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Impact of Hurrican Katrina on the Insurance Industry | Towers Watson Hurricane Katrina Analysis of the Impact on the Insurance Industry *This paper was originally written and produced in October 2005. Introduction The effects of Hurricane Katrina stunned and moved the entire country — indeed, the world. We generally expect things to get better rapidly once the wind and the rain stop, but the news from New Orleans only got worse as the weather improved. Tragic stories of extreme hardship emerged, and we Following the Executive Summary, we provide analyses will long remember some of the horrific images that and estimates of insured losses by major line of were captured by the media. We can only hope that business. Even a month after Katrina’s landfall, we this experience will lead to meaningful improvements must emphasize that the estimation of ultimate in disaster response, particularly with respect to the insured losses is an uncertain venture, certainly more economically disadvantaged members of our society. art than science. This is particularly true in light of The insurance industry plays an important role in both the continuing inaccessibility of some damaged natural disaster recovery, and will undoubtedly be both areas and the difficulty of dividing damage between the subject of and a participant in the public debate wind (covered by normal homeowners policies) and arising from this catastrophe. We have prepared this storm surge (excluded from homeowners policies). white paper in hopes of contributing to the discussion We then discuss the broader impact of the storm on of the financial impact on insurers, as well as the the insurance industry, as well as implications for deeper implications for the industry. financial and operational risk management, concluding with brief comments on some of the immediate public As of September 30, 2005, we estimate the insured policy issues that have arisen. losses from Katrina to be between $40 billion and $55 billion, displacing the 9/11 terrorist attacks as the single most expensive insured occurrence in the U.S. to date. Some claims from the 9/11 attacks are still open, but the consensus estimate of the insured losses is approximately $35 billion (in 2004 dollars). As further points of comparison, Hurricane Andrew produced approximately $20 billion of insured losses, followed closely by the 1994 Northridge earthquake (approximately $18 billion). We write this soon after Hurricane Rita came ashore close to Katrina’s landfall. Rita weakened significantly as she approached the coast, and the onshore damage appears to be contained relative to that of Katrina. However, reports are not yet in from the critical offshore energy industry, much of which was on the “bad” (eastern) side of Rita’s eye. Coming so soon after the 2004 hurricane season that introduced Florida to Charley, Francis, Ivan and Jeanne in quick succession, the Katrina/Rita “double whammy” makes it easy to think that hurricane seasons have suddenly gotten worse. We include a brief comparison of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and a look at historical hurricane losses, along with some insights on hurricane frequency and severity. towerswatson.com Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Impact on the Insurance Industry 2 Executive Summary Katrina is a major hurricane by several measures. The primary insurance market will harden — but Meteorologically, Katrina was the third-strongest storm only selectively. We expect prices for homeowners (in terms of central pressure) to make landfall in the and commercial property in catastrophe-prone areas U.S. It also had the widest recorded radius of any to rise — or to stabilize to the extent that the latter category 4 hurricane. The widespread damage due to were softening prior to Katrina. The marine and the breadth and strength of the wind was exacerbated energy markets will be particularly problematic, due by the storm surge that accompanied it, which was to the size of the Katrina loss in conjunction with last measured at a record 29 feet along the Mississippi year’s heavy hurricane losses and further losses from coast. While much of the media attention has focused Hurricane Rita; insurance prices in this market will on Louisiana and New Orleans, the coastline across rise everywhere. Some of the market impact will be Mississippi into Alabama was devastated as well. immediate; some will occur more gradually as pricing models are recalibrated to incorporate Katrina and The estimated insurance loss is between $40 Rita. In catastrophe-prone areas, both onshore and and $55 billion. Based on information available as offshore, commercial insurance terms and conditions of this writing, we estimate the range of privately will be tightened as insurers seek to control their insured loss to be between $40 and $55 billion. (This aggregate hurricane exposure. In these areas, there excludes losses insured under the National Flood may also be availability problems as insurers and Insurance Program.) Katrina will displace Andrew as reinsurers reevaluate their exposures. There will be the costliest hurricane and is likely to eclipse the little overall movement in automobile and liability 9/11 terrorist attacks as the single most expensive rates. Businesses outside of areas exposed to insured occurrence in the U.S. Our estimate includes catastrophes are likely to see further softening in their an allowance for demand surge (the increase in local rates as insurers compete more aggressively for the market costs due to the vastly increased demand “safe” business. for materials and services relating to cleanup and reconstruction). However, it excludes the costs to The reinsurance markets will also be affected. the insurance industry of any retroactive expansion We expect that the property per-risk and property of property coverage to include damage that would catastrophe reinsurance market will harden, and otherwise be attributable to flooding. Our estimate capacity may be reduced somewhat. To the extent that also includes a provision for liability insurance claims reinsurers rely on retrocessional protection, they will arising from allegations relating to pollution, negligent experience higher prices and less capacity to support health and nursing home care, errors and omissions them. Like the associated primary market, the marine by insurance agents in explaining coverage, and other and energy reinsurance market will be particularly possible causes of action. problematic as the players reevaluate their appetite for this sector. The industry is responding reasonably well. Under the circumstances, the insurance industry is responding reasonably well to the disaster — both operationally and financially. An estimated 10,000 claim adjusters have been dispatched by insurers to handle what is anticipated to be well over a million claims, using mobile units equipped with satellite hookups and other support technology. Responses to disasters of this magnitude are never perfect, and much of the work for these people still lies ahead. However, it appears that the claim-adjusting process is well under way. Financially, while roughly two dozen insurers have been placed on various types of “watch” lists by rating agencies pending a clearer understanding of the impact of their Katrina losses on capital adequacy, there have been no reported failures. For most affected insurers, Katrina will be more of an earnings event than a capital event. towerswatson.com Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Impact on the Insurance Industry 3 Katrina (and Rita) will create pressure for stronger the business, as several insurers are already “back capitalization. Rating agencies are currently in a in on top” of their reinsurance protections. This event dialogue with companies most affected by Katrina, will almost certainly cause a shift in the industry’s reviewing the extent of their losses and plans to perception of what constitutes adequate reinsurance replenish capital. A number of companies have protection. already announced capital-raising activities. Once Insurers — and society as a whole — will need to these immediate issues are settled, we expect rating reconsider the potential for mega-catastrophes. agencies to begin exerting pressure on companies Our analysis of past hurricanes clearly indicates writing catastrophe-exposed business to (a) further that radical growth in property concentrations in improve their catastrophe risk management systems catastrophe-prone coastal areas has vastly increased and controls, and (b) provide stronger capitalization to the potential for large catastrophe losses. When support the risks inherent in this type of business. including other perils, such as earthquake and Katrina will attract few (if any) new insurers. Hurricane terrorism, it appears that a Katrina-sized loss event Andrew and 9/11 occurred during or at the end of will occur between every 50 and 100 years. “Smaller” very soft insurance markets, when there was clear events (in the $20 billion range) should occur, on potential for upward rate activity. In addition, they average, roughly every 15 years. Insurers, investors, caused industry surplus growth to stagnate (Andrew) regulators and policymakers need to adjust to this new or actually become negative (9/11), leading to lack reality. of capacity in the existing markets. This combination Several important problem areas should receive created business opportunities for new market thoughtful public attention. Many key concerns that entrants supported by fresh capital. In 2005, the have been raised, such as the state of governmental industry is just starting
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