Stuart Robson. The First World War. London and New York: Longman, 1998. xii + 156 pp. $11.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-582-31556-3. Reviewed by Leland Barrows Published on H-W-Civ (April, 1999) The raison d'etre of this book is perhaps best several national points of view, among the com‐ summed up by a blurb on its back cover that de‐ batants and at home, while it was going on, and scribes the series of which it is a part. The "Semi‐ afterwards; the mutual influence of war, on one nar Studies in History," the reader is informed, hand, and science and technology, on the other; provides "a means of bridging the gap between the social and demographic efects of the war; and specialist articles and monographs and text‐ the effects of war propaganda as generated by books." The genre thus is that of a reading that a both sides. A fnal chapter assesses the results of university teacher of Western Civilization or of the War as a set of paradoxes, among them the post-1815 European History might assign to cover idea that Germany or rather the German army, the First World War in lieu of the relevant chapter thanks to General Erich Ludendorff's duplicity, in a general textbook. came out of the maelstrom undefeated but The reader, accordingly, is presented with a stabbed in the back and that the British Army, 96-page attempt at a historical synthesis of the which to Robson played the major role on the Great War that while strictly bound to the Western Front after the failure of the Nivelle Of‐ 1914-1918 time frame covers much more than fensive of Spring 1917, appeared to come out di‐ military history. It evokes the initial battle plans minished because Prime Minister Lloyd George (the Schlieffen/Moltke Plan in the case of the Ger‐ chose to denigrate the achievement of the British mans, Plan XVII in the case of the French), the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Douglas Haig. course and consequences of war mobilization on Comprehension of the text is aided by fve the home fronts, the emergence of war maps: i) the German invasion routes into Luxem‐ economies, and explanations as to why the En‐ bourg, Belgium, and France in August 1914; ii) the tente powers won and the Central Powers lost. Eastern Front from 1914 to 1918; iii) the Western The text introduces a social-cultural element: con‐ Front in 1915 (with Verdun misspelled and the siderations of how the war was perceived from Meuse, Sambre, Moselle, and Meurthe Rivers H-Net Reviews missing); iv) the Gallipoli Campaign; and v) the ilar sorts of coincidences that appear regularly Verdun region of France in 1916. The text is com‐ throughout the book. plemented by a set of teaching/learning aids that The "Bibliography" gives very good coverage includes seventeen short documents, readings of the latest scholarship regarding the First World drawn from a variety of sources, that illustrate or War, particularly its socio-cultural and technologi‐ develop points raised in the text; a four-page cal ramifications. It also lists old favourites such "Chronology of events"; a short biographical dic‐ as Barbara Tuchman's, The Guns of August (New tionary called "Cast of Characters" listing seventy- York: MacMillan, 1962) and Alistair Horne's, The one of the personages active in the War; a "Glos‐ Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (Harmondsworth: sary" listing and defining thirty-four terms, rang‐ Penguin, 1978), both of which, although targeting ing from "strategy" and "tactics" to "traverse" and narrow but very significant sets of events in the "trenches frestep," and fnally, a "Bibliography" of War, give valuable background information and 297 entries, all but one of which are in English (in‐ sequels and are in many ways more suitable for cluding English translations from original lan‐ the beginning undergraduate student or the gen‐ guages). eral reader than the book being reviewed. Both The teaching/learning aids, particularly the books are eminently readable. seventeen "Documents," collectively give the read‐ The book jacket states that the "format, well- er a better feel for what this war was to its partici‐ tried and effective, combines information, analy‐ pants than does the text. The "Documents," along sis and assessment effectively." This reviewer, with the "Chronology of Events," the "Cast of Char‐ however, has doubts as to the effectiveness of this acters," and the "Glossary," provide much valu‐ book, despite the very good teaching aids and able detail. "Bibliography," because the 96-page narrative syn‐ The "Documents" are a mixed lot. Particularly thesis itself is both incomplete, tendentious, gripping is "Document 6," "A German View of cliche-ridden, and confusing--and, in some cases, Trench Fighting: Excerpts from the Diary of misleading or even wrong. At the same time, the Rudolf Binding" drawn from Rudolf Binding, A Fa‐ reviewer recognizes the extreme difculty of writ‐ talist at War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1929), ing a successful historical synthesis of the First particularly the image it evokes of the corpse of a World War in less than a hundred pages. In the British soldier that somehow got built into the limited space that follows, he will point out a few parapet of a German trench in such a way that a of the problems that he has perceived. soldier could hang his rifle on its puttee-clad pro‐ Robson has been strict in leaving out informa‐ truding legs. Equally gripping is "Document 16," tion on backgrounds and sequels in both the text an excerpt from the letter of a Canadian nurse de‐ and in the "Cast of Characters," He thus says very scribing the death in a British hospital of an evac‐ little about the political and diplomatic origins of uated soldier, the victim of mustard gas. "Docu‐ the War or about such matters as the evolution of ment 1," an early (September 1914) statement of aspects of modern warfare prior to 1914 that German war aims by Chancellor Theobald von might have suggested both that the War would be Bethmann Hollweg, is all the more fascinating in long and that the trench system would appear that it suggests that eighty-four years later Ger‐ and evolve. He gives very little pre-1914 and many seems to have achieved many of its stated post-1918 biographical information about the economic aims of 1914 through its membership in principal military and civilian protagonists. He the European Union. Robson has unfortunately fails, for instance, to evoke the colonial experi‐ not made any comments about this and other sim‐ ence of such French officers as General Joseph Si‐ 2 H-Net Reviews mon Gallieni and Marshal Joseph Joffre even Americans, on the other. As for Australia, the though he does so in the case of the British Field birth trauma of nationalism was probably caused Marshal, Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, who more by the feeling of abandonment by Britain af‐ did anticipate a long war. He also fails to mention ter the British surrender of Singapore in 1942 or to emphasizes the fact that most of the British than by participation in the First World War. generals, particularly General Sir John French As Robson is Canadian, a professor of history and General Sir Douglas Haig as well as Lord at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario, he Kitchener, had fought in the South African War tends to emphasize the role of the British and the (1899-1902), a war in which the British forces did Commonwealth forces both on the Western Front not necessarily distinguish themselves. and at Gallipoli. In particular, he evokes the The colonial backgrounds of senior British thoughts about successful infantry attacks of Gen‐ and French officers were important because of eral Sir Arthur Currie, by 1917 the Commander of the ways in which colonial experience influenced the Canadian Corps. While it is helpful that Rob‐ their perceptions of the strategies and tactics to be son has underlined the contributions of Canada, employed in European warfare. It also conferred Australia, and New Zealand to the military efforts administrative experience as well as a degree of of the Entente that many accounts of the War only independence of mind, influencing patterns of be‐ include more-or-less anonymously in the British haviour in crisis situations and enabling such gen‐ effort, he fails to say very much about the French erals as Joffre, Gallieni, and Charles Mangin, a colonial and North African troops and guest work‐ strong partisan of the use of African troops in Eu‐ ers who were of great importance to the French rope, to escape from the consequences of such war effort. He also neglects the American military military doctrines as that of the "offensive a out‐ presence, not even mentioning the name of the US rance" (that also had a partial colonial origin) Commander-in-Chief, General John Joseph Persh‐ when these proved to be unworkable. ing. Robson also de-emphasizes President Regarding post 1919 personages and events, Woodrow Wilson's role in the peace process and Robson's two comments about the future career of indirectly dismisses the Fourteen Points as a "lib‐ Marshal Philippe Henri Petain, the hero of Ver‐ eral imperialist bid for world power... that had to dun, consist of an aside about the French collabo‐ wait for Pearl Harbor in 1941" (p. 91). rationist regime of 1940 (p. 90) and the statement One can cite other examples of Professor Rob‐ that Petain "Lived one war too long" (p. 127). son's tendentiousness. He is very critical of Mar‐ When Robson chooses to say more, his comments shal Joffre, French Commander-in-Chief at the tend to be tendentious or ambiguous.