Dedication:
This publication is dedicated to the men and women who fought the fires of December 1993 and January 1994, and to the thousands of other volunteers who stand ready to assist their communities and the people of NSW through their dedication and commitment to the NSW Rural Fire Service.
Text: Copyright NSW RURAL FIRE SERVICE Unit 3, 175-179 James Ruse Drive Rosehill NSW 2142 Ph: 02 9684 4411 Fax: 02 9638 7956
Illustration: Copyright NSW RURAL FIRE SERVICE
Printed January, 1998 ISBN 0-7311-0895-7 Foreword.
This publication is designed to place in context the events of December 1993 and January 1994 and to shed some light on the interaction between communities and their environments.
Many communities were faced with a fire threat the like of which had not been experienced for at least a decade, with many people having never experienced such a fire storm before.
Whilst some accept that fire is a natural and beneficial aspect of our environment, many people take this force for granted and consequently do not prepare for these events.
It is in the nature of "disasters" that they fade from public memory quickly. This is an attempt to return to "normality" as soon as possible, and yet, if we fail to learn from these events, we will be as unprepared as ever. Thus we are seen as victims of these occurrences.
Unlike floods and cyclones, fires can be prepared for, prevented or at least their impact can be substantially reduced if we accept the need to plan for these events.
The fire history of the areas impacted upon in 1993-94 is well understood. Traditional fire paths that is the course that fires take, have been plotted over many years and we can predict the likely behaviour of fires given the weather conditions, the topography of the area and the amount of available fuel.
Why is it then that communities remain uninterested or unaware of the potential dangers of fires and do not undertake simple but effective strategies to protect themselves and their homes?
The interactions between communities and their environs are both complex and dynamic. So too are the forces which contribute to fires of extreme intensity as witnessed in 1993-94.
This publication provides some essential facts of these dramatic fire events. Careful consideration will reveal how people responded to the emergency and what fire authorities and governments can do to be even more prepared in the future.
Whether the public will be better prepared for the next significant fire event is difficult to predict. Fire authorities generally and the NSW Rural Fire Service in particular, are working hard on community based fire prevention and protection programmes which will go a long way towards ensuring that individual house holds are better prepared. A range of other programmes supported by many brochures and pamphlets seek to spread the message of fire safety.
Ultimately fire is everyone's responsibility. As Australians we MUST accept that fire is a feature of our forests and grasslands. If we can gain a greater understanding of the part fire plays in the environment and how this force will impact upon our communities we will have gone a long way to accepting our individual responsibility in this complex and dynamic interaction between people and where they live. Introduction ______
In early January, coastal New South Wales experienced an extended period of extreme fire weather, north of Sydney to the Queensland border and south of Sydney to Batemans Bay. The areas primarily affected included the coastal plains and nearby ranges. More than 800 fires started between December 27, 1993 and January 16, 1994. The total area burnt was 800,000ha. Intrusion by fire into Sydney and nearby metropolitan areas occurred in a manner never before documented. All areas burnt had been subject to previous wild fire, but never before had they burned simultaneously. The fires seemed to be everywhere across the State and yet the area burnt represented only 1% of NSW.
The Headquarters of the then Department of Bush Fire Services became the focal point of the operation and resources were rapidly marshalled from every State and Territory in the Nation. International resources from New Zealand were utilised. Defence forces assisted in strength. At the height of the campaign about 20,000 personnel were deployed on suppression, life and property protection and support activities.
Despite the extent of the fires and their severity, particularly in and near the large urban areas from Sydney to the Blue Mountains and the Central Coast, losses were remarkably light. Tragically, one civilian and two volunteer firefighters lost their lives.
In total, 206 homes, mostly in urban areas, were totally destroyed. Many others sustained minor to severe damage. The low level of loss under the conditions which prevailed is testimony to the skill, courage and untiring endeavours of the many emergency services personnel and others who played a role in life and property protection, and fire suppression.
Despite the low level of loss, death and injury, there is no room for complacency. Fires similar to those of 1993-94 will occur again. The community must be prepared for this eventuality. One aspect of being prepared is to understand the dynamics of this protracted fire event.
This publication sets out to document this period of fire activity which resulted in the greatest
A State Ablaze firefighting effort in New South Wales history. It discusses the causes, the aftermath and what happened during that period which has left an indelible impression on the minds of those involved. It also examines the environmental impact and legislative changes that have been introduced since the fires.
Note: During the 1993 -94 bush fires our service was called the NSW Bush Fire Service. Since 1st September 1997 a new Rural Fires Act was proclaimed. Our service is now the NSW Rural Fire Service. (see page 27 &28)
4 Weather
Weather conditions play a significant role in the behaviour of bush fires. Temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and direction, atmospheric stability and rainfall are significant factors which influence the way fires behave. They have a direct impact on the fire's ability to spread and consequently play a crucial role in defining the ease or otherwise of the fire suppression task.
Temperature
It is not possible, even on the hottest of days, for the sun alone to raise the temperature of grass and forest fuels to their ignition points. It requires the addition of an ignition source. On days of high temperature, however, the fuel is pre-heated to a stage which is closer to its ignition point and will be easier to ignite from another source. During periods of high temperature, water moisture in the fuel will be evaporated into the air, providing conditions of low relative humidity exist. (See RH). Temperature may also influence or be a factor of atmospheric stability and wind speed and direction.
Relative Humidity (RH)
The amount of water vapour in the air is measured as a percentage. For example when the RH is 100% the air is said to be saturated and will not absorb any more moisture. During periods of high humidity, fires will not spread as quickly because fuels contain a high amount of moisture. Conversely during periods of low RH, (below 30%) fuel moisture levels will be low and when exposed to high temperatures will continue to release more moisture to the air. Consequently fires will spread rapidly, spotting commences (burning material blown ahead of the main fire front starting new fires) and crown fires (fire in the uppermost part of the trees) may develop. At less than 20% RH fire behaviour becomes erratic (in combination with other elements) and less predictable.
1600 WIND SPEED C A - Calm
B - 15km per hour Rate of spread (metres per hour) C - 30km per hour 1200
800 B
400 A
0 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 5 % of moisture in fuel (fuel moisture between 4-6% is critical) Clouds
Clouds shield fuel from direct sunlight which will result in fuels having a higher moisture level than if they were in direct sunlight. In a forest, fuels exposed to direct sunlight may have a moisture content 2 - 3% lower than fuels in deep shade. A similar situation exists with extensive cloud cover. The absence of clouds will expose fuels to the direct rays of the sun allowing a greater amount of fuel to dry out.
The Effects of Rain
Following periods of rain, fuels will have higher moisture levels. When this coincides with moderate to high temperatures, humidity levels will also be high and consequently fires either will not burn or will not burn as readily. The longer the period since the last rain, the lower the amount of moisture in the fuels. Some fuels, such as grass, may dry out in a matter of hours following rain, under the right conditions. If the moisture level of fuel is low due to periods of prolonged dry spells or drought, fire intensity and consequently fire behaviour becomes extreme. The bush fires in NSW of December 1993 and January 1994 were examples of extreme fire intensity which was preceded by prolonged drought, high temperatures and low RH.
Wind Effects
Bush and grass fires are driven and spread by wind. It is therefore the most important weather element affecting fire behaviour. The two main elements of wind effect are (1) DIRECTION and (2) SPEED. Wind also contributes to the effects of spotting.
A State Ablaze
6 (1) Direction
Winds on NSW east coast and tablelands from the north, north west through to the south west are dry and hot during summer. These winds are normally associated with high to extreme fire intensities because they bring hot air from the centre of the continent. These hot, dry winds reduce the moisture content of fuels resulting in a high fire danger. Additionally, change in wind direction during a fire will effect the shape of a fire.
(2) Speed
The faster the wind the more it is capable of lifting burning material ahead of the fire front. This is called spotting. The wind has the ability to bend or push the flames closer to the ground, enabling the fuel ahead of the fire front to be pre-heated and reach temperatures Direction (1) close to its ignition point resulting in fires spreading faster. This can be significant on flat ground, however W N when an upward N slope is introduced the fire will accelerate dramatically. SW
Large, extremely intense fires can generate winds of their own. Air at low levels is drawn into the fire, supplying oxygen, necessary to sustain combustion. At higher levels, hot air and ash rise rapidly in the smoke (convection) column. Wind speed near the ground is influenced by the height and density of vegetation, topography and the fire's convection column.
Elements Combined
When all of these weather elements combine to produce the kinds of effects that suit the ignition and spread of major fires. Firefighters refer to "Blow-up-days". We can reasonably expect between 4 and 6 such "Blow up" days during any bush fire danger season. In January 1994 we had 16 such days in a row.
7 L
Other Factors Affecting Bush Fire Behaviour
Terrain: Terrain influences bush fire behaviour. Fires burning on slopes will travel faster uphill because fuel ahead of the fire is pre-heated. The reverse is true of fires travelling downhill. The aspect of slopes is also important. A slope with a westerly aspect has greater exposure to the sun than a south facing slope and results in a changed moisture content in the fuel and its readiness to burn. The aspect of a slope will also effect the wind with warmer winds reducing fuel moisture content further.
Natural barriers will also affect fire behaviour. Features L such as rivers and creeks will impede the progress of a fire and may even stop it. Particularly rocky terrain is also likely to slow a fire's progress.
Fuel:
The quantity, type and arrangement of fuel will also effect fire behaviour. (refer The Burning Question - NSW Rural Fire Service) L
Weather Conditions - January 1994
For the period January 5 to January 9, 1994, a deep, low pressure system was located to the south of Tasmania maintaining hot, dry, westerly winds over New South Wales. Such conditions are more typical of late winter or spring. Weak sea breezes near the coast gave way to dry and gusty westerly to northwesterly winds in
A State Ablaze the afternoons.
Maximum temperatures above 35C, relative humidity around 13% and winds gusting to 70km/h promoted rapid fire spread. Cold fronts passing through New South Wales produced some showers over the Southern Tablelands but brought no relief further north. Gradually, after January 9, the low moved away. The winds eased and became more humid, from the east to northeast, as is more usual for January.
8 Interstate support
On January 5 the Commissioner took an unprecedented decision and accepted Inter State offers of assistance on a large scale. The bush fire situation in coastal New South Wales and adjacent ranges had deteriorated and it became obvious from weather forecasts that conditions would not improve quickly. Threat analysis indicated the potential for heavy losses and the assistance, he was sure, was needed.
On Saturday, January 8, there were 1,954 interstate and military firefighters and 206 of their units on various fire grounds around New South Wales. This was just part of the support afforded by firefighting agencies from around Australia and New Zealand. Without their support the scenario of the January fires might have been quite different.
Firefighters were deployed throughout the State from the north coast to fire grounds south of Sydney. Many personnel found themselves working at more than one location as circumstances demanded. The willingness to accommodate, the flexibility and total commitment of these thousands of men and women made their efforts all the more important.
Aircraft use
Aircraft were used extensively for reconnaissance, deployment of firefighters and equipment, and water bombing.
However, like all other methods of firefighting, when high to extreme fire weather prevailed, frontal attack was not effective. Water bombing was effective in quietening hot spots during backburning or on low intensity flank fires. It also served to quieten fire and allow ground resources to be more effective. Aircraft were also used for evacuation and notification of remote properties.
9 Environmental Consequences
The environmental consequences of these major fire events had a dramatic effect in two main areas:
(1) immediate impacts in terms of overall air quality, particularly in the Sydney basin; and
(2) extensive areas of native vegetation being burnt killing native fauna and having long term impacts on vegetation communities.
(1) Air Quality
During the peak of the January fires, the extent of smoke and ash particles in the air (particulate matter) rose dramatically. Daytime visibility dropped with many residential areas being adversely affected by the smoke which was unable to adequately disperse. January 8 was a dramatic day due to the effect on daylight through the dense smoke hanging over the Sydney area.
People with respiratory problems, particularly the aged were affected in varying degrees by the high particulate exposure.
(2) Natural Areas
In Sydney, the fires had a dramatic impact on several of the region's National Parks. The Royal National Park was a case in point with 98.5% of the park being burnt. This resulted in a decision to close the park to prevent major soil erosion and ensure public safety from fire damaged trees, which were falling in a number of popular areas.
Gosford
A State Ablaze
Sydney
The Royal National Park
10
Wollongong Photo by John Grainger
The number of fires in the Royal National Park over many years is such that the structure and composition of plant communities may have been permanently altered. The recovery of native vegetation is dependant on the intensity, frequency and season of fires (refer Fire - the Australia Experience NSW Rural Fire Service). Areas subjected to hot fires will recover if the frequency of fire is limited. In the Royal National Park, scientific research is continuing to determine if some plants and animals are severely impacted upon or even lost in the long term.
While native animals are comparatively well adjusted to fire, the opening up of the land through the removal of vegetation can subject smaller marsupials and native rodents , lizards and snakes to excessive predation from feral animals. Foxes and cats will prey on the smaller animal species which can no longer take refuge in the dense heath areas along the coast. Feral deer in the Royal National Park, although diminished in numbers, have increased the rate of erosion in some areas as they search for green pick within the Park.
Other national parks dramatically impacted upon by the fires include Lane Cove River State Recreation Area, Blue Mountains National Park, Wollemi National Park, Yengo National Park and Dharug National Park. Although not quite as severe as the Royal, the impact of the fires will be felt for some time as these parks recover from the extensive fires which burnt out of control.
The NSW Bush Fire Service as it existed during the 1993-94 fires comprised 70,000 volunteer firefighters in 2,400 brigades located in 142 local government areas. The Service is responsible for some 90% of NSW. 20,000 volunteer firefighters were committed to combatting the fires whilst 50,000 more were held in reserve. It was always possible that fires would start in areas that had escaped thus far. Many brigades had to watch as other units were sent past their areas to assist. These brigades were held on standby, ready for immediate deployment should a fire start in their areas of responsibility. This was especially necessary as their knowledge of their local area gives them the best chance of quickly extinguishing a fire. To say that these firefighters were not involved in the fires of 1993-94 is simply wrong. While not directly committed their role was vital, 11 (see for example the events of January 13th). Chronology of Meteorological Events
Sydney Weather
Date Maximum Relative Wind Gusts Temperature Humidity Direction & 1500hrs S p e e d ------January 128.3 degrees 55% from ESE at 26km/hr from SE at 48km/hr ------January 227.4 degrees 70% from E at 33km/hr from NNE at 52km/hr ------January 337.1 degrees 62% from SSE at 30 km/hr from N at 76km/hr ------January 429.7 degrees 28% from SE at 35km/hr fromW at 50km/hr ------January 536.0 degrees 16% from ENE at 31km/hr from ENE at 59km/hr ------January 637.3 degrees 12% from WNW at 35km/hr from W at 69km/hr ------January 737.8 degrees 8% from W at 40km/hr from WNW at 50km/hr ------January 836.8 degrees 12% from W at 39 km/hr from NNW at 76km/hr ------January 927.9 degrees 32% from ESE at 31 km/hr from ESE at 44 km/hr ------January 10 25.1 degrees 61% from E at 22km/hr from E at 48km/hr ------January 11 26.6 degrees 61% from ENE at 31km/hr from ENE at 67km/hr
A State Ablaze ------January 12 30.0 degrees 69% from E at 26km/hr from ENE at 59km/hr ------January 13 30.0 degrees 70% from ENE at 24km/hr from ENE at 46km/hr ------
12 Fire Activity
350
334
300
250 259 255 252
200 197 201 183
150 154
113 100 109 101 85 72 50 62 28.12.93 29.12.93 30.12.93 31.12.93 10.1.94 1.1.94 2.1.94 3.1.94 5.1.94 4.1.94 7.1.94 6.1.94 8.1.94 9.1.94
Chronology of Fire Activity
Monday, December 27, 1993:
Fires were burning in the Copmanhurst, Kyogle, Nymboida and Maclean Council areas on the north coast, Great Lakes, Cessnock and Port Stephens Council areas in the Hunter Region, and Wingecarribee, Shoalhaven and Wollongong Council areas to the south of Sydney. Some of these fires had started prior to Christmas.
Tuesday, December 28, 1993:
Many fires in the Hunter Region and the north coast continued to burn. Fresh reports were received of fires in these and adjacent Council areas.
Wednesday, December 29, 1993:
The number of fires on the north coast continued to increase with 32 uncontrolled fires. Throughout New South Wales, brigades were called to numerous fires, many of which they were able to 13 contain. Total number of fires now was 72. Thursday, December 30, 1993:
A total of 85 fires were recorded for New South Wales, either new outbreaks or ones already in existence. The Singleton Council area and north coast council areas were the worst affected.
The first State Tactical Assistance Response Group (STARG) & Incident Management Team were deployed to Grafton from the Greater Sydney Area. It included Bush Fire Brigade members and employed staff from as far south as Wollongong and Gosford in the north.
Friday, December 31, 1993:
Fire activity continued to escalate, particularly in the Northern and Hunter Regions. Fire activity increased in the Sydney area. A second STARG force from the Sydney area was sent to the Northern Region to assist local firefighters.
Saturday, January 1, 1994:
There were 109 bush fires burning by this time with a loss of about 35,000 ha. The fire in the Bundjalung National Park (Richmond River Council area) spread, resulting in the evacuation of 500 campers and closure of the Park. The Howes Valley fire in the Hunter Region continued to spread. A third STARG force was sent to the area to assist.
Sunday, January 2, 1994:
By this stage more than 55,000ha had been burnt. Total Fire Bans were in force for the Hunter, North West Plains, Central West Plains and Central West Slopes weather districts. Fresh fire reports were received from Gosford, Banyabba State Forest and Ingleburn to name but a few. The Clarence Valley in Grafton was experiencing its worst fires since 1968.
Monday, January 3, 1994:
A State Ablaze Fires in New South Wales now totalled 197, with Total Fire Bans in force for the weather forecast districts of Hunter, Northern Rivers, Illawarra, Metropolitan, North West Plains, Central West Plains and Central Tablelands.
An increase in fire activity was experienced in the Sydney and Central Coast areas. Evacuations occurred between Gunderman and Spencer with major fire activity also south of Batemans Bay. The number and size of fires on the North Coast and in the Hunter Region increased.
Tuesday, January 4, 1994:
The tragic deaths of two volunteer firefighters occurred on this day. At Double Duke State Forest, north of Grafton, one New South Wales Bush Fire Service volunteer firefighter was killed when a burning tree fell on his truck. The other volunteer Bush Fire Service member was the second 14 firefighter to die when he was killed by a falling tree at Mount Horrible, near Lithgow. There was a further deterioration in weather conditions resulting in 154 fires burning. Wednesday, January 5, 1994:
A number of new fires started at locations such as Wyong on the Central Coast, at Pretty Beach, south of Ulladulla and in other areas including the Royal National Park, south of Sydney. Existing fires continued to burn, making huge demands on firefighting resources.
The first request for interstate assistance was made on this day, resulting in a huge commitment of resources from all States and Territories, including aerial assistance from New Zealand. A Total Fire Ban was declared for the whole of the State of New South Wales from midnight. This Ban was not revoked until midnight of Friday, January 14.
Thursday, January 6, 1994:
The first major outbreaks of fire in the Sydney metropolitan area occurred including along the Lane Cove River and within the Sutherland Council area. Wollongong was also affected. Evacuations occurred from residential areas adjoining Lane Cove River Park, Bundeena and from the Bendalong Caravan Park to the City’s south.
Major fire activity was also experienced near Port Stephens and along the south coast. This took several days to contain. Many other areas continued to be affected by the fires. Interstate firefighters and personnel from the Defence Forces began assisting the New South Wales Bush Fire Service resources, which proved vital in the firefighting effort.
While fire activity prior to January 6 contributed to the overall fire extent and damage, many fires were extremely difficult to contain and mop up, breaking away from containment lines when subjected to the extreme fire weather conditions experienced between January 6 and 8. There were extended periods during these days when direct fire suppression was impossible. All firefighters could do under such conditions was to protect life, property and themselves.
Fire weather conditions during this period were extreme. Temperatures were well into the 40’s with low humidity (less than 20%) and winds gusting over 50km/hr. To exacerbate the problem, most areas had been without rain for many weeks.
Southwest of Gosford, thousands of people were evacuated from their homes as fire threatened. Along the ranges in the Hunter, the Howes Valley fire had joined with the Bala Range fire, burning over an area in excess of 30,000ha, threatening many villages east of the Range from Central Mangrove through to Wollombi. Many of those villages were evacuated.
The situation on the north coast remained serious where thousands of firefighters continued to battle blazes in remote, rugged terrain. Many of these fires had been burning since late December and were proving very difficult to keep behind established containment lines.
By January 7, the fires in the Double Duke and Bundjalung State Forests, north of the Grafton area, had joined along the Pacific Highway. While containment lines were established, they were considered quite tenuous given deteriorating weather conditions. Uncontained fires were 15 also burning on the Mid-North Coast, the southern shores of Port Stephens and also at Batemans Bay on the State’s south coast. Friday, January 7, 1994:
Conditions continued to deteriorate with an increase of fire activity in many areas. Suburbs around the Lane Cove River Park in Sydney continued to be impacted by fire. Fires continued to burn to the south of Sydney with fires in the Blue Mountains and Warringah starting during the afternoon.
Fires were now burning along the eastern seaboard and adjacent ranges from the Queensland border almost to the Victorian border.
The F3 Freeway and the northern railway line between Sydney and Newcastle were closed at 1630hrs.
Saturday, January 8, 1994:
Many of the fires were burning out of control due to appalling weather conditions. Every available firefighting resource needed was committed; reserves had to be maintained for other incidents, and many interstate resources had been recruited to meet the anticipated threat. Firefighters were beginning to feel the effects of fatigue but continued firefighting operations with professionalism and commitment.
Fires continued to burn in heavily populated suburbs of Sydney, Wollongong and Gosford. Much of the firefighter's work concentrated on property protection as suppression was almost impossible under these conditions.
Photo by Patrick Riviere (Sydney Freelance Agency)
A State Ablaze
16 Deployment of firefighting resources - January 8, 1994
North Coast
NSW Bush Fire Service - 350 units / 2,000 firefighters Queensland Fire Service - 10 units / 50 firefighters
Hunter Valley and Central Coast NSW Bush Fire Service - 700 units / 5,000 firefighters NSW Fire Brigades - 40 units / 300 firefighters Victorian Country Fire Authority - 85 units / 800 firefighters Queensland Fire Service - 10 units / 50 firefighters
Sydney
NSW Bush Fire Service - 500 units / 5,600 firefighters NSW Fire Brigades - 200 units / 1,000 firefighters Northern Territory Fire Service - 3 units / 11 firefighters South Australian Country Fire Service - 11 units / 50 firefighters Melbourne Metropolitan Fire Brigades - 6 units / 25 firefighters South Australian (Metropolitan) Fire Service - 190 firefighters ACT Fire Service - 10 units / 50 firefighters Royal Australian Navy - 100 firefighters Tasmanian Fire Service - 92 firefighters
Blue Mountains
NSW Bush Fire Service - 200 units / 2500 firefighters (with reserves in Sydney fringes) NSW Fire Brigades - 40 units / 300 firefighters South Australian Country Fire Service - 44 units / 200 firefighters Western Australian Bush Fire Brigades - 116 firefighters Victorian Department of Conservation and Natural Resources - 21 units / 90 firefighters Melbourne Metropolitan Fire Brigades - 6 units / 30 firefighters
South Coast
NSW Bush Fire Service - 200 units/ 1600 firefighters
Total Air Resources 71 helicopters 4 fixed wing water bombers 17 1 jet reconnaisance aircraft State Totals
NSW Bush Fire Service - 1950 units / 16700 firefighters NSW Fire Brigades - 280 units / 1600 firefighters Interstate and military - 206 units / 1954 firefighters
250 National Park and Wildlife Service firefighters 350 State Forest Firefighters State Emergency Service (SES) - 40 units / 400 personnel
Sunday, January 9, 1994:
Easing weather conditions allowed containment of many fires, however, property continued to be threatened in the Warringah area. The F3 at Gosford was reopened at 1730hrs for people to reach homes, but remained closed to all other traffic. Rail passengers caught ferries to Sydney and Gosford. Rail services were slowly reintroduced as tracks were inspected.
Conditions allowed major backburning to take place in many areas, particularly the southern and northern suburbs and Blue Mountains. Helicopters continued to be utilised to assist firefighters on the ground. The fire situation remained serious with fresh fire activity in many areas and a continuing threat to property. At this stage over 98% of the Royal National park had been burnt.
A State Ablaze
18 Monday, January 10, 1994:
Fires continued to burn, particularly in the north of the State and the Blue Mountains and Hawkesbury areas. Firefighters persisted in backburning to contain many fires but there was still a need for life and property protection in many areas where fires continued to flare up. The F3 was finally opened to all traffic, but despite a slight improvement in conditions, the Total Fire Ban for the whole State remained in force.
Tuesday, January 11, 1994:
A continuing easing of conditions allowed containment of more fires.
Wednesday, January 12, 1994:
The Total Fire Ban remained in force but a further easing of conditions allowed the lifting of bush fire emergency declarations (known as Section 41F declarations) in the Northern Region, with the exception of Nymboida and Kyogle. Concern remained for the Gospers Mountain fire which had the potential to impact on outer Sydney areas should conditions deteriorate.
Thursday, January 13, 1994:
The Total Fire Ban remained in force but the situation was greatly improved, with the worst considered to be over. Lightning strikes in the Central Region of the State started numerous fires. These were quickly extinguished by local Brigades. Firefighters continued to work on backburning operations in many areas.
Friday, January 14, 1994:
Interstate firefighters were stood down and New South Wales firefighters from out-of-area were released to go home. The Statewide Total Fire Ban was revoked from midnight, January 14 and residents were informed that the situation was now considerably safer.
Saturday, January 15, 1994:
The final Section 41F declarations were revoked and fire management returned to local land managers. Military assistance was reduced and withdrawn during the day. More than 800,000ha had been burnt.
19 Case Studies of Specific Fire areas
Blue Mountains:
Fire was first confirmed in the Blue Mountains at 1330hrs on Thursday January 7. It was reported that the fire, which started at Mt. Wilson, crowned within 100m and was spotting well ahead into the dry vegetation. The fire made a run to Mount Dixon and by 1930hrs had spotted across the Grose River east of Mount Hay Range.
The fire in the Grose Valley spread very slowly throughout Saturday the morning of January 8 until about 1300hrs, when the fire made its second main run. By 1545hrs, the main firefront was located on the western slopes of Springwood Creek at Winmalee. At 1600hrs the wind changed, from west/northwest to southwest, and the fire crossed the creek with a total fire length of 28km.
By 1730hrs, with a fire length of 32.75km, the front impacted on Booker Road and Roberts Parade, Hawkesbury Heights, northeast of Winmalee. Six buildings were destroyed by the fire - four homes, a Youth Hostel and an unoccupied historical stone house.
In just two hours, from 1600hrs to 1800hrs, the fire’s eastern front, having swept through Hawkesbury Heights to Hawkesbury Lookout, burnt towards Agnes Banks, Yarramundi and Bowen Mountain on a much larger front. A section of the fire crossed the Nepean River, but was quickly brought under control by Brigades.
At 1330hrs, the northern flank of the fire was threatening Skyline Road at Mt. Tomah. During the afternoon the fire again crossed Bells Line of Road from the north, at Berambing. The previously long, narrow fire had now broadened, burning on a 30km front, generally towards the northeast.
On Sunday January 9 easing weather conditions allowed major backburning to take place in the Blue Mountains to contain the blaze. The fire continued to threaten a number of areas over the following days and was not contained until January 14.
A State Ablaze Hawkesbury:
On Friday 7 January a firebreak was constructed using heavy earth moving machinery around the town of Putty to protect it from the potential threat of the Gospers Mountain fire and the Howes Valley fire. The Gospers Mountain fire had burnt out a large area of heavily fuelled wilderness area east of the Putty Road (connecting Windsor with Singleton), while the Howes Valley fire was burning immediately to the north of the township.
At 1430hrs on Saturday 8, the Gospers Mountain firefront was located 14km from St Albans, the village was already severely affected by smoke and ash being thrown well ahead of the fire. Firefighters from Hawkesbury, supported by interstate resources continued to contain both this fire and the northern flank of the Blue Mountains fire.
20 The Gospers Mountain fire was contained on January 16, partially due to rain. It had burnt more than 45,000 hectares.
Warringah:
At around 1630hrs on Friday January 7, a fire started at Cottage Point which, under the influence of the adverse weather conditions, spread rapidly with high intensity. In just three and a half hours the 2km wide eastern fire front impacted upon the residential area of Ingleside - some 7km from its source.
The fire also fanned out to the northeast, across Coal and Candle Creek towards the Pittwater shoreline suburbs of Elvina Bay, Church Point and Bayview and to the southwest towards Terrey Hills. Its southeasterly run took it towards Mona Vale Road. Within 27 hours from ignition, it had significantly impacted on the suburbs of Church Point, Bayview, Warriewood, Elanora Heights and Cromer, as well as other residential areas on the eastern side of the West Head Peninsula.
Over Saturday night, the fire had continued to move in a south easterly direction. By 1400hrs, the south eastern edge had reached Warriewood, with the western flank located 2km north of Terrey Hills. By 0900hrs the fire was well into north easterly run.
Eight hundred campers and residents of Elvina Bay were evacuated from Pittwater’s Western Shores by ferry. Firefighters continued to concentrate on the protection of life and property. Conditions made it impossible for them to attempt containment of the fire at this time. Residents were evacuated as the fire spread to the north east, south, south east and south west. At noon, it jumped Mona Vale Road and by 1500hrs the retirement village at Collaroy was evacuated after the fire had spotted across Wakehurst Parkway and Narrabeen Lakes. Two home units were destroyed. Property was also lost at Ingleside, Elanora Heights, Bayview, Lovett Bay and Elvina Bay.
Firefighters worked to contain different flanks of the fire over a number of days. During this time it threatened properties in a number of areas. All fires in Warringah/Pittwater were contained by January 12.
Royal National Park:
Fire started in the Royal National Park, to the south of Sydney, on January 3. It travelled from east of Heathcote on January 5 to the sea on January 6, resulting in evacuations from Bundeena and Maianbar.
At about 1500hrs on the 6th January, 1994, there was a spot fire behind Eric Street. Bundeena. The northern flank of the fire progressed toward Audley, Warumbul, Maianbar and Bundeena. The southern flank burnt between Kangaroo Creek and Wattamolla, heading against the wind, in a south westerly direction.
21 At 1330hrs on January 6 a Bush Fire Emergency was declared for the Sutherland Local Government Area under Section 41F of the Bush Fires Act.
Firefighters commenced backburning around Bundeena just after midnight. On January 7, at around 1000hrs, backburning commenced to the north west of the fire, east of the Princes Highway from Loftus to Heathcote.
The southeastern flank continued to burn unchecked and by early afternoon was threatening beach suburbs along the coast. 70 people were evacuated from Garie Beach by boat and air, and another 40 people were airlifted out of the Royal National Park. Backburning continued on the western flank, moving generally south, midway between Waterfall and Heathcote and advantage was taken of the generally cooler and calmer conditions overnight.
A second fire (which started at Helensburgh Tip at 1330hrs on January 6), also moved to the coast and on the afternoon of January 7, children were evacuated from the tiny village of Otford. Voluntary evacuation of adults commenced at 1900hrs.
Backburning continued throughout the night and by 1400hrs Saturday the backburn on the western flank of the fire was extended to Waterfall, and by 0800hrs (8.1.94), was well past Waterfall to Waterfall Flat. Increasing temperatures and wind, together with lowering humidity caused conditions to rapidly deteriorate and by 1430hrs, conditions were too dangerous for direct firefighting to continue. Two spot fires occurred west of Lady Wakehurst Drive, between the Royal National Park fire and the other fire which had originated from Helensburgh Tip.
Observations of the fire from the air indicated that the Royal National Park Fire and the fire which originated near the Helensburgh Tip, would join up into the one fire. The intensity and location of the fires made it dangerous to place crews in the field to try and suppress them, or to contain their progress.
A decision was taken to secure the area around Grays Point, Kirrawee, Sutherland and Loftus, by backburning.
A State Ablaze By 1930hrs, the south eastern flank of the Royal National Park fire joined with the north eastern flank of the Helensburgh Tip fire, which continued its run in a north easterly direction towards the Princes Highway. The run of this fire forced the partial evacuation of Waterfall on January 9. The fire was contained the following day.
At 1630hrs on the 9th January, 1994, discussions took place between the Section 41F Appointee, and the Police concerning the evacuation of Waterfall. The Police took the necessary action to evacuate.
On the 6th January, 1994 some 120 persons were evacuated by water from the Worumbul area; People in the main, volunteered to be evacuated from the Bundeena Area, and as the situation deteriorated in that area, Police were deployed to evacuate dwellings backing onto the National Park. These evacuations were carried out after consultation with the Section 41F Appointee. 22 On the 7th January, 1994, other people were evacuated from Garie Beach and also from Waterfall on the 9th January, 1994; By 1730hrs the fire had crossed the railway line, near the F6 Tollway, and Princes Highway south of Waterfall, after the danger had passed, and by 1850hrs, residents were permitted to return to their homes.
The fires in the Royal National Park were inactive on the 13th January, 1994, except one at the southern end of the Park. Rain fell in that area overnight and active fire fighting, was no longer necessary.
The fires burnt out 371 hectares of Garawarra State Recreation Area (41%), and 14,840 hectares of the Royal National Park (98.5%) and the estimated damage occasioned to National Parks and Wildlife Service assets was approximately $1.398 million.
Property, real and personal, destroyed or damaged as a result of this fire is estimated at $1.508 million.
Lane Cove River Park:
Having started on January 6 within the Berriwerri Reserve and Lane Cove River Park and affecting the suburbs of Macquarie Park, South Turramurra and West Pymble, the fire was finally contained later the same day before it crossed Quarry Creek, Marsfield.
At around 1630 hrs on January 7 the fire re-ignited moving east over De Burgh’s Bridge and into the gully below West Killara. By 1700hrs it was severely impacting upon the residential areas atop the escarpment bounding Albert Drive, Fiddens Wharf Drive and Carramar Road.
By 1800hrs new spot fires had started north of Lady Game Drive (north of the CSIRO National Measurement Laboratory) and by 1830hrs, minor damage to Ku-ring-gai College occurred as the fire continued its south easterly run towards the Commonwealth Acoustic Laboratory and Ultrasonic Institute in West Chatswood. The fire ended its run just west of Kooba Avenue. Unfortunately, a number of residential properties had been lost. Containment lines were established north of Delhi Road and south of the Lane Cove River to contain its southern flank. These fires were within 10 kilometres of the centre of Sydney.
Under appalling weather conditions, material from within the area that had burnt the previous night was blown across Delhi Road into unburnt parts of the Lane Cove River Park. By 1100hrs on Saturday 8.1.94 the fire was burning behind the CSIRO Research Laboratories and Hoyts Media television studios and by 1230hrs had jumped the Lane Cove River once more into the suburban areas of Chatswood West and Lane Cove West, just 7km from the City’s centre.
The fire was burning with such intensity that spot fires were being experienced more than 500m ahead of the main firefront in Stringybark Reserve, just 6km from the high-rise business district of North Sydney. The fire was finally contained at 1330 hrs.
23 Woronora River (Menai / Bangor and Como / Jannali):
Many fires were burning in the Sutherland area during this period.
Just after 1500hrs on Friday January 7 a new fire was reported east of Menai Oval at Menai. Fire conditions were extreme and in just two hours the fire had reached the gully below Menai Oval and between the ridge top developments, Jervis Drive and Bampton Avenue to the north Bunyan, Ballina and Boronga Places and Belarada and Belbowie Closes jutting out into the bushland to the east.
As the fire travelled towards the northern end of Bila Road a fire storm occurred with significant long-range spotting. Spot fires were reported on the eastern side of Bila Road ridge at 1700hrs and by 1800hrs the fire front extended well over 2km. The southeastern flank of the fire jumped Yala Road between Tulukera Place and Turi Close at about 1800hrs with spot fires reported in Woronora - a full kilometre away - at about the same time.
Five homes were lost at Menai / Bangor. Many more were seriously threatened. The dedication and determination of the firefighters, police and other emergency services personnel saved many threatened properties. (The north eastern flank continue its run until contained by the Woronora River, east of Bonnet Bay. To the north and north east, backburning, which commenced at midnight, contained its immediate spread).
At the same time as the south eastern flank was impacting upon dwellings around Bangor’s Yates Road ridge top, the spot fires recorded just north of Woronora were now of such intensity, that the fire began spotting across the Woronora River into Jannali Reserve, just off the southern end of Washington Drive, Bonnet Bay. By 2200hrs the eastern most point of the fire was along Tudar Road, Bonnet Bay.
By Saturday morning the fire was located just across the river from Illawong, Bonnet Bay, Jannali and Como. Conditions were particularly poor, making firefighting difficult.
At 12.00 noon the northeastern flank of the Menai / Bangor fire broke away, travelling east
A State Ablaze between the escarpment and the River. At around 1430hrs it destroyed a number of homes below the escarpment at Illawong. At around 1600hrs it spotted 400m over the Woronora River into Como, west of Lincoln Crescent. Further spot fires occurred just before 1600hrs. The southeastern flank of the Menai / Bangor fire spotted into Jannali at around 1400hrs and by 1600hrs, this flank was located to the west of Lincoln Crescent. Over the next two or three hours, 87 homes were totally destroyed. Many people were injured and one person was killed during this fire.
These fires were contained on January 9 with firefighters patroling many for some days afterwards because of the risk of reignition.
24 Tindag Creek Waukivory Failford
Terreal Quart Pot
Dogtrap Creek Allynbrook Saggers Creek Bungwhal
Wallaringa Cambra
Poppong 1
Howes Valley Medowie
Pelawmain Kindarun Minmi
Coricudgy Bowmans Ryhope
Bucketty Gospers Mt.
Kariong
Gunderman
Mougamarra Blue Mountains Terry Hills
Warringah Lane Cove
Alfords Point Como-Jannali
MAP Sydney surrounding Royal National Parks areas (fires of 1994) Parklands Bundeena
Case Studies
Fire at Banyabba (North Region)
A total of 23,500 hectares of bushland and other private property was destroyed in this fire. The bushland comprised of:
Crown Land 3700 hectare State Forest 7100 hectare National Parks Reserve 12000 hectare
"There is no evidence identifying any known person as being responsible for setting the fire which gave rise to this bushfire which continued between the 21 December, 1993 until containment on the 6th January, 1994," State Deputy Coroner Hiatt stated in his report. 25 Fire at Mount Horrible (Central East Region)
On Monday the 3rd January, 1994 a dry lightning storm passed through the Bathurst area in the late afternoon.
At about 1815hrs a landowner was on his property when the dry thunder storm occurred. The storm was accompanied by a tremendous amount of lightning which caused him to check for fires in his area. He rode his motor cycle to the top of a hill on his property and saw a very small fire north west at Mount Horrible.
At 1820hrs he reported the fire to the Palmers Oakey Bush Fire Brigade.
At the same time the Fire Control Centre for Evans Shire Council received a number of reports of fire caused by lightning strikes.
There were two fires at Mount Horrible. The first was a small fire on the northern side of Mount Horrible Road which was quickly suppressed by the Wattle Flat Brigade after it had destroyed a small amount of natural bushland.
The main fire was on the southern side of Mount Horrible Road, in Winburndale Nature Reserve, an area controlled by the N.S.W. National Parks and Wildlife Service. This is the same area where Mr. John Martin saw the lightning strike and, where shortly after, the first fire was seen.
This point is at Grid Reference South 331368 and East 1494846 in Winburndale Nature Reserve about 500 metres from Palmers Oakey Road, Mount Horrible.
Personnel fought the fires until approximately 1530hrs on 4/1/94 when very strong winds increased the fire intensity causing it to jump over the back burn put in by firefighters. The fire was then considered dangerous and in the circumstances firefighting was abandoned.
During the day of the 4th January 1994, bulldozers were used to establish fire breaks, together with hand constructed fire trails, back burning and aerial water bombing. This led to the bush fire
A State Ablaze being contained, having destroyed approximately 50 hectares of the Winburndale Nature Reserve.
The bush fire was effectively controlled by the combined efforts of the Evans Shire Bush Fire Brigades, N.S.W. NPWS Officers and Forestry Officers, assisted by personnel from the Lithgow Bush Fire Brigades.
During the evening of the January 4, Brigades and other personnel were deployed to mop up the area which had been contained. Mopping up consisted of raking the ashes back into the fire; breaking up stumps and carrying them back into the burnt ground. It also included knocking burning bark off trees; cutting burning trees down into burnt areas in steep and rough terrain.
It was at this fire that a volunteer firefighter was killed. 26 Bush Fire Operations and Planning
A planning process was in place prior to the January 1994 fires with particular emphasis on the operational plan. Following the fires the process was reviewed and considerably enhanced with greater emphasis placed on the fuel management aspect of the planning process.
➤ Every local council area in which a rural fire district exists is required to have a Bush Fire Management Committee (BFMC). The BFMC is made up of representatives of the local council, fire fighting authorities, land managers such as the National Parks and Wildlife Service, and conservation agencies.
➤ Each BFMC must prepare two plans for its area: one that sets out arrangements for how different organisations will work together in fighting major bush fires (an operational plan) and one that sets out how fire hazards will be managed to reduce the risk of bush fires (a Risk Management plan.) The Commissioner of the Rural Fire Service is empowered to prepare or implement these plans himself if a BFMC does not do so.
Review of Legislation
Immediately after the January 1994 fires, the NSW Government set up a Cabinet Committee to consider bush fire management and control.
The Committee’s brief was to examine bush fire control systems provided for by NSW legislation, and to recommend improvements to those systems. Ultimately, the Cabinet Committee recommended a number of changes to the Bush Fires Act 1949, the major piece of State legislation dealing with prevention and suppression of bush fires. These changes focussed on the planning process.
27 Coronial Inquiry
A coronial inquiry into the causes of the January 1994 fires and the four deaths that occurred began in August 1994. The inquiry was conducted by the Senior Deputy State Coroner, John Hiatt, and continued until August 1995. The report was presented to the NSW Government on 28 February 1996 and subsequently released for public consideration.
As a result of the Coroner’s findings, the Government initiated a comprehensive review of the Bush Fires Act 1949. In late 1996, the Cabinet approved the preparation of new legislation, the Rural Fires Bill in order to improve the systems for bush fire prevention and suppression.
➤ The Rural Fires Act, 1997, comprehensively reformed the principles of the Bush Fires Act 1949. The more significant achievements of the Rural Fires Act are:
(i) It provides for an Act that recognises contemporary fire management practices.
(ii) It affords proper consideration to the needs of the environment. The Act adopts ecological sustainability as an underlying principle in the exercise of functions by the NSW Rural Fire Service. The Act also recognises the importance of protecting threatened species during the planning and implementation of fuel management programmes.
(iii) It encourages public participation in the preparation of local Bush Fire Risk Management Plans to ensure local environmental issues are considered and to encourage local participation in bush fire prevention and preparedness.
(iv) It establishes the NSW Rural Fire Service as an entity providing a unified framework for the delivery of fire services to country New South Wales.
(v) One of the principal objectives of the Act is to establish and maintain Service wide standards for rural firefighting throughout New South Wales. This includes such issues as training, equipment and operational response systems.
A State Ablaze
(vi)The Act establishes the Rural Fire Service Advisory Council to advise the Minister and Commissioner on issues pertaining to the management and administration of the RFS. Members of the Council include representatives from other Government agencies, land managers and stakeholders.
(vii) It establishes procedures to deal with severe bush fires for which a co-ordinated response across agencies is likely to be required. The development of policies for co-ordinated firefighting is the responsibility of the Co-ordinating Committee. Members of the Committee include representatives from other Government agencies, land managers and stakeholders. The Committee is also ultimately responsible for bush fire risk management planning.
28 Conclusion.
It was difficult to comprehend the events of 1993 - 94 as they were happening and it remains a huge task. The number, area and extent of the impact of these fires will require much more research than is possible even with the passage of a few years.
This publication has attempted to give you an overview of these fires and a taste of some of their key features.
We must try to understand the nature of these events in order to be better prepared in the future. Legislation, rules and regulations introduced by Government since January 1994 can only achieve so much. The people need to take up the challenge of understanding their environments and their communities and what they can do to prepare and protect themselves when fire again threatens to impact upon them both directly and indirectly.
In this way, we Australians will come to accept fire as a feature of our lives and our landscape. Fire is not a force to be feared but one that can be tamed and used for the benefit of the people, fauna and flora that shape and colour this unique continent.
Further References
Fire! The Australian Experience. RFS publication. The Burning Question, RFS publication. Webster, Joan. The Complete Australian Bushfire Book, Penguin Books Australia Ltd, 1989. Overton, Frank. Fire Fighting. Management and Techniques. Inkata Press. 1996. The RFS produces a range of publications which are avaiable free to the public, teachers and students. For more information contact your local Fire Control Centre.
Acknowledgements
RFS Head Office: Public Affairs Planning Services Training Services
and, The men and women that make up The NSW Rural Fire Service.
29 Glossary of terms used in the text.
Back burn: a fire fighting technique where the fuel is burnt ahead of an approaching fire in order to prevent its further spread. Ideally the back burn runs towards the main fire providing a wide fuel free area between the fire front and the control line.
Bush Fire Emergency: Under section 41F of the Bush Fires Act 1949, (now superseded by the Rural Fires Act 1997, Section 44) the Chief Co-ordinator of Bush Fire Fighting in NSW determined when a fire was beyond local resources. He was then able to make a declaration and appoint a single officer to take overall control of fire fighting under this section of the Act. Section 44 in the new act.
Containment lines: A line beyond which a fire can not spread. This line is usually a fuel free zone due to hand or mechanical clearing, a line of saturated fuel, (too wet to burn), or some natural or man made barrier, e.g., river or road.
Crown: The crown of a tree is the top portion of that tree consisting of the leaves and branches. A fire is said to have "crowned" when it burns through the tops of the trees.
Fire Break: A fuel free or fuel reduced area usually in a line to halt the run of a fire. Fire breaks can vary from 1 m to large areas depending on the size of the approaching fire or the fire that could potentially develop in that area.
Fire storm: This term is used to describe a fire of extreme intensity. When air is full of ash and smoke, the temperature is very high and all material that could burn has been heated to near its ignition point a fire storm is said to exist. It is not a normally term used by fire services but is useful in describing a scene to the public.
Fire weather: Temperature, relative humidity and wind speed and direction will determine the behaviour of any given fire. When accurate weather conditions are known or when forecast, firefighters can predict the rate of spread of a fire, the height of the flames and the likely spotting characteristics. The Bureau of Meteorology provides the RFS with Fire Weather Warnings when conditions look favourable for the start and spread of fires.
A State Ablaze
Flank: The two or more sides of a fire.
Front: The head of a fire.
Available Fuel: Any combustible material. Anything that will burn given the right conditions. In the forests of NSW this material consists of leaves and twigs 6mm in diameter or less. In grassed areas, all grass that has dried, (cured) is potential fuel.
Fuel Management Plan: A plan to reduce the risk of bush and grass fire is necessary in every Rural Fire District.
30 Green pick: The green tips and shoots of grass, shrubs and bushes, preferred by grazing animals.
NSW Bush Fire Service: This was the name given to the 2,400 brigades in 142 local government areas before the new Act in 1997. The service is now called the NSW Rural Fire Service, (RFS).
Regions: The RFS has 8 Regions in NSW. Each contains a number of council areas. The Regions are: Albury, Southern, Western, Central, Central East, Hunter, Castlereagh & Northern.
Run, (of fire): Bush and grass fires are moving fires that spread , generally, in the direction of the prevailing wind. This forward spread is called the "run" of the fire.
STARG: State Tactical Assistance Response Group. These groups of firefighters and their fire appliances are despatched to assist areas where fires are beyond or likely to be beyond local resources. They are drawn from areas not involved with fires. Each STARG consists of 10 heavy tankers and other support vehicles and typically 80 - 100 firefighters and officers.
Spotting: Burning material thrown ahead of a fire by the wind which, when it lands, creates another smaller fire ahead of the main fire is called a spot which creates a spot fire. This process is called "spotting".
Unit: A fire appliance such as a heavy tanker, light tanker, village protection unit or a rapid response striker are collectively called "units" for easier and rapid communication.
31 Como
Bonnet Bay Como
Bonnet Bay Jannali
January 4, 1994
Jannali
January 21, 1994
THE NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT