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5 Populist Parties in Poland A University of Sussex DPhil thesis Available online via Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/ This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details Supply and Demand Identifying Populist Parties in Europe and Explaining their Electoral Performance Stijn Theodoor van Kessel University of Sussex Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy July, 2011 ii I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree. Signature: iii Contents List of Tables and Figures v List of Abbreviations viii Acknowledgements x Summary xii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Setting the Scene 1 1.2 State of the Art: The Problems of Populism 4 1.3 Defining and Identifying Populist Parties 12 1.4 Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties 19 1.5 Research Design and Methodology 31 2 Populist Parties and their Credibility in 31 European Countries 38 2.1 Introduction 38 2.2 The Populist Parties and their Credibility 41 2.3 Conclusion 80 3 Paths to Populist Electoral Success and Failure: QCA Analysis 83 3.1 Introduction 83 3.2 Operationalisation of Causal Conditions 84 3.3 Crisp Set QCA Analysis 94 3.4 Fuzzy Set QCA Analysis 98 3.5 Conclusion 107 4 Populist Parties in the Netherlands 110 4.1 Introduction 110 4.2 Identifying the Populist Parties in the Netherlands 111 4.3 Explaining the Electoral Performance of the Dutch Populist Parties 117 4.4 Conclusion 133 5 Populist Parties in Poland 136 5.1 Introduction 136 5.2 Identifying the Populist Parties in Poland 137 5.3 Explaining the Electoral Performance of the Polish Populist Parties 146 5.4 Conclusion 163 iv 6 Populist Parties in the United Kingdom 166 6.1 Introduction 166 6.2 Identifying the Populist Parties in the United Kingdom 167 6.3 Explaining the Electoral Performance of the British Populist Parties 178 6.4 Conclusion 197 7 Conclusions and Implications 200 7.1 Introduction 200 7.2 Populist Parties in 31 European Countries 202 7.3 Comparing the Populist Parties and their Electoral Performance in the 205 Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom 7.4 Implications and Avenues for Further Research 212 Bibliography 218 Appendix A List of Consulted Country Experts (Chapter 2) 242 Appendix B Country Expert Questionnaire (Chapter 2) 243 Appendix C List of Interviewees (Case Studies) 244 Appendix D Expert Survey (Case Studies) 245 Appendix E QCA Analysis Data 247 v List of Tables and Figures Chapter 1 Figure 1.1 Explanatory model concerning the electoral performance of populist 29 parties. Chapter 2 Table 2.1 Populist parties within the 31 European countries under 39 consideration that managed to gain parliamentary representation at least once after the past four parliamentary elections. Table 2.2 The credibility of populist parties in Austria. 43 Table 2.3 The credibility of populist parties in Belgium. 45 Table 2.4 The credibility of populist parties in Bulgaria. 48 Table 2.5 The credibility of populist parties in the Czech Republic. 50 Table 2.6 The credibility of populist parties in Denmark. 52 Table 2.7 The credibility of populist parties in Finland. 53 Table 2.8 The credibility of populist parties in France. 55 Table 2.9 The credibility of populist parties in Germany. 57 Table 2.10 The credibility of populist parties in Greece. 58 Table 2.11 The credibility of populist parties in Hungary. 60 Table 2.12 The credibility of populist parties in Iceland. 61 Table 2.13 The credibility of populist parties in Ireland. 62 Table 2.14 The credibility of populist parties in Italy. 64 Table 2.15 The credibility of populist parties in Latvia. 66 Table 2.16 The credibility of populist parties in Lithuania. 67 Table 2.17 The credibility of populist parties in Luxembourg. 68 Table 2.18 The credibility of populist parties in the Netherlands. 69 Table 2.19 The credibility of populist parties in Norway. 71 Table 2.20 The credibility of populist parties in Poland. 72 Table 2.21 The credibility of populist parties in Romania. 74 Table 2.22 The credibility of populist parties in Slovakia. 76 Table 2.23 The credibility of populist parties in Sweden. 78 Table 2.24 The credibility of populist parties in Switzerland. 80 Chapter 3 Table 3.1 Raw data for the QCA analyses. 87 Table 3.2 Thresholds for QCA analyses. 88 Figure 3.1 Proportionality of electoral results (vote share compared to seat 90 share) in 31 European countries. Figure 3.2 Aggregate electoral volatility in 31 countries (mean over last four 92 parliamentary elections). vi Table 3.3 Truth table for csQCA analysis. 94 Figure 3.3 Venn diagram representing csQCA outcome. 95 Figure 3.4 Plot of degree of cases‟ membership in electoral performance 99 against their membership in the CREDIB condition. Table 3.4 Fuzzy set truth table for presence of electoral success, consistency 101 threshold set at > 0.9. Table 3.5 Intermediate solution for presence of populist electoral success. 102 Figure 3.5 Plot of degree of cases‟ membership in electoral performance 103 against their membership in the causal configuration AVAIL*CREDIB and CREDIB*PR. Table 3.6 Fuzzy set truth table for absence of electoral success, consistency 105 threshold set at > 0.88. Table 3.7 Intermediate solution for absence of populist electoral success 106 (threshold > 0.88). Table 3.8 Intermediate solution for absence of populist electoral success 106 (threshold > 0.80). Chapter 4 Table 4.1 Dutch parliamentary election results 1998-2010. 115 Figure 4.1 Disproportionality between votes and seats in parliamentary 118 elections in eight European countries. Table 4.2 Electoral choice according to social background 1956-2002 in %. 118 Figure 4.2 Aggregate electoral volatility in the Netherlands. 120 Figure 4.3 Positive versus negative references to multiculturalism in party 122 manifestos. Figure 4.4 Most important issues as perceived by the Dutch electorate. 123 Figure 4.5 Position of electorate on the issues of asylum seekers and ethnic 124 minorities. Figure 4.6 Reasons for party choice in parliamentary election of 2002. 125 Figure 4.7 Reaction to the statement: „MPs do not care about opinions of 126 people like me‟. Figure 4.8 Parties voted for in 2006 by the 2010 Freedom Party electorate. 127 Chapter 5 Table 5.1 Parliamentary election results in Poland since 1997. 139 Figure 5.1 Disproportionality between votes and seats in Polish parliamentary 146 elections. Figure 5.2 Disproportionality between votes and seats in parliamentary 147 elections in eight European countries. Figure 5.3 Party membership as a percentage of the electorate in 20 European 148 countries. Figure 5.4 Aggregate electoral volatility in Poland. 150 Figure 5.5 Anti-corruption references in party manifestos. 155 vii Figure 5.6 Confidence in political parties in 15 European countries. 156 Chapter 6 Table 6.1 Party affiliation in 15 European countries. 179 Figure 6.1 General election results (vote- and seat share) of the three main 180 parties, 1964-2010. Figure 6.2 Disproportionality between votes and seats in parliamentary 181 elections in eight European countries. Figure 6.3 Respondents who perceive race relations/immigration/immigrants 184 to be „the most important issues facing Britain today‟. Figure 6.4 Response to the question: „If there were a referendum now on 188 whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote?‟ Figure 6.5 Support for EU membership in the UK 1981-2004. 188 Figure 6.6 Agreement with the statement „EU membership is a good thing‟. 189 viii List of Abbreviations* AWS Solidarity Electoral Action (Poland) AWSP Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (AWSP) BNP British National Party CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre (Warsaw, Poland) CD Centre Democrats (the Netherlands) CDA Christian Democrats (the Netherlands) CEEC Central and Eastern European country CP Centre Party (the Netherlands) D66 Democrats 66 (the Netherlands) EP European Parliament EU European Union FPTP First Past the Post LN Liveable Netherlands LPF List Pim Fortuyn (the Netherlands) LPR League of Polish Families MEP Member of the European Parliament MP Member of Parliament NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NF National Front (UK) PC Centre Agreement (Poland) PiS Law and Justice (Poland) PO Civic Platform (Poland) PR Proportional Representation PSL Polish Peasant Party PvdA Labour Party (the Netherlands) PVN Party for the Netherlands PVV Freedom Party (the Netherlands) PZPR Polish United Workers Party QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis SLD Democratic Left Alliance (Poland) SMP Single Member Plurality SNP Scottish National Party * For the sake of brevity, this list does not include all the populist parties (and usual suspects or borderline cases) discussed in Chapter 2. ix SO Self Defence (Poland) SP Socialist Party (the Netherlands) SSP Scottish Socialist Party TON Proud of the Netherlands UKIP UK Independence Party UP Labour Union (Poland) UW Freedom Union (Poland) VVD Liberal Party (the Netherlands) x Acknowledgements In the process of carrying out my research and writing up this dissertation I could rely on the invaluable support of a substantial amount of people. Without their comments and encouragement, this dissertation would not have taken its present form, if it had been written at all.
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