Planetary Thinking/Planetary Building: an Essay on Martin Heidegger and Nishitani Keiji Author(S): Evan Thompson Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol

Planetary Thinking/Planetary Building: An Essay on Martin Heidegger and Nishitani Keiji Author(s): Evan Thompson Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 1986), pp. 235-252 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398773 . Accessed: 28/09/2014 11:15

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This content downloaded from 142.103.160.110 on Sun, 28 Sep 2014 11:15:05 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Evan Thompson Planetary thinking/planetarybuilding: An essay on Martin Heidegger and Nishitani Keiji

In The Questionof Being, Martin Heidegger writes that we are ... obligednot to giveup theeffort to practiceplanetary thinking along a stretch of theroad, be it everso short.Here too no prophetictalents and demeanorare needed to realize that thereare in storefor planetary building encounters for whichparticipants are by no means equal today. This is equally true of the European and of the East Asiatic languagesand, above all, for the area of a possibleconversation between them. Neither of thetwo is able by itselfto open up thisarea and to establishit. What is thepractice of planetarythinking? What is therelation between philosophyand thisthinking? Heidegger'scall forplanetary thinking occurs as partof his attempt to readthe Westernphilosophical tradition as a whole.Although the truth of philosophy is not dependenton thehistorical actuality of theWest, philosophy is, forHeideg- ger,essentially Western discourse. In WhatIs Philosophy?,he writesthat The wordphilosophia tells us thatphilosophy is somethingwhich, first of all, determinesthe existenceof the Greek world.Not only that-philosophiaalso determinesthe innermostbasic featureof our Western-Europeanhistory. The oftenheard expression"Western-European philosophy", is, in truth,a tautology.Why? Because philosophyis Greekin itsnature; Greek, in thisinstance, means that in originthe nature of philosophyis of such a kind that it first appropriatedthe Greek world, and onlyit, in orderto unfold.2 I wish to discusshere the natureof thisclaim, especially in its relationto the projectof planetarythinking. We mustrealize first, however, that these state- mentsare not an argumentfor Western superiority; they are, rather, an attempt to thinkthe nature of philosophy,the "field" on whichit originates.As Jacques Derrida explains:"It is simplythat the foundingconcepts of philosophyare primarilyGreek, and it would not be possible to philosophize,or to speak philosophically,outside this medium." 3 Heidegger'sconception is, then, a philo- sophicalone: it is a conceptionof theform or eidosof a cultureand theessential relationof philosophyto thatform. For Heidegger,metaphysics consists from the beginning in a determinationof Beingwhich he calls the "ontologicaldifference." Metaphysics establishes itself by establishinga differencebetween beings and Being;metaphysics is thisdifference.At the same time,metaphysics does not thinkthis differenceas difference,but looks to thecomponents of thedifference instead. Put anotherway, metaphysicsdoes not thinkBeing as such,immediately conceiving Being within an oppositioninstead. Metaphysics comes to understandBeing as theuniversal groundof all beings,and at thesame time as theground of itself, the highest being. This determinationof Being(what Heidegger calls "onto-theology")is an event in thehistory of Being,which marks the forgetting of Being.Metaphysics does not thinkits own ground;it is the "oblivion of Being." Heidegger'sproject of

Evan Thompsonis a doctoralstudent of philosophy at theUniversity of Toronto. PhilosophyEast and West36, no. 3 (July,1986). © by the Universityof Hawaii Press.All rightsreserved.

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thinkingBeing as suchmeans, then, a dismantlingof thestructures metaphysics has erectedin orderto reachtheir ground.4 His call fora planetarythinking is inseparablefrom this project, for if metaphysics is essentiallyWestern discourse, and ifmetaphysics is necessarilyoblivious of its own ground, then the attempt to thinkthis ground confronts the limits of Westernthought. Heidegger'sreading already requires a distancefrom or displacementof the Westerntradition. One mustnot confuse,however, this general displacement witha steppingout ofthe tradition, as ifthis were simply possible. This displace- mentcomes about as a displacementof the traditionin the discourseof the tradition,and so is everywhereproblematical. Philosophy can no longertake itselffor granted; we do not know if thepath we treadleads to theclearing or leaves us lost in the forest.Heidegger would "step back" frommetaphysics so thatits essence(the ontologicaldifference) could be thought.But what is the natureof thisstep? Where can we stepwhen the notion of position has become suspect? To be cast adriftfrom one's mooringsis bothliberating and disorienting,and is a conditionof the thinking we are searchingfor. We senseour limits and appear to be open fora conversationwith other traditions. Indeed, it is at thispoint that we occasionallyfind an awarenessof non-Westerntraditions in thewriting of philosophy.One thinksof Heidegger'sdialogue with the Japanese5 and, more recently,Derrida's comments on phonocentrismand theChinese language in his developmentof the problematicof writing,in Of Grammatology.6These at- temptsare a step forwardfrom much of the provincialismin philosophical writing,and yet theyare everywhereambiguous: on the one hand, thesedis- cussionsdisplace the narrativein whichWestern culture is the finalreference point.On theother hand, we cannotforget that the formulation of this displace- menthas onlycome about because of theassertion of theidentity of philosophy and thediscourse of a particulartradition. This identificationis neversubjected to criticismand justified,even in confrontationwith other traditions, but is presentedas if it were perfectlynatural (the forceof the so-called tautology "Western-Europeanphilosophy"). This identificationrests, furthermore, on the ontologicaland epistemologicaldivision of "East" and "West," whichis also neverquestioned; the contoursof what Edward Said calls "imaginativegeography"inform philosophical texts no less thanproper "Orientalist" ones.7 In thevery displacement of Westernculture, at preciselythe moment when binary oppositionswere to be questioned,a logicof Same and Other,centre and margin, is perpetuatedin whichthe non-Western becomes merely another name forthe margin,the blank space, theOther. The reificationof geographicalboundaries not onlyimpoverishes philosophy, but all of language,for it makes traditions appear self-enclosed,with no gaps and passagewaysamong them. At issue,then, is ourunderstanding of difference and a logicof same and other. To take accountof differenceimplies a criticalattitude to our understandingof our own tradition,one whichincludes questioning the identificationof philo-

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sophyand Westerndiscourse. This claimhas, of course,already been countered on historicaland comparativegrounds. Many scholars are concernedwith showingthe importanceof other traditionsin the developmentof Western philosophy,and withcomparing philosophies in differentcultures. Although theseinvestigations are essential,they do not quite reachthe problems we face here.Comparative philosophy does not oftenreflect on theproblem of its own status,on the natureof comparativediscourse. Of course,these problems are always presentin the practiceof translation,but translationis still largely conceivedin a comparativeframework, one nothermeneutically subtle enough to accountfor the growingprocesses of confrontation,interference, accommoda- tion, and appropriationamong various traditions.The developmentof more complicatedhermeneutics cannot rest content with only historical and compara- tiveanalyses, for one ofthe tasks of comparative philosophy is, as HenryCorbin puts it (rightly,I believe,though in a differentspirit from the discussionI will pursuehere), "to enquireinto the form, here and there,of time lived, and thusof the advent of the conceptof somethinglike a history,and so of a historyof philosophy."8 In our case, beginningwith Heidegger,we must attemptto understandwhat the words "West" and "philosophyas Westerndiscourse" signifyphilosophically, in textsthat are philosophical;in otherwords, with how philosophyunderstands itself. Ultimately,of course,none of theseproblems can be separated.The herme- neuticactivity is alwaysconnected to certainproblems and texts,which in turn are foundin particulartraditions and communities.We mustbegin from where we findourselves, from a particularsituation or encounter,but we should not proceednaively, in isolationfrom broader, theoretical concerns. We shoulddraw on theresources of theHeideggerian critique, yet at thesame timenot lose sight of theparticularities of theissues we are investigating. In thisspirit I wishto approachthe matter of planetarythinking through the thoughtof theJapanese philosopher, Nishitani Keiji. Nishitaniis one of those who mightbe called the "heirs" of Heidegger(he studiedwith Heidegger in Germanyin the 1930s). His philosophicalendeavour (and that of the Kyoto School) is monumental,for it is one ofthe few examples of European philosophy beingappropriated by anothertradition and beingreplied to by thattradition, boththereby becoming part of a planetarymovement. If one ofthe philosophical tasksleft to us in thelate twentiethcentury is theappropriation of Heidegger's thought,we woulddo wellto look to Nishitani,for he showsthat Heidegger's call for planetarythinking has not gone unheard. I wish here to continuethe conversationbetween Heidegger and Nishitaniand to explorethis meeting of traditionsin Nishitani'srecently translated work, Religion and Nothingness.9 My conviction,which I hope to makepersuasive, is thatNishitani's presentation and developmentof a contemporaryphilosophy of "emptiness"(sunyata) not only address Heidegger'skey concerns,but provide the space in which dialogue amongcivilizations and planetarythinking become possible.

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In Nishitani'sthought we are presentedwith a movementfrom what he calls the "field of consciousness," to the "field of nihility,"to the "field of emptiness."10 This movementis both historicaland personal:in it "relative nothingness"or nihilismis situatedas a particulardevelopment of our culture and a stageof individualtransformation. For Nishitani,European thought has becometrapped on the"field of nihility,"stopping short of an understandingof what Buddhistscall "emptiness."Nishitani's challenge to us, though,is not to adopt Buddhism,but to achievean understandingof emptinessworking from our own premises.He recognizes,however, that his own thoughthas onlycome about becauseof an encounterwith Western thought and history.His discussion of therelations between emptiness, time, and historyis especiallya resultof this encounter,for Nishitani openly admits that Buddhism has not encounteredthe problemof the historicity of time to theextent that it has beenencountered in the West.This meetingof Buddhistand Europeantraditions around the problem of historyis the startingpoint for Nishitani'smeditations in the latterpart of Religionand Nothingness: How is itpossible for what we call historyto carryits historicity through to itslast and finaltranshistorical base withoutthereby being terminated as historyat the hands of the transhistorical?In otherwords: How is it possiblefor history to becomeradically historical by virtue of itshistoricity being carried through to a transhistoricalground? (RN, p. 213) Nishitanifollows Toynbee in presentingthe problem.In the Abrahamic religions,historical consciousness develops as an aspect of God's relationship withhumanity: God establishesa covenantwith a people in the Old Testament; forChristians, God becomeshuman in theunique eventof thebirth of Christ. Historicalprocesses here become intrinsicallysignificant; the articulationof historytakes a narrativeform as thedestiny of a people,the fall and redemption of humanity,or the modernnarrative of the emancipationof the subject.For Nishitani,this development of historicalconsciousness is a movementbeyond a merelycyclical conception of timefound, for example, in BrahmanicalIndia. What is sacrificedin such a development,however, is theuniversal, impersonal natureof time. Historical time is nowinseparable from a standpointof person or will;the development of an historicalconception of time goes handin handwith the realizationof Divinityin a personalrelationship. It becomesincreasingly difficult,however, to mediate this personal relationshipwith an impersonal universality;thus the growth of religiousintolerance. In our times,though, the crisisof religious consciousness has resultedin a denialof a transcendentDivinity and thedeepening of the nothingness of creation into an abyssalways underfoot (the "fieldof nihility").Here theintrinsic significance of historybegins to come apartso that,in thewords of Dostoyevsky's underground man, "anything can be said of world history,anything conceivable even by the most disordered imagination."1 This is thesituation in whichNietzsche also findsus. We have foundthat thereis no truth,but we continueto seek it: "What does nihilism

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mean? That thehighest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking;'why' findsno answer."12 Nishitani shares Nietzsche's estimation of our situation:we cannotescape fromtime, and so mustanalyze our desireto escape and finda mode of being-in-timewhere time is no longerfelt as a burden.The transitionto emptiness,however, does not mean thatwe simplyturn our backs to "nihility." We mustattempt to enterthe heart of nihilism and open itup to whatlies beyond it. Heideggerconfirms this when he writesin The Questionof Being that to overcomenihilism we mustfirst enter into its essence. For Heidegger,to enterthe essenceof nihilism is to "step back" towardsthe place whereBeing and nothingness are gatheredtogether. In "What is Metaphysics?"nothingness appears as the totallyother of Being,that whichis not any determinateentity.13 For a thinkingthat only knows entities, what Heidegger calls the"horizon of scientific conception"and Nishitanithe "field of consciousness,"Being, that which is not any being,can onlyappear as nothingness.This nothingnessis, then,a "relative nothingness,"a qualificationthat Heidegger also makesexplicit in The Question ofBeing. 14 Heideggerquestions this nothingness in orderto makeproblematical, and thus ultimatelyto transcend,a thinkingbound to the representationof determinateentities. He interpretsDasein's projectioninto nothingness to mean thathumanity is the"place-holder for nothingness"; humanity holds "theplace open forthe complete other of beings,so thatin its opennessthere can be such 15 a thingas being present(Being)." Whereas Nishitanitransforms "relative nothingness"into "absolute nothingness"or emptiness,Heidegger assimilates nothingnessto the possibilityof being-present;absence belongsto presenceas one ofthe possibilities of Being: "Being and nothingnessare notside by side. One intercedeson behalfof the other in a relationship,the amplitude of whose essence we have scarcelyconsidered yet." 16 (I will have more to say of thisdifference later.)The essenceof nihilismis, then,not nihilistic:the essence of nothingness belongs to Being; thus nihilism,as a determinationof Being, belongs to metaphysics. Heidegger'scall forplanetary thinking comes fromthis attempt to thinkthe essenceof nihilism.Nihilism now envelopsthe planet and in thisenvelopment it appears as if thereare onlybeings, that Being is an emptyconcept. Yet metaphysicsitself is, forHeidegger, the oblivion or concealmentof Being,for meta- physicsnever thinks Being as such. The withdrawalof Being in nihilism,and hence the collapse of the ontologicaldifference between Being and beings,is alreadyat workin metaphysics;it is inherentin thegrasping of thedifference by way of itscomponents. Our sightis fixedon whatdiffers, and we remainblind to differenceas such.17The overcomingof nihilismis based on understanding metaphysicsas the "oblivion of Being." The "step back" would thinkthis oblivion,and so enterthe heartof nihilism.For Heidegger,metaphysics can nevercome to a realizationof theoblivion of Beingin theontological difference, formetaphysics is foundedupon it.Thus, the question of Being "dies off,if it does

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notsurrender the language of metaphysics,because metaphysical conception for- bids thinkingthe question as to theessence of being"(italics in original).l8The attemptto thinkthe ontological difference as differenceis, then,to moveout of metaphysics.Such a movecannot be made bya seriesof propositions or chainof reasons,for reason is essentiallymetaphysical. For Heidegger,one mustrather leap out of metaphysics,a leap he would accomplishby the"step back." The "step back" is not an historicalone; one does not attemptto returnto a supposedpremetaphysical thinking. The "step back" is a stepaway frommeta- physicalthinking towards its ground,so thatthe essenceof metaphysics,the ontologicaldifference, can be thought.One attemptsto movefrom the oblivion of thedifference to a fieldwhere Being can be thoughtnonrepresentationally. ... we mustfirst assume a properposition face to facewith the difference. Such a confrontationbecomes manifest to us oncewe accomplishthe step back. Onlyas thisstep gains for us greaterdistance does whatis near giveitself as such,does nearnessachieve its first radiance. By thestep back, we setthe matter of thinking, Beingas difference,free to entera positionface to face,which may well remain whollywithout an object.19 The "step back" would move away fromthe vestigesof representationon the "fieldof nihility" to experiencewhat Heidegger calls the"belonging together" of humanityand Beingin the Same. The Same is not themerely identical free of difference;the Same preservesdifference, implying a processof mediationor unification.This unification,however, is not one in whichhumanity and Being existseparately and thensomehow happen to meet.Their relationship is not one of a necessaryconnection, a systematicencounter between terms that are meta- physicallygrounded. Instead of determining belonging by together, the unity of a manifold,together is determinedby belonging,by identityin movement,a processof appropriation: Dasein, as thatbeing who exists, that is, who stands out frombeings into the presentof Being, is appropriatedto Being. Being, as presence,needs the openness of Dasein, its "place-holder," to arriveas presence. ... a springis neededin orderto experience-authenticallythebelonging together ofman and Being.This springis theabruptness of theunbridged entry into that whichalone can granta toward-each-otherof man and Being,and thus the constellationof the two. The springis theabrupt entry into the realm from which man and Beinghave alreadyreached each otherin theiractive nature, since both are mutuallyappropriated, extended as a gift,one to the other.Only the entry intothe realm of this mutual appropriation determines and definesthe experience of thinking.20 Nishitanishares Heidegger's attempt to moveout ofmetaphysics to a newway of thinking.In Religionand Nothingness,he also confrontsthe problemof identity,here in its relationto the mode of beingin emptiness.Traditionally, metaphysicsunderstands identity as a characteristicof the Beingof beings:an entityis said to be thesame with itself, and thissameness is variouslyarticulated as idea, form,substance, and so forth.Inherent in thisconception is the separationof actual fromessential being and theattempt to approachthe former by

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way of thelatter. To discoverthat something is metaphysicsasks whatit is. This separationis, of course,the ontological difference: "Being is dividedinto what- ness and thatness.The historyof Beingas metaphysicsbegins with this distinc- tionand itspreparation. Metaphysics includes the distinction in thestructure of truthabout beings as such as a whole."21 For Nishitani,emptiness is the completenegation of metaphysicalidentity and "a conversionof thestandpoint of reasonand all its logical thinking"(RN, p. 117). The standpointof emptinesscomes about as a negationof "nihility,"not in orderto assertthe priorityof beings,but as a realizationof the nondualityof being and nothingness."Relative nothingness"becomes "absolute nothingness,"for nothingness appears at theheart of self-identity.Here theself-identity of an entityis shownto be itsnonself-nature; thus Nishitani abandons theterm "nothingness"and takesup "sunyatd"or "emptiness."The mode of beingand thinkingon the"field of emptiness"Nishitani finds expressed in theancient Zen phrases:"Fire does notburn fire," "water does notwet water," "the eye does not see theeye." Here theessential being of fire,for example, is expressedby saying that it does not burn itself;actual being, on the other hand, is expressed simultaneouslyby saying that fire burns. The essenceor self-natureof fire occurs at preciselythe pointwhere it does not burn,that is, is not itself;this point of nonself-identity,however, is inseparablefrom the actual processof combustion. Nishitaniwrites:

If we supposethat the natural, essential quality (physis)-or, in Buddhistterms, "self-nature"-residesin thepower and workof combustion, then the selfness of fireresides at thepoint of its so-called non-self-nature. In contrast to thenotion of substancewhich comprehends the selfnessof firein its fire-nature(and thusas being),the true selfness of fire is itsnon-fire-nature. The selfnessof fire lies in non- combustion.Of course,this non-combustion is not somethingapart fromcom- bustion;fire is non-combustivein its veryact of combustion.It does not burn itself.To withdrawthe non-combustionof firefrom the discussionis to make combustionin truthunthinkable. That a firesustains itself while it is in theact of burningmeans preciselythat it does not burnitself.... The non-self-natureof fireis itshome-ground of being.(RN, p. 117)

Here actualand essentialbeing cannot be presentedseparately. This is notto say, however,that the two are simplyidentical, which would be themonistic extreme. Emptinessis thenegation of an inherentbeing in things,and thusexpresses the truecondition of phenomena. But as a lack or negation,emptiness is notseparate fromphenomena; it is nota ground,substance, or essencebehind or withinthings. Emptiness,then, cannot be understoodsimply in termsof the ontologicaldifference;"the way thingsare" is not operativewithin such a division. The nondualityof formand emptiness,or actual and essentialbeing, means that beingis illusoryat itsground, that everything is illusoryappearance. Yet itis not some thingor beingthat appears, it is appearanceitself with nothing behind or beneathit. The traditionalBuddhist example for such a mode of appearanceis thatof themagician who fabricatesthe illusion of a horseor some otheranimal.

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Althoughthere never was any animalthere, the appearance nevertheless arises. As Nishitaniputs it: "... appearanceis illusoryat theelemental level in itsvery reality,and real in itsvery illusoriness" (RN, p. 129). This mode of beingis thus knowable,but not as therepresentation of an objectby a subject;in Nishitani's words, emptinessis experiencedas a "non-cognitiveknowing of the non- objectivething-in-itself" (RN, p. 139). The transitionfrom "nihility" to emptinessalso involvesa transformationof our understandingof time.On the "fieldof nihility,"the recognitionof the "infiniteopenness" of time resultsin an understandingof time as infinitely extendedwithout beginning or end. Dasein, being-in-the-world,is the living of thistime; Dasein does not live in time,but livestime. In the livingof timeas infiniteextension, Dasein losesits purely human determination, for it is dispersed along the endlesspathways of spatial and temporalrelations and revealedas sheerbeing-in-the-world, being-in-the-world as such.The originor groundof timecannot be found,then, by searchingever backwards or everforwards, for theordinary, linear conception of time has beendisplaced by infinite dispersion. Thisdispersion, however, is beingcontinually constituted each "moment,"and it is therethat the origin of timeis to be sought. On the"field of emptiness,"the infinite openness of timebecomes an ecstatic fieldof transcendence at each moment,a fieldwhere the self is ecstaticallyoutside of time. Here the intrinsicreality of being-in-the-worldis negated, but this negationis not a denial of our actualbeing-in-the-world, for the latter can only come about ifit is freeof intrinsicdeterminations. From theperspective of the "fieldof nihility,"the "fieldof emptiness"transcends being-in-time; Dasein appearsas not-being-in-time.On the"field of emptiness,"however, the "field of nihility"is reappropriatedso that transcendenceoccurs as a revaluationof being-in-time,a livingof timewhere the debt of existenceis realizedas the Bodhisattvavow, which is responsibleto all beingsand takeson theirsuffering. The nondualityof form and emptinesshere shows itself as thenonduality of time and eternity.Time cannot be circumscribedby an insideand outside;the tracing of boundariesis alwaysrelative, situated in a particularuniverse. Nishitanidistinguishes several levels of understandingtime: when being-in- timemanifests as being-at-doing(samtskrta), time becomes a fieldof infinite becomingwithout beginning or end, an endlesscontinuum of moments,each newand impermanent.The realizationof"nihility," however, opens up an abyss at thebottom of each moment,so thatthe beginning and end of timeare to be foundin an ecstaticfield "beneath" the present.Time takes on a cyclicform, while"nihility" appears as eternity,a transcendentfield from which the world, graspedas the totalityof what is, is perpetuallyslipping away. For Nishitani, eitherof theseaspects, considered in isolation,robs timeof its fullhistoricity: irreversibilityinisolation leaves us withreligious eschatology or thesecular myth of progress,both ultimatelytied to will and egocentrism,and thusintolerant.

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Cyclictime destroys novelty and creativity,for the beginningand end of time become one in the nothingness"beneath" each moment.Even so radical an understandingas Nietzsche'seternal return, Nishitani argues, errs in theextreme of sacrificingthe individual to theuniversal. Nietzsche recognizes that the will is not a facultyof an intrinsicallyreal subject,that we "foist" the grammatical categoryof subject on an impersonalprocess of figuration (the will to power),but he is unable to retainwhat Buddhism calls the"conventional self." On the"field ofemptiness," however, linear and cyclictime are reconciledand revaluated.The emptinessof time means that time canfunction irreversibly, but the awareness of an opennessat theground of each momentmeans that the beginning and end of time can always be found now, in the dependent-originationof the present moment.In thissense, the past, present,and futureare all simultaneous:linear and cyclictime become "circuminsessional" time. This simultaneityallows us, in Nishitani'swords, to "encounterSakyamuni and Jesus,Basho and Beethovenin thepresent" (RN, p. 161). Thisencounter is notan empatheticone ofsubjects, as in nineteenth-centuryhermeneutics, for here we are locatedon a fieldof selfless- ness. The Buddhistactively realizes22 Buddha in theBodhisattva vow; Basho's frogagain becomesan occasion forpoetry in thewriting of Sengai.23 The displacementof thedivision of actual and essentialbeing on the"field of emptiness"results in a nonegocentricmode of being-in-time.We finda similar displacementin Heidegger'slater thought, for just as Nishitanireappropriates "nihility"in emptiness,so forHeidegger nihilism becomes a "moment"in the historyof Being,one of theways Beingis, as he putsit, "sent" in history. Alreadyin The Questionof Being, Heidegger reads the "concealment of Being" in both sensesof the double genitive:Being is concealed,but thisconcealment also belongsto Being. He writesthat the oblivionof Being can be seen "as a concealment,presumably a shelteringwhich still preserves what has notyet been revealed."24 Concealmentis thoughtas veiling-in Greek,lethe, what remains concealedin unconcealment:a-letheia.25 The historyof Beingis now thoughtin itsepochs, from the Greek epoche, a holdingback. This holdingback Heidegger sees as thefundamental characteristic of thehistory of Beingas "sending."His understandingof this "sending" is important,especially for our comparison with Nishitani,for it effectsa displacementof the concept of the ontologicaldifference.Heidegger turns to theGerman idiom "es gibt"and theFrench "ily a," and sees Beingas a "gift"that is sentin history;the "It" thatgives, however, is veiled,concealed. The giftinstead becomes thought by way of the ontological difference:a gift of Beingthat secures, establishes, maintains beings. In its very givingof thegift, the "It" and givinghold back, conceal themselves.In "Time and Being,"Heidegger writes: A givingwhich gives only its gift,but in the givingholds itselfback and withdraws,such a givingwe call a sending.According to themeaning of giving whichis to be thoughtin thisway, Being-that whichIt gives-is whatis sent.

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Each ofits transformations remains destined in thismanner. What is historicalin thehistory of Beingis determinedby whatis sentforth in destining,not by any indeterminatelythought up occurrence.26 The "step back," then,would thinkthis giving that remains veiled in thegift of Being,releasing the ontological difference to themore originary play of giving: Being"overwhelms" beings, is givento beingsas a gift;beings, on theother hand, receiveBeing and in theirreception sustain Being in its overwhelming.Being's overwhelmingof beingsallows beingsto arriveand be present.The arrivalof beings,however, keeps itself concealed in theunconcealedness of Being.Pierre Livetuses theanalogy of an archeraiming at a targetto explainthis overwhelming and arrival.27The tensionof thebow is thefundamental energy that moves thearrow. The directionof thearrow is determinedby thearcher who aims the bow, but one can also considerthe directionof the arrowto be guidedby the targetthat will receive the arrow. By analogy,the tension of thebow is the "It gives,"the energyby whichBeing is sent.The movementof the arrowto the targetis themovement of Beingto beings,determined not onlyby thesending, but by beings,the target or destinationof thesending (Geschick). This analogy showshow Heideggerconceives the relation of Beingto beingsas theunity of an event:bow, arrow,target, and archerall come togetheras an event,and in this eventthere is no questionof groundingthe movementin a final,determining factor.The relationof Beingto beingsbecomes a back-and-forthmovement of overwhelmingand arrival,unconcealment and concealing: The differenceof Beingand beings,as thedifferentiation of overwhelmingand arrival,is theperdurance (Austraq) of the two in unconcealingkeeping in concealment.Within this perdurance there prevails a clearingof whatveils and closes itselfoff-and thisits perdurance bestows the being apart, and thebeing toward each other,of overwhelmingand arrival.28 The sendingof Being as unconcealmentpoints to an intimacyof timeand being.Being is not any beingin time,yet Being as unconcealmentor presenceis determinedby time.Time, however,is also determinedby Being: timepasses away, but its passingaway is constant;it endures,presences. Being is not any being,and timeis not any thingin time;Being and time,as presence,determine each otherreciprocally. In metaphysics,however, Being as presenceis forgotten: Beingis conceivedas groundfor and thehighest of presentbeings. In thesame way,the presence of timeis conceivedby way of thepresent moment, the now. Yet forHeidegger, the presencing of time cannot be determinedby the present as moment.As we saw, Heideggerassimilates nothingness to Beingas a mode of being-present;in thesame way,he seesabsence (the no-longer-now and thenot- yet-now)as a "mannerof presencingand approaching."29 In thepast, presenc- ingis extended,whereas in thefuture, presencing is offered.In a passage similar to one of Nishitani,Heidegger writes: Approaching,being not yetpresent, at thesame timegives and bringsabout whatis no longerpresent, the past, and converselywhat has beenoffers future to

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itself.The reciprocalrelation of bothat thesame timegives and bringsabout the present.We say "at the same time,"and thus ascribe a timecharacter to the mutualgiving to one anotherof a future,past, and present,that is, to theirown unity.30

In thenext paragraph, however, Heidegger qualifies this "mutual giving" so that it can no longerbe said "thatfuture, past and presentare beforeus 'at thesame time'."What Nishitanicalls the"non-self-nature" of time,Heidegger expresses by writingthat the "mutualgiving" of timeis nothingtemporal: past, present, and futureoffer each other the presencingthat is given in them. It is this presencing,for Heidegger, that opens up whathe calls "time-space":the "mutual giving"of past, present,and futureopens a regionin whichwhat we know as space occurs. The reciprocaldetermination of past, present,and future,and the space it opens up is, forHeidegger, the "dimensionality"of time.Dimension here does notmean an area ofmeasurement, but the opening up oftime-space, in whichthe threefoldgiving of timeshows the three dimensions of time.But Heideggeralso writesof a fourthdimension of time,one he calls "nearhood" (Nahheit)."Near- hood" is the first,primal givingthat allows each momentof time its own presencing,holding the moments both apart and towardseach other: ... it bringsfuture, past and presentnear to one anotherby distancing them. For it keeps what has been open by denyingits adventas present.This nearingof nearnesskeeps open the approach comingfrom the futureby withholdingthe presentin the approach, nearingnearness has the characterof denial and withholding.It unifiesin advancethe ways in which what has-been, what is about to be, and thepresent reach out towardeach other.31

Time,like Being,is thena giftof a givingthat opens and conceals. The sendingof Beingas presenceand theopening of time,their active identity as an event,Heidegger calls Ereignis,the "event of appropriation."We have alreadyseen Ereignisin theform of themutual appropriation of humanityand Being,their belonging together. Being and humanity,in thereciprocity of their movement,come to presenceeach in itsown way;in theirappropriate coming to presence,each is deliveredto the other. Heideggerplays on the relationof Ereignento Erdugnen,"to place beforethe eyes" or "to show,"both suggesting a "cominginto the light."32 The belongingtogether of humanityand Beingcan also be seen, then,as the process by whichthe "clearing"(Lichtung) occurs, whichgrants both Being and time.As giftsof appropriation, Being and timeboth vanishin Ereignis,a play both activeand passivein whicheven the "It" of "It gives"would remaina representation.The openingand concealingof Beingand time belong to the "event of appropriation": Ereignis appropriatesand expropriates.

Insofaras thedestiny of Beinglies in theextending of time,and time,together with Being,lies in Appropriation,Appropriating makes manifestits peculiar property,that Appropriation withdraws what is mostfully its own frombound-

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lessunconcealment. Thought in termsof Appropriating, this means: in thatsense it expropriatesitself of itself.Expropriation belongs to Appropriationas such. By thisexpropriation, Appropriation does not abandon itself-ratherit pre- serveswhat is its own.33

For Nishitani,the realization of "nihility"prefigures the transition to emptiness;for Heidegger, we are givena preludeto the"event of appropriation" in the relationof humanityand technology.What Heideggercalls the "framework" (Ge-stell)is theconfrontation, the "mutual challenging," of humanity and Being in thetechnological age. The "framework"might be called the"configuration" of thisepoch of Beingthat is our own age: everywherebeings are determinedas what is calculable,capable of beingquantified and manipulated.The "framework,"however, is neveranywhere present as an entity;it is not subjectto the determinationitenforces, and so remainsunthought. Yet itexpresses the manner in whichthe belonging together of humanity and Beingis determinedin our age: Beingwithdraws in favourof thecalculable being, while humanity unceasingly strivesto bringall entitiesunder its control.Perhaps, in what seemsto be the furthestwithdrawal of Being,a strangetransition is announced. Whatwe experiencein theframe as theconstellation of Beingand man through the modernworld of technologyis a preludeto what is called the eventof appropriation.This event,however, does not necessarilypersist in its prelude. For in theevent of appropriationthe possibility arises that it mayovercome the meredominance of the frame to turnit into a moreoriginal appropriating. Such a transformationof the frameinto the eventof appropriation,by virtueof that event,would bringthe appropriaterecovery-appropriate, hence never to be producedby man alone-of theworld of technologyfrom its dominanceback to servitudein the realm by whichman reachesmore fullyinto the eventof appropriation.34 The course that I have chartedso far throughthe textsof Heideggerand Nishitanihas revealedwhat might be called"family resemblances" of thought. In both philosophers,we are presentedwith a movement,which I willcall one of transcendence.My choiceof thisword is, perhaps,infelicitous, for it is a wordof manymeanings whose confusion Heidegger sees as "the distinguishingcharac- teristicof metaphysicalconceptions still customary today." 35 Transcendence is essentialto theontological difference: it is themovement from beings to Being; fromwhat Heidegger calls "changeable being" to a "beingin repose"; it is also the titlefor the highestbeing, the onto-theologicaldetermination of Being.36In Heidegger'searly writings, however, transcendence becomes the "surpassing" essentialto Dasein, theground phenomenon of Dasein's freedom.37 Man's Da-sein can only relateto what-isby projectinginto Nothing.Going beyondwhat-is is of the essenceof Da-sein. But this"going beyond"is metaphysicsitself. That is whymetaphysics belongs to thenature of man.... Meta- physicsis theground phenomenon of Da-sein.It is Da-seinitself.38 In Heidegger'slater thought, metaphysics is called the"fate of transcendence": "Transcendenceis metaphysicsitself, whereby this name does not signify

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a doctrine and disciplineof philosophybut signifiesthat 'it' 'gives' that transcendence."39 It is preciselythis understanding of transcendencethat establishes a conver- sationamong Asia, Europe,and Greece-here amongBuddhism, Nishitani, and Heidegger.The philosophicalnarrative of Nishitani'swriting is formedby this movementof surpassing:on the"field of nihility"transcendence as constitutive ofDasein is firstgrasped-Dasein's freedomis groundedin perpetualsurpassing to the world as being-in-the-world.On the "field of emptiness,"Dasein is revealed as not-being-in-the-world;Dasein has attained the "other shore": "'Gate, gate,paragate, parasamgate, bodhi, svaha!' (0 Bodhi,gone, gone, gone to theother shore, landed at theother shore, Svaha!)." 40 Yet this"other shore" is whatNishitani calls an "absolutelynear side": Dasein's surpassingof the world occurssimultaneously as themost thorough being-in-the-world. If such a movement of thought,this movementof transcendence,is common to Greco- European philosophyand Buddhistphilosophy (to say nothingof otherAsian philosophicaltraditions), then Heidegger's equation of philosophy with Western discoursecannot be admitted,even in his own understanding of thestatement. This identificationwas meant to preventthe impositionof our thoughton other traditions,but it reinforcesthe perception of the "East" as an ineffableOther. Heidegger'seffort to achievea conversationis monumental,but theplurality of theplanet's traditions cannot be accommodatedby thesimplistic opposition of "East" and "West," or in a reductivelogic of Same and Other.We mustmove to a logic that is plural,in whichwe are aware of our criteriafor sameness, difference,for what constitutes a universeof discourse.Such a pluralismshould notbe uncritical,and cannotbe builton ignorance;we can onlyopen ourselvesto thetraditions of the world, however, if we do nota prioriconsider ourselves to be theonly bearers of a certainthought. Beforeclosing, I wishto investigatesome of the differences between Heidegger and Nishitani,and thevarious directions that their thought might take us in our taskof planetary thinking. My suggestionsare meantto be tentative,to furthera conversationthat is onlybeginning. I have remarkedseveral times that whereasNishitani transforms "relative nothingness"into emptiness,Heidegger assimilates nothingness to Being,ab- senceto presence.Yet thematter is not quite so simplyput. At issue is how we understandthe opposition presence/absence, how we see itfunction. In Ereignis, Beingas presenceis givenas a gift,but thegiving conceals itself, and so remains absent. The forgettingof Being is not a human lapse of memory;it is the necessarylack or concealmentof theclearing in thegranting of Beingas unconcealment(the lethe of alhtheia).What comes to presenceis also a lack. In a late prose-poem,"The Lack of Sacred Names," Heideggerwrites: To speak poetically-thatmeans here: to letsay to itselfthe pure call of coming to presenceas such,even if this be onlyand preciselya comingto presenceof a removaland of a withholding.41

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It is this lack that we neverexperience; instead of experiencingcoming to presenceas theself-concealing openness of theclearing, we experiencepresence as thepresent. Heidegger's thoughts on thislack are someof his mostwavering, or, as Derrida would put it, his most "undecidable." On the one hand, the oppositionof presence and absenceis surpassedin Ereignisexpropriating itself of itself.Here "presence"and "absence" could onlybe determinedby arresting the movementof Ereignis, in an attemptto determineits "moments," but that would be like tryingto determineexactly at what point a dancer's weighthas fully shiftedfrom one foot to another.On the otherhand, Heideggeralways refers absenceback to presence,lethe to aletheia;thus the possibility remains that the self-concealingclearing is an ineffablepresence: "If this were so [that lethe belongs to aletheial],then the opening would not be the mere opening of presence,but the openingof presenceconcealing itself, the openingof a self- concealingsheltering." 42 On the"field of emptiness," however, the assimilation of absence to presencecan only appear as a symptomof not havingrealized nonduality,of not freeingoneself fully from grasping things by way of the ontologicaldifference. To the extentthat eitherpresence or absence is made ultimate,one remainscaught in representationalthinking. Emptiness is not an ineffablepresence: it is the absence of inherentbeing and simultaneouslythe presenceof form."Form is emptiness,and emptinessis form."To speak of absencecoming to presence as absenceis subtlyto reifyabsence, for presence and absenceare themselvesempty. It is thisnonduality of formand emptinessthat allows forNishitani's "circuminsessional" time. Heidegger comes close to this understandingwhen he writesof the "mutualgiving" of time,but thisgiving alwaysremains one ofpresence. Heidegger insists that the presencing that opens time-spacecannot be conceivedon thebasis of thepresent, the now, and yethe neverreturns to the conventionalmoment; our everydayconception of time remainsderivative from a moreprofound understanding. For Nishitani,though, the"mutual giving" of time is one ofemptiness, and, because of the nonduality of formand emptiness,he is able to returnto the everydayform of timeas the successionof moments. Heidegger'sand Nishitani'smeditations both call fora thinkingthat surpasses reason.For Heidegger,reason cannot think the lack or holdingback of Being, forreason is metaphysical:instead of thinkingBeing, metaphysics establishes a reasonedhierarchy between Being and entities,in whichthe former is groundfor the latter.For Nishitani,reason operateswithin the separationof actual and essentialbeing, and thus"does not enterdirectly and immediatelyto thepoint wheresomething is. It does notput one directlyin touchwith the home-ground of a thing,with the thing itself" (RN, pp. 114-115). Nishitaniinterprets philosophy as theoria,an intellectualor contemplativebeholding of realitythat does not overcomethe division of self and world.Religion, however, enquires after reality in such a way that realityis realizedin the questioning.Nishitani bypasses a subjectivisticunderstanding of religion,but preservesthe selfin an identity

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of process:religion is the "self-awarenessof reality,"in which"our abilityto perceivereality means that reality realizes (actualizes) itself in us;... thisin turnis the onlyway thatwe can realize(appropriate through understanding) the fact thatreality is so realizingitself in us; and thatin so doingthe self-realization of realitytakes place" (RN, p. 5). This divisionbetween religion and philosophyin Nishitani'swriting seems to be inheritedfrom European existentialist thinking in its responseto the erosionof religiousbelief and the predominanceof science. Heidegger,in a similarway, always understands science to be technicalthinking, whereasphilosophy and poetryconfront the fundamental matters of Beingand language. These separations,however, recapitulate the divisionof actual and essentialbeing: on the one hand, we have an ontic thinking,concerned with entities;on the otherhand, a thinkingof essentialmatters. The distinctions Heideggerand Nishitanidraw in the realm of thought,then, reinforce the divisionsto be overcome.An effectof these separations can be seenin Nishitani's occasional statementsthat ultimate reality can onlybe presentedas paradox: When we persistin our pursuitof whatis trulytrue, among the thingsthat are true,the trulytrue appears in the mode of paradox or absurdity,under the conditionsordinarily considered as altogethercontradictory to truth.Where ratiois pushedto itslimits the "irrational" shows up. Wheremeaning is pushed to its extreme,"meaninglessness" shows up. And yet what thus appears as paradox,irrationality, or meaninglessness,is trulyabsolute reality. (RN, p. 180)

But ifemptiness is nondual,then how can it be so easilyaligned with the simple opposites of reason and meaning?The "irrational"does not seem to be the emptinessof reason,but reason's flip side, which appears in themovement from the"field of consciousness"to "nihility."If one holds thatreason is inadequate to conveyultimate reality, then one musthold paradox to be inadequateas well; ifultimate reality is ultimatelyinconceivable, then it mustescape any attemptto captureit, reasoned and paradoxical.On theother hand, ifthe "fieldof emptiness" is an "absolutelynear side," thenwe mustbe led to an appreciationof reasonin its role of guidingus in theeveryday world. Nishitanidoes not always remain withinthe separationof meaning and paradox.He tellsus thatthe Japanese word "kokoro" can meanboth "meaning" and "mind"; thusto understandmeaning is to obtainthe mind of a givenmatter ("koto"). Understandingis a reciprocaltransmission of minds,"wherein a koto takespossession of us and transfersinto us, evenas we in turnreally transfer over intothe koto so thatour mindbecomes and worksas thekoto" (RN, p. 179). In thisback-and-forth movement, "meaning" is an abstraction,for it arreststhe processand attemptsan ideal correlationof thought,meaning, and matter.In Mahayana Buddhistliterature, such as the VimalakfrtiSutra, ultimate reality is said to be inconceivablefor the graspingmind, that is, for the mind that constructsrealities out of conceptsand thenclings to thesereifications. On the "fieldof emptiness,"one toleratesthe impossibilityof graspingthings as they reallyare: as Robert Thurmanputs it, "the graspingmind cannot grasp its

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ultimateinability to grasp;it can onlycultivate its tolerance of thatinability." 43 In the PrajidpdramitdSuitras, emptiness is said to be emptyeven of itself: emptinessis thelack of svabhdva(intrinsic reality), but thislack does not itself have an intrinsicallyreal status.This understandingis said to preventthe two extremesof reificationand repudiation(nihilism): emptiness is not intrinsically real, but it is not a denial of conventionalthings, for it is the dependent- originationof form.Thus, as Nishitanitells us, the realizationof "mind- meaning"is notan act ofgrasping or discerning;itis whathe calls "a discernment of non-discernment"(RN, p. 182). Planetarythinking requires such a middleway, one that does not sacrifice identityto difference,or reducedifference to identity.Instead of tryingto merge manytraditions into one, or restingcontent with tolerant isolation, we must attemptto create the spaces in whichtraditions can interfereand call forth modificationsin each other.I say "spaces" in theplural, for space and tradition are interdependent;neither one is ultimatelysituated in theother. The encounter among traditionsshould not be dogmaticallycombative, but we should not exclude criticalconfrontation, that is, confrontationaimed at furtheringthe conversation,not drowning out thevoices of others. Agonistics is notnecessarily intolerant(as manyproponents of religious dialogue seem to think),for it can be a strategyfor furthering a conversation. What unitesus in conversationhere is the attemptto thinkin a planetary context,and so to build and dwell in a planetaryworld. Heidegger tells us in "Building Dwelling Thinking"that the "nature of buildingis lettingdwell. Buildingaccomplishes its naturein the raisingof locationsand thejoining of theirspaces. Onlyif we are capableof dwelling, only then can we build" (italicsin original).44Heidegger writes that a bridgegathers a landscape together;in creatinga passage, it setsoff the banks of a riverand does not merelyconnect whatwas alreadythere. A bridgedetermines a space, and space is theopenness thatpermits us to build;in his words,"building ... is a foundingand joiningof 4 spaces." 5 The joiningof spaces is nottheir unification, but, to borrowan image fromMichel Serres,the negotiationof passages among them.A passage is createdby movement, and, in movement,passage and traverserare inseparable. Planetarythinking must search for pathways among traditions, must attempt to join the spaces that make up our world. Such a journeynot only altersour "imaginativegeography" to the contoursof the landscape,but producesnew spaces and terrain,places we have not dweltin before.

NOTES

1. MartinHeidegger, The Questionof Being,trans. William Kluback and JeanT. Wilde (New Haven, Connecticut:College and UniversityPress, 1958), p. 107. 2. Martin Heidegger,What Is Philosophy?trans. William Kluback and JeanT. Wilde (New Haven, Connecticut:College and UniversityPress), pp. 29-31.

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3. JacquesDerrida, "Violence and Metaphysics,"in Writingand Difference,trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, Illinois:The UniversityPress of Chicago, 1978),p. 81. 4. See Heidegger,What Is Philosophy?pp. 71-73. 5. MartinHeidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," in On the Way to Language,trans. Peter D. Hertz(New York: Harperand Row, 1971). 6. JacquesDerrida, Of Grammatology,trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore,Mary- land: The JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1974), pp. 25-26, 90-91. 7. Edward Said, Orientalism(New York: VintageBooks, 1978),pp. 49-73. 8. HenryCorbin, The Conceptof ComparativePhilosophy, trans. Peter Russell (Ipswich,Eng- land: Golgonooza Press,1981), p. 4. 9. Keiji Nishitani,Religion and Nothingness,trans. Jan Van Bragt(Berkeley, California: Univer- sityof CaliforniaPress, 1982); hereafterreferred to in thetext as RN. 10. The "fieldof consciousness"refers to the separationof selfand world wherethe latteris understoodas a fieldof objectivityfor a subject,the former."Nihility" is theterm Bragt coins for "relativenothingness," the nothingnessof nihilismand existentialism,in contrastto "absolute nothingness"or "emptiness." 11. FyodorDostoyevsky, Notes From Underground; The Double,trans. Jessie Coulson (London: PenguinBooks Ltd., 1972),p. 37. 12. FriedrichNietzsche, The Willto Power,trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale,ed. WalterKaufmann (New York: VintageBooks, 1967),p. 9. 13. Martin Heidegger,"What Is Metaphysics?"in Existenceand Being(South Bend, Indiana: GatewayEditions, 1949). 14. Heidegger,The Questionof Being, p. 97. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. See MartinHeidegger, Identity and Difference,trans. Joan Stambaugh(New York: Harper and Row, 1969),p. 70. 18. Heidegger,The Questionof Being, p. 73. 19. Heidegger,Identity and Difference,p. 64. 20. Ibid., p. 33. 21. MartinHeidegger, The End of Philosophy,trans. Joan Stambaugh(New York: Harper and Row, 1973),pp. 2-3. 22. Nishitaniuses "realize" in the double sense of "to actualize" and "to appropriatethrough understanding."See RN, pp. 5-6. 23. See Worldof the Buddha: A Reader,ed. LucienStryk (New York: AnchorBooks, 1969),p.356. 24. Heidegger,The Questionof Being,p. 89. 25. Cf. Heidegger,Identity and Difference,pp. 50-51. 26. MartinHeidegger, On Timeand Being,trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harperand Row, 1972),pp. 8-9. 27. PierreLivet, "Interferenceentre civilisations ou dialogue autor6efrent:l'ambiguit6 heideg- gerienne,"in Les EtudesPhilosophiques: Philosophies Orientales et ExtremeOrientales, Octobre- Decembre,1983 (Paris: PressesUniversitaires de France),pp. 477-478. 28. Heidegger,Identity and Difference,p. 65. 29. Heidegger,On Timeand Being,p. 13. 30. Ibid., pp. 13-14. 31. Ibid., p. 15. 32. See AlbertHofstadter's introduction to his translationof Martin Heidegger,Poetry, Lan- guage, Thought(New York: Harperand Row, 1971),pp. xviii-xxii. 33. Heidegger,On Timeand Being,pp. 22-23. 34. Heidegger,Identity and Difference,pp. 36-37. 35. Heidegger,The Questionof Being,p. 57. 36. Ibid. 37. See MartinHeidegger, The Essence of Reasons,trans. Terrence Malick (Evansville,Illinois: NorthwesternUniversity Press). 38. Heidegger,"What is Metaphysics?"p. 348. 39. Heidegger,The Questionof Being,p. 87.

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40. "The Prajiiaparamita-hridayasutra," in D. T. Suzuki,Manual ofZen Buddhism(New York: GrovePress, 1960), p. 27. 41. MartinHeidegger, "Der Fehl heiligerNamen," ContreToute Attente, 2-3, Printemps-Ete, 1981; Englishtranslation, "The Lack of Sacred Names," by Thomas Pepper (unpublishedmanu- script).I wishto thankThomas Pepperfor making this manuscript available to me, and formany conversationsthat have aided me greatlyin writingthis essay. 42. Heidegger,On Timeand Being,p. 71. 43. Robert A. F. Thurman,trans., The Holy Teachingof VimalakTrti(Philadelphia, Penn.: PennsylvaniaUniversity Press, 1976), p. 161. 44. Heidegger,"Building Dwelling Thinking," in Poetry,Language, Thought, p. 160. 45. Ibid., p. 158.

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