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Two Dogmas of Empiricism

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Two Dogmas of Empiricism of meanings and independently of fact. Pursuing this line, let OGMAS OF EMPIRICISM us examine the concept of meaning which is presupposed. Meaning, let us remember, is not to be identified with cism has been conditioned in large part by naming.' Frege's example of 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star', is a belief in some fundamental cleavage and Russell's of 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverley', illustrate hitch are analytic, or grounded in meanings that terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning. 'afters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, The distinction between meaning and naming is no less impor- The other dogma is reductionism: the belief tant at the level of abstract terms. The terms '9' and 'the number ful statement is equivalent to some logical of the planets' name one and the same abstract entity but us which refer to immediate experience. Both presumably must be regarded as unlike in meaning; for astro- ne, are ill-founded. One effect of abandoning nomical observation was needed, and not mere reflection on II see, a blurring of the supposed boundary meanings, to determine the sameness of the entity in question. e metaphysics and natural science. Another The above examples consist of singular terms, concrete and Ard pragmatism. abstract. With general terms, or predicates, the situation is somewhat different but parallel. Whereas a singular term pur- Background for Analyticity ports to name an entity, abstract or concrete, a general term ) between analytic and synthetic truths was does not; but a general term is tr'413 of an entity, or of each of ume's distinction between relations of ideas many, or of none The class of all entities of which a general ,, and in Leibniz's distinction between truths term is true is called the extension of the term. Now paralleling ,hs of fact. leibniz spoke of the truths of the contrast between the meaning of a singular term and the all possible worlds. Picturesqueness aside, entity named, we must distinguish equally between the meaning he truths of reason are those which could not of a general term and its extension. The general terms 'creature 1 the same vein we hear analytic statements with a heart' and 'creature with kidneys', for example, are its whose denials are self-contradictory. But perhaps alike in extension but unlike in meaning. small explanatory value; for the notion of Confusion of meaning with extension, in the case of general ss, in the quite broad sense needed for this terms, is less common than confusion of meaning with naming ticity, stands in exactly the same need of in the case of singular terms. It is indeed a commonplace in 8 the notion of analyticity itself. The two philosophy to oppose intension (or meaning) to extension, or, , sides of a single dubious coin. in a variant vocabulary, connotation to denotation. of an analytic statement as one that attrib- I See above, p. 9. ) more than is already conceptually contained Bee above, p. 10, and below, pp. 107-115. 20 volved in the meaning of the word 'man' The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned ; is not; but two-leggedness may at the into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms; thus d as involved in the meaning of 'biped' (2) can be turned into (I) by putting 'unmarried man' for its not. Thus from the point of view of the synonym 'bachelor'. We still lack a proper characterization of it makes no sense to say of the actual this second class of analytic statements, and therewith of ana- mice a man and a biped, that his rationality lyticity generally, inasmuch as we have had in the above descrip- two-leggedness accidental or vice versa. tion to lean on a notion of "synonymy" which is no less in need , for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms of clarification than analyticity itself. ning is what essence becomes when it is In recent years Carnap has tended to explain analyticity ject of reference and wedded to the word. by appeal to what he calls state-descriptions.' A state-descrip- f meaning a conspicuous question is the tion is any exhaustive assignment of truth values to the atomic, what sort of things are meanings? A felt or noncompound, statements of the language. All other state- ,ies may derive from an earlier failure to ments of the language are, Carnap assumes, built up of their ling and reference are distinct. Once the component clauses by means of the familiar logical devices, in s sharply separated from the theory of such a way that the truth value of any complex statement is step to recognizing as the primary business fixed for each state-description by specifiable logical laws. A aning simply the synonymy of linguistic statement is then explained as analytic when it comes out true icity of statements; meanings themselves, under every state description. This account is an adaptation of 6ry entities, may well be abandoned.' Leibniz's "true in all possible worlds." But note that this version nalyticity then confronts us anew. State- of analyticity serves its purpose only if the atomic statements of 13rtic by general philosophical acclaim are the language are, unlike 'John is a bachelor' and 'John is mar- tk. They fall into two classes. Those of the ried', mutually independent Otherwise there would be a state- be called logically true, are typified by: description which assigned truth to 'John is a bachelor' and to nmarried man is married, 'John is married', and consequently 'No bachelors are married' would turn out synthetic rather than analytic under the pro- of this example is that it not merely is posed criterion. Thus the criterion of analyticity in terms of remains true under any and all reinterpre- state-descriptions serves only for languages devoid of extra- married'. If we suppose a prior inventory logical synonym-pairs, such as 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man'— nprising 'no', 'un-', 'not', 'if', 'then', 'and', synonym-pairs of the type which give rise to the "second class" logical truth is a statement which is true of analytic statements. The criterion in terms of state-descrip- Lnd below, pp. 48f. Carnap [3], pp. Off; 141, pp. 70ff. i. Our problem, however, is analyticity; which does not limit itself to the reporting of preexisting fficulty lies not in the first class of analytic synonymies. I have in mind what Carnap calls explication—an al truths, but rather in the second class, activity to which philosophers are given, and scientists also in notion of synonymy. their more philosophical moments. In explication the purpose is not merely to paraphrase the definiendum into an outright 2. Definition synonym, but actually to improve upon the definiendum by ho find it soothing to say that the analytic refining or supplementing its meaning. But even explication, mid class reduce to those of the first class, though not merely reporting a preexisting synonymy between lefinition; 'bachelor', for example, is defined definiendum and definiens, does rest nevertheless on other pre- But how de we find that 'bachelor' is existing synonymies. The matter may be viewed as follows. I man'? Who defined it thus, and when? Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as wholes, , the nearest dictionary, and accept the are clear and precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of dation as law? Clearly this would be to explication is to preserve the usage of these favored contexts e horse. The lexicographer is an empirical while sharpening the usage of other contexts. In order that less is the recording of antecedent facts; a given definition be suitable for purposes of explication, there- Lielor' as 'unmarried man' it is because of fore, what is required is not that the definiendum in its ante- is a relation of synonymy between those cedent usage be synonymous with the definiens, but just that ieral or preferred usage prior to his own each of these favored contexts of the definiendum, taken as a ynonymy presupposed here has still to be whole in its antecedent usage, be synonymous with the corres- in terms relating to linguistic behavior. ponding context of the definiens. bion" which is the lexicographer's report Two alternative definientia may be equally appropriate for iymy cannot be taken as the ground of the purposes of a given task of explication and yet not be synony- mous with each other; for they may serve interchangeably within indeed, an activity exclusively of philolo- the favored contexts but diverge elsewhere. By cleaving to one id scientists frequently have occasion to of these definientia rather than the other, a definition of expli- term by paraphrasing it into terms of a cative kind generates, by fiat, a relation of synonymy between ary. But ordinarily such a definition, like definiendum and definiens which did not hold before. But such tire lexicography, affirming a relation of a definition still owes its explicative function, as seen, to pre- to the exposition in hand. existing synonymies. s to affirm synonymy, just what the inter- There does, however, remain still an extreme sort of defini- Dy GanttMan; Walla that all species ot between two languages, the one a part of the other. Riligible. For the rest, definition rests on But these correlations are not arbitrary. They are supposed explaining it. to show how the primitive notations can accomplish all purposes, m' has come to have a dangerously refo- save brevity and convenience, of the redundant language. Hence rm doubt to its frequent occurrence in the definiendum and its definiens may be expected, in each case, ical writings. We shall do well to digress to be related in one or another of the three ways lately noted.
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