Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–02–3 September 2002 Vol. 15, No. 3 From the Commandant September 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 3

While all U.S. operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom have been characterized by the skill and dedica- tion of United States military personnel, the contributions of U.S. special-operations forces have been particularly valuable. To ensure that the contributions of the Army special-operations forces involved do not go unsung, the Army Special Operations Command has undertaken a project that will record the activities of ARSOF units. The USASOC historian’s office has inter- viewed soldiers from a variety of ARSOF units and is recording the results of the research in a book scheduled to be pub- lished later this year. ARSOF have been able to perform their In this issue of Special Warfare, we are for- missions in Afghanistan quickly and effec- tunate to be able to present abbreviated ver- tively. It is difficult to read the accounts of sions of many of the articles that will be their activities without feeling a sense of included in that book. While our selections do admiration and pride. not encompass all the articles that will be At the Special Warfare Center and included in the book, our intent has been to School, we have another reason to be proud present vignettes that represent the wide of the operations that ARSOF have per- range of ARSOF missions. formed in Afghanistan. The efficiency and In many of the vignettes, the participants professionalism that have characterized are identified by pseudonyms. The pseudo- ARSOF soldiers’ actions there are a result nyms are used for security reasons, but they of the training programs that we have may have another, unintended effect: By helped develop and administer over the obscuring the identity of the individuals, the past several years. Moreover, the bravery, pseudonyms allow the reader to realize that flexibility and self-reliance demonstrated the activities were those of a team, any of by ARSOF soldiers validates our assess- whose members would have been capable of ment-and-selection procedures. In the end, performing the same actions. ARSOF activities in Afghanistan have The number of vignettes is evidence of the shown the world what we have known for wide range of ARSOF missions and the num- some time — that we are training some of ber of units that have participated in the finest soldiers in the world. Afghanistan to date. Those missions include precision flying at night, disaster relief, psy- chological operations, direct action, uncon- ventional warfare, coalition operations, coun- terinsurgency, and the provision of supplies and communications under extremely diffi- Major General William G. Boykin cult conditions. Despite challenges from weather and ter- rain, from cultural and language barriers, and from a sensitive political situation, PB 80–02–3 Contents September 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 3

Commander & Commandant Major General William G. Boykin Features Editor 3‘Find Those Responsible’: The Beginnings of Operation Jerry D. Steelman Enduring Freedom Associate Editor by Dr. Richard L. Kiper Sylvia W. McCarley 6 Into the Dark: The 3/75th Ranger Regiment Graphics & Design by Dr. Richard L. Kiper Bruce S. Barfield 8‘We Don’t Fail’: The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion Automation Clerk by Dr. Richard L. Kiper Gloria H. Sawyer 10 Meeting the ‘G-Chief’: ODA 595 by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

13 ‘We Support to the Utmost’: The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion

V E R TAS I T R A B E by Dr. Richard L. Kiper S LI E T Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the 16 Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: The Staff of the 3/5th SF Group United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is to promote the professional development of special- operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. 19 ‘Of Vital Importance’: The 4th PSYOP Group Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do by Dr. Richard L. Kiper not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 22 ‘Have Tools, Will Travel’: Company D, 109th Aviation Battalion Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and by James A. Schroder should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special 24 The Campaign in Transition: From Conventional Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where to Unconventional War copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private 27 Change of Mission: ODA 394 subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web 30 Caves and Graves: The 19th SF Group (https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm). by Dr. Richard L. Kiper By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 32 To Educate and to Motivate: The 345th PSYOP Company Eric K. Shinseki by Dr. Richard L. Kiper General, United States Army Chief of Staff 34 Armed Convoy to Kabul: The 3/20th SF Group Official: by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp 36 Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP Teams in Joel B. Hudson Afghanistan Administrative Assistant to the by Dr. C.H. Briscoe Secretary of the Army 0219002 Headquarters, Department of the Army (Contents continued next page) Contents PB 80–02–3 September 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 3

39 Ambush at 80 Knots: Company B, 3/160th SOAR by James A. Schroder 42 An Army for Afghanistan: The 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, and the Afghan Army by Dr. Richard L. Kiper 44 ‘Deminimus Activities’ at the Bagram Clinic: CA Team A-41 by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp 46 Forty-Five Seconds on a Hot LZ: The 2/160th SOAR by James A. Schroder

50 Observations: ARSOF in Afghanistan by James A. Schroder

53 Vigilant Warrior 2002: War Game Demonstrates ARSOF’s Value to the Objective Force by Major General William G. Boykin

56 As I Saw It: The Eyewitness Report of a Soldier Who Fought During World War II and Survived by Colonel Vernon E. Greene, U.S. Army (ret.)

Departments 62 Foreign SOF 63 Enlisted Career Notes 64 Officer Career Notes 66 Update 68 Book Reviews ‘Find Those Responsible’: The Beginnings of Operation Enduring Freedom by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

aliban, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden — tions there. Two-thirds of the country is as the rays of the early morning sun covered by mountains that rise to almost Treflected from the twin towers of the 17,000 feet. Only 15 percent of the land can World Trade Center Sept. 11, 2001, few support agriculture. Three major lan- Americans had ever heard those names. guages and 30 minor languages, religious Within hours, however, few Americans divisions between the majority Sunni Mus- would not have heard them. lims and the minority Shi’a Muslims, trib- Not since Dec. 7, 1941, had the United al cultures, oppression, illiteracy, famine, States been attacked directly by a foreign drought, and the lack of infrastructure power. Within 24 hours, intelligence reports have severely hampered military and linked Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden diplomatic attempts to destroy the al- to the attacks, and congressmen and mili- Qaeda terrorists and to remove the Taliban tary officials were calling for retaliation. from power.5 Of no small import are the President George W. Bush characterized the millions of undocumented land mines that attacks as “acts of mass murder” and are strewn about the country. pledged “to find those responsible and bring “We will rally the world,” declared Presi- them to justice.”1 While Secretary of State dent Bush, and Secretary of State Powell Colin Powell mounted a diplomatic offen- immediately launched a diplomatic offen- sive to garner support for action by the U.S., sive to rally support from both the United Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pre- Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty pared an order to mobilize reservists and Organization, or NATO. “We’re building a members of the National Guard. Deputy strong coalition to go after these perpetra- Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz warned tors,” Powell told reporters. Within days, that the military was “entering into a cam- the U.S. had received pledges of support paign against terrorism.”2 from Russia, China, NATO and the Euro- On Sept. 15, the U.S. Senate adopted a pean Union.6 Such coalition support would resolution that authorized “the use of prove invaluable. United States armed forces against those Any doubt as to the legality of military responsible for the recent attacks launched action against the terrorists and their sup- against the United States.”3 Bin Laden porters was laid to rest when the U.S. Con- quickly became the focus of an unprece- gress passed a joint resolution authorizing dented manhunt, and Afghanistan was the the president “to use all necessary and prime area of attention.4 appropriate force against those … [who] Afghanistan’s geography and demogra- aided the terrorist attacks.”7 To establish a phy are significant challenges to opera- secure footing for further coalition support,

September 2002 3 Secretary Powell invoked Article 51 of the told the American people in a nationally U.N. Charter, which guarantees “the inher- televised address Oct. 8. The previous ent right of individual or collective self- night, U.S.-led airstrikes had struck tar- defense if an armed attack occurs against a gets near Kabul and Kandahar.13 However, Member of the United Nations.”8 Calmly, it was clear that if the U.S. was going to systematically, and methodically the U.S. wage an effective campaign in the remote- was dotting the “i’s” and crossing the “t’s.” ness of Afghanistan, the use of bases in the In a warning issued at the Pentagon region would be critical. The efforts of the Sept. 17, President Bush stated that he Secretary of State had paid off when the wanted bin Laden brought to justice “dead Uzbeks allowed coalition forces to be based or alive.”9 It was no idle threat. Two days at Karshi Kanabad, which would become earlier, during a meeting at Camp David, known as K2. On Oct. 7, airplanes carrying Bush and his national-security team had logistics and communications personnel reviewed the options for responding to the and equipment from both the 528th Sup- terrorist attacks. port Battalion and the 112th Signal Bat- During the meeting, Director of Central talion began arriving at K2. Also in the Intelligence George Tenet offered a plan for process of deploying were elements from using the Northern Alliance opposition to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Reg- the Taliban. Under his plan, U.S. ground iment, the 4th Psychological Operations forces would link up with the Northern Group, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and Alliance fighters in order to attack terror- the 5th SF Group.14 ist supporters in and around cities in Critical to the conduct of any military northern Afghanistan. According to the operation is the establishment of a logistics president, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld base and a communications network. “understood the utility of having the CIA While the 528th and the 112th valiantly involved,” and “quickly grasped” the plan labored to convert a primitive airfield into “to mate up our assets with the Northern a usable facility, the 160th SOAR and the Alliance troops.” Chairman of the Joint 5th SF Group began planning for future Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton then pre- combat missions. State Department sented three military options. In his third spokesman Richard Boucher admitted that option, he recommended attacks by cruise representatives were in contact “with the missiles and manned bombers, with the whole gamut of Afghan factions, including addition of placing “boots on the ground” — the Northern Alliance.” Secretary Rums- the insertion of Army Special Forces.10 feld stated on “Meet the Press” that the When President Bush told “everybody who U.S. was attempting to find ways of assist- wears the uniform to get ready,” on Sept. 15, ing antiterrorist forces.15 Washington Post reporters already were specu- Civil Affairs units began planning for lating that SF was “certain to be at the center the distribution of blankets and food to dis- of the action.”11 Little did the reporters know placed persons that would take place once that while the National Guard and the Army the tactical situation had been stabilized. Reserve were activating their soldiers, and In the meantime, however, on Oct. 7, U.S. while military installations were tightening Air Force C-17s began air-dropping their security measures, the U.S. Central Com- humanitarian-aid rations. Two days later mand, or USCENTCOM, was quietly summon- Air Force EC-130 “Commando Solo” air- ing planners from the U.S. Army Special Oper- craft began broadcasting radio messages to ations Command to investigate various means emphasize the international nature of the of retaliating against the terrorists. As the fight mission to free the Afghan people from the against terrorism began, Rumsfeld did oppressive rule of the non-Islamic Taliban. acknowledge, “a lot of the effort … will be spe- Other messages were directed at the Tal- cial operations.” Army Secretary Thomas White iban: “You are condemned. Resistance is seconded that acknowledgement.12 futile. Surrender now.” Those scripts were “On my orders, the United States mili- prepared by the Product Development tary has begun strikes,” President Bush Company of the 4th PSYOP Group.16

4 Special Warfare On the night of Oct. 19, Rangers from the Nod,” Washington Times, 27 September 2001, 17; 75th Ranger Regiment parachuted from Charter of the United Nations, www1.umn.edu/ MC-130s into Afghanistan. That same humanrts/instree/chapter 7.html. 9 Dan Balz, “Bush Warns of Casualties of War,” night, detachments from the 5th SF Group Washington Post, 18 September 2001, 1. This warning landed by MH-47E helicopters flown by the was issued on 17 September. 160th SOAR. The articles in this issue of 10 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “At Camp David, Special Warfare tell the stories of some of Advise and Consent,” Washington Post, 15 September the Army’s special-operations forces that 2001, A01. 11 Elaine Sciolino, “Bush Tells the Military to ‘Get were engaged in the operation to find those Ready’; Broader Spy Powers Gaining Support,” New responsible for the terrorist attacks on the York Times, 16 September 2001, 1; Dana Priest, “Spe- U.S. that September morning — Operation cial Forces May Play Key Role,” Washington Post,15 Enduring Freedom. September 2001, 5. 12 Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt, and Thom Shanker, “Scarcity of Afghan Targets Leads U.S. to Revise Strategy,” New York Times, 19 September Dr. Richard L. Kiper earned his Ph.D. in 2001; Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Prepares Vari- history at the University of Kansas. He pre- ety of Responses,” Washington Times, 21 September viously served as an officer in Special 2001, 1. 13 Forces, airborne, and infantry units state- Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. And Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; side and overseas. He also served on the Bush Warns ‘Taliban Will Pay A Price,’” New York Army Staff, and he was an instructor at Times,8 October 2001, 1; Peter Baker, “Kabul and West Point and at Fort Leavenworth. He Kandahar Hit in Attacks Through Night,” Washington earned his Combat Infantryman Badge Post,8 October 2001, 1. 14 and Purple Heart in Vietnam, where he C.J. Chivers, “2nd Wave of Troops Arrives in Uzbek- istan,” New York Times,8 October 2001; U.S. Army served in the 5th Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command Crisis Response Cell as an infantry-company commander. His briefing, 092000Z Oct 2001. first book, Maj. Gen. John Alexander 15Rowan Scarborough, “Northern Alliance Gets Help McClernand: Politician in Uniform, won From U.S.,” Washington Times, 28 September 2001, 1; the Pratt Award for best nonfiction Civil Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Bush Approves Covert Aid for Taliban Forces,” New York War book in 1999. Times,1 October 2001, 1. 16 U.S. Army Center for Military History,“Afghan War Notes: Chronology,” 25 April 2002; Andrea Stone, “USA’s Air- 1 Rowan Scarborough, “Military Officers Seek Swift, borne Message: Taliban, ‘You Are Condemned,’” USA Deadly Response,” Washington Times, 12 September Today, 17 October 2001, 10; Major Larry Paulson 2001, 1; Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Intelli- (pseudonym), 4th POG, interview by author, 3 April gence Points to Bin Laden Network,” Washington 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Post, 12 September 2001, 1; eMedilMillWorks, Inc., Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. “President Bush’s Remarks,” Washington Post,12 September 2001, 2. 2 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Asks Call-Up of Reserves, As Many As 50,000,” New York Times, 14 September 2001; Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Plans War on Terrorists, Not Infrastructure,” Wash- ington Times, 14 September 2001, 13. 3 David Von Drehle, “Senate Approves Use of Forces; Military Patrols Cities and Ports,” Washington Post, 15 September 2001, 1. 4 Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Intelligence Points to Bin Laden Network,” Washington Post,12 September 2001, 1. 5 Afghanistan Online, www.afghan-web.org; Country Watch – Afghanistan, www.countrywatch.com. 6 “A New World Order,” Christian Science Monitor, 14 September 2001, 1; President Bush’s address to the nation, 12 September 2001. 7 Associated Press, “Text of Joint Resolution,” Wash- ington Post, 15 September 2001, 4. 8 Nicholas Kralev, “U.S. Can Strike Without U.N.

September 2002 5 Into the Dark: The 3/75th Ranger Regiment

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

n Oct. 19, 2001, Ranger Task Force targets on Objective Iron. They could not 3/75(-), with a regimental command- identify Objective Copper from the air. AC- Oand-control element, conducted the 130s also fired on buildings and towers with- first Ranger combat parachute assault since in the walls of Objective Cobalt. Operation Just Cause in Panama. Four MC- Company A(-), with a sniper team, had 130s dropped 199 Rangers from 800 feet the mission of securing Objectives Tin and above ground level under zero illumination Iron to prevent enemy interdiction of to seize a remote desert landing strip, or Objective Cobalt and the landing strip. DLS; to destroy Taliban forces; to gather Specialist Martin Pasquez realized how intelligence; to provide a casualty transload low the airplane was flying when the doors site; to establish a forward aerial of the MC-130 were opened and dust blew refuel/rearm point, or FARP, for rotary-wing into the plane. As they were floating down, Sergeant First Class Ron Searcey and the En route to the drop, Rangers on each chalk men of his platoon were able to orient themselves by the light of Objective Tin, recited the Ranger Creed. Subsequent actions which was burning as a result of the bomb strike. Because both fixed- and rotary-wing proved that they indeed exemplified the aircraft would be landing, the Rangers had creed: ‘Readily will I display the intestinal for- to bag all of their parachutes before mov- ing off the landing strip. The Rangers were titude required to fight on to the Ranger objec- prepared for resistance, but only one enemy soldier appeared. He was killed by tive and complete the mission.’ several soldiers from Company C. Because they had performed numerous rehearsals, aircraft; and to assess the capabilities of the the Rangers were able to assemble, clear airstrip for future operations.1 Objective Iron, and establish the pre- Objective Rhino, located southwest of Kan- planned blocking positions quickly.2 dahar, consisted of four separate objectives: The mission of the two platoons from Com- Tin, Iron, Copper and Cobalt. B-1 bombers pany C was to clear Objective Cobalt — the dropped 2,000-pound bombs that were guid- walled compound on the objective.Although the ed by the global positioning system on Objec- AC-130 had directed fire against the com- tive Tin, followed by fire support from AC- pound, damage was minimal. Concrete walls 130s. Initial reports indicated that 11 enemy and roofs reinforced with rebar had absorbed soldiers had been killed and nine had been the blasts, or the shells had simply penetrated seen running away.The aircrew identified no the ceilings, leaving only a hole. The same was

6 Special Warfare true in the case of the towers. As Rangers controllers smoothly directed them to the moved toward Objective Cobalt, a loudspeaker awaiting refuelers. Finally, each Ranger per- team from the 9th Psychological Operations formed superbly. Battalion broadcast tapes in three languages to En route to the drop, Rangers on each encourage enemy soldiers to surrender. The chalk recited the Ranger Creed. Subsequent Americans did not know that the compound actions proved that they indeed exemplified was empty. Pre-assault fire had breached the the creed: “Readily will I display the intesti- wall, giving the Rangers an entry point into the nal fortitude required to fight on to the area. The Rangers moved quickly to the specif- Ranger objective and complete the mis- ic target buildings and the towers that were to sion.”5 In addition to accomplishing their be cleared. Clearing the buildings proved to be assigned mission, the Rangers proved that a more difficult and time-consuming process American military forces could strike swift- than had been anticipated: Many of the locked ly, silently, with deadly force, at night. steel doors could be opened only by multiple Ranger fortitude, technology and training shotgun blasts or demolition charges.3 combined to demonstrate to the Taliban and Fourteen minutes after Company C(-) had to al-Qaeda that there are no safe havens. begun to clear the compound, an MC-130 car- On Nov. 25, 2001, U.S. Marines occupied rying medical personnel arrived, and doctors the site of the Ranger assault and desig- began to treat two soldiers who had been nated their new facility Camp Rhino.6 injured during the jump. Six minutes later, a flight of helicopters that were participating in another operation arrived to be rearmed Notes: and refueled. While they were being serviced, 1 “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October 2001” orbiting AC-130s destroyed enemy vehicles (Masirah Island, Oman: 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger and personnel that were moving toward the Regiment, 25 October 2001), 1; “The 75th Ranger Reg- area. Meanwhile, members of a U.S. Air Force iment: Combat Operations in Southern Afghanistan in special-tactics squadron were surveying the Support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” briefing pre- DLS to determine its ability to accommodate pared by the 75th Ranger Regiment, n.d. 2 1st Lieutenant Kenneth Brown (pseudonym), Spe- larger aircraft. cialist Martin Pasquez (pseudonym), Sergeant First Upon completion of the rearming and Class Ron Searcey (pseudonym) and Sergeant Thomas refueling operations, the helicopters depart- Evans (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th ed and the Rangers who had been clearing Ranger Regiment, interview by author, 28 March 2002, Cobalt began to collapse toward the MC- Fort Benning, Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. 130s that had been refueling the heli- 3 Staff Sergeant James Turner (pseudonym), Compa- copters. The last MC-130 departed five ny B, 9th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations hours and 24 minutes after the airborne Group, interview by author, 3 April 2002, Fort Bragg, assault had begun.4 N.C.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations “Rangers Lead the Way,” and the 75th Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Sergeant First Class Ron Searcey (pseudonym), Captain Stanley Rangers led the way in accomplishing every Davis (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th objective assigned. Several factors con- Ranger Regiment, interview by author, 28 March 2002, tributed to the success of the Rangers. Accu- Fort Benning, Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special rate intelligence allowed them to conduct Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. detailed rehearsals. The interior construction 4 “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October 2001,” 1. of the buildings on Objective Cobalt, howev- 5 Captain Sam Crevald (pseudonym), Headquarters er, caused the clearing operation to take Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, longer than had been anticipated. Firepower interview by author, 28 March 2002, Fort Benning, provided by on-station AC-130s prevented Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations enemy forces from interfering with the oper- Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Ranger Creed, www.benning.army.mil/rtb/ranger/rgrcreed.htm. ation. The actions of the departure airfield 6 Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Grabs Airstrip Near control party — ensuring that fixed-wing air- Kandahar, Gains Fixed Base Inside Afghanistan,” craft taxied and parked where there would Washington Times, 27 November 2001, 1. be no possibility of collision — were critical to overall success. As the helicopters arrived,

September 2002 7 ‘We Don’t Fail’: The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

n Sept. 21, 2001, 10 days after the pany A arrived in theater, and there was terrorist attacks on the United little knowledge available about which OStates, Company A, 112th Special other units might be coming or when. Operations Signal Battalion, received a U.S. In addition, the available real estate was Central Command deployment order to pro- littered with trash and discarded Russian vide communications support to the Joint equipment, and the soil was contaminated Special Operations Task Force, or JSOTF, with petroleum, oil and lubricants. As units that was being established in Karshi Kan- began to move into the base, some difficul- abad, Uzbekistan, in support of Operation ties developed among the communicators Enduring Freedom.1 On Oct. 4, 37 soldiers from different headquarters and the allo- deployed to the theater; they arrived there cators of real estate. For example, systems Oct. 6 and reported to the J6.2 that would be used to process top-secret The 112th is capable of deploying rapidly information were supposed to be located to establish the long-haul links that allow near a secure compartmented information deployed special-operations forces, or SOF,to facility, or SCIF. When units arrived, how- communicate with headquarters in Europe ever, the SCIF had not been established. and in the United States, and with When it was established later on, some embassies in neighboring countries. units had to move their equipment and Although the mission in Karshi Kanabad interrupt their communications. would be a combat mission, it was typical of Company A arrived in theater with one the missions that the 112th had practiced many times on exercises in the U.S. and abroad. Those exercises had led Company A to develop standard communications deploy- ment packages in order to minimize last- minute predeployment planning. Upon its arrival in Karshi Kanabad, Company A faced the initial difficulty of determining where to set up its operations. This was a critical decision, because it is a guiding principle of communications that once communications have been estab- lished, the communications equipment U.S. Army photo should not be moved. There were only The 112th Signal Battalion operates at Karshi Kanabad about 100 people on the ground when Com- in Uzbekistan.

8 Special Warfare super-high-frequency satellite hub, a tacti- was being established there. 2nd Lieu- cal telephone switch, a data-services team, tenant Tom Washington, a former enlisted one SCAMPI node capable of providing SF soldier, and his platoon immediately secure and nonsecure networking, data appropriated space in a field near the services and secure telephones, equipment perimeter and went to work. Within 48 for secure video teleconferencing, and three hours, Washington’s company had complet- Special Operations Communication ed the links between the JSOTF and the Assemblage, or SOCA, teams capable of higher headquarters, as Company A had providing tactical satellite communica- done. In Washington’s words, that accom- tions. The 112th was also equipped with plishment was possible only because about 200 personal computers. “Incredible guys are running these sys- Within 48 hours, the company had tems.” The next month, soldiers from the installed communications to support the first platoon established communications Joint Special Operations Air Component, in Kabul between the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF which had already been established. Minor Group, and the JSOTF. The platoon also technical problems and real-estate alloca- deployed three SOCA teams to support for- tion difficulties that required some equip- ward-operations bases in Khowst, Kanda- ment to be moved resulted in the SCAMPI har and Shkin.5 not being re-established for about four days. Operation Enduring Freedom validated Normally, some of those problems would the concept that a rapidly deployable sig- have been resolved in a predeployment nal battalion that is dedicated to support- commo exercise. Under the conditions, how- ing SOF is essential to the accomplishment ever, it was not possible for Company A to of special-operations missions. Soldiers of troubleshoot problems beforehand.3 the 112th have developed the attitude of Once the JSOTF commander arrived, he the customers they serve. First Sergeant assigned the 112th the mission of being Martin Masterson of Company A summed fully capable by Oct. 13 to support future up that attitude: “We don’t fail; we just missions. Captain Steve Marks, who had don’t fail.”6 commanded the company during operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard, took it as a challenge that the company would not be Notes: the weak link in the execution of future mis- 1 United States Central Command Deployment Order, 19 September 2002. sions. The unit met the challenge, and it was 2 Briefing, Company A, 112th Special Operations able to establish a secure video teleconfer- Signal Battalion, January 2002, U.S. Army Special encing link from the theater back to the U.S. Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Eventually, the unit was executing 10-14 3 Captain Steve Marks (pseudonym), Company A, video conferences daily.4 These conferences 112th Signal Battalion, interview by author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Spe- enabled commanders to provide real-time cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. reports and to receive immediate guidance 4 First Sergeant Martin Masterson (pseudonym), on future operations. The company also Company A, 112th Signal Battalion, interview by arranged for two SOCA teams to deploy to author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape record- embassies and for one SOCA team to pro- ing, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. vide communications between a Special 5 2nd Lieutenant Tom Washington (pseudonym), 2nd Forces detachment at Mazar-e Sharif and Platoon, Company B, 112th Signal Battalion, inter- its headquarters. view by author, 6 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, After approximately 100 days, a conven- tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Com- tional Army signal battalion replaced Com- mand archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. 6 Masterson interview. pany A at Karshi Kanabad, but that did not end the 112th’s involvement in the war against terrorism. In March 2002, the sec- ond platoon of the 112th’s Company B deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, to pro- vide communications to the JSOTF that

September 2002 9 Meeting the ‘G-Chief’: ODA 595

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

s the sun rose Oct. 19, 2001, in the Special Forces A-detachment 595 had Dari-a-Souf valley in northern arrived only a few hours earlier, flown in AAfghanistan, Captain Mike Nash wait- during the night by the crew of an MH-47E ed to meet his new Afghan ally.1 General Chinook helicopter from the 160th Special Abdul Rashid Dostum was the commander of Operations Aviation Regiment. Relying on the largest armed faction of the Northern their multi-mode radar, the pilots had Alliance. An ethnic Uzbek and former Soviet brought the SF soldiers over mountains tank officer, Dostum had been fighting the Tal- higher than the Rockies and had flown iban in the canyons of the “Valley of the River them through a nighttime dust storm that of Caves” for years. He had been described to forced back two MH-60 escorts. To reach Nash in intelligence reports as a “ruthless the detachment’s objective, the Chinook warlord,” who would likely be unreceptive to had to conduct an aerial refueling while Americans and might even attempt to kill him flying at 110 knots only 300 feet above the at their first meeting. ground, in the moonless dark. Nash and the 11 other men of U.S. Army From the time of their arrival until 5 a.m.,

Special Forces soldiers from A-detachment 595 ride into battle with Afghan warriors. U.S. Army photo

10 Special Warfare Nash, his executive officer and his team discern that Dostum’s 2,000 troops were sergeant received a complete intelligence horse-mounted cavalrymen, and in the update. The ominous personality profile of crash planning sessions, no one noted that Dostum that Nash had received in Uzbek- Nash had grown up as a cowboy. istan was recast during the update. Dostum As Dostum’s entourage moved up a rocky was now described as a smart, pragmatic trail, Nash took measure of the SF team’s fighter who was eager for the American sol- mounts. They were “tough little mountain diers to join him. ponies,” he noted, “like American mustangs At 9 a.m., an advance security party of from out West.” He thought the saddles were 30 Afghan horsemen, armed with AK-47 too small for American soldiers. The stirrups assault rifles, PK machine guns and rock- were also short and nonadjustable, forcing et-propelled grenades, rode into the Ameri- the team members to ride with their knees can base camp. Dostum soon followed, also uncomfortably bent. The real problem, he on horseback, guarded by 20 more heavily thought, would occur if anyone were to fall armed riders. Dostum, Nash and two other men, one of them a translator, sat on carpets on the hill- Approximately six-foot-two and weighing side. They drank a cup of hot “shai” (Afghan tea) and made their initial plans.2 Nash around 230 pounds, Dostum was decidedly sized up the Afghan general — much bigger the man in charge. Deep-voiced, with close- than the average Afghan, he thought. Approximately six-foot-two and around 230 cropped gray hair and a short beard, Dostum pounds, Dostum was decidedly the man in charge. Deep-voiced, with close-cropped looked Nash in the eye as he spoke. He shook gray hair and a short beard, Dostum looked hands frequently, in a confident, friendly way. Nash in the eye as he spoke. He shook hands frequently, in a confident, friendly way. Dostum said that he had enough hors- from his horse on the narrow mountain es to take six Americans with him to his trails. Nash called out the first of several ad headquarters several hours’ ride to the hoc “horse SOPs” (standard operating proce- west, and he announced that he would be dures): “Keep your feet light in the stirrups,” leaving in 15 minutes. Mules would bring he ordered. Should anyone be thrown by a their rucksacks later, he assured the Ameri- runaway mount with his foot caught in a cans. Nash and his executive officer quickly stirrup, he added, the nearest man must chose the men for his “split team.” He left shoot the horse dead. “You’ll be killed if his warrant officer and the other half of his you’re dragged on this rocky ground,” he detachment behind to establish a base camp warned his team. and to organize the force’s logistics with Two days later, on Oct. 21, Dostum led Dostum’s supply officer. Nash and his team from his mountain It was a coincidence that the captain cho- headquarters camp to the front lines, sen to ride with Dostum was the best horse- where Nash proposed to begin aerial bom- man in the 5th SF Group. The lean, sandy- bardment of the Taliban forces. Oddly, haired Nash was raised in north central Nash noticed, Dostum seemed exceedingly Kansas on his parents’ cattle ranch, and he protective of him and his fellow Americans. competed in collegiate rodeo in calf-roping Besides surrounding them with his person- while earning a degree in biology at Kansas al bodyguards, Dostum would not allow the State. Detachment 595 had initially been Americans to approach closer than eight sent to Uzbekistan on a different assign- kilometers from the Taliban front lines. ment, which had subsequently been can- Nash’s team used its global-positioning- celled. As a result, the team was left with- satellite receiver to establish its position, out a mission until it was selected to sup- and then through the brownish haze, team port General Dostum’s anti-Taliban force. members plotted the azimuth and direc- Intelligence staffs had not had the time to tion to a far-off enemy bunker. A lone B-52

September 2002 11 Special Forces soldiers from A-detachment 595 direct airstrikes in north- ern Afghanistan.

U.S. Army photo bomber turned 20-minute-long racetracks Nash and his men were at the forward in the sky 20,000 feet overhead, dropping a edge of the assault, riding with the attack single bomb on each pass. force and guiding precision bomb strikes The first bomb turned out to be the one that would drive the Taliban from the that landed closest to the target. Subse- Dari-a-Souf valley for the first time in five quent adjustments moved the strike of the years. bombs a kilometer or more farther away, and in a different direction each time. Nash even saw Taliban troops gather Dr. Kalev I. Sepp earned his Ph.D. in his- around to inspect one of the bomb craters tory at Harvard University. He previously with impunity. Disappointed with the served as an officer in Special Forces, results, Nash released the B-52 after its Ranger, airborne, armored cavalry and sixth pass. Dostum, however, was buoyant. artillery units stateside and overseas, and The translator explained, “You made an he was an instructor at West Point. He aircraft appear and drop bombs. General earned his Combat Infantryman Badge as Dostum is very happy.” a brigade adviser during the Salvadoran With each bomb that fell, rapport civil war. improved between Dostum and his com- manders and the U.S. SF soldiers. Never- Notes: theless, to improve the effectiveness of fur- 1 This article is based on an interview with Captain Mike Nash (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, ther bombing, Nash insisted to Dostum 5th SF Group, Fort Campbell, Ky., by the author, 26 that he and his men be allowed to move March 2002. Dari-a-Souf is pronounced “DAH-ree-ah closer to the front. Dostum objected. He SOOF.” told Nash that he was certain that if any 2 Shai is pronounced “shy.” American were to be killed, the U.S. gov- ernment would withdraw all Americans from Afghanistan. Eventually, through discussions at com- manders’ meetings and through the per- sonal example of Americans under fire, Nash convinced the general that he did not need to fear an American withdrawal. When Dostum began his “big push” Nov. 5,

12 Special Warfare ‘We Support to the Utmost’: The 528th Special Operations Support Battalion by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

ilitary theorist Baron Antoine from numerous exercises with special- Henri de Jomini defined logistics operations forces enabled commanders and Mas “the art of moving armies.”1 section leaders to begin planning for a Since its reactivation in 1987, the 528th deployment of an unspecified period of Special Operations Support Battalion has time.2 become expert in the art of providing logis- The 528th conducted initial coordination tics support to special-operations soldiers with United States Special Operations who are deployed on exercises and mis- Command to familiarize the command sions worldwide. with the 528th’s capabilities. The 528th In October 2001, elements of Company also coordinated with the 5th Special A, the 528th’s forward-support company, Forces Group to reconfirm the SF group’s again deployed to support special-opera- support requirements. Again, OPSEC pre- tions soldiers. On this occasion, however, vented the 528th from being informed that the soldiers were not on an exercise, but it would be supporting a bare-base opera- were instead fighting the war on terrorism. tion and from coordinating directly with Because of considerations of operations the 10th Mountain Division, which would security, or OPSEC, the 528th did not provide base security. receive complete information about where The 528th’s mission would be to estab- it would deploy or exactly what its mission lish a ration point and a warehouse for would be. However, the unit’s experience repair parts, to provide office supplies and clothing for deployed special-operations forces, and to establish a fuel point. Short- ly before departure, the 528th’s leaders were informed they would deploy to Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, and that there would be no conventional support units to assist the 528th once it was in country.3 The unit also received attachments to per- form mortuary, medical and veterinary ser- vices. Both the company staff and the bat- talion staff had to constantly adjust the deployment package, which was based not U.S. Army photo on the anticipated requirements, but on Members of the 528th Special Operations Support Bat- the number of aircraft that would be avail- talion assemble racks at Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan. able to deploy the force.

September 2002 13 Upon its arrival in theater, the unit arrived daily by airlift. immediately coordinated with the advance The 528th’s reputation as a “can do” unit party from the 160th Special Operations quickly spread throughout the camp. Soon, Aviation Regiment, or SOAR, and an Air units that had deployed with little or no Force colonel from the Joint Special Opera- meals ready-to-eat, water, sleeping bags or tions Task Force-North for the allocation of winter clothing learned that the 528th the unit’s real estate. Previous exercises had would not turn away soldiers who needed revealed the capabilities of the Air Force support. Although the mission of the 528th base-support package, and that knowledge is to support special-operations units, the enabled the 528th to tailor its support battalion became, in essence, an area-sup- accordingly. Previous exercises had also pro- port unit. The only item that the unit tend- duced close cooperation with other services’ ed to hoard was toilet paper, which was in support forces, such as between Army and very short supply. Leaders also had not Air Force cooks. Staff Sergeant Manual Par- anticipated the tremendous need for office sons, a 528th food-service specialist, took supplies, initial stocks of which soon ran the responsibility for running the dining low. The necessity of stocking deployment containers with more of those items is a lesson learned. The 528th’s reputation as a ‘can do’ unit quickly Although some sections of the 528th had established relations with other SOF units spread throughout the camp. Soon, units that had during exercises, not all of them had. For deployed with little or no meals ready-to-eat, water, example, the warehouse section had never met the S4 sections of either the 160th sleeping bags or winter clothing learned that the SOAR or the 5th SF Group. This lack of familiarity could have been detrimental 528th would not turn away soldiers who needed except for the message that the 528th support. Although the mission of the 528th is to made clear: It was supporting soldiers who were conducting dangerous operations. support special-operations units, the battalion Staff Sergeant Celeste Holmes, the ware- house supervisor who would soon depart became, in essence, an area-support unit. for Officer Candidate School, understood how critical the mission was. “We won’t facility as a 24-hour operation.4 Soldiers turn away a shooter,” she said.5 encountered such unforeseen difficulties as Essential to the success of the support contaminated soil, trash dumps, remnants mission was the professionalism of the of Soviet equipment, and an occasional junior NCOs. Those soldiers, several of cobra emerging from the latrines — that is, whom had 8-10 years of experience in the after latrines were constructed. battalion, were accustomed to deploying A combat-arms soldier’s most valuable and directing a team to support special- tools are his weapon and his ammunition. operations units. They were proficient in 528th soldiers quickly learned that their taking the initiative, in thinking on their most valuable tools were lumber and a feet, and in taking responsibility for their forklift. Fortunately, Company A had actions. It was the NCOs who determined deployed with plywood and other lumber what was needed, and their decisions that could be turned into floors and allowed the unit to operate for two weeks latrines. The forklift operator became one in theater without resupply. They under- of the most sought-after soldiers on the stood how important their mission was at entire installation. Forklift operators the national level. moved mountains of abandoned equipment “We had little or no guidance, but lots of and trash to make room to develop Camp experience,” commented 1st Lieutenant Stronghold Freedom. They moved the con- Michael Bridgewater.6 OPSEC, country tainers that became the warehouse, and clearances, speed and the lack of environ- they moved the pallets of equipment that mental information forced the 528th to rely

14 Special Warfare on the experience it had gained from previ- author, 4 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, ous exercises. Having the ability to antici- U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort pate requirements enabled the unit to Bragg, N.C. deploy with the items needed to assist in the establishment of the base camp, to con- struct facilities, and to provide logistics support to units based at the camp. In early December 2001, most of the 528th’s Company A redeployed to Fort Bragg. Its mission in Afghanistan was assumed by the 507th Corps Support Com- mand. Operation Enduring Freedom vali- dated the operational concept that had led to the activation of the battalion — a unit capable of deploying quickly, operating independently and supporting effectively the Army’s special-operations forces. There is no greater compliment than one given by one’s peers. The true measure of how well the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion accomplished its mis- sion was best captured by Staff Sergeant Timothy Matthews from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group: “The 528th is a class act.”7

Notes: 1 Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), 69. 2 Captain Samuel Sims (pseudonym), Headquarters and Main Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 6 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U. S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. 3 “After Action Review for Operation Enduring Free- dom” (Fort Bragg, N.C.: Alpha Forward Support Com- pany, 528th Support Battalion, 13 March 2002), 1. 4 Staff Sergeant Manuel Parsons (pseudonym), Headquarters and Main Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape record- ing, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. 5 Staff Sergeant Celeste Holmes (pseudonym), Head- quarters and Main Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. 6 1st Lieutenant Michael Bridgewater (pseudonym), Company A, 528th Special Operations Support Bat- talion, interview by author, 6 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. 7 Staff Sergeant Timothy Matthews (pseudonym), Headquarters and Service Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, interview by

September 2002 15 Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: The Staff of the 3/5th SF Group

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

hen 300 soldiers of the al-Qaeda Operating Base, or FOB, 53.1 FOB 53, surrendered near the city of which was based in Mazar-e Sharif’s five- WMazar-e Sharif Nov. 24, 2001, nei- story Turkish School, was coordinating the ther the chiefs of the Northern Alliance nor consolidation of the newly-liberated city. their American advisers anticipated an The FOB commander was away, monitor- uprising that would become one of the ing the Northern Alliance’s encirclement of major battles of the war in Afghanistan. Konduz, a full day’s drive to the east. Late on the afternoon of Nov. 24, trucks carrying the 300 al-Qaeda prisoners arrived at the 18th-century fortress of Qala-i Jangi, 10 kilometers west of Mazar, where the pris- oners were interned under the guard of about 100 troops of the Northern Alliance. Built of adobe-style mud bricks, Qala-i Jangi dominated the local landscape. More than 300 meters in diameter, Qala-i Jangi was of the style known as Vaubanian — built with moats, ramparts, scarps and counterscarps and parapets. Its walls, 10 meters high and 15 meters thick, were topped with hundreds of firing ports. Dur- ing the 20th century, the fortress had served the Royal Afghan Army, the Soviet Red Army, the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. General Abdul Rashid Dostum had reclaimed it as his military headquar- ters only two weeks before, and U.S. Army U.S. Army photo SF teams had briefly stayed inside the U.S. Special Forces soldiers survey the damage to the Qala-i Jangi fortress fortress before moving to the cleaner and more spacious Turkish School, which was The mass surrender seemed to be more deserted except for its caretaker and a few good news for the two dozen United States instructors. Special Forces soldiers from the 3rd Bat- That night, the FOB received a report of talion, 5th SF Group, who staffed Forward trouble with the prisoners at Qala-i Jangi: An al-Qaeda prisoner had killed two

16 Special Warfare U.S. Army photo guards and himself with a concealed hand an armory in the southern compound, and A view of the breach in grenade. The next morning, the FOB they were now as well-armed as the the north wall of the received news of another suicide-by- Alliance forces who were trying to contain Qala-i Jangi fortress. The grenade that had killed three prisoners. them inside the fortress. From the ram- breach was created by an At 1:45 p.m. Nov. 25, Joint Special Oper- parts of the fort, the British squad poured errant U.S. Air Force bomb on Nov. 26, 2001. ations Task Force-North, located at Karshi machine-gun fire into the south compound. Kanabad, Uzbekistan, radioed FOB 53 The Americans directed aerial bombing that the prisoners at Qala-i Jangi had against the prisoners’ positions, while only killed two Americans. The next report from 150 meters away, Northern Alliance troops JSOTF-North was that one American had struggled to contain the al-Qaeda. As dark- been wounded and that another was ness gathered, the rescue force withdrew to trapped inside the fortress. Neither report the Turkish School to plan the next day’s was wholly correct. operations. Throughout the night, they As quickly as possible, the FOB opera- heard gunfire and explosions coming from tions officer formed an ad hoc rescue force. the fortress. A squad of British troops with a U.S. Navy On Nov. 26, the rescue force, reinforced attachment that had been operating in the by a platoon of infantrymen from the 10th Mazar-e Sharif area formed the rescue Mountain Division and by additional SF force’s assault element. Two U.S. Air Force soldiers, returned to the fortress to contin- intelligence officers, an Afghan interpreter, ue the aerial bombardment that would the SF battalion’s surgeon, and two SF support ground assaults by the Northern NCOs joined the rescue force to serve as Alliance. The force was almost wiped out medics, radiomen and translators. when an errant 2,000-pound bomb pulver- The rescue force arrived at the main gate ized a section of the massive fortress wall. of Qala-i Jangi to the sounds of steady gun- Eight American and British troops were fire and explosions. Hiding inside the wounded, and several Afghans were killed. fortress headquarters in the north wall, That night, two AC-130 Spectre gunships the first American radioed that the prison- orbited over Qala-i Jangi, raking the south- ers had exploded a bomb, overpowered ern compound with fire from 40- and 105- their guards and seized control of the mm cannon. Their last rounds detonated a southern half of the fortress. He added that hidden munitions dump, shaking the he had last seen the second American in entire fortress and hurling artillery shells hand-to-hand combat with a swarm of al- over the walls, while burning rockets shot Qaeda prisoners, and that he did not in all directions. From nearly 20 kilometers believe that the captured American was away, FOB members on the roof of the still alive. The first American later escaped Turkish School watched the ammo dump over the fortress’s north wall. blaze fiercely all night. The al-Qaeda prisoners had ransacked On the third day of the uprising, Alliance

September 2002 17 troops fought their way into the southern from within. The al-Qaeda had not antici- compound with the support of fire from pated that the prisoners would be interned tanks. Room-to-room fighting precluded outside the city, or that the Alliance sol- the use of airstrikes. The next morning, diers, supported by American and British pockets of al-Qaeda were still holding out, forces and airstrikes, would be able to con- but a squad of Alliance soldiers found the tain and then defeat the uprising at Qala-i second American’s body and delivered him Jangi. to the Anglo-American rescue force in the northern compound. The body was trans- ported to the Mazar-e Sharif airfield that Notes: evening, for a flight to Uzbekistan. 1 This article is based on interviews with members of Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, Fort As the rotors of the MH-47 helicopter Campbell, Ky., by the author, 22-23 March 2002. 2 The American John Walker Lindh was in this group of recaptured prisoners, but he did not identify himself until a day later, when he was interned at Shebergan Prison, west of Mazar-e Sharif.

U.S. Army photo Dead al-Qaeda and Tal- turned, the U.S. and British soldiers held a iban fighters litter the brief service and rendered military honors ground as Afghan sol- to their fallen comrade. An SF sergeant diers and members of major produced an American flag that he the 5th SF Group gather inside the fortress of had carried in Iraq during the Gulf War Qala-i Jangi after four and had brought to Afghanistan. Unable to days of fighting. drape it over the body because of the rotor wash, he handed the folded flag to the two officers who would escort the body on its journey home, so that they could present it to the American’s family. The next day, Nov. 29, the last pocket of al-Qaeda resistance in Qala-i Jangi surren- dered. The 86 holdouts were the only sur- vivors of the 300 who had entered the fortress six days before.2 Intelligence reports later revealed that the mass sur- render had been a deception to get the al- Qaeda troops inside Mazar-e Sharif, so that they could retake the district capital

18 Special Warfare ‘Of Vital Importance’: The 4th PSYOP Group by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

n 1961, Secretary of the Army Frank pines in support of OEF-Philippines and Pace wrote: “The psychological warfare the Country Team. Tactical PSYOP forces Iprogram is of vital importance to also supported TF 1-187 during Operation national security and defense.”1 Shortly Anaconda in the Shah-i Khot region. after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, All PSYOP plans and programs required that importance became evident as the 4th policy-level approval from both the Assis- Psychological Operations Group, or 4th tant Secretary of Defense for Special Opera- POG, began planning for anticipated psy- tions and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD- chological operations, or PSYOP, in SO/LIC, and the Under Secretary of Defense Afghanistan. The mission would be to pro- for Policy, or USD-P. Once the overarching vide operational and tactical level PSYOP plans and programs were approved, a proto- that would undermine the terrorists and type of each individual PSYOP product was separate them from their support systems. sent to the commander in chief of USCENT- Although teams from the 4th POG are COM for approval. The product was then constantly deployed in the United States submitted to ASD-SO/LIC for policy review. Central Command, or USCENTCOM, Once it was approved, it was released for region, there were no PSYOP teams dissemination.2 focused on Afghanistan at the time of the If the product was a digital radio pro- terrorist attacks. But within weeks, gram or a video program, it was sent into PSYOP teams were ready to deploy into theater by satellite for local broadcast. the specific area of operations in support of Once printed products received final Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF. approval, they could be printed at Fort The 8th PSYOP Battalion established a Bragg or they could be transmitted digital- Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, ly to a forward-deployed print facility for or JPOTF, for all PSYOP within the area of production. So far, approximately 135 sol- operations. Different elements of the 4th diers — print personnel, staff augmentees POG, as well as mobilized Army and a tactical PSYOP company — have Reservists, provided tactical PSYOP forces been mobilized from the Army Reserve to to augment special-operations forces, or assist in support of OEF. SOF, and conventional forces. These Critical to PSYOP planning is target- PSYOP elements deployed not only to audience analysis, which is provided by Afghanistan, but also to other forward civilian analysts in the regionally oriented areas. PSYOP elements deployed to Guan- strategic-studies detachments of the 4th tanamo Bay, Cuba, to support the debrief- POG’s Research and Analysis Division. ing of captured terrorists and to the Philip- These cultural experts, most of whom hold

September 2002 19 Ph.D.s, use the extensive research leaflets informed the people which chan- resources and contacts at their disposal to nels to tune to for U.S. PSYOP-produced develop themes and to identify potentially programs.3 Initially, Commando Solo was effective target audiences. For example, able to broadcast only 10 hours a day, but hard-core al-Qaeda or Taliban members once Special Operations Media Systems might not be affected by a PSYOP cam- Broadcast, or SOMS-B, radio stations were paign, whereas villagers who have suffered established in Afghanistan, programs at the hands of the repressive regime could be broadcast 24 hours a day. would be viable targets. Included in the Ensuring an adequate supply of native supporting PSYOP plan developed by the linguists has been a challenging problem. JPOTF were a number of themes, among Because of the huge volume of work, the them ones that sought to encourage sup- 4th POG had to augment its Pashto and port for the Partnership of Nations forces; Dari speakers by hiring contract linguists undermine Taliban/al-Qaeda; emphasize who could translate proposed leaflets and the inevitability of Taliban/al-Qaeda radio programs and could serve as radio defeat; rally support for the Afghan Inter- announcers. The Army has the only com- im Authority; promote the capture of prehensive military PSYOP capability and Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda lead- thus must perform the lion’s share of the ers by offering rewards; and strengthen work in executing a PSYOP plan. Air Force Afghan-U.S. friendship. Once the plan and capabilities are limited, but they include an important broadcast platform (Com- mando Solo aircraft) and the means of Intelligence sources reported that the delivering leaflets on target. The Navy has PSYOP campaign was a key factor in the sur- one shipboard system and one land-based system, neither of which was available for render of Konduz. Additional feedback indi- Operation Enduring Freedom.4 The airborne assault on the airstrip cated that PSYOP leaflets and radio broad- southwest of Kandahar by the Rangers casts were important in leading the Afghan was filmed by a combat camera team. Two tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams also population to withdraw its support from the accompanied the Rangers on the jump. Immediately following the operation, the Taliban and especially from al-Qaeda. video footage was turned over to PSYOP forces in theater, who used their digital themes were completed, specific products video distribution system to send it to the were developed. The entire process draws 4th POG headquarters at Fort Bragg. From heavily on the knowledge, analytical acu- Fort Bragg, it was immediately transmit- ity, and cultural empathy of Ph.D.-level ted to Washington, where it was reviewed area experts as well as military PSYOP and then released to the national media. specialists. Digital PSYOP technology made it possible Within a few weeks after Sept. 11, two for the major news networks to show the liaison officers deployed with the 5th Spe- footage shortly after it had been recorded.5 cial Forces Group; they were soon followed Measuring the overall effectiveness of a by tactical PSYOP forces, a deployable PSYOP campaign presents a challenge print center, and a satellite downlink for because it is difficult to precisely ascertain radio programs. In a matter of a few the relationship between a leaflet or a months, more than 75 million leaflets were radio program and the actions taken by an dropped from B-52s and C-130s, more than individual or a group. Some effect mea- 3,000 hours of radio programs were broad- surements are based on anecdotal evi- cast by Commando Solo, and more than dence. For example, Afghans reported that 7,500 hand-held radios were distributed by they enjoyed the radio programs because air drop and by tactical PSYOP teams they broadcast music, and it was the first operating with SF A-detachments. Certain time the Afghans had been permitted to

20 Special Warfare hear music in six years. The broadcast 1951, Record Group 319, National Archives. music was selected by POG area experts; 2 Dr. Darren Curtis, Strategic Studies Detachment, changes in the music programming were 4th POG, interview by author, 15 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., transcript, U.S. Army Special Operations made based on feedback provided by the Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. PSYOP teams accompanying the SF A- 3 Keith B. Richburg and William Branigin, “U.S. detachments. Intelligence sources report- Bombs Aid Rebels in North; Propaganda Campaign ed that the PSYOP campaign was a key Intensifies,” Washington Post,8 November 2001, 13. 4 factor in the surrender of Konduz. Addi- Andrea Stone, “Soldiers Deploy on Mental Terrain,” USA Today,3 October 2001, 7. tional feedback indicated that PSYOP 5 Staff Sergeant James Turner (pseudonym), Com- leaflets and radio broadcasts were impor- pany B, 9th Battalion, 4th POG, interview by author, tant in leading the Afghan population to 3 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. withdraw its support from the Taliban and Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. from al-Qaeda.6 6 Curtis interview. The 4th POG employs personnel from 7 Major Henry Blackaby (pseudonym), Psychological the rank of colonel to that of private; their Development Company, 8th Battalion, 4th POG, inter- education levels vary from high-school view by author, 17 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape graduate to Ph.D. The PSYOP products in recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Afghanistan are reviewed by the Office of archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. 8 Letter, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Psycho- the Secretary of Defense; they are distrib- logical Warfare Division, “Operations in Western uted by U.S. Air Force aircraft; they are European Campaign,” October 1945, 1, Record Group received by people living in a country that 319, National Archives. has for years been dominated by foreign invaders and oppressive rulers; and they are scrutinized by the American media. Major Henry Blackaby, commander of a psychological development company, recog- nizes the seriousness of the PSYOP cam- paign and the level of scrutiny that it receives. Leaflets and radio broadcasts are a critical element in Operation Enduring Freedom. All of the links in the chain are important, but according to Blackaby, “The real heroes are the young troops who devel- op the products.”7 Following World War II, General Dwight Eisenhower stated, “The exact contribution of psychological warfare toward the final victory cannot, of course, be measured.” He added, “However, I am convinced that the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor in under- mining the enemy’s will to resist.”8 There is reason to believe that Eisenhower’s assess- ment will be equally valid when the final history of Operation Enduring Freedom is written.

Notes: 1 Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Importance of Army-Wide Support of the Psychological Warfare Programs, 2 February

September 2002 21 ‘Have Tools, Will Travel’: Company D, 109th Aviation Battalion

by James A. Schroder

he initial success of the war on ter- ducting its monthly drill, Jackson informed rorism depended heavily upon the the unit’s personnel to be prepared for a Tavailability of assets from Army Spe- probable activation and to make arrange- cial Operations Aviation, or ARSOA — the ments for deployment. The call came the organization that could infiltrate special- following week, and the unit reported to operations forces throughout Afghanistan. the 160th’s facilities at Fort Campbell, Ky., Helicopter maintenance was key to that and at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga., Nov. 12. success, and maintenance requires a large Company D’s relationship with the 160th amount of resources — especially person- SOAR was a new one.1 Although the 109th nel. To meet the great demand for aviation was being activated for the first time in assets, ARSOA more than 30 years, extensive training had sought help from left the company well-prepared. The unit’s the Army National readiness rating was more than 90 percent Guard. Company for people and equipment, a notable D, 109th Aviation, achievement in the National Guard. an aviation inter- To prevent any delay in delivering urgently mediate mainte- needed mechanics, the 160th accepted full nance, or AVIM, responsibility for the administrative require- company that is ments of activating the National Guard unit. capable of provid- The 109th’s post-mobilization training would ing maintenance be performed as time permitted. Major Jack- expertise for the son and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Simp- various models of son,2 the SOAR’s executive officer, worked U.S. Army photo helicopters organic together to develop a pioneering plan that Mechanics from Compa- to the 160th Special Operations Aviation would capitalize on the experience and the ny D, 109th Aviation, Regiment, was uniquely suited to augment capabilities of Company D, which consisted of work on helicopters of the 160th’s maintenance resources. mechanics experienced at working on Chi- the 160th SOAR at Fort The maintenance company, composed of nooks, Blackhawks and Kiowas. Although doc- Campbell, Ky. personnel from Nebraska and Iowa under trine calls for an AVIM company to remain the direction of Major Martin Jackson, a separate from its supported unit, the newly former CH-46 pilot in the Marine Corps established plan divided Company D’s person- and a veteran of the Gulf War, had com- nel into four contact teams that were assigned pleted a three-week annual-training rota- to the 160th’s 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions and tion in Germany Sept. 15, 2001. During the to the regiment’s training company. weekend of Oct. 20, while the unit was con- Each contact team rapidly assimilated

22 Special Warfare the fast pace of the 160th’s maintenance sections. Although they required some familiarization and training on special- operations helicopters, the 109th mechanics brought their talent and years of experience to the maintenance effort, and they prompt- ly established credibility. Within a month, the Company D mechanics were working long hours, on multiple shifts, side by side with their Night Stalker contemporaries. This teamwork enabled the 160th and the 109th to complete helicopter phase mainte- nance in as few as 28 days, a remarkable feat. Both the National Guard and SOAR personnel benefited from the relationship: The experienced Guard members passed their knowledge to the younger mechanics, and the SOAR personnel shared their knowledge of special-operations aircraft with the Guard members. U.S. Army photo Company D was also integrated into Success was achieved as a direct result of pio- Members of Company D, Green Platoon, the 160th SOAR’s training- neering ideas, highly competent personnel, 109th Aviation, negotiate and-selection course. More than 60 soldiers specialized training and a commitment to obstacles during training from Company D completed the course maintenance. The Guard soldiers demon- with the 160th’s Green within the first six months of their activa- strated the same work ethic and dedication Platoon. tion. Their accomplishment further to mission accomplishment that the Night increased the credibility of the Guard Stalkers do, and they provided continuity in members. Green Platoon is a prerequisite the maintenance sections during the rotation for deployment overseas, and the gradu- of 160th personnel overseas. They enthusias- ates provided a source of mechanics for tically attended Green Platoon and energeti- potential overseas deployment. So far, cally accepted all training. The 160th SOAR approximately 30 mechanics of the 109th was able to meet the high demand for its heli- have deployed overseas to Afghanistan, copters because of its joint enterprise with Korea or the Philippines. One soldier from Company D. the 109th who had a background in law- enforcement excelled in the course and was selected to be an instructor because of his James A. Schroder earned his MBA at special background and capabilities. Murray State University. He previously This working association was unique in served as an NCO and as a warrant officer in another respect. Company D arrived with Special Forces, military intelligence and avia- 14 female mechanics, an unfamiliar sight tion units stateside and overseas, and he com- for the 160th’s mechanics. Female soldiers pleted Ranger training and Russian lan- are precluded by regulation from being guage training. He earned two Air Medals assigned to active-duty special-operations piloting CH-47D Chinook helicopters in the aviation units as mechanics or as crew Gulf War, and he piloted MH-47Es for seven members. The 14 female mechanics in the years as a member of the 160th Special Oper- 109th had the exclusive opportunity to ations Aviation Regiment. serve in a unit that is outside the reach of their active-duty counterparts. Notes: The mutually beneficial association 1 This article is based on an interview with Major Martin Jackson (pseudonym), commander of Compa- between the 160th SOAR and Company D, ny D, 109th Aviation Battalion, by the author and Dr. 109th Aviation, greatly contributed to the Chuck Briscoe, 24 April 2002, at Fort Campbell, Ky. enormous helicopter maintenance effort. 2 “Edward Simpson” is a pseudonym.

September 2002 23 The Campaign in Transition: From Conventional to Unconventional War

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

nexpectedly, the war in tuns who constitute the majority of the Afghan Afghanistan accelerated ahead of population below Kabul. But events would soon Uthe estimated timetable prepared outstrip these assumptions. by the staffs of the United States Central In both the north and the center of Command and its special-operations units. Afghanistan, the local warlords went on the As had been planned, U.S. Army Special offensive as soon as the first SF troops stepped Forces detachments flew into Afghanistan off their helicopters to join them. Unbe- beginning in October 2001. The winter was to knownst to the Americans, the Northern have been a “Valley Forge” experience for the Alliance was ready to begin conventional-style supposedly beleaguered Afghan Northern maneuver warfare against its Taliban adver- Alliance. SF detachments were to spend saries. With the support of aerial bombing and those cold, snowy months in the valleys of the other aid, including air-dropped arms and rugged Hindu Kush, drilling the loose collec- ammunition, the Northern Alliance took the tion of warrior bands into a well-trained and initiative — sometimes on their own, some- well-equipped army. The commander of the times prompted by their new American advis- 5th Special Forces Group would employ his ers.1 Deft U.S. diplomatic maneuvering gar- unit as Joint Special Operations Task Force- nered bases for American and coalition forces North to carry out this effort. He hoped that in Pakistan and in Uzbekistan, and simulta- one of the northern towns, maybe two, might neously isolated the Taliban from their former be taken from the enemy before the cold sources of money and aid. forced the traditional winter hiatus from mil- In rapid succession, city after city fell to the itary operations. Northern Alliance. First, the Alliance took Around April or May 2002, this new anti-Tal- Mazar-e Sharif, the second largest city in iban army was to begin a spring offensive to Afghanistan, on Nov. 10. The towns of Bamian secure the northern tier of Afghan cities. The in the center,Taloquan in the north, and Herat offensive would also open roads into Pakistan in the west surrendered within days, and Kon- and Uzbekistan. Those roads would facilitate duz was besieged. Then on Nov. 13, in a single the movement of supplies overland and possi- day, Northern Alliance forces advanced from bly facilitate the entrance of U.S. combat divi- the trenchlines at Bagram into Kabul, which sions into Afghanistan. Then, perhaps later had been hurriedly abandoned by the Taliban. that year, a general offensive toward Kabul The next day, Jalalabad fell. Just before could be launched. Operations in the southern Thanksgiving, the Taliban forces at Konduz region around Kandahar were thought to be capitulated. problematic. Strong anti-Taliban leaders had On Thanksgiving Day, the first major not yet been identified among the ethnic Pash- U.S. conventional ground forces arrived in

24 Special Warfare Afghanistan. Two U.S. Marine battalions The emerging concern was the possibility of occupied a dirt airstrip in the desert 80 a major human disaster in Afghanistan, kilometers from Kandahar, where a brought on by a shattered infrastructure, a Ranger task force had conducted a para- million refugees, and the coming of winter. chute raid in October. The Marines relocat- Civil Affairs units and engineer units were ed three weeks later to the Kandahar air- hastily deployed into the theater of war to port, which had been captured Dec. 1 by begin recovery efforts and disaster-relief oper- Pashtun forces and U.S. SF troops. ations. Humanitarian aid of every description, In the south, two anti-Taliban Pashtun promised by the signatories of the December leaders finally emerged. Aided by SF 2001 Brussels Accord, would have to be airlift- teams, they marched their forces toward ed into the country. In addition, the multifari- Kandahar, the “spiritual capital of the Tal- ous agencies that needed to oversee the distri- iban movement.” One of those two men was bution and application of the aid would have Hamid Karzai, who was chosen to head the to accompany it, and they would have to be Afghan Interim Authority at the Bonn protected and supported as well. Conference Dec. 3. He narrowly escaped being killed by an errant U.S. Air Force guided bomb two days later, as his forces It became evident that the campaign was not going battled the Taliban on the northern to transition neatly into a post-conflict paradigm of approach to Kandahar. Gul Agha Sherzai’s Pashtuns, attacking up the southern route, peacekeeping forces overseeing nation-building won the race to Kandahar Dec. 7. Every major Afghan city and town was now liber- projects; rather, the campaign was becoming more ated from Taliban control. like a counterinsurgency. The task of creating a American and allied Afghan forces destroyed the entire Taliban government new, multiethnic Afghan National Army to prose- and army in Afghanistan in two months. Some observers had predicted that the cute this new campaign fell to the soldiers of the campaign might take two years.2 3rd SF Group and to French mountain troops. The focus of the Afghan war now shifted to the east, along the Pakistan border. While thousands of Taliban soldiers simply On Dec. 24, 2001, the first elements of the changed allegiance to the victorious side — Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations a long-established Afghan tradition — and Task Force arrived in Kabul. A week before, thousands more lay dead, other thousands the International Security Assistance Force, were retreating to sanctuaries and strong- or ISAF, had been established under British holds in eastern Afghanistan and in west- command, to serve as a peacekeeping force. ern Pakistan. To cut them off, the coalition These efforts would be essential in stabiliz- air forces bombed the caves of Tora Bora. ing Afghanistan against any Taliban resur- Meanwhile, the Afghan soldiers — various- gence, or in preventing a new civil war ly called the Anti-Taliban Forces, Opposi- among the Afghan warlords who had been tion Group Forces, and the Afghan Military restored to power in their various provinces. Forces — advanced into the mountains to The number of U.S. military personnel in finish off the enemy. This effort had little Afghanistan continued to grow from the result. SF teams also established bases hundred-plus special-operations-forces sol- around the eastern town of Khowst, and diers who had fought the initial battle for various special-operations units conducted Afghanistan, to nearly 5,000 troops. U.S. direct-action raids inside Afghanistan in Army infantry battalions arrived in Febru- search of fugitive al-Qaeda and Taliban ary 2002 to replace the Marines. Detach- leaders. Preparations were made to assist ments from the National Guard’s 2nd Bat- Pakistani army units in this hunt on their talion, 19th SF Group, and the Regular side of the border, but the operation never Army’s 3rd SF Group arrived to take over came to fruition. from departing 5th SF Group teams. The

September 2002 25 Chinook helicopter company from the 160th Afghan national-guard battalions to provide Special Operations Aviation Regiment’s 3rd “internal security” for the new government. Battalion arrived to relieve the 2nd Battal- The initial phase of the war was essentially ion’s initial Chinook contingent. The 3rd conventional in nature, notwithstanding the Ranger Battalion, after conducting its sec- fact that it was fought by Afghan irregulars ond parachute raid in November, rotated its and U.S. special-operations forces. Paradoxi- companies in and out of Afghanistan to sup- cally, once the enemy was beaten in open com- port continuing countrywide operations. bat and had transitioned to guerrilla warfare, The 5th SF Group members who were man- the U.S. Central Command placed convention- ning Joint Special Operations Task Force- al division and corps commanders in overall North at Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, pre- charge of military operations in Afghanistan. pared to transfer their missions and remain- American troop strength in country ing forces to JSOTF-South at Kandahar, and reached 7,000, and the allied troops in the to return to the U.S. at the end of February. In ISAF,manned by 18 nations, numbered near- turn, JSOTF-South, constituted from the ly 5,000. Subsequent large-unit operations by headquarters of Naval Special Warfare U.S., British and Canadian soldiers and spe- Group-One, was likewise scheduled to close cial-reconnaissance units found that Taliban down on March 30 and would hand-off its fighters were re-entering Afghanistan from operations to the recently-formed Combined Pakistan. The “Loya Jirga” — the grand Joint Special Operations Task Force- national council — was scheduled for June, Afghanistan, or CJSOTF-Afghanistan, which the same month during which the Afghans was building a new base camp at Bagram Air- were to choose their new post-Taliban gov- field. Two hundred soldiers from the 3rd SF ernment. As Afghan infighting grew in scope Group, and 100 soldiers from the National and in intensity, and as intelligence sources Guard’s 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group, staffed reported that the Taliban forces were re- the CJSOTF-Afghanistan headquarters. grouping, a successful outcome of the Loya At the same time, U.S. and coalition military Jirga was not assured. The campaign to seal staffs planned a brigade-size tactical opera- the military victory with political, social and tion to root out Taliban and al-Qaeda sur- economic stability was a long way from con- vivors hiding in the rugged escarpments clusion. This meant that the work of Army around the isolated Shah-i-Khot valley. Code- special-operations forces in Afghanistan was named Operation Anaconda, the sweep was far from over as well. intended to flush its quarry toward ambushes and blocking positions that would be set around the valley. When the action began, the Notes: stubborn and effective enemy defense of the 1 U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, “Informal Press Opportunity with Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, 30 Octo- Shah-i-Khot took the American commanders ber 2001.” “We’re providing weapons and ammunition by surprise. Planned as a two-day operation, to a variety of opposition groups in a variety of ways.” Anaconda extended into two weeks of heavy (http://www.uscentcom.mil/ news/ transcripts/ bombing and hard fighting, with significant 20011030.html). losses of troops and aircraft. 2 U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, “Gen. Franks Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 27 The Afghanistan campaign was taking an February 2002.” Gen. Tommy Franks, Commander, unexpected turn. It became evident that the USCENTCOM: “Combining the resources and capabil- campaign was not going to transition neatly ities of the Defense Department, Central Intelligence into a post-conflict paradigm of peacekeeping Agency, and other agencies of the Federal government forces overseeing nation-building projects; has produced results [in Afghanistan] no single entity could have achieved.” (http://www.uscentcom.mil/ rather, the campaign was becoming more like a news/ transcripts/20020227.htm). counterinsurgency. The task of creating a new, multiethnic Afghan National Army to prose- cute this new campaign fell to the soldiers of the 3rd SF Group and to French mountain troops. In the capital of Kabul, the Germans schooled a national police force, and the British trained

26 Special Warfare Change of Mission: ODA 394 by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

he “fog and friction of war” so often Sergeant Ty McFadden to build on the cited in military theory became a company’s two-day initial training pro- Treality for the 12 soldiers of Special gram.5 The men of Three-Nine-Four re- Forces Operational Detachment A-394 equipped themselves with sledges and pry soon after their arrival in Afghanistan.1 bars, and they reconfigured their body At the “Rose Garden,” a former Taliban armor and weapons for combat within the military training camp near Kandahar, Cap- confines of the mud-walled structures com- tain Jed Samuels, the leader of the SF team, mon to the hinterlands of Afghanistan. received his first change in mission from his Then, after almost two weeks of intense battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel rehearsals, Three-Nine-Four received a Terry Sanders.2 “Three-Nine-Four,” which is warning order to move against a suspected assigned to Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd target. But the target was not a building — SF Group, had come to the theater of war it was several square kilometers of moun- Feb. 8, 2002, equipped with four ground- tainous terrain. Samuels’ team was to be mobility vehicles (armed “Humvee” trucks) part of a coalition task group of units from and prepared to conduct mounted special- New Zealand, Canada, Norway and Den- reconnaissance and direct-action missions.3 mark that would identify caves for destruc- Now, as Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th tion by aerial bombing. But as the mission SF Group, was preparing to redeploy to the start-time approached, Three-Nine-Four United States, Company C, 3rd Battalion, and SF A-Detachment 391 were redesig- 3rd SF Group, would instead take over the nated the quick-reaction force, or QRF, for departing unit’s mission of sensitive site the allied forces, and Hensen and his com- exploitation, or SSE. The Company C com- pany headquarters would serve as the mander, Major Mickey Hensen, directed QRF’s command element.6 Sergeant Major Rudy Madden and Master Leaving their vehicles behind, the members Sergeant Gregg Corr to immediately train of the QRF flew to Bagram Airfield, the aban- the company in close-quarter battle, or doned Soviet base north of Kabul. While wait- CQB — fighting inside buildings.4 ing for orders, the QRF spent the night freez- The training in CQB was not refresher ing on the cement floor of the only available training. Company C normally trained for facility — a bombed-out hangar. mounted desert reconnaissance, its special- The next morning, Madden asked Com- ty. The team members had to teach them- mand Sergeant Major Marc Lorenzo, the selves to perform the advanced CQB tasks. senior NCO in the 10th Mountain Division, Samuels turned to his second-in-command, if the 10th could feed the SF teams, which Warrant Officer Max Gorley, and to Master were still huddled in the hangar on QRF

September 2002 27 standby.7 The SF soldiers were unshaven, advanced operating base, or AOB, had just some with full beards, and they were wear- been established. Later that night, Three- ing an assortment of jackets and pants. Nine-Four was in the 10th Mountain Divi- “Come with me,” Lorenzo said, and he led sion’s tactical operations center, receiving a them to a mess line where he ordered the grim intelligence update. Five Apache servers to give the SF soldiers all they attack helicopters had been badly shot up, could eat for breakfast. Later, after the and A-detachment 372 had taken casual- mission was completed and the QRF stood ties, including Warrant Officer Stanley L. down, Three-Nine-Four was ordered back Harriman, who had been killed while lead- to Kandahar to prepare for a major new ing an Afghan truck convoy to the battle. operation code-named “Anaconda.” About 25 soldiers from the 10th Mountain The nature of 394’s new mission was spe- Division had been wounded, and soldiers cial reconnaissance, and the team re-fitted from the 10th were still trapped near their and rehearsed to establish clandestine landing zones in the Shah-i-Khot valley. observation posts in enemy-held territory “Not a good first day,” commented one of on two rocky mountaintops. But after two the SF NCOs. Ominously, the C-130 trans- days of preparation, Three-Nine-Four was port that was flying the team to Bagram ordered to stand down to allow Danish and was also carrying an empty metal coffin for German troops to conduct the operation. Harriman. The unexpectedly intense fighting had Because the team had left almost all of its forced the commitment of the QRFs from the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Air- equipment behind at Kandahar, it was now borne Division and Joint Special Operations having difficulty gathering the gear it needed Task Force-South. At Bagram, every avail- able Australian, German and American unit for the mission. Australian troops operating was urgently mustered to create another viable reaction force. The team members from the same base were astounded at the now heard troubling rumors about an team’s lack of extreme-cold-weather clothing; American who had fallen out of a helicopter into enemy hands, and of one, maybe more, ‘You blokes’ll perish up there,’ they warned. Chinook helicopters that had been shot down by enemy ground fire. After two days The succession of unexecuted missions was on standby, Samuels’ team was detached wearing on the morale of the SF soldiers, from the ad hoc QRF and told to prepare for who were eager to get into the fight. The a reconnaissance mission. biggest action of the war so far was about Three-Nine-Four was to land at night by to begin, and they were being held in helicopter. The team was to climb to an reserve at the Kandahar “Rose Garden.” observation site that was 10,400 feet above On D-Day of the operation, as the SF sol- sea level and blanketed by an estimated diers listened to the various American and three feet of snow. From the jagged escarp- allied commanders sending orders and infor- ment, it would overlook two trails on which mation over the radio, it became apparent to Taliban troops were believed to travel. them that Anaconda was not going as Because the team had left almost all of its planned. The radio chatter indicated unex- equipment behind at Kandahar, it was now pectedly strong enemy resistance and having difficulty gathering the gear it need- numerous U.S. casualties from the fire of ed for the mission. Australian troops operat- mortars and machine guns. ing from the same base were astounded at The team received a terse message: “You the team’s lack of extreme-cold-weather have one hour to pack your rucksacks for a clothing; “You blokes’ll perish up there,” dismounted mission.” Details would be pro- they warned. Generously, they loaned the vided later, they were told. Meanwhile, an Americans snowshoes, walking poles, and aircraft was waiting to fly them back to snow-camouflage clothing. The team medic, Bagram airfield, where Company C’s new Sergeant First Class Jason “J.D.” Thurman,

28 Special Warfare coaxed the airfield’s Spanish military hospi- its gear — just in time to get orders from tal into giving him morphine autoinjectors. its new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Staff Sergeant Jake Millett traded boxes of Carl Hooper of 1st Battalion, 5th SF rations to the Aussies for spare “double-A” Group, to whom the team had been and D-cell batteries.8 attached.12 Staff Sergeant Jerry Rawlins was partic- When the second push of Anaconda ularly interested in acquiring a Barrett began, Three-Nine-Four would not be left M-82A1 .50-caliber sniper rifle.9 Given the behind. The team was elated to learn that vast open spaces in Afghanistan, many tar- it was going into combat. The objective gets would be visible beyond the 800-meter would be the rocky massif west of the range of the team’s Remington M-24 model Shah-i-Khot valley called the “Whale.” The 7.62 mm rifles. While still in the U.S., Rawl- men of Three-Nine-Four would guide ins had requested one of the Barrett “fifty- bands of Afghan mercenary troops to fight cals” from the joint operational stocks at the religious fanatics on some of the most inac- Lexington Bluegrass Arsenal, but he was cessible terrain on Earth, at altitudes that told that the entire inventory had already would leave them gasping for air as they been requisitioned. However, by trading his climbed into the battle over rocks and extra 7.62 mm match-grade cartridges to a snow. The “fog and friction of war” that had 10th Mountain Division reconnaissance pla- held the team out of combat now drew it in. toon, Rawlins gained an introduction to the This time, for the first time since arriving chief of the division’s explosives-ordnance- in Afghanistan a month ago, Three-Nine- disposal unit — who had a Barrett to spare. Four’s mission would not be changed. Rawlins signed for the rifle and carried it into the Anaconda battle.10 By midnight, the team members were Notes: ready, and they settled down for some much- 1 This article is based on interviews with the mem- bers of Operational Detachment A-394, Company C, needed rest before their insertion into enemy 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, Bagram Airfield, territory. Just a few hours later, McFadden Afghanistan, by the author, 10 May 2002. received some news: An estimated 200 2“Jed Samuels” and “Terry Sanders” are pseudonyms. enemy soldiers had been spotted moving 3 Because of space constraints on transport aircraft, around Three-Nine-Four’s intended landing the team’s vehicles arrived four days after the team had landed. The detachment personnel traveled on zone. The team’s recon mission was can- two different aircraft, as well. celled, and the area was bombed instead. 4“Mickey Hensen,” “Rudy Madden” and “Gregg Corr” Anaconda was about to begin an are pseudonyms. unplanned second phase, to try to accom- 5“Max Gorley” and “Ty McFadden” are pseudonyms. plish the operation’s original mission of 6 There were not enough helicopters to lift the entire force as originally organized, so the SSE force was destroying Taliban and al-Qaeda units that reduced. had escaped to mountain hideouts. ODA 7“Marc Lorenzo” is a pseudonym. Three-Nine-Four would now join a seasoned 8“Jason Thurman” and “Jake Millett” are pseudonyms. team from the 5th SF Group, A-detachment 9 J”erry Rawlins” is a pseudonym. 594, and travel in a convoy of pickup trucks 10 Rawlins never fired his Barrett during the Anacon- da battle. Because the al-Qaeda fighters often con- and sport-utility vehicles lent by the 10th cealed their weapons beneath their robe-like coats, Mountain Division, to Gardez, a four-and- Rawlins was unable to identify any of the distant fig- one-half hour drive away.11 ures he spotted as “definitely enemy.” Just before sunset, the teams arrived at 11 Several senior members of the 3rd SF Group later their new base, a mud-walled compound remarked on the excellent support that they received from the 10th Mountain Division, in contrast to their crowded with more than 100 coalition sol- experience with the same division in Haiti in 1995. diers. Samuels took stock of his team. He 12 “Carl Hooper” is a pseudonym. determined that before the team could attempt any operation, it would need the equipment that had been left behind in Bagram and Kandahar. Within a few days, Three-Nine-Four had recovered all

September 2002 29 Caves and Graves: The 19th SF Group

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

ny doubt as to whether Army Department of Defense in support of National Guard Special Forces national objectives. Agroups can meet the standards of After having undergone a period of the active-component groups has been dis- preparation at Fort Campbell, Ky., during pelled by SF A-detachment 923, from the which it was placed under the command of 19th Special Forces Group, headquartered the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, Detach- in Utah. Despite limited training time, ment 923 arrived in Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, in early March 2002. There, it was assigned the mission of operating as a quick-reaction force in Pakistan to inter- dict members of the Taliban who were flee- ing Afghanistan — a mission that the detachment never executed. On April 25, the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, ordered the team to Bagram, where the 3rd SF Group assigned it the mission of supporting cave searches in the Tora Bora region. The team then came under the tac- tical control of Task Force Rakkasan, from the 101st Airborne Division. Specifically, the team was to reconnoiter potential heli- copter landing zones, or HLZs, determine the level of enemy activity, and observe possible cave sites.1 On April 27, Captain Kerry Barnes U.S. Army photo found himself moving Detachment 923 to Members of A-detach- these National Guardsmen unhesitatingly Jalalabad, which is a long way from the ment 923 talk with exchanged their mufti for desert camou- drug store where Barnes plies his trade as Afghanis near Alefkhel, flage when they were called to duty in a pharmacist. In Jalalabad, the detach- Afghanistan. December 2001. During the two years prior ment met another SF team, A-detachment to that, the members of the 19th SF Group 966, and the Afghan soldiers that A-966 had participated in exercises in Thailand, was advising. Because A-966 had already Korea, Tonga and the Maldives in prepara- established rapport with the Afghans, tion for any special-operations mission Barnes incorporated six of its members that might be assigned to them by the and 50 Afghans into his operation. On

30 Special Warfare April 30, the force began to move to its objective by truck. Although the distance to the objective was about 50 kilometers, vehicles could traverse only the first 30 kilometers, to Tangi Qolleh. The Afghan commander dis- patched a reconnaissance element to Ale- fkhel, while the SF detachments contract- ed for 16 mules to move equipment from Tangi Qolleh. The force left Tangi Qolleh at 7 a.m. on May 1 and arrived in Alefkhel at 11 a.m. The terrain was so steep that the U.S. Army photo mules could go no farther, so the teams Alefkhel villagers receive humanitarian aid. contracted for porters from the village. After an hour and a half, the teams had In exchange for villagers’ permission to covered only 300 meters (straight-line dis- excavate the graves, the SF detachments tance). The distance from Alefkhel to the coordinated with U.S. Civil Affairs person- proposed observation site was only 2,500 nel and arranged for more than 12,000 meters, but the elevation increased 1,500 pounds of humanitarian-assistance supplies meters. After a climb of three and one half to be distributed to the villagers. On May 7, hours, the teams reached the site. From CH-47 helicopters brought in the aid, and there, they could observe two ridges, and the village elders began to distribute it. there appeared to be two caves on each By truck, by mule, and by foot, this Nation- ridge. The teams soon located three poten- al Guard SF A-detachment accomplished its tial HLZs, but the HLZs would require the assigned mission — searching for caves and use of demolitions to make them usable. locating landing zones. In addition, the team On May 2, two SF engineers arrived with located grave sites that contained 25 bodies, the demolitions. The next morning, they and it arranged for humanitarian assistance began clearing the landing zones. to be distributed to a village that had an esti- Team members observed the caves, and mated 2,000 inhabitants. then, together with the Afghans, they moved Superior training, flexibility and dedica- to the sites. Two caves had been sealed by tion are the hallmarks of the SF soldier. SF bombs; the third was only an illusion of a A-detachment 923 proved that those quali- cave, caused by the shadows of overhanging ties are as prevalent among National rocks. The fourth suspected cave was a fight- Guard soldiers as they are among their ing position with overhead cover. Nearby active-duty counterparts. were several bunkers that appeared not to have been occupied recently.2 Villagers from Alefkhel reported that Notes: about 25 Arab bodies had been buried in a 1 Master Sergeant Andy Stewart (pseudonym), Com- pany B, 1st Battalion, 19th SF Group, interview by mound in the village. SF team members author, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape also located two graves on one of the recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command ridges. On May 4, American and Canadian archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. conventional forces, accompanied by 2 Captain Kerry Barnes (pseudonym), Company, 1st reporters and forensic experts, arrived. The Battalion, 19th SF Group, interview by author, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army media immediately began to film the grave Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. mound, but they did not film the excava- 3 Ryan Chilcote, “Hunt for bin Laden’s remains,” tion that was being conducted by the foren- www.cnn.com, 7 May 2002; Peter Baker, “Mass Grave Is sic personnel. In all, 25 bodies were found Discovered at Tora Bora,” Washington Post,8 May 2002, at the sites. After the forensic experts took 16; Carlotta Gall, “Allies Exhume 23 Bodies Thought to Be al-Qaeda Fighters, Washington Post,8 May 2002. DNA samples, they reburied the bodies. The story appeared on CNN and was reported in major newspapers.3

September 2002 31 To Educate And To Motivate: The 345th PSYOP Company

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

ollowing Operation Desert Storm in the 345th PSYOP Company, from Dallas, 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf Texas. After being alerted in early Decem- Fdeclared, “Psychological operations ber 2001, the 345th, commanded by Major are going to be absolutely a critical, critical Ralph Marshall, reported to Fort Bragg part of any campaign that [the United Jan. 7, 2002. As an airborne company with States] must get involved in.”1 a focus on the U.S. Central Command’s Now, more than 10 years later, another area of operations, the 345th was the logi- operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, cal choice for activation. has reaffirmed not only the value of psy- The active-component 9th PSYOP Bat- chological operations, or PSYOP, but also talion conducted a one-month validation the value of and the necessity of using program for the 345th that included sub- jects such as marksmanship, troop-leading The teams also developed themes relating to procedures, battle drills and drafting oper- ations orders. The validation program con- the provision of humanitarian assistance and firmed that the 345th was prepared for its wartime mission.2 to the value of education. The low level of In early March, the company learned education among the Afghan people was a that it would deploy to Afghanistan to sup- port the 3rd Special Forces Group. hindrance to the PSYOP campaign. Because Although the Texans had never worked with SF teams, Staff Sergeant Max Carson the low literacy rate restricted the effective- and his tactical PSYOP team, or TPT, had ness of written products, leaflets had to trained with SF units at the Joint Readi- ness Training Center during Carson’s 10 depict the PSYOP themes clearly and simply. years in the company. The 345th’s early coordination with the reserve-component PSYOP forces to aug- 3rd SF Group and the SF group’s detailed ment active forces. planning during the preparation of the Because there are only six active-compo- PSYOP annex to the operations order nent PSYOP battalions, the U.S. has found ensured that the two units would be able to it necessary to activate reserve-component integrate their operations effectively. The PSYOP units during Operation Enduring 3rd Group sent an advance party to Freedom to ensure that commanders have Afghanistan to make plans for the deploy- access to the full spectrum of PSYOP oper- ment. Recognizing the importance of ations. The first unit to be activated was PSYOP, the 3rd included Captain Timothy

32 Special Warfare Issacson from the 345th to serve as a cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. PSYOP planner with the advance party.3 3 Staff Sergeant Max Carson (pseudonym), 345th Later, when the National Guard’s 19th SF PSYOP Company, interview by the author, 16 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Spe- Group arrived in Afghanistan to augment cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. the 3rd Group, the 345th continued its 4 Major Paul Fletcher (pseudonym), 345th PSYOP close coordination with the 19th Group as Company, interview by the author, 9 May 2002, well. Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Spe- It is critical to the success of Operation cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. Enduring Freedom that all U.S. forces stress the themes of the legitimacy of the existing Afghan government, the surrender of antigovernment forces, and the impor- tance of education. During the first two weeks that the 345th was in country, TPTs deployed countrywide to emphasize that the U.S. force was not an occupying force, and to assess the effectiveness of the themes of Afghan unity and the capability of the Afghanistan National Army. The teams also developed themes per- taining to the provision of humanitarian assistance and to the value of education. The low level of education among the Afghan people was a hindrance to the PSYOP campaign. Because the low literacy rate restricted the effectiveness of written products, leaflets had to depict the PSYOP themes clearly and simply. Reserve-component TPTs patrolling with National Guard SF detachments provided the 345th with the feedback that was essential for determining the effectiveness of PSYOP themes. Using immediate feed- back from forces in theater, the 345th’s Product Development Detachment (also located in theater) was able to develop con- cepts and recommend products to the Joint PSYOP Task Force.4 The integration of the 345th PSYOP Company with both the active-component 3rd SF Group and the National Guard’s 19th SF Group is testimony to the vital role that reserve-component special-opera- tions forces can play in supporting the war on terrorism.

Notes: 1 Field Manual 3-05.30, Psychological Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 2000), 1-2. 2 Major Ralph Marshall (pseudonym), 345th PSYOP Company, interview by the author, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Spe-

September 2002 33 Armed Convoy to Kabul: The 3/20th SF Group

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

hen the National Guardsmen of assigned to the named task force. Faced the 3rd Battalion, 20th Special with these circumstances, Colonel Mark WForces Group, arrived at Bagram Phelan, the 3rd SF Group’s commander, Airfield, Afghanistan, they proved that created his own augmentee pool from an they were ready for anything — even for arriving unit that had been assigned to his the disbandment of their unit.1 command — the headquarters and support The headquarters of the Regular Army’s personnel of the 3rd Battalion, 20th SF 3rd SF Group had been designated the Group. Combined Joint Special Operations Task The 3/20th’s commander, Lieutenant Force, or CJSOTF, for Afghanistan. The Colonel Jack Sykes, had earned his nick- CJSOTF was to receive 120 Army name “Hurricane” because of his energy and because of the driving pace of training “When General Tommy Franks visited the in his Florida-based unit.2 Without a unit to lead, Sykes threw himself into his new Special Forces units here,” recalled the exec- job: J5 plans officer in the 3rd SF Group’s joint operations center. utive officer of the West Virginia National Sykes’ soldiers also found themselves in Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, “he new jobs: They filled out staff sections so that the command post could operate said, ‘I’ve seen the 3rd Group and the 19th around the clock, they built fortifications and guard posts, and they renovated the Group, and I can’t tell them apart.’ ” The XO bombed-out Russian buildings scattered joked that both the 3rd Group and the 19th about the base. The imposing command sergeant-major of the 3rd SF Group strode Group had been offended by the remark. through the staff tents and motor bays of the camp, assigning soldiers to the neces- Reservists who had been called to active sary tasks. duty specifically to fill out the task-force One ad hoc collection of the 3/20th’s SF staff. soldiers was responsible for managing the However, the CJSOTF received none of armed convoys that the CJSOTF dis- the Army Reserve soldiers, because the patched across Afghanistan. Late in the Special Operations Command of the morning of May 7, 2002, those 3/20th sol- United States Central Command in Doha, diers prepared to accompany three officials Qatar, kept the augmentees there, even from Bagram to the Kabul Military Acade- though doctrine called for the soldiers to be my, some 40 kilometers away.

34 Special Warfare Sergeant First Class Sandy Marcello group of dust-covered soldiers, they had was the NCO in charge of the task-force been light-heartedly cautioned against convoys.3 Marcello, the owner of an auto saying so out loud. “When General Tommy body shop in Tennessee, had served on Franks visited the Special Forces units active duty as an SF weapons sergeant and here,” recalled the executive officer of the as an SF engineer sergeant. He had West Virginia National Guard’s 2nd Bat- deployed on a series of operations to Pak- talion, 19th SF Group, “he said, ‘I’ve seen istan in the 1980s during the Soviet occu- the 3rd Group and the 19th Group, and I pation of Afghanistan. Recalled to active can’t tell them apart.’ ” The XO joked that duty for Operation Enduring Freedom, both the 3rd Group and the 19th Group Marcello returned to a territory that he had been offended by the remark. That understood well. He called the crew and morning, as the soldiers drove down the the passengers of the two-vehicle convoy road to Kabul, through minefields and past together, and in quick, well-rehearsed burned-out tank hulls, there was no sign of phrases, he described the mission, the offense taken by either party. The Guards- route, the timetable, the checkpoints, the men said they were simply glad to be in communications and the emergency proce- Afghanistan, “to finally have our turn at dures that would be followed if the convoy bat” — whatever the mission. encountered mines or ambushes. The two armed “Humvee” trucks had been inspected and were ready to roll. Staff Notes: Sergeant Darryl Albright drove the lead 1 This article is based on interviews with members of Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group, and vehicle. In civilian life, Albright worked as with members of the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, at a nurse; in the 3/20th, he served as an SF Bagram Airfield and in Kabul, Afghanistan, by the medic. Sergeant Aaron Lawless was also author, 7-8 May 2002. an SF medic; his duties complemented his 2 “Jack Sykes” is a pseudonym. pre-war career as a physician’s assistant 3 “Sandy Marcello,” “Darryl Albright,” “Aaron Law- less,” “Albert Cassidy,” “Jules Burgette,” “Jamie Bar- and as a nurse. Lawless held a carbine ber” and “Timothy Nixon” are pseudonyms. across his lap. On the roof of the vehicle, Specialist Albert “Wes” Cassidy, a police- man from Hollywood, Fla., manned the M- 2 .50-caliber machine gun. In the 3/20th, Cassidy was a parachute rigger, but he had once been a rifleman in a mechanized- infantry unit, where he mastered the work- ings of the heavy machine gun. The trailing vehicle was armed with a MK-19 40 mm grenade launcher, manned by Sergeant Jules Burgette, who in civilian life was a college student in Florida. At the right-side rear door, Sergeant Jamie Bar- ber kept an M-240 machine gun at the ready. Once his tour of duty in Afghanistan ended, Barber intended to return to his job as a hotel manager. The only Regular Army SF soldier in the convoy was Sergeant First Class Timothy Nixon, a medic from the 3rd SF Group’s Support Company, who drove the second vehicle. Although the passengers might have been tempted to make the observation that there was no distinguishing the National Guardsmen from the Army regular in the

September 2002 35 Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP Teams in Afghanistan

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

hile deployed to Afghanistan, two tract requirements for projects, for arrang- coalition humanitarian liaison ing the delivery of food and clothing, and Wcells, or CHLCs from the 489th for overseeing work in progress. Civil Affairs Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, In Afghanistan, the CHLCs focus on basic Knoxville, Tenn., performed similar tasks necessities and seek to create positive but worked for different commands and impressions for future generations. Their coordinated with quite different populaces. mission continues to be tough and demand- ing; it requires consummate professional- ism and a positive “can do” attitude in the face of daily frustrations. Getting troops on the ground to take the hand-off from the 96th Civil Affairs Battal- ion and to sustain the momentum of the humanitarian effort launched by the 96th was critical. Members of the 489th CA Bat- talion’s CHLC 6, which was assigned to support the 101st Airborne Division’s Task Force Rakkasan, lived out of their ruck- sacks for a month at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. Initial meetings with the Afghan region- al commander who was responsible for the outer-perimeter security of Kandahar Air- field facilitated the hiring of local inter- preters and the leasing of two pick-up Photo by Kevin P. Bell trucks that would be used to transport A member of the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion (left) talks with workers who are recon- members of CHLC 6 to outlying Alliance structing a warehouse in Konduz. camps and villages. With the CHLC’s two Working in conjunction with local elders Iridium telephones, Major Gregory Jerni- and government officials, the four- to six- gan and Staff Sergeant Eric Nolan, both man CHLCs (commonly referred to as “chi- civilian law-enforcement officers, estab- clets”) are responsible for assessing lished communications, and CHLC 6 was humanitarian needs (water, food, shelter, “in business” in less than a week. clothing, and education), for establishing Using common civilian transport, and priorities based on need, for preparing con- wearing civilian clothes and beards, the

36 Special Warfare Because Afghanistan has been plagued with drought for seven years, many of the CHLC proj- ects involved drilling wells.

U.S. Army photo CHLC minimized the “footprint,” or obvi- Afghan children. The stateside response ous presence of their military connection. was tremendous, and the actions of the But the impact of their presence was sig- families and the family-support groups nificant. Within two weeks, 42 village built strong bridges for the future. elders had gathered at Kandahar Airfield. Despite limited communications in out- Some had walked as far as 30 miles to lying areas, “word of mouth” quickly spread meet Jernigan and to listen to his propos- the news that a small village that had als. Since Afghanistan had been plagued by needed internal water for more than 10 drought for seven years, all of Jernigan’s years had a new well. Engineers from the proposals — ranging from well-digging to 489th CA Battalion had provided the nec- irrigation projects — involved water. essary technical supervision and the expe- For the first time, village leaders were rience to ensure that drilling went to the being invited to share in the prioritization bottom of the aquifers — the critical ele- of solutions. They were also seeing some ment of reliable water sourcing. response to requests for assistance — Meanwhile, in Kandahar, some 40 miles which was a radical change. In the past, from the former Soviet airfield, the soldiers the further the villages were from Kanda- of CHLC 2 performed “hands on” missions har, the less prosperous they were: Dis- in a different way. CHLC 2 was an integral tance reduced interest. part of an ARSOF team built around an SF While refining, validating, and updating detachment from the National Guard’s 19th the contract process, CHLC 6 used ARSOF SF Group. ARSOF integration had been and TF Rakkasan helicopters to begin dis- prompted by rocket attacks, the deaths in tributing wheat, rice, dates, beans, and Kandahar of an SF medic and three mem- blankets to the 51 villages and towns bers of an explosive-ordnance-disposal around the airfield. Having visited most of team, and the wounding of an SF lieutenant the villages and having talked with the who had been on patrol in the Kandahar elders, CHLC 6 and Detachment 910, Com- market area. pany A, 9th Psychological Operations Bat- Major Harry Singletary, Major Gregory talion, wanted to repay the hospitality of Mulligan and Captain Terry Rounds (not all the villages. As a way of reciprocating, they from CHLC 2) emphasized that combat tac- established links with relatives in Palm tical skills became primary when CHLC 2 Beach, Fla., and Knoxville, Tenn., and with was told to help defend the ARSOF team’s family-support groups at Fort Campbell compound at night, and when CHLC 2 was and Fort Bragg, who were willing to donate dispatched to clear suspected rocket-launch simple toys and school materials for the sites in a nearby apartment building. How-

September 2002 37 ever, during the day, the CHLC’s Civil As Civil Affairs projects, such as the Affairs missions (medical, food distribution, rebuilding of Mirawyse hospital by the 96th and education) took priority. CA Battalion, were completed, the psycho- CHLC 2’s medical and education team, logical-operations team — Detachment 1-2 Specialists John Harriman and Arthur Wal- of the 345th PSYOP Company, from Dallas, ton, dressed in civilian clothes to conceal Texas — publicized the successes. their rank. They concentrated on significant However, when the 19th SF Group liai- projects that would help residents and that son team at Kandahar Airfield discovered would counter Iranian-sponsored anti-Amer- that Detachment 1-2 had a squad auto- matic weapon, or SAW, and an M-203 with basic loads of ammunition, the detachment was “reassigned and transported” to the SFOB in Kandahar. Within 48 hours, Detachment 1-2 had become part of an SF- Afghan vehicle-mounted task force that was en route to Nowzad to capture a noted Taliban leader. Because almost everyone in the village was illiterate, the assistant team leader, Sergeant Tim Elton, brought along several loudspeakers. The team sergeant, Staff Sergeant Charles Milton, a veteran of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, was carrying the M-203. Milton, Elton and the SAW gunner, Specialist Joshua Danner, along with 12 other Americans, were crammed into four pickup trucks. Two- hundred-fifty Afghani soldiers were stuffed Photo by William A. Jones aboard 10 other trucks for the 18-hour CHLC 6 arranged for fam- cross-country trek. “It was a ‘Rat Patrol’ ily-support groups in the ican propaganda. One dual-purpose project but twice as hairy. It wasn’t a convoy — it United States to donate was the air conditioning of the building that was more like a herd racing across the high school supplies to chil- housed the popular Afghan radio station. desert at night,” remembered Milton. dren in Afghanistan. The radio-station project would expand When the task force arrived, the entire communications to a population that has a village was pitch black: the village had no 75-percent illiteracy rate. Because the anti- electricity and no generator. Night visitors quated Croatian radio equipment used by usually meant trouble. Thus, an explana- the Iranians tended to overheat after two tion was necessary to ease tension among hours, air-conditioning the Afghan station the villagers about the “unexpected” intru- would allow the Afghans to dominate the sion. That’s when Elton’s loudspeakers local airways. were brought into play. Although the Tal- Harriman also learned that employing iban leader was not in the village, Detach- locals, whom he said could “talk to the peo- ment 1-2 demonstrated combat skills that ple and connect with them,” as radio made it a true force multiplier. Thus, true announcers was preferable to using U.S.- ARSOF integration was achieved in the schooled Afghans. Employing locals also heart of Afghanistan. improved the station’s credibility and expanded its listening audience. Both Har- Editor’s note: All the names given in this arti- riman and Walton admitted that their cle for U.S. military personnel are pseudonyms. toughest task was convincing nongovern- mental organizations to shift from simple emergency actions to more complicated Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori- developmental projects that would yield an for the U.S. Army Special Operations long-term benefits. Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

38 Special Warfare Ambush at 80 Knots: Company B, 3/160th SOAR by James A. Schroder

ne particular aviation mission during mixed within the flight. Unfortunately, day- Operation Enduring Freedom proved light came quickly: A daylight mission Othat all the aviators within the 160th increases the risk, both to aircraft and to Special Operations Aviation Regiment are personnel. trained to the same high level of competence. The formation received continual intelli- After executing an operation on the gence updates from an observation plat- Takur Ghar Mountain on March 4, 2002, in which several helicopters from units of the 160th were either damaged or destroyed by enemy fire, the 160th temporarily com- bined some of the assets of Company A of the 2nd Battalion with those of Company B of the 3rd Battalion. On March 16, members of the composite unit were alerted that the next day they would fly their helicopters, loaded with Navy SEALs, to intercept a convoy of al- Qaeda forces and either capture or destroy the enemy. The operation would require MH-47D helicopters from Company B and MH-47Es from Company A. Chief Warrant Officer Gary Black,1 the MH-47E flight leader, had previously served with Company B. Black had overall responsibility for the mission. U.S. Army photo He assembled all the helicopter crews and form that routinely surveyed the battle- An MH-47D Chinook and briefed them on the mission, diagramming field.2 As the flight raced to intercept the assault force wait for the the procedure on butcher-block paper. Once convoy, the SEALs aboard the MH-47Ds order to launch a mission in Afghanistan. he was confident that the participants fully asked for permission to remove the win- understood their tasks and all contingen- dows on the Chinooks. Removing the win- cies, Black told the group to get some rest. dows would allow the soldiers to fire on the Early on March 17, after attending a convoy in case one of the Chinook’s M-134 quick update briefing, the elements of the miniguns failed or jammed. The pilots combined flight departed, with an MH-47E agreed, and the crewmembers and the in the lead and the remaining Chinooks assault element jettisoned the windows on

September 2002 39 each helicopter en route to their objective. M-249s followed them. The enemy convoy of three trucks was As Chief Warrant Officer Mark Reagan4 traveling down a wadi, a dry steam bed that landed his helicopter, the right-side mini- functions as a road, and a fourth truck gun jammed after a 15-second burst. Staff trailed about two miles behind in the same Sergeant Charles Martin,5 the flight medic stream bed. The pilots had expected to be and a former squad-automatic-weapon gun- able to see the vehicles far enough out to ner in the 75th Ranger Regiment, immedi- plan an approach for the assault. However, ately began using his M-4. Firing in semi- 30-foot granite cliffs prevented the aviators automatic mode to conserve ammunition, he from seeing the convoy until they were shot the nearest enemy soldier; then he and almost on top of it. Sergeant Walker, the right door gunner, who was also firing an M-4, killed a second foe. As the crewmembers and SEALs shot through the window holes, the pilots quick- ly repositioned the helicopter to a new spot just over the crest of a small hill. The new position masked the helicopter and gave the assault force a superb position, overlooking the convoy, from which they could engage the surviving al-Qaeda forces. Meanwhile, Elkenback and his crew spot- ted the fourth truck in the stream bed to the north. They rapidly closed on the vehicle and stopped it by executing a 180-degree decelerating turn with the helicopter’s left minigun trained on the truck. There was no place to land. As the helicopter hovered, a woman exited the truck and held up a child; U.S. Army photo five other people in the vehicle simply An MH-47D conducts an Black, executing a gut-wrenching 90- stared at the Chinook. The crew maintained in-flight refueling over Afghanistan. degree right turn with a rapid deceleration, excellent fire discipline. After the ground landed his helicopter approximately 20 feet force performed a quick assessment of the in front of the lead vehicle and forced the situation, the team leader instructed the convoy to stop. The rules of engagement crew to abort, and Elkenback returned to stated that if the occupants pointed the main convoy. weapons at the helicopters, the gunners The ground-force commander ordered could shoot the enemy. The al-Qaeda sol- two Chinooks to return to the fourth truck diers aimed their weapons at the heli- to perform an extensive search. This time, copters as they exited their trucks. The left one Chinook hovered ahead of the vehicle minigun on the lead Chinook immediately as the second helicopter landed nearby and fired on the first vehicle. unloaded the ground force. The passengers Black’s maneuver forced Chief Warrant exited the vehicle, sat on the ground and Officer Charles Elkenback,3 flying the sec- waited for the team to complete its search ond helicopter, to bank hard to the left in of the vehicle. Meanwhile, the two heli- order to avoid a collision. As Elkenback’s copters had departed, but they would helicopter banked, the right cabin-door return after the search and take the team minigun, the ramp gunner and the SEALs back to the main convoy. aboard fired on the convoy. The other Chi- By now, however, the helicopters were nooks moved into position to engage their running low on fuel, so the ground com- respective vehicles. The enemy scrambled mander released them so that they could out of their trucks, shot at the helicopters refuel from a MC-130P tanker that was and attempted to run to a nearby ravine. A flying nearby. After refueling, the heli- storm of gunfire from miniguns, M-4s and copters returned to exfiltrate the ground

40 Special Warfare force. The operation yielded 16 enemy sol- diers dead and two taken prisoner, along with the destruction of enemy vehicles and weapons. Despite moderate enemy fire, the helicopters suffered only minor battle damage. The mission was a success, and the inte- grated aviation assets worked well togeth- er. The aviators of both companies had demonstrated their professionalism and competence in battle, and the SEALs con- gratulated the Night Stalkers on a job well-done.

Notes: 1 “Gary Black” is a pseudonym. 2 Bill Gertz, “U.S. Attacks Afghan Convoy,” The Washington Times, 19 March 2002, 6. 3 This article is based on an interview with Chief Warrant Officer Charles Elkenback (pseudonym), Company B, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by the author, 8 May 2002, Kan- dahar, Afghanistan. 4 “Mark Reagan” is a pseudonym. 5 Interview with Staff Sergeant Charles Martin (pseudonym), Company B, 3rd Battalion, 160th Spe- cial Operations Aviation Regiment, by author, 8 May 2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

September 2002 41 An Army For Afghanistan: The 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group, and the Afghan Army

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

ears of civil war have left nation forces in order to enhance the Afghanistan without a national nation’s security. General Tommy Franks, Yarmy. Tribes and ethnic groups led commander of the United States Central by warlords were able to defeat the Soviets Command, emphasized the importance of and, with American assistance, they drove SF’s training mission in Afghanistan: “The out the Taliban. Subsequently, those tribes national army of Afghanistan is going to be and ethnic groups became the dominant an essential element of [Afghanistan’s] military forces within the country. long-term security,” he declared.2 The Afghanistan Interim Authority, or The Kabul Military Academy was a Rus- AIA, as well as members of the antiterrorist sian training site during the Soviet occupa- coalition, recognize that the security of tion of Afghanistan. Bombing by U.S. B-52s Afghanistan can and small-arms fire during the fighting in only be ensured by Kabul demolished or heavily damaged a well-trained army many of the academy’s buildings. In addi- composed of all tion to the destruction, arriving SF soldiers members of Afghan found rooms piled several feet high with society. In May, human feces. To make the facilities usable President George as classrooms and as barracks for the Bush, in a conver- Afghan officer and enlisted recruits, Ameri- sation with interim can engineers performed extensive recon- Afghan leader Ha- struction. Their efforts include decontami- mid Karzai, pledged nation, wiring for electricity, and extensive $2 million to help structural repairs. Photo by Kevin P. Bell equip an army for The 1st Battalion was given 10 months Soldiers from the 3rd SF Afghanistan.1 To that end, soldiers from the in which to train nine 600-man infantry Group issue new uni- 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, battalions and six 300-man border-guard forms and equipment to have begun training the first recruits for an battalions. At the end of that time, the recruits for the National ethnically-diverse Afghan national army. Afghan military cadre trained by the SF Afghan Army. Providing that type of training is a typi- soldiers would begin training additional cal SF mission — SF soldiers frequently forces. The objective, according to the com- assist other countries in training their mil- mander of the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant itary forces to prevent or defeat subversion Colonel Keith McDaniels, is to build “a or insurgency. Cross-cultural communica- credible, capable force.”3 tions skills and regional expertise enable Recruits for the Afghan army are select- SF soldiers to organize and train host- ed by provincial officials, and then they are

42 Special Warfare sent to Kabul for training. Travel to Kabul the trainers emphasize the importance of is extremely difficult, and although trans- learning to recognize leaders by their portation is the responsibility of the gov- appearance and their position. Critical to ernment, American and coalition forces the success of both the Afghan army and the have periodically had to assist with the nation is that the recruits understand their movement of Afghan forces. In individual and unit relationships to higher Afghanistan, birth certificates are nonexis- headquarters and to the government of tent, so verifying a soldier’s age is almost Afghanistan.4 impossible. Afghanistan has no national The Afghanistan identification method, such as a card, so training mission is the SF soldiers must ensure that only only one of the those recruits who have passed the initial missions that SF is screening are allowed to begin training. trained to perform. Each Afghan recruit is supposed to bring Previous training an AK-47 and four magazines of ammuni- missions have pre- tion when he reports for training, but not pared the SF sol- all of them do. The AIA is responsible for diers to occupy a providing equipment for the recruits, but bare-base facility its supply process is slow. The SF trainers and to train a have adapted to the situation by using native military U.S. Army photo their personal equipment to teach basic force.5 No other force in the U.S. military An SF soldier from the tasks such as camouflage. has the capability or the flexibility needed 1st Battalion, 3rd SF The trainers teach basic soldier skills — to perform such a highly political mission Group, works with recruits for the National marching, marksmanship, map-reading, with such global implications. One SF Afghan Army during their first aid, physical fitness and small-unit tac- trainer summed up the importance of the first week of training. tics. Training then progresses to the study of mission as follows: “That we are here dur- mortars and communications. There is no ing this time is key to stabilizing NCO tradition in Afghanistan, so enlisted Afghanistan for long-term growth and recruits who are identified as having lead- development.”6 ership potential receive additional leader- ship training in an attempt to create an NCO corps. After undergoing two weeks of Notes: training, officer recruits begin receiving 1 “U.S. to Help Equip Afghan Army,” Washington Post,3 May 2002, 5. leadership training, and they are then 2 Laurie Goering, “Kabul Sees Army as Key to incorporated into leadership positions with- Peace,” Chicago Tribune, 22 May 2002. in their battalions. Compounding training 3 J.S. Newton, “New Ranks Emerge From Dust,” difficulties is the fact that the recruits speak Fayetteville Observer,2 June 2002, 1A. “McDaniels” is either Dari, Pashtu or Farsi; most are illit- a pseudonym. 4 Major Henry Deaver (pseudonym) and Chief Warrant erate; most have little concept of teamwork; Officer 4 David Carson (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, 3rd and the recruits come from tribes that have SF Group, interview by author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 7 been fighting one another for decades. May 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Few recruits have any knowledge of Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. Afghanistan’s origins or of its government. 5 Captain John Montgomery (pseudonym) and Master Sergeant Charles Dunleavy (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, Tactical Psychological Operations teams 3rd SF Group, interview by author, Kabul, Afghanistan, assist the SF soldiers by teaching classes on 7 May 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Opera- the history of Afghanistan; Afghanistan’s tions Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C. geography and the make-up of its various 6 Carson interview. tribes; the Afghan government; and the Afghan election system. All instruction emphasizes national unity, the identity of the leaders of the AIA, and the legitimacy of the new government. Because many of the AIA leaders are unknown to the recruits,

September 2002 43 ‘Deminimus Activities’ at the Bagram Clinic: CA Team A-41

by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

t was a newsworthy story from around the town of Bagram to determine Afghanistan, said CBS “Sixty Minutes where U.S. resources could be applied. ITwo” producer Shawn Efran.1 With the Sergeant First Class Roger McDonald, the military defeat of the main force of Taliban team sergeant who never quite lost his and al-Qaeda units, the difficult task of Queens accent, served as “front man” for the helping Afghans rebuild their country fell team. He made travel plans; arranged meet- to small groups of United States special- ing agendas with the local political and mil- operations soldiers like Civil Affairs Team itary leadership; and prepared the security A-41. They were professional soldiers of plan for the gatherings. The team’s expert the first order, but they wore beards and on civil infrastructure, Sergeant First Class dressed in local garb in order to gain better Lyle Canberra, surveyed and assessed access to the people they wanted to help. water and sewage systems, aqueducts, Their job was “nation-building,” which wells, power grids, roads and bridges. He stood in sharp contrast to the destructive also organized demining operations, as he morality of the al-Qaeda. had done on other former battlefields. As characters in a news story, the four Sergeant First Class Bart Schuyler was A- men of A-41 were “good copy.” Major Silas 41’s medical specialist, and like McDonald Greene led the team with energy and excel- and Canberra, he was a veteran of Special lent judgment. To Efran, Greene’s urbane, Forces. He had practiced his skills on the articulate style belied his background as a edges of civilization on all the continents of tank officer who had successfully complet- the world. ed airborne and Ranger training. His effec- The team was trained in foreign lan- tiveness at leading his team was derived in guages, but not in any of the languages of large part from his previous assignments Central Asia. A-41 was oriented for in the U.S. Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Bat- employment in the European Command talion, a special-operations unit based at area: Greene spoke French; McDonald, Pol- Fort Bragg, N.C. Greene had become an ish; Schuyler, German and Spanish; and expert horseman while pursuing a bache- Canberra, Spanish and Portuguese. The lor’s degree in animal science at the Uni- scale of the crisis in Afghanistan required versity of Massachusetts at Amherst, and as many Civil Affairs teams as could be he had just received a master’s degree in deployed. In any case, given the variety of defense analysis at the Naval Postgradu- Pashtu, Dari and Urdu dialects endemic to ate School. His thesis, coincidentally, was the various ethnicities of Afghanistan, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia.” local translators were the best choice for The team moved constantly in and local communications.

44 Special Warfare The “Sixty Minutes Two” producer van whose back seats had been removed. brought his cameraman and his sound Schuyler knew he could participate in man to meet A-41 in mid-January 2002. “deminimus activities” in this situation — Their correspondent, Scott Pelley, would fly that is, on Greene’s orders, Schuyler could in after the crew completed the back- use U.S. resources to alleviate the immedi- ground research and prepared the story.As ate suffering of non-U.S. personnel. After they would have done with any new team allowing Doctor Atta to take the lead in the members, McDonald and Canberra gave treatment, Schuyler began coordinating a the crew rudimentary weapons training follow-up visit with a U.S. Army surgeon at and put them through security drills, for the Italian-run hospital in Kabul. He also their self-defense. Schuyler taught them made arrangements for skin grafting and basic first-aid procedures for gunshot physical therapy. Schuyler himself checked wounds and related trauma. The camera- on the boy later and was pleased to learn man had once served in the 82nd Airborne that there was no secondary infection. The Division, and he cooperated happily; the boy’s hand was saved. sound man, a freelancer like the camera- man, fit in just as well. When Pelley joined A-41 and the “Sixty A-41 responded in an almost automatic fash- Minutes Two” crew a week later, Greene ion. McDonald and Canberra took up security simply followed his normal, crowded sched- ule. That day, A-41 was scheduled to re- positions to hold back the gathering crowd. visit the emergency clinic in the city of Bagram. It was one of 23 clinics that, along Greene found himself helping to push-start with a hospital, were supported by an Ital- the clinic’s worn-out ambulance. … Schuyler ian private volunteer organization. Howev- er, Doctor Mohammed Atta, the clinic’s doc- began coordinating a follow-up visit with a tor, had not been paid in eight months. He had remained in his hometown through U.S. Army surgeon … in Kabul. both the Soviet and Taliban occupations, even when Bagram became the center of The incident in the Bagram clinic was over fighting. He was now living hand-to-mouth in less than 20 minutes, and all of it was in a nearby bunker and was planning to caught on tape by the “Sixty Minutes Two” start a garden on its roof. team. Scott Pelley featured the incident in Minutes after A-41 and Pelley’s crew his story on A-41, which was aired nation- arrived at 11 a.m., a mob of local children wide under the lead-in title, “Mission Impos- rushed in carrying a badly injured 16-year- sible.” For Greene, McDonald, Schuyler and old boy, whom Doctor Atta recognized. The Canberra, who made one of the 10 Civil boy had reached down to pick up a Affairs “alpha” teams operating across the grenade, and it had detonated in his right country, the incident represented just anoth- hand. His little finger and part of his ring er morning of another day of trying to give finger and thumb were gone, and the dor- Afghanistan “a good start” toward making sal portion of his hand was “de-gloved” to itself a nation that would not become a sanc- the wrist — that is, the skin was peeled tuary for terrorists again. back. The boy also had a grenade fragment projecting from his cheek, but most of the blood on his face had come from his hand. Notes: While the “Sixty Minutes Two” crew was 1 This article is based on interviews with three mem- bers of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, recording the event, A-41 responded in an N.C., conducted by the author 5 April 2002. Silas almost automatic fashion. McDonald and Greene, Roger McDonald, Lyle Canberra and Bart Canberra took up security positions to hold Schuyler are pseudonyms. back the gathering crowd. Greene found himself helping to push-start the clinic’s worn-out ambulance, a battered old mini-

September 2002 45 Forty-Five Seconds on a Hot LZ: The 2/160th SOAR

by James A. Schroder

or two months early in 2002, the spe- trate two special-operations teams into two cial-operations-aviation warriors of separate LZs, one in the northern area of Fthe 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Objective Remington and the other in the Operations Aviation Regiment, conducted southern area. Razor 03 would fly to the numerous missions from Bagram air base. northern LZ with Razor 04, drop off Razor By March 3, 2002, they had inserted many 04 and then proceed to the southern LZ. coalition and United States teams into the Razor 04 planned to land at the northern Shah-e-Kot valley in Afghanistan in support LZ, drop off his team, and then proceed of Operation Anaconda. The Night Stalkers north at a slow airspeed in order to allow had completed the infiltrations under the Razor 03 to link up. Once they had cover of darkness using MH-47E Chinooks. rejoined, the two Chinooks would return to The flights had been routine, with little enemy Bagram air base and end the mission.1 contact. The helicopter landing zones, or LZs, Razor 03 and Razor 04 departed the air had been at altitudes ranging from 8,000 feet base on the night of March 3 to fly to an off- set location. The flight arrived at the pickup zone, or PZ, without incident, loaded two The delay caused a problem for the ground special-operations teams, and departed on time. Intelligence indicated that the flight force: There wouldn’t be enough time for routes and the LZs were relatively secure, the ground force to move to its observation but an AC-130 gunship was to check the LZs and confirm that the area was clear. position, or OP, under the cover of dark- When the flight of Chinooks was six min- utes from the objective, the AC-130 was divert- ness. The team leader requested permis- ed because of its proximity to an incoming sion to go directly to the OP. B-52 airstrike. The AC-130 therefore failed to establish “eyes on the objective.” Chief War- rant Officer 3 Alfred Mann,2 the flight leader, to 11,500 feet mean sea level, or MSL. The LZs and Captain Timothy Dickerson,3 the air-mis- offered limited space to land, and the margin sion commander, or AMC, decided to return to for error was slim. The altitude of the LZs the PZ, which was only a 15-minute flight challenged aircraft performance and pilot from the objective, and to wait for the bombing skill; single-engine flight was never an option. operation to end. At the PZ, the flight crews The mission planned for the night of reduced the helicopter engines’ speed to March 3 was uncomplicated: Two Chi- ground idle in order to conserve fuel. nooks, Razor 03 and Razor 04, would infil- Next, an air assault by the 101st Air-

46 Special Warfare borne Division onto Objective Remington one o’clock position. The machine gun was further delayed the mission. The helicopter not an unusual sight, because the mountains crews shut down the engines to conserve of Afghanistan are littered with abandoned fuel. The delay caused a problem for the military hardware. Next, they spotted a don- ground force: There wouldn’t be enough key tied to a tree at the three o’clock position. time for the ground force to move to its Upon landing, Mann informed the team observation position, or OP, under the leader that they were not alone. cover of darkness. The team leader As the team stood near the ramp hinge, requested permission to go directly to the poised to exit the helicopter, Sergeant Jer- OP. Mann calculated the performance fig- ald Curtis,4 saw a man duck behind a ures and stated that the team leader could berm at the nine o’clock position. Mann get in, but there was no guarantee that the relayed that information to the team LZ would be suitable for landing. The team leader, who stated that his team was tak- leader replied that he saw the imagery and ing the hill. Sergeant Derick Mackenzie,5 that there were places to land. the right ramp crewmember, held the The air-assault mission ended, and the team up as the information was relayed. flight began the engine start-up procedures. Unfortunately, the right engine on Razor 03 exceeded its limits on start-up. Mann decided that it would be foolish to take an aircraft with a questionable engine to 10,000 feet MSL. He immediately shut down the heli- copter. Dickerson contacted the rear and requested a replacement aircraft. Coinciden- tally, two Chinooks were in the forward arm- ing and refueling point, or FARP. Dickerson coordinated with the operations center for the two Chinooks in the FARP to become replacement helicopters. Once the replace- ment Chinooks arrived at the PZ, the pilots in Razor 03 and Razor 04 decided to use the replacements, because now both of the origi- nal aircraft were low on fuel. Mann informed the team leader that in the best-case sce- nario, he could get the team to the LZ by 2:45 U.S. Army photo a.m. The delay would allow the team only one Just as Mackenzie dropped his arm to Razor 03’s battle-dam- hour of movement under the cover of dark- release the team, an enemy soldier stood aged aircraft at the ness. The team leader again requested per- and launched a rocket-propelled grenade, forced-landing site. The mission to go directly to the OP. or RPG, at the left side of the helicopter. aircraft was later recov- At 2:30 a.m., the flight departed en route The RPG hit Razor 3, knocking out all of ered and is being directly to the OP and executed the mission the electrical power. The exploding round returned to service. exactly as planned. The first AC-130 gunship wounded Curtis’ right leg. The flaming reached its fuel limit and handed its mission projectile passed through the aircraft and over to a second AC-130, which cleared the knocked out the transfer rectifiers, which new LZ and departed for another tasking eliminated all of the multifunctional dis- approximately six minutes prior to Razor plays; the Advance Flight Control System, 03’s arrival at the LZ. During the approach, or AFCS; radios; all of the aircraft’s mis- the crew members thought that the LZ sion equipment; and the M-134 miniguns. appeared to be suitable for landing, although Smoke filled the cabin and obscured the they noticed footprints in the snow that was vision of those in the back. common at those high altitudes. Coming clos- Small-arms fire caused the No. 1 er, they noticed an unmanned DSHK hydraulic system to fail. The RPG had also machine gun (in pretty good shape) at the knocked out the intercrew communication

September 2002 47 When Razor 03’s controls locked up, the aircraft was 10 feet above the ground. Although the crew expected it to roll over, the aircraft remained upright.

U.S. Army photo system between the front door gunners inch-square back-up altitude indicator, which and the pilots. The team stayed on the air- was the only flight instrument that remained craft, and the team leader yelled, “Get us operative, Tucker called out airspeed, altitude out of here!” Mackenzie, the only crew and direction. Mackenzie confirmed that both member who could communicate, yelled to engines were running. He informed Mann Mann over the intercom system, “Fire in that a man had fallen out at the LZ and that the cabin rear ready! Pick it up, pick it up! they had to go back. Then he focused his atten- Go, go, go!” and fired an M-60 machine gun tion on Parcelli, who was dangling beneath the mounted in the aft right cabin window. helicopter, and pulled him in as the aircraft Mann took the controls from Chief Warrant took more small-arms fire. Officer 3 George Tucker6 and quickly Mann and his crew immediately decided departed without the use of the AFCS. to go back, fully aware that the miniguns The oil-soaked ramp, which had been were inoperative and that they had only the rendered inoperative when small-arms fire M-60 and their individual weapons. Mann damaged the helicopter’s utility hy- banked the helicopter to the right and felt draulics, was stuck in the down position. vibration in the flight controls. As Macken- As the helicopter lurched off the ground, zie looked forward, a red haze, caused by Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts, slip- hydraulic fluid spraying from a severed line, ping on the greasy floor, fell and rolled enveloped the ramp area. Soon it became toward the open ramp. Sergeant Paul Par- apparent that the hydraulic system was celli,7 the ramp gunner, rushed toward the failing — a condition that could render the tumbling SEAL and caught him. Macken- Chinook unflyable. Mackenzie read the zie, reacting to movement, rushed after maintenance panel and confirmed that the both of them. Mackenzie and Parcelli tem- hydraulic pressure for all three systems was porarily held Roberts, but they could not zero. Aware of the gravity of the situation, maintain their hold during takeoff. As the he opened a can of hydraulic fluid, one of helicopter shuddered, Roberts and Parcelli four that he routinely kept near the pump, fell out of the helicopter. Parcelli, tethered and poured it into the hydraulic-fill module. by a safety harness, remained with the He quickly hand pumped the life-saving liq- Chinook, but Roberts fell to the ground uid into the system. This procedure tem- from about five feet. When the helicopter porarily restored cyclic control, but the cleared the ridge line, Parcelli dangled cyclic controls continued to lock up even as 3,000 feet above the ground. Mackenzie added more fluid. Using his flashlight to illuminate the four- Mann determined that he couldn’t make it

48 Special Warfare back to the LZ and that he would have to land immediately in order to save the lives of those aboard. He identified a potential land- ing zone and put the helicopter in a landing attitude. The cyclic controls locked up when the helicopter was 10 feet above the ground. Mann pressed the pedals to turn the nose, and he lowered the thrust. The aircraft hit the ground with the nose 15 degrees high and the right side 10 degrees high. The crew, expecting the helicopter to roll over, conduct- ed an emergency shutdown, secured all sen- sitive items and executed the emergency- action plan. The team leader exited the heli- copter and established communications to effect recovery. Soon, Razor 04 arrived at the crash site, recovered all the personnel before the closing enemy could reach their location, and returned to the PZ. “Leave no man behind” has become an unof- ficial motto of special-operations forces. Despite severe damage to their helicopter, Mann and his crew valiantly attempted to rescue Roberts. Only when Mann could not maneuver the unstable helicopter because of the loss of hydraulic power, a lack of electrical power, and inoperative miniguns, did he decide to abandon the rescue attempt. Through his exceptional flying skills and complete coordination with Tucker, Mackenzie and the rest of the crew, Mann landed the aircraft without further casu- alties. This mission is a testimony to the skill and courage of special-operations aviators in the face of overwhelming odds. “Night Stalkers don’t quit!”

Notes: 1 This article is based on an interview with Chief War- rant Officer 3 Alfred Mann (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Bat- talion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by the author, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, Ky. 2 “Alfred Mann” is a pseudonym. 3 “Timothy Dickerson” is a pseudonym. 4 “Jerald Curtis” is a pseudonym. 5 Interview with Sergeant Derick Mackenzie (pseu- donym), Company A, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by the author, 9 July 2002, Fort Campbell, Ky. 6 “George Tucker” is a pseudonym. 7 “Paul Parcelli” is a pseudonym.

September 2002 49 Observations: ARSOF in Afghanistan

by James A. Schroder

he success and the speed of execu- barriers — all of which the soldiers tion of the war on terrorism, Opera- encountered in Afghanistan. Ttion Enduring Freedom, or OEF, SF training encourages ingenuity, auton- were a result of years of strategic invest- omy and adaptability because, by design, ment in personnel, training and equipment the 12-man SF detachments infiltrate many of United States Army special-operations miles into enemy territory or into semi-per- forces, which consist of Special Forces; missive environments, having only each Rangers; Civil Affairs; Psychological Oper- other to rely on. All three SF attributes were ations; the special-operations support brilliantly demonstrated as SF soldiers units — the 112th Signal Battalion and the called in close air support from remote loca- 528th Support Battalion; and the 160th tions, conducted direct actions against the Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Taliban hierarchy, and performed foreign The accomplishments of OEF were pos- internal defense — creating a national army sible because of the expertise, commit- from disparate local Afghan forces. ment, ingenuity, adaptability and warrior The Rangers illustrated their lethality ethos of these dedicated soldiers — a direct as an exceptionally competent Army strike result of their personnel-selection process- force. Their seizure of the airfield south of es and their specialized training. The tech- Kandahar was an example of flawless exe- nological advances of the past few years cution: They fought as they had trained — contributed to the victories, but individual with speed and ferocity. They took no casu- soldiers made the difference. alties, and they confiscated valuable intel- Special Forces verified their invaluable ligence information. capacity during OEF, fighting alongside At Takur Ghar mountain, in a firefight Afghani soldiers against Taliban and al- reminiscent of the one in Mogadishu, the Qaeda forces in the austere, mountainous Rangers attacked an enemy force terrain of Afghanistan. Numerous mem- entrenched atop a 10,000-foot high moun- bers of SF detachments attributed their tain, neutralized it, and then kept other hos- success during OEF to the realistic final tile forces at bay for more than 15 hours phase of the SF Qualification Course, exer- until all friendly forces could be extracted at cise Robin Sage. During the exercise, the night. The valiant effort cost the lives of SF students learn to address a myriad of three Rangers, and many more were wound- problems associated with working with ed, but no man was left behind. “guerrilla forces,” ranging from logistical, Civil Affairs units deployed to administrative, financial and operational Afghanistan with a mission to assist the issues to cultural conflicts and language Afghan people, who were suffering from

50 Special Warfare years of restrictive and negligent Taliban The tactical importance of PSYOP was rule. Because the CA teams are combat also beneficial. The 910th Tactical PSYOP forces, they were able to operate in danger- Detachment educated and warned vil- ous and hostile areas that were unreach- lagers during tactical operations around able by nongovernment organizations. their villages. The 910th’s soldiers also After conducting an assessment of basic proved that they were a combat multiplier survival needs — water, food and shelter — that could fight alongside infantry forces. the CA teams began providing humanitar- Teams from the 112th Signal Battalion ian aid to the needy people. provided rapid and continuous connectivity, The teams also conducted many construc- across a broad spectrum of communications, tion-project estimates for water wells, hospi- between deployed commands and the state- tals, schools and road repairs. Unfortunate- side combatant commander, as well as ly, the funding for these projects was not between intratheater commands. OEF cre- readily available: The nations that had ated an enormous demand for bandwidth to promised the necessary financial aid were accommodate all the secure and nonsecure slow in delivering the funds. The delay cre- ated resentment among the local governors The accomplishments of the war were possi- or chieftains who had believed that if they cooperated fully with the CA teams, the con- ble because of the expertise, commitment, struction projects would begin immediately and endear them to their native populace. ingenuity, adaptability and warrior ethos of The CA teams also operated as combat these dedicated soldiers — a direct result of forces when necessary. One CA team, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell 2, their personnel-selection processes and spe- responded as a quick-reaction force during a crucial mission to recover an explosive- cialized training. The technological advances ordnance-disposal team whose members of the past few years contributed to the victo- were killed while attempting to destroy an enemy ammunition cache. The CA team ries, but individuals made the difference. performed its military duties with profi- ciency, in an extremely dangerous situa- data — including voice, data and video — tion, on very short notice, and while adjust- that was essential to mission completion. ing its plan en route to the objective. Small ARSOF signal teams deployed to Psychological Operations units con- remote locations, overcame harsh environ- tributed to the strategic and tactical objec- ments and technical and tactical difficulties, tives of the war. PSYOP teams demon- and never failed to deliver communications. strated their ability to produce and deliver The signal teams reacted promptly to the leaflets that were culturally sensitive and many urgent demands imposed upon them, targeted to specific themes that met the for each request was of great importance to combatant commander’s objectives. The the requesting customer. strategic importance of the leaflets was The units of the 528th Support Battalion immense. The Afghan people needed to contributed to OEF in various ways. Com- know why American and coalition forces pany A provided the SOF-specific expertise were in their country. The PSYOP leaflet necessary for equipping and supplying campaign provided that knowledge, but demanding customers. At Task Force Dag- the effectiveness of the leaflet campaign ger, the 528th’s support soldiers estab- was difficult to measure because most of lished a warehouse system and assisted the Afghan people could not read. The Air Force personnel in correcting an leaflets presented simple messages about accountability problem so that they could mine awareness, explained the source of better control the off-loading of personnel the humanitarian rations that fell from the and equipment from aircraft. The 528th sky, and stressed that the Americans were soldiers also established accountability for friendly and not an occupying force. every item transferred or issued to non-

September 2002 51 Army SOF personnel. never dropped a mission because of a main- By doctrine, the 528th acts as a medium tenance problem, and its operational rate between special-operations supply chan- was in the high 90s. Whether they were nels and conventional supply channels. treating troops who had been injured in bat- Unfortunately, the transition from SOF tle or who had been rescued from aircraft support to conventional support suffered crashes, or whether they were caring for because of a limited availability of SOF civilians who had been injured by subver- personnel, and Task Force Dagger immedi- sives, the 160th’s flight medics, all gradu- ately felt the impact as it battled the ates of the Special Operations Combat Med- inflexibility of conventional supply sys- ical Course, demonstrated their life-saving tems. The maintenance-support team from skills. the 528th’s Company B distinguished itself When National Guard and Army by maintaining the decrepit civilian vehi- Reserve SOF soldiers mobilized to aug- cles used by SF soldiers. The mechanics ment active-duty forces, they left behind kept the vehicles operational by making their civilian jobs and families, well aware “controlled substitutions” from comparable that their deployments would last at least nonworking vehicles. Many times, especial- a year. The deployments caused financial, ly when they were repairing all-terrain family and personal stress, but the recalled vehicles in remote locations, the mechanics SOF soldiers enthusiastically embraced could rely on nothing except their tools and their assigned responsibilities. They expe- their ingenuity. rienced the same combat situations as the The Night Stalkers of the 160th Special active-duty soldiers, and they executed Operations Aviation Regiment used their their duties to the same standards expect- vast collection of organic assets — multi- ed of all SOF personnel. million-dollar flight simulators, state-of-the- While the learning curve may have been art helicopters, advanced mission-planning steeper for the RC soldiers, who had previ- programs, and outstanding training — to ously practiced their soldiering tasks only execute nearly impossible missions in on a monthly basis, National Guardsmen Afghanistan to the promised standard: time and Reservists play a critical role in the on target plus or minus 30 seconds. Com- implementation of “rotational warfare.” bating some of the harshest environmental Rotational warfare depends upon a compe- conditions in the world, the Night Stalkers tent, well-trained reserve force that can doggedly completed many arduous and haz- replace the limited number of active-duty ardous aviation missions in support of OEF. SOF personnel in combat after a specified The “Don’t Quit” attitude of the Night amount of time, usually 3-6 months. The Stalkers played a crucial role early in the reserve-component forces also contributed campaign, when the 160th’s aviators com- to stateside successes by helping maintain pleted numerous challenging infiltrations of helicopters for the 160th SOAR, by aug- personnel from SF units and from other gov- menting the cadre and staff at SF school- ernment agencies. The MH-47E proved to be houses, and by producing high-quality the most capable helicopter in Afghanistan. PSYOP products. Its terrain-following technology enabled it to While the phenomenal success of OEF is fly in zero visibility, several hundred feet not due to the efforts of any one SOF unit, the above the ground, for long durations. The valuable contributions of every individual powerful MH-47D/E Chinook provided the soldier in each component of the well-trained primary means of transportation across soar- and dedicated ARSOF community are to be ing mountaintops and remote desert loca- commended. Without the efforts of ARSOF tions. The MH-60 DAP provided armed soldiers, the war on terrorism could not have escort for the Chinooks in Afghanistan, a progressed so rapidly and so effectively. salient source of armed protection. For months, the mechanics and crew members worked long, grueling hours to keep the machines in the air. The 160th

52 Special Warfare Vigilant Warrior 2002: War Game Demonstrates ARSOF’s Value to the Objective Force by Major General William G. Boykin

he 2002 Army Transformation war that range from strategic to tactical. game, Vigilant Warrior, demonstrat- In the future, the U.S. will maintain a Ted the value that United States strong interest in achieving its objectives Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, through, with and by indigenous or surro- will offer to the Army Transformation’s gate forces. ARSOF are the combat multi- Objective Force. plier. When the U.S. commits forces to any This year’s Vigilant Warrior, which con- of the full range of ARSOF missions, the cluded April 26, focused on assessing both nation’s demands and expectations run the design of the Objective Force and its high. Because of the demands and the chal- capabilities for global and full-spectrum lenges of the missions, ARSOF must con- war-fighting. Set in the year 2020, the war tinue to invest the majority of their time game was based on a global situation that and resources in training adaptive, mature included a major regional contingency and and intelligent soldiers. Leader develop- several smaller-scale contingencies. Joint ment and specialized training remain key forces participated in the exercise, and a to maintaining a quality force that will be series of joint task forces provided com- capable of meeting the demands of future mand, control, communications, comput- war-fighting. ers, intelligence, surveillance and recon- A mission that continues to be critical to naissance, or C4ISR. The U.S. Special Oper- the achievement of U.S. objectives is ations Command provided augmentation nation- and army-building. When it is in to the joint special-operations task forces. the U.S. national interest to help develop ARSOF participated in all scenarios of the military capabilities of foreign nations this year’s war game. The war game proved or of indigenous groups, ARSOF will serve to be an excellent means of evaluating con- as a key enabler by developing the con- cepts of the future and identifying issues cepts and by executing the programs relat- that require further development. During ed to foreign internal defense. Special the evaluation of each of the scenarios, one Forces works with foreign militaries and common lesson emerged: ARSOF are a key indigenous groups to develop focused war- component of the Objective Force. It is more fighting capabilities. Beginning at the indi- important now than ever before that vidual level and working through battalion ARSOF be better integrated into both joint operations, SF soldiers can assist a host- and Army war-fighting doctrine. ARSOF nation’s soldiers in developing and refining represent a multifunctional battlefield oper- a full range of military capabilities. ating system, a maneuver element, and an ARSOF are capable of building other operational enabler for achieving objectives nations’ armies because they have mas-

September 2002 53 tered basic and advanced warrior skills trine for the other members of the coali- and are able to teach those skills in a for- tion. In many cases, the members of the eign environment. While language skills CST will later work with the same forces and cultural awareness are important, they have trained. That fact mandates that ARSOF’s ability to effectively teach war- new U.S. Army C4ISR systems be fielded to rior skills is paramount. Unless SF soldiers ARSOF so that the coalition commanders are expert war-fighters, they cannot be can integrate maneuvers into the common effective in training others in the funda- operational picture that U.S. commanders mentals of war-fighting. Basic marksman- will use in providing command and control ship, patrolling, raids, ambushes, move- to the coalition partners during tactical ments to contact, and offensive and defen- operations. sive operations remain critical common Promoting security cooperation with denominators for all armed forces. Fur- allies and friends will continue to be a task thermore, much of the training in foreign for the U.S. Army as part of its campaign environments must focus on operations in strategy. Occasionally, the U.S. Army will urban terrain. The Special Forces “create” favorable balances of power by assisting friendly nations’ efforts in inter- nal defense and development, or IDAD. It During the evaluation of each of the scenar- is reasonable to believe that most U.S. cam- ios, one common lesson emerged: ARSOF are paigns will continue to require IDAD dur- ing some phase of the campaign, if not a key component of the Objective Force. … throughout the campaign. As a means of reducing the potential for hostilities in ARSOF represent a multifunctional battlefield areas in which U.S. forces are conducting operating system, a maneuver element, and operations, security-cooperation efforts could be performed in other areas nearby an operational enabler for achieving objec- in order to divert the war-fighting forces and logistics of hostile groups. tives that range from strategic to tactical. While IDAD is a multiagency responsi- bility, ARSOF remain an invaluable com- Advanced Urban Combat Course, or bat multiplier. Conventional forces may be SFAUCC, enhances the survival skills of employed to establish a secure environ- SF teams and serves as a mission- ment within which a nation can rebuild enhancer. SFAUCC will continue to unimpeded. Soldiers in Special Forces; progress and to integrate new technologies, Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological and in the future, SF soldiers will integrate Operations, or PSYOP, integrate their SFAUCC into the training they provide to operations with the operations of other ele- foreign armies. ments of the U.S. government, of foreign ARSOF must not only stay abreast of governments, of nongovernment organiza- conventional war-fighting doctrine, they tions and private volunteer organizations, must become experts in Army, SOF and and of host-nation national systems. CA joint doctrine. As ARSOF move toward the works through the indigenous leadership Objective Force, new doctrine emerges, and to assess or re-establish government infra- ARSOF continue to rapidly integrate new structures and civil infrastructures. doctrine, tactics and techniques, as well as PSYOP elements play a critical role in the new technologies, into the training pro- information campaign to influence the grams of all ARSOF war-fighting units. In behavior of designated target audiences at the future, few operations will be unilater- the tactical, operational and strategic lev- al U.S. actions, and coalition operations els. Through a variety of mediums, PSYOP will be pre-eminent. When called into units also inform the public and indige- action as a coalition support team, or CST, nous populations of U.S. objectives in an with foreign forces, ARSOF must be adept effort to gain popular support and to pro- at interpreting the principles of U.S. doc- vide public-service information.

54 Special Warfare On the future global battlefield, ARSOF will offer Army and joint-force command- ers a multispectrum, specialized force capable of performing full-spectrum uncon- ventional operations. ARSOF can help commanders achieve national objectives with a unity of effort and an economy of force. They can wage unconventional war- fare, or UW, to shape the operational envi- ronment and, occasionally, to create a situ- ation that will compel adversaries to divert their forces and to shift their focus from the primary area of operations. As required, ARSOF may execute a UW cam- paign as the main effort, and then employ their integrated assets to provide security- cooperation programs once combat opera- tions have been completed.

Major General William G. Boykin is com- mander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

September 2002 55 As I Saw It: The Eyewitness Report of a Soldier Who Fought During World War II and Survived

by Colonel Vernon E. Greene, U.S. Army (ret.)

hen I was born in West would even earn $3 for a three- and that he was admired and Virginia May 11, 1923, round fight. I seemed to be locked respected. I decided that I wanted WWorld War I was still a in for life. to become a soldier and move away vivid memory to most Americans, An uncle whom I never had a from the coal dust and the daily and war clouds had already begun chance to meet helped shape my risk of losing life or limb. to darken the skies over Asia and course. He was a Georgia boy, my As the Japanese, German and Europe. father’s brother, Reney, whose neat, Italian governments became more I was the middle of nine children — handsome World War I soldier’s vocal and as their military capabil- three boys and six girls. When my picture hung in our front room. I ities became more visible, the father died in 1938, I did as my never knew what rank Uncle United States was becoming con- older brother had done: I dropped Reney held, but from those who cerned about a possible worldwide out of school to work in the coal knew him, I learned that he set an conflict. The U.S. Army welcomed mines to supplement the family outstanding example for others volunteers and paid privates $21 a income. The daily wage was just month. Too young to enlist without short of $5. Although we were an adult signature, I asked my old- required to report to work Monday est sister to sign the necessary through Friday, we were paid only papers, and on Oct. 18, 1939, I was if we were needed. Otherwise, we en route from Bluefield, W.Va., to returned home without pay. Those Fort Thomas, Ky. Upon arrival at who were fortunate worked three Fort Thomas, I was physically and days a week. mentally tested and then sent, still One evening the younger of my in my civilian clothes, directly to two brothers and I were trying to what would be my home for the sneak into a boxing arena. When next three years, Company M, 10th an official came to the door and Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry asked if anyone wanted to box, my Division. brother volunteered me. We got in I was not to become familiar with free, but I lost the fight. I fought a the terms “basic training,” “boot few more times before I entered the camp,” and “advanced training” Army. I got three dollars if I lost, until I returned from Iceland in and five dollars if I won. I usually 1943. In the 10th Regiment, a sol- picked up three dollars. At the age dier learned by on-the-job training. of 16, I was going to work not It was a difficult environment for a Photo courtesy Vernon Greene knowing whether I was going to Vernon Greene on the day he entered the Army, Oct. tenderfoot. I lived with my peers, earn a wage each day or whether I 18, 1939, at the age of 16. my leaders, my superiors and my

56 Special Warfare evaluators. There was little room for cient in the ring, the decision was NCOs. In a few words, he stated me to err without being critiqued. easy for me, especially after a pro- that he would stop sending people Punishment was readily available fessional fighter knocked me out in to the guardhouse, that the work through extra guard duty, kitchen my last fight. would be done, and that if we could police, policing for match sticks and In the fall of 1941 we took a not get our soldiers to perform, we cigarette butts, marking targets on motor trip from Michigan to the could turn in our stripes, and he the rifle range, oral and written rep- harbor in New York City. The Army would find someone who could. rimands, and reduction in rank by did not want anyone to know that Discipline improved. local authority. we were on our way to Iceland to German military air and sea Early in my 10th Infantry days, augment the British forces who power in the North Atlantic region a corporal assembled about 30 of us had been rushed there after the had increased considerably after new soldiers from different units Germans took Norway. Later, we the German invasion of Poland in for basic close-order drill. He learned that some of the British September 1939 and of France in showed us a black pen and said, soldiers were veterans of Dunkirk. 1940. Prior to the U.S. entry into “This is a yellow pen.” He then They seemed twice our age, and the war, German reconnaissance walked up to each soldier and they became valuable instructors aircraft would fly over our firing asked him the color of the pen. and friends. During our stay in Ice- ranges, but we were not permitted Each soldier, including me, land, we called our regiment the to fire on them. One morning in responded, “Yellow, Corporal.” He December 1941, as the first said, “That’s great. We understand sergeant was about to dismiss us each other.” I soon learned that being from the 4 a.m. reveille formation, Late in 1939, we moved to Fort both a good squad he said, “Oh, yes! The Japanese McClellan, Ala., to join other units of bombed Pearl Harbor. Dismissed!” the 5th Infantry Division and to leader and a good boxer After that, we saw more enemy spend a cold winter living in tents. aircraft and submarines, and At Fort McClellan we learned to required more time than many allied ships were sunk en function as a team during squad, there was in a day. route to us and to our European platoon, and larger-unit field exer- allies. Caring for the shipwreck cises. In the spring of 1940, the 5th Because I loved soldier- survivors (mostly Merchant Infantry Division moved to Fort Marines) became an additional Benning, Ga., for field maneuvers — ing, and because I was mission for us. the largest peacetime field maneu- not very proficient in the On Oct. 24, 1942, I was promoted vers in U.S. history — conducted in to sergeant and appointed section Louisiana and Texas. ring, the decision was leader of two machine-gun squads. In the fall of 1940 we moved into Shortly thereafter, I appeared new wooden barracks at Fort easy for me. before a board for Officer Candi- Custer, Mich. — our first perma- date School and was selected for nent shelters in more than a year. 10th Labor Regiment. We worked the Infantry Officers’ School at Our training there concentrated on 12 hours a day, seven days a week, Fort Benning, Ga. Although I individual proficiency and small- primarily unloading ships and attended OCS there, I did not grad- unit tactics. By that time I had building fortifications and roads. uate, and I was assigned to Compa- been promoted to corporal, and I We also manned defensive posi- ny M, 311th Infantry Regiment, was the leader of a machine-gun tions and patrolled the beaches. 78th (Lightning) Infantry Division, squad. My promotion brought my With our work schedule, the sum- located at Camp Butner, N.C. The monthly pay up to $42, from which mer days and winter nights division had been activated Aug. I sent my mother an allotment. We seemed even longer than they 15, 1942, from a reserve unit. Most enjoyed our stay at Fort Custer. I were. It was rumored that prison- of the cadre were from the 29th fought a few bouts, but I soon ers in the guardhouse worked only Infantry Regiment. They were learned that being both a good eight hours per day, five days a much older than I, and they knew squad leader and a good boxer week. Perhaps the appeal of the each other. I did not know any of required more time than there was guardhouse workday caused disci- them. For the first time in my mil- in a day. Because I loved soldiering, pline to get out of hand. Our first itary career, I was a replacement, and because I was not very profi- sergeant called a meeting of the an unknown quantity.

September 2002 57 I was assigned to be a section the death, bravery, fear, sorrow and the division staff assembled the leader to two machine-gun squads, suffering of those operations would regimental commanders to discuss the same position I had held in Ice- require volumes, and I will leave the new offensive and to receive land. Following three weeks of the details to more gifted writers. the field orders. The 311th Infantry maneuvers in South Carolina in On Dec. 11, the 78th Division, Regiment was assigned the task of November 1943, the division now attached to V Corps and the seizing Kesternich and Huppen- returned to Camp Butner to pre- U.S. First Army, received the mis- broich. The 311th’s 2nd Battalion pare for departure to the Second sion to seize the town of Schmidt pried Kesternich away from the Army maneuvers in Tennessee in and to capture the Schwamme- Germans during a two-day battle. January 1944. The month prior to nauel Dam. However, the execution For this action, the 2nd Battalion our departure, I was promoted to of the mission was postponed was awarded the Presidential Unit first sergeant, at age 20. For the because of an increase in enemy air Citation. Staff Sergeant Jonah E. next 2 1/2 months, we slogged our and ground activities, including Kelley of the 2nd Battalion was way through mud, through the infiltration of enemy para- posthumously awarded the Medal streams, and over mountains. We of Honor, the only one awarded to a were being hardened for combat. member of the 78th Division dur- On April 1, the division rolled into ing World War II. a new station at Camp Pickett, Va. The 3rd Battalion (my battal- After undergoing many personnel ion), dressed in white camouflage changes directed by Washington, suits, advanced over open, snow- the division began field exercises at covered terrain, then crossed a cav- the battalion, regimental, and com- ern-like ravine to reach Huppen- bat team levels. By September, broich. The fierceness of the strug- there was no doubt that the division gle is evidenced by the casualty list was going overseas, and by Sept. 26, for the battle. The battlefield was we were sailing for England. The liberally covered with dead sol- 78th Infantry Division spent diers. More than a year later, while approximately four weeks in I was stationed at Camp Robinson, Bournemouth, England, but by the Ark., I was surprised to receive the end of November, it had moved to Silver Star for my minor role at Tongres, Belgium. In December, the Huppenbroich. 78th moved into Germany, first to The way was now clear for fur- the Rotgen area and then to the out- ther action against the skirts of Lammersdorf. Schwammenauel Dam and Photo courtesy Vernon Greene The 311th Regiment was intro- Corporal Vernon Greene (top) with members of his Schmidt. Still a first sergeant, I duced to combat Dec. 9, 1944, when machine-gun squad in Iceland, 1941. was assigned to be a platoon leader the regiment took over 7,000 yards (a lieutenant’s position), in charge of the line in the Hurtgen Forest, troopers dropping into our zone. of four machine-gun squads. The one of the bloodiest battlegrounds The increased activity was part of 3rd Battalion and other division of the war. By Dec. 23, the snow- the German counteroffensive into units received orders to move lined foxholes of our defensive posi- the Ardennes. The 78th was toward Schmidt, which was located tion covered 12,000 yards. Our instructed to halt its drive and to 2 1/2 miles west of the Roer River. positions were on the northern take the defensive. The division’s Other divisions thrown against shoulder of the Ardennes salient, sector, north of the enemy thrust, Schmidt had been driven back with the “Bulge.” With Germans on had to be held, so the 78th’s sol- heavy losses. three sides of us, we stayed there diers dug into the snow and pre- The plan called for us to ride until Jan. 30, 1945. During 130 pared coordinated defensive posi- into Schmidt on tanks. We had dif- days of continuous combat, the tions throughout the sector. ficulty finding the tanks and load- 311th fought in the Hurtgen For- By mid-January, the German ing onto them because of incoming est, on the Siegfried Line, in offensive into the Ardennes had artillery fire and a lack of commu- Nideggen, along the Roer River, on been smashed, and the 78th pre- nication with the tank crews. the Cologne plain, in Remagen, and pared to resume the offensive. On When we were about 200 yards in the Ruhr Pocket. To tell fully of Jan. 28, during a heavy snowfall, from Schmidt, the lead tank was

58 Special Warfare knocked out by an anti-tank gun lar opposite the second-lieutenant Roman town with a population of located near the edge of town. The bar. That gesture concluded my about 5,000. As a place from which other tanks turned and started commissioning, and I went back to we could launch an attack across toward the rear. My battalion com- the war. the Rhine, Remagen offered many mander ordered us off the tanks. When I returned to the 311th, difficulties, but it had a double- We assembled our platoons, Schmidt and the Schwammenauel track railroad bridge, just over moved rapidly across the open dam had been secured, and the 1,000 feet long, that had been built fields and dispersed toward the 311th had crossed the Roer River at the end of World War I. town. Bullets from machine guns at Zerkall and Nideggen. I was The 311th was placed under the zinged overhead while the enemy pleased to be back home. It was a command of Brigadier General gunners adjusted their range. For- bit awkward for my friends to call William M. Hoge, commander of tunately, most of the enemy me “sir” instead of Sergeant the 9th Armored Division, for the artillery was targeted on our Greene. I wondered what they expansion of the Remagen bridge- assembly areas, now vacant. With called me behind my back. head. Hoge informed the 311th’s adjacent units, we reached the Although none of us knew it, we commander, Colonel Chester Will- center of town by nightfall. After ingham, that he wanted one battal- dark, tank crews on foot led their ion of the regiment to move east tanks forward in low gear to our I was surprised when the astride the main highway in the new defensive positions. general took the crossed HovelHimberg area, and the rest of The 311th was instructed to the regiment to move north, in a assemble in Schmidt as the divi- rifles from the collar of a column of battalions, along the east sion reserve. While we were there, bank of the Rhine River to Honnef. I received mysterious orders: 1. lieutenant colonel and Early on March 8, the 311th Take a driver, a jeep with a full placed them on my collar rushed in to the bridge at Remagen tank of gas, and a five-gallon can of to cross the Rhine and to expand gas; 2. Go to the regimental head- opposite the second- the bridgehead. Riding in trucks, quarters, take a bath, get a clean the regiment rolled through the uniform and report to the adjutant. lieutenant bar. That ges- rubble of crumbled rock, aban- I did as I was told. When I reported ture concluded my com- doned equipment and mangled to the adjutant, I was formally dis- bodies that littered Remagen. The charged from the Army of the U.S. missioning, and I went 1st Battalion, in the lead, moved and told to report to the 78th Divi- across the bridge and toward the sion headquarters. There I was back to the war. front line, which was about 1,000 given a hot meal and a bed and yards from the bridge. Because of instructed to eat breakfast early were about to end the slow, tough an increase in combat activity, the and be ready to meet the division fighting of the previous months 2nd and 3rd battalions had to dis- commander, Major General Edwin and begin the race to the Rhine mount from their trucks west of P. Parker Jr., at 8 a.m. the next day. River. None of us could have the Rhine and follow on foot, bring- The next morning I was seated guessed that within a month, we ing only their personal weapons. in a room filled with officers when would be on the east bank of the The heavier, crew-served weapons General Parker entered. All pres- Rhine. Along a route of attack that (machine guns, etc.) that would ent snapped to attention. I was was thickly wooded and hilly, the have provided needed firepower introduced to the general, an out- regiment slugged its way forward would follow later, on vehicles. standing soldier, who swore me against elements of the proud 3rd Enemy bomber- and fighter-air- into the Army of the U.S. as a sec- Parachute Division and other Ger- craft activity, added to the Ger- ond lieutenant and placed a gold man units. Town after town fell man’s effective field artillery, bar on my collar after the adjutant rapidly. Late in the afternoon of encouraged us to move rapidly. The read that I was commissioned “for March 7, after a day of hard fight- 311th was the first complete U.S. the duration of the war plus six ing, troops of the U.S. 9th Armored infantry regiment to cross the months.” I was surprised when the Division reached the west bank of Rhine. general took the crossed rifles the Rhine at the town of Remagen, By 3:30 p.m. on March 8, the from the collar of a lieutenant midway between Cologne and 311th, fighting to expand the cru- colonel and placed them on my col- Koblenz. Remagen was an old cial bridgehead, had closed on

September 2002 59 wired the necessary explosives for its detonation. They made several unsuccessful attempts to detonate the explosives. On March 15, the Germans sent bombers against the bridge, and swimmers armed with explosives. They also used a large railroad gun and V2 rockets to attack the bridge. On March 17, the bridge at Remagen collapsed. The Allied armies had drawn up along the entire length of the Rhine’s west bank to attack in con- junction with the largest air assault of World War II, which The 10th SF Group Coin occurred March 24. In late March, as the 78th Divi- In July 1969, while commander of the 10th Special Forces Group, sion was defending the First Vernon Greene designed a coin intended to give the soldiers of the Army’s northern flank along the 10th SF Group a sense of pride in their unit. According to the 50th- Sieg River, the 311th Regiment anniversary annual published by the 10th SF Group in 2002, “A tra- was relieved of duty for a five-day dition was thus begun, calling for each Group member, past and pres- period of rest, recuperation, and ent, to carry his coin at all times.” training. Following those wonder- On the front of the coin, beneath the unit’s official designation, is a ful days, we were ordered to occupy replica of the Trojan-horse crest worn by members of the 10th SF Group newly acquired territory along the on their berets during the 1950s, when the beret was still unofficial. The Sieg River. The regiment remained reverse side of the coin features a scroll with the Special Forces motto, in this position while other ele- “De Oppresso Liber.” Beneath the scroll is an image of a beret carrying ments of the First Army conducted the SF crest. Below the beret is a large scroll that has space for engrav- a pincers movement to encircle the ing the owner’s name. Below that is another scroll with the words, “The Ruhr Valley, Germany’s richest Best,” which according to the annual, “signifies the goal of the Group and industrial district. Later, attack all its members — pre-eminence in all endeavors.” orders placed the 78th Division in The original die for the coin was produced by the Robbins Manu- an offensive movement that was to facturing Company of Attleboro, Mass., which the annual says has culminate with the capture of Wup- minted all the coins to date. The 10th SF Group retains exclusive pertal (estimated population: rights to the use of the coin. 270,000). This maneuver played an important role in the elimination of the area called “The Ruhr Pocket,” Erpel. By nightfall, the 311th was a 60-hour accounting reported that from which about 300,000 prison- joined by two armored infantry 578 German soldiers were brought ers were taken by our forces. battalions of the 9th Armored Divi- to our prisoner-of-war cages. As a subordinate unit, the 311th sion; one battalion of the 47th On March 10, Army engineers advanced about seven miles per Infantry, 9th Infantry Division; a began constructing a pontoon day for eight days. Wide attacking troop of the 89th Cavalry Recon- bridge and a treadway bridge that zones, rugged terrain, and piece- naissance Squadron; one company were needed to replace the dam- meal resistance of the enemy dic- of the 656th Tank Destroyer Bat- aged railway bridge at Remagen. tated the nature of the action in talion; and the 1st Battalion, 310th The Remagen bridgehead, 10 miles the pocket. The climax of the regi- Infantry, 78th Infantry Division. In deep and 30 miles long, posed a ment’s drive came with the capture all, the U.S. force amounted to no serious threat to the heart of Ger- of Wuppertal on April 16, which more than a few thousand men and many. The Germans had planned proved to be our last day of combat. a handful of armor. While the total to blow up the bridge rather than The Ruhr Pocket was not exactly a cost to the Germans was unknown, let it be captured, and they had picnic, as the regiment suffered 37 men killed and 218 wounded. On

60 Special Warfare the credit side of the ledger, we cap- bled because he appeared to be fin- and our accomplishments of years tured 266 towns, overran 149 ishing a four-year tour overseas, past. I wish every American citizen square miles of territory, took more and I was pleased because he was could make a trip of that sort; it than 15,000 prisoners, and cap- still “vertical and mobile.” might give them a better idea of tured large quantities of materiel When we arrived in New York, where we have been and who we and equipment. Red Cross ladies greeted us with are. In addition to performing many smiles, coffee and doughnuts. It is a pleasure now to reflect on small, time-consuming tasks, the Everywhere, we were greeted with these significant years of my 311th Regiment also assisted in unhesitating handshakes or pats on youth. With time, the recollections securing First Army communica- the back. What a contrast that wel- of ice-covered foxholes, the rip of tion and supply lines against any come was to the silent treatment we burp guns, and the screams of the guerrilla-warfare activities that received upon our return from wounded have dimmed, but the the enemy might instigate. These Korea. An even greater contrast friendships formed during the com- tasks continued after the uncondi- was the reception we received when mon danger of war remain forever tional surrender of Germany on bright. My old companions, my cur- May 7 at Rheims, France. rent pillar of friends and my won- Another task was tending to the With time, the recollec- derful family form my cornerstone. thousands of displaced persons the To all these, I dedicate these Germans had brought from con- tions of ice-covered fox- remembrances. quered countries to be used as holes, the rip of burp slave labor. We assisted in feeding, clothing and housing these people guns, and the screams Colonel Vernon E. until they could be returned to Greene’s 34 years in their homes. However, some of of the wounded have the U.S. Army in- these individuals attempted to loot dimmed, but the friend- clude service during German houses and farms. We World War II, the attempted to maintain law and ships formed during the Korean War and the order in the communities through- Vietnam War. Colonel out our assigned areas. common danger of war Greene enlisted in 1939 at the age During this period, the ground remain forever bright. of 16, became a first sergeant at the forces in Europe provided a source age of 20 and received a battlefield of manpower for the expected inva- commission while serving in sion of Japan. The 78th Division we returned from Vietnam: U.S. cit- Europe during World War II. His was sent to Berlin as part of the izens carrying protest posters and duty assignments include service occupation force. Earlier, I had let calling us murderers. Maybe those both at NATO headquarters and at it be known that I wished to later reception groups were not suf- SHAPE headquarters. While in remain in the Army after the war. I ficiently aware of our governmental Special Forces, he served as an SF was placed in the 70th Infantry structure to know that their duly- staff officer in the Military Assist- Division, a unit that was deploying elected civilian officials had placed ance Command, Vietnam; served at to the Far East. We were moved to the soldiers in harm’s way. Why spit the Special Warfare Center as a France to await ship transporta- on the uniform? division chief and as an instructor tion through the Suez Canal. The In May 2000, I had the privilege in the SF School; served as a mem- victory over Japan came while I of visiting the area in Europe over ber of the 7th SF Group; and served was in France. I had accumulated which we had fought 55 years ear- as commander of the 10th SF enough credit points to return to lier. We visited battlesites as well Group (1968 to 1970). Colonel the U.S. early, and my port of as two cemeteries, one in Belgium Greene attended the Army War Col- embarkation was changed to a port and the other in Holland, where lege and the National War College. in the Normandy area. As I board- thousands of American soldiers are Following his retirement from the ed the ship, I was humbled and buried. In Belgium, Holland and Army in 1974, he taught at both the pleased to recognize a soldier who Germany, people ranging from high-school and community-college had been in Company M, 10th mayors to school children were level for several years. Infantry, when we were sent to Ice- eager to tell us how much they land in the fall of 1941. I was hum- appreciate our friendship today

September 2002 61 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Moscow reports Israelis According to Russian reports, former Russian servicemen who have settled in Israel are recruiting Russian veterans being recruited by the Israeli military. Former marine and airborne soldiers, as well as others who have served in Chechnya and in other Russian conflict areas, are said to be especially sought. While the recruiting action incorporates the skills of former soldiers into the Israeli forces, it also lowers the unemployment rate among Russian émigrés.

Mexico’s Yucatan state While the Mexican Attorney General’s Office has undertaken a “weapons for provisions” to create armed auxiliary trade-in program in Yucatan state to reduce drug and other criminal violence, Mexican military authorities in the 32nd Military Zone are creating an armed auxiliary.Under the military’s plan, armed contingents will be drawn from the local populations in eastern rural areas of Yucatan to assist the army when necessary.The auxiliary will be required to provide assistance during natural disasters and to provide back-up in combating drug traffickers and other criminals. The auxiliary will comprise 21 10-man squads. After receiving basic weapons training and self-defense training, the members of the auxiliary will be armed with “short-range” weapons (presumably shotguns). The program is anal- ogous to other efforts in Central and South America that deal with organized criminal and insurgent activities in areas where the military or police presence is limited.

Tri-Border area may have In the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S., a number of regions have links to terrorism received scrutiny as potential vectors of international terrorism. One of those regions is the “Tri-Border” area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, where frontiers of the three countries come together. Like many frontier regions, the Tri-Border area has become known for its smuggling ventures and other assorted criminal enterprises. The largest Arab community in Latin America is centered in the area, and some of the Arab inhab- itants are said to be strongly anti-U.S. and anti-Israel in their views. Because of the sub- stantial Islamic population in the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este and in the sur- rounding area, and because of enduring reports of terrorist training camps, rest areas, and terrorist-associated alien and materiel smuggling, the area has also been consid- ered a potential jump-off point for international terrorist activity.Recent developments have fueled further interest. For example, the importing of 30,000 ski masks to Ciudad del Este by a Lebanese importer who had connections to the area raised many ques- tions and suggested a terrorist nexus. So, too, did the Brazilian arrest of Egyptian Mohammed Ali Abul-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman, an alleged member of the extremist group Gamaa Islamiya, which has cells in Brazil and in Ciudad del Este, and ties to al- Qaeda. Growing foreign interest regarding terrorist links to the Tri-Border area has sometimes provoked strong adverse reaction both from the respective national gov- ernments and from media commentators. For example, statements made by senior U.S. government representatives in May about the existence of terrorists in the Tri- Border area sparked irritation and denials from regional commentators. Nevertheless, the area is likely to remain an object of interest for international-security specialists.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

62 Special Warfare Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

PSYOP gains additional The Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Proponency drill-sergeant positions Office has negotiated the expansion of the role of the PSYOP specialist in the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s drill-sergeant program. Beginning in mid-2003, the PSYOP MOS (37F) will gain four authoriza- tions for E6 drill sergeants at Fort Benning, Ga. The positions will support one-station unit training in Fort Benning’s Infantry Training Brigade. Selection for the positions will be highly competitive. A drill-sergeant assignment will provide outstanding opportunities for a soldier to enhance his individual leadership skills. Because it may also carry a great deal of weight with senior enlisted promotion boards, the assignment may also enhance the soldier’s opportunities for career progression. The SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at PERSCOM will begin selecting soldiers for the male- only positions in October 2002, based on the following criteria (in order of precedence): • At least 18 months of successful tactical leadership experience in the 9th PSYOP Battalion and a combat-arms-secondary MOS. • At least 18 months of successful tactical leadership experience in the 9th PSYOP Battalion. • At least 18 months of successful leadership experience in PSYOP and a combat-arms-secondary MOS. The selection criteria emphasize the importance of successful tactical lead- ership experience. Soldiers who are interested in the drill-sergeant posi- tions or who are interested in obtaining more information should contact SFC Neil Dziemian in the PERSCOM SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at DSN 221-8901 or commercial (703) 325-8901; or send e-mail to: Neil.Dziemi- [email protected]. Soldiers may also contact Sergeant Major Eric Scheib, SWCS SOPO, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: [email protected].

September 2002 63 Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

Major promotion board The 2002 reserve-component major promotion board considered 106 offi- selects 65 CA officers cers in the Civil Affairs Branch and selected 65. The selection rate for the CA branch continues to be higher than the average rate for the Army Reserve. The following table summarizes the CA Branch’s results: Considered Selected % Selected USAR (previously considered) 1990 288 14 CA (previously considered) 16 6 38 USAR (first consideration) 4533 1745 38 CA (first consideration) 90 59 66 USAR (total) 6523 2033 31 CA (total) 106 65 61 For additional information, telephone Major Charles R. Munguia at DSN 239- 6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: [email protected].

FA 39 LTC promotion rate The FY 2002 lieutenant-colonel promotion board was the first promotion board to dips below Army’s average be held under Officer Personnel Management System III. The board considered 68 officers who were members of FA 39 and selected 19. The board selected one offi- cer above the zone, 15 officers in the promotion zone and three officers below the zone. The FA-39 promotion-zone selection rate of 71.4 percent was slightly below the Army’s promotion-zone rate of 77.3 percent, but the FA 39 below-the-zone selection rate of 11.5 percent was double the Army’s rate.

FY 2004 LTC command The FY 2004 lieutenant-colonel command board will convene Oct. 1, 2002. The board will fill FA 39 positions following commands will be available to FA 39 officers: 1st PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group (FA 39B); 3rd PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group (FA 39B); ARFOR, JTF-B (FA 39A); 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (FA 39A); 96th CA Battalion (FA 39C). The Department of the Army has approved the addition of the 4th PSYOP Group’s PACOM battalion (FA 39B) to the list of commands that will be available to FA 39 officers during the FY 2004 board.

FA 39 officers may apply FA 39 officers may request that both their military and civilian experience be for constructive credit considered as a basis for granting constructive credit toward completion of the Regional Studies Course. To be considered for constructive credit, applicants must submit a memorandum that addresses the following qualifications: • Political-military analytical proficiency. The officer must have experi- ence that demonstrates a proficiency in international studies and in political-military analysis related to the use of special operations. • Regional expertise.The officer must have experience that demonstrates perform- ance of a comprehensive, detailed area analysis of a region of concentration. • Cultural expertise.The officer must have experience that demonstrates possession of the skills necessary for successful communication across cultural boundaries. • Comparative political studies. The officer must have experience that

64 Special Warfare demonstrates an understanding of major modern political ideologies. • Economics. The officer must have experience that demonstrates an understand- ing of the basic theories of national and international economic phenomena. When requesting the substitution of college or graduate-level courses for experience, applicants must furnish course descriptions. Requests must be submitted to the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, Attn: Jeanne Goldmann. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: [email protected].

SWCS, USASOC, DA pursue The JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Propo- SF warrant-officer initiatives nency Office, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Depart- ment of the Army are pursuing several initiatives to assist in the recruit- ing and retention of Special Forces warrant officers. Short-term • NCOs who become SF warrant officers will be able to retain their spe- cial-duty assignment pay as a part of “save pay.” This action is expected to be approved shortly and should become effective in October 2002. • SOPO has requested that DA allow SF sergeants first class who become SF war- rant officers to be promoted to CWO 2 when they complete the SF Warrant Offi- cer Basic Course. This initiative, if approved, is anticipated to last only two years. Long-term • SOPO has requested a warrant-officer accession bonus for NCOs who become SF warrant officers. The proposal is being considered by DA and is expected to be approved for implementation in FY 2004. • SOPO has requested a critical-skills retention bonus for CWO 3s and CWO 4s in MOS 180A. • SOPO has requested that designated SF warrant officers below the rank of CWO 5 be allowed to serve 24 years of warrant-officer service. The Warrant Officer Management Act requires warrant officers below the grade of CWO 5 to retire when they reach 24 years of warrant-offi- cer service or 30 years of active federal service, whichever comes first. • SOPO has requested that the Army adjust the pay scales for warrant officers so that an NCO who becomes a warrant officer will not have to rely on “save pay.”

PERSCOM points of contact SF Branch chief LTC Dave Maxwell DSN 221-3173 LTC assignments MAJ (P) Jack Jensen DSN 221-3169 MAJ assignments MAJ Ken Hunt DSN 221-5739 CPT assignments CPT Steve Johnson DSN 221-3175 Accessions CPT Joe Lopez DSN 221-3178 Field-grade technician Ms. Sandra Bryant DSN 221-7915 Accessions/CPT technician Ms. Pam Redman DSN 221-2452

September 2002 65 Update Special Warfare

Kensinger takes command Runners-up were Specialist of USASOC Aaron J. Laurich, Company C, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Lieutenant General Philip R. Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.; and Kensinger Jr. took command of the Staff Sergeant Thomas N. White, U.S. Army Special Operations Headquarters and Headquarters Command from Lieutenant Gener- Company, U.S. Army Special Oper- al Doug Brown in a ceremony at ations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Fort Bragg Aug. 29. Kensinger was formerly the Army SWCS videotapes available assistant deputy chief of staff for through DoD Web site operations. His special-operations assignments include commander, Two videotape products pro- Special Operations Command-Cen- duced at the JFK Special Warfare tral; deputy commanding general Center and School are now avail- The emblem of the Army Special Operations Battle Lab and chief of staff, USASOC; com- able to requestors through a mander, 3rd SF Group; commander, Trojan horse head denotes cunning Department of Defense Web site. 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group; execu- and stealth, and the scales symbolize The mountaineering video series, tive officer, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF analysis and assessment. The check- produced at the request of the 10th Group; commander, SF Battalion ered field in perspective symbolizes Special Forces Group, consists of six Task Force, Joint Task Force 11, in strategy and simulation directed videotapes: “Basic Mountaineering” Honduras; and detachment com- toward a future horizon. The torch (production identification number, or mander in the 7th SF Group. reflects learning and guidance; the PIN, 710962);“Level 2 Mountaineering Kensinger is a 1970 graduate of shield represents national defense; Techniques Part 1” (PIN 710963); the U.S. Military Academy. He and the wreath represents honor and “Level 2 Mountaineering Techniques earned a master’s degree from high achievement. Part 2” (PIN 710963);“Mountaineering Louisiana State University in 1980. Rescue” (PIN 710964); “Backpacking Brown is slated to become the deputy USASOC announces with Mules and Llamas” (PIN commander of the U.S. Special Opera- Soldier, NCO of Year 710965); and “Medical and Weather tions Command, MacDill AFB, Fla. Considerations in a Mountain Envi- The U.S. Army Special Opera- ronment” (PIN 710966). Emblem represents tions Command announced the The second videotape, “Army Oil winners of the Soldier and NCO of ARSOBL’s missions Analysis Program” (PIN 711439), the Year competition July 25. was produced for all Army units The Special Warfare Center and The USASOC Soldier of the Year and Army laboratories. School’s Army Special Operations is Specialist Joshua C. Simmons, a To order copies of these training Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, now has radio and communications security products, visit the following Web its own emblem. repairer with Company A, Support site: http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil. The emblem was created by the Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Click on “Central DoD Production Army Institute of Heraldry. The five Training Group, JFK Special War- Database DAVIS/DITIS,” then lightning bolts represent the following: fare Center and School. search for videos by subject, title or Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psycholog- The USASOC NCO of the Year is PIN. The database will allow ical Operations, Special Operations Staff Sergeant Peter N. Johnson, an requestors to locate most special- Aviation and Rangers; sea, air, land, Army Reserve psychological-opera- operations training subjects. The space and information; or concept tions specialist assigned to Headquar- videotapes are free to requestors development, war gaming, simulation, ters Support Company, 17th Psycho- within DoD. Because of their con- experimentation and analysis. The logical Operations Battalion, Joliet, Ill.

66 Special Warfare tent, some video products may State University in 1985. ucts can be difficult. Correlating a have limited distribution and will His previous assignments include significant behavioral response not be available to all requestors. division telecommunications officer, with a specific PSYOP activity is The mountaineering and oil-analy- platoon leader and executive officer, another difficult but necessary sis tapes were produced by SWCS’s 123rd Signal Battalion, 3rd Infantry step. A third critical step is deter- Audiovisual Branch, Directorate Man- Division, Wuerzburg, Germany; and mining whether the PSYOP objec- agement Office, Directorate of Train- assistant division signal officer, signal tive has been met. ing and Doctrine. For additional infor- battalion operations officer and secre- The MOE model recommends a mation, telephone Diana Wells, DMO tary of the general staff, 25th Infantry systematic approach that would AV Branch, at DSN 239-2472 or com- Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. consider tasks at the “micro” and mercial (910)432-2472. Bell, who had commanded the “macro” levels, from the analysis, 112th since June 29, 2000, will planning and development process- 96th CA Battalion soldiers attend the Air War College, es through the execution of pro- receive awards for OEF Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. — grams. The model examines the Forty-nine soldiers from the 96th Barbara Ashley, USASOC PAO PSYOP objectives, themes, collec- tive and individual tasks, and Civil Affairs Battalion received Efforts to measure PSYOP awards Aug. 26 for their efforts dur- product introduction. It also exam- ing Operation Enduring Freedom. effectiveness continue ines behavioral responses in order Awards included the Bronze Star The Special Warfare Center and to determine the level of success. Medal, the Army Commendation School’s Psychological Operations Specifically, it examines task exe- Medal with “V” device, the Combat Training and Doctrine Division is cution during the planning, prepar- Infantryman Badge, the Combat encouraging all sectors of the ing, distributing and disseminating Medical Badge, the Navy and PSYOP community to help phases of a PSYOP campaign. Marine Corps Achievement Medal improve the success of PSYOP by Members of the PSYOP communi- and the Army Achievement Medal. offering recommendations for ty may derive worthwhile informa- The soldiers had been deployed to refining the recently proposed tion regarding the effectiveness of either Afghanistan or the Philip- PSYOP measures-of-effectiveness, past and present PSYOP programs pines, assisting those nations with or MOE, model. from the following documents: the task of eliminating terrorism and The MOE model offers a means of • Situation reports from strategic, rebuilding infrastructure. The sol- evaluating PSYOP effectiveness by operational and tactical mis- diers also provided food and techni- examining PSYOP task execution and sions and exercises. cal assistance to local populations. target-audience behavioral responses • After-action reviews. “We went there as a group. … All (Special Warfare,June 2002, 67). The • Reports of PSYOP or IO working that we do … is a team concept, PSYOP Training and Doctrine Divi- groups. and I am just one of the members sion is working to refine the proposed • Evaluations performed by of a team,” said Sergeant First MOE model in order to produce a valid PSYOP assessment teams. Class Byron R. Shrader, a medic methodology that can assess the accu- • Campaign plans and programs. assigned to the 96th, who received racy, persuasiveness and productivity • Notes or logs. both the Army Commendation of PSYOP products. • Intelligence requests for Medal with “V” device and the U.S. military PSYOP specialists PSYOP-relevant information. Combat Medical Badge. target the emotions, motives and • Survey research proposals and reasoning of foreign governments, designs. 112th SOSB receives new organizations, groups and individ- The MOE project will be a long- commander uals to effect attitudinal and term endeavor, and the PSYOP Training and Doctrine Division will Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Gal- behavioral changes consistent with U.S. policy objectives. They analyze provide periodic updates. To submit lagher took command of the 112th recommendations or to obtain more Special Operations Signal Battal- numerous factors while trying to develop effective PSYOP programs. information, telephone Lynn Gilfus, ion from Lieutenant Colonel project officer, at DSN 236-1318 or Robert T. Bell Jr. in a ceremony at But, given the unpredictability of human behavior and the cultural, commercial (910) 396-1318; or e-mail Fort Bragg July 3. [email protected]. Gallagher, a native of Pittsburg, historical, social and environmen- Kan., received his commission tal factors that can affect a partic- through the Reserve Officer Train- ular target audience, measuring ing Corps program at Pittsburg the effectiveness of PSYOP prod-

September 2002 67 Book Reviews Special Warfare

The Last Battle: The Mayaguez were shot down. In Wetterhahn’s Incident and the End of the account, they seem to care only about Vietnam War. By Ralph Wetter- the public-relations potential of pro- hahn. New York: Carroll & Graf viding the American people with an Publishers, 2001. ISBN: 0-7867- apparent victory.The Marines appear 0858-1. 400 pages. $27. to be led by officers who only want to kill and who care little for their men. Ralph Wetterhahn’s The Last Conversely, the Cambodians appear Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and to be the ones who were attacked. The the End of the Vietnam War tells Cambodian motive for seizing the the story of the seizure of the ship is not covered, and the book con- United States merchant vessel tains very little of the murderous his- Mayaquez by the Khmer Rouge in tory of the Cambodian regime of Pol 1975. The operation to rescue the Pot. As a historical analysis, the book vessel and its crew was this displays clear bias. reviewer’s first combat mission: I Wetterhahn also fails to verify some was a second lieutenant flying one of his information. The most glaring of the HH-53 rescue helicopters. example is that he accepts as true the In The Last Battle, Wetterhahn Khmer assertion that 72 men held off presents two stories. The first is an the U.S. Marines, airstrikes and heli- account of his visit to the island of leaders of the forces of the Marines, copters. But in A Very Short War,an Koh Tang during the late 1990s, as a Navy and Air Force. He also tells earlier book about the Mayaguez inci- member of JTF Full Accounting. the stories of the fighters them- dent, Dr. John F.Guilmartin confirmed Cambodians and Americans fought selves — the captains, sergeants that Khmer casualties were 50 killed at Koh Tang May 15, 1975, over the and lance corporals — and explains in action and more than 70 wounded. Mayaquez and its crew, which the the chaos of battle, the shooting- Wetterhahn seems to have put his Cambodians had seized. Wetterhahn down of helicopters and even the story of the battle together in order to tells how he and others searched for workings of tactical communica- provide context to the search for the the remains of the Americans left on tions in each aircraft. Wetterhahn missing Marines. In doing so, he put that battlefield and in the wreckage also includes the experiences of a his story together hastily and of the helicopters that had crashed member of the Mayaguez crew and researched it poorly. and sank offshore. the memories of one of the Khmer It is sad that the story of the search Wetterhahn’s first-person narra- company commanders, whom he for and the recovery of the Marines — tive of the search and of the discov- interviewed during the 1990s. Joseph Hargrove, Gary Hall and ery of the remains of three Marines Wetterhahn manages to sustain an Danny Marshall — is overshadowed who were missing in action estab- interesting narrative. He keeps the by the errors in the story of the lishes his credibility. Then, from reader informed regarding the point Mayaguez incident and in the author’s telling the tale of researchers dig- of view and the time of the action, and “blame America” analysis. In making ging for bones and relics, Wetter- he provides some good observations the search and recovery a small part of hahn flashes back to the story of on the chaos of battle. But his analy- the book, Wetterhahn missed his the battle itself, which he tells from sis of the motives of the U.S. leaders, chance. The Last Battle could have various points of view. whom he appears to despise, is ques- been a tale about the perseverance to His account relates decisions tionable. Those leaders are shown as give closure to three men’s lives. That made at the White House by then- devoid of concern about the crew of tale should have been the largest part President Gerald Ford and his staff, the merchant ship, the Marines in of the book. It is one in which Wetter- as well as decisions made by the battle, and the helicopter crews who hahn took part personally,and it is one

68 Special Warfare that he could easily have gotten right. eties are pushed in seemingly con- peace groups. The members of the As it is, the reader is unsure what to tradictory directions. Access to network shared information and believe, because so little care was information makes hierarchies less coordinated their activities, and taken with so many facts. The bottom efficient: Component groups may NGOs “swarmed” on Mexico, both line of this review is that Wetterhahn not feel it necessary to participate physically and electronically. tries to do too much, tries to analyze in a state hierarchy of groups that The fourth section focuses on some too many characters, and strays from have different interests. At the paradigms for thinking about conflict the facts. Overall, The Last Battle is a same time, groups and individuals in the information age. Whoever mas- good read — spoiled. that are geographically dispersed ters the network form of organization can form supranational communi- will realize a major advantage. Mili- BG Richard Comer ties, based on a common element tary and government organizations U.S. Air Force that transcends national borders. will need to establish network-hierar- Hurlburt AFB, Fla. These communities are not organ- chy hybrids. Interagency task forces ized as hierarchies, but as networks. are an example of network-hierarchy In Athena’s Camp: Preparing The information revolution hybrids. A military organization could For Conflict in the Information favors networked organizations. establish a network-hierarchy hybrid Age. Edited by John Arquilla and Networked organizations are more by forming smaller units with a flat- David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica, flexible and can act upon informa- tened chain of command. Advances in Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1997. tion faster than hierarchies can. communication technology may make ISBN 0-8330-2514-7. 501 pages. $36. The book uses the Zapatista it possible for smaller units to com- revolt of 1994 as an example of a municate and coordinate rapidly with In Athena’s Camp is a collection networked organization waging a each other and to attack by swarm; of essays that discuss ways in conflict. The Zapatista National i.e., to converge rapidly and stealthily which conflict can be waged in the Liberation Army, or EZLN, in Chia- from several directions. One general postindustrial world. pas, Mexico, occupied several local officer could command a multitude of In the first section of the book, the towns and declared war on the Mex- platoon- or company-sized units from essays examine the current revolu- ican government. Besides perform- different services without the addi- tion in military affairs, or RMA, and ing traditional guerrilla operations, tional battalion or brigade layer of note that it is mainly information- the EZLN linked into communica- command. That sort of approach is driven. RMAs occur periodically in tion nodes that had been formed by not unprecedented in history: The history, evolving out of a particular a network of nongovernment organ- Mongols and the German U-boat technological or organizational izations, or NGOs, operating in the “wolf packs” are examples of geo- breakthrough that has radical area. The NGOs included religious graphically dispersed units swarming effects on doctrine. In the current groups, human-rights groups and at the critical time and place. RMA, as in previous ones, those who Although some of its passages will have the wisdom to see more pro- be of more interest to philosophers found meanings of new systems will than to soldiers, In Athena’s Camp is be the most successful. an interesting book. It should be read The essays in the second section by anyone in the special-operations maintain that information systems community who is interested in infor- have become so critical to the military mation operations, especially those in world and the civilian world that PSYOP, a field that is only beginning those systems can be both the means to better use technology to form net- of attack and the target of an attack. work-hierarchy hybrids in order to An information-warfare attack, made act faster than our competitors. with the same level of audacity as the Sept. 11 attack, might be less bloody Major Bill Gormley but could have the potential to be far 304th PSYOP Company more obtrusive into the ways that our Sacramento, Calif. society operates. The third section of the book dis- cusses ways in which information technology is changing society. Global interconnectivity can bring profound societal changes, as soci-

September 2002 69 Special Warfare

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