Projective Paternalism Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim, and Axel Ockenfels.∗ July 12, 2019 Abstract We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Archi- tects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs' motives. A conventional behavioral wel- farist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others' choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies. ∗Ambuehl: University of Toronto, UTSC, and Rotman School of Management, 105 St. George Street, Toronto, ON, M5S 3E6, Canada,
[email protected]. Bernheim: Stanford University, Department of Economics, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA,
[email protected]. Ockenfels: University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Universit¨atsstrasse22a, 50923 Cologne, Germany,
[email protected]. We thank Joshua Knobe, Yoram Halevy, Armin Falk, Glenn W. Harrison, Kiryl Khalmetski, Frank Schillbach, Cass Sunstein, Dmitry Taubinsky, Stefan Trautmann, and seminar and conference audiences in Berkeley, Copenhagen, Cork, Cornell, Heidelberg, Innsbruck, Nijmegen, NYU, Stanford, Toronto, and Zurich for helpful comments and discussions. Max Rainer Pascal Grossmann and Yero Samuel Ndiaye provided excellent research assistance. Ambuehl gratefully acknowledges support through a University of Toronto Connaught New Researcher Award and the University of Toronto Scarborough Wynne and Bertil Plumptre Fellowship. Parts of this paper were written while Ambuehl visited the briq Institute in Bonn.