State Compliance and the Track Record of International Institutions* Jeffrey M. Kaplow† Abstract This paper examines how the past performance of an international institution—its track record of compliance—affects the decisions of states to comply with the institution in the future. A substantial IR literature sees institutions as rationally designed to achieve outcomes desired by member states, and so struggles to explain why compliance varies even as an institution’s design remains fixed. I propose an informational theory of state compliance that fills the gap between rational design and actual institutional performance, showing how an international organization may persist with low levels of compliance even as states do not attempt to revise the institution’s design. This theory suggests that an institution’s track record should affect future compliance in settings where the underlying strategic problem is characterized by the need for reciprocity among member states. I test the influence of institutional track record on state compliance using data on violations of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, finding strong empirical support for the track record mechanism. This finding has important implications both for our understanding of the constraining power of international institutions and for the ongoing policy debate about the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * This research was supported by a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellowship at the RAND Corporation and by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California. † University of California, San Diego; Department of Political Science;
[email protected] A large and influential literature in international relations sees international institutions as rationally designed to achieve the goals of member states.