AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

CAPE VERDE

INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT OF ASSOMADA

Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER)

OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (OPEV)

11 March 1992 PROJECTPERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

ASSOI'IADAAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

LOANCS/CV/AGR/78/3

CAPE-VERDE

00067 TABLEOF CONTENTS

EQUIVALENTSAND ABBREVIATIONS ( ) BASICDATA ( i) PREFACE ( ii ) AUDITSUMMARY ( v)

I . BACKGROTJND I

.l GeographlcalSettlng andOvervlew of the Economy I .2 AgriculturalSector I .3 TheProject 2

2. PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION 3

2.1 LoanEffectlveness 3 2.2 ImplementationSchedule and Modtfications 3 2.3 PreparingReports 4 2.4 Procurementof Goodsand Services 5 2.5 Costand Financing 5 2.6 Dlsbursements 6 3. RESULTSOF THE PROJECT 7 4. PERFORMANCESOF THE PROJECT l0

5. PERFORMANCESBYVARIOUS PARTIES t2

5.1 ExecutlngAgency t2 5.2 TheBank 12 5.3 TechnicalAssistance l4

6. CONTINUITY l5 7. CONCLUSIONS.LISSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS t5 7.1 Conclusions t6 7.Z Lessons t7 7.3 Recommendatlons l8 fi)

EOTJIVALENTSAND ABBREVIATIONS

CurrencyEqul valents

urrency CapeVerdian Escudo (CV Esc.) FUA 87.4823CV Esc. (3rd Quarter 1989) FUA 1.27777US Dol lars US DolI ar 58.4648CV. Esc.

ABBREVIATIONS ADB Afrlcan DevelopmentBank

BURGEAP. Bureaude GéologieAppl lquée (Office of Applled Geo'logy) DRS Défenseet Restaurationdes Sols (SolI Conservatlonand RehabiI i tatlon) C.VEsc. CapeVerdlan Escudo ADF : Afrlcan DevelopmentFund

I FAD International Fundfor Agricultural Development

PRODESA ProJetde DéveloppementAgrfcole Intégré d'Assomada (AssomadaAgrlcultural DevelopmentProject)

MDR Ministèredu DéveloppementRural (Mtnlstryof RuralDevelopment) PCR ProJectCompletlon Report PPAR Project PerformanceAudit Report fi|)

BASIC DATA

COUNTRY Republi c of CapeVerde PROJECT AssomadaAgrlcultural Development ProJect LOANNO. cs/cv/AGR17813 BORROl.{ER TheGovernment of CapeVerde EXECUTINGAGTNCY Mlntstryof RuralDevelopment IMPLEMENTATIONPERIOD 5 years1979-1984

I. LoanInformatlon

Amount FUA3.5 mlI I lon Interest None Servlce Charge 0.751per yearon the dlsbursedamounts not reimbursed RepaymentPerlod 40 years GracePeriod l0 years II. ProJectData

Total Cost FUA9.5ml lon ADFFlnanclng FUA3.5ml lon IFADFtnanclng FUA3.5mi lon GovernmentFlnanclng FUA0.5mll lon

III. SlgnlflcantEvents and Dates PreparatI ol n January-FebruaryI 978 Appralsal July I 978 Negottatlons l5 Ocotber1978 Approval l9 October1978 Slgnatureof LoanAgreement 17 November1978 LoanEffectlveness 3l March1980 DeadlI ne for I st Disbursement 3l December1979 Effective Dateof lst Dlsbursement 3l March1980 DeadlI ne of Last Disbursement 3l December1980 Effective Datefor Last Dlsbursement l2 September1985 IV. PerformanceIndl cators

CostOverruns 3 years Delayin Completlon ProJectsuspended Statusof Implementatlon Incomplete Insti tutional Performances I ncompI ete Suppli ers' Performances Rather good TechnicalAssistance Performances Rathergood V. Missions

Categories Dates Appraisa1 July 1978 Launchi ng February.|979,I 979 Fol1 ow-up August June1982 Supervision September1980, .|984,June 1982, January November1984 Mid-TermReview February'19871 983 CompletionReport June ProJect PerformanceAudit Report NovemberI 989

:" -. _- ..,:iË1-'.'r. fiii)

PREFACE

1. Thts ProJectPerformance Audlt Report (PPAR)deals wtth the Assomada Agrlcultural DevelopmentProject in Cape Verde, which received a loan of FUA7.0 million. Half of this loan wasflnanced by the ADFand the other half btas co-financed by IFAD. The total cost of the proJect tras estimated at FUA7.4 miI I ion. The project has not been completed. It tvas stopped followlng numerousdifficulties, to a great extent, lnherentIn the erroneous estlmates of the area's undergroundwater potentlal for lrrigatlon. Disbursements made up to the tlme the proJect rras stopped amounted to FUA4.5 million that is to say 601 of the inttial amountof the ADFand IFAD I oans.

2. The completlonreport revlews the varlous aspectsof the proJect from the standpolnt of design, implementatlonand performancein the alm of determlnlngto what extent the antlclpatedadvantages have effectively been achleved. hlith regard to the performanceaudtt report, it analyses the reasonsfor the difficulties encounteredby the project so that the BankGroup can draw lessonsand take them lnto conslderationln future operations for similar proJects.

3. The performancesaudlt report ls based on the revlew of various documentsrelevant to the project includlngthe PCRin additlon to dlscussions with Bank staff and lnvestigatlons by the performancesaudit mlssion in Cape Verde. The ProJect PerformanceAudi t Report (PPAR)was submltted to the Borrowerand to the Departmentsinvolved in the project and the observations receivedwere taken lnto account. (iv)

AUDITSUMMARY l. ïhe AssomadaAgricultural DevelopmentProject almedat brlnglng about full agricultural developmentof the upper basins of the Engenhasand Boa Entradarivers on the Island of Santiago. TheproJect ttas lntendedto:

(l ) develop 2 130 ha for ralnfed cultlvatlon uslng malnly antl-erosionworks;

(ii) develop 150 ha for irrlgated farmlng through the sinking of wells and piping undergroundwater resources;

( | | I ) develop feeder roads and ensure potable water supply to the populatlonln the area.

2. The proJect executlng agencywas referred to as PR0DESA,under the responstblllty of the Mlnistry of Rural Developmentand wlth financlal autonomy. PRODESAwas establlshed In June 1979 and was the secondproJect flnanced by the Bank Group in CapeVerde and the flrst in the agricultural sector.

3. The total proJect cost rras estlmatedat about FUA7.4 milllon, co-flnancedequally by the ADFand IFAD(FUA 3.5 mtllton each) and by the Governmentwhl ch I nvestedFUA 0.517 mt I I lon.

4. The project began i n I 980 but v{as stopped by decision of the Governmentof CapeVerde ln 1985in view of the manydifficultles encountered ln tts implementatlon,due, in particular, to erroneousassumptions, such as the one regardingthe availabiljty of water in the area for lrrigation. The ADFand IFAD agreed with this decision.

5. hlhenthe project was discontinuedin 1985, actual disbursementsby the ADFand IFADamounted to FUA4..l6 million, that is to say, a'lmost60% of the total loan amountgranted by thesetwo institutlons. (v)

6. Despitethe dtfficultles encounteredand suspenslonof the proJect, manypositlve achlevementscan be accredltedto the project whlchvas not a failure as somervould have it believed.Among other things, we can mention:

(t ) antl-erosioncontrol workswhl ch wereperformed sati sfactori ly and by a less costly technlquethan the one proposedin the appraisal report;

(ii) constructlonflood walls to protecttands agalnst the rîslng of rlvers whichrlas an innovationof the proJectofflcers;

(fif) slnktngwells to supplywater to the populatlon;

(lv) constructlonof servlceroads;

(v) i ntroductlon of actlvl tl es such as stockbreedlng and arboricul ture;

(vl ) lnstitutlng a natlonal agrfcultural advisory structure, rhlch facilitated PRODESAprocurements, served as a pllot proJect.

7. It ls true that one of the proJect's maJorcomponents, that ls to sàJ, the lrrlgatlon of t50 ha, wasonly partially implementedbecause of the lack of available water in the area. However,the poor performanceof this componentwas due, as vtasalready mentioned,to the fact that the project vras bui1ton an assumptionwhich was refuted.

8. The lessons and recommendationsthat can be drawn from thi s experienceare presentedbelow. (vi)

8.I Lessons

Before undertaklng the proJect appralsal stage, prlor assuranceshould be glven that all the basic assumptionson whichit lies are conflrmed;

l,lhenasklng a country to carry out studles for a proJect, the Bank should elther provide for the financing of these studles, or assure that the country has other means to carry them out and taken Into account the lmplementatlon period for these studles i n the proJect implementation schedule;

llhen wlthdrawlngfrom an incompletedproJect, the Bank shoulddo so ln such a ttay that the lnvestmentsalready madeare preserved;

The Bank should not proposeto a country proJects \dlth complexcomponents that exceedthe technical capaclty of natlonaloperators;

For a country ttlthout sufflcient professlonals and for a complex proJect, the Bank should cal I on amp'le and experienced technical assi stance and provlde a tral nl ng programme for nationals to ensure the project's contI nuati on;

If di sagreementsarise betweenthe partles concernedwhen lmplementingthe project, negotiationsmust be conductedso as to arrive at an understandingand permit the project to be continued. (vti )

8.2 Recommendations

For proJectswhere lnformation on the phystcal and human environment are rare i t i s recommendedthat consI derabl e time should be taken to prepare thl s project whiI e carefullyverifying the assumptlonson whlchthts proJect i s based.

It I s recommendedthat addltional studles, needed for proJect implementatlon,be included ln the proJect's fi nanci ng;

In countrieslacking quallfied professionals,the Bank, In preparinglts project, should'glveparticular attentlon to the tralning component;

Confrontedwlth a problemproJect, the Bank should first try to solve these problemseither by reappraisingthe proJectat mld-termor by revising the inittal obJectives; It should,in any event, examlneall posslblealternatlves beforedeciding to dlscontlnuethe project.

Recommendationswith regard to the proJect

It is recommendedthat the Banksupport actions financedwithin the frameworkof thi s project and parti cul arly the national agricultural advisory structure, ôf, offspring of the project. It i s al so recommendedthat thi s structure be developedand reinforcedfor future Bankoperations in the agricultural sector. : i,rr tri;iir]l,:, .lr I . BACKGROUI'ID

l.l GeographicalSettlng andOvervlew of the Economy

l.l.l TheRepublic of CapeVerde is an archlpelagocomprising l0 islands (5 uninhabitedlslands); the islands cover a total area of 4 033 kmZ. They are of volcanic origin and the majority are mountaneouswtth very steep slopes; they are subJectto erosionand to frequent rocky outcropplng.

1.1.2 The archlpelagols located In the seml-arldezone which ls an extensionof the Sahellanbelt; lts cllmate ls generallycharacterised by low and lrregular rainfall. Theaverage rainfall varies between200mm on the low islands to l300mmon the altitudes; desplte tts low volume, the ralnfal I causes i ntense erosion on these slopes whlch are often steep and poorly protected by sparse vegetation. The country experlencesperiods of severe drought.

1.1.3 The total population was estlmated at 350 000 Inhabttants wlth a growth rate of about Zf. Almost 70I of the population lives in the rural area, dwelllngsare scatteredand houses are rarely groupedInto vlllages;.the population ls concentratedln the coastal areas and the hlghlandswhere there is suffic'ient raln for farming. There is considerableemigratlon of the population.

| .Z Agrlcul tural Sector l.Z.l TheCape Verdian economy is mainlydependent on agriculturewhich has been gl ven parti cular importanceI n the fi rst ( I 982-88) and the second (1986-90)development plans. Themain crops are maize,potatoes, bananas and Angolabeans. Sugarcane, which covers the largest part of irrigated lands to the detrimentof produce,is mainlycujtivated to produce"grogue" an acoholic beverageappreci ated by Cape Verdians. The areas used for farming are estjmatedat about 40 200 ha including about38 300 ha for rainfed crops and I 860 ha for irrigated crops. Productionremains considerably below the country'srequirements and coverage by importsis substantial. -2-

1.2.2 Stockbreedlngls sllghtly moredeveloped and permlts about 80tr of the country'srequlrements to be satisfied. It involvesbovines, goats, sheeps andabove all pig breeding.Poultry farming ls sttll onlysllghtly developed.

1.2.3 TheGovernment's policy puts emphaslson the developmentof trrlgated crops which, in additton to thetr security, allow for doubleytelds, desertlflcationand erosloncontrol, the developmentof agrlculturalcredit, applledresearch and the tralnlngof professlonalsand farmers.

1.3 TheProJect

1.3.1 The orfgfn of the proJect dates from February 1977 when the FAO InvestmentCentre carrled out an agrlcultural proJectsgeneral tdentlficatlon misslonto CapeVerde on behalf of the Bank. The proJect was submlttedto and approvedby the Bank. Its preparation was carried out by a secondFAO mlssion In February1978 and the appralsal by the Banktook place ln July l?78. IFAD also partlclpatedln Tts financtng.

1.3.2 The proJect Intendedto brlng full agrlcultural developmentto the upper baslns of the Engenhosand Boa Entrada Rlvers located 1n the Santa Catarina district yhlch ls sltuated on the Island of Santlago. The maJor componentswere (l) anti-eroslon measuresand land deve'lopment;(ll) the supply and dlstrlbutlon of lrrigatlon water; (lli) physlcal infrastructure (roadsand bui ldings). -3-

2. PROJICTIMPLEMENTATION

2. I . LoanEffectl veness

The loan agreementrras si gned on I 3 NovemberI 978 and became effective on 3l March 1980. Fulflllment of the conditions precedent to di sbursementtherefore took I 6 months. Thls apparently long delay i s explainedby CapeVerde's inexperiencein project management(this tlas the first project flnancedIn the country)and also by the delay in recruiting a Portugesespeaking expatrlate dlrector for the project.

2.2 ImolementatlonSchedule and Modlflcations Made

2.2.1 It is not possible to makea comparisonbetween the proJected and actual schedulelnsofar as the proJectwas not completed;it was discontinued 5 years after starting-up, becauseof the dlfficulties encountered. The inittal scheduleprovided for the proJectimplementation ln 5 years from lts start-up date. The PerformanceAudit Report showsthat thls scheduleyas unreali sti c and the example of undergroundgal ery dl gglng works to pl pe irrlgatlon water ls golng to prove lt. Moreover,these workswere spreadover the 5 years of the project at the rate of 500mper year. However,before undertaklngthe works tt v{asnecessary to flrst locate the sites and then carry out hydrogeologlcalstudles which were not taken Into account ln the implementatlonschedule and al so rrere not provlded for ln the proJect's financing. Thesearch for flnancingand carrylngout the studles took 3 years (1980-1983)causlng a considerabledelay ln the irrlgatlon component's i mpI ementat i on .

2.2.2 TwomaJor modlflcatlons were noted during project implementatlon,one concerns the construction of the headquartersand the other technlcal assi stance.

2.2.3 Theappraisal report madeprovision for rehabilitatinga l9th century 'ldi bui ng to serve as off i ces and housing. This ol d buiI ding vtasi solated i n an inaccessiblearea and had no facilities; aboveall, it lvasinconvenient becauseof its distancefrom the two areasof project activities. In placeof thi s i nadequatechoi ce, project offi cers constructedheadquarters i n the ci ty of Assomadabetween the two project areas and with al I the necessary facilities. It wastherefore not possibleto implementthe two accommodations -4-

with the available financial packageprovided in respect of the appraisal report In addltlon to the headquaters. However,the fallure to implement these trto accommodatlonsls not becauseof the changeof site; the reallty is that the construction componenttras largely under-estlmatedfrom the start becauselt wasexpected to be on force account.

2.2.4 The other modlflcatlon to the proJect regards the technI cal assistanceprografime. As technical asslstanceto the proJect, the appralsal report had provlded for only an expatrlate dlrector and l2 man/monthsof consultancy. ProJect offtcers, havlng understoodthe lmportanceof training for a country that was beglnning to emergefrom colonlal dependenceand whose maJorconstralnt vtas the shortage of professlonals, requestedand obtained from the ADBthat funds allocated for consultants' mlsslons be transformed lnto scholarshlps. ThreeCape Verdlan professlonalson the proJect therefore wereable to benefit from tralnlng progranmesabroad.

2.2.5 In additton to these two modlflcatlons,durlng lmplementatlon,there wasalso the substltutlonof a serles of technlcsfor thoselnltlally proposed after the project offlcers had reallsed that the appralsal report's proposals dld not coincldewlth reallty In the fleld becausethey were not basedon a thoroughstudy of the envlronment.There were also addltlons to the proJect such as arborlculture activitles, stockbreedlngand reforestatlon. Although very appropriateand useful, these actlons howeverwere dlversely appreclated by the ADF in so far as the proJect offlcers took such lnltiatives wlthout waiting for thelr approval ln many cases. Thls sltuatlon brought about friction betweendonors and the executingagency which were further aggravated towardsthe endof the proJectto flnally result tn lts discontinuation.

2.3 PreparingReports

Rarely have activity reports been preparedas regularly as for the AssomadaAgricultural DevelopmentProject. The PCRpoints out (page l9 para. 3.5) that Cape Verdian authorities scrupulouslyrespected loan agreement guldelinesin thls regard. This is very exact. In additionto the quarterly reports, the executingagency, with the sameregularity, producedand sent to the Bank5 annual reports. Thesereports gave informatlonon the project and the problemsencountered. -5-

2.4 Procurementof Goodsand Servlces

2.4.1 Theappralsal report madethe followlngprovlsions for procurerîentof goodsand services for the proJect:

internatlonal competltlvebiddlng for vehlcles, machineryand equipment,agricultural Inputs and the foreign exchangeelements of bulI dl ngs and roads;

force accountfor all constructlonworks.

2.4.2 The procedureswere carefully followed and In thts regard the PCR pointedout the seriousnessand consclentlousapproach of the teamresponslble for lmp'lementatlon.The only exceptlon noted was the recrultment, wlth the consentof the ADF,of a Portugeseexpatrlate project managerto factlltate conmunlcatlonsas CapeVerde is a Portugesespeaklng country.

2.5 Costand Fl nancl ng

2.5.I The total cost of the proJect, ôS estimated at appraisal , was FUA7.38 mlI I lon. The ADF and IFAD contributed equal amounts to 'the financing: 50trof forelgn exchangecosts and 44.64'1"of local currency costs for each. The Governmentflnanced the remainder,that ls to say 10.72I of local currencycosts.

2.5.2 In so far as the AssomadaAgricultural DevelopmentproJect h,asnot completed,rather voluntarily discontinuedby the ADFand IFAD, it does not seemposslble to comparethe project's estimatedand actual costs. This task becomeseven more difficult in the absenceof cost accounting. Expenditures h,erenot by category. For this reason,and as indicatedin the PCR(page 19 para. 3.6.2), it js not easyto knowif a cementorder was used for buildings or for irrigation whichare two distinct components.Another difficulty, that is in addition to the one alreadymentioned in determiningactual costs, is that the project underwenttechnical modifications as pointed out in para.2.2.5. Hence,for example,the project usedexclusively labourers to carry out the anti-erosion works i nstead of heavy machines as i ni ti a1ly .|985, proposed. l^lhenthe project was di scontinued i n December the actual cost amountedto FUA4.6 million, that is to say 62?.of the estimatedcost. The PCR(Table 3.2 page22) tried to reconstituteactual expendlturesby component -6-

at the tlme the proJectwas dlscontlnued. However, as thts ls not the case of a completed proJect, rather a proJect that Ylascontl nual ly revised with addltlonsand modtflcatlons,lnterpreting actual costs ln our oplnion, is I imlted I n scope.

2.6 Dlsbursements

Theappral sal report proJectedthe dl sbursementof ADFand IFADI oans (3.43 mmilllonseach) ln equal parts distributed over 5 years. Actual disbursementsTrere'less than the proJecteddlsbursements. VarTous reasons ttere at the orlgin of thts situatlon. Flrst the proJect'sreJectlon of mechantsattonof the antl-eroslonworks wlth heavyequlpment, flnally replaced by labourersand postponingirrigatlon vorks owlng to the absenceof water resources,reduted the volumeof disbursementsfor the flrst two years. ïhere werealso delaysln processlngdlsbursement requests by the CapeVerdlan slde and lastly the delay stemmingfrom the suspensionof dlsbursementsdeclded by IFADin 1980because of the arrearsthat it wasdue. -7-

3. RESULÏSOF THEPROJECT

3.1 Theresults notedat date the project wasdiscontinued ln December 1985are summariedin the table belowextracted from the PCR.

TableI Comparisonof ProJectionsand Actual Performancesof the ProJect At Appralsal Actual X Reali sed

i) Anti-erosioncontrol and land development

Slopesof morethan 40tr (ha) I 300 I 130 87 Slopesbetween 0 and 40%(ha) 830 375 45 Improvementof irrigation network(ha) I50 22 l5 Checkdams(number) Igil 2 212 il6 Valley bottomdams (number) 86 22 26 LongltudlnalDykes (number) l8 i i ) Irrlgatlon ]^laterSupplJt and Distributlon

Intakestunnels (km) 3 0.4 l3 l,lellsfor Irrlgatlon (Number) t8 5 33 Improvementof PrimaryCanals (km) 9.9 5.4 54 Constructionof NewCanal s (km) 3.80 1.70 45 Constructlongf SecondaryCanals (km) 32 1.90 6 Reservoirs (m3) 800 I 450 l8l . Undergroundbarrage (Number) lil) Infrastructure

Tracksand approachroads (km) r9.9 22.00 lr2 Potable].later Fountains (No. ) 40 22 55 ColI lectlon Centres(No. ) 2 2 100 Mechanical !'lorkshops(No. ) I I 100 Accommodations 2 0 0

3.2 A review of these results shows that, when the proJect was discontinued,certain componentshad already been implemented within the I îmit or even beyondthe objectives set such as the checkdams,tracks and approach roads,water reservoirs, collection centres and mechanjcal workshops; however, the major component,the improvementof irrigation networks,which in fact ensuredthe project's profi tabi I i ty, vras implemented at only 227". Had the project beencontinued, surely this result wouldnot havebeen higher for the simplereason that the assumptionsregarding the undergroundwater reservefor irrigation wereproved totally false. Hereinlies the entire problemof the project and the basic reasonsfor its lack of success. The project lvasnot appraisedon the basis of thoroughstudies but on assumptionssupposing there -8- wouldbe sufflclent undergroundwater reservesto lrrlgate 150 ha and the Governmentyas requlred, under one of the loan condttlons, to undertake hydrogeologlcalstudles to verify these assumptlons.The Government,which did not havethe meansto carry out suchstudles, took conslderabletlme to find flnanclngwhlch ftnally wasobtalned through French asslstance and it was a Frenchfirm, BURGEAP,that carrled out the studles. The results of the studles unfortunatelydid not confirm the assumptlon,they proved, or the contrary,that waterresources in the proJectarea were lnslgnlflcant. Glven thts sltuatlon, doubtbegan to rlse as to the suttabtllty of contlnulngand frlctlon betweendonors and proJect offlcers developed,the latter crittcizing the formerfor the shortcomingsof the appraisalreport. That wasalready the thlrd year of the proJect. Thatwas the opportunltyfor negotlatlonsbetveen donors and the Governmentto reformulateor reappralse the proJect. But nothingof the sort wasdone.

3.3 Some Indtvtdual tnttiatlves by the proJect executlng agency aggravatedthe frlctlons. Moreoverthe executlng agency, lr vlew of the failure of the irrlgatton component,trled to reorient the proiect a'lone by Introduclngcertaln actlvltles that were not provldedfor lnlttally, such as reforestatlon, constructlonof longltudlnal dykesto protect crops against the rise of the rlver, the developmentof stockbreedlngetc. TheseInltlatlves, although positive, were often taken without the approval of donors who demandedcompllance with the proJect as negotlated.

3.4 Flnally the last straw was a completelyaccldental phenomenon. In September1984 a tornadoof rare Intenstty hit the proJect area and damageda considerablepart of the constructedstructures. A Joint ADF/IFADsupervislon mission visited the slte in November1984 to determlnethe damage.This missionprepared 21 recommendations,all very complexand relating not only to the restoring of worksbut also to other aspectsof the project, such as the inltiation of cost accounting,replacing the extensionservice, establishing detaiI ed profi I es of ri vers, carrying out I and reforms for a more just distribution of lands for irrigation, pursuit of the socio-economlcsurvey ln the project area, installing pluviometresand preparinga mapof water points with yield measuresetc. Thesefew examplesgive an idea of the complexity of these recommendationsin addition to the fact that carrying themout would require time and resources. It seemsthat the ADF lost sight of these constralnts because,in a letter dated 8 May 1985that is to say, only 5 monthslater, the Governmentwas informedthat as the recommendatlonshad not -9- been lmplemented,ADF uas obliged to suspenddl sbursements. Gl ven thl s observatlon,the Government,after havlngprovedthat manyposltlve things had nevertheless been accompli shed through the proJect, I n turn acceptedto di scontinuethe project.

3.5 Retrospectlveanalysis of the ADFdeclslon showsthat it was rather poorly prepared. The ADFwithdrew from the project wlthout concernfor the future of the investmentsalready made through lts loan. In this regard, it shouldbe recalled that, at the time the proJect!{as discontlnuedby donors, 60X,of the loan had already been dlsbursed. As indtcated in Table l, the proJect performed lmportant antl-erosion actlons, set up an extenslon facility, which vlasthe first to be created In CapeVerde, created useful i nfrastructure such as servlce roads, sunk welI s i n sufft cl ent numbersfor humansupply, establi shed i nfrastructure facl I I tatl ng the sale of goods, developedstockbreeding, arboriculture, cooperatlve actlvlty, professlonal tranlng etc. In brief, the AssomadaAgricultural Developmentproject was not a total failure as trasthought. It accompllshedmany poslttve actlons, whlch conslderedtogether could constltute a viable proJect. -10-

4. PERFORMANCESOF THE PROJECT

4.1 As the AssomadaAgrlcultural DevelopmentProJect (PRODESA)uas not completed,lt seemsdifflcult to establtshan evaluatlonof lts performances. l,lhenthe proJect was dl scontlnued,lt was clearly Indlcated that the project's performancesin terms of increasedproductlon and the numberof beneficlarles, wouldbe below proJectlons in the appralsal report: an addttional productlon of 800 tons In the year the proJect vlas dlscontlnued (year 5) agalnst a proJection of 3 600 tons at the samedate and 235 famllles beneflting from lrrlgation lnstead of I 600. Neverthelesslt ls approprlateto raise the guestionas to why the proJect's performanceswere so weak.

4.2 The reallty ls that PRODESAuas the vlctlm of a serles of factors that conslderablyreduced tts efftclency. Hereare the maJorones:

t) the major componentof the proJect, that I s to say the lrrlgatlon of 150 ha, falled becausethe proJect was based on erroneousassumptions concerning water supply In the area, that rras the observatlonof the audlt mlsslon and also of the ADFand IFAD proJect completlonml sslons. Instead of assumlng, i t should have been establlshedthat the reglon had sufflclent underground water resources and i n order to do that hydrogeologlcal studles should have been carrl ed out beforehand. But this important stage was omltted by dlrectly appralslng the proJect to note mld-waythat the area dld not have sufflcient water resourcesfor the needsof the proJect;

il) At the tlme of the proJect appralsal , Cape Verde had Just emergedfrom dependency;as a result, it did not have skilled and experiencedprofessionals to managean investmentproject. PRODESAvlas the first project financed ln the country. This importantaspect seems to havebeen lost sight of during project appraisal since, exceptfor the Director of the project and the l2 man/monthsof consultancy,no provision tras madefor other technicalassistance. In similar projectsand in countrieswith more professionalsthan CapeVerde more consistent technlcal assistancehas beenProvtded. - ll

tit) The important componentof the project, that ls to say, the i rrl gation of I 50 hà, I nvolved a technic not welI known i n Africa. Moreover,a part of thts area ïas to be lrrigated by water from the dlgging of 3000mof horizontal lntake tunnels. Thls practlce exists only In the CanaryIslands ln Spain. Also except for the 3-month trai ni ng programmethat the I ast co-dlrector of the proJect attended I n the Canary I sI ands, neither the country nor ADF/IFADhad any experience i n the matter whichwould have been of help to the proJect.

iv) No soclo-economlc study tras carrled out hence there ïas a completemlsunderstandlng of the proJect area whenthe project started-up. In the absenceof a referencesltuatlon, the real lmpact of the proJect on the target population remained uncertain.

4.3 Despite these llmlting factors, many posltlve actlons, aS were pofnted out, were accompllshedby the proJect fn addltlon to staff trainlng and the creatlon of an outreachstructure. Belglanand Italian proJects that fol lowed PRODESA,and whlch were slted as examplesof success ln Prala, succeededonly becausethey lnherlted from PR0DESAtralned staff, an outreach structure, infrastructure and evenequlpment. _12_

5. PERFORMANCESBYVARIOUS PARTIES

5. I Executlng Agency

5.1.1 The proJect executlngagency known by the namePRODESA, on the vhole, carried out rather coherentwork throughoutthis proJect. The performancesof the ExecutingAgency can be appreclated from three standpolnts; from the standpolntof procurementof goods and servlces, from that of carrying out project activitles and that of preparingreports.

5.I.2 Activttles lnvolved ln the proJect rere both numerousand varled, they involvedagrlcultural extensionservlces, lrrlgatlon development,dlgglng tunnels and sl nking welI s , constructlng tracks and bul'ldl ngs, developlng stockbreedlng, arborlcul ture, agricul tural credlt etc. 0f course al I these activitles were not reallzed, certaln remaln Incomplete;nevertheless the seriousnesswlth whtchthe executlngagency lmplemented them can be noted. In this regard, all the works done on force accountcan be clted such as the constructlonof bulldlngs, the slnklng of wells, the constructlonof roads, irrigatlon developmentworks. Somecomponents, such as lrrlgatlon, vterenore of a problembecause of an erroneousconcept ln whlch PRODESAwas not at all involved. Other componentsproved unrealtstlc In thelr lmplementatlonor,'at least too costly, such as the technlquesrecommended for antl-eroslon works, whlch Involved heavymechanisation and for whlch PRODESAsubstltuted the most si mple technlgue wlth si mlI ar results .

5.1.3 As regards the procurementof goodsand services, PR0DESAproved its competencetn preparing bidding documentsand dld its utmost to complywith procurementprocedures as stipulated in the loan agreement. The documents, sufficiently detaiIed, encounteredno difficulties in being approvedby the ADF. PRQDESAexcelled also ln producingquarterly and annual actlvity reports. Thesereports were preparedand sent to the Bankwith a regularity rarely equalled. Theyshowed the progressof the proJect.

5.2 TheBank

5.2.1 It wouldnot be an exaggerationto say that the AssomadaAgricultural DevelopmentProJect rras the victim of poor Bank preparation. Surely, the country had just becomeI ndependentand the Bank saw that I t had to _ 13- provlde immedlateasslstance. And the AssomadaAgrlculural Development ProJectrras, in this regard, well selected becauseof the lmportanceof the agrlcul tural sector i n the country and the neï Government's concern about ensurlngthe supplyof food to the population. However,the Bank'senthuslasm somewhatneglected the needto preparethe proJect well. Thereforebarely one and a half years went by betweenthe tdenttfication of the project and its appraisalin a partlcularly difflcult context, that ls to say CapeVerde where there tras practlcally no informatlonavailable on the physical and human environmentof the proJect area. Before appraisal, or ln any event before startlng up the proJect, socio-economlcstudles and hyrogeologicalstudies should have been carrled out. The absenceof these two studles ls at the orlgln of the problemsencountered by the proJect.

5.2.2 Durlngthe lmplementation,and desplte the problemsencountered, tt would have beenexpected that the Bankredress the situatlon or ln any event carry out a mld-termreview changingthe problemcomponents. Recommedatlons weremade In thls veln at the end of the mid-termrevlew misslon in February 1983. Thls mlssion noted that the baslc assumptionsfor the proJect were erroneousand consequentlythe set obJectlveswere unreallstic. It formulated recommendatlonsto revlse the obJectlvesaccordlng to realltles in the fteld. However,the recommendatlonswere not followed.

5.2.3 Theonly effort to correct the sltuatlon wasmade by the last mlsston .|984. in November This missionreviewed all the proJectcomponents, prepared 21 recommendationsfor the proJect executlng agency which were to help start-up the project agaln. Althoughgenerally complex, these recommendations were being applIed when the ADF decision to suspenddlsbursements vtas delivered at Praia, on the pretext that nothing had beendone to apply the recommendations.it seemsthat this decision was taken hastily in so far as no missionwent in the field to observethe facts. ïhe completionreport says that, in this regard (page ?7 para. 3.9.'13), "it seemsthat, after the i nvestigations of the completion report preparation mission, most of the recommendationscontained in the letter of 8 May had at least begunto be solved at the date when it lvas sent and this (the decislon to suspend disbursements)had exasperatedCape Verdian officers". The audit mission madethe sameobservation. - 't4 -

5.2.4 Lastly, the ADF's wlthdrawal from the proJect, follored sometime after by IFA0, dld not seemto have beenprepared well. I'lhenvlthdrawlng, the ADFshould have ensured the continulty of certaln actions, such as extension services, aErlcultural experlmentatlonln marshlandsand arborlculture, the introductlon of stockbreedlngetc. The audlt mlssion noted that MDR had dlstrtbuted the proJect's actlons amongits varlous servlces. But, owlng to lack of resources, most of these actlons lnltiated by the proJect were operatingvery slowly.

5.3 TechnlcalAssl stance

5.3.1 Technlcal asslstanceto the proJect ttas reducedto Just the proJect di rector. Generally he carri ed out hts task I n a rather correct manner. Surely he was not ln a position to overcomeall the problems,many of whlch vrerenot dependenton hlm, but he was able to demonstratehis competencein routlne proJect managementand in produclngactlvltlty reports. - t5 -

6. CONTINUITY

A unlt of MDRfollowed the proJectafter it had beendlscontinued, it wasthe DirectionRégionale du DéveloppementRural. Thls unit is installed in the proJect'sofflce. It is directed by a veterinarlan and has assumeda good part of the proJect'sactlvlties but the prtncipal actlvtty of this unlt is sti I I maintainingthe extenslonservice. Throughthts faclI ity, farmers i n the area continuedto be supervised,of coursewith very ltmited resources, but the Governmentmade an effort to ensurecontlnuity and tt ls through this structure that the Belgtanand Italian proJects,lmplemented ln thls samearea were successful. If lt were for thls permanentstructure alone, the Assomada Agrfcultural DevelopmentproJect wouldnot have beenuseless. In the opinlon of the audit misslon,the Bankshould give its supportto this structure which constitutesthe ftrst link in a nationalextension system. _ t6 _

7. CONCLUSIONS.LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Codcluslons

7.1..| The AssomadaAgrlcultural DevelopmentproJect stopped without attai nlng al I i ts obJectives . It encounteredserious di ffi culti es i n lmplementatlon,but vle have trled to showthroughout thls report that the proJect officers trere not at the orlgln of these problems. They can be critlcised, but they had the merit and often the courageto take lnltlatlves to redirect the project lnsofar as lt appeared obvlous as proJect implementatlonadvanced, that the baslc deslgnwas erroneous.

7.1 .2 thl s erroneous design I s the result of the proJect's hasty preparationin a burst of enthuslasmto provlde supportto the newRepublic of CapeVerde; the ADFaccelerated proJect preparatlona llttle too much. There trasno time to verify certaln assumptlons,such as water reserves In the area that vrereto permlt the lrrlgatlon of 150 ha. One of the loan condltlons obllged the Governmentto undertakestudles to conflrm thls water reserve, awarehowever, that 1t dld not havethe resources. The result was that there rras a 3-year walt to obtatn the negatlve conclusionof these studles. The important I rrl gatlon componentwhi ch would ensure the proJect's profi tabi I I ty was therefore questloned. Fromthat tlme donorsbegan to doubt the proJect's viablllty, whereasproJect officers, wlthout being dlscouraged,Initlated nerr actlons such as antl-erosion measures, reforestatlon, construction of longitudtnal dykesto protect avallable lands against the floodlng of rivers, stockbreeding,arboriculture, etc. Howeverthese lnitlatlves rather provoked hesitancy on the part of donors who always require that the negotiated proJectsbe followed. Frictlons therefore arose and developedbetween the two parties and ftnally resulted in discontinuingthe project whereas607" of the fundshad been dlsbursed and the mainactivities werebeing implemented.

7..|.3 In addition to the positive actions mentionedabove, it. is also necessaryto credit the project with establi shing a permanentagri cul tural extensionstructure which is the first in CapeVerde and whichis developing into a national agriculture extension system. Iherefore, owing to thi s structure,the project's actionsconti nue. _17_

7.1.4 In concluslon,the proJect audlt mlssion, wtthout condemningthe decislon to dlscontlnuethe project, regrets somewhatthat an effort was not first madeto save lt by reappraislngand redeflningobJectlves while taklng into accountthe real situation that exlsted in the field. Thls could have beendone, for example,after the mld-termappralsal misslon. Howeversimply decidingto stop CapeVerde's first agricultural proJectresulted somewhatin a feellng of failure and frustratlon on the part of CapeVerdlans for whomthe positlve aspectsof the project vlere lmportant. The proJect did not deserye suchan outcome.

7.2 Lessons

ThemaJor lessons that stemmedfrom the proJect'sexperlence are the fol lowlng:

before undertaklngthe appralsal phaseof the proJect, it ls necessaryto ensurebeforehand that all the bastc assumptlonson whichthe proJectlies are conflrmed.

whenrequestl ng a country to carry out studies regardlng a proJect,the Bankshould etther providefor the financing'of thesestudles, or assurethat the countryhas other resourcesto carry themout and take lnto accountthe time for carrylng out the studiesin the projectimplementations schedule.

whenwithdrawlng from an incomplete project, the Bank should ensurethat the 'investmentsalready madeare preserved.

the Bankshould not proposeproJects to the country with complex componentsthat exceed the technical capacity of national operators;

for a country without adequateprofessionals and for a complex project, the Bankshould call on professionalsand experienced technical assistance and provide a training programmefor nationals to ensurethe continuatlon; _ 18_

tf dlfferencesof oplnlonarlse betweenthe partles concernedIn the lmplementatlonof the proJect,a meetlngls necessaryto arrive at an agreementand permit the proJectto be continued.

7.3 Recommendations

It ls recommendedthat for proJects where lnformatlon of the physlcal and humanenvironment are rare, more tlme be taken in the proJect's preparationensurlng the verTficatlon of all the baslcassumptlons on whlchthis proJectlles;

It I s recommendedthat addltlonal studles needed for the lmplementationof the proJectbe lncludedln the flnanclngof proJec t ;

In countrles lacklng quallfled professlonals, the Bank ln preparlng t ts proJect should pay partlcul ar attentl on to the trainl ng component;

Confrontedwtth a problemproJect, the Bankshould first try to solve these problemselther by reappralslngthe proJect'at mld-term,or by modifytngthe intttal obJectTves,It should ln any event use al I posslble alternatives before decidlng to dlscontinuethe proJect.

Recommedatlonsfor the proiect

It ls recommendedthat the Banksupport actlons financed wlthtn the framework of thi s proJect, parti cularly the national agr!cultura'l extension structure, an offsprlng of the proJect. It I s recommendedthat thi s structure be developed and re-enforced for future Bank operations i n the agricul tural sector. AFRICANDIVELOPMENT FUND TRANSLATEDBY: Moira Short-Ferran ( FreeI ance)

COMPLETIONREPORT OF THE INTEGRATEDAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTPROJECT OF ASSOMADA REPUBLICOF CAPE VERDE

DEPARTMENÏOF AGRICULTUREAND RURAL DEVELOPMINT December,I 983

OPEV/BSO/OI83M BASICDATA A. IDTNTIFICATION

I. COUNTRY CAPEVERDE

2. PROJECT AssomadaProJect of IntegratedAgric. Development 3. LOCATION Islandof Santlago- Concelhode SantaCatarina 4, BORROI.IER Governmentof CapeVerde 5. EXECUTINGAGENCY Mintstry of Rural Developmentand Flshery (MRDF) PR0DESAUni t B. LOAI{ Duri nLAsses sment Provi ded

l. Amount(in BUAml I I ions) 3.51 2.084 2, Servlce Commisslon 0.75% 0.757" 3. ReimbursementPerlod (Years) 40 40 4. GracePeriod (Years) l0 l0 5. Dateof Negotiatlons 16110178 6. Dateof Approval 19110178 7. Dateof Signature 17|nl7g 8. Dateof Effectlveness JuneI 979 3r/03/80 9. Payments Dateof First Dlsbursement 31112179 I 3/05/80 Date of Last Disbursement 3t ltzt85 t2t09t85 10. Exchangerate 39.996 64.4 (3rd Quarter1978) (averagerate) C. PROJECT

l. 0riginal ObJectives : Integrateddevelopment of the upperbasins of the ri vers Engenbosand Boa Entrada of a total surfaceof 3,500hectares and comprlsing:

the developmentof 2, I 30 hectares for raln-fed crops mainly through anti-erosion works;

the development of I 50 hectares for i rri gated plantatlons par works of collectlon and dlversion of underground level waterresources;

the improvementof the road network and the supplyof drinkingwater. 2. Descriptionof ProJect

(l) Anti-erosionCamBaign and Land Development

During AssessmentProvi ded J"_ .|,130 slopes more than 407"(ha) 1,300 slopesbetween 0 and 407"(ha) 375 reafforestatlon (ha) :ro 8r5 terracesfor irrigation (ha) 61 4 checkdams (number) I ,91I 2,212 deepvalley checkdams (number) longitudinal dykes(km) ,:3

OPEV/BSO/OI83M Durlng AssessmentProvl ded _r_ fit) Collectlon and Supglyof Irrigatlon l.later 'lerl catchmentgal es (km) 3 0.4 i rrt gation welI s (number) I8 5 repalrs of malnpipes (km) 9.9 5.4 installationof newplpes (km) 3.80 I .70 installation of secondarypipes (km) 32 r .90 reservoirscubic metres to: 1,450 undergrounddams (number) I

( 1t 1) FaclI l ti es dlrt tracks andaccess roads (km) r9.9 22.00 drinklng water taps (number) 40 22 water towers (number) 2 2 mechanic workshop I I quarters I 0

3. Total cost (FUAmllllon) 7,395 4,594 4. Sourcesof Financino

ADF 3,434 2,084 IFAO 3,434 2,084 Governmentof CapeVerde 0.5r7 0.426

5. Expensesby Component(FUA mllllon) (a) Anti-eroslon Campalgnand LandDevelopment 3.94 3.08 (78) (b) Collecttonand Supply of Irrigatlon Hater 0.87 0.43 (49) (c) Facilitles 0.28 0.35 fi23) (d) AgriculturalEqulpment, Vehicles, Agrlcultural Products,Runnlng 1.r6 0.34 (29) (e) National Staff 0.79 0.25 (32) (f) Technical Assistance 0.34 0.l4 (42) 7.38 4.59 (62) 6. Supervision

Follow-up ml sslons : February1979, August/September .|982. 1979, June1982, November Supervisory missions : September I 980, March I 982, Januaryr' February'l 1983, January1984 and November 984.

0Ptv/Bs0/0183M TABLEOF CONTENTS

Pagq

INÏRODUCTION I

. I Agricul tural Sector I .2 Aimsof the PRODESA 4 .3 Project Review 4 .4 DocumentsConsul ted 5 2. DESCRIPTT0N0F THE PRoJECT 5

2.1 GeneralDescrlptlon of the ProJect 6 2.2 Detailed Descrlptionof varlouscomponents of the proJect 6 2.3 Descriptlonof Componentsand of ADB'sSpendlng 9 3. IMPLEMENTATIONANDCOST OF THEPROJECT 't0

3.1 Analysfsof Condltionsfor LoanEffectlveness IO 3.2 Analysisof the Termsof ProcurementGoods and Services t1 3.3 Examinatlonof MajorChanges 12 3.4 Examinatlonof ProJectSchedule t7 3.5 Analysisof Reportsfrom CapeVerde t8 3.6 Examinationof Costs t8 3.7 Reviewof the ExpendltureSchedule per Component 21 3.8 Assessmentof Consultantsand Suppliers' Services 22 3.9 Examinatlonof the BankGroup,s Supervlsion 22 3.10 Examinationof the Observanceof the Borrower'scommitments 25

4. INSTIÏUTIONALASPECTS 27 4.1 Examinationof the LegalContext, Organizatlon, personnel Training and Progress 27 4.? Audi ti ng 27 4.3 Monitorlngand Appraisal 27 5. ECONOMICSTUDY 29 5..| Examinationof the Resultsof the Project 29 6. CONCLUSIONS 33 6.1 Analysisof Resultsas Comparedwith Set Goals 33 6.2 Lessonsto be Learntfrom the Project 34

Ïhe present completlonreport rras prepared fol lowing a mission jointly carried out in CapeVerde in January1987 by an ADFteam made up of MessrsA. DUCR0QUET,Agro-Economist, and K. GUEYE,Finance Director, as well as by a IFADteam made up of MessrsR. Garcia AGREDA,Hydraulic and Civil Engineerand A. PRUNtLL0,Industrial Economist, Consultants.

0Ptv/BS0/0183M LISTOF ANNEXES Mapof the ProJectSite l. Layoutof rural surfaceand agricultural output 2. Scheduleof estlmatesand realizations 3. Circumstancessurrounding the terminationof the ProJect 4. Recapitulationof paymentsmade by the ADB

OPEV/BSO/OI83M EdTIVALENTSAt{p 3çRoilYMS

EOUIVALENTS

Currency CapeVerdlan Escudo (O/ Esc.) I ADFUA 87.4823CV Esc. (2ndTerm 1988) I ADFUA 1.27777US$ I US$ 68,4648CV Esc.

ACROi{YMS

ADB Afrlcan DevelopmentBank ADF Afrlcan 0evelopmentFund BURGEAP Offtce of Applled Geology CVEsc. CapeVerde Escudo FAP FomentoAgro-Pecuario ( Enterprlse) IFAD Internatlonal Fundfor Agrlcultural Development ILO Internatlonal LabourOrganl zatlon MRD Mlnistry of Rural Development scR SolI Conservatlonand Restoratlon PAICV TheAfrlcan Party for the Independenceof CapeVerde PRODESA AssomadoProJect of Integrated Agrlcultural Developnent

OPEV/BSO/OI83M -l

l. INTRODUCTION

I . I Aoricul tural Sector

l.l.l The Archipelogoof the Cape Verde lslands ls made up of lO inhabited islands and of 5 uninhabitedsmaller islands covering a total surfaceof 40,330sq. km. A large portion of the country is mountainousand subJectto severeerosion. Climattcconditions vary from island to island and for each island, accordingto its bearing and altitude. This climagc multlformity is madeworse by signtficant inter-annualchanges which are due particular ln to the motlonsof the Inter-Tropical.|985, Front. In the principal island Santiagofor lnstance, betweenl97l and the rainfal I mark fluctuated between34mm and 1,277mn,with an annualaverage of 580 mmin the region with the heavlest ralnfall (Serra Malaguetta)and betweenl3mm and 402mmwith an annual averageof l20mmln Praia, consideredas one of the driest regions. Agricultureconcerns four lslands (Santiago,Santo Antoa, San Nicolao and Fogo) whtch go to make up 961"of the cultivated surface and represent94.5I of rural economy.

1.1.2 As a result of the ralnfall pattern, agrlculture is indeterminate. The cultlvated areas fall Into 4 cllmatlc zones,In relation to the level of possiblesucess expected of the farmlng season.

(t) the dampzone (600mm) : 9,000ha (li) the sub-dampzone (between400 and 600mn) : 16,000ha (lii) the dry and semi-dryzones (between 400 and 300mmand 300mm) : 15,000ha Together, these zones represent 9tr of the total surface. It must be polnted out that more recently, ( si nce I 980), droughts have been more frequent (showinga deficit of between0 to 40%according to one particular area and in relation to the past).

l.1.3 Renewableunder-water resources which are technlcally workable,were estimatedat 220,000 cubic metres per day, according to the BURGEAP(the Bureauof Applied Geology). If we subtract what is neededfor the population, for industry and for cattle, vle are left with about 200,000cubic metresper day, for agricultural purposesand of that amount,50l can be workableunder acceptableeconomic condltlons. 0n the basls of 40 cubic metresper ha. per day, i! is possibleto irrigate almost3,000 hectares, whereas it is currentiy possibleto irrigate 1,800hectares.

1.1.4 The populationls estimatedat a total of about 350,000souls, wlilr an averageannual growth of around 27". The population of the rural areùs represents two-thirds of that total . The agricul tural pattern i s that of small and scatteredportions of land. The 26,000agricultural farmersshare less than 40,000hectares of farm land. 0f that total, 15,000are ownersof the farms or of part of the farms.

I . I .5 Inspite of a re-orientation of the Cape Verdian agricul tura'l production,the CapeVerde Islands are still far from beingself-sufficient as far as food 1s concerned. Evenin 1967,the last time the rains were good, 307"of her needshad to be met by food imports. Since then, the country's.|985, national output has fal len to an averageof l07" of her needs. In agricultureaccounted for 12.77"(l6.7I if the fishing industry is takeninto account)of the GNP(see Appendlx I for details).

OPEV/BSO/O'I83M 2-

1.1.5 The cultivated area can vary signlftcantly from year to year accordingto the fall of the first rains, lf they fall ln July or in August. Nevertheless,quantities harvesteddepend on the rainfall at the timè of floweringand moreoften than not, the harvestedarea ls smaller than the sown area; so that the amountof maize (the most lmportant cereal) harvested, varied between I 00 and 9,000 tons duri ng the I 976-1985 decade. The predomlnantcrop of the raln-fed farming systemis maize,grown ln assoclatlon with several speciesof beans. Cropsgrown ln relatively dry conditJonsare less lmportant: they include sweetpotatoes (1,000 ha) cassava(300 ha) coffee (200ha).

1.1.7 In the irrigated sector, skllls are unpollshedln the traditional areas (801 of the surface) and give rise to an excesslvewaste of water, i nsuffI ci ent for waterlng crops I n the dry season. l'llth the exception of banana(10% of the irrigated area) which is meantfirst of a'll, for export, the other crops are meantto satlsfy local food needs,especially as far as sugar cane production I s concerned (50 to 60tr of the surface), grown exclusively for the purposeof an alcohollc drtnk, brewed locally. The remalnlngarea is devotedto, sweetpotatoes and cash-crops:cassava, potatoes andfrul t.

1.1.8 Meat production (2,700 tons/annum)covers 90É of local needs (9kg/ person/annum)accounted for by bovlnes (showlnga markeddecrease), goats (65,000 heads), sheep (15,000 heads) and especially plgs (50,000 heads). Poultry-farmingis still ls not common.

1.1.9 Needsin proteln are net malnly by the flsh consumed;the level of current lntake going over the Zïkgllnhabltant/annummark and shouldreach 45kg before the year 2,000. The ADBgroup contrlbutes to the developmentof the small-scalefishing sector througha speclflc proJectapproved in 1987. 3,300 flshermenare engagedln the sector, operatingfrom 75 beaches,wlth 1,170 boats 4 to 6 metres long,450 of whlch are engine-run. The output of thls small scale fishing sector is estimatedat around10,000 tons.

I . I . l0 Commercial i zl ng of agrlcul tural products I s carri ed out through traditlonal channelsconslsting very often of several intermediaries before reachlngthe retall market. The gross proflt marginon the productionprice mayvary between25 to 2001following the distanceto be covered,the scarcity and fragl I I ty of the product. The dl sparitles noted regarding production prices also illustrate that the existlng systemdoes not makethe balance between supply and demandposs i bl e. Improving i nformation on avaiI able quantitles, and on prices is oneof the goals set by the Agricultural Recover_v Plan of Cape Verde and approvedby the Board of Dlrectors of the African DevelopmentFund in September1985 and should ensurea better readjustmentof suppli es. l.l.ll Theagricultural credit systemis stlll not sufflclently developedso as to allow for an upturnin investmentsin farming. It is difficult to find appropriate funding for hydro-agricul tural improvementson the farms, for modernizingcattle-raising and for annua'linputs. The credit section of the RecoveryPlan mentionedin previousparagraphs, will providethe Republiccî Cape Verde with the i nsti tutional and fi nancial means to pa11 i ate the situation.

OPEV/BSO/O'I83M -3

l.l.l2 The agricultural developmentpolicy implementedwithin the framework of the First DevelopmentPlan (1982-85)and more so, within the frameworkof the SecondPlan (1986-1990)in whichagriculture ls given priority, aims in particular, at the followingobjectives:

(i) to fight against thg^ advancingdesert and erosion by launchingproJects dealing with water and soiI conservatioir andthose deallng with reafforestation;

( i i ) to I ncrease production by mustering the most accessible productivlty reserves, i.e. lntensifying production in the i rri gated areas and I n the sub-damp and damp zones, increasingthe lrrigated surfaces wherepossible and at a reasonab'le cost (200 to 250 ha), by schematizi ng animal production through the rnodernizationof stock-farming, the revitatlizatlon of fruit orchardsand by the stepping-upof the ftght againstpests;

(lii) to consolldateand valorlze hydraullcresources;

( i v) to promotec1 ear-cut commerclal channels and to bui1 d the necessaryfactlities such as storage rooms,cold rooms,all of which wtll safeguardboth consumerand producer, rather than a systemof guaranteedprlces patd to the cape Verdian powers-that-be and whlch i s not only cosily, but rnost probablyinefflcient;

(v) to de.ve_l9Rrenewabl e energy such as Aeoli an energy, (especlally suitable ln the CapeVerdian context) firewôd and biogas;

(vi ) to lmprove town and country pl anning, through the implementatlonof a novel policy relative to the usesof the soiï, within the frameworkof the proceedingsof the CES,of land reform and of the canalization of underwaterresources and of a proper town/ country ba'lance;

(vi i ) to better productionfaci I i ties by intensifying land reform, by creating an agrlcultural credit systemand by improving the commercialarrangements of producers(cooperative storei for i nstance);

(vi i i ) to consoli date state enterprises, i nstrumental ï n agricultural development(the TNAVIfor poultry-farming,the Justino Lopex Agro-Industrial Complex for pi g and catti e raising andthe FAPfor the supplyand export of surpluses);

( i x) to trai n executive personneland agricul tural farmersat the Multi-PurposeTraining Centre in San Jorge and to set up à national networkof agricul tural extension workers making themaware of problemsrelated to rural development;

(x) to step-up applied research in the fields of pedology, hydraulicresources, ecology, plant and animalproduction anrJ socio-economics;

OPEV/BSO/OI83M 4

(xi) to give moreimpact to the foodand agricultural industries 1.2 Aimsof the PRODESA

1.2.1 The AssomadaAgricultural DevelopmentProJect known in CapeVerde by the acronym,PRODESA, had as its goal to lmproveagricultural output and incomein the upper reglons of the basins of the rivers Engenhosand Boa Entradaln the Concelhoreglon in Santa-Catarlnaln the Island by San Tiago. Consideringthe maJorobstacles of the reglon (whlch are those of the Cape Verde agrlcultural Fattern as a whole) that ls the deterioration of the terraln through erosion and becauseof insufficlent water resources, the princlpal measuresprovlded for are those centred on the campaignagai nst erosionand on the ttllage of nevtagrlcultural areas, on the irrigation of approxlmately150 supplementaryhectares of land, as well as the creation of supportivefacilities (dtrt tracks, rural watersupply systems etc). 1.2.2 Agricultural developmentas devlsedby the PR0DESA,is basedon the context of the reglon, provldlng the meansfor lt to step-up exi sting plantatlons. 0n those slopes whlch go beyondthe 401 mark, provisions have been madeto lntensify the growing of the ptgeon pea, up to about 4,500 seedlingsper hectare. Thls speciesis lmpervlousto droughtsand becauseof Its root-type reduces eroslons, moreover,these peas are of an appreciative nutrlent value. 0n slopes of less than 401, plans have beenmade to develop the habttualantl-eroslve skills, small stonewalls, contour-lineslopes etc, and to sowthe tradltional malze-beancomblnatlon. 1.2.3 The lrrlgated sector (150 hectares) should gtve scope to vegetable crops (onlons, garl I c, tomatoes,cabbage, carrots, melons) i n rotation with sweetpotatoes and potatoes at a twlce-yearly rate. 1.2.4 Thetyplcal farm shouldconslst of 0.1 hectareof lrrlgated land, 1.4 hectareof non-irrigatedland:0.8 ha devotedto the plgeonpea and 0.6 ha to somecomblnation. I .3 ProJect Revlew

I . 3. I In January/February1977 , that I s to sty, I ess than two years followlng CapeVerde's independence(July 1975)the FAO'sInvestment Centre inttlated a mlsslonwhich was to ldentify all agrlcultural-relatedprojects, on behalf of the ADBGroup. Themlsslon recommended that priority be given to the AssomadaAgri cu'ltural DevelopmentProJect. tllth the consent of the tw

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loan ttas signed on l5th December1978. The ADBlras singled out as funding institution. Thls ras the flrst Jotnt operatlonbetween the ADBGroup and thè IFADwhich had besides just seenthe light of day.

1.3.3 The tvo loans becameofficial ly effective at the samedate: 3l st March1980 that is to sôy, rnorethan 5 monthsfo'llowtng that of the signlng (see section 3.1: Reasonsfor the delay). The project lasted for a littlà morethan 5 years.l985, since it was termlnatedby the CapeVerdian Government on l3th August following a decision madeby the Iendersto suspendall payments(see paras. 3.9.12 and 3.9.13 and appendix3: Circumstances surroundingthe terminatlonof the proJect). There was therefore a credit balanceof:

1.4.15mllllon CVESc. for the ADF I I 817 mi1 I ion USdol I ars for the IFAD

Thesebalances have since then beencancelled and havebeen deducted from sums that the CapeVerde Government must reimburse. I .4 DocumentsConsul ted

1.4.1 All Information found in the present report were obtained by the misslon sent out to preparethe report on the flnal stagesof the Project, which stayed ln CapeVerde from 24th to 3lst January 1987. This misslon workedhand in hand wtth a simllar IFAD mlsslon madeup of a couple of consultants. Thelr report tlas passedon to us by the IFADon lst September 1987.

1.4,2 It must be pointed out that the organ set up to control and manage the Project was disbandedearly 1986l.e. six npnthsafter the Governmenthad offlcially decldedto bring activlties to a close, prior to the normaldate of termination(letter from the Mlnister of Flnanceand EconomicAffairs, dated 3lst August1985, see Appendix 3). Nevertheless,the missionwas able to meet three of the officials in chargeof the project:

Messrs: AntonioPedro Barbosa Borges - Mlnes Engineerwho lras in charge of the proJect as of May I 985

0swa'ldode 0l iviera E Cruz Agricul tural Engineer

DomlngoesUbaldo Mesqulta Accountant Someinformation tvas obtained from the State Secretariat in chargeof Researclr andPlanning attached to the Ministry of Deve'lopmentand Fishery.

1.4.3 Yet, no comprehensivedocument vras formulated by the CapeVerdian authorities on the variousactivities of the ProJect. Documentsconsulted are therefore, for the most part, files belongingto the ADBrelative to the project, consisting of letters, periodical progressreports (annual and quarterly reports), supervisionreports, and the middle-stageassessment report.

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2. DESCRIPTIONOF ÏHE PROJECT 2.1 GeneralDescrlLotton olthe.-Prol-ect

2.1.1 The maln aim of the project was to lntenslfy and thereby further agricultural output ln the areas coverlng the upper basins of the rivers Eugebosand Boa Entrada. The area ln questlon covers about 3,500 hectares. Theproject intended:

(i) to prepare2,130 hectaresof land for raln-crops, mainly by the help of antl-eros I ve devlses ; (l I ) to prepare 150 hectares of land for lrrigated crops by collecttng andharnesslng under-surface water resources.

2.1.2 TheproJect also intendedto lmprovethe rural road systemas well as to increasethe populatlon'sdrinking water supply. Theoverall populationof the reglonwas estlmated at 4,500tnhabltants. 2.2 DetalledDescrlnttonol the VartousComoonents of the Proiect (a) Anti-eroslonmeasures and land o 2.2.1 Thts componentconslsted ln preparlngthe land lntendedfor raln-fed cropsas well as In reduclngthe maizeand beans grown areas of the slopesand replacing them by the "caJanuscaJan" (the plgeon pea). To that end, provisionswere made for the followlngmeasures: (t) protectlon and soll restoration workson those slopes rhlch fal I between0 and40tr, over an areaof 830hectares. (tt) protectlonand soll restoratlonworks on thosti sI opes vrhi ch go beyondthe 40trmark, over an areaof 1,300hectares; (iil) laylngout of lrrlgable surfacescovering6l hectaresin all;

(tv) bulldtng of l,9ll gabloncheck dams, In order to improvethe undergroundwater level and supply;

(v) constructlon of 86 mud-checkdams in the river beds and the colI ecti ng the water which wlI I be used for i rri gating 89 hectaresof land.

?.2.? Protection and Soil Restoration Norks were to be carried out a:i fol I ows:

( i ) on those slopes of between0 and 407, creati ng contour-'lI ne mud banks on which the "CaJanusCajan" would have been pl anted ( surface: 830 hectares) . Moreover, vlal1 -supported surfaceswere to be installed on 6l hectaresof land, ready for irrigation;

(ii) on those slopes of more than 40'L,building of individual.l,300 banksintended exclusively for the pigeonpea (surface: hectares).

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2.2.3 In order to implementthe measuresof this section, provision had beenmade to buy two bulldozersof around70 HPeach,2 tipper-lorries 6 tons each, I loader, somegabions, as well as somespare parts.

(b) ColI ection and Supplyof l.laterfor lrri gation

2.2.4 The overridlng obJectlveof thi s component,was the bui1 di ng of facilities for the collectfon and supplyof water for lrrigating a total area of 150 hectares(61 hectaresof terraces and 89 hectaresof fenced-in land, thanks to the constructionof checkdams). The following measureslvere thus to be taken:

(i) the digglng of 3,000m of horlzontal intake tunnels to supply water to the 6l hectaresof terraces;

(ii) the sinklng of l8 wells deep In the valleys and equipplng them vlith motor-operatedpumps, I r order to i rri gate 89 supplementaryhectares sltuated abovethe 86 retaining dams;

(iit) the installlng or rehabilitatingof the irrigation networkon the 150hectares of land to be lrrigated. 2.2.5 The lnstallatlon or rehabllttation operatlonsof the irrigatlori networkwere to consist of:

(i ) the rehablI itatlon of 9,900 metres of main pipes and the buildingof 3,750metres of newmain pipes;

(ii) the extensionof two reservoirs and the bui)ding of a nerr reservoirwhlch had a total capacityof 800cubic/m. (llf) the butldtngof 32,000metres of secondarypipes.

2.2.6 In order to carry the operatlonsof this componentthrough, the fol lowlng provisions weremade:

(i) for the gallerles: a dlesel motor-equipped7 cubic m./mm . compressor, a pneumatlc hammer, rai I s, trol I eys and explosives,

(ii) for the wells: boringequlpment, l8 diesel motor-pumps(8 HP). (c) Facilities

2.2.7 This componentprovlded for the followlng lnvestments:

(i) improvementof 17 kmof roads;

( i i ) colI ection of water from 40 sources for the purpose of supplying the vi I I ages;

(iii) building of two warehousesin the valleys of Engenhos(3i6 sg. metres)and Boa Entrada (200 sq. metres)respectively;

(iv) renovationof an existing building and constructionof a connecting bui1 di ng which were to serve as offi ces and lodgingsfor the Project Manager;

OPEV/BSO/OI83M 8-

v) constructionand mechanlcal. workshop equlpment 2.2.8 Theexlstlng bulldtng ls ln Telhal;after repalrsthe useablespace shouldhave been 300 sg.m. of which,the groundfloor wasto be fitted out as offlces andthe lst floor as the ProjectManager's official quarters. The 145 sq.m.connectingbutldlng was to be fttted out as transit lodgings. 2.2,9 Provlslonswere also to be madefor a generator,as well as for homeand office furniture. (a) OperatlonalMeans 2.2.10 Thls componentbrought together the varlous meansneeded for project managenent,agrlculture extenslon and for the maintenance of structuresespeclally as far as the followlngare concerned:

( ) vehlcl es; ( l) farmlngequfpmentl ( i i ) renewableagrl cul tural I nputs; ( v) technlcalassl stance; (v) local personnel; (vi ) | nvestmentmal ntenance and malntal nl ng proJect materlal .

2.2.11 By way of transport, provlsion had beenmade for the purchaseof an al l-purpose vehlcle, for the ProJect Manager,6 lorries for the ProJect's executlvestaff andof 20 motorcyclesfor the proJect's extensionworkers.

2.2.12 The farms lylng wlthln the proJect area were to be glven a spray eachand agricultural Inputs (fertlllzers, seeds,pestlcldes) to last for four years.

2.2.13 Technlcal asslstance was to take the form of 1 Project Manager whose contract tras to cover the duration of the Project (5 years) and temporary consultants , a l,later Speclal i st ( three-month contract) , a coordlnatlngspeclal lst (slx-monthcontract).

2.2.14 Underthe ProJect, provislons were also madefor locally recrulted personnel. I Agronomlst, I Rural Engineer, I l.lelI and Drift SpecialI st, I Managlng Accountant, 3 Acting Technlcl ans, I 8 Agricul tural Extensi on Norkeri, I Draughtsmanand I HeadMechanlc. Further provisions were madefor the recruitment of general servlce personnel, I Secretary, 2 Drivers. 2 AsslstantMechanics, 3 EngtneDrivers and 3 AssistantEngine Drivers. (e) Accommodating Measures

2.2.15 In order to back the movesundertaken especially in the campalgn against erosion, the CapeVerdian powers-that-bewere to take the necessary stepsto:

(i) checkand control cattle clrculatlon in the area; (ii) prohiblt annualcrops on slopesof morethan 407.;

(iii) upkeepand enhance the existlng systemof waterrates paid to the Ministry of Rural Oevelopment.

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2.3 Descrllllon of Comoonentsand of ADB'sSoendino

2.3.1' Thefundlng system chosen at the ttme of assessmentwas basedon a Joint fundlng scheme(ADB, IFAD and the CapeVerde Government) and could be brokendown as follows:

Forelgnexchange costs I FAD : 507. ADB 50'1"

Localcurrency costs I FAD : 44.64'1" ADF 44.64L Government 10.721"

The ADFnas therefore to particlpate ln the funding of all the $roject's components.

OPEV/BSO/OI83M l0

3. IMPLEMENTATIONANDCOST OF THEPROJECT

3.1 Analyslsof Condltlonsfor LoanEffectlveness

3.r.1 The prelimi nary condltions for the fï rst disbursement were met during the 16 rpnths followlng the signingof the Loan.|980.Agreement. The date of Its effectivenesswas flxed by the ADBat 3lst March Althoughthis was a relatively long deadllne, this is not unusualfor a rural development proJect funded by the ADBGroup. Moreover,the proJect lvas one of the first of its klnd that the youngCape Verde Republlc had to deal with and she had to becomeconversant wtth proceduresof lnternatlonal organizations.

3.1.2 The prellmlnarycondltlons conslsted malnly of the usual ADBGroup condltions, namely: ( i ) legal advlce;

(ii) other funding sources in the event of an overrun of the proJect's cost; (iii) ltst of goodsand services;

(lv) the flrst blddtngdocument Moreso, underthe proJect, the authoritles were to set up a managingunit for the proJect; thls unit was to be dlrectly afftlltated to the Minjstry of Rural Development,provlding lt wtth personnel(ProJect Manager,Rural Engineer, Agronomlst, l,lelI and Drt f t Expert, Managlng Accountant; 3.r.3 The CapeVerde AuthorTtleswere slor in meetingthe preliminary condltlons not because of thetr lack of experience as a borrower from international funding organ, but rather becauseof red tape. Consequent'ly, the legal opinlon dlspatchedto the ADBon 6th July 1979had to be completed, as an afterthought, for a "Lab,Blndtng 0eclsion" by the President of the Republlc,dated 7th February1980, ln vlew of the ratification of the Loan Agreementbetween the ADFand the Republlcof CapeVerde. This decision was madepubl i c i n the Off I cl al l,lhlte Paperdated lOth MarchI 980 and was the most delaylngelement in the meetlngof the condltlons.

3.1.4 Anotherproblem arose out of the recrultlng of a Project Manager. The CapeVerdlan powers-that-be,for languagereasons, wanteda Portuguese with no co1onlalexperience. Slnce at the tTme,Portugal was not one of the ADF'spartners, a departurefrom the ADFprocedures was ineviiable. Onemusl point out that there wereother possibi'lities(recruiting a Brazil national, or an expert who spoke Portuguese,not a feat i n i tsel f) . 0dd1y enougir, neither of thesesolutions y{ere adopted at the time. 3.1.5 The Project ImplementationUnit wascreated by decreeNo. 58/79of 9th June 1979and the CapeVerdian working team started work as eariy as end 0ctober1979, It consisted of:

Messrs:Barbosa Borges Antonio Pedro, Mining Engineer; PereiraSilva EmmanualMagno, Rural Engineer; Mesquita Ubaldo Domingos, Accountant;

0Prv/BS0/0r83M il

Thelast memberof the teamMr. De 0llveira E CruzOswaldo, Agronomist, joined the team early 1980. The PortugueseAgronomi st, Project.l980. Manager,Armi ndo PensaDa Stlva Cardoso,took up office on l6th January

3.1.6 Attention should be drawn to the fact that the ADBsent out tvo follow-upmlssions in FebruaryI979 and August1979 respeciively, to help the CapeVerdian authorltles hammerout the businessof preliminary conditions to be met. Further support by the ADBwould probably not have speededup the loan's effectiveness.

3.2 Analysisof the Termsof_Procuremnt of Goodsand Services 3.2.1 Fromwhat one can gather on examlnatlonof the proceduresfollowed to acqulregoods and services, the teamin chargeof carrying out the project Irere thoroughand professlonal in thelr approach. No contract it seemswas signed without prior approval by the ADFand requests for approval were as a rule, justlfiable enoughto enable the technlcal departmentsof the ADF to quickly adoptan attitude towardsthe proposedprocedures.

3.2.2 The appraisal report had made provlslons for i nternational competitlve btddtng for vehlcles, machinesand equipment, agricultural chemlcals,as well as for the lmported supplles Intendedfor the farm-road programmeand for the bulI dt ngs. Constructlon work tr/asto be done under supervlsionby the implementingagency.

3.2.3 An Inltlal Internatlonal competitlveblddlng vraslaunched in l97g in applicationof thesepolicy lines for the acqulringof a rangeof vehicles and goods. This bid invitation fell through,possibly becausethe deadline fixed for the donors was too short (60 days) in a country were communications wtth the outside world were not up to scratchand whosedomestic market is not strong enoughto enable tradltional suppliers to take part. In the wake of this vain attempt and becauseof the tray the orders brerespread out in time and also becauseof the low unlt cost of these orders, the Bankagreed that contractswere to be signedfollowlng ltmited shoppingfor suppliers who had showninterest in the CapeVerde contract. As a result, about 20 contracts were signedduring the flve-year spanof the proJect, for an overall payment (maklng of FUA500,000 an averageof FUA27,000 per contract), account.l25,000,which v{assett'led by the ADF. The highest btll paid was for FUA the lowest,FUA ll3 (for the purchaseof miners'helmets). Apart from one refund, paymentswere made by the ADFdirectly to suppliers.

3.2.4 For the procurementof goods and services at local level or fcr. easily imported goods, di rect negotlatlon contracts vlere si gned and when necessarythrough local shopping. These trere main1y bui1 di ng materiil (cement, contracts.|981, steel bars, fuel, spareparts, insurancepol icies etc). Às of early it wasdecided that supplierswere to be paid fronrthe Project Budget(on an advancemade available by the Bankof CapeVerde) and'later reimbursedby the ADF. The total sumof thesepurchasses rvas covered by a sum of FUA1.00 million disbursedby the ADF.

3.2.5 The third methodof purchaslngwas on force account; j n othcr words,the Project ImplementationUnit usedfunds put at its disposal by tire ADFin the form of renewableadvances. The costs defrayedunder this method v{erethose relative to labour neededin the carrying out of various tasks (thoseconcerning the tracks, the rural watersupply system, those linked wiih

0PEV/BS0/0183M 12 erosioncontrol, land tilling, agriculturalhydraullcs, building etc). The sumtotal disbursedby the ADFfor theseservices (especially for manpower), cameto FUA423,000. 3.2.6 For obvlousreasons, implementing these proceduresgave rlse, at least at the onset of the proJect, to no endof problemsbetween the borrorers and donors. Nevertheless,thanks to variousfollow-up missions sent out in sucesssionto CapeVerde, at the start of the proJectQ misslonswere sent out in 1979,I in 1980),these prob'lems were satlsfactorily ironed out.

3.3 Examlnatlonof MaJorChanges 3.3.1 As a matter of course, a rural developmentproJect must adapt to exlstlng condltlons, since lt ls an off-shoot of these condltionsin at least three respects; (a) the climate; (b) marketlngcondltions of the product; (c) motlvationand interest of farmers ln the proJect's aims. This principle is all the more lmportantas the proJect-relateddocuments, feasibtlity studies, and appralsal reports are for the most part, lndlcators showing the maln courses of actlon whlch must be followed to begln with, drawn up on r hypothetlcalbasls and for which checklngwould have meant running counter to scheduleand to costs latd down. Thts form of checking i s besides never perfect slnce lt is lmposslbleto masterbeforehand condltlons which will be prevalentduring lmplementatlonstages. 3.3.2 The PRODESAProJect tras no exceptlonto the rule and significant changeswere madeto the various sectlons of the ProJect, thereby moving away from the tnittal obJectlves. Adaptlngthe ProJectto the reallties of the fleld rras not wlthout lts dtfflcultles becausethe Project team and the country In general had llttle experlenceln matters of the kind and could not take Inltlative, forelgn to the tnttlal ProJect. (a) Modlflcationof Parts 3.3.3 Eroslon Control and Land Develooment.Those i n charge of the project soonreallzed that the bulldlng of Indtvldual bankson slopes of more than 40trwas rather tedlous and of llttle.|,300 iriterest. Seedholes b,eremade on bedscoverlng 1,.|30hectares instead of hectares. For slopes lower than 40'L,hedges of "caJanuscaJan" were planted together with other anti-erosion crops (aloes for instance) in contour-lines (the banks'rere left out); the operation was lmprovedby a systemof dralns and ditches. The preparedland rras 375 hectaresbig, Instead of 830 hectares. Theseoperations helped to saveon stones (rarely avallable in the area) and manpower.Furthermore, it vraspossible to adapt these novel measuresto the existing sizes of fariri without having to resort to an alteratlon of boundaries. In a nutshell, it becamecrystal-clear that the origina'l idea tras too costly for the expected lncreasein output. Theoperation chosen turned out to be easier to implement and with similar results. The explanationbeing the root structure of the pigeonpea (whtchdigs deep into the soil) and its adaptationin genera) to the environment. 3.3.4 Regardlngthe preparationof land to be irrigated (the 61 hectar.rs of terraces initlal 1y planned for as welI as the 89 hectares of valle1, depths), operatlonsfe11 short of expectations(4 ha for the terraces and l3 ha for the valley depths). This stemsfrom the fact that water resourcesl,lei'e less than originally expectedand thereforethe land madeready for irrigation wassmal I er than pl anned.

0PEV/BS0/0183M

'l'; '.:i ':r::. ::. t3

3.3.5 The numberof damsbullt on the rlver beds was also reduced Qz lnstead of 85) becausethe topograhicaland geomorphologicaisurveys carried out durlng the Project showedthat the numberof appropriate sites was limited. 0n the other hand,the numberof checkdams built in the gullies and in the bedsof the mountainstreams was increased from the l,9ll to 2,212>.

3.3.6 In addition, a newtype of operationwas carried through:dykes in stone and gabionwere bullt the length of the water-courses,so as to protect the hydro-agriculturallnstallatlons, situated in the valley depthsand hence vulnerableto the rlse in water-levels. As a result, 3.2 km of dykeswere built underthe project.

3.3.7 Mentionhas to be madeof anothermeasui'e not origtnally planned but wtth a posltive impact 1n protecting the soil: this involves è reafforestation plan, realized by the FAO with funds made available by Belgium. In the project area, the implementingorgan was able to reafforest 815hectares of land chlefly on slopeshigher than 100%.

3.3.8 Although its impact v{as not as great as planned, the component "Eroslon entltled Control and Land Development"played an important role in checkingerosion, whlch tvasone of the projects areassetbacks.The impactof the structures built vras felt partlcularly during the tornado period of September1984 (at least 490 mmof raln ln 48 hoursas comparedto the annual averageof 337mmfor the 1970'78period in the region of Santa Catarina). Eventhough a numberof antl-eroslve structures were damaged(l62 checkdams completelywashed away,387 checkdams partly washedaway, l5 damspartially destroyed, 84_sq.m. 9f longitudinal dykes and 2 ha of irrigated crops destroyed,we'lls sand-filled), damagescaused to the environmenth,ere limited and as a result of sandlng, retrievlng areas situated abovethe damsturned out to be easier than expected.

3.3.9 Furthermore,contrary to what lras plannedfor the component,the proJect made almost excluslve use of manpowerthan of heavy machinery, consequently,money flowed into the reglon, explaining in part, rllhy some operations like the terraclng which neededmore than manpower,could not be carrled through.

Collectlngand Dlstrlbutlng l^laterfor Irrigation

3.3.10 This vlas the most problematlcof all the componentsand the one which on several occasionscalled to question the very principle of the Project. The i rri gation programmevras based on the avaiI abi'li ty of 5,6cC cubic metres/dayof water, makingit possiblethereby to irrigate 150hectares of land on the basis of 0.4 litres/s/ha. Theappraisa'l report hadpointed o1rr "thorough (para. that more surveys were to be carried out in that respect"'loan 3.0.8). "Anothercondition" was laid downaccordingly in the agreement but, these studieslvere mentioned 1n actual fact only in 1982. Late 1982with fundsmade available by France,the Ministry of Rural Developmentcommissionecl the BURGEAPto carry out a surveyon the area's water resources.

3.3.11 The findings of this study were madeknown late 1983. Thav confirmed that the I evel of water avaiI able vlùs very I ow as comparedrc sourcesalready workable prior to the Project (515 cubic m/day). The BURGEAF also suggestedthat the waters of another slope should be diverted to tne proJectarea by wayof horizontaltunneis. Twooptions were proposed: the lst

OPEV/BSO/OI83M l4 consistedof excavatlnga tunnel 1.5 km long, then collecting and using the waterto lrrigate 12 ha; the 2ndconsisted tn digglnga tunne'l3.8 km long and using the water to lrrlgate ?6 hectares. The estimated duratlon of these operatlonswas 3 years in the ftrst case and 8 years ln the second. Because of the slze of the operationsto be carrled out (FUA1.6 million in the first case and 3.8 mlllion ln the second),no conclusionvilas arrived at, all the more so, as these measureswould not have furthered the proJects maiden obJectivesin any way. 3.3. l2 Consequently, hydro-agrlcul tural operations were cut down conslderablyand Involved: (i) (lnstead ' 400mof Intake tunnels of 3,000m) divided I nto three drtfts the Mantabatunnel : 20 metres, 40 cubic m/day; the Fontelimadrift (rePairs) 50metres,40 cubic m/day; the Blca tunnel: 150metres, 250 cubic m/day (ii) the slnklngof 6 rrells (lnsteadof l8) to collect water in the alluvlumground water area;

(iil) the rehabllttatlon of 5.4 km of prlmary ptpes (tnstead of 9.9 km) and the Installatlon of 1.7 kmof newplpes (instead of 3.8 km);

(iv) the tnstallatlon of 1.9 km secondaryptpes (instead of 32 km); (v) the bulldlng or repalrs of 1,450cubic metresof reservoirs.

Furthermore,ln the wakeof the mld-termproJect revlew mission sent out early 1983,the idea of uslng pllable tubesfor trrlgatlng farms by stphoningwater from the secondarytubes, tlas put forward.

3.3.13 In addltlon, the proJectput forwarda novel ldea: that of butldlng an undergrounddam so as to collect water from the alluvion level. The site sltuated-in Rlbetrlnha has an undergrounddam, 41 metres long, a drainage tunnel 37 metres long, a vlsiting uell, a vater collectlng chamberand a 280 cubicmetres reservoir. 3.3.14 The completedworks meant an averageflow of 1,250 cubic metres/da-v (that is rnorethan twice the pre-projectflou), makingit possible.|50to irrigat.c moreor less satisfactorily 54 hectareslnstead of the intended hectares (25 of whichwere devoted more or less unsatisfactorilyto sugarcane growing.

3.3.l5 FaciI lties: The maJor changemade here concerns the project's headquarters. The appraisal rep,orthad madeplans for the renovationof rural buildingsretrieved by the State. Their locationin Ielhel, far out of town, madethé suggestionunwelcome. As of September1979, the project authorities suggestedtnit project headquartersvtere to be built in Assomada,the chief townof the region. fne suggestionwas accepted a!d iustifiably So, singe tire building-project. was tô serve as thè-Officesof the Agricultural Departmentat the end of the However,the cost of the newbuildings over-runningwhat was earmarkôd,the programmelras reducedand the two buildings (the Director's official residenceind transit lodgings)were done away with'

0PEV/BS0/0r83M

.,À..:iÉ;. :: l5

3.3. l5 In order to improvethe population'ssupply of drinking water, the proJecthad made provision for the installations of 40 public taps. Follow'ing a recognltion survey of existi ng water sources and account taken of the dlstancesïnhabitants haveto cover, proJect managenentdecided to reduce the numberto 24 and in actual fact only 20 were butlt. Moreover,the reference normdecided on at the time of appraisal,fitted with a filter 20 n long and a goal protective'avoidingarea, lras discarded. This meantrunning counter to the set, namely, al I contaminationof the water provided for domestic purposes;experience has howevershown that the risks of pollution are rather slight.

3.3. I 7 The appraisal report al so had plans for the bui I di ng of 2 warehousesfor stori ng and commercia'l i zi ng agricul tural products. Thesewere built but turnedout to be ill-adapted and badly located. Farmersstill take their productsto Assomadafor sale and the butldtngshave been deserted. 3.3.18 Plans tlere madeto bulld l7 km of accessroads so as to make passagewlthin the proJect area easier. In fact, 20 km of access roads were built, to link the three additional rural conglomerations.Nevertheless, becauseof severe floodïng in 1984, proJect funds had to be used to repair damagesand the resultlng cost vrasthe sameas for the building of 2 Km of accessroads.

3.3.l9 Although not provtded for tn the proJect, project management decidedto build a pig farn, food-storagerooms and a water reservoir which were to serve as prototypesfor farmers. The plg-farm is currently run by the Ministry of Rural Development.Although mention is madeof this in the PRODESAActivity Report, it seemsthat these investmentshave not been the subJectof official requestsput forwardby the CapeVerde authorities.

3.3.20 Thc Technical Assistance Programmewas al so the object of nrodiftcatlon. Other than the Project Managerwho was to be recruited for the entlre duration of the project (5 years), provisions were made for 12 consultantshired on a monthlybasis. The Project Managertook up duty in January1980 and t+ason the Job till May1985, but no Consultantwas recruited under the proJect. The hydrological survey whlch tlas to be conductedby a Consultantvlas in fact carried out by the BURGEAP(the Office of Applied Geology)and funded by France. Other consultantswere to be sent to Cape Verde to train top level local personnel; instead, three Cape Verde technici ans were sent abroad on trai ni ng courses (for 2, 3 and 2 months respectively, aroundmi d-l 982).

(b) Modifïcationsmade to Agrlcul_turalJxtensjon Hork 3.3.21 The agricultural extensionwork dev'iceset up wasthe first of ius kind in CapeVerde since prior to the Project, there r{ere no supervision departmentsin the country. The aims of this agricultural extensionwas to championthe pigeonpea, the maize-beancombination, .l,600to diversify and expand irrigated plantations. Thisoperation was to cover farms.

3.3.22 Hhenthe project took off in 1980,there wereiew qualified worke:; availablein CapeVerde. Theagricultural extension work team was in fact sei up only in 1982with the hiring of 7 agentstrained in Portugal. Fromthei onwards,the project area vlùsdivided up i nto 7 sub-areas,each under tre supervisionof one agricultural extensionworker 1iving permanentlyon the

0PEV/BS0/0183M t5

spot. In each sub-area"contact leadersrrwere elected to help define the technlcaltopics that neededpopularlzlng and to preparegroup meetings. Each agrlcultural extenslonworker had to drawup a weeklyworking schedule which he rras to submit to the proJectManagement. Farmers were approachedeither indtvlduallyon their farmsor in groups1n the two demonstrationcentres set up underthe proJect. Theagrlcultural extensionworkers got in touchwith 235families. 3.3.23 l'{ith a vlew to sustalnlng efforts exerted in the anti-erosion campalgn,the agrlcultural extenslon team laid emphasis on making farrners awareof the importanceof the plgeon pea nurseries. Thanksto the positive results of the lst attemptsand of the generaldistribution of seedlings,the agrlcultural extenslonteam was able to break the initial reluctanceof the Inhabltants to adopt thls crop. In consequencewhereof, late 1980pigeon pea seedswere sownon 1,130 hectaresof slopes. Other crops were madepopular and these include (aloes, slsal and food crops). In addition, thanksto the effectlve implementatlonof a newforest code, agricultural extensionworkers rrere able to make tnhabltants awareof the dangers related to the dlsorder'ly utlltzatlon of flrewood. l,{tth the help of forest keepers hired by the Mlnlstry of RD, woodsupply noy seemsto be under control. 3.3.24 The Agrtcultural Extenslonteam also devotedsome time to the dlssemlnatlonof lmprovedlrrigated technlquesand to the replacement'inthe lrrlgated farms, of food crops by sugar cane. Thanksto the two demonstration centres, and to the dlstrlbutlon of potato seedllngs,the workerswere able to convlnce farmers rtth lrrlgated farm-steads to replace sugar cane by more profl t-maklng cash crops. In vlew of lmprovlng tradi tional i rri gation technlques,widespread tn the area, provlslons weremade for the recruiting of keeperswho were to see to it that vlllagers abtde by the newly laid down rules. Theseemployees are currently belngpaid by the villagers themselves.

3.3.25 Under the proJect extenslon workers vrere to be.|,500 ln charge of phyto-sanitarycontrol. Theywere to acqulre and distribute spraysand somepestlcldes. However,glven the dangerwhlch could havearisen out of the handlingof toxlc productsby villagers not famlllar with them, the project authorltles gave up the idea and the FumlgationDepartment of the MRDis notr in chargeof this operation.

3.3.26 The Agrlcultural Extensionteam inttiated measuresin the farms whtch were not explI c1tely provlded for i n the appraisa1 report. This I nvolved the i ntroductlon of frul t-trees such as pomegranate,ci trus frui t. vine and mango. Theyalso introducedstock farmlng as soonas it becameclear that water resourceswere insufficient for irrigating vast areas. Underthe project therefore, sheep,pigs and rabbits vrereraised and commercializedfor breedingpurposes and tn 1984,l3 sheep,120 pigs and325 rabbits were sold. 3.3.27 Fees are novlcharged for the dlstrtbutîon of agricu'ltural inputs (pigeonpea and potato seedlings,fertilizers and pesticides)as well as for fumugation. Proceedsare paid into a special accountopened at the Bankof CapeVerde and these fundsare nowused to supplyvillagers with agricultural inputs. At the end of the Assomadaproject, these funds amountedto CV E:c 3,456,2'14(i.e. US$5.|,000) not countingwhat the Abel Djarsi Cooperativeowe" andwhich amounts to CVEsc. 1,200,000 (i.e. US$I7,600).

0PEV/BS0/0t83M 17

(c) AmendnentsmadS te_the LoanAgreenerul 'loan 3.3. 28 Amendmentsmade to the agreementconcern two aspects:

(i) the deadli ne for fi rst di sbursement!{as postponed from 31112179(date on the initial agreement)to 3l/6/80 (amendmentof 713180);

(ii) the non-utilization of the entire loan, since in August I 985, the Government.|987,requested the terminati on of the proJectand in March the DeputyMinister of Finance, Governorof the ADBrequested the cancelling of the balance - i.e. FUA1.46 million (letter No. 162187of 25th March 1987).

3.3.29 Thedeadlinefor last disbursementdid not haveto be modified. It had beenfi xed at 3lst December1985 and the last disbursementtook place on l2th September1985. 3.4 Examinationof the Prolect Schedule

3.4.I Regardlng thi s sectlon, rather slgnificant schedule changeswere made. The date for the entry into effect of the project wasofficially fixed at 3l st March 1980 when condltions precedentto fi rst di sbursementwere satlsfied. Nevertheless,the proJectactually started only whenan important vorking capital tvasput at the dlsposalof the project authorities, maklngit posslblefor themto embarkon concretefleld work, in August1980. In actual fact, acti vi ti es started only after the rai ny season i n Novembert 980. 0perationsended officially In August 1985but PRODESAcontinued actjvities till the endof the ftrst quarterof 1986. Theproject thereforelasted for a llttle morethan five years.

3.4.2 Changesin the proJect schedulewere announced as from 1981by the ProJectManagement who ln their annualreport wrote in particular "( ) we are able to maintainthat whena proJect scheduleis drawnup without sufficient fundamentaldetails, the organresponslble for its implementationis boundto run into scheduleobstacles, that someof the origina'l recommendationswill be subject to changesand that the expenditureestimates wll'l not be corroborated in practice." Althoughpresented as a noveltyby the project authorities (not forgetting that this rlas CapeVerde's first rural developmentproject), this is a typical state of things for è projectof this nature (see para. 3.3..|). Moreover,i t must be pointed out, that the project authoriti es subsequentIi, regardedthe project as a pilot project, trying to adapt jt to circumstancei (rather than proposea reviewof the proJect'sobjectives anC schedule), 1c experienceacquired and to the findings of the fo11ow-upstudy carried out especiallyin the field of hydrology.

3.4.3 Theapprai sal report had I ai d downthe fol l owing schec.luie:

(i) the building programme(renovation and consiruction)ùccess road networkprogramme and rural water supply: 'iir^s';2 year::: ( i i ) preparing of land on s'lopesof beiween0 and 40'[; lCû hectaresper annum;

(iii) preparingof land on slopesof more than 40"1:260 hectares per annum;

OPEV/BSO/OI83M l8

(iv) building of gallerles for the col'lectionof underground water:5 years; (v) hydro-agrlculturaldevelopment I st year: l0 hectaresi2nd year: Z0 hectares; 3rd year: 30 hectares;4th year: 40 hectares;5th year: 50 hectares; Theother activities llke agriculturalextension, check dams, valley bottom checkdams were to be donethroughout the proJect'sduration. 3.4.4 At the tlmeof the 1983mld-term proJect revievl, less emphasiswas put'schedule. on certain obJectlvesand that ln turn influencedthe initial project Generallyspeaklng, all but one project activities weredelayed; the accessroad networkand the mechanlcsworkshop, were carried out in two years as p'lanned.Mentlon must also be madeof the appropriatenessof the !riorlty ilven to road communlcationand to equipmentmaintenance. Details retatlveto the scheduleare givenln appendlx2. 3.5 Analyslsof Reportsfrom CapeVerde 3.5.I The Cape Verdlan authorlti es fol Iowed to the I etter the recommendationsof.the loan agreementwhlch stipulated the handingin of a progressreport to the Bank every quarter. The first re.port covered the (the quarter ieriod April to June1980 and the last 24th) coveredthe lst of iggO. TireproJect authorltles sent flve annualreports io the BankGroup (the flrst for 1980and the last for 1984). Thesereports have been very valuable in the writing out of the presentcompletlon report. 3.5.2 owing to the unusualcircumstances surrounding the project's terminatTon,thé Borrowerdld not wrlte out a report on the final stagesof the proJectand there ls no annualreport for 1985. 3.6 Examlnatlonof Costs (a) Comparlsonbetween estlmated cost andactual cost

3.5.I The cost of the proJect had been estlmatedat CV Esc.295.35 milllon,l.e. FUA7.38 mllllon, iate current during the 3rd quarter of 1978. Fundingttas to be brokendown as follows: (i) The ADF loan 1rasto cover 507,of the foreign exchangeand 44.64'1" I ocal currencYcos ts ; (ii) the IFAD'loanwàs to cover 50%of the fcreign exchangeani 44.6415of the local currencycosts in accordancevlith the io ca'lI ed parl passusYstem;

3.6.2 It has not beenpossible to supplydetails on aciual expensesper component,for the following reasons: (i) the break downof expensesper componentwould have mealf the setting up of a cost accountingunit whichwould havp analyzed ôveralI costs i n particul ar, whereasthe project': accountingsystem was a simpleone.

(il) someexpenses defrayed by the CapeVerde Government were not ear-marked for the proiect. In particul ar, expenses relative to the emolumentsof civil servantsseconded to the project;

0PEV/BS0/0183M t9

(iil) someexpenses were not labelledin accordancewith whatthey trere meantfor. An order for cementcould have been used for several actl vi ti es under various components( proj ect headquartersand installtng trrigation pipes, for instance). 3.6.3 Nevertheless,the misslon which latd the groundworkfor the CompletlonReport had madean attempt to provide figures for the estimated cost andthose for the actualcost of variousparts of the proJect(see table 3.1 and3.2 belov).

Table 3.1 Estimated Cost of Project (according to asessmentreoort)

- in millions Esc. - - in FiJAmillion -Plan of Funding- Local Foreign Local Foreign IFAD Section Cufrencv Exchange Total Currencv Exchange lSltal ADF (l_L Govt.

A. Erôsion Control and Land Develooment 82.49 29.88 r 12.38 2.A6 0.75 2.8r 1.?94 1.?94 0.221

B. Co'llection and Dislribution C[-Hater for Irrioation 10.91 13.92 24.83 0.27 0.35 0.62 0.296'0.296 0.029

C. Infrastructure

tracks, fountains, food storage centres 4.80 0.67 5.tti8 0.12 0.02 0.t4 0.062 0.062 0.013

project headquarters 1.88 0.81 2.69 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.031 0.031 0.00s

0. Aqriclt.ltural Equipment. Vehicles. Runninq

phyto-sani tary materi al 0.r0 0.94 r .04 0.02 0.03 0.013 0.013 vehi cl es 0.12 2.30 2.42 0.06 0.06 0.030 0.030 agri cu'ltural i nput.s 0.99 5.62 6.62 0.02 0.r4 0.17 0.0810.081 0.003 running 10.35 12.65 23.00 g.26 a.3z 0.58 0.274 0.274 0.028

E. Local staff 22.45 ?2.45 0.s6 0.56 0.251 0.251 0.0rt0

F. Technical Assistance 3.31 6.49 9.79 0.08 0. 16 0.24 0. I r8 0. r l8 fi-._it:.i

Total base costs 137.41 73.28 210.69 3.44 1.83 5.Zl 2.450 2.450 u.::j 'r0 Contingenèies ( l52) 20.6r .99 3l .60 0.52 0.27 0.790 0.367 0. 367 rJ.un-:i Finan. Conting. (77.per year) 34.8r 18.25 53.06 0.87 0.46 1.327 0.6r7 L.617. 0.093 TOTAL r92.83 r02.52 295.35 4,82 2.56 7.385 3.434 3.434 0.517

(l) The sumof the IFAOloan amountsto USg3,820.00

OPEV/BSO/OI83M 20

Tab'le3.2

Cost Estimate of ImolementedProiect

in thousandsof FUAs Section IFAD IFAD A0F Government Total Percentaoe./ paynents (esti- payments (estimates) estimates in thou- mates i ncl uding sandsof cont'i ngen- us$ ci es

A. Erosion Contro'l and Land 0evelooment 1430.88 r488.55 lrE8.55 99.91 3077.01 78.)2

B. Collection and 0istribution of l{ater for Irrigation 201.51 209.63 209.63 9.36 4?,8.63 49.33 c.Infrastructure 40.s9 42.23 42.23 267.6r 352.07 123.01

0. Ag!"icultural EquiPment. Vehicles. Running rs0.40 156.46 r56.46 28.20 34r. r2 29.4?

E. Local staff 111.27 115.75 rr 5.75 2r.53 2s3.03 32.r6

F. Technical Assistance 68.s9 71.36 7r.36 r42.72 41.58

Total 2003.24 2083.98 2083.98 426.61 4594.57 62.22

0PEV/BS0/0183M 2r

3.6.4 l.lith reference to the estlmated cost I n FUA, i t appears that operatlonscarrled out amountedto only 60.77"of the original cost. This percentagewould still be lower if estimatesare madein US dollars, âS betweenl978,tlme of the appralsaland 1985,tlme of the final payments,the dollar had beenrevalued by nore than 20I. As a consequence,the IFADpaid only 52.41of its 3.82mlllion loan. Thedifference arlses out of the fact that no part of the proJectwas carrled throughboth ln termsof quality and slze as comparedto the orlglnal ldea. It ls thereforedifficult to evaluate posslbleover-run of unlt costs as a lot of the operationsunderwent formal changes(new but'ldTngs lnstead of repalrs, dlscardlngof banks,replaced by contour-lI ne hedgesetc) . l,,loreover,there are no accounting factors for thi s sort of exercise.

3.5.5 The only ltem rhtch recordeda cost overrunis that concerning technlcal asslstance; the assessmentreport had plans for FUA 340,000, Includtngcontlngencies; even thoughfor servlcesrepresenting in volume, practlcally 516of provlsions,the ltems absorbedonly aboutFUA 155,000 of the proJect'sbudget. 3.7 Revlewof-the ExEendltureSchedule per Component 3.7.1 The appralsalreport and the loan agreementhad plannedthat the proJectwould begln durtng the courseof 1979. It ls on that basis that the followlngplan andfundtng schedule was lald down. Table3.3

THEORIqTNAL FUNDING PLAN AND SCHEDULE (tn FUAthousands) Yearl Year2 Ygrr3 Yeaf4 Year5 Total

ADF 756 594 659 684 741 3.434 I FAD 756 594 659 684 741 3.434 Government r53 76 90 88 lr0 _ 517 Total I .565 | .264 I .408 I .456 I .592 7.385 T 23 t7 19 20 21 r00

3.7.2 As shownabove, the proJect actually started ln the secondhalf of 1980once the workingcapltal yas madeavallable and once the first equipmeni orderedhad arrived. Up to March1981, the ADFwas the only external fund'ing source. The IFADstarted its operationsonly in Mayl98l by reimbursing5,li; of the sumswhich had beenpaid by the ADFthen by sendingfunds directly tc the project or its supplierson the basis of the parl-passuprinciple (507.for' the ADFand 50%for the IFAD). It is on these lines that the actual funding plan and schedulebelotv y/ere estlmated.

0PEV/BS0/0183M 22

. Table3.4 Actual and Plan FinanclngSchedule (ln FUAmllllons)

I 989-81 I 982 I 983 r984 r985 TotaI

ADF 610 419 388 486 r8l 2,084 I FAD 529 500 388 486 t8l 2,084 Government 165 _u. JA 5l _58 427 1.304 998 850 1.033 44 4.595 tr/ActualCost 28 22 l9 22 9 100 t/EstlmatedCost 17 t4 l4 l4 6 62

3.7.3 Therhythm of paymentsHas at least 40trless than expectedanci this ls not unusualfor a rural developmentproJect and it would have taken at least three years to use up the funds avallable. He mustpoint out here that other than delays In payment,due to the adminlstratlvemachinery that pay-out requests go through, the IFAD suspendedlts paymentsfor someweeks early 1982, ln the wakeof CapeVerde's delay ln paylng her service commlss'ionon the IFAOloan, thoughthls delay dld not have any serious influence on the proJect.

3.8 Assessmentof Consultants and SupplI ers' Servlces 3.8.I Technlcal asslstance took the form of an independentconsultant recruited Tn Portugal for languagereasons. Hts orlgtnal proflle (agronomic research) meantthat belng ln charge of a proJect was not going to be a very easy task since administrative and organlzatlonal matters tend to over-ride technlcal matters. I'doreso,he had I lttle experiencein hydro-geologyand in eroslon control. Nevertheless,he turned out to be professionally-mindedand was able to supervlsethe proJect executlve staff wlthout any difficulty, the latter worked hand-ln-handwlth hlm, co-slgnlng the annual and quarterly reports. The proJects take-off was not wlthout hltches, since as early as 1980and for famlly and health reasons, the proJect Managerhad asked to stay I n Portuga'l going out to Cape Verde for only two months per year. Odd'ly enough, thjs request yras granted by the Mlnlster of Rural Developmentbut reJectedby the ADFwhlch suggestedthe nomlnatlonof a CapeVerde national as proJect Manager. In December1980, a telex from CapeVerde made it knownthaf the Managerwas gotng to stay out there permanently.

3.8.2 Numeroussuppl i ers, CapeVerdi ans and forelgners, vrerei nvolved i i providing supplles and equlpment. Supply deadllnes were relatively lolo becausefew boats called at the ports, but more so becauseof internal Cape Verdian problems(duty free clearanceprocedures) or of problemsrelating to the re'leaseof funds by donors (dlspatch of goodson documentarycredit or after an advancedeposit).

3.9 Examinationof the BankGroup's Supervision

3.9.1 TheADBGroup's participation in the project wastwo-fold:

(i) on its own behalf, to control and follow-up the use of the loan grantedon ADFfunds;

oPEV/BS0/0183M 23

(il) on behalf of the IFAD,a funding partner, to control and follow-upthe useof the loan grantedby the organ.

3.9.2 The ADBGroup followed the project partlcularly c'loselyas thl s vas the Group'sfirst proJect in CaPeVerde,the table belowis explicite. Table3.5 RecelltulatlveTable of ADFand IFAD Supporttng Mlssions February,1979 Follow-up*mlsston by the LoanOfficer August/September,I 979 Follow-upmisslon by the LoanOfficer September,1980 Supervislon mlsslon March,I 982 Supervlslon mlsslon June,I 982 Follor-upmlsslon by the LoanOfficer November,I 982 ADF/IFADfol lor-up mlsslon January/February,I 983 ADF/IFADmld-progress assessment mission January,I 984 Supervislon mlsslon November,1984 ADF/IFADsupervl slon misslon r Follow-upmissions are not of a technlcalnature, usually they representa generalreview of proJectsfunded by the ADBGroup tn the countryconcerned. Theabove table showsthat apart from 1981,the proJectwas closely monitored In the field by the ADBGroup.

3.9.3 At a central level, the volumeof correspondencerelative to the proJect-the also shoys that the proJect ttas regularly and attentlvely supervised by Bank staff; a survey carried out on a representative sample of unamblguousquestlons lllustrates that the ADBreply-deadline ttas as a rule less than six weeks:thts mayhave seemedlong to the ExecutingAgency faced ytth on-the-field realltles, but ls ln fact hard to avold given the internal structure of an Instltutlon like the ADB. Moreover,lt must be underscored that an alleviatlve meanshad beenfound to cover local expenses,since the Bank of Cape Verde met all flnanclal needs ln the forn of advanceson a current account.

3.9.4 In terms of the relatlonship between the donors and the implementationagency, lt gradually turned sour as of 1983 and broke down completelyin August1985. Oneof the reasonsbeing that the officials in charge of implementingthe proJect vrereof the opinion that the appraissl report should have been the back-bonefor implementationand that they wer'j not to be blamedfor not adaptingto the context and reality of the project, especial Iy as context and real i ty ran counter to the very foundation of solie componentsof the project (irrigation of plantations and anti-erosion campaign). Mid-ProgressApprai sa'l (January-February.Ï983)

3.9.5 The mid-progress appraisal (January-February, I 983) made i t possible to take a close look at the remarksand conclusionsarrived ac. following two years of work to implementthe project. The original aims vvere significantly revised (see Appendix2>. Regardingsoi I conservation,the memorandumwhich endorsedthis mid-progressappraisal, advocateda changeof strategy founded on closer collaboration between the PRODESA,the FA0-ReafforestationproJect and the UNDP-SCR(Soil Conservation& Restoration) proJect expert. This strategy meantresorting to nevrcrops:

0Ptv/BS0/0r83M 24

(i) on slopes of morethan 401: settlng up of terraces (for lrrlgatlon) or of lon walls (ln the non-lrrigatedzones) and plantlngstsal, aloesand food crops elseyhere. However,this dld not meandlsregardlng previous actlvltles (distributing the plgeonpe.a), improvlng gullies by appropriateworks and plants and building damsln the mainbeds.

3.9.6 Thls merprandumal so recomendedthe strengthening of the soclo-economicaland technlcalmeans of survey(mapplng, rainfall measuring, aerlel photos,surveys, soll analysls). As to agrlcultural extension,the memorandumrecommended the supervlslon of the extenslon workers by an englneer,as well as the selllngon credlt of agrlculturalinputs (instead of glvlng them awayfree of chargeas Inltlally suggestedin the appraisal report). This latter advlceonly conflrmedthe arrangementsa'lready made to the effect, by the PRODESA. 3.9.7 If the flndtngsof this mlsslonuere In generalwell acceptedby the CapeVerdian slde, the PRODESAofflclals vJere,to say the least, surprised by the i mpertlnence of some remarks about them which appeared i n the mld-progresstechnlcal appralsalreport, drafted by the trro IFADconsultants rho had taken part I n the January-FebruaryI 983 mlsslon ( I etter by the l.{lnl ster of Rural Developmentdated 8th February1984) . Onemust pin-poi nt the fact that the report had been addressedto the Cape Verdian porers-that-be,because the IFADwtll not havett otherwlse,inspite of the Bank'sreservatlons.

ADF/IFADMlsslon of Supervlslon- November1984

3.9.8 The mlssfon of supervlsionsent out ln November1984 reached Cape Verde someweeks after the September1984 tornadoeswhtch parttally damaged several anti-eroslve and land preparatlonoperatlons. The project authorities had started repairs. The supervlsorymlsslon suggestedthat repairs were to be suspendeduntl'l llght had beenshed on the actual,cost per operation and on the funds to be earmarkedfor repalrs per operatlon. The mission in fact realized that the PRODESAaccounting system did not makeanalysing the cost per operation posslble. The mlsslonfound out however,that there wereother documentskept by the technlcal departmentsof the PR0DESA,indicating for each operatlon carrled out, the exact quantltles used (manpower,material); these documentscould be used to calculate estlmatedcosts and that they had beenprepared ln collaboratlonwith the ILO.

3.9.9 The memorandumsigned at the term of the mlssion recommendedtne putting off of paymentsrelative to componentA (Eroslon Control) and a- (Facilities) for whtchdisbursements had almostcovered what was.l983earmarKed ûn the nevllist of goodsand servicesrevised on 7th February during the mid-progressappraisal report. Account must be taken of the fact thai contingencies(human and financial had beenput under the sameitem (categor-v 7) for an overall cost of FUA2.\ million: that is to say, 307.of tne estimatedcost of the project. At the time of the MlddleStage appraisal, ii would have been normal to allocate, at least in part, this amountto t-\e variouscomponents of the project, but the uncertaintywhlch then prevaileda" to the availability of water resourcesmade it impossibleto apportionwi l-1 accuracythe remaini ng I tems.

3.9.10 Another bone of contentlonwas the use of check damswithout the help of the protectionof plants with ftrm roots on the up-river basins.

0PEV/BS0/0r83M 25

3.9..11 Althoughthe ProJectManager signed the memorandumpersonally, at the endof the miision, a few dayslater ln a letter dated20th November1984, he offered to makesome changes because according to hlm, the report contained misleadinginformatlon which-would put the proJectln Jeopardy-He undertook besldes,io give moredetatled informatlonon the unlt cost of operations admtttingthat the problemhad not arlsenbefore then. 3.9.12 Neither the IFADnor the Bankhad respondedto these misgivings, i i nce i n agreementwl th the IFAD,the Bankhad sent a I etter dated 8th ltlay iggS, stating that it rlasgoing to suspendal! paymentsbecause none of the twenûy-onerÀcommendations implicitely mentionedIn the memorandumof November l9g4 had beenput 'payments lnto practlce. A telex of 23rd_Ma{ confirmedthat the suspensionof concernedCategorles I (Sectlon A: Anti-erosion Cimbaignl;II

3.t0.1 The preltmlnary condltlons to be rnet at the time of the first disbursementwai the Governmentscommltment to pay its due. Even if it is diffi cult to come by the precise amountof Cape Verde's dues ( specifi c spendingplus salarfes of secondedclvll servants), without doubt, the Gôvernmént'patda large part of what lras due. After the suspensionof paymentsby'the ADFand the IFAD, all btlls were honouredby the Governmeit ilnicn funded almost al I damagedoperations and which carri ed through tne constructionof the Btca gallery and the undergrounddam at Volta de Ouro. 3.10.1 By way of condltlons, the Borrowershould have: ( i ) protected the ho'ldi ng ri ghts of farmers. The Land Reform bitt which rrasadopted ln March1982 asserted the right of farmers to own land. Inoccupiedland 11asconfiscated by the State and granted to farmers under usufruct contraci. Posslble allôcations and disputes r,reresettled by the lanrl reform commissjons,set up on the initiative of the farmers, especlally in lrrigated zones. At the sametime, steps haci beentakeh to updatethe land registry. The expropriationof 20 hectaresof'land belongingto somePortuguese who had gone back to Portugal for good, lras only settled in part (half of oPtv/Bso/0r83M 26

the area) becauseit rvas lmposslbleto identify al I the Joi nt-owners;

(ii) takgn steps to wipe out sugar-cane;ln fact, thls policy vras trlbutary to the increaseand nastering of water resou-rces, the only posslble way to replace sugarcane by fodder crops, which needmore_ water. The poor results obtained following attempts to collect water from nev,sources did not a'llow foi the_ total wlping-out of the sugar-cane (grown alrnost exclustvelyfor the manufactureof a local alcoholic drink knownas "grogue");

fiit) regulated the movementof cattle (measureimplemented);

(iv) regulated annual crops on slopes of rnore than 4OL. As a result of very heavyland pressure,this step demandedland compensatlonwhlch yas glven by degrees as the land wùs developed;thls measurerlas carrled only ha'lf way through; (v) have had separate accountsopened for the ADFand the I FAD loans; thts ls one area In whlch shortcomingswere laid bare, In so far as the PRODESAaccounting system rras à slmpleone andscrutlntztng expenses was impossible.

(vi) pald-up thelr due the appralsal report had arrived at an estlmate of ltr of the proJect's total cost as CapeVerde,s contrlbutlon. In fact her contrlbutlonvras more:9.57. of the proJect's actual cost, perhapsmore if one takes into accountltems whtchwere not in the proJect budget (salaries of secondedcivl I servants). I'loreso, the Governmentkept paytngtill late 1985and early 1986,so as to keepproject actlvltles golng, evenafter havlngnotified donorsof the offlclal terminatlonof the proJect;

(vil) at Mlnlsterlal level, shouldhave strengthened the divislon in charge of maintenanceof vehlcles and equipments;in connectlon wtth other proJects, the main workshop was expanded;

(vii | ) securedthe collaboratlon of the Mlnistry of Public Norks for sometasks that neededspeclallzed material. Maybethu assoclatlon vlas not as c'lose as the assessorswould have wished,but someequlpment was put at the project's disposai (pumps, boring equipment etc) ; (ix) I aunched I n priorl ty, hydro-geologtca'l surveys i n the proJect area; thts is one commitmentwhich came through rather late: hydro-geologicalsurveys were availableon)y at the endof 1983;

(x) taken the necessarysteps to go on levying water rates arc to distribute newly developpedland; the low level ,lî reali zation of thi s I and developmentcomponent, rendere,j this commitmentvoid since only a small portion of land was distributed. As to water rates, there wereno major changes comparedto the prevlousstate of things.

OPEV/BSO/OI83M 27

4. INSTITUTIONALASPECTS 4.1 Examlnirtlonof the LegalContext.Organlzatlon. PersonnelTrêlning and Progress PRODESA

4.1.1 The frameworkset up to managethe proJect cameto be knownby the termPRQDESA. It wasimprovized as a decentrallzeddepartment of the Min'istry of RuralDevelopment, financlal'ly se'lf-sufflclent and vas set up in June1979 (see parà. 3..|.5). Its structure remainedvery smooth-runnlngand_ well adaptedto obJectives. Underthe supervlslonof the ProJectManager, PRODESA rdasmade up of three departments: i:;':iîiji:::';l'J;l'l.fHi"llln iiT'l#'"l3ll"'iffi::lil: systems,the road progrànme,buildlng, as welI as col lectlng waterfor lrrigation;

the department of agrlcul tural extenslon responsi bl e for reafforestatlon, soll protectlon, farmlng, plant production, soiI animal productlon, experimentation,organization and , tral nlng; the admlnlstrativeand flnanclal department.

4.1.2 Permanentstaff uorklng for the proJect went gradually from 32 persons (1983) to 46 (1984) and the numberwent down as from mld-1985. itROOfSAfound it hard to bulld up a homogenousand efficlent team of agrlcultural extension workers. Insplte of an Intense recruitment campaign làunchedln 1980 and 1981, the teamrras completedonly two years after the start of the proJect, maln'ly by expatrlates who had worked i n Ango'la or i n Guinea Bl ssau. 4. I .3 On-the-Job tral nl ng tras conductedfor second grade staff. The 3 top level personnelof PRODESAwent abroadon 2 to 3 monthtraining coursesin I 982( see para. 3.3.I 9). 4.2 Audltl ng

4.2.1 Auditing was carrled out by the Bank of Cape Verde which wenf through the PRODESAaccounts once a year, squaring up i ts bank accounts According'to the audlt reports and accordingto the principles generall; accepted in the matter of accounting, the PRODESAaccounts mirrors tria financlal situation of the organ. 4.3 MoniLoringand-Appraisal

4.3.1 The appraisal report had plannedthat the follow-up and appraisa) (GEP) actlvlties wouldbe entrustedto the Office of Research.|982,and Planning of the Ministry of Rural Development.In November the IFAD assigneda consultantto CapeVerde with a view to helping local authorities as well às project authorities set up without delay a central unit for the fol1ow-upand appraisal of rural developmentprojects under the GEPand a unit for the follow-up and appraisal of the Assomadaproject.

OPEV/BSO/0183M 28

4.3.2 This mlssioncame to the concluslonthat the project authorities wereto be entrustedwlth the follow-upof operatlonsof the vartoussections o! tfe proJectand that the GEP-wasto proceedwtth perlodtcappratsal r.poits of t-he PfoJect's status, I t al so recornnendedthat another udtt responiibl e speclftcallyf9l fol_lorlngqnd writlng out actlvlty reports be set up unà"t the proJect. Identlfyingpolnters which would have facilltated the collecting of appropriatedata showlngthe progressof the varloussections could not be carrledout. Noworklng plan to the effect wasformulated,

4.3.3 This shortcomlngwa! alleviatedln part, by the periodlcreports on the proJect's management,whi ch supplI ed someI nformatlonon the various c9qp9ne1tg.However, these reports dld not contalnany genuineanalysis of dtfflcultles met nor of recommendatlonsand henceno solutions côuld be i maglned.

4.3.4 For its part, In 1984,the GEPalded by the Offlce of RuralSurveys carried out a surveyamong the farmersof the proJect area, with a view io obtalnlngtheir opinlonson the variousoperatlons and to measurethe impact the latter couldhave had on the reciplents. Thls surveylras also to enable thesereclpients suggest posslble changes or modlflcatlonsto be madeto sorne components. 4.3.5 Thefindings of thls surveyrere unfortunatelynot analysedor used by_the project's authorltles. However,they containedsome interesting Informatlon:as for lnstance,the fact that vlllagers yere in favour of the constructlonof small walls the length of the water course,rather than any other measureagainst floodtng. Onecould also readabout the villagers poinl of vlew concerningagrlcultural extensionwork and on the terms of water dlstributlonfor irrigatlon purposes. 4.3.6 This illustrates that at the tlme, the proJect authorities Here doubtless not ful ly aware of the Interest whlch a fol 1ow-up/evaluation programmewell carried out could arouse as a managlngimplement. One must conslder that the lack of sklI led personnel In the field of progressl appralsal not only at the level of the RDMlnistry but at the level of the project ltself, was an lmmenseobstacle ln the carrylng out of such a programmeand ls a factor which cannot be overlooked. Slnce then, several CapeVerdlan officlals have reapedthe profit of the AMTAtraining course in the fleld of progressappralsal. Consequently,there nowexists a technical capactty ln the field, whlch future rural developmentprojects could makeuse of.

OPEV/BSO/OI83M 29

5. ECONOMICSTUDY 5.1 Examlnatlonof the Resultsof the Prqlect (a) BasicData and Impact Evaluatien Indlcators 5.1.1 Duringthe preparatoryphase of the proJect, statlstlcal data on CapeVerde in generaland on the proJectarea ln particularwere ltmited. For lack of a basic socio-economlcstudy whlch would have broadened all knowledge on the rural populatlonsltuation in the proJectarea, putting forward any comparativefigures of the situation before and after the proJect seems laborlous. 5.1.2 Moreover,as lndlcatedin components4.3 above,since no efficient progressappralsal of the proJectwas inltlated, lnformatlonr_elating to the indicatorsof performanceof the varioussections were ferl andfar betweenand sometlmescontradi ctory. Horever, I nformatlon I n the acti vl ty reports, drafted by the proJectauthorltles, as well as lnformatlonptcked -up by the mission,make 1t posslble to give someIndlcatlons as to the effects and impactattributable to the proJect. (b) PartlclpÈtlon of Reclplents s.r.3 It is htghly probable that someerrors ln the original conception of the project croppedup becauseof the lack of soclo-economicstudy at the ground-workstage of the proJect. Throughthls study somemisunderstanding èoncernlngthe needs and expectatlons of the target group could have been avoidedand the target group could have taken moreactlve part in the proposed operatlons and goa'ls 5.r.4 Furthermore,durlng the implementatlonphase of the proJect, there was no regular consultation betweenthe loca'l authorities (adminlstration and PAICV)who had played so cardlnal a role In someoperations (making the populatlonaware and partlctpating in the cholceof manpower)and this lack of offtclal heads together meant that when the proJect took off there tlas some retlcence on the part of the target groupvis-a-vis somemeasures the project wasofferlng in particular, the reluctanceof farmersto reducethe maize-bean crops and to restrict the movementsof cattle which causedserious damageto crops. Hoyever,the impactof agricultural extensionactivities, as well as the results of someactivlties, pigeonpea), graduallychanged their attitudes. (c) Effect on Outout and Impacton Income

5.1.5 Twopreliminary remarks must be madein thls connection: (t) land to be lrrigated had to be decreased,consldering the capacttiesof undergroundwater actually available. Hence, insteadof the 150 hectaresplanned for, only 32 hectares were sufficiently irrigated and 22 hectares were partl;t i rri gated. Consequently,i t seemsunreal i sti c to compaie results arrived at in termsof output and income,with the original goals set to the effect.

0PEV/BS0/0183M 30

(ii) secondly,emphasis must be madeon the fact that under'land, the proJect, attention-waspatd mostly to irrtgated throughagricultural extenslonwork in particular. As a result, tvo demonstratlonfields for trrigated crops lvere set up althoughnone !,as set up for dry farmlng. 5.].6 Regardingthe latter,375 ha (downfrom the 830 ha target), hrere cultlvatedfollowing the contour-linesand soynwlth plgeonpea, ihterlarded uith the maize-beancomblnatlon and 1,130ha (downfrom the 1,300ha target) trereturned into one contlnuousseed-bed of plgeonpea. Inspite of the fact that the initlal goalswere not reached,there ls no doubtthat the villagers graduallyreal lzed that the growingof the pigeonpea could be to their advantage. Undisputedly, proceedsfrom thl s product comparedto other speculatlonsgalvanized farmers into adoptlngthls crop. 5.1.7 Project managementestimated the output of the pigeonpea in the proJectarea, at some360 tons which meansabout 701 of the original goal set. Onecan conslderthls result as relatively satisfyingin so far as ihe plgeonpea is a novelty,unknown to farmersln the areaprlor to the project's lmplementation.During the mlssions stay In the area, there was a great demandfor pigeonpea seedllngsand that provesthe posltTvelmpact of this cropon the farmers' i ncomes.

5.r.8 As far as lrrlgated crops are concerned,the project management estlmate food surpluses obtained, thanks to cash crops grown on lrrTgated land, at about 800 tons per annumand the addttlonal incomeat 25.2 million USF,that ls about0.3 million US dollars. Thls stemsfrom the averageprice level of cash crops whlch ls aboutCV Esc. 30 per kllo. Themtssion noticed that the retall price of potatoes, sweet potatoes and other vegetab'lesin the Assomadamarket _vary betweenCV Esc. 35 and 50 whlch, given the margin deductedby mlddlemen,conflrms the global lncomeestlmated by the projèct authorlti es,

5.r.9 In terms of Incomes,lf one comparesthls flgure of 0.3 million dollars to the estimatedlncone at the ttme of appralsal(1.4 million dollars) not forgettlng that newly trrigated areas coveredonly about 20 to 25%of what was planned,one can reckon that the actual incomeper irrigated hectare is not far from the initial estimates. This has nothing to do with a goodoutput estlnateper hectarebut to a high increaseIn the retail price. Indeed,the appraisal report had plannedon an overall output of 6,680 tons from the intended150 ha of irrigated land that is, about44 tons/hectarewhereas, the current output is about 20 tons/ha. It appearsthat the output estimates pur forward at the time of appraisal vlere rather optimistic, considering thg farmers'lack of experienceon crop variegation.

5.r . t0 In practice, variegationmeant replacing the sugarcane monoculture by cash crops, a positive Tnfluencebrought about by the project. The show fields playeda limited thoughpositive role in the introductionof newcrops and agricul tura'l techniques for the i rri gated I and. Although the rate of adoptlonwas not calculatedin any regulatedwày, it is estimatedthat about 307"benefitted from irrigation, i.e. 60 to 65 villagers, chiefly those wht'r vlerein touchwith the agricultura'lextension workers and the'ir activities. a. rather wide rangeof cash crops (cabbage,sweet pepper, courgette, potatoes, onionsetc) replacedthe mainpre-project crops ltke cassava,sweet potatoes, andmore so, sugarcane, on the same32 ha of well irrigated land.

oPEV/BS0/0183M 3l

5.l.ll It is to be fearedhowever, that followlngthe terminationof the proJect,and since there are muchless fertlllzers and seedlingsavailab'le, the posltlve results arrlved at in termsof varlegatlonwill gradually be compromlsed. (d) BeneficlargGroup 5.1.12 Accordingto the Report,1,500famllles were to benefit from irrigation. Sincematerial obJectives were reduced, this meantthat only 235 famtllesactually benefitted from irrigation. 5.I . I 3 Otherwise, advantageshave been more general, ùl though project actlvlttes werecentred malnly on irrigatedcrops. It is however,dlfficult to calculatethe numberof farmsor famllles In the dampzones, who adopted the ptgeonpea and who reaped the benefitswhlch the p'lantrepresents.

(e) Social Jmpgct 5.1.14 As far as employmentgoes, there ls no doubt that the project's impact ln the area vrasvery great, thoughshort-llved. During the project's lmplementation,one thousandpersons were regularly employedespecially for the faclllties programmes;at peakperiods, the flgure doubled. From1982 to I 985 for i nstance, the AssomadaproJect yras supposedto be the bi ggest employer of the I s1 and of Santiago. The I ocal populatl on and pol i ti cal offlcia'ls lookedon the proJect chiefly as a provlder of dlrect incomefor the rnanpouertt hired. It was therefore conslderedas a short-term solution to unemploymentrather than a solution to the reglon's intrinslc development problems .

5.1.15 As far as improvlng1 lfe styles ls concerned,the rural water supply programme(20 taps) had a very posltlve lnfluence on the population of the area as a whole and the amountof water available for humanand animal consumptlonis nowconsidered as satisfactory.

(f ) Insti tutloml Impact

5.1.16 The influence here yras very posltlve as the following factors i I I ustrate: ( i ) the department of agrlcul tural extenslon set up by the project has servedas a modelfor all agrlcultural extension workdone since then, at national level; (ii) locally, the regional office of the MRDin the region of Concelho of Santa Catarina came i nto existence thanks to project faci I ities andpersonnel;

(iii) the experiencehad throughthe Assomadaproject servesas a reference to a1I developmentacti vi ti es undertakenby the Ministry of Rura'lDevelopment throughout the country;

(iv) officials whomanaged the project are novrin key posts at n central or regional level, thanks to the experience the;' acqui red .

OPEV/BSO/OI83M 32

(g) Ro'leof l{omen

5.1.17 Thespeclflc role of womenIn the lmplementatlonof the proJectv{as given llttle attentlonnot only during !h. preparatoryphase but alsô during implementatlonproper. However,they makeup almost50L of the breadwinners in the area and run the farms they own. Besides,more than 601-of labourers hired for building, for anti-erosionoperatlons or for tillage are wonen. Evenwhen the headof the famlly is a man,the womandevotes tierself to the growlngof cropsfor homeconsumption and she dlsposesof surp'lusesin the market.

5.I . l8 However,the proJect contributed largely to the improvementof wagesfor femini ne I abour. l,lomen's ]rages whl ch orl glnal ly represented75L of men'sxages for the sametasks, changedprogressively to reach,at the end of the proJect95f, of that of the men. (h) Impacton Environment 5.I . I 9 The 8l5 hectares of reafforested I and (under the FAOproj ect lmplemented,by PROOESA), the 375 hectaresof qulck-sethedge bedq" the l,t:O hectaresof one contlnuousbed of pigeonpea as well as the buildfngof 2,167 checkdams have all hada very positive impacton the generalconditions of the envlronmentand on erosloncontrol. Unfortunately,there are no series of hydrologlcaldata old enoughto determinethe effect of theseactivities on the wlplng out of flood waves and on the lmprovmentof the level of undergroundwater Tn the slopesof Engenhosand of BoaEntrada.

OPEV/BSO/OI83M 33

5. CoNCLUSIoNS

6.1 Analyslsof Resu'l-tsas Comparedwlth Set Goals

6.'l.l Theperformances of the project in termsof an increasein output, incomeand the numberof beneficiaries, have fallen well short of what vras expectedin the appraisal report. Ihere was an additional 800 tons per year of food crops instead of the intended 6,800 tons. The overall additional incomewas around 0.3 million dollars/yearinstead of the expected1.4 million and there are about 235 families to benefit from the irrigation programme instead of the expected1,600. However,ln thls particular case of the Assomadaproject, it seemsunrealistic to comparethe results arrived at with the lnltlal objectiveswhlch were based on supposltlonswhich turned out to be completelyfalse. Consequently,the original ideas haveproved themselves too ambltlous1n relation to the actual potentlallties of the project area and couldtherefore not be a realistic target. 6.1.2 Nevertheless,the project showedposlttve results in its erosion control In the project area. The planting of quick-set hedgesfollowing contour-lI nes, the di ssemlnation of the pl geon pea and other deep-rooted species, the buidling of check dams, damsand protective walls on plots exposedto floods and the reafforestatlon moves,all havea definite positive impacton the ecosystemof the project area. 6.r.3 Furthermore,even if the amountof lrrlgated land fell short of expectatlons,the project madeit possible to lmproveon irrigation techniques and to convincefarmers to give up the sugar canemonoculture for the benefit of a wider vari ety of cash crops. 0n the social pl ane, the rural water supply,easler communicationbetween villages thanksto the newroads, are all factors which represent long term achievementsfor the villagers of the area. To boot, one thousandpersons, the maJority belng vomenhad a relat'ively well-pald job over the five-year period. Although job offers vlere not forthcomlngwith the proJect's termination, one must hopethat at least some of these wage-earnerswere able to i nvest part of their wages i n iami1y farmsteads.

6.1.4 Even ïf these results seem modest as comparedto the amount invested(around FUA 4.6 million), the AssomadaproJect wi'11 nevertheless have been a very beneficial experienceTn the field of rural and agricultural development.Indeed, thanks to thjs operationconceived as a pi lot project, ( i ) the managing team has acquired experience and competenca which may be used i n other activi ti es I i nked with rural deveI opment; ( i i ) agricul tural extensionvork practical ly unheardof i n Cape Verde before the project I s norl commonal I over the countr^_rr andthe systemset up in Assomadais a referencemodel;

(iii) the anti-erosion strategy and techniques have made considerableprogress and some alternatives initial iy proposedhave si nce beenexcl uded (becauseof thejr cosr) in preferencefor actual experience;

0PEV/BS0/0r83M -34

(iv) as to the collecting of undergroundwater, novel techniques uere put to the test and - successfully adopted and rnay certainly be usedin other regions of the country. 6.2 Lessonsto be Learntfrom the proJect

6.2.1 In spite of the achievements and results of the i ntegrated agricultural developmentproject, it highltghtedshort comings-Verdewhich must oe borne ln mind v4henimplementing other proJects In Cape and even elsewhere,in fields whichinterest the ADBGroup.

6.2.2 Preparlng the proJect set off Inadequacleswhich called i nto questlon its economy. Indeed, one may wonder why a proJect with such a hydro-agrlcul tural developmnt cali bre could be I aunched before rel i abl e hydrologfcalsurveys are carried out. Onecan only deplore the fact that the suppositionson which the estimates for irrtgable land tlere based, yrere fallaclous. tven if we grant that the orTglnal plan of a proJectmust be able to adapt to the actualities of the field, (see para.3.3.t) which are not alwaysobvious at the time of the project's conceptlonno matter howthorough, it is lmperativeto makeallowances for errors In the maln componentsbecause the proJect'ssurvival dependson them.

6.2.3 The groundworkrvas insufficlent wlth regards to socio-economic research:the classification of farms, the yearnlngsand expectationsof head farmers, as well as the obstacles met yrere all not adequatetygrasped to ensure the consolidationof the various coursesof agrlcultural development advocated. This is all the more lndlspensableIn CapeVerde, where know'ledge of the habitat is extremelylimited. A soclologlst shouldparticipate in the preparatory/appraisalphase of a project of thls nature.

6.2.4 The estimateof costs was also unsatlsfactory. The expenditure tab'lesof the appraisal report were not detalled enough(costs were given per componentor per major sub-component)to allotr for a strict control of funds and thelr partitlon amongthe components(ADF) or categories(IFAD). This led to mlsunderstandingand differences of lnterpretatlon betweenborrower and donors.

6.2.5 0n an i nsti tutional scale, the framework set up showed some capacity to adapt to reali ti es which were qutte dlfferent from the basic suppositions. Anyhow,this sort of situation ls quite commonif on'lybecause the context alters as years go by (the completecycle of a rural developmei'rt project from the identification phaseto the end, spansoften over morethan cr. decade). It is imperativetherefore to haveaccess almost permanentiy to sone survey; fol low-up or appraisa'l which may help make the accommodationsa;'rd directions necessaryto optimize the committedresources, possible. Tne project's impiementationunit rrlastoo busy wlth the day-to-dayrunning of the project to carry out this kind of duties.

6.2.6 The implemeniationproper also high'lightedshortcomings from which Iessonsmust be learnt:

(i) inadequateliaison betweenthe proJectand other national and regional organs involved in development.In CapeVerde, local and party organs(PAICV) play a major role in railying the masses,therefore their adherenceand partici pation i n

OPEV/BSO/0183M 35

extension operations i s a concomltant to the success of efforts undertaken. The proJect author'lties would irarrebeen better off had they worked ln concert with the local and party organs, througha consultatlvecommlttee, for instance- ( systematica1 ly resorti ng to i i ) PR0OESAml sused i ts efforts by 'the work on force account. No doubt, implementingsome of anti-erosive operations (dams, protective dykes) vi 1i age pumps and part of the road programmecoul d have bsen entrustedto CapeVerdian flrms, follorlng a local shopping. The operations schedulecould have been speededup, PR00ESA could have had practical premlsesbefore 1984and could have devoted i tseI f more to pl anning and publi c servi ces (agricultural extensionwork, experlmentlng,reafforestation and anti-erosion work sites, organlzationof farmers);

( i i j ) an accountlng system I I l-adapted to the needs of the progress/appraisal stages: the appralsal report had made provision for foreign aid In organizlng the accounting divl sion. PRODESAthought tt worthrhlle to shelve the matter. Experiencehas shownthat several problemswould have been avoided i f the accountlng system ha{ made i t possible to make more accurate estlmates of operational costs, of overrunetc.

6.2.7 The terms of acqulring goods and services also turned out to be reI atl vely heavy-goTng , even i f the machlnery vras eased out duri ng implementation. For goodsand services acqulred through a working capital, the procedureshad no hitches even though the replenlshmentof these funds often took very long; which could have meantdiscontlnance of paymentshad not the Bankof CapeVerde granted bridglng loans. For dlrect paymentpurchasing, the internatlonal competJtivebidding procedurewlth prlor approval of the contracting party by the donor turned out to be unnecessarilywinding for a small amount. A palliative systemshould have been set up it seems,(50,000 USdollars, for instance)in so far as the obJectrelative to the contractwas clearly stated in the llst of goodsand services.

0PEV/BSO/0t83M iP- Ër t' , CAPEVERDE: INTEGRATEDAGRIEULTUIUL DEVELOPMENT t i t PROJECTOF ASSOMADA : M A P I ------i I I t. a a I t\ \t ral E l- 9 g

o ) ô vr 'ËO Jç

\Y{ Ig.oor I Ë;.u { o s h\t \ t\ qy'; ç è \ l{ I $ F vï o c t { yl .ù.s' v'ao \ t-^ -g I s a i g f, oq, î^$ { o _l t{, f e. I è è o N x 3 e J rno Q < oé z |\ û- al OO o t)û

UJ o F 9 z (r rrl o tl AnnexI REPUBLICOF CAPE VERDE THEINTEGMTED AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMEN] PROJECT OF ASSOMADA Layoutof the Rural Areirof the l,lholeof ÇApeVerde

Area(ha) 0utput (tons) (Average8l-85) Cultlvatedland 40,21 1 IrrlgÈted area I,866fi ) of whlch: sugarcane 1.022 l2.260 hl "grogue" banana 180 4,041 food crops 293 3,930 sweetpotatoes 290 3,210 potatoes 215 3,222 cassava 148 I,763 maize 100 100 frult orchards 24 440 other lrrlgated crops 35

(l) Thereare 1.7 rotatlonsper annum Thls areaconsfsts of : 211nrodern 741 tradl tlonal 51 seml-lrrlgated

38.345

Malze-beancombl natlon 3l,634 2.955(malze) 2.329 (beans) Plgeonpea 4,030 I,340 Sweetpotatoes 1,764 3,487 Cas sava 330 656 Potatoes 50 150 Peanuts 160 160 0ther r04 Coffee r83 44 Frult trees 90 300 (Sparse) (5,150) 2,300 l'loodand Forests 27,133

High altitude affore- station 5,1l5

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Mr. JaoPerelra Sllva Minlsterof RuralDevelopment Prala CapeVerde SubJect: TheIntegrated Agrlcultural DevelopmentProJect of Assomada

Slr, I should ltke to remlndyou that ln the wakeof the ADB/IFADSupervlsory Mlsslonwhlch stayed In your countryfrom 3rd to l3th November1984 under the above-mentionedproJect, several recommendatlonsttere arrived at In concert wlth your Government.These recommendatlons uere Jotntly slgned ln the memorandumof whlch a copywas put aslde for your Department. I shouldlike to take the llberty of ca'lllng to mlnd that the followlng declslonswere made: fi) under the proJect, an lnventory of all works damagedby the ralns of September1984 shall be made: fir) thts lnventory shall contaln indlcatlons relatlve to the locatlon, prlnclpal physlcal characterlstlcs and the cost of each structure; ( I I t ) under the proJect, repalrs of damageddams shal I be carrl ed out followlng an Inventoryas referred to In ltem No. l, and after sendlngto the ADBfor eachoperatlon, the p'lanof repalrs, the slze of the structureand the estlmatedbudget based on unlt prlces; (lv) the proJect shall also formulate for each butldlng and dam not damaged,the bulI dlng plan, the proflI es I n Iength and breadthof rlvers supplylngthe dam, the amountof materlal used, lncluding thelr cost. (v) paymentsrelative to the structure bulldlng of check damsand dams shall be madeonly for damagedworks but the project shall flrst of all producethe ttemsmentloned In ltems (I to IV). (v1) as far as lrrigatlon operatlonsare concerned,the project shalI carry out tts programmeof collectlon whlchconsists of digging250m of drifts, the excavationof a wide well and the buildlng of an undergrounddam; these operations shall be carriedout on approvalby the ADBof the plans,specificatlons, budgets; (viI ) the project shall see to it that a secondarysystem for the supplyof water for the developmentof foods crops be installed; (viii) the proJect shall continueits programmeof reafforestatlonbearing also in mJndthe FAO/Belgianprogramme of reafforestation;

0PEV/BS0/0183M (lx) the vlllagers of the target-groupsshall be glven plots of land to reafforest in compensailonof the lncomedecllné: (x) under.the. proJect, nurserlesshall be madeavallable In order to rep'lyto the populatlons,reafforestailon requlrements. (xi ) !tç proJect shalI organlze.the plantlng of approprlate spectes (slsal, caneof provence,frult treesetc) in the guittâs; (xil) under tlq proJect, rqln-gauge-s,as tell as a mapof water polnts showingthe measurementof the flow of sourcesshali be establtsired; (xtll) the managers'lodglngsand the translt lodglngsshall not be bullt slnce the proJect'slmplementatlon wtll coml to an end In December I 985;

(xtv) thg proJect shalI lnlttate an efftclent systemof agrlcultural extenslonworkers who vlll take lnto conslderltlontrrtgiilon crops and thosegrown In drler condlilons; (xv) the departmentof agrlculturalextenslon shatl be developped; (xvl) thq proJect's nanagershall be the sole coordlnatorof the proJect and he shall see to lt that the prlnclple of the commandlnguntÈ ls respected;

(xvll) the term of offtce of the proJectmanager shall be extendedtill the end of the proJectplanned for late Décember1985, so as to ensure the properrunnlng of the proJect;

(xvllt) prlor to authorlzlngfurther paymentsconcernlng the expendlturefor categorles I , 3, and 7, I ndlvl dual brl efs pei operation shalI be establI shed;

(xix) the proJect shall apply the baslc prlnclples of a cost accounilng system;

(xx) the Governmentshatl contlnuelts soclo-economlcsurvey launched In the proJectarea; (xxl) the Governmentshall proceedwlth land reformsso as to dlstrtbute equttablythe lrrlgatedland.

I am sorry to say none of these reconmendatlonswere lmplemented.The state of thtngs as regards the proJect ls not clear In so far as rte do not have elementswhich wlll makelt posslblefor us to assesswhat has al ready been done.

Conslderlngwhat precedesand becauseof the fact that the proJect,s end is planned for December1985, rre wouldsuggest sendlng, as soonas possible, a missionwhose duties it wiI I be to report the project's progress. pendingthe fi ndlngs of the misslon, rre are of the opl nion that paymentsshoul d be suspended.

I thanKyou very muchfor your cooperati on .

Yoursfai thful ly,

OPEV/BSO/OI83M SUBJECT:TheIntegrated Agrlcultural DevelopmentProject of Assomada (PR0DESA)Loan No.

In accordancewl th the terms of the above-mentlonedLoan Agreement, implementationis dravlngto a close, on 3lst December1985. As you know,the project's implementatlonwas faced tllth numerousobstacles, ln partlcular, the insufflclent water-resourcesfor lrrigatlon and hlgh personnelmoblltty. To these restraints must be addedthe dovnpourof mld-Septenber1984, whtch serlouslydamaged the facllltles set up underthe proJect. In spite of asperslonscast on the proJect, one must admlt that after four year's of implementatlon,it's lmpacton the populatlonand the natural envlronmentof the area, ls posltlve. About50tr of the loan anpuntts stlll to be patd. The ProJectDlrector Mr. Stlva Cardoso,an expatrlate,left the countryat the end of hfs contract on 3lst Marchlast. 0n 24th May,the Mlnlster of Rural Developmentrecelved a telex (No. 114/103of 23 May) slgnedby Mr. I.B.C. John announclngthe suspenslonof paymentsas of 22ndMay, resulting In the comp'leteparalysls of the proJect. Thesituation is stlll the same,the ralns are here,and the ADF andIFAD have not glvenus anyother cholces. In theseconditlons, the Governmentthlnks that lt ls tn the Interestof all, to put ôn end to the lnlttally deflnedproJect. Nevertheless,the balance mlght elther be alloted to the bulldtngof a gallery for whlchsurveys have Just beencompleted, or be cancelledlf no efftclent use ls madeof lt.

Yoursfalthfully,

OPEV/BSO/0183M I ..

Annex3 REPUBLICOF CAPE VERDE THEINTEGMTED AGBrcULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECJ OF ASSOÈIqDA CiRCUMSTATICESSURROTJNDING THETERI'IINATION OF THEPROJECT

SU.MMARY

Item I : Copyof the ADBletter dated8/5/85 Item2 : Copyof the letter by the CapeVerde Mlnlster of Economyand Flnancedated l3/08/85 Item 3 : State of lmplementattonof recommendatlonsof donors at the ttmeof letter dated8th May,1985.

OPEV/BSO/OI83M Annex3 Appendix 3 Page

REPUBLICOF CAPE VERDE

THE INTEGRATEDAGBICULTURAL-DEVELOPMENT PROJECT OF ASSOMADA

CiRCUMSTANCESS-URROUNDTNG THETERMINATION OF THE PROJECÏ

State of Implementationof Recommendationsformulated by the donorsat the time of the letter dated8th May1985

Item I ProgressReport No. l8 (3rd term 1984) (which reachedthe A0B early January 1985) had proceededwith the concise inventing of damages causedby the SeptemberI 984 tornadoes. Repalrs vrereesti matedat: Checkdams: 7.5 milllon CVEsc. (US$100,000) Dams : 2.5 million CVEsc. (US$ 37,500) No preclse figure was given for damagesdone to other structures (drifts, irrigation pipes, wells etc.) even if mentionwas madeof the damage. item 2 Althoughannouced in its correspondenceof November1984, the project Managementdid not convey a1I informatlon on the actual cost of operations carried out. This would have been possible by meansof proJect brlefs preparedin collaborationwith the IL0.

Item 2 The cost of repairlng damageddams roughly estlmatedat 2.7 CV Esc. ln report No. l8 was in fact the subJectof more precise estimates (4.5 mtllion C.V. Esc)which was never conveyed to the BanK.

Item 3 Plans for buildings doneon force account(worKshop and offices) were dispatched by mail of 2ist November1984 and reached the ADB on 6112184.0n the other hand,plans of other operationsand buildings, althoughannounced never reached the Bank,it seems.

Item 6 An implementationproject concerningthe undergrounddam of the Volta 0uro was addressedto the ADBon February.l985.1985. Remarksmade by the ADBv{ere sent by telex of 23rd May Item 6 should therefore havementioned that this file !{asbeing scannedand maybeeven make the first remarks. As to the buildingof the BICAgal1ery, it meant digging and adjusting to the land and to the water level met. Tlie previousgallery in Maniebamade it posslbleto imaginethe size of the operation.

Item 7 l^lith the approval of the donors ( 1983 middl e-stage appraisal mission), the project had already tried to introduce the use of pliable pipesfor irrigating plots of lands. Besides,a telex frorn the ADBdated 24th Januai'1'1985, approved the purchaseof pliabie pipes for the secondaryirrigation network.

OPEV/BSO/OI83M Annex3 Appendtx3 pageZ

Item8. 9 and l0 Theretlas no Indlcatlonsthat attentlon wasnot pald- ' to these recomrendatlons , al I the more so, I t seems,- lhat reaffore-statlon ras not one of the parts that madeup the ÂOfliËnO proJect but had been I ntroducedsubsequently undàr a proJect sponsored9y -tne.F40. The report of the mlddte stage evaiuaÉlng misslonhad alreadymentloned the exlstenceof a mlnlslertal decree whichhad with-held th.eproJect area as a partlal forest reserve; by vlrtue of vhlch, provlslonsïere madefor'collectlve and indlvliuai reafforestatlonmeasures-, the s-etttngup of nurserlesand an organ-to llaise rlth the FAOproJect. ReporfNo. 16 (tst term l9B4) meifiont the setttng up of two nurserles In Chade Tangueand Carrelrà, so underthese condltlons, vlhy set up other nurserles? Item ll Ttte project authorltles had of courseaccepted thls recormendatlon Iletter of November1984) but had to walt tlll the ralny season beforerespondlng.

Iteml2 PreciseInformatlon should have been glven about the existlng raln gaugesand the flow of sourcesal I the rroreso that the matter had croppedup durlngmld-progress appralsal. Item l3 This recommendatlontras never dlsputed.

Items14 and 15 The boostfng of agrlcultural extenslon work ls an all-time target of all agrlcultural developmentproJects. The maln problemmet ls that of tralnlng men. In that respect, the PRODESA v{as a revelatlon, a tralning centre for agrlcultural extenslon workershas slnce beencreated. Itemsl6 to 20 Thesefnvolve the proJect's organlzatlon: management, accountlng, fol low-up. It uas recormendedthat the expatrlate contract be extended,rhereas by telex by 18111185,the ADBhad taken note of the CapeVerdlan authoritles' declslon not to extend the ProJect Dlrector's term of offlce and recormendedthat one of the CapeVerdlan offlclals be promotedDlrector. It would have been wlser to Inslst on lncreaslngCape Verdlan representation at the Managementlevel of the proJect, slnce tro technlcal assistants posted to the proJect had I eft I n NovemberI 984. As to follow-up-appraisal,the inqulry carrled out by the Offlce of Researchand Planning of the MRDin June1984, went on tlll December I 984 and gave rl se to an appraisal report dated January I 985, althoughthelr flndlngs hadnot beenmade available to the ADB. Item21 The mid-stageappralsal report had Judgedthat the land reform made headwayat a reasonablepace but that there rrasno needto speedup the process. The recommendationof item 21 shouldhave been more exp'li ci te i n stating the set targets.

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