This is a repository copy of The Ethics of Democratic Deceit. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/83254/ Article: Edyvane, D orcid.org/0000-0003-2169-4171 (2015) The Ethics of Democratic Deceit. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 32 (3). pp. 310-325. ISSN 0264-3758 https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12100 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing
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[email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ The Ethics of Democratic Deceit Derek Edyvane Abstract Deception presents a distinctive ethical problem for democratic politicians. This is because there seem in certain situations to be compelling democratic reasons for politicians both to deceive and not to deceive the public. Some philosophers have sought to negotiate this tension by appeal to moral principle, but such efforts may misrepresent the felt ambivalence surrounding dilemmas of public office. A different approach appeals to the moral character of politicians, and to the variety of forms of manipulative communication at their disposal.