Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory Conditions, Mechanisms, and Effects
BY D.W. LEE
Understanding Current Conflicts Contemporary conflicts have become more transnational, protracted, irregular, and resistance- centric.1 They can be best described as protracted internal conflicts with multiple state actors and nonstate actors intervening much like the multidimensional hybrid operational environment discussed in Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022.2 This article aims to explain how to harness the emerging strategic utility of nonstate actors by utilizing well-established bodies of knowledge on resistance dynamics. This objective is based upon the observation that an increasing number of external state actors overtly or covertly inter- vene in intrastate conflicts by exploiting the environment’s resistance potential in order to increase their respective strategic influence.3 Similarly, both internal and external nonstate actors take advantage of interstate conflicts or political instability stemming from failing states. The current conflicts in Iraq and Syria certainly meet this characterization; as do those in Ukraine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Libya. More state actors are supporting or sponsoring political movements in intrastate conflict, making the termination of fighting very difficult. For instance, the resilience of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is largely attributed to the pro- tracted Syrian civil war in which regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all spon- sor local movements. In addition, external nonstate actors such as ISIL, al-Nusrah, and Hezbollah are also deeply involved in the conflict. In other words, these current conflicts represent a sample of a larger shift in warfare. As of this writing, Uppsala University’s world conflict data program compiles 40 conflicts in the world for 2014. All but one of them are intrastate conflicts and 13 of them are internationalized.4 In short, state actors are actively leveraging and taking advantage of the resistance potential of groups engaged in civil conflicts.
D.W. Lee is a lecturer in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
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The United States must adapt to this oper- by movements to exploit the conditions. The ational environment in order to achieve discussion of mechanisms accompanies a national policy objectives. Key to this goal is a description of the effects that can be expected shared problem identification that will lead to when movements take advantage of these con- mitigation and reduction of the fog and fric- ditions. The article concludes with a discussion tion inherent in a hybrid operational environ- of some of the essential traits associated with ment. Problem identification begins with effective resistance in highly repressive envi- understanding how external groups are lever- ronments. aging and harnessing the resistance potential This article is mostly informed by social of organic movements toward their respective movement theory and collective action theory. strategic interests. By understanding how resis- Other disciplines also address resistance. tance potential is shaped toward strategic However, political sociology offers the deepest objectives, we can also better determine how insights into internationalized civil wars and to replicate the best practices of supporting resistance given its disciplinary focus on revo- and sponsoring robust organic movements. lutionary, resistance, and insurgent dynamics. In order to fight successfully in this com- The article offers a broad overview of the mul- plex hybrid environment, a deep understand- tidisciplinary resistance literature as opposed ing of resistance dynamics is critical. Without to an in-depth case study of a single resistance understanding resistance dynamics, it becomes movement. The main purpose is to distill com- next to impossible to identify who is working monly established and empirically validated with adversarial state actors and how their patterns and mechanisms of resistance. I also nonstate surrogates gain political support use resistance and insurgency interchangeably against our own strategic interests. Our recent throughout. Given how extensively organic unsuccessful attempt at building a surrogate movements have been utilized by external force in Syria is a good reminder of why it mat- actors, one’s resistance movement is frequently ters to harness the utility of organic resistance. another’s insurgency.6 Pragmatism guides this Instead of building a sustainable movement article; it aims to learn the best practices from with an armed wing, we thought a program all forms of robust movements regardless of designed to train and equip a few dozen com- their political orientation. mandos would suffice.5 This article intends to What is a Resistance Movement? delineate the strategic dynamics of resistance and discuss the utility of resistance as a strate- In order to harness the utility of resistance, this gic tool. article begins with some definitions, both doc- I will begin with a discussion of how resis- trinal and academic. The Department of tance is conceptualized in doctrinal and aca- Defense defines a resistance movement as “an demic terms to distill the essential characteris- organized effort by some portion of the civil tics of the concept. Then I will highlight three population of a country to resist the legally aspects of resistance: antecedent conditions, established government or an occupying mechanisms, and effects. I will identify what power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”7 antecedent conditions facilitate resistance, fol- In political science or sociology, resistance is lowed by a variety of mechanisms employed notoriously difficult to define due to its
132 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 3 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY multidisciplinary nature. It can arguably range three different angles: antecedent conditions, from armed guerillas to symbolic gestures mechanisms, and effects.10 This is a very useful depending on which academic discipline way to think about resistance as the synthesis defines it.8 Because of this diversity, I use a helps us understand what one should include broad academic definition of resistance in to develop a resistance movement. That is, the order to avoid a potential bias: “[collective United States should understand what condi- and] active efforts to oppose, fight, and refuse tions to factor in, what activities to support, to cooperate with or submit to … abusive and what effects can be expected toward the behavior and…control.”9 We can infer three end-state. shared characteristics from the definitions: Figure 1 depicts typical processes in the organization, civilian components, and disrup- development of resistance movements. They tion or coercion against some authority. are organized in three categories: conditions, Unfortunately, these definitions offer little mechanisms, and effects. The utility of these on how to recognize resistance potential and categories is threefold. First, there is much con- leverage it toward a strategic objective. This is fusion about what factors promote robust where social movement theory can inform us resistance, often conflating what is available in of the process of resistance. Based on the polit- the environment with what activities should ical process model developed by Douglas be emphasized. Second, little discussion exists McAdam, we can approach resistance from on what effects external actors can facilitate
Figure 1: Social Movement Approach to Resistance Dynamics
PRISM 6, no. 3 FEATURES | 133 LEE with and through surrogate movements. represent broad factors and should not be Without understanding recurring links understood as specific prescriptions. between conditions, mechanisms, and effects, Conditions it is almost impossible to confidently support resistance elements. Figure 1 clarifies some of Antecedent conditions are independent of any the confusion and suggests what to look for, other explanatory variable.11 An antecedent what to do, and what to achieve to support a condition can be defined as “a phenomenon robust resistance movement. The categories whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a causal law or hypothesis.”12 In Jarek Tuszyński
Catholic priest Jerzy Popieluszko’s sermons mobilized a broad segment of the Polish population. His martyrdom immensely expanded the political opportunities for the opposition movement.
134 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 3 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY essence, antecedent conditions are locally been ordered to shoot.14 Similarly, Archbishop available ingredients that can be enhanced or Oscar Romero of El Salvador gave a great deal amplified through active mechanisms toward of political legitimacy to political opposition robust resistance. In order to support resis- groups such as the Democratic Revolutionary tance then, it is critical that intelligence prepa- Front and the Farabundo Marti National ration of the battlefield begin by analyzing Liberation Front (FMLN).15 His support for what conditions exist in the operational envi- resistance groups opposing the El Salvadoran ronment. regime was so powerful that he too was assas- Social movement theory suggests four sinated. At his funeral, more than 100,000 major types of antecedent conditions: politi- mourners gathered demanding both land and cal, economic, social, and informational. political reforms.16 The FMLN’s guerilla force Political conditions can be factions within the was still very weak and unable to mount effec- regime or the existence of political opposition tive offensives against the government. The groups. Such political groups might be formal army fired on the mourners, killing dozens. or informal. In addition, nonpolitical entities This massacre quickly became a mobilizing can also expand political opportunities for narrative for opposition groups. In fact, the resistance movements. For instance, Jerzy assassination of Romero drove many sympa- Popieluszko was instrumental in providing thizers and nonviolent activists to actively sup- political legitimacy to the Polish opposition port and join the FMLN guerrillas.17 movement and Solidarity. Popieluszko was a Elections provide unique political oppor- Catholic priest who routinely delivered anti- tunities for resistance. The overthrow of communist sermons and gave both religious Slobodan Milosevic took place right after the and nationalist speeches in support of rigged presidential election of 2000. Marcos Solidarity. His sermons mobilized such a was also overthrown following the 1986 snap broad segment of the Polish population that election in the Philippines where the appear- the regime had him assassinated in 1984. ance of election fraud was quickly utilized for Ironically his martyrdom immensely expanded mobilization. Cardinal Ricardo Vidal almost political opportunities for the opposition immediately made a statement condemning movement. the apparent election irregularities. Where Religious leaders creating political oppor- elections are used as a tool of political legiti- tunities for resistance movements are not mation, resistance potential follows. The key uncommon. Cardinal Jaime Sin of the is to maintain continuously updated informa- Philippines was able to turn the tide in 1986 tion about political events and elections in when the first “people’s power” movement countries of interest. Even draconian regimes managed to oust Ferdinand Marcos.13 Marcos tend to allow elections if only to achieve inter- ordered his military to crush the opposition national legitimacy. This provides a unique movement supporting Corazon Aquino, opportunity to map the political landscape of widow of the assassinated senator Benigno the regime. Aquino Jr. Cardinal Sin immediately issued a Certain economic conditions are highly statement urging Catholics to go out and pro- associated with the onset of resistance move- tect the protesters from the troops who had ments. However, not all robust resistance
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movements are attributable to economic especially in less than fully developed coun- downturns. Typically, conditions often linked tries. Second, even if such conditions were with the onset of resistance include income observable, the classical model offers no causal inequalities, under-employment, unemploy- mechanisms to link the assumed individual ment, inflation, or income stagnation. Note psychological disequilibrium with collective that it is often external shocks that trigger the mobilization. It just offers a leap of faith exacerbation of these conditions. Economic between individual psychology and collective measures taken by external actors can create a action. Thus, Fearon and Laitin show with more conducive environment for organic resis- their empirical analysis of the Minority at Risk tance.18 dataset that ethnic divides or grievances alone Ungoverned or under-regulated econom- rarely explain the intensity or duration of civil ics can also provide opportunities for resis- wars.23 In fact, they provide statistical evidence tance groups to generate resources to sustain that the outbreak of intrastate conflicts cannot themselves. These unsanctioned economic be explained by the strength of political griev- areas typically have built in informal or auton- ances. This is not a trivial finding given how omous channels of resource extraction and popular the notion of grievance is in the com- redistribution. The autonomy of the Bazaar in mon understanding of insurgent dynamics. Iran was a major factor during the Iranian Third, the antiquated classical theory of insur- revolution of 1979.19 The Bazaar provided gency cannot explain how resistance can take much needed resources to key organizers of place in developed countries. the resistance when the regime cut subsidies Individual grievances do play a role in the and stipends to students and academics.20 development of resistance. The question is Economic conditions themselves are how. Typically, grievances become instrumen- rarely sufficient for resistance to emerge or to tal when they are exploited and framed by take hold. While economic conditions groups or networks actively seeking to create throughout the Middle East were generally opportunities for collective mobilization. For comparable in the 1980s and 1990s, insurgent the special operations forces (SOF) commu- movements emerged in only a few select coun- nity to harness resistance potential, then, the tries.21 While all major macroeconomic indica- focus should be on both the existing condi- tors were comparable in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, tions and the activities of political actors. This Morocco, and Tunisia between 1980 and 1992, is in essence what Emirbayer and Goodwin call only the first two countries experienced major the problem of agency, warning of the false insurgent movements. This reflects the explan- promise of structural determinism.24 In other atory poverty of the classical model of resis- words, one cannot properly leverage resistance tance which links collective action directly to unless potential (antecedent conditions) is individual psychological conditions. Several understood in the context of agency (purpose- flawed assumptions explain the limited ana- ful activities). lytic value of the classical model.22 First, it is Socioethnic divides and existing dissident almost impossible to observe and measure networks provide great potential for resistance. individual psychological conditions in order In particular, external actors can leverage such to see how they may impact resistance, conditions to establish a robust organizational
136 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 3 RESISTANCE DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY platform. It is no coincidence that most robust or matter to other entities.”27 Translated to the resistance movements emerge from pre-exist- concept of resistance, causal mechanisms are ing ties and networks. These pre-existing ties the activities and techniques used by insur- typically have built-in mechanisms to coordi- gents or activists to exploit and accelerate the nate information and action across civil soci- antecedent conditions for resistance purposes. ety. Ethnic divides can be a powerful fault-line Effects, then, are the outcomes insurgents to promote resistance initially. However, an intend to accomplish by exploiting the condi- isolated group can be an easy target for the tions through a variety of mechanisms. regime to marginalize and vilify. The SOF com- United States Special Operations munity must pay attention to what network Command (SOCOM) recently released a con- resources socioethnic groups can contribute to cept paper that emphasizes cultivating soldiers the creation of broad coalitions of resistance “with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to movements as opposed to just relying on a understand and influence human actions and single subgroup. activities.”28 The same concept paper stresses Ideological conditions refer to existing the need to link these activities to creating grievances stemming from economic dispari- desired effects in the human domain.29 ties or structural strains such as income Understanding how mechanisms are related to inequalities, unemployment, underemploy- effects is not only academically useful, but also ment, or discrimination. In essence, these con- operationally relevant to the human domain. ditions often stem from social, economic, or Conversion/Co-optation and Effects political strains. They also include existing norms of collective action and violence that When opposition political groups support a can be utilized to justify mobilizing large resistance movement, the latter typically gains groups for resistance. For instance, a sense of legitimacy quickly. This legitimacy can also be victimization is often used by Islamists to jus- used to gain support from the population. For tify jihad.25 Typically, insurgents will try to the movement, this is perhaps the quickest align their ideology with socially accepted path to leveraging existing groups to elevate its themes of dissent.26 Instead of treating resis- political appeal. As Robert Helvey demon- tance ideology as a monolithic worldview, it is strates, conversion is a powerful mechanism to more useful to approach it as a set of griev- transform potential political fractures into ances specifically framed to motivate and jus- resistance.30 He notes that the Serbian opposi- tify collective action. tion movement was able to oust Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, even though the regime Causal Mechanisms and Effects possessed much more powerful coercive Mechanisms refer to the causal links between means, because some of the Serbian police and antecedent conditions and outcome variables. bureaucrats withdrew their loyalty.31 In essence, In the social sciences, a causal mechanism is regime sympathizers were converted to support defined as “physical, social, or psychological the opposition movement. processes through which agents with causal Conversion is the process by which the capacities operate, but only in specific contexts movement signals to the pillars of regime sup- or conditions, to transfer energy, information, port that they will be disenfranchised by the
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movement.32 The movement will work with However, internal conversion and external some regime elements to either facilitate or network building are not mutually exclusive stabilize the eventual transfer of political mechanisms. Rather, they should be consid- authority. This is a different way to establish ered complimentary processes designed to auxiliary and underground networks for resis- leverage political fractures. Conversion can tance. Instead of creating purpose-built net- also be used in the steady state. A political works from elements outside of the ruling claim made by the resistance movement can coalition, the logic of conversion would pre- gain popular support if an existing political scribe identifying moderate or disgruntled fac- party or influential dissidents also endorse it. tions within the power structures of the The interests of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary regime. Resistance can be considered as a zero- Guards Corps in Lebanese politics are often sum political game where one defection or advanced in this way by Hezbollah, thus acquiescence means a twofold gain for the achieving a synthesis between strategic resis- movement and a twofold loss to the regime. tance networks and smaller operational net- From this perspective the benefits of conver- works. sion become clear compared to those of build- Chenoweth and Stephen also confirm this ing external resistance networks to match the relationship with their qualitative and statisti- regime’s coercive capacity. cal analysis of regime-change campaigns.33 Spc. Kristina Truluck/U.S.Spc. Army
Humvee down after Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant attack in Mosul, Iraq 2014-06-14
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While civil resistance methods are statistically Lina Khatib demonstrates how ISIL co-opted correlated with successful resistance move- existing Sunni tribes to accelerate its expan- ments, the likelihood of such success is heavily sion.37 The rapid fall of Mosul can be partially influenced by the magnitude of defectors.34 explained by conversion in that Sunni police Several causal mechanisms warrant further and soldiers had little reason to fight due to explanation. First, regime defectors can greatly Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki’s systemic per- enhance the perceived viability of the resis- secution of the Sunni population. ISIL contin- tance movement. In 1986, Defense Minister ued to make local alliances to accelerate its Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff pace of expansion. Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos in the In Syria, ISIL essentially rehired civil ser- Philippine Army used the Reform the Armed vants and teachers to maintain control of areas Forces Movement (RAM) to support the polit- under their control as long as they agreed to ical opposition movement in the Philippines.35 use ISIL’s ideology.38 With the Catholic Church’s backing and To summarize, the effect of conversion can Aquino’s street demonstrations gaining be profound. It can establish broad political momentum, the RAM proved to be a key ele- legitimacy for the resistance movement. It can ment of the movement’s success.36 help the movement leverage or pool resources Second, regime defectors can deliver criti- with existing organic institutions to accelerate cal intelligence to the movement. Such intel- its pace of growth. Most importantly, it can ligence can be utilized to send surgical signals help the resistance movement become very to other fence-sitters that the movement poses hard for the regime to repress as such oppres- no threat to them or siding with the regime sion is more likely to trigger a political back- will harm their future position. Defection can lash. This is what Gene Sharp calls “political also be subtle and nonphysical. Endorsements Jiu-jitsu,” which he defines as a process from existing political groups can be powerful through which violent repression is exploited catalysts as well. to elevate the legitimacy of resistance and thus Third, regime defectors typically can bring garner popular support.39 subordinates and equipment to the move- Resource-Generation and Effects ment, which tend to be resource-poor, espe- cially in the beginning. In the steady state, Resistance is not cheap. It requires a wide vari- existing political groups can provide wider ety of activities to gain popular support and access to the movement with their communi- maintain access to the population. These activ- cation platforms and constituency networks. ities include information campaigns, publica- In short, conversion is a critical mechanism to tions, public demonstrations, and cultural and consider given how resource intensive it can be educational events, to name just a few. Self- to build an effective resistance movement that sufficiency is, therefore, a critical requirement can withstand the regime’s superior coercive for any resistance movement. State actors can power from scratch. easily use official and financial means to starve Growing evidence suggests that conver- dissident groups. Audits are frequently used to sion was one of the main mechanisms ISIL suppress dissident groups of financial used to expand both in Syria and Iraq. In Iraq, resources. It is no surprise that robust
PRISM 6, no. 3 FEATURES | 139 LEE resistance movements such as Hamas and resources, such as street games mocking then Hezbollah sustain themselves with a variety of Serbian president Milosevic. Other movements legal and illegal financial and commercial also employ fund-raising events. Memorial ser- enterprises. vices are a good example of events used by a It is convenient to think that external wide variety of resistance movements. Setting actors can greatly help the movement by pro- up charities that accept donations from inter- viding the required resources to finance vari- national actors is another example. Another ous activities. However, there is a big caveat: mechanism is nesting the movement within the success of resistance largely depends on its existing groups that have built-in mechanisms perceived legitimacy. No matter how secretive of collecting and distributing membership fees external support can be, just a single exposure for services. However, these movements use can completely rob the movement of authen- the resources to develop self-sustaining plat- ticity and legitimacy—this single point of fail- forms instead of just focusing on acquiring ure is something the planner should be very kinetic capabilities. One of the first activities careful about. of Hezbollah was collecting trash, and since Successful resistance movements generally then, it has established diverse new social develop their own internal mechanisms to institutions, ranging from schools to hospitals. generate resources in order to avoid being per- The tree army in Kunar Province, ceived as a puppet of outside influence. Otpor, Afghanistan, is another example of a dissident a Serbian resistance movement, is famous for group with humble beginnings. It started as an using creative ways of generating its own agricultural development project led by the Omar Siddeeq YousifOmar
Humble Beginnings: ANA soldiers sit in Kunar Province, home of the tree army, a militant organization that began their journey with little resources and have become a self-sustaining resistance group with the common goal of eliminating the Taliban.
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Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell with historically reoccurring patterns of suc- (NRCC), working under Task Force Mountain cessful resistance movements. Warrior (TFMW), and it quickly became a self- Brokers who organically connect structur- sustaining resistance movement against the ally disjointed groups in order to facilitate bloc Taliban.40 Key to its success was the NRCC’s recruitment play an irreplaceable role. Shin- emphasis on imparting economic skills and Kap Hand provides a detailed account of how codes of honor to Afghan partners, which in the American revolutionaries overcame inter- turn propped up the perceived legitimacy and nal stratification against the British Empire.43 viability of the movement.41 Trainees were Paul Revere and Joseph Warren were not in recruited only from respected families. And by leadership positions, but they provided the working with one of the best agricultural critical connective tissue between the thinkers departments in Afghanistan, the partners man- and the doers of the American Revolution.44 aged to provide essential skills and services to Similarly, single members of the National their home villages. Once the tree army was Socialist German Workers’ Party sufficiently developed, its network was able to (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, drive insurgents out of the area by establishing NSDAP) in the 1920s and 1930s were instru- itself as a legitimate resistance movement mental to the rapid expansion of the move- against the insurgency and taking over timber- ment.45 The primary function of the single ing from the Taliban. members was to identify key influencers in Illegal timbering and smuggling lumber existing networks and organizations in order was one of the most profitable illegal activities to bring them under the NSDAP in a wholesale financing the Taliban in Kunar Province.42 By fashion. In other words, they were mobile bro- far, the tree army remains one of the most suc- kers focusing on bloc recruitment. cessful and self-sustaining resistance move- A similar pattern of network development ments supported by the U.S. against the was observed in Poland in the 1970s and Taliban. 1980s. Early members of Polish anti-commu- nist opposition realized that isolated student Bloc Recruitment, Mass Mobilization, and activism was not sufficient to challenge the Effects communist regime. Their resistance was well Mass mobilization mechanisms for resistance organized but quickly suppressed by the differ from individual recruitment. The pace of regime’s divide and conquer tactics as students growth and the scale of growth must be were framed as over-privileged troublemakers. achieved concurrently as weak movements can Realizing this failure, Adam Michnik estab- be easily controlled or even co-opted by the lished civic organizations such as the Workers regime. This is why successful movements have Defense Committee in Poland (Komitet Obrony empirically employed a specific mobilization Robotnikkow, KOR) and the Society of Scientific mechanism called bloc recruitment. Individual Studies (Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych, TKN) recruitment and bloc recruitment are not in order to connect Solidarity with other clus- mutually exclusive. The argument of this arti- ters of resistance that did not necessarily align cle is to complement existing mechanisms with each other.46 KOR was not an overtly political organization. Its mission was to
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provide legal assistance and support for jailed broad coalition of dissident and existing sub- demonstrators and their families.47 TKN was a groups. In other words, the notion of solidarity mobile educational program. In practice, it was built into the overall resistance landscape. was called the Flying University where academ- Similar dynamics were also observed in ics and cultural figures organized dispersed Italy during the formation of clandestine polit- events to discuss sensitive topics such as Polish ical militancy in the 1970s. Donatella della national literature.48 Porta meticulously shows that most dedicated The perceived neutrality of civil brokers members of the Red Brigades, the Proletarian was perhaps the single most important organi- Armed Groups, the Front Line, the Communist zational innovation that key leaders engi- Fighting Formations, and a few other minor neered through trial and error. Jacek Kuron clandestine groups came from existing politi- and Adam Michnik learned in the 1970s that cal groups and associations through interper- focused yet unconnected resistance could be sonal ties.50 What della Porta empirically easily neutralized by the regime’s divide and shows is that overt networks and affiliations conquer strategy. The success of Solidarity in play the role of a large pool composed of the 1980s in replacing the Polish communist potential recruits who can be mobilized regime cannot be explained without taking through existing and multiple personal ties into account the role of civic networks specifi- into a more selective and cohesive subgroup. cally founded to coordinate and manage a The magnitude of trust-based ties built and
Figure 2: Polish Opposition Network, 1980/198149
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sustained in routine overt political organiza- instance, while personal poverty may be a tions predicts the level of commitment common economic condition, it can bridge to expressed by those who joined the under- regime incompetence, corruption, or nepo- ground militant groups.51 tism. The youth bulge that was exacerbated by In sum, the United States must learn how the global recession was blamed on the cor- to identify and assess the potential of organic rupt and nepotistic regimes in the Middle East brokers in order to facilitate bloc recruitment. during the Arab Spring. In many ways, the self- Learning about relational dynamics among immolation of Tunisian street vendor and across existing networks is critical and is Mohamed Buazizi captured and collectivized not a trivial matter. Relational information is a widespread individual grievance of economic qualitatively different from individual attri- inequality. It was not an isolated incident, but butes in that the latter are used to recruit indi- was framed as a symptom of deep-seeded viduals, while the former informs the planner structural issues affecting many like Buazizi. about how heterogeneous groups and net- Frame amplification is the technique works converge or diverge along different designed to imbue the bridging frame with an political issues. Understanding those fault active sense of agency by invoking resonating lines can be a critical factor in expanding the social or religious norms.55 For instance, it can scope of mobilization. be framed that college graduates are under- employed or unemployed not because of a Framing, Messaging, and Effects structural economic strain, but because the Perhaps the most effective mechanism to regime is actively skimming the benefits of achieve a rapid rate of bloc recruitment is stra- national resources. It is well documented that tegic framing. Strategic framing is the process ISIL and its predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq con- by which the movement combines grievances sistently used targeted violence to amplify the with political arguments regarding three latent sectarian tension between Sunni and frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motiva- Shia populations.56 By accentuating and exac- tional. Instead of merely reproducing existing erbating the divide, ISIL has sought to mobi- individual grievances, strategic framing pro- lize and recruit disenfranchised Iraqi Sunnis.57 vides interpretive schemes designed to induce Returning to the Arab Spring, the death of a shared consciousness for collective action. In Buazizi in Tunisia and the murder of Khaled fact, SOCOM stresses the need to understand Said in Egypt were quickly amplified as state- and adopt culturally relevant messaging sponsored campaigns of unbridled violence themes in order to localize information opera- against the population.58 Incidents of violence tions.52 If political or economic dissatisfaction were quickly utilized by existing movement is the ingredient of collective action, then stra- networks in what Wendy Pearlman calls tegic framing is the catalyst. Snow and Benford “microfoundations of uprising.”59 These inci- provide four specific mechanisms of this align- dents were reframed as moral judgments ment process: bridging, amplification, exten- invoking the violation of shared norms, dig- sion, and transformation.53 nity, and life. Vilification is a common tech- Frame bridging is how individual condi- nique used for frame amplification.60 tions are bridged to a structural issue.54 For Vilification has two processes. First, it begins
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with a polarization process where competitors Frame transformation is the process of are lumped into a generic “other” category. revitalizing a perhaps stagnating ideology. An Second, the “other” category is repeatedly anti-regime narrative may need to be revamped associated with socially and culturally negative in order to earn international support or rec- traits.61 ognition. Typically, the movement may invoke In frame extension the normative judg- a “far enemy” to justify the need to work with ment established with the amplification pro- external actors. It is no coincidence that cess is extended to various groups within the Solidarity’s narrative aligned the Polish com- population.62 That is, because the regime is munist regime with the Soviet Union, just like actively defrauding the national economy for Zawahiri went from the near enemy of the personal greed and to satisfy its “oligarchy,” it Egyptian state to the Far Enemy of the West. is not only college graduates but also the entire Perhaps this is where the Arab Spring failed to middle class that are suffering from poor eco- take advantage of the opening political oppor- nomic conditions. In Tunisia, labor move- tunity of elections. The secular camps within ments quickly seized the moment and orga- the overall opposition coalition were not as nized nation-wide demonstrations showing well organized as the Muslim Brotherhood, solidarity. In Egypt, what started as an urban- thus failing to transform their “opposition nar- based anti-Mubarak voice quickly became a rative” to a “political narrative.” national narrative about Egyptian national These are just a set of a few mechanisms pride. By this process the claim of one group typically employed by movements to trans- is extended to represent a broader set of social form individual grievances into a powerful groups. ideology of political mobilization.63 Once a
Figure 3: Simplified Typology of Repression
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narrative is developed by codifying and dis- attention. Given the definitions discussed ear- seminating it through print or online media, lier, it should be clear that modern resistance these mechanisms can sustain the movement often takes place in politically austere environ- very effectively. Even the current narrative of ments. This means sponsoring resistance ISIL can be described in a similar fashion. should factor in substantial measures of While the genesis of ISIL is uniquely Iraqi regime repression. Thus, it is necessary to Sunni, its information operations have examine some of the typical obstacles to sus- adopted the narrative of the far enemy and tained collective action in order to identify vilification of the West to justify why foreigners what traits to look for when looking for resis- should do whatever it takes to join the tance movements to sponsor. Caliphate and mobilize themselves to commit A resistance movement challenging the lone-wolf attacks on civilian targets. government or occupying force is most likely External support can play a critical role in to face a multitude of repressive efforts. Figure enhancing the movement’s strategic framing. 3 represents a simple typology of state repres- Recent research on the Arab Spring clearly sion. While state repression can be categorized indicates that external media outlets can create in multiple ways, typically it can be conceptu- an echo effect to elevate the salience of certain alized by two factors: scope of repression and political themes and frames.64 Even if the method of repression. Vertically it ranges from regime shuts down social media or even the kinetic to nonkinetic and, laterally, it ranges Internet, external communication and dis- from collective to individual. Four types of semination outside the country corresponds to repression are commonly used against opposi- elevated popular interest and support for resis- tion movements: leadership targeting, leader- tance. In fact, this was not unique to the Arab ship cooptation, resource control, and dele- Spring. Keck’s and Sikkink’s extensive case gitimation.67 This typology should work as a studies of transnational movements demon- check list for planners to factor in what types strate how a political claim travels outside, of support organic resistance movements amplified by external media outlets or epis- would need in order to withstand regime temic communities, and then reenters the repression and survive. country of origin to empower the movement.65 When a resistance movement or insur- They call this pattern of resistance growth the gency challenges a regime, the latter will first “boomerang” effect.66 Applied to resistance, an try to remove the leaders by arresting or killing external supporter can surgically guide this them. However, decapitation rarely leads to well-established pattern to enhance the per- organizational collapse of insurgent or terror- ceived viability of an organic opposition ist movements.68 When leadership targeting is movement. not sufficient or successful, the regime will often employ resource control measures to Conclusion starve the challengers.69 These include shutting This article identifies critical conditions, mech- down social institutions, audits, and financial anisms, and effects that can be utilized for sup- sanctions. In addition, regimes will often try porting resistance movements. However, one to divide and disrupt movements through environmental factor deserves additional nonlethal means. Such efforts include
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cooptation, infiltration, reintegration prom- political, economic, social, and ideological ises, and selective incentives. foundations built during the steady state that If a resistance movement is to succeed in enable the movement to deflect regime repres- coercing or disrupting its targeted regime, it sion and turn it into a rallying point.73 becomes critical for the former to have organic Resistance movements succeed when they can capabilities that can be utilized to withstand strategically employ both lethal and nonlethal and overcome state repression. Historically, methods instead of relying on a single strategy. movements typically acquire these capabilities When resistance movements are not balanced, by employing various nonkinetic and nonvio- they often lead to undesirable strategic conse- lent activities such as providing essential ser- quences, such as was the case of the vices and organizing public events to garner Nicaraguan Contras, where neither the surro- popular support.70 This is why this article high- gates nor the sponsor achieved their respective lights the processes used by insurgents to objective.74 If resistance is to be employed as a develop organic political support, resource strategic tool for advancing national security independence, organizational resiliency, and goals, the United States must carefully factor ideological legitimacy. These processes can be in the intricate dynamics between conditions, found across different environments ranging mechanisms, and effects. Tactics of guerilla from East and Central Asia to the Middle warfare are no longer sufficient to inform us East.71 This resiliency often stems from a coali- how to harness the strategic nature of resis- tion of multiple networks. This multiplicity tance. PRISM may carry an operational liability. However, it is the same factors that give resistance a dif- fused and broad “attribution” characteristic: repression on one is an attack on everyone. Social movement theory calls this mechanism the “repression backfire.”72 The regime will typically have more coer- cive capacity than the resistance movement. It is common to think that lethal aid is what resistance needs to compete with the regime’s military and security forces. Lethal aid may prove effective against weakened or fragile regimes, but not against mature autocratic regimes such as North Korea, China, Iran, or Russia. Lethal assistance also carries a hefty political price. Social movement literature suggests that what enables the movement to compete effec- tively against the regime is not how well it fights with brute force, which is typically expressed as guerilla warfare. Rather, it is the
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Notes Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 160-2. 14 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why 1 Glenn Johnson & Doowan Lee, “Revisiting Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011, Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, December, 2014. p. 161. 2 U.S. Army, ARSOF 2022, United States Army 15 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991, Cambridge Fort Bragg, NC, 2013, 3. University Press, 2001, p. 197. 3 Note that internal conflicts can be a civil war 16 Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective or an internal political confrontation or both. Action and Civil War in El Salvador, Cambridge 4 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/ accessed University Press, 2003, pp. 26-27. July 28, 2015. 17 Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective 5 For a good discussion on why the surrogate Action and Civil War in El Salvador, Cambridge force was so ineffective, see David Maxwell, “Why the University Press, 2003, p. 105. New Syrian Army Failed: Washington and 18 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach Unconventional Warfare, War on the Rock: http:// to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare Magazine, warontherocks.com/2015/08/why-the-new-syr- Vol. 26, No. 3, 2013, p. 30. ian-army-failed-washington-and-unconventional- 19 Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and warfare/ accessed on August 20, 2015. without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran,” in 6 For a good large-N statistical analysis of Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: a Social external support for armed groups, see Zeec Maoz and Movement Theory Approach, Indiana University Belgiin San-Akca, “Rivalry and State Support of Press, 2004, pp. 187-9. Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1947-2001, 20 Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2012. without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran,” in One of their findings is that supporting only armed Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: a Social groups tends to prolong and complicate intrastate Movement Theory Approach, Indiana University conflicts. Press, 2004, pp. 187-9. 7 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: 21 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 10-16. Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: Government 22 For an example of how structural strains are Printing Office, November 2010 (as amended through inadequately used to explain revolutionary move- 15 June 2015), p. 206. ments, see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 8 For a detailed discussion how each discipline Stanford University Press, 1966. defines resistance, see Hollandder and Einonhner, 23 James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, “Conceptualizing Resistance” Sociological Forum, Vol. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 19, No. 4 Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003. 9 Profitt, 1996: 25 from Hollandder and 24 Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin, Einonhner, “Conceptualizing Resistance” Sociological “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4 Agency, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6, 10 Douglas McAdam, Political Process and the 1994. Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, University 25 David A. Snow & Scott C. Bryd, “Ideology, of Chicago Press, 1982. Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements, 11 Henry E. Brady & David Collier, Rethinking Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review, Vol. Social Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, 12, No. 1, 2006. p. 274. 26 David A. Snow & et al, “Frame Alignment 12 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Processes. Micromobilization, and Movement Students of Political Science, Cornell University Press, Participation,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 1997, pp. 9-10. No. 4, 1986, pp. 467-76. 13 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why 27 Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,
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Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, had the following qualities: desire to protect the local Harvard University, 2005, p.137. community from alien influences, theocratic 28 Operating in the Human Domain, Version motivations, and obligation due to some prior 1.0, United States Special Operations Command, association based on family, group, or individual. Tampa, Florida, August, 2015, p. 38. 42 Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, 29 Operating in the Human Domain, Version & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber Exploitation and 1.0, United States Special Operations Command, Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of Tampa, Florida, August, 2015, p. 38. Afghanistan: A Case Study Describing the Nexus 30 Robert L. Helevey, On Strategic Nonviolent Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals, Albert Communities Within the Forest Sector, Journal of Einstein Institution, Harvard University, 2004. Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013, Pp. 333-4. 31 Robert L. Helevey, On Strategic Nonviolent 43 Shin-Kap Han, “The Other Ride of Paul Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals, Albert Revere: The Brokerage Role in the Making of the Einstein Institution, Harvard University, 2004, pp. American Revolution,” Mobilization: An International 26-8. Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2009. 32 Ibid. 44 Shin-Kap Han, “The Other Ride of Paul 33 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Revere: The Brokerage Role in the Making of the Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent American Revolution,” Mobilization: An International Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011. Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2009. 34 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why 45 Marryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 48-51. People’s Republic,” in Social Movements and Networks, 35 Felipe B. Miranda ed, Democratization: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 92. Philippine Perspectives, University of the Philippines 46 Ibid. Press, 1998, p. 34-35. 47 Ibid. 36 Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The 48 Ibid., p. 96. Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, University of Pittsburgh 49 Ibid., P. 99. Press, 1995, pp. 133-9. 50 Donatella della Portan, “Recruitment 37 Lina Khatib, The Islamic State’s Strategy: Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: Lasting and Expanding, Carnegie Middle East Center, Italian Left-Wing Terrorism,” International Social June 2015, pp. 6-11. Movement Research, Vol. 1, JAI Press, 1988. 38 Lina Khatib, “The Islamic State’s Strategy: 51 Donatella della Portan, “Recruitment Lasting and Expanding,” Carnegie Middle East Center, Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: June 2015, pp. 10-11. Italian Left-Wing Terrorism,” International Social 39 Gene Sharp, How Nonviolent Struggle Works, Movement Research, Vol. 1, JAI Press, 1988, pp. 159-63 Albert Einstein Institution, Harvard University, 2013, 52 Operating in the Human Domain, Version pp. 112-5. 1.0, United States Special Operations Command, 40 Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, Tampa, Florida, August, 2015, p. 53. & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber Exploitation and 53 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of K. Worden, & Robert Benford, “Frame Alignment Afghanistan: A Case Study Describing the Nexus Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Participation, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, Communities Within the Forest Sector, Journal of No. 4, 1986. Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013. 54 Ibid. 41 Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, 55 Ibid. & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber Exploitation and 56 “February 2004 Coalition Provisional Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of Authority English Translation of Terrorist Musab Al Afghanistan: A Case Study Describing the Nexus Zarqawi Letter Obtained by United States Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Government in Iraq.,” February 2004, U.S. Communities Within the Forest Sector, Journal of Department of State Archive, http://2001–2009.state. Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013, pp. 347-8. gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm. Specifically, the NRCC ensured the Afghan partners
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57 Karen Bach, “Iraq Sectarian Violence: Sunnis 70 Paul K. Davis & et al, Understanding and Protest Amid Al Qaeda Calls To Arms,” Archive of Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism, Huffington Post, (February 1, 2013), http://karen- RAND Corporation, 2012. bachxy.blogspot.com/2013/02/iraq- sectarian-vio- 71 Paul K. Davis & et al, Understanding and lence-sunnis-protest.html. Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and 58 Wendy Pearlyman, “Emotions and the Terrorism, RAND Corporation, 2012. The RAND Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings,” Perspectives publication uses an inductively compiled set of social on Politics, American Political Science Association, movement factors to describe the extent of popular Vol. 11, No. 3, 2012, p. 396. Also see Lisa Anderson, support generated by multiple insurgencies. These “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the include the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, Foreign Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey, the Maoist Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, 2011. insurgency in Nepal, and al-Qaida. 59 Wendy Pearlyman, “Emotions and the 72 Backfire is defined as a public reaction of Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings,” Perspectives outrage to an event that is publicized and perceived as on Politics, American Political Science Association, unjust. For a detailed discussion on backfire Vol. 11, No. 3, 2012, p. 396. dynamics, see David Hess & Brian Martin, 60 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s Transformative Events,” Mobilization: an International Struggle for Sacred Authority,” International Review of Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2012. Social History, Vol. 49, No. S12, 2004, pp. 164-66. 73 Paul K. Davis & et al, Understanding and 61 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism, Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s RAND Corporation, 2012. Struggle for Sacred Authority,” International Review of 74 For a detailed account about the Contras and Social History, Vol. 49, No. S12, 2004, pp. 164-66. its both local and regional consequences, see Stephen 62 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, David Rockefeller Center for K. Worden, & Robert Benford, “Frame Alignment Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 1991. Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, Photos No. 4, 1986. 63 For additional mechanisms and techniques, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Framing Jihad: Page 130. Image by shamsnn. Syrian Demonstration Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s Douma Damascus 08-04-2011. From < https://www. Struggle for Sacred Authority,” International Review of flickr.com/photos/61606819@N07/5606924846>. Social History, Vol. 49, No. S12, 2004. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Ge- 64 Sean Aday & et al, “New Media and Conflict neric License < https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ after the Arab Spring,” United States Institute of by/2.0/deed.en>. Photo unaltered. Peace, 2012. 65 Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Page 134. Image by Jarek Tuszyński. The funeral of beyond Borders, Cornell University Press, 1998. Father Jerzy Popieluszko in the church. Stanislaus 66 Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Kostka in Warsaw. At
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