Labor Coercion and Human Capital-Promoting Institutions: Evidence from Russia DRAFT, DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE Brendan McElroy December 12, 2015 Why are some countries leaders, and others laggards, in the accumulation of human capital? Recent evidence indicates that land inequality and labor-repressive agriculture have been persistent obstacles to the establishment of human capital- promoting institutions such as mass elementary education. Landowners who rely on cheap, immobile farm labor have a strong incentive to oppose investment in schooling as a subsidy to footloose agricultural workers. In this paper, I show that such incentives can be dampened by legacies of the preindustrial economy. In Russia until 1861, serfs paid their obligations either as labor services or as quitrents in cash and kind. I exploit spatial variation in pre-emancipation serf obligations to estimate the effect of quitrents on human capital in 1911. Former quitrent ar- eas had higher male and female literacy rates, school enrollments, and per capita public investment in village schools, after controlling for preexisting differences in human capital. Ph.D. Candidate in Government, Harvard University. cgis S-350, 1730 Cambridge Street, Cam- bridge, MA 02138:
[email protected]. I am grateful to Carles Boix, Tracy Dennison, Torben Iversen, Jim Robinson, Theda Skocpol, Daniel Ziblatt, and the participants in the 2nd Annual Politics and History Conference held at Harvard’s Center for European Studies, May 15–16, 2015, for insightful comments, and to Hugh Truslow and Jim Hodgson for assistance acquiring data used in this paper. I owe special thanks to Steve Nafziger for sharing geocoded maps of the Russian Empire.