Stuart Robson. The First World War. London and New York: Longman, 1998. xii + 156 pp. $11.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-582-31556-3.

Reviewed by Leland Barrows

Published on H-W-Civ (April, 1999)

The raison d'etre of this book is perhaps best several national points of view, among the com‐ summed up by a blurb on its back cover that de‐ batants and at home, while it was going on, and scribes the series of which it is a part. The "Semi‐ afterwards; the mutual infuence of war, on one nar Studies in History," the reader is informed, hand, and science and technology, on the other; provides "a means of bridging the gap between the social and demographic efects of the war; and specialist articles and monographs and text‐ the efects of war propaganda as generated by books." The genre thus is that of a reading that a both sides. A fnal chapter assesses the results of university teacher of Western Civilization or of the War as a set of paradoxes, among them the post-1815 European History might assign to cover idea that Germany or rather the German army, the First World War in lieu of the relevant chapter thanks to General Erich Ludendorf's duplicity, in a general textbook. came out of the maelstrom undefeated but The reader, accordingly, is presented with a stabbed in the back and that the British Army, 96-page attempt at a historical synthesis of the which to Robson played the major role on the Great War that while strictly bound to the Western Front after the failure of the Nivelle Of‐ 1914-1918 time frame covers much more than fensive of Spring 1917, appeared to come out di‐ history. It evokes the initial battle plans minished because Prime Minister Lloyd George (the Schliefen/Moltke Plan in the case of the Ger‐ chose to denigrate the achievement of the British mans, Plan XVII in the case of the French), the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Douglas Haig. course and consequences of war mobilization on Comprehension of the text is aided by fve the home fronts, the emergence of war maps: i) the German invasion routes into Luxem‐ economies, and explanations as to why the En‐ bourg, , and France in ; ii) the tente powers won and the lost. Eastern Front from 1914 to 1918; iii) the Western The text introduces a social-cultural element: con‐ Front in 1915 (with misspelled and the siderations of how the war was perceived from , Sambre, Moselle, and Rivers H-Net Reviews missing); iv) the Gallipoli Campaign; and v) the ilar sorts of coincidences that appear regularly Verdun region of France in 1916. The text is com‐ throughout the book. plemented by a set of teaching/learning aids that The "Bibliography" gives very good coverage includes seventeen short documents, readings of the latest scholarship regarding the First World drawn from a variety of sources, that illustrate or War, particularly its socio-cultural and technologi‐ develop points raised in the text; a four-page cal ramifcations. It also lists old favourites such "Chronology of events"; a short biographical dic‐ as Barbara Tuchman's, (New tionary called "Cast of Characters" listing seventy- York: MacMillan, 1962) and Alistair Horne's, The one of the personages active in the War; a "Glos‐ Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (Harmondsworth: sary" listing and defning thirty-four terms, rang‐ Penguin, 1978), both of which, although targeting ing from "strategy" and "tactics" to "traverse" and narrow but very signifcant sets of events in the "trenches frestep," and fnally, a "Bibliography" of War, give valuable background information and 297 entries, all but one of which are in English (in‐ sequels and are in many ways more suitable for cluding English translations from original lan‐ the beginning undergraduate student or the gen‐ guages). eral reader than the book being reviewed. Both The teaching/learning aids, particularly the books are eminently readable. seventeen "Documents," collectively give the read‐ The book jacket states that the "format, well- er a better feel for what this war was to its partici‐ tried and efective, combines information, analy‐ pants than does the text. The "Documents," along sis and assessment efectively." This reviewer, with the "Chronology of Events," the "Cast of Char‐ however, has doubts as to the efectiveness of this acters," and the "Glossary," provide much valu‐ book, despite the very good teaching aids and able detail. "Bibliography," because the 96-page narrative syn‐ The "Documents" are a mixed lot. Particularly thesis itself is both incomplete, tendentious, gripping is "Document 6," "A German View of cliche-ridden, and confusing--and, in some cases, Trench Fighting: Excerpts from the Diary of misleading or even wrong. At the same time, the Rudolf Binding" drawn from Rudolf Binding, A Fa‐ reviewer recognizes the extreme difculty of writ‐ talist at War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1929), ing a successful historical synthesis of the First particularly the image it evokes of the corpse of a World War in less than a hundred pages. In the British soldier that somehow got built into the limited space that follows, he will point out a few parapet of a German trench in such a way that a of the problems that he has perceived. soldier could hang his rife on its puttee-clad pro‐ Robson has been strict in leaving out informa‐ truding legs. Equally gripping is "Document 16," tion on backgrounds and sequels in both the text an excerpt from the letter of a Canadian nurse de‐ and in the "Cast of Characters," He thus says very scribing the death in a British hospital of an evac‐ little about the political and diplomatic origins of uated soldier, the victim of mustard gas. "Docu‐ the War or about such matters as the evolution of ment 1," an early (September 1914) statement of aspects of modern warfare prior to 1914 that German war aims by Chancellor Theobald von might have suggested both that the War would be Bethmann Hollweg, is all the more fascinating in long and that the trench system would appear that it suggests that eighty-four years later Ger‐ and evolve. He gives very little pre-1914 and many seems to have achieved many of its stated post-1918 biographical information about the economic aims of 1914 through its membership in principal military and civilian protagonists. He the European Union. Robson has unfortunately fails, for instance, to evoke the colonial experi‐ not made any comments about this and other sim‐ ence of such French ofcers as General Joseph Si‐

2 H-Net Reviews mon Gallieni and Joseph Jofre even Americans, on the other. As for Australia, the though he does so in the case of the British Field birth trauma of nationalism was probably caused Marshal, Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, who more by the feeling of abandonment by Britain af‐ did anticipate a long war. He also fails to mention ter the British surrender of Singapore in 1942 or to emphasizes the fact that most of the British than by participation in the First World War. generals, particularly General Sir John French As Robson is Canadian, a professor of history and General Sir Douglas Haig as well as Lord at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario, he Kitchener, had fought in the South African War tends to emphasize the role of the British and the (1899-1902), a war in which the British forces did Commonwealth forces both on the Western Front not necessarily distinguish themselves. and at Gallipoli. In particular, he evokes the The colonial backgrounds of senior British thoughts about successful infantry attacks of Gen‐ and French ofcers were important because of eral Sir , by 1917 the Commander of the ways in which colonial experience infuenced the Canadian Corps. While it is helpful that Rob‐ their perceptions of the strategies and tactics to be son has underlined the contributions of Canada, employed in European warfare. It also conferred Australia, and New Zealand to the military eforts administrative experience as well as a degree of of the Entente that many accounts of the War only independence of mind, infuencing patterns of be‐ include more-or-less anonymously in the British haviour in crisis situations and enabling such gen‐ efort, he fails to say very much about the French erals as Jofre, Gallieni, and , a colonial and North African troops and guest work‐ strong partisan of the use of African troops in Eu‐ ers who were of great importance to the French rope, to escape from the consequences of such war efort. He also neglects the American military military doctrines as that of the "ofensive a out‐ presence, not even mentioning the name of the US rance" (that also had a partial colonial origin) Commander-in-Chief, General John Joseph Persh‐ when these proved to be unworkable. ing. Robson also de-emphasizes President Regarding post 1919 personages and events, 's role in the peace process and Robson's two comments about the future career of indirectly dismisses the Fourteen Points as a "lib‐ Marshal Philippe Henri Petain, the hero of Ver‐ eral imperialist bid for world power... that had to dun, consist of an aside about the French collabo‐ wait for Pearl Harbor in 1941" (p. 91). rationist regime of 1940 (p. 90) and the statement One can cite other examples of Professor Rob‐ that Petain "Lived one war too long" (p. 127). son's tendentiousness. He is very critical of Mar‐ When Robson chooses to say more, his comments shal Jofre, French Commander-in-Chief at the tend to be tendentious or ambiguous. One can outbreak of hostilities. He is equally critical of likewise question Robson's conclusion that "the Plan 17, the French battle plan calling for the re‐ Great War made Canada and Australia"--an asser‐ conquest of and Lorraine by means of a tion, in support of which in the case of Canada, he rapid ofensive action (ofensive a outrance) in the bases on Jonathan Vance's, Death So Noble (Van‐ event of war with Germany. He blames Jofre for couver: UBC Press, 1997). Rather the Great War, the lack of realism of this Plan that in addition to particularly the debate over conscription in Cana‐ failing to anticipate the slaughter that entrenched da, exacerbated the cleavage between French and heavy would infict upon uncovered in‐ English Canadians whose recollections of "the war fantry charging forward, took very little account as an ennobling and successful crusade" (p. 94) of the strong possibility that Germany would in‐ were more a reaction to French Canadian vade France through Belgium. "traitors" on one hand, and vacillating, isolationist

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Plan 17 was nevertheless more realistic and ing to declare for the Entente. Robson anticipatory of what really occurred in August says little about the fghting in Italy or about the 1914 than was Plan 16 that was in efect when Jof‐ reinforcement of the Italian army by detachments fre took over as Chief of the French General Staf from France and Great Britain. He barely evokes in 1911. Although Robson attributes Plan 17 to the Romanian war efort and does not mention General Jofre and his chief-of-staf, General Noel the French expeditionary army in Romania. Re‐ Joseph de Curieres de Castelnau, its elaboration grettably, Robson does not mention the campaign was strongly infuenced by the military collabora‐ in German East Africa during which the German tion of the British General, Sir Henry Wilson, and commander, General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, General going back to 1909. The successfully held of larger British, South African, two of them anticipated a German violation of and Portuguese forces, only surrendering when Belgian neutrality to be countered by the inter‐ ordered to do so on 14 , three days vention of the British army in France near the Bel‐ after the armistice in Europe. In short, Robson's gian frontier. The nascent Plan 17 would also be First World War is almost provincially European. known as "Plan 17 - Plan W" in recognition of Sir Even aspects of the war that are well ex‐ Henry Wilson's contribution (see R. Alexandre, plained have confusing gaps. Take, for instance, Avec Jofre d'Agadir a Verdun, : Berger-Lev‐ the . Robson emphasizes the im‐ rault, 1932). Thus Plan 17 did anticipate German portance of the "Voie Sacree," the one road by action through Belgium; it simply got the propor‐ which Verdun could be supplied by means of a tions wrong, but it assigned a position to the continuous truck convoy; however, he fails to ex‐ British Expeditionary Force facing the Belgian plain why the various railway lines shown on the frontier on the left fank of the French Armies. map of the Verdun Region (Map 5, p. 43), particu‐ Then there is the problem of the geographical larly the east-west chemin-de-fer meusien, that scope of the war. Robson places great emphasis paralleled the road could not be used for this pur‐ on the Western Front. Only the listings in the four- pose. In fact this railway operated and was used page "Chronology of Events" make an attempt at to move in food and other supplies, the road and geographical balance by the inclusion of such the trucks being reserved for men and ammuni‐ events as the Arab revolt in the Hedjaz (June tion. 1916) and the entrance of British forces into Like other students of the First World War, Jerusalem (9 December 1917). He describes the Robson stresses the ways in which war stimulated Gallipoli campaign of 1915 primarily to show technological innovations on both sides: the de‐ what a disaster it was, but he fails to give the full velopment and the use of poison gas, the develop‐ background. The point of Gallipoli was not simply ment of tanks, particularly by the British, as well to attack the Central Powers elsewhere than on as the development of dirigibles, airplanes, air the stalemated Western Front but to aid the Rus‐ combat tactics, ersatz products, and the like. Nev‐ sians who were being attacked by the Turks in the ertheless, in his descriptions of the crucial impor‐ Caucasus and to open up the Straits and the Black tance of railway networks to the war efort, Rob‐ Sea to the Entente. The continuation by the son fails to note the difculties for both sides on French of the Gallipoli campaign in the form of the Eastern Front caused by the discrepancy in the Salonika campaign is barely mentioned even the Russian and the general European railway though it was intended to relieve Serbia, to com‐ gauges. Moreover, in his fascination with technol‐ bat Bulgaria that had declared for the Central ogy in , Robson completely forgets the Powers, and to increase pressure on the southern great importance of the horse, not necessarily for fank of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by induc‐

4 H-Net Reviews (although the belligerents used light cav‐ cluded among the "Documents" (Document 14) a alry for reconnaissance; i.e., the German list of soldiers' slang, some of it very humourous Uhlanen), but as beasts of burden, particularly for (drawn from John Brophy and Eric Partridge, The moving and positioning heavy artillery. The out‐ Long Trail: Soldiers' Songs and Slang 1914-18, comes of campaigns on both sides were infu‐ Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, enced by the abundance or the shortage of horses 1965). The list includes practically every expres‐ and feed (oats and hay). sion used by the Entente troops to designate Ger‐ A peculiar inaccuracy is Robson's claim that mans--"Fritz," "Jerry," "Boche," "Hun," and "Heiny" "we know less about the French mutiny of 1917 (p. 111)--but it does not include "Tommy", the than about any other event in modern French his‐ nickname for British soldiers. tory," an exaggeration, particularly when stated in Although the "Documents" and the "Bibliogra‐ a book published in 1998, however much the phy" are really the saving grace of this book, one French authorities of the period (and for many regrets that their utility is diminished because of years afterwards) attempted to keep the situation a faulty reference system. Each item is numbered, secret. The archives of the period have been open the author citing the numbers as needed in the for scholarly use for some twenty years. Such text, placing them in square brackets. This French historians as Guy Pedroncini and Pierre method is reader-hostile. Given the generalized Durand have published quite extensively on the use of computer-assisted page layout and print‐ question of the 1917 mutiny. Although Robson ing, why did Professor Robson fail to utilize a cites the famous anti-war Chanson de Craonne standard reference format placing individual cita‐ (Document 4) to illustrate his brief description tions, identifed in the text by index numbers, at (pp. 68-70) of the Mutiny, there is considerably the foot of the relevant pages? Equally disappoint‐ more material available to interested historians. ing is the "Index" (pp. 151-55) that is incomplete, Finally, one wonders how Robson's attempts failing to mention important personages, like Cor‐ at humour will appeal to his readers. Take, for in‐ poral Adolph Hitler, the names of whom appear stance, the title of Chapter Two, "1914: Oops! the in the text. Plans Fail" or his quip that Sir John French, the In short, although written by an expert on the Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary First World War, this book is a potboiler of limited Force in 1914, "wavered between Eeyore's pes‐ interest for the readers for whom, according to simism... and Pooh's optimism" (p. 123). Are the the publisher, it is destined. It is certainly not suit‐ readers expected to be familiar with Winnie the able for unassisted or unsupplemented use by an Pooh? Then there is the description of the British undergraduate with little or no prior knowledge General, Charles Plumer, as looking "more like a of the First World War. At best, it might be of resident of Fawlty Towers than a general"--an apt some utility to a professor preparing a lecture on description--but how many readers of this book an aspect of the subject or to a graduate student will have ever heard of "Fawlty Towers"? Wishing preparing for his PhD comprehensive examina‐ to be humourous, Robson could, more appropri‐ tions. In either case, however, the teaching (and ately, have cited examples of contemporary hu‐ learning) aids, particularly the "Documents" and mour, for instance, that early on the British sol‐ the "Bibliography," will prove to be of greater val‐ diers nicknamed the French general, Louis ue than the text. Franchet d'Esperey, who replaced General Charles Copyright (c) 1999 by H-Net, all rights re‐ Lanrezac in command of the French Fifth Army, served. This work may be copied for non-proft as "Desperate Frankey." Robson has, however, in‐ educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐

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Citation: Leland Barrows. Review of Robson, Stuart. The First World War. H-W-Civ, H-Net Reviews. April, 1999.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3033

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