Hermeneutic Circle -- Viscious Or Victorious

Hermeneutic Circle-Viscious or Victorious Maddox, Randy L Philosophy Today; Spring 1983; 27, 1; ProQuest pg. 66

Hermeneutic Circle -- Viscious or Victorious

randy I. maddox

The discipline of hermeneutics has has received much attention and in come to play an increasing role in con many ways helps to characterize the temporary philosophical discus.sion. various "schools" of thought is that of, This is a direct result of the awareness the "hermeneutic circle."2 Expressed that characterizes nearly all modern in perhaps its simplest terms, the desig thought of the contextual nature ·of nation "hermeneutic circle" refers to· truth. For, precisely the concern of the dilemma that "a certain preunder hermeneutics is the attempt to mediate standing of a subject is necessary or no meaning expressed from one context to communication will tal{e place, yet that another. understanding must be altered in the Philosophy has not, however, sim act of understanding."3 The debate in ply taken over the models and methods contemporary hermeneutical discussion of hermeneutics utilized, for example, deals with the nature of that preunder in theological and legal thought, and standing and the extent to which it can applied them - unchanged - to its be altered. The purpose of this paper problem. Rather, precisely the question is to present an overview of this debate of the appropriate methods and; or un and advance a constructive proposal re derstanding of hermeneutics has be lating to it. To facilitate the discussion, come a matter of vigorous contempor a short summary of the background to ary philosophical debate. In a recent the present debate is first required. survey treatment, Josef Bleicher has identified three main "schools" of BACKGROUND TO thought within this debate which he CONTEMI'ORABY DISCUSSION designates "Hermeneutics as 1) Meth While something like the herme od, 2) Philosophy and 3) Criticism."1 neutical circle was discussed as far back As the primary contemporary represen as classical rhetoric,"' the more perti tatives of these groups he treats 1) nent background for tlte contemporary Emilio Betti, 2) Hans-Georg Gadamer discussion begins with the man who is and 3) .Tiirgen Habermas. generally recognized as the father of Within this debate on the nature the concern for hermeneutics in a sys of hermeneutics, a particular topic that tematic and general fashion - Fried~

PHILOSOPHY TODAY SPRING 1983

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University rich Schleiermacher. While Schleier~ of the whole and its .parts and that the macher was primarily concerned with solutions deal with the problem ln the use of hermeneutics in theology, his terms of a method. real significance lies in the fact that he A development that is in essential stressed the need to set this specific continuity with Schleiermacher's ap~ hermeneutical task within a general proach can be found in the philologist hermeneutical understanding that dealt August Boeckh - a student of Schlei~ with hermeneutics as the "art of under ermacher. In his treatment of the in~ standing.''5 The key to his conception terpetive moment of philology, Boeckh of this art is found in his ma::>!:im that notes that a circle of reasoning hermeneutics comes into play where is found in various kinds of interpreta understanding breal:rs down. 6 This is tion. "In fine, the various kinds of in~ not to say that herr.neneutics deals only terpretation presume substantial a with difficult texts, for one must build mounts of factual knowledge, and yet one's understanding of the diffieult text these different bodies of knowledge be on the basis of one's understanding of come known first through interpreta the more common texts. Nonetheless, tion of all the sources.''11 Recognizing the special task of hermeneuti.cs deals that this circle could become "vicious," with explaining difficulties. As such i.e., allow for no solution, he defines the hermeneutics can be called " 'part' of essence of the hermeneutic art as the the art of thinking."7 attempt to avoid this.12 The means by Schleiermacher's treatment of the which this is done are again methodo hermeneutical circle fits in precisely logical in that Boeckh's recommenda here. The essence of the problem is tion is that one break this circle by: that in trying to understand an author {or another language, etc.) one finds beginning with clear-cut examples, where the historical basis is given oneself involved in the dilemma that or can be supplied. After these ..complete knowledge always involves have been analyzed and the prin an apparent circle, that each part can ciple governing the manner of rep~ be understood only out of the whole to resentation has been discovered, which it belongs and vice versa."8 That this principle may by analogy be applied to more difficult in Schleiermacher sees this problem as stances.13 primarily a matter of method or the development of an art is evidenced in A significant further development his proposed solutions. There actually in the discussion of the hermeneutical seem to be two solutions proposed. The circle takes place in Wilhelm Dilthey. more "practical" solution is that one Essentially, where he goes beyond should first read quickly through a Schleiermacher a"nd Boeckh is that he whole text and then start over again applies the relat!onship of the whole with the "vague" idea of the whole thus and the parts not just to texts but to gained and attempt to "fill it out."9 In the structural continuity of life itse-lf. other places there is reference to what To quote him: "All psychological Schleiermacher calls "divination" as thought contains the basic feature that the key to breaking into the circle.10 the apprehension of the whole makes For our purposes, an explanation of the possible and determines the interpre relation of these two ways is not neces tation of the individual."H However, sary. The primary point is that the not only was he critical of the Roman problem is basically that of the relation ticist restriction to texts, he also HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE • • • 67

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University charged them with not taking the As he argues, all interpretation i3 relativity of history seriously enough grounded in a fore-having, a fore-sight, and thus producing a closed sense of and a fore-conception.20 What consti unity.~~ His main point in response is tutes this preunderstanding is not, how that the focal point of the hermeneuti ever, some unchanging structure of the cal circle must be seen as a hypotheti mind or some innate content that needs cal or reflective element, not something merely be reawakened. Rather, it is concrete or divined.16 From his under the product of all previous experience standing of the hermeneutical circle, and understanding and the "horizon" Dilthey drew several conclusions. These of ·~he current experience that is pres included: 1) meaning and meaningful ent apprehensively (drawing on Hus ness are contextual; 2) meaning is his serl21} in the experience itself. The pur torical, it has changed with time; 3) pose of interpretation is not to escape there is really no true starting point this preunderstanding but rather to ex for understanding; and 4} there is thus plicate what is present there in an im no presuppositionless understanding.11 plicit or vague manner. Once interpre It is in this light that Dilthey can claim tation has accomplished this, the circle that the process of understanding con does not cease to exist. Rather, the new ceived in terms of the hermeneutical understanding becomes the preunder circle is peculiarly suited to deal with standing of the following experience. the dynamism of historical life and its In this Heidegger agrees with Dilthey subsystems."8 against the Romanticists who, because The final figure to be dealt with they dealt at the level of texts, could in this background discussion- Martin talk of a final or complete understand Heidegger - in many ways is a con ing, tinuation of the move of Dilthey to uni Heidegger's main concern is to versalize the significance of the her deny that this circle is "vicious." In meneutical circle. However, Heidegger deed, he castigates even the "feeling does this through the radical method of that the existence of the circle is an in defining the nature of understanding evitable imperfection" as a misunder itself as circular and then making the standing of the act of understanding particular expressions studied by his which neglects the basic structure of predecessors derivative of this struc "care" that characterizes all under ture of understanding. In short, his is standing.22 For him, what is decisive is a treatment of the hermeneutic circle not how to get out of the circle but which develops at the level of an on rather that one should recognize the tology of the understanding rather than fact that all understanding is inevitably merely at the level of methodology as in the circle and that one should "ex in Schleiermacher or Boeckh.w ploit" this situation, for in the circle is Heidegger's essential point is that hidden a positive possibility of the most an interpretation must arise from a primordial kind of knowing.:2a previous understanding however vague - of the matter under consider Heidegger's radicalization of the ation and that its goal is to lead to a hermeneutical circle, which makes the new understanding which can then be methodological approach of Schleier come the basis for further interpreta macher and Boeckh a derivative of an tion. He is denying the view that un ontological account of understanding, derstanding can be presuppositionless. becomes the background against which

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Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University the contemporary debate develops and standing, but that does not mean that can now be discussed. one cannot test that preunderstanding during the interpretation or that the HERMENEUTICS AS PHILOSOPHY results of the act of interpretation are HANS-GEORG GADAMER bound totally by the preunderstanding. Gadamer attempts to work out the How then does one discover there implications of Heidegger's fundamen is a difference between one's preunder tal derivation of the circular structure standing and of that of a text? For Ga of understanding for the hermeneutics damer, it is "the experience of being of the human science~·.. 24 Thus, for him, 'pulled up short' by the text."~ 0 What the task of hermeneutics is not to de is implicit in tllis view is that the pri velop a procedure or method of under mary characteristic of valid interpreta standing but "to clarify the conditions tion is self-awareness of one's own pre- in which understanding takes place."25 understanding and openness to the As he describes these conditions: "the claim of a text. "This kind of sensi movement of understanding is con tivity involves neither •neutrality' in stantly from the whole to the part and the matter of the object nor the extinc back to the whole. Our task is to ex tion of one's self, but the inclusion of tend in concentric circles the unity of the contrasting awareness of one's own 2 the understood meaning." " In all acts fore-meanings. "ai of interpretation there is a polarity of Thus Gadamer's depiction of the familiarity and strangeness. The need act of understanding is neither the in-. is for the interpreter to recognize both terpreter reducing the past text to only aspects of this polrurity and thereby that which is identical with or congen bring to light any hidden presupposi ial with the present nor the negation of tions he or she might have which func the present and a positioning of oneself tion as a "filter" through which they totally in the past - as a prcsupposi view the matter to be interpreted. It is tionless recorder. Rather, he calls for a Gadamer's conviction that "it is the "fusion of horizons." By this he means tyranny of hidden preunderstandings that one attempts to find "bridges" of that makes us deaf to the language that commonality between the text and the speaks to us in tradition."27 In saying interpreter that can make understand this, however, he is not calling for pre ing possible without denying the sit suppositionless interpretation. Rather, uatedness of either within their respec he sees the Enlightenment's under tive contexts. \Vhat makes this fusion standing of itself- freeing itself from possible is that both the interpreter and all prejudices - as an impossible mis the text exist within a common over sion which actually functions itself as arching tradition of human discourse."2 a prejudice that blinded Enlightenment (A similar description of the interpre~ thinkers to the preunderstandings they tation process can be found in Paul retained.28 His call is that one seek to Ricoeur, though worked out in more bring all preunderstandings "above explicit dialogue with contemporary board" from the beginning so that they structuralist thought.) ~ 3 might be tested during the act of inter There are three further aspects of pretation and that thereby a distinction Gadamer's project that deserve men can be made between legitimate and tion. First, like Heidegger, he denies illegitimate preun:derstandings.29 One that the act of understanding ever cannot escape starting with a preunder- reaches full illumination. This is be- HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE • • • 69

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University cause of the radically historical nature The implication of this confuSion of of human existence.34 Second, aga.in the question of meaning and interpre following Heidegger (especially in his tation is that the question of truth is later writings),_ Gadamer ties all human not adequately dealt with. For Betti, experience of meaning to language, for Gadamer's positiOn "enables a substan "it is in language that we articulate the tive agreement between text and reader experience of the world in so far as this . . . to be formed, without however, experience is common."35 Finally, Ga guaranteeing the correctness of under damer reshapes the primacy of the fU standing."38 Gadamer's response that ture in the t-emporality of human ex he is dealing not with the question of istence which Heidegger demonstrated, the truth of particular understandings a reshaping in which the anticipation but the nature of understanding itself is of understanding is itself made once seen by Betti as simply stating the 6 3 more relative to tradition." That is, the problem, not solving it. n anticipation of wholeness derives not All this is not to say that Betti and so much from an anticipation of future Hirsch do not treat the hermeneutical wholeness as from an anticipation of circle. Rather, they treat it as one the wholeness of all tradition up to the problem of method among others. For point of current interpretation. The Betti, it is treated under his considera implications of these points will be de tion of the canon of coherence.4u And veloped in the following di~cussion. Hirsch gives a rather suggestive treat ment of it in terms of a distinction be HERl'tiENEUTlCS AS l'tiETHOD - tween genre and trait where the ex El\lllLIO BETTI AND ERICH HlRSCH perience of a trait leads to a vague idea Betti and Hirsch represent primar of a genre that must then be filled outY ily a reaction against the implications ·what is characteristic of both is that of the direction given hermeneutical they see this circle as finite in that the thought by H-eidegger and Gadamer in goal of a complete or acceptable inter favor of a position much closer to that pretation is possible. As suggested, the represented by Schleiermacher and reason this is possible is· that they are Boeckh. The first evidence of this is dealing with particular texts, not un that they want to deal in hermeneutics derstanding as such. exclusively with the problem of inter What are we to make of this cri preting texts (or aesthetic objects) tique? The insistence on a need to and not with the more general topic of maintain the authority of the text is the understanding itself. Among their commendable. But, is it true that Ga reasons for this is a conviction that the damer surrendered the autonomy of the latter approach threatens the objectiv text? Is not one of his primary em ity of interpretation. As Betti puts it: phases the need to let the "otherness" of the telt be experienced precisely by It is here that the questionable becoming aware of one's own preunder character of the subjectivist posi standings that might stand in its way? tion comes to full light; it is ob viously influenced by contempor Are not Hirsch and Betti guilty of the ary existentialist philosophy and Enlightenment fault of failing to recog tends towards the confounding of nize their preunderstanding by attempt interpretation and meaning-infer ing to claim that they can separate ence and the removing of the canon of the autonomy of the themselves totally from them and thus text.5 1 guarantee valid autonomous interpre-

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Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University tation? And, do not fail to see that meaning inasmuch as they enter into while the concern for methods of inter discourse,4-

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University what is being communicated in the tra cal concern appears to be to call into dition is the truth. question all positions which, like the This assumption brings us to th~ Enlightenrrient and Habermas, assum~ second element of Habermas' critique a final standpoint from which to judge of Gadamer. He cannot accept Gada tradition. This would appear to degen mer's focusing on the question of the erate into either total authoritarianism possibility of understanding to the ex or total relativism, depending upon the clusion of a concern for the validity of unanimity one gave to the voice of the its results, precisely because this as tradition. sumes by default the truth of the tra This is the stage at which the de· dition. As a critical theorist, Ha.ber bate on the hermeneutic circle current. mas points out that this assumes tra ly stands. The crucial question now be~ dition was created free from distortion comes whether there is any way, within or compulsion of a socio-economic na the scope of hermeneutical reflection, ture - an assumption he attempts to that the impasse we appear to have disprove.'>! In Knowledge and Human reached between these two positions Interests) he develops the claim that all can be breached, knowledge is influenced by human in terests (agreeing with Gadamer's dis A Jl'ROPOSAL avowel of presuppositionless interpreta A possible solution to this impasse tion). But more importantly, he goes suggests itself as one reflects on the on to assert the positive superiority of a use of the term 14preunderstanding" in certain type of interest - emancipa the debate. It soon becomes clear that tory cognitive interesf.l'2 His point, two basic meanings are assigned to this against Gadamer, is that hermeneuti term. It is on this basis that Gadamer cal interpretation must henceforth can distinguish between legitimate and function critically on a.ll tradition that illegitimate preunderstandingS.54 One does not manifest this emancipatory basic set of meanings deals with the interest. As a model of how this can be fact that every act of understanding is done, he gives a suggestive adaptation based on the cumulative results of pre of psychoanalysis to develop a depth vious acts and on the "horizon" of the hermeneutic that can analyze distorted object involved in the present act - communication. .!l-3 which includes the observer's relation The question that remains is how to the object. It is this sense that Gada this really differs from Gadamer. Ga mer views as positive and argues that damer too was willing to reject some it should not be overlooked or denied. parts of past tradition, for example, the On the other hand, there is the use of Enlightenment view of presupposition preunderstanding to designate more less interpretation. Thus, the real ques hypothetical meaning inferences as to tion is not whether one will reject parts the nature of totality, etc., which are of the tradition, but on what basis. Ha not merely derived from the contents bermas makes the critical concern for of preunderstanding in the first sense, emancipation found in marxist and psy but can actually serve to criticize it. chanalytic thought his basis. Gadamer, This second sense of preunderstanding to th1~ contrary, regards this as ideolo is evidenced by the Enlightenment gical and affirming prematurely a final thinkers in their ideal of presupposi point of which the human is not cap tionless interpretation and by Haber able. Indeed, Gadamer's primary criti- mas in his endorsement of critical rea-

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Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University son. It is this second sense of preun which designates the heuristic explana derstanding that Gadamer rejects as tory schema through which one at the prejudice of over-hastiness. tempts to integrate the present exper For clarity of discussion, an ex ience with the "preunderstanding." The plicit distinction should be made be preconcept may well have been sug tween these two senses of preunder gested to the interpreter by his or her standing. Following a suggestion of tradition. That is, it may first come Wolfhart Pannenberg, we will designate on the scene as part of the preunder the first sense as "preunderstanding" standing. However, it is crucial to note proper and the second as "precon that while interpreters can never es cept."115 The choice of "preconcept" i~ cape the fact that a particular precon to emphasize the hypothetical nature cept was suggested by their tradition, of the second sense. they are not bound to accept that sug Utilizing this distinction, we would gestion - precisely because of the propose that an advance in the con heuristic nature of the preconcept, even temporary debate on the hermeneutical when part of a tradition. circle can be made by drawing an an From this perspective an explana alogy with the discussion in contempor tion emerges of why the hermeneutic ary philosophy of science of self-cor ci:fi:cle is not a vicious circle but rather recting cybernetic systems.6 6 In this dis "grows in concentric circles" or "spi cussion a distinction is made between rals." This phenomenon grows out of the givenness of the data - which 1) the radical historical nature of ex includes considerations of the effects of perience - whereby really new data the relation of the observer to the data are continually presenting themselves - and the use of heuristic interpretive to be analyzed; and 2) the heuristic devices which are not so much "de nature of the preconcept - for not only rived" from the data as they are imag can the preconcept be modified or pos inative schemata through which one sibly rejected in light of experience, but can attempt to interpret the data. Two any modification of the preconcept points about these heuristic devices would result in different ways of con must be emphasized. First, they can struing the content of the preunder not be totally avoided, for without some standing. such devices to act as a guide, no re How does this proposal affect the search or interpretation of research stance of the contemporary hermeneu would be possible. Second, the fact that tical debate? In the first place, there one begins with these devices heuristic can be a renewed appreciation of the ally does not mean they are untestable. legitimate concerns of Erich Hirsch. In Rather, they are validated precisely by his numerous criticisms of what he their coherence, consistency and their (somewhat unjustly) saw as the "closed ability to actually account for the data circle" of Heidegger and Gadamer, his 5 under consideration. ' primary concem was always to empha On analogy, in the discussion of size the hypothetical character of all the hermeneutic circle one should make interpretation. ss In our terms, he was a distinction between the "preunder wanting to assert that the preconcept is standing" which designates the un a matter open to verification or rejec avoidable influence of past experience, tion and not something one simply ac training, and the "horizon" of the pres cepts unquestioningly from the preun ent experience, and the "preconcept" derstanding. Drawing on Piaget's "cor- HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE • • • 73

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University rigible schemata" as his model, he em Such a closed circle is unacceptable to phasizes that a schema can be radically him. While we consider this interpre altered and corrected. .-; 9 Our remaining tation of the herm.eneutic theorists as problem with Hirsch is that he is not unjust, our primary interest is in Steg sensitive enough to the fact that most mliller's proposed correction of their interpreters inherit their preconcepts view. In essence, he appeals to Kuhn's from their tradition and that a rejec understanding of the heuristic function tion of that preconcept, as Kuhn has ing of a theory in enquiry as the true shown, is often a more traumatic "rev meaning of the "inability to escaPe pre~ olution" than Hirsch's language sug suppositions."H \iVe find this to be com gests. The basis of this problem is that parable to our distinction between pre Hirsch is still limiting his discussion of concept and preunderstanding. In that hermeneutics to the interpretation of light, what StegmUller is rejecting is aesthetic works, without adequate ap not the theory of the hermeneutic cir preciation of the existential-ontological cle as such but inadequate formulations dimension of human existence that un of it which do not note it!': open-ended derlies this interpretation. nature. The other significant contribution An implication of this proposal as of this proposal to the current herme well, is the de-emphasis of the distinc neutical debate is the corrections it sug tion between the natural sciences and gests to the impasse between Gadamer the human sciences regarding the pres and Habermas. On the one hand, Ga ence of presuppositions. StegmUller damer can be criticized for trying to had noted this, claiming that the dis reject all use of preconcept whatsoever. cussion of the hermeneutic circle was Without a preconcept, interpretation a secondary application to the human would be impossible. What is needed sciences of something formulated more is not the rejection of all preconcepts exactly in the natural sciences.u2 but their careful validation. On the More recently, Reto Fetz has pub other hand, Habermas must be re lished a lengthy article devoted to minded of the heuristic nature of his comparing Heidegger's understanding preconcept of critical reason. For, as of the circle of understanding to Jean Gadamer has shown, the moment a pre Piaget's circular developmental logic concept becomes illegitimate is the mo of the sciences. His conclusion is that ment it becomes treated as a preunder Kuhn's understanding of the nature of standing- i.e., as given rather than as a paradigm presents a middle ground hypothetical and heuristic. wherein the human sciences and the The distinction between preconcept natural sciences overlap.a3 The real and preunderstanding and the analogy point of question that remains is wheth with self-correcting cybernetic systems er one follows Heidegger in seeing the is also helpful in dealing with contem human sciences as more prhnal and the porary critiques of the discussion of the natural sciences as der.tvative, or hermeneutic circle. The most extensive whethe·r one follows Stegmliller in as such critique is that of the logician serting the reverse. Wolfgang Stegmiiller. His main objec One final note. The suggestion that tion to this discussion is that he inter the topic of our discussion can be more prets the theorists of the hermeneutic adequately described as the "herme circle to be understanding this as a neutic spiral" than as the "hermeneutic closed and therefore vicious circle.il0 circle" has found an increasing number

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Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University of supporters recently.-1] 4 As suggested ing a theoretical basis for it. What above, we see our proposal - with its makes -the "hermeneutic circle" victor awareness of the open-ended nature of ious is that it is not closed in on itself, the preconcept - as not only sympa but can break out to include both new thetic to this suggestion, but as provid- data and new interpretations.

REFERENCES

1. Bleicher, Josef. Contemporary Hermeneutics. 27. Ibid., p. 239. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. 28. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 102. Bleicher distinguishes between 29. Ibid., p. 246. the hermeneutical circle and the hermeneutic 30. Ibid., p. 237. circle on the basis of a distinction between 31. Ibid., p. 238; cf. p. 422. a concem for method and a concem for on 32. Ibid., p. 273. tology respectively. This distinction will be 33. Ricoeur, Paul. "Fron: Existentialism to the observed in this paper as much as possible. Philosophy of Language," in Paul Ricoeur: 3. Palmer. Rkhard. Hermeneutics. Evanston, An Anthology of His Work. Ed. C. Reaga!) IL: Northwestem University Press, 1967. p. & D. Stewart. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978. 25. pp. 86-93. See especially pp. 90-1. 4. Cf. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Meth 34. Gadamer, oP. cit., p. 269. od. NY: Seabury, 1975. p. 154. 35. Ibid., p. 495. 5. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. Hermeneutics. ed. 36. Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Theology and the Heinz Klmrnerle. Missoula, MT: Sholar's PhilosJJphy of Sci.,nce. Phil.: Westminster, Press, 1977, p. 96. 1976. p. 165. 6. Ibid., pp. 41££. 37. Betti, Emilio. "Hermeneutics as the General 7. Ibid., p. 97. Methodology of the Geisterwissen.rchaften;' 8. Ibid., p. 113. in Bleicher, oP. til., vv. !il-94. See p. 73. 9. Ibid., p. 69. 38. Ibid., p. 79. 10. Cf. Ibid., p, 150; and Palmer, op. cit., p, 87. 39. Cf. Gadamer, op. cit., pp. 465-6. 11. Boeckh, August. On Interpretation and CTi 40. Betti, op. cit., pp. 59-60. iidsm. Nonnan, OK: University of Okiaho 41. Hirsch, Erich. Validity ill Interpretation. ma Press, 1968. p. 52, 131. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. p. 12. Ibid., p. 90. 77. 13. Ibid., p. 109. 42. Bleicher, op. cit., pp. 121-2. 14. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriftetl. GOttingen: 43. Habennas, Jiirgen, "The Hermeneutical Vandenhoec:k & Ruprecht, 17 volumes - Claim to Universality;' in Bleicher, op. cit., 1917-1974. Vol. V, p. 172. :DP. 181-211. See p. 203. 15. Cf. Ibid., XIV, p. 783. 44. Hahermas, Jiirgen. Knowledge and Human 16. Cf. Makkreel, Rudolf. Dilthey -Philosopher Interests. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. p. 168. of the Human Stf~dies. Princeton: Princeton 45. Ib-id., p. 171. University Press, 1975. pp. 269-70. 4-6. Cf. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Replik", in Her 17. Cf. Palmer, op. cit., pp. 118-121. meneutik itnd Ideologiekritik. Ed. Karl-Otto 18. 1Jakkreel, op. cit., p. 301. Ape!. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971. pp_ 283- 19. Cf. Palmer, op. cit., p. 132; Gadamer. op. cit., 317. See p. 289. p. 261. 47. Cf, Habermas, Jiirgen. Zur Logik der So2ial 20. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. NY: wissrmschaften. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1967. Harper & Rowe, 1962. p. 190, p. 289. 21. Cf. Husser!, Edmond, Ideas. NY: Collier 48. Ibid., p. 303. Books, 1962. pp. 105-111. 49. Gadamer, Tf'utlt and Method, p. 495. 22. Heidegger, oP. cit., pp. 194, 363. 50. Ibid., p. 422. 23. Ibid., p. 195. 51. Habennas, "The Henneneutical Claim to Uni 24. Gadamer, op. cit., p. 235. versality," pp. 205-7. 25. Ibid., p. 263. 52. Habermas, Knowledge awl Hutnan Interests, 26. Ibid,, p. Z59. p. 198. HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE • • • 75

Copyright (c) 2002 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) DePaul University 53. Ibid., p. 228. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 54. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 246. p. 32. 55. Pannenberg, op. cit., pp. 194-202. 60. Stegmiiller, Wolfgang. "Der sogenannte Zir 56. Cf. Ibid:.i p. 131; Ernest Nagel. Tlu Struc kel des V erstehens," in N atur mW Geschichte. ture of Science. NY: Hareourt, Grace & Ed. Kurt HUber. Hamburg, 1973. pp. 21-46. World, 1961; and Krausser, Peter. Kritik See pp. 22, 31. der endlichrm V ermmft. Frankfurt: Suhr 61. Ibid., p. 33. kamp, 1968. 62. Ibid. 57. For some considerations that can lead a scien 63. Fetz, Reto. "Kreis des Vertehens oder Kreis tist to switch interpretive schemata see Tho der Wissrmschaften?" Freiburger Zeitschrift mas Kuhn. The structure of Scientific Revo fiir Philosophic wu:l Theologi.~ 26 (1979) : lutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 163-201. See p. 187. Press, 1970. pp. 150-159. 64. Cf. Ibid., p. 168 fn 26; Stegmiiller, oP. cit., p. 58. Hirsch, op. cit., p. 109-110. 27; Coreth, Emerich. Grundfrcwen der Her 59. Hirsch, Erich. The Aims of Interpretation. meneutik. Freiburg: Herder, 1"969. p. 103.

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PHILOSOPHY TODAY

SPRING 1981 SUMMER 1981 Semiosi.s a..s Dialogue - Eugen Baer A Smile at!d a Sense of Tragedy. Letters Collingwpod and Wittgenstein Oi'l- the Task of from J. Glenn Gray- David. Farrell Krell Philosophy - J. A. Martin, Jr. Kant a.s a Christian Philosophr:r: Hope and Meditations on the Intimate and the Ultimate: the Symb.ols of Christian Faith - Philip Exce,-pts from the Philosophical Journals of I. Glenn &ay - Selected by Sherry Gray Roslii Compassion 01~d T!'llnscendence of Duty and A Bibliography of W oP'ks by 1. Glen11 G,-ay lnclinafion - Alan R Drengson Man and Being in Heidegger ami Zen Budd Hannah Arendt and the Solitoriness of Think hism - John Steffney ing - Sherry Gray The LeaP of Thinking: a C ompari.son of H ei Topics, Topicality and the New Topos- Mi degge,- and the Zen Maste,- Dagen - Carl chael Heim Olson The HunoankaJion of PhilosopJ.y th,-ough the On the Fundamental Erperi.ence of Voice in Bhagrwad Gita: Antonio de Nicol!u and Or- Language with some Notes on Heidegger - tega y Gosset - David L. Hall H. Miles Groth Frpm Niet:;:sche to Heidegge,-; a Critical Re Th-e Significance of the Mountain Image {01' view of Heidegger"s Works on Nietzsche the Philosophy of Life - Ash Gobar Michael Gelven Freud's Philosophy - Debra B. Bergoffen Husserl's EaP'Iy Conception of the Triadic Structure of the lntenlioool Act - Quentin Play, Freedom and SpDf'l - Rudolph M. Fee Smith zell

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