An Apology for Mythology

By Joseph Dalton Wright

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Bachelor Arts in the Integral Curriculum of Liberal Arts at Saint Mary’s College

April 16, 2012 Advisor: Ms. Theodora Carlile

Wright, 1

“Whence a lover of myth, too, is in a sense a philosopher, for a myth is composed of wonders” -Aristotle, Metaphysics1

1 Metaphysics, Book A, Chapter Two (Aristotle 1966) Wright, 2

Introduction

What is the self, how does it operate? This question is the theme of Socrates’ final conversation in Plato’s dialogue Phaedo. The first word of the dialogue is αὐτός2

(self), and in the first sentence Plato connects this issue with the mixture of opposites.

“Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?” (Phaedo, 57A) Socrates drank the hemlock and fulfilled the Athenian court’s verdict. Plato uses the word φάρµακον3, which in Greek can mean both medicine and poison. If the φάρµακον is medicine, then Socrates is actually curing an illness, and liberating himself from disease, but is the hemlock medicine or poison? The φάρµακον embodies a critical question: how can opposites reconcile and collaborate? The opposing meanings meet, mix, and coordinate in the

Φάρµακον; a unity-in-opposition of medicine and poison. Plato knows relationships like this are troubling, but the agony is beneficial, for the test reveals how our consciousness connects and creates. Socrates presents several opposites as candidates for reconciliation throughout the dialogue, such as pleasure and pain, and one and many. However, the strangest pair is λόγος4 and µυθος5.

Λόγος and µυθος originally expressed the same thing: word. However, over time they developed differently. On the one hand λόγος comes to mean argument or reason itself, and is the common tool of sophists, rhetoricians, and philosophers. Λόγος aims at discovering the essence of a thing, and tries to determine whether a proposition or

2 Aὐτός, αὐτή, αὐτό, I. Pron. Of 3rd pers., self (Liddell and Scott) 3 Φάρμακον, I. a medicine, drug, remedy II. A poisonous drug, drug, poison (Liddell and Scott) 4 Λόγος, ό, (λέγω) I. the word by which the inward thought is expressed: also II. The inward thought or reason itself. (Liddell and Scott) 5 Μυθος, ό, I. anything delivered by word of mouth, word, speech(Liddell and Scott) Wright, 3 hypothesis is reasonable. On the other, µυθος becomes the property of poets and playwrights. Myth expresses a mystery. The two words change over time with the occupations employing them, disassociate, and become traditional opposites; for poets and philosophers conflict. The poet sees the philosopher as already dead, hyper-rational, and a rejecter of the body.

O human being, desiring great wisdom from us, how happy you will become among Athenians and the Greeks!—if you have a good memory, and are a thinker, and have hard labor in your soul, and aren’t wearied either by standing or walking, and aren’t too much annoyed when you shiver with cold, and have no desire to dine, and keep away from wine and gymnastics and other mindless things, and believe that it is best (which is likely for a shrewd man) to win by being active and taking counsel and warring with your tongue. (Chorus, Aristophanes’ Clouds 411-419)

Conversely, the philosopher is suspicious of the poet, for poets are merely mimetic, and do not attempt to discover the causes of things. “Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing.” (Phaedo, 39B) The philosopher and poet are at odds, and therefore so are λόγος and µυθος. Plato challenges this segregation, however, and unites them in philosophy.

Socrates is unquestionably a master of argument, employing rhetoric and dialectic, but in the Phaedo he is also poetic. Socrates incorporates λόγος and µυθος in this dialogue, and this fact suggests that they are both essential to philosophy and to discern the self, but why? What is one lacking that the other possesses? Why does

Socrates propose a philosophy that combines something rational, such as λόγος, with Wright, 4 something mystical, such as µυθος? This question also perplexes Cebes, a sharp and keen companion of Socrates:

Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop’s fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. (Phaedo, 60D)

Cebes desires clarification; he wants to know why Socrates, a lover of wisdom, thinks myths are philosophic expressions. Similarly, we must also try to unravel this obscure relationship and discover why Socrates reconnects λόγος and µυθος. For both are necessary to investigate what the self is.

Purpose of Essay

This essay investigates the relationship between λόγος and µυθος. A relationship is unclear when one of the two objects lacks a definition. This is precisely the case with myth. Defining myth is difficult because its function is not apparent. What a myth actually expresses is mysterious, and, therefore, potentially can accomplish anything.

Some may claim myth is definable, but they are really only defining their perception of it.

Indeed, myths are not definable, limitless. To grasp how myth and reason relate in philosophy, we must build an idea of myth by examining how Plato uses myth.

This essay’s aim is to clarify how Plato uses myth, not to provide theories which do not stem from the text. Doing so would be detrimental to a proper interpretation of the dialogue. Instead, the essay will construct a concept of myth from the text. In his

Classical Mythology, R. J. Lenardon discusses the impossibility of establishing a universal theory for myth: Wright, 5

One thing is certain: no single theory of myth can cover all myths. The variety of traditional tales is matched by the variety of their origins and significance, so that any monolithic theory cannot succeed in achieving universal applicability. (Lenardon 1977)

Therefore, conforming Plato’s myths to a foreign theory for myth is irresponsible.

Similarly, we must abandon all previous prejudices for myth. However, if a reader requires some kind of concept before proceeding, I suggest adopting a very broad understanding of myth as a story or fable. This establishes something simple to build with, without restricting growth.

The normal procedure for studying the relationship between two objects calls for a study of each alone, by itself. This process is analogous to a jigsaw puzzle, for an understanding of each piece is crucial before fitting them together. However, this essay cannot offer such a luxury. For Plato weaves the development of philosophy and myth together. Each myth refers back to philosophy and forces us to recognize their connection. One introduces, informs, and elaborates on the other. The investigation is especially difficult because Plato does not deal with philosophy and myth in a similar manner. On the one hand is philosophy. Socrates clearly communicates, that is in the

Phaedo, what philosophy is, what it studies, and how philosophers ought to live. On the other is myth, which does not receive any kind of articulation. Further, Socrates uses myths as foundations for his arguments, yet he does not elaborate on their purpose. Plato is placing emphasis on myth while leaving it elusive. Plato does this in order to develop our understanding of myth, and force us to constantly consider what myths are and what they can achieve. Therefore, before grasping how philosophy and myth unite, we must examine how they develop. Wright, 6

To grasp how philosophy and myth relate, we must adhere to the way Plato arranges the Phaedo. For myth develops with philosophy as the dialogue progresses.

Proceeding this way ensures a proper navigation through the course set for myth. Before this essay studies the Phaedo, however, it will discuss how the dialogue relates to the

Apology and Republic. This inclusion will provide more material for analysis, cement the necessity for an inquiry, and offer insight into Socrates’ actions; exposing what he attempts to accomplish. If we can determine why philosophy and myth must collaborate, we may, as the first line suggests, begin to discern the self.

The Defense for Philosophy

Is philosophy beneficial? This is the question which forces Socrates into an

Athenian court to defend his lifestyle. Philosophy’s value is not readily apparent to the city or individual, and this is why philosophic activity requires an apology. The

Apology’s name6 suggests it is the critical defense for philosophy, but it cannot be. The arguments in Socrates’ speech are inadequate, and they do not properly treat the subject.

Assistance is necessary, and the Republic and Phaedo provide it. All three dialogues comprise Socrates’ apology for philosophy. Let us demonstrate this by examining the

Apology.

The Apology is Socrates’ rhetorical speech at his trial; as such it cannot be a complete defense for philosophy: “How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know” (Apology, 17A). To adequately defend philosophy, Socrates must persuade others of its instrumental and intrinsic value, and this requires a leisurely

6 ἀπολόγία, ἡ, I. A speech in defense, defense (Liddell and Scott) Wright, 7 conversation. Since it is the city’s official business, however, a trial is the furthest thing from leisure. Socrates cannot carefully discuss what philosophy is, or if the philosopher is just; he is surrounded by jurors, and time is constricting him.

The truth is rather that I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged anyone; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have conversed with each other only a short while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have, that capitol cases should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would be convinced; but now it is not easy to rid you of such great prejudices in a short time. (Apology, 37A-B)

Time cannot be an issue if Socrates is to remove the common man’s prejudices.

Leisure is a condition necessary for philosophy, essential to conduct it. Dialectic is impossible without leisure. Therefore, any dialogue defending philosophy is by necessity leisurely. The question then becomes: if Socrates cannot apologize for philosophy in the

Apology, then what is he doing? What is the Apology’s purpose? No doubt the answer to this question is extremely complex, and another essay must address the whole subject.

This essay can only elaborate on Plato’s scheme to connect the Apology with other

Platonic dialogues.

The Apology cannot resolve philosophical dilemmas; instead it displays themes that require additional treatment. This is evident from Socrates’ questions. “But perhaps someone might say: ‘Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger of being put to death as a result?”(Apology, 28b) This question may be rhetorical, but it is direct and captures the real issue: is philosophic activity praiseworthy? The response however is indirect. Instead of demonstrating philosophy’s value, Socrates compares himself to Achilles, “who so despised danger, in Wright, 8 comparison with enduring any disgrace” (Apology, 28C). The comparison to Achilles is the best evidence that Socrates’ speech is rhetorical; for a crowd of Greeks loves nothing more than a strong, steadfast, and noble warrior. Clearly, Socrates cannot sufficiently treat this issue, since he cannot engage his judges with dialectic. Rhetoric is the only option during a trial. The question Socrates asks is left unresolved, and Plato deliberately litters the Apology with similar instances. This forces us to discover which dialogues recover the themes. Let us demonstrate how the Republic and Phaedo assist the Apology.

The Republic is Socrates’ narrative of a long and elaborate discussion about justice in the city and the soul. “First we’ll investigate what justice is like in the cities.

Then, we’ll also go on to consider it in individuals, considering the likeness of the bigger in the idea of the littler” (Republic, 369A). The Republic is too intricate for this essay to summarize without reference to an authority; it will assume the correctness of Allan

Bloom’s Interpretive Essay. Bloom posits that the Republic is Socrates’ true defense for philosophic activity. The language Plato knits into the Republic supports this thesis:

“What would your apology be, Socrates, if someone were to say that you’re hardly making these men happy” (Republic, 419A). An apology is a speech in defense at a trial.

The Republic is another trial for Socrates, and it asks the same question as the Apology: is the philosopher just? Similar words and phrases link the dialogues, and place an ominous cloud over the Republic. However, there is a difference between these trials. On the one hand is a vicious courtroom full of jurors—some ignorant—and a Socrates who cannot conduct dialectic. On the other is a group of Socrates’ friends, earnestly trying to understand him, and leisurely engaging in dialectic. The conversation in the Republic grants Socrates the circumstances the Apology denies him. Socrates may now “rid you of Wright, 9 such great prejudices” (Apology, 37A-B). Bloom’s thesis appears correct; the Republic may be the conversation Socrates needs to make an adequate case for philosophy’s entrance into the city. However, the Republic is not the only dialogue that comes to the

Apology’s aid, the Phaedo also is necessary.

The Phaedo is a story describing Socrates’ final conversation. “You have a right to say that, for I think you mean that I must defend myself (άπολογήσασθαι) against this accusation, as if we were in a law court” (Phaedo, 63B). The Phaedo, then, is also a trial for Socrates, another defense for philosophic activity. The three dialogues clearly treat a similar theme, but their unique association raises a troubling question: which provides an adequate defense? One must be independent and sufficient, or they will continue to refer to each other in an endless cycle, and philosophy will crumble. The apology must stop somewhere.

An adequate defense for philosophy must demonstrate its intrinsic and instrumental value. Further, Socrates must successfully persuade others that philosophy is beneficial. Obviously, the Apology cannot achieve this, but what of the Republic? Bloom addresses this in his Interpretative Essay:

At this point in the discussion, Socrates argues that philosophy is needed in the city; he does not argue that philosophy is the best human activity. Philosophy is not the theme of the discussion, but justice, and particularly a just city. Nevertheless, the most comprehensive discussion of the city leads—against the will of Socrates, as it were—to a discussion of philosophy…This constitutes a defense of philosophy from the political point of view. (Bloom, 391)

Socrates avoids a full defense in the Republic; it is incidental. Ultimately, an apology to the city is secondary. The political community is a condition necessary for philosophic Wright, 10 activity—the philosopher requires a city and leisure—but this community does not create philosophy’s value. Socrates’ defense cannot revolve around the city. Philosophy is not the city’s servant, it is desirable for itself. First, philosophy requires a complete defense; establishing it as the highest human activity, and good in itself.

The Phaedo is a perfect example of Plato’s irony. Socrates’ true trial, philosophy’s defense, takes place after his conviction, and in a prison. Unlike in the

Republic, Socrates gladly provokes and accepts this apology. Crito, Socrates’ dear friend, even warns him that conversation may have “a bad effect on the action of the poison”

(Phaedo, 63D). However, Socrates dismisses this and begins his argument:

Never mind him, I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be. (Phaedo, 63D)

This apology articulates what philosophy is, why the activity is good in itself, and fulfills all the criteria for an adequate defense; the conversation is leisurely, and focuses on philosophy. “We were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy” (Phaedo, 59A). The various arguments concerning the soul’s immortality originate from this defense, and return to it. The Phaedo is therefore a complete defense for philosophy7.

7 This does not mean that the Apology and Republic are incomplete works, it merely means that they are incomplete defenses for philosophy. The circumstances surrounding the conversations and their topics force Socrates to mention philosophy and defend it incidentally. The dialogues are actually treating a separate issue, and this is why a proper defense cannot occur. Wright, 11

The Phaedo’s position among the Platonic dialogues is clear. However, our new appreciation for the dialogue only adds to the anxiety. Socrates’ actions are strange, but the way Plato writes the dialogue is far stranger. The Phaedo is a story in a dialogue. On the one hand the Republic and Apology are firsthand accounts, Socrates’ speech and his narrative. On the other is the Phaedo, a secondhand account, hearsay. The three dialogues all attempt to treat a similar subject, yet Plato uses different writing styles. The problems with the dialogue increase after reflecting that Socrates merges myth with philosophy before he defends it. Indeed, when we first encounter Socrates he greets us with a fable.

Therefore, an apology for one is an apology for the other. Mυθος and λόγος are essential to the philosopher and comprise philosophy’s value. The reconciliation affords Socrates one last chance to persuade his dear friends to philosophy, and the first opportunity to adequately answer his accusers. The dialogue portrays a Socrates that is defending philosophic activity and every day of his life. A philosophic life style must involve the study of myths.

And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset? (Phaedo, 61E)

The New Theseus Phaedo begins his story by explaining why so much time elapsed between

Socrates’ trial and death. An ancient Athenian tradition spares Socrates; giving him several days to bid farewell to friends and family.

Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Wright, 12

Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honor of the god. Now it is there law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and death. (Phaedo, 58B-C)

Phaedo explains that the following conversation, which is Socrates’ defense for philosophy, is only possible because of a myth. The first connection Plato displays between myth and philosophy is a historical one; for philosophy as we know it evolved from myth. Epic poems and myths present an ideology, and philosophy spawns from these early works. For an ideology declares why or how reality is, and nothing provokes conversation more than a declaration about reality. The works of Homer, Hesiod, and other poets inspired the whole Greek world, creating something at which to wonder and analyze. Poetry provides a philosopher with material to critique, something to question.

For the truth the poem or myth propagates is disputable. Plato demonstrates how myth can accomplish this, presenting a message through a story, by comparing Theseus and

Socrates.

The story about Theseus creates a parallel between Socrates’ final conversation and Theseus’ journey to Crete. The parallel is clear for two reasons: the journey coincides with the subsequent conversation, and exactly fourteen people are present. Theseus saves fourteen youths and maidens, and Socrates is with fourteen friends. Plato challenges

Theseus with Socrates. Athens honors Theseus because he is their founder-king and champion of the city as an institution. However, Socrates is far more heroic. Theseus Wright, 13 merely saves the lives of the fourteen youths and maidens, but Socrates is saving his friends’ souls. The character of Socrates is literally achieving mythical proportions.

Socrates is competing with Theseus for the youth’s adoration. Plato wants Socrates to become the symbol of a good Athenian, and champion of philosophy. The parallel establishes Socrates as the quintessential philosopher of the dialogue8; for Phaedo’s story is about a Socrates who was “the best and wisest and most righteous man” (Phaedo,

118A). However, Plato’s comparison and Pheado’s claim rely on the same thing: the success of Socrates’ mission.

Plato can only parallel Socrates and Theseus if they accomplish something similar. Theseus destroys the Athenian’s fear of Crete and the Minotaur, a creature which is half man and half bull. Likewise, Socrates is educating us, destroying our fear of a philosophy that combines µυθος and λόγος. We perceive mystery and reason as incompatible, connecting them would create a terrible monster, the fear of which renders the soul ignorant and guides it down the wrong path to ruin.

And the journey is not as Telephus says in the play of Aeschylus; for he says a simple path leads to the lower world, but I think the path is neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way to any place if there were only one road. But really there seem to be many forks of the road and many windings; this I infer from the rites and ceremonies practiced her on earth (Phaedo, 107E-108A).

Luckily, Socrates has a scheme; he knows why the two relate, how to destroy our fear through education, and how to prepare us for the labyrinth. Socrates knows myth is the key to saving his friends.

8 This means Socrates’ actions in the Phaedo are always deliberate, correct, and consistent. Wright, 14

An Image of the Self

The Phaedo defends philosophy, and the Socrates that Plato portrays is the dialogue’s quintessential philosopher. Socrates greets his dear friends for the last time with his own myth, and this indicates myth is essential to philosophy.

What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after (Phaedo, 60B-C).

Immediately, Socrates challenges our concept of a myth maker. Socrates does not go into mania (a state of possession) as is common among poets, nor does he invoke the muses as

Homer does: “Sing in me, Muse and through me tell the story” (Homer’s Odyssey, 1).

Instead, Socrates’ story stems from wonder, something everyone can experience. The first thing Plato must remove is our common conception that myths do not apply to everyday, for every day is full of wonder.

“But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand”

(Phaedo,60A-B). Plato graphically describes Socrates’ motion in order to emphasize the necessity of the body to the philosopher and poet. The senses spark wonder; they expose poets and philosophers to images of reality and are a vessel for mysteries. Socrates perceives the opposing sensations in his leg, wonders about it, and then makes a myth Wright, 15 expressing the experience. Myths, then, are mysterious because myth makers transport the wonder they experience into the story. The wonder is no longer the sole property of one person, but enters into the myth and becomes accessible to all. However, Socrates’ fable is not stupefying. Rather, the story articulates what is unknown, and offers an explanation.

Socrates’ fable acts as a hypothesis, a theory aiming to account for the phenomena. Socrates states: “for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after” (Phaedo, 60C). When Socrates senses “a strange thing” (Phaedo,

60B), he attempts to rationalize it, and then makes it into a story. Pleasure and pain must follow one another because their heads are attached, but this does not solve the issue, it only distills what is so wonderful. Mystery and reason meet in the myth, and in this sense myths are very similar to humanity. Phaedo expresses the mixture of opposites in him: “a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and pain together, when I thought that Socrates was presently to die” (Phaedo, 59A).

Plato uses Socrates’ reimagining of Aesop’s fable to express the human experience. Mystery and reason are opposites, and in a relationship similar to pleasure and pain. Only beings possessing λόγος can experience wonder, and wonder gives birth to philosophy. If reason comes to someone, mystery follows: “When one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after” (Phaedo, 60C). Mystery and reason are fastened together in humanity. Although the cosmos functions on its own, without man’s recognition or knowledge, it is mysterious to us. The mysteries only exist in us. Socrates’ myth attempts to tackle the most puzzling relationship of all: the relationship between subject (self) and object (universe). Λόγος reorganizes and recreates reality; it is thought. Wright, 16

Myth then expresses the mystery reason grasps. Myths are made in the image of their maker.

Socrates demonstrates that the composition of myth is similar to man. The fable does not only relate to Socrates, but concerns us all, and connects to all. Plato displays myth for what it is, a recreation, in a story, of what the self experiences. Socrates impresses himself on his fable. The fable can stir wonder in us because it conveys the same mystery stirring Socrates. Myth, then, is a vessel for wonder. Story gives birth to philosophy. Epic poems such as Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, and the mythical tales in

Hesiod’s Theogony describe wonderful scenes and display episodes that speak directly to the troubling, and perhaps unanswerable, questions humanity faces: where do we come from, where are we going?

At this point in the dialogue, Socrates has revealed that myths are essential to philosophy as carriers of wonder. The philosopher is therefore a lover of myth. For the philosopher chases wonder no matter where is goes. Socrates displays that myths must become philosophical, and this forces him to discuss a dream.

Make Music and Work at It

Socrates begins to make myths after reinterpreting a dream. “Tell him, Cebes, the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams”

(Phaedo, 60D-E). The dream commands Socrates to “make music and work at it” (60E).

Formerly, that is before the trial, Socrates thought the dream was encouraging him, as people encourages runners—philosophy is a long marathon—to do what he was already Wright, 17 doing, because “philosophy was the greatest kind of music and I was working at that”

(61A). After the trial, however, Socrates reconsiders, in case the commands “[mean] that

I should cultivate the Muses in this way” (60E). Socrates’ interpretation of this dream dictates what he considers philosophic activity to be. But before we can understand the significance of Socrates’ reinterpretation, let us reflect on the comparison between music and philosophy.

Socrates’ former view of philosophy concerns λόγος, the word by which the inward thought is expressed. If philosophy acts as music, then λόγος must be a creative and fluid harmony. Thought, then, is always in motion and developing. The comparison is rather problematic, for now the philosopher can never claim anything with certitude, for his thoughts are always moving forward. Philosophy is never static.

The greatest difficulty arises after reflecting on the doctrine of Parmenides.

Parmenides concludes that all is one, and, in the Theaeteus, Socrates appears to support this over Heraclitus and Protagoras’ doctrine of change and motion.

For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction (Theaetetus,153A).

However, Socrates does not actually endorse either doctrine. The Theaetetus ends with both Socrates and Theaetetus concluding that knowledge is elusive, but that dialectic is always beneficial. Even if Socrates does sincerely agree with Parmenides’ doctrine, this only means they both conceive of the universe as a unity, not that they should stop thinking. Indeed, this kind of intellectual stasis is detrimental to philosophy. Further, in Wright, 18 the Parmenides, Parmenides compares dialectic to exercise, and this supports Socrates’ notion that thought is always moving.

The impulse you bring to argument is noble and divine, make no mistake about it. But while you are still young, put your back into it and get more training through something people think useless-what the crowd call idle talk. Otherwise, the truth will escape you (Parmenides, 135d).

Dialectic is a kind of λογος, and therefore Parmenides agrees that thought must be continuously moving, and constantly developing.

Socrates’ comparison becomes more problematic when he outlines the reinterpretation of his dream.

For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon (Phaedo, 61A-B).

The fact that Socrates reinterprets his dream does not indicate that he is contradicting the former interpretation. The opposite is true. Socrates is broadening his horizon, and fulfilling philosophy. Λόγος reconnects with myth; they both reunite as creative and poetic expressions. Only after following Plato’s development of the words can we see that λόγος is creative like µυθος.

The word translated as “maker of myths” (Phaedo, 61B) is µυθολογικός9, and it can also translate as: versed in mythology. Socrates facetiously says “I was not a maker

9 Μυθολογικός, ή, όν, versed in mythology (Liddell and Scott) Wright, 19 of myths”. This statement is clearly ironic; for Socrates not only makes a myth, but turns

Aesop’s fable into verse10. The irony is meant to stress µυθολογικός; it is the key to understanding this new interpretation of philosophy.

Mυθολογικός is a philosophic activity. The philosopher now adopts another duty, one which is necessary to fulfill his vocation, myth making and studying. Socrates ponders—uses λόγος to reorganize—pleasure and pain, and then uses µυθος to reproduce the mystery, the unity-in-opposition. Both λόγος and µυθος are creative. Λόγος recreates reality; it is the production and infinite conversation of thought, how we think about the world and ourselves. Λόγος is a presentation by which inward thought is expressed.

Mυθος, on the other hand, is a kind of pretending (προσποιησαι), a work of the imagination. Plato stresses the importance of reworking the wonder reason graphs into a myth, sharing and distilling it for all. However, how does this process work? This question prompts Socrates to promote mythology in order to strengthen the imagination, and to reveal how this productive interaction operates. The self appears to be something which is always making, constantly producing thought. “Make music and work at it”

(Phaedo, 60E). Myth affords us the opportunity to capture the mysteries of the self in a finite form. Indeed, myth is a finite expression of an infinitely active λογος. The self is present in the story.

Only after merging myth and reason does Socrates offer the defense we’ve been waiting for, philosophy’s apology. The defense is therefore an apology for mythology as well. This means myth studying and making is also intrinsically and instrumentally good,

10 This does not necessarily indicate that anything in verse is mythical. Wright, 20 and the highest of human activities. “I will try to make a more convincing defense than I did before the judges” (63B).

Catharsis

Socrates describes philosophy as an examination of the self, and states that philosophy studies “nothing but dying and being dead” (Phaedo, 64A). This conversation is not solely about Socrates, but about someone like Socrates, it is a defense for every philosopher. The argument assumes philosophers study death—the separation of body and soul—to purify themselves.

The senses are problematic; for they hinder every investigation the soul conducts and makes it impossible to discover truth. Only when the soul removes itself far away from the body, and remains in thought can “something of the realities become clear to it”

(Phaedo, 65C).

But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are to ever know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone (66D).

Initially, the senses depict mysteries to the soul and cause wonder, but these mysteries are just images. The philosopher’s soul must go beyond images and “reaches out toward the reality” (65C). This process—employing “pure, absolute reason” (66A), to grasp the

“pure, absolute essence of things” (66A)—is cathartic and purges the soul of the body’s evil. Wright, 21

And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure,—and that is, perhaps, the truth (67A).

Socrates argues for a philosophy which focuses on essence to purge what the senses supply. This process leads the philosopher to discover absolute beauty, justice, equality, and goodness. The investigation removes the philosopher from temporal concerns, and provides a science to discern virtue.

And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in fact a purification from all these things, and self restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification (69B-C).

Philosophers, then, desperately try to recreate reality in thought, λόγος, and harmonize what they think is, with what actually is, truth. The absence from the corporeal alone cannot purify the soul without a proper production of thought. If the soul recreates (can conceive of) reality as best as it can in thought, it is purified.

If λόγος (the recreation of reality through thought) rearranges reality properly, then the soul bears witness to the purest image of reality, and therefore the most majestic of mysteries. Reason moves philosophers to the mystical; it allows them to experience a wonder which is only possible after thought concerns itself with absolute goodness, beauty, justice and the other forms. This is why Socrates concludes:

And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified ill dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, ‘the Wright, 22

thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few’; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. (69C-D)

Philosophy, then, is the highest human activity, it is cathartic. Similarly, µυθολογικός is also cathartic. Plato transforms myth into an expression of reality. Originally, myths were philosophical. However, now philosophy is becoming mythical. This is why Socrates declares: “The thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few” (69C-D). Λόγος now casts itself on realty’s mysteries; meeting its limit to express what reality is. Philosophy, therefore, must turn to myth.

Διαµυθολογωµεν

Following Socrates’ defense, Cebes raises an objection. Cebes fears the souls of all men vanish after death; “scattering like a breath or smoke” (70A). Cebes’ question raises fear in all of us, for the question concerns the puzzling relationship between subject and object. Both the soul and how it relates to reality are unknown, so fearing death is quite reasonable. However, Socrates must destroy this terror, or we, like Cebes, will lose our way in the labyrinth, and fear the Minotaur.

The following conversation revolves around the soul’s immortality, and myth is necessary for the discussion. The normal procedure for dialectic calls for a proposition, a statement or hypothesis to analyze. However, what occurs at the moment of death is perhaps the greatest of mysteries, and ignorance surrounding this issue is inevitable. At the same time, avoiding the conversation would devastate the souls of Socrates’ dear friends. Socrates, therefore, must not only turn to myth, using it as a premise for the conversation, but also provide a method for critiquing each story in order to determine how it corresponds to λόγος. Wright, 23

I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset? (61D-E)

Plato is demonstrating how to deal with Cebes’ fear, how to question stories to see whether they can resolve the problems surrounding life and the obscurities of death.

Mυθος must develop with λογος, aim at truth, and the word Plato uses to personify this development is διαµυθολογωµεν.

“Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing (διαµυθολογωµεν) about this to see whether it is probable or not?” (70B). Διαµυθολογωµεν is untranslatable, yet understanding this word is necessary to follow myth’s development. To ensure that we can properly grasp the meaning of this word, it is necessary to reflect on the prior use of it—only one author is known to use this word before Plato—and then analyze the subsequent actions.

Truly wise, truly wise was he who first grasped this in his mind and expressed it clearly (διεµυθολόησεν) with his tongue, that it is best by far to marry in one’s own station, and that a poor man should not yearn to wed either among those who luxuriate in wealth or among those who glory in their high birth (Prometheus Bound, 887-893).

In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the chorus cries these words. Zeus is punishing

Prometheus for sharing the secret of fire with humanity. In this play, Hephaestus gruesomely nails Prometheus to a rock on the edge of the world. However, Prometheus, who possess the gift of prophesy, accepts his punishment and will not admit fault. He boldly asks, “Why should I be afraid, when death is not my destiny?” (933). Plato is a playwright, and undoubtedly uses this word to spark a comparison between Prometheus Wright, 24 and Socrates. Both characters are condemned unjustly, and both refuse to admit any wrong doing; suffering what they must. “Those who bow to Necessity are wise” (Chorus,

Prometheus Bound 936).

The chorus’ praising of Prometheus also applies to Socrates. Socrates is another friend to humanity and is about to conduct διαµυθολογωµεν; ensuring that his friends witness the wedding between λογος and µυθος. This wedding is the fire Socrates passes to his friends, a light which can enlighten the dark corridors of the self and illuminate the passage to the next world. The flame is bright, for it climbs the divided line.

The best way to grasp the action Plato describes with διαµυθολογωµεν is to examine the conversation immediately following; for the language Socrates and Cebes employ reveals its function.

“Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing (διαµυθολογωµεν) about this to see whether it is probable or not? (εἴτε εἰκος11 οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε µή;)”

“I do,” said Cebes. “I should like to hear what you think (δόξαν12) about it.”

“Well,” said Socrates, “I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

“Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition (παλαιὸς µὲν ούν ἔστι τις λόγος), which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true (καί εἰ13 τουθ οὕτως ἔχει), if the living are born from the

11 εἰκος, probable, likely. (Liddell and Scott) 12 Δόξα,ή a notion, opinion. (Liddell and Scott) 13 Εί, conditional particle, if. (Liddell and Scott) Wright, 25

dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof (τεκµήριον14) that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed” (70B-D).

The conversation mimics the divided line. Plato holds myth to the same standards as argument, knitting them together. The exchange carries myth from images to opinion, and proceeds up the divided line to hypothesis and the realm of the intelligible. Socrates gathers myth together for an argument and investigation. Critiquing a story in this way allows us to discover whether it contradicts reality, and this is exactly where Socrates moves the discussion. “Now if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth” (70D). Plato is creating a philosophy which is mythical; employing both the mystical and rational. Only a philosophy which harmonizes and weds reason and mystery can tackle the mysterious relationship between subject and object.

Myth can go where argument cannot. The roles reverse. Formerly, myth provided the material for philosophy; allowing reasonable discussion about the unknown. Now myth uses reason as the material to produce a work of the imagination. Myth can advance where argument alone cannot. Mυθος transcends to the final stage of Plato’s divided line with λόγος, and the two collaborate to express reality.

Reality

14 Τεκμήριον, τό, (τεκμαίρομαί) a positive proof. (Liddell and Scott) Wright, 26

The most perplexing mythical episode in the dialogue is Socrates’ final myth.

This myth comes after the arguments concerning the soul’s immortality, illustrating how

Socrates views the world and life after death.

Not only that, Simmias, but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you certain. And if you analyze them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther (107B).

Argument cannot sufficiently reproduce what Socrates considers reality to be. The conversation must end where it begins, with myth and the puzzling relationship between subject and object. “We were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy” (59A).This myth proceeds from the conclusions of the arguments for the soul’s immortality. Therefore, before we discuss this marvelous myth, let us first address how Socrates and his friends conclude their argument.

The argument finishes with the group agreeing that the soul is immortal, and in a state similar to the forms, unchanging and incorruptible. That is, like the forms, the soul does not perish as body does but is eternal. “Then, when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death” (Phaedo, 106E). The soul is somehow similar to the eternal forms; there is a strange correspondence between the two.

But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains and remains always the same with the changeless, since it is in communion with therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so? (Phaedo, 79D) Wright, 27

Indeed, Socrates basis the argument for the soul’s immortality on the comparison between the soul and the immortal forms.

“Then, Simmias,” said he, “is the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?” (76D-E)

Socrates assumes this mysterious correspondence, and proceeds to make a myth starting from the final stage of the divided line. Let us reexamine the last stage of Plato’s divided line.

In the Republic, Socrates describes the dialectic process and how arguments proceed to the realm of the intelligible.

Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, stepping stones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too” (510A).

The final myth argues from this final dialectical stage; assuming the existence of the forms and portraying the consequences of such an assumption. The story therefore harmonizes and imagines the correctness of the prior conversation. Myth arrives at the Wright, 28 destination Plato sets for it. A story is now the highest of philosophical expressions, it conveys reality in a way no natural science can. Socrates’ final myth transports his wonder, it is the world through his eyes, and what he considers is the actual make up of the universe. Socrates takes argument and renders it into imagination. “If I may tell a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing” (110B).

The earth Socrates illustrates is massive, and impossible for man to ever truly comprehend. According to this story, humanity exists only in a small portion of the earth, and, like small ants or frogs about a pond, we miss its true size and beauty.

Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depths of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should, by reason of sluggish or feebleness, never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the sea into the upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how purer and fairer it is than the world he lived in. Now I believe this is just the case with us; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move. But the fact is the same, that by reason of feebleness and sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air, for if anyone should come to the top of the air or get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes see lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so would he see the things in that upper world; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognize that that is the real heaven and the real earth (109CDE- 110A).

Humanity is missing something. Socrates’ story forces us to acknowledge the weakness of the human intellect. The story presents an earth and heaven which exist beyond us. Wright, 29

Going on all around us is another earth and heaven, one which is out of reach, but still possible to imagine.

Reality, as Socrates portrays it, is similar to man’s composition. Heaven and earth move as thought, always acting. Further, the earth seems to be reasonable, detecting if a soul is purified or vile.

But those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons; they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell with upon the earth. And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough (114B-C).

The earth is also quite intricate and contains various rivers, winding and moving throughout the earth, connecting all.

“Now all these are connect with one another by many subterranean channels, some larger and some smaller, which are bored in all of them, and there are passages through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; and there are everlasting rivers of huge size under the earth, flowing with hot and cold water; and there is much fire, and great river of fire, and many streams of mud, some thinner and some thicker, like the rivers of mud that flow before lava in Sicily15, and the lava itself. These fill the various regions as they happen to flow to one another at any time. Now a kind of oscillation within the earth moves all these up and down. And the nature of the oscillation is as follows: One of the chasms of the earth is greater than the rest, and is bored right through the whole earth; this is the one which Homer means when he says:

Far off, the lowest abyss beneath the earth;

15 Plato’s official opinion on Sicily is not entirely known. Wright, 30

and which elsewhere he and other poets have called Tarturas. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which the flow.” (111D-112A)

The earth in this story does not seem like an object at all, but more like us, a subject, something with a spirit which can correctly distinguish right from wrong, wise from foolish, and purified from vile. The earth rejects those who fail to recognize and initiate themselves, while allowing the purified to depart to a higher realm. The message is that those who love the body render themselves into nothing but objects, and are swiftly thrown into the worst parts and hollows of the earth. Purification, then, appears to only be possible only after discovering that the world, like man, is also a combination of matter and spirit. We must purge ourselves of the objects we create. The spiritual world governs the physical universe, as a person’s soul governs their body. Man is the microcosm of

Socrates’ macrocosm, a soul matter veils. “This then is why a man should be of good cheer about his soul, who in his life has rejected the pleasures and adornments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good” (114D-

E).

The closing myth resolves the issue the first myth presents, how we relate to the objective world. Socrates thinks the object is really a subject. Myth, then, also reveals what reality is, expressing the natural world for what it actually is, a subject.

Mυθολογικός (Mythology) is now absolutely necessary to discover truth, for it provides access to a world argument alone cannot display.

Now it would be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be Wright, 31

immortal, I think he may be properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long (114D-E).

The magic charm of myth purifies the soul, fills man with wonder, and directs him to consider what reality is. Only at the end of the dialogue, does myth finally convince

Socrates’ friends to pursue philosophy. “By all means, Socrates, we should be glad to hear this story” (110B). Stories can stir the soul to desire truth; make the pursuit a noble enterprise in the mind of the person hearing the tale. The wonder myth contains is inexhaustible, it is constantly giving birth to philosophy. This is why Socrates’ final action is to pay a cock to Aesculapius, a cock to mythical figure, a debt to mythology.

“Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it” (118A). Socrates calls every philosopher to myth making. Story telling is part of the philosopher’s vocation. The dream commands Socrates to “make music and work at it” (60E). We ought to obey as well.

Final Reflection

The best way to end an essay is to end it like an adventure, by returning to the beginning. The opening exchange between Phaedo and Echecrates reveals the various themes in the dialogue. However, it also answers them.

Were you with Socrates yourself (αὐτός), Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

I was there myself (αὐτός), Echecrates (57A). Wright, 32

Phaedo’s response indicates that the self is in the story. Plato wants us to study the stories we tell and study ourselves. Indeed, a close examination of the dialogue reveals more about Phaedo then any other character.

The story Phaedo tells Echecrates is how Plato wants us to study and create myths. The story fascinates Echecrates, its content seizes his soul and directs it to philosophy. As the dialogue progresses, Echecrates engages Phaedo with further questioning. This is why Socrates’ final defense must take place in the Phaedo: a story sparks conversation. The mythical Socrates achieves something noble, he is praiseworthy. A defense for philosophy ought to be a story. For stories, as Socrates demonstrates, are cathartic and produce conversations about the episodes they illustrate.

The discourse reveals that µυθος and λόγος meet in philosophy. Indeed, the story is about a conversation; employing both myth and dialectic. Both climb the divided line, and cross into the realm of the forms. Finally, Socrates’ defense must be a success, for his dear friend Phaedo is participating in philosophy. Phaedo is myth making. Plato makes a philosophy that is mythical, for myths are full of wonder.

Wright, 33

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