SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ANIMALS

Alan R. Drengson Victoria, British Columbia

Many of the preconceived and superstitious beliefs about ani­ mals held in the 19th-century West probably grew out of the fears and anxieties ofcolonial Europeans living in places new to them. Europe had been free ofalmost all large wild animals for several centuries by the time colonials arrived on the American and African continents and on the sub-continent of India. Moreover, during the 19th century the industrializing West was a society often characterized by its own oppressive fantasies and fears of repressed human sexual energic~s. As these energies wen: turned toward achievements in the worlds ofthe wild kingdoms, both the indigenous natives and animals came to be seen as life-threatening enemies. The white sl~tt1ers of course knew that they were the invaders, often taking the resources and territory of other peoples with violence, hatred and the conflict that this provokes.

In our century, popular fiction expressed a similar brutal atti­ popular tude in the various gorilla stories and wild animal "safari"-type expressions films. The king ofall animal fantasies was perlpps King Kong, oia the world's largest and most ferocious film ape. The big white brutal hunter and the great film apes have shown similar tastes in attitude many film episodt:s. The "movie gorillas," after all, were not unintelligent; they were, in fact, shown to be far more intelli­ gent than most WI~sterners would have been willing to allow. These ferocious movie apes, and the various stories of killer apes, were re-echoed in fiction and film stor~es about killer beasts of every kind: wolves, coyotes, grizzlies, tigers, sharks, rats, bats, birds, snakes and so on. In reading this sort of literature, and in viewing these types of films, one gets the impression that there has been a continuous war between humans and the other animals ofthe earth.

The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1 63 The determination with which animals have been pursued and eradicated displays something that goes beyond mere eco­ nomic drives, for fear, hatred and even fanaticism are in evi­ dence. In many ways this curious phase of our history seems characterized by large doses of psychological projection. Tar­ zan's apes have a culture that is too human to be missed (Burroughs, 1976). Their raids against the African blacks dis­ play levels of brutality and violence similar to that shown by Western society in its contacts with various indigenous "hostiles." The evolutionary theory that was popularly mis­ nature understood as Darwinism saw nature as "red in fang and seen claw." The struggle for survival, dominance and superiority as was seen everywhere. Nature was seen as one continuous competitive competitive struggle, just as human society. The gorilla seemed struggle an apt symbol for this conception ofnatural violence, given its wild, human-like appearance and size. In stories and on the screen, gorillas were usually shown as fighting or attacking humans.

Recent field studies ofanimal behavior reveal that this view of the gorilla's "violent" nature is very much overdrawn (Lorenz, 1974; Montague, 1973). At best it simply predisposed people to "see" what they wanted or feared to see. At worst it led them to destroy and to actually extinguish hundreds of irreplaceable and valuable animal species.

It was inevitable that sooner or later someone such as George Schaller (l963, 1964) would set out for the dense forests of Africa intent upon studying the behavior offree living gorillas in their native habitat. Schaller pioneered field studies ofthese large primates. Until his work, most of our knowledge of the gorilla and ofthe other great apes was based on hearsay, rumor and observations of apes in captivity.

gentle Schaller's studies revealed that the gorilla is one of the most and passive, gentle and placid animals in the wild kingdom. Re­ reclusive clusive and shy, they keep to themselves hidden in the forests, animals roving their territory in small interrelated bands.

Before spending time with the gorillas, Schaller was concerned for his safety with them, as stories from nearby natives indi­ cated the gorilla to be a violent and dangerous animal, given to unpredictable rages and charged attacks. However, in all ofhis time with the mountain gorillas, Schaller was never once se­ riously threatened. On the contrary, after they got used to his presence, some gorillas even tolerated being in the same tree with him.

Schaller's studies and those ofother ethologists have again and

64 The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1 again demonstrated that the behavior of animals living free and wild differs markedly from those in captivity. Free-living animal species rarely engage in intraspecific violence. Their territorial clashes are more bluster and ritual than a fight to the death. Moreover, free-living animals, mammals and especially primates, are far more intelligent and aware than inheritors of 19th-century humbug have been inclined to think. Part of the assertive reason for any existing blindness is related to the assertive character character of our culture during and since industrialization. It of was widely thought and felt that the earth was a human prov­ industrial ince to do with as man wished. But doubts about this arrogant culture position surfaced in various forms.

The Frankenstein story, for example, revealed human insen­ sitivity and the failure to control natural forces in the form of a gothic tale. The monster was the creation of a technology and mind-set which isolated humans from the rest ofthe biosphere, at the same time as it tended to desensitize them to the suffer­ ings of their fellow beings. Given that humans are often the cause of much of this suffering, and given also that Wl~ know this, especially at a sub-conscious level, it is only to be expected that this would find expression in allegoric tales.

In the nineteenth century the machine-made monster was a the symbol of human arrogance and fear. Today, l:ln often-used mind symbol of our alienated, dehumanized state is the computer, sans which has come to stand for the human mind sans feeling in a feeling multitude of sci-fi stories and films. In 2001 the malevolent computer's cognitive circuits are disconnected-only then is human entry into the "Godhead" possible and rebirth assured. 2001 is a film metaphor for the birth ofa new type ofperson, a humanity that has transcended its own technology, a humanity conscious ofits own native potentials.

The computer, in such films as 2001, can be seen as a symbol for the modern rational mind-not the full-blooded reason ofa Plato, but more the narrowed logical functioning of recipe mathematics. The rational mind ofa computer follows lines of thought to their logical conclusion, no matter what kind of absurdity this might lead to. Ifthe logical conclusion is "kill the hibernating astronauts," then that is what will be done. The computer in 2001 is, beyond a certain point, obsessional and paranoid.

This "rational mind" also depicts the triumph of scientific technology and finds its philosophical echoes in reductionist, positivistic behaviorism. To the degree that this perspeetive makes us insensitive to other humans and other forms oflire, it also blinds us to the inexpressible mystery oflife as revealed in

Social andpsychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 65 our immediate experience. Nevertheless, the positivistic em­ phasis on a methodical gathering of information laid the groundwork for recent field studies of the gorilla and other animals.

How far we can be led to narrowed relationships with other life forms, even with family pets such as dogs, can be brought out by considering the views expressed in a recent book on dog training. Charles P. Eisenmann (1971) has claimed that the usual theories and methods of dog training are based on 19th-century Pavlovian theories of conditioning that assume that the dog has only minimal intelligence. Essentially, they represent a 19th-century mechanistic approach. The dog's nervous system is conditioned to react automatically without the intervention ofthought or consciousness. As a result ofthis approach, there is a tendency not to be open to increasing our awareness of the dog's range of sensitivities and its potentials for intelligent behavior. Habit, routine, and other attention­ deadening processes may tend to make one even less sensitive. But this is hardly strange, for even in daily interpersonal rela­ tionships anyone can be inattentive, unperceptive and insen­ sitive, or less than whole-hearted.

sensitive My own perception of the differences between sensitive awareness awareness and automaton-like insensitivity involving other of forms of life has centered around dogs. Human relationships other with dogs can at times be characterized by a sort of paradox. forms One may be inclined to think that dogs are not very aware; that of they do not understand very much; that they are simply con­ life ditioned to react to appropriate stimuli or by means ofinstinct; and yet one mayfeel that they do understand much more than we think. Dog-training methods often seem to incline us to think that their understanding is rudimentary at best. The animal is conditioned over and over to behave in a certain way to a single command, and soon the behavior becomes me­ chanical, unthinking, rate. We may rarely consider the animal to be capable of intelligent behavior, perhaps because we tend to associate intelligence with the verbal competence and thought processes that language makes possible. This in itself tends to affect our perception ofanimal intelligence adversely. If we assume that the animal, in this case the dog (or ape), is not capable of intelligent behavior or creative response, then our attitude will tend to discourage its notice, development and enhancement, in self-fulfilling expectation. If we approached our children in the same way, this attitude would tend to stunt their growth as well.

However, even if dogs (or apes and other animals) can "think for themselves" (which is perhaps the wrong phrase), they do

66 The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1 not seem to be preoccupied by thoughts. Since, as far as we know, they do not have language, they probably do not have a continuous stream ofthoughts with which to be preoccupied in the ways in which humans often are. Nor do they seem to be troubled by long-range desires or fears. When a dog is hungry, it eats; and when it is sleepy, it sleeps. There is nothing de­ ceptive about dogs; their feelings are always completely in the open. One who takes the trouble to carefully watch his or her dog will soon become convinced of this. Moreover, dogs tend to reflect the moods and feelings oftheir human associates and they often reflect these same feelings back to humans. For example, human fear can incline an animal to either attack or to flee. Ifyou fear a strange dog you meet on the street and it is within a critical distance, it will be aware of this fear, and, given certain actions on your part, will probably retreat; how­ ever, if its territory is threatened, or if it is cornered, it will likely attack.

Most of us remember t11at as children we were quite open to human the feelings ofour pets. In many respects dogs are emotionally emotions, very much like two- or three-year-old humans. Both dogs and feelings, young children have a free-flowing, flexible awareness that is and not usually troubled by distorting beliefs and theories, but is sensitivity more occupied by interacting with humans, animals and of things. As childf\~n we may have thought that our dogs felt pets precisely what we felt when we were happy, frightened or sad. As an adult I have from time to time been reminded of how extremely sensitive animals are to feelings in the house. Once, when particularly distraught over a series ofunhappy incidents involving serious :illness, moving, accidents, and the death ofa friend, I wept in sorrow. Our dog responded to my sorrow immediately, and he did everything he could to sympathize with and to comfort me. I later tried to get a similar response from him by feigning sadness, even sobbing loudly. No re­ sponse. He looked at me with eyes that said, "Who do you think you're fooling?" As adults we often dismiss this imme­ diacy of feelings and emotions, especially where animals are concerned. We tend to be preoccupied by thoughts, by reliving the past and anticipating the future. We may worry about our jobs, our children, our bills, about all manner of things. Such indulgences may ll~ad us to miss much ofwhat is now going on around us, to lose contact with or to ignore our own deeper feelings.

It requires effort Ito become attuned, sensitive and compas­ sionate to the feeLings and sufferings of others. We may be inclined, as a result ofthe ways in which we are often raised, to understand only our own suffering, to feel only our own diffi­ culties. The difficulties of others tend to remain abstractions.

Social and psychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 67 How far the human world, the great apes and animals gener­ ally, have suffered from the results of this desensitization is nearly beyond comprehension.

Some Western philosophers have seriously asked at times whether we can ever know how another person feels, or whether we can even know that another person is able to think, or is conscious. Many philosophers and psychologists have held that animals certainly cannot think and do not have a Cartesian diversity of emotions. Rene Descartes doubted that animals conception have any feelings or thoughts. To him, finally, they were seen of as machines ofthe natural world provided for our pleasure and animals exploitation. Only humans, after all, have souls, and only be­ as ings with souls are capable of self-awareness, emotions, machines feelings, reflections, purposes, suffering and joy. Animals have no inner life, no more feeling than does an engine. Cartesian skepticism inevitably spilled into the human realm and Des­ cartes himself was led to ask early in the Meditations (1954, 15-30) whether he could know if any other human body pos­ sessed a souL Since reason was supreme for Descartes, the only basis he could have for judging whether others thought or felt was by analogy with his own mind as revealed in purposeful action. In short, one cannot know this in any immediate or feelingful way; one can only infer it on the basis of evidence. Later, Wittgenstein's work in Philosophical Investigations (1953) attempted to refute these positions.

These doubts, which were expressed philosophically, even­ tually found their way into popular literature and film. The more general doubts of recent times afe probably also a re­ sponse by humans to meet the demands of specialized occu­ pations in an industrialized technology. If asked today where alienation consciousness resides, we are inclined to point to the brain. To from be sure, when we develop ourselves almost exclusively as in­ larger tellect, we can become like the imagined computing machines world depicted in films and stories. This is truly the height of aliena­ of tion: to be divorced from one's own feelings, to be out oftouch sentient with one's whole experience, to be cut off from the larger world beings of sentient beings, no longer responsive to their feelings, no longer awar;e of their being.

Marx's descriptions of alienation were penetrating in this re­ gard. His discussion perhaps unduly emphasizes characteris­ tics of certain economic class systems, but is penetrating with respect to industrial civilization. In contrast, the hunter-gath­ ering peoples, who of necessity fished the salmon, killed the deer and bear, nonetheless were not cut off from their own feelings and the natural world. Their stories, their rituals, their

68 The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1 cultural practices, their struggles with the elemental powers, are evidence of a deep awareness of their own being and the being of the creatures they pursued, They saw them as like themselves, as conscious beings with personhood: one apolo­ gized to the salmon for having to take them. Moreover, one's ancestors were animals whose forms adorned one's artifacts. "Reason" dismisses such animism as superstitious and lacking in the dimensions of possibility open to industrial societies.

However, reason in this sense is not sufficient for life, nor, as Hume pointed out, is it sufficient even to move the will. But then, Hume's reason aside, "reason" has reasons ofits own for acting. The drive for consistency is one of its primary charac­ teristics, and this is reflected in the conceived models oflinear logics. In contrast, human growth and the inner transforma­ tions of the deeply religious or spiritual life all seem to deny consistency of character over time. One grows, one changes, and, as Hegel pointed out, the growth ofthe spirit is dialectical; its movement describes a spiral through which opposites in­ philosophical terpenetrate to form new states of being (Taylor, 1975). Marx influences claimed to find the same dialectics in economics and in things. of Heraclitus observed that nature is a harmony between the dualistic tension of opposites. The Pythagoreans, the first Western phi­ Western losophers to see all ofexistence as a Cosmos, also spoke of the thought blending of opposites. Buddhist logic, which attempts to map the movements of consciousness as it expands to complete wholeness, is dialectical (Streng, 1967). Moreover, as Plato's example shows, the master Socratic philosopher is not partial to a particular perspective and through dialectic is able to see things from different angles; he/she is not trapped by a partic­ ular viewpoint, for all attempts at description ultimately fail to capture the whole of even one idea, let alone reality. This becomes clear when the partialities oflimited perspectives are exposed as Socrates and Plato expose them, Plato finally can only speak metaphorically of the process leading to and the vision of the ultimate truth, or ultimate reality, for human languages are very much limited by dualistic patterns of thought which are entangled with the senses.

If we consider a number of the elements of recent Western history, we can see better how our culture arrived at the nar­ rowed perspectives that have plagued us for the last one hundred years, perspectives that tended to cut us off from the natural world and led us to see it as populated by violent gorillas. Some of these elements are the following: Cartesian emphasis on mind as primarily a thinking capacity with a bias toward intellect; Humean empiricism as a narrow epistemol­ ogy which sensationalized concepts and is biased toward the

Social andpsychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 69 gross senses, with a special tilt toward sight; a psychology that denied the significance of the inner life and emphasized be­ havior; an emphasis in the larger society (reflected in educa­ tion) on the aims of industrialization and human primacy, (and yet human expendability emerges as a twin feature in the form ofefficient war machines); a fragmentation ofknowledge by specialization, at the same time as there is a separation of the functions of knowledge from the capacities and the func­ tions ofthe human self in its completeness; the virtual ignoring of the means to cultivate this whole self and a deep self­ knowledge. These and other factors are part of a philosophy which has promoted the development of a narrowed con­ sciousness with very limited perspectives. In cutting itself off from the larger world offeelings, the larger world ofhumanity, and of animals, plants and their ecology, this consciousness became an inauthentic consciousness prone to self-deception and self-induced ignorance, a consciousness about which much existentialist literature has been written (Barrett, 1958; Kaufmann, 1956).

But perhaps, as the Taoist sage Lao Tzu (and others) have taught, things can only move so far in one direction, for they eventually reach the extreme, and then swing back toward the other pole. This was clearly illustrated in a recent television film documentary, The Amazing Apes. A man and a young gorilla sat on the ground facing one another. They were "signing" to each other by means ofthe hand signals taught to human deaf mutes. The scientist was teaching the gorilla ad­ ditional vocabulary that the gorilla seemed very intent on learning (Premack, 1972; Patterson, 1978). There was some­ thing profoundly moving about this vignette. It displayed the possibility of a cooperative relationship between human a and gorilla, one in which there develops a reciprocal con­ pardble sciousness. Indeed, this scene seemed almost a metaphor, or for perhaps a parable, for transformed relationships between hu~ transformation man and other forms oflife on this planet. Here humans pass ofhuman­ beyond the aggressive exploitation of another life-form and animal even beyond the mere husbanding of a "resource." Here was relationships suggested the possibility ofa transformation ofrelationships in which the more highly evolved served the other in an effort to realize certain values. In this filmed interaction the teach~ ing process was not forced conditioning, but rather seemed based on an understanding that had grown with, but had tran­ scended the language being taught.

As the gorilla and the human researcher interacted and learned from one another, it was clear that these two quite different creatures were sharing a common awareness. Their attentions were locked together in a concentrated effort to

70 The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1 understand one another. In some respects the understanding seemed to be quite independent of the attempt to teach the gorilla sign language. One could sense a rapport between these two beings, a humanizing ofthe human'through the exchange, and at the same time a stretching of the gorilla toward the human leveL

This scene suggested that as our societies grow ever more lessening technologized there will be an ever increasing need for more the contacts and exchanges with other animals, for this may help potential us to lessen the potential psychic damage of our technologies psychic (Shepard, 1978). For, this kind of contact helps us to be in damage touch with our own feelings and heart, and this in tum helps us of to approach the world in a no-harm way by means of sym­ technologies pathy, love and compassion. This, as has been said so well by Rolling Thunder, brings a different kind ofunderstanding and a different quality ofperson:

It's not very easy for you people to understand these things because understanding is not knowing the kind offacts that your books and teachers talk about. I can tell you that understanding begins with love and respect. It begins with respect for the Great Spirit, and the Great Spirit is the life that is in all things~all the creatures and the plants and even the rocks and the minerals. All things-and I mean all things-have their own will and their own purpose; this is what is to be respectf:d. Such respect is not a feeling or an attitude only. It's a way of life. Such respect means that we never stop realizing and never neglect to carry out our obligation to ourselves and our environment (Boyd, 1974).

The filmed vigm:tte ofscientist and gorilla also reminds one of a theme that is woven through many Eastern philosophies, that it is through silence that one comes to understand the ultimate teachings, the "teachings which cannot be taught" (Tarthang Tulku, 1975, 84--100). It is through an inner silence that we may become receptive to, and have contact with th{, whole of our awareness, the whole of our sources of understanding. These sources are not exhausted by the traditional Western analyses of the five senses, but also include such things as the capacity to sense the feelings of another, the capacity to be aware ofone's whole body at once, the capacity to extend one's awareness beyond the self, the capacity to be flexibly receptive. It is possible in rdationships with animals, and ofcourse, other people-especially when deep experiences are simply shared without talk~to understand this learning in the presence ofthe silence. This is illustrated in an East Indian story (Rajneesh, 1976, 102-06), which I shall paraphrase:

A wealthy father sent his son to live with an enlightened Master. The son, Svetaketu, eventually became one of the Master's most

Social andpsychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 71 learned and skilled pupils, and after several years it was time for him to return home. His father was in the fields when he saw his son returning. His son walked proudly, with his head held high, indicative of his superior learning. The father was worried, how­ ever, by what he saw, and so when they met at home and were sitting by the fire in the evening, the father gently asked, "Has the Master taught you that which cannot be taught?" The son was at first puzzled, but then replied after some thought, "Ofcourse not, how could he teach me that which cannot be taught?" The father replied that Masters have a way of creating a situation in which this important teaching can be learned. Then he said to his son, "You go back to the Master and ask him to teach you that which cannot be taught." The son returned the next day and asked the Master why he had not been taught"that which cannot be taught." The Master replied, "One must ask for it, then it can be done, not before." And so he said to the son, "You take 400 of my animals and go far into the forest where you will see no human. And you stay with the animals until they are 1,000, then you may return to my place." The son did as he was told. At first he would lecture the animals on all of the things that he knew. He would recite sutras, and quote scriptures. He would philosophize to them. But as they paid no attention to these things, he soon stopped talking. Before very long his walk began to change, his bearing altered, He began to see and hear things he had missed before. He began to feel things he had forgotten how to feel. Soon he lost all track of time and many years passed. One day he realized that the animals were restive, for now they numbered over 1,000, and it was time to return to the Master's farm. Svetaketu brought the animals back from the forest and let the animals back in their fields, and then began dancing as he went to the Master's door. The Master saw him coming and went to greet him. The Master said, "I see you now have learned that which cannot be taught." And Svetaketu said: "Yes, I knew you would know, but I have come to thank you just the same. I have come to dance my gratitude."

being In this story it is being with the animals in their silence that with brings the son to the realization of the larger world of full animals consciousness: a consciousness undivided by conflicts; a con­ and sciousness undivided by opposites and judgments; a con­ opening sciousness unimpeded by conditioning and the past, undefiled to the by desire; a consciousness open to all sources ofknowing, even whole those sources that are totally non-verbal and non-conceptual. world The son had become a full human, had flowered into a total person; through his silence with the animals he had opened to the whole world.

This story is an especially appropriate vehicle for describing the ecologically sensitive and aware human, one whose con­ sciousness reflects a planetary self-awareness. Upon seeing the gorilla and the scientist communicating silently with sign lan­ guage, this story takes on an especially powerful character

72 The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1 which clarifies the vision seen through this vignette. One is reminded of the Mahayana vision of the Bodhisattva, and the vow to work for the deliverance of all beings (Walpola, 1974). The vow and the work both ferment to bring the Bodhisattva to full awareness, and through this the sentient world becomes more fully aware of its own creative capacities. From such a perspective it is possible to see that the most highly developed consciousness on this planet could be its most benign spirit.

REFERENCES

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Social and psychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 73 PREMACK, A. J. & PREMACK, D. Teaching language to an ape. Scientific American, 1972,227,92-99. RAJNEESH, B. S. Vedanta: Seven steps to samadhi. India: Raj­ neesh Foundation, 1976. ROSZAK, T. Person/Planet. New York: Harper and Row, 1978. ROSZAK, T. The unfinished animal. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. SCHALLER, G. B. The mountain gorilla: Ecology and behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. SCHALLER, G.B. The year a/the gorilla. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. SHEPARD, P. Thinking animals. New York: Viking, 1978. STRENG, FJ. Emptiness: A study in religious meaning. Nash­ ville: Abingdon Press, 1967. TAYLOR, C. Hegel. London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. TERRACE, H. S. How Nimchanged my mind. Psychology Today, Nov., 1979, 65~96. THOMPSON, I. (Ed.) Earth's answer. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. TULKU, T. (Ed.) Reflections of mind. Emeryville: Dharma Publishing, 1975. WALPOLA, R. What the Buddha taught. New York: Grove Press, 1974. WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan, 1953.

Communications with the author and requests for reprints may be addressed to Philosophy Department, University of Victoria, P.O. Box 1700, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada V8W 2Y2.

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