that extended explosion. To wit, the intelligence being produced the singularity notion and tied the topic to the might magnify and expand, for which the result could emergence of computers that might be considered as be to have humans seem like mere ants in intelligence ultra-intelligent, commonly today referred to as aiming versus the super-intelligence spawned by AI. Again, to be super-intelligent or super-human in capability. some view this outcome as disastrous for humanity, Rather than emphasizing the dangers associated with possibly being enslaved by a super-intelligent AI, mankind developing an ultra-intelligent machine, while others believe that mankind might be saved due Good [36] urged that the survival of humanity to an artificial super-intelligence that could solve the depended on being able to craft such a system and gravest problems confronting the survivability of indeed ought to be done as soon as possible: “The humans. survival of man depends on the early construction of an ultra-intelligent machine.” 2 In his research, Good attempted to outline some of the Arguments ensue as to which of those is the overall features or elements that seemed at the time to “singularity” and also whether they must be combined potentially be required to achieve an AI super- or co-existent to count as the singularity occurring. intelligence. For example, he debated those theories of Perhaps “a” or arrival at human intelligence is the period concerning a tremendous amount of mandatory for getting to “b,” though others contend parallelism that would be needed, a facet of modern- that it is possible that an AI decidedly less-than-human day computers that were not especially viable when intelligence levels might percolate via “c” per an Good [36] wrote his paper in the 1960s: “It cannot be intelligence explosion and then nearly instantaneously regarded as entirely certain that an ultra-intelligent exceed “a” and arrive at “b,” thus never especially machine would need to be ultraparallel since the settling down at the mere capacity of human number of binary operations per second performed by intelligence. Others argue that there is not anything the brain might be far greater than is necessary for a feasibly beyond human intellectual capacities, computer made of reliable components. Neurons are regardless of how adept the AI might be, and as such not fully reliable; for example, they do not all last a the achievement of human intelligence is the capstone lifetime; yet the brain is extremely efficient. This limit. In that case, the singularity would be solely efficiency must depend partly on ‘redundancy’ in the about the “a” and not take into account the “b” and “c” sense in which the term is used in information theory. postulates which are deemed as impossible and a false A machine made of reliable components would have aspiration. an advantage, and it seems just possible that ultraparallel working will not be essential. But there is Additionally, some assert that a super-intelligence a great waste in having only a small proportion of the might be reached without any need for and indeed no components of a machine active at any one time.” occurrence at all of an intelligence explosion.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Philosophy of Technology for Computational Law
    © Mireille Hildebrandt, draft chapter for OUP’s The Philosophical Foundations of Information Technology Law, eds. David Mangan, Catherine Easton, Daithí Mac Síthigh A philosophy of technology for computational law Abstract: This chapter confronts the foundational challenges posed to legal theory and legal philosophy by the surge of computational law. Two types of computational law are at stake. On the one hand we have artificial intelligence in the legal realm that will be addressed as data-driven law, and on the other hand we have the coding of self-executing contracts and regulation in the blockchain, as well as other types of automated decision making (ADM), addressed as code-driven law. Data-driven law raises problems due to its autonomic operations and the ensuing opacity of its reasoning. Code-driven law presents us with a conflation of regulation, execution and adjudication. Though such implications are very different, both types of computational law share assumptions based on the calculability and computability of legal practice and legal research. Facing the assumptions and implications of data- and code-driven law the chapter will first investigate the affordances of current, text-driven law, and relate some of the core tenets of the Rule of Law to those affordances. This will lead to an enquiry into what computational law affords in terms of legal protection, assuming that one of the core functions of the law and the Rule of Law is to protect what is not computable. Keywords: positive law, rule of law, legal certainty, justice,
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Technology & Informatics: Syllabus
    Legal Technology & Informatics: Syllabus Think Outside The Bar Notre Dame Law School ­ Spring Semester, 2015 Ron Dolin, JD, PhD, Co­Instructor Jason Boehmig, JD, Co­Instructor Synopsis:​ Legal technology is rapidly transforming both the practice and nature of law. This class seeks to explore both the current trends and the future possibilities of this transformation, as we begin to train the future generation of technology savvy lawyers, and technologists who understand the intricacies and potential of what the law could be. Legal informatics could be defined as a computational perspective of law: where does legal information reside, and how is it manipulated and transmitted? Note that there are no prerequisites for this class beyond an interest in the subject. There are numerous examples of technologically driven legal transformation. Case law search has moved from hard copy to closed digital systems such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, and into free cloud­based systems such as Google Scholar and Ravel Law. More and more statutes are available online. Changes can be seen in e­discovery, privacy, the delivery of (online) legal services, and the budding legal technology startup community. As a result, questions arise as to the proper statutory and ethical framework for the legal profession and the boundaries between humans and machines in implementing legal functions. Beyond the current and near­term technologies, however, are core academic and philosophical questions that will have increasing import as machines gain in sophistication and capability.
    [Show full text]
  • Dan Katz on Legal Informatics, Corporate Law Firm Ownership and 21St Century Legal Education September 20, 2011 Dan Katz
    Dan Katz on Legal Informatics, Corporate Law Firm Ownership and 21st Century Legal Education September 20, 2011 Dan Katz A recent article argues “65 percent of today’s elementary aged kids may end up doing work that hasn’t even yet been invented.” This is a thought provoking number and it points to the disruptive nature of innovation and its impact on a variety of labor markets. There is a portion of the downturn in legal hiring that is associated with the business cycle. When economic conditions improve – there should be a rebound. However, starting even before the recession, it is reasonably clear that a serious structural change was underway. Expect this broader trend to continue. As Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein have argued, we are at the very beginning of Law’s Information Revolution. Whether we like it or not, informatics, computing and technology are going to change both what it means to practice law and to “think like a lawyer.” Yesterday’s Fast is Today’s Slow: For better or for worse, when it comes to building software, there is nothing deeply exceptional about a subset of tasks undertaken by lawyers. In this vein, law is like other industries. The bundle of skills associated with the practice of law falls on a continuum – where a number of basic tasks have already been displaced by computation / automation / “soft” artificial intelligence. Faced with cost pressures, legal information technology is being leveraged to either automate or semi-automate tasks previously performed by teams of lawyers. Namely, a series of first generation innovations such as e-discovery and automated document generation have already imposed significant consequences on the legal services market.
    [Show full text]
  • Communication Models in Law1
    T. Bekrycht: Communication Models in Law 157 COMMUNICATION MODELS IN LAW1 by TOMASZ BEKRYCHT* Communication processes can be generally described with the use of two models. The first one adopts cybernetic perspective, while the second one adopts social per- spective. Cybernetic perspective leads to transmission conception of communication whereas the social one to convergent concept of it. Both communication models are deeply present in the legal discourses, i.e. in lawmaking discourse and discourse of application. The issue related to the analysis of communication models in law is a part of a comprehensive area, which in the literature on the subject is related to the problem of ideology of lawmaking and law application. Dynamic nature of our social and legal reality can be described, on the one hand, by means of the conceptual network of communication models and, on the other hand, by means of many models of law- making and law application created by Jerzy Wróblewski and socio-historical model of lawmaking developed by Ewa Kustra based on the models of law set out in the conception of Phillipe Nonet and Phillip Selznick. The paper describes the position of the above-mentioned models in these discourses. KEYWORDS Modelling, discourse of lawmaking, discourse of law application, communication models 1. INTRODUCTION The issue related to the analysis of communication models in law is a part of a comprehensive area, which in the literature on the subject is related to 1 The following text was prepared as a part of a research grant financed by National Science Center (Poland), No. DEC-2012/05/B/HS5/01111.
    [Show full text]
  • A Comparison of Four Ontologies for the Design of Legal Knowledge Systems ?
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 6: 27–57, 1998. 27 © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. A Comparison of Four Ontologies for the Design of Legal Knowledge Systems ? PEPIJN R. S. VISSER and TREVOR J. M. BENCH-CAPON LIAL – Legal Informatics at Liverpool, Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, P.O. Box 147, Liverpool, L69 7ZF, United Kingdom, (+44) 151 - 794 3792, E-mail: {pepijn, tbc}@csc.liv.ac.uk Abstract. There is a growing interest in how people conceptualise the legal domain for the purpose of legal knowledge systems. In this paper we discuss four such conceptualisations (referred to as on- tologies): McCarty’s language for legal discourse, Stamper’s norma formalism, Valente’s functional ontology of law, and the ontology of Van Kralingen and Visser. We present criteria for a comparison of the ontologies and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the ontologies in relation to these criteria. Moreover, we critically review the criteria. 1. Introduction In the Oxford dictionary the word ontology is defined as the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being (Allen, 1990). The word ontology is used in AI research as well, although its meaning in the latter field is only remotely related to the original metaphysical meaning of the word†. In the latter field, ontologies are loosely defined as ‘explicit conceptualisations of a domain’ (Gruber, 1992). Recently the results of gathering explicit conceptualisations of knowledge-system domains has been recognised as a valuable effort in its own right, deserving of widespread attention (e.g., Wiederhold, 1994, p. 7). This trend can also be seen in the legal domain, for instance, Moles and Dayal argue that researchers in the field of AI and Law should study the (implicit) ‘assumptions being made about the nature of law’ (Moles & Dayal, 1992, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Model and Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning
    AI and Legal Argumentation: Aligning the Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning Dr. Lance B. Eliot Chief AI Scientist, Techbruim; Fellow, CodeX: Stanford Center for Legal Informatics Stanford, California, USA Abstract concerning how to best undertake legal argumentation Legal argumentation is a vital cornerstone of justice, and how to gauge when legal argumentation is being underpinning an adversarial form of law, and accomplished well or performed poorly [10] [41] [46]. extensive research has attempted to augment or undertake legal argumentation via the use of Taking a brief side tangent for purposes of definitional computer-based automation including Artificial clarity, there is pervasive ambiguity about the meaning Intelligence (AI). AI advances in Natural Language of the phrase “legal argumentation” as to its exact Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) have definition and denotations. Likewise, the phrase “legal especially furthered the capabilities of leveraging AI argument” also has varied connotations. To make this for aiding legal professionals, doing so in ways that discussion relatively parsimonious, this paper are modeled here as CARE, namely Crafting, considers that “legal argumentation” shall herein refer Assessing, Refining, and Engaging in legal to the broadest scope of all facets involved in the act of argumentation. In addition to AI-enabled legal argumentation within the field of law. Meanwhile, the argumentation serving to augment human-based phrase “legal argument” will be reserved for use when lawyering, an aspirational goal of this multi- discussing a particular instance or sub-element within disciplinary field consists of ultimately achieving the umbrella of legal argumentation. It is hoped that autonomously effected human-equivalent legal this will enable the discussion to be more readily argumentation.
    [Show full text]
  • An Ontological AI-And-Law Framework for the Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning
    An Ontological AI-and-Law Framework for the Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning Dr. Lance B. Eliot Chief AI Scientist, Techbruim; Fellow, CodeX: Stanford Center for Legal Informatics Stanford, California, USA Abstract At the core of the law is the human cognitive aspects for A framework is proposed that seeks to identify and establish legal reasoning [62], and it is presumed that legal reasoning a set of robust autonomous levels articulating the realm of ultimately underlies all the salient acts of studying, convey- Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning (AILR). Doing ing, and undertaking the practice of law [35] [36]. As such, so provides a sound and parsimonious basis for being able AI as applied to the law is predominantly about the nature to assess progress in the application of AI to the law, and of legal reasoning and how this cognitive act can be under- can be utilized by scholars in academic pursuits of AI legal taken by a computer-based system. Aptly stated by Ghosh reasoning, along with being used by law practitioners and [33]: “AI & Law is a subfield of AI research that focuses on legal professionals in gauging how advances in AI are aid- designing computer programs, or computational models, ing the practice of law and the realization of aspirational that perform or simulate legal reasoning. In other words, AI versus achieved results. A set of seven levels of autonomy & Law is the field of modeling computationally the legal for AI and Legal Reasoning are meticulously proffered and reasoning for the purpose of building tools for legal prac- mindfully discussed.
    [Show full text]
  • Division of Informatics, University of Edinburgh
    I V N E R U S E I T H Y T O H F G E R D I N B U Division of Informatics, University of Edinburgh Centre for Intelligent Systems and their Applications Institute for Adaptive and Neural Computation Institute for Communicating and Collaborative Systems Institute for Computing Systems Architecture Institute of Perception, Action and Behaviour Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science informatics by Michael Fourman Informatics Research Report EDI-INF-RR-0139 Division of Informatics July 2002 http://www.informatics.ed.ac.uk/ informatics Michael Fourman Informatics Research Report EDI-INF-RR-0139 DIVISION of INFORMATICS Centre for Intelligent Systems and their Applications Institute for Adaptive and Neural Computation Institute for Communicating and Collaborative Systems Institute for Computing Systems Architecture Institute of Perception, Action and Behaviour Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science July 2002 entry for ‘informatics’ to appear in International Encyclopedia of Information and Library Science (second edition) (0415259010) John Feather and Paul Sturges eds. Routledge 2002 Abstract : This article is an extended entry in the Routledge International Enclopedia of Information and Library Science. It gives an account of the origins and meaning of the word ‘informatics’, and attempts to give some hint of the scientific depth, intellectual scope, and social importance of the subject, using examples relevant to the intended audience of this encyclopedia. Keywords : informatics Copyright ­c 2002 by Routledge The author and the University of Edinburgh retain the right to reproduce and publish this paper for non-commercial purposes. Permission is granted for this report to be reproduced by others for non-commercial purposes as long as this copyright notice and the reference to the Encyclopedia are reprinted in full in any reproduction.
    [Show full text]
  • Connecting Legal Text to Ontology Concepts and Instances
    D2.4 Ontology population: connecting legal text to ontology concepts and instances Grant Agreement nº: 690974 Project Acronym: MIREL Project Title: MIning and REasoning with Legal texts Website: http://www.mirelproject.eu/ Contractual delivery date: 31/12/2018 Actual delivery date: 31/12/2018 Contributing WP 2 Dissemination level: Public Deliverable leader: UL Contributors: UNITO, CORDOBA, UNIBO, INRIA D2.4 Ontology population: connecting legal text to ontology concepts and instances This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 690974 MIREL- 690974 Page 2 of 55 09/03/2019 D2.4 Ontology population: connecting legal text to ontology concepts and instances Document History Version Date Author Partner Description 0.1 30/11/2010 Livio Robaldo UL Initial draft 1.0 30/12/2017 Livio Robaldo UL Final Version Contributors Partner Name Role Contribution UL Livio Robaldo Editor Main editor of the document UNITO Luigi Di Caro Contributor Writing of specific sections Cordoba Laura Alonso Alemany Contributor Writing of specific sections UNIBO Monica Palmirani Contributor Writing of specific sections INRIA Serena Villata Contributor Writing of specific sections Disclaimer: The information in this document is provided “as is”, and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. MIREL consortium members shall have no liability for damages of any kind including without limitation direct, special, indirect, or consequential damages that may result from the use of these materials subject to any liability which is mandatory due to applicable law. MIREL- 690974 Page 3 of 55 09/03/2019 D2.4 Ontology population: connecting legal text to ontology concepts and instances Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Jurisprudence and Structural Realism
    Campbell University School of Law Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 2017 Jurisprudence and Structural Realism Kevin Lee Campbell University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw Part of the Jurisprudence Commons Recommended Citation Kevin Lee, Jurisprudence and Structural Realism, 5 Legal Issues J 63 (2017). Available at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw/141 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. Jurisprudence and Structural Realism Kevin Lee^ Some Anglophone legal theorists look to analytic philosophy for core presuppositions. For example, the epistemological theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard Quine shape the theories of Dennis Patterson and Brian Leiter, respec­ tively. These epistemologies are anti-foundational since they reject the kind of certain grounding that is exemplified in Cartesian philosophy. And, they are coherentist in that they seek to legitimate truth-claims by reference to entire linguis­ tic systems. While these theories are insightful, the current context of information and communication technologies (ICT) has created new informational concepts and issues. As a result, the analytic epistemologies are increasingly chal­ lenged by alternative perspectives. One such alternative is Structural Realism (SR), which is influential among the nat­ ural sciences, and especially physics. "Informational Struc­ tural Realism," (ISR) is a variant of SR that was introduced by Luciano Floridi.
    [Show full text]
  • The Coming of Age of Legal Technology
    The Coming of Age of Legal Technology September 26, 2016 By Roland Vogl (https://law.stanford.edu/directory/roland-vogl/) Comments (5) (https://law.stanford.edu/2016/09/26/184188/#comments) In mid-August 2016, Uber expanded its reach and acquired the self-driving trucks company Otto (https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/18/uber-acquires-otto-to-lead-ubers-self-driving-car-effort-report-says/). And since mid-September Pittsburgh residents have been able to catch self-driving Uber rides (http://fortune.com/2016/09/14/uber-self-driving-cars-pittsburgh/). The message to Uber drivers is now clear: Don’t rely on Uber providing that extra income for much longer. Return to the Stanford Lawyer homepage (https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer-magazine/#slsnav-the-legal-aggregate)Much has been said in recent years about the impact of proliferating AI (artificial intelligence) on life and work. With regard to the legal services industry, some are also predicting a radical disruption and the era of “robo-lawyers,” suggesting that we are facing an AI- driven revolution that will make lawyers obsolete in the not-too-distant future (https://www.wired.com/2014/03/geeks-guide-karl- schroeder/). Others expect a more gradual evolution where lawyers will standardize and systematize routine activities and streamline the old ways of doing business. This scenario would initially evolve in tandem with the more radical transformation in the way that the expertise of professionals is made available in society (http://www.susskind.com/). In the long run, however, the more radical transformation would dominate, and capable AI systems would eventually displace traditional work.
    [Show full text]
  • From Visualization to Legal Design : a Collaborative and Creative Process
    This is a self-archived – parallel published version of this article in the publication archive of the University of Vaasa. It might differ from the original. From visualization to legal design : a collaborative and creative process Author(s): Berger-Walliser, Gerlinde; Barton, Thomas D.; Haapio, Helena Title: From visualization to legal design : a collaborative and creative process Year: 2017 Version: Accepted manuscript Copyright ©2017 the Authors | American Business Law Journal | Academy of Legal Studies in Business. Published by Wiley. This is the pre- peer reviewed version of the following article: Berger-Walliser, G., Barton, T.D., & Haapio, H., (2017). From visualization to legal design : a collaborative and creative process. American Business Law Journal 54(2), 347–392, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12101. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. Please cite the original version: Berger-Walliser, G., Barton, T.D., & Haapio, H., (2017). From visualization to legal design : a collaborative and creative process. American Business Law Journal 54(2), 347–392. https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12101 From Visualization to Legal Design: A Collaborative and Creative Process Gerlinde Berger-Walliser,* Thomas D. Barton,** and Helena *** Haapio INTRODUCTION I. LEGAL DESIGN: AN EVOLUTION OF THEORY A. MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES: THE EMERGENCE OF DESIGN THINKING B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DESIGN THINKING C. CHALLENGES AND CHANCES OF DESIGN THINKING IN LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING II. A FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL DESIGN A. IDENTIFY USER NEEDS THROUGH OBSERVATION AND EMPATHY B. DEFINE PROJECT GOALS THROUGH COMMUNICATION, VISUALIZATION.
    [Show full text]