Hypersonic Weapon As a New Challenge for the Anti-Aircraft Defense Command and Control System

Hypersonic Weapon as a New Challenge for the Anti-Aircraft Defense Command and Control System

Piotr MALINOWSKI Military University of Aviation, Dęblin, Poland; [email protected], ORCID: 0000-0002-4240-982X

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37105/sd.87

Abstract

The intensification of the air threat resulting from the emergence of hypersonic weapons in the immediate vicinity of Poland has become a significant challenge for the Polish armed forces, including anti-aircraft defense. The capabilities of the new type of weapon determine not only the need to modernize and acquire systems designed to engage aerial targets, but also the command and control systems that control them. Due to the nature and the limited scope of the article, the deliberations presented in it are generalized results of a research on the scale of the threat posed by hypersonic weapons in the airspace and the need to modernize anti-aircraft defense command and control subsystems, which may be involved in com- bating them as part of the national air defense system. The presented conclusions also con- cern the problems of multiplying the current level of automation of the command and control subsystem. This is related to the need for the effectiveness of the military decision- making process as well as uninterrupted and efficient cooperation with the national and allied elements of the air reconnaissance and air defense assets subsystems, including the components of missile defense, which is predestined to engage hypersonic weapons. Keywords: military security, hypersonic weapons, anti-aircraft defense, C2 system

1. Introduction defense system, including its command and control subsystem. Although the idea of cre- ating a weapon capable of immediate reac- The advent of the era of hypersonic air tion, of large range, is not new, still its em- threats in tactical operations is redefining bodiment in the form of a Russian hyper- the requirements for the entire anti-aircraft sonic weapon is a significant transformation

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Hypersonic Weapon as a New Challenge of the threats that determine the necessary including Russia, were working towards pri- transformation of the domestic anti-aircraft marily using hypersonic technology in the defense potential. ballistic missiles weapon segment, boost- The desire to intensify the automation of glide vehicles, and cruise missiles. The emer- anti-aircraft defense command and control gence of military strike systems in the air- processes results from the complexity of ef- space that are capable of delivering precise fective combat against aerial targets that are strikes at speeds several times the speed of so difficult to engage. It is also a requirement sound is a significant challenge for the entire for the dynamization of operations on the air defense system, including anti-aircraft contemporary battlefield where not only hy- defense. Currently, such weapons are classi- personic weapons pose significant air fied as supersonic or hypersonic. The first threats. However, its current introduction group includes missiles which fly above into the strike assets arsenal of several ar- Mach 1. They are generally regarded as flying mies around the world reveals not only the between Mach 1 and Mach 5, about 1,000 to scale of the new threat. It also determines, as 5,000 km/h (Speier, 2017, p. 2). Whereas shown by the conducted research, an urgent the term hypersonic weapon is generally un- need to achieve an appropriate level of de- derstood to refer to the ones that fly within fense against this type of air threats, which the atmosphere at speeds above Mach 5 (five will be also influenced by the efficient func- times the speed of sound), or above 6,100 tioning of the command and control subsys- km per hour. One focus of military interest is tems. hypersonic missiles that can travel at ap- This article contains considerations and proximately 5,000 to 25,000 km per hour conclusions, the purpose of which is to pre- (or between 1.4 and 7 meters per second) sent the characteristics and capabilities of (Speier, 2017, p. 2) – up to 25 times faster hypersonic weapons, particularly emphasiz- than a standard airliner. Additionally hyper- ing the armament of the Russian Federation, sonic weapons refer to weapons that not as well as the impact of these weapons on the only travel faster than Mach 5 but also have modernization and automation of the anti- the capability to maneuver during the entire aircraft defense command and control sub- flight. system. Therefore, the author focused on New hypersonic systems currently have solving the following research problem: How two primary sub-varieties: hypersonic glide do the capabilities of hypersonic weapons af- vehicles (HGVs), and hypersonic cruise mis- fect the needs of modernization and automa- siles. The first sub-variety, hypersonic glide tion of the anti-aircraft defense command vehicles are typically launched by rockets and control subsystem? A mixed research into the upper atmosphere. After disengag- method, based on the elements of text and ing from the carrier missile, the hypersonic literature exploratory research (analysis), vehicle lowers its altitude and continues to simulation of anti-aircraft defense combat fly to its target by itself. They are released at capabilities, experiment during military ex- altitudes that can vary from around 50 km to ercises was used to solve the indicated prob- higher than 100 km and glide to their targets lem during the research, the generalized re- by skipping along the upper atmosphere. sults of which are included in the article. HGVs have a range comparable to ballistic missiles but they fly at a lower altitude, and a negligible portion of their flight path fol- lows a ballistic trajectory. This results in the 2. Hypersonic weapons as an air time between detection by ground-based threat sensors and impact being shorter compared to a ballistic missile’s re-entry vehicle (Brehm, Weeler, 2019, p. 2). The HGVs are For around two decades, several coun- carried to the upper layers of the atmosphere tries around the world (GMTFF, 2019)

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Safety & Defense Vol. 6(2) (2020) by rocket missiles, which give them an ap- pose no risk to aircrews, are unstoppable propriate initial velocity. and phenomenally accurate, can yield an im- The second sub-variety are hypersonic pact equal to five to ten tons of high explo- cruise missiles (HCMs). Hypersonic missiles sive with no warhead at all yet be capable of typically operate using air-breathing super- delivering a nuclear bomb, and can reach sonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engines nearly every coordinate on the surface of the to accelerate and maintain missile velocity. earth within 30 minutes” (Simon, 2020). For A scramjet usually begins operating at Mach this reason, it is recognized as a threat that 4 or Mach 5. Therefore, a hypersonic cruise can change the perception of the implemen- missile must first be accelerated to Mach 4 tation of air strikes and the way of achieving or Mach 5 by other means, such as rocket en- strategic goals of military operations. This is gines (Hruby, 2019, p. 18). influenced by the possibilities of the hyper- HCMs could be ground-, air- or ship- sonic weapons due to which “they are able to launched and would likely ﬂy at an altitude evade and conceal their precise targets from of 20 to 30 km, beyond the reach of most defenses until just seconds before impact. current air-to-surface missile defence sys- This leaves targeted states with almost no tems (Brehm, Weeler, 2019, p.2). The prin- time to respond” (Speier, 2018). cipal advantages of an HCM would be its Taking into account the geostrategic lo- speed and maneuverability. These cruise cation of Poland, after analyzing the devel- missiles are difficult to defend against be- opment trends of hypersonic weapons, it can cause of their unpredictable trajectories. be concluded that the most serious air threat Both hypersonic types of weapons can carry related to the use of this type of weapon is a nuclear warhead, a conventional explosive likely from the Russian systems of this warhead, or no warhead at all, instead rely- weapon. It may result from the use of both ing on sheer kinetic force to destroy its tar- hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hyper- get. There are many other potential types of sonic cruise missiles (HCMs) owned by the hypersonic weapon being developed. These Russian Federation. include more complex missile systems, The first strategic type of Russian hyper- manned and unmanned reusable air vehi- sonic weapon is the Avangard (Vanguard) cles, and space launch systems (Speier, 2017, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, which is part p. 4). of an intercontinental ballistic missile The threat of using hypersonic weapons (ICBM) missile complex equipped with a hy- in an armed conflict, resulting from one personic glide warhead (Trimble, 2019, p. party’s possession of these is a factor that 20). Each ICBM is armed with one hyper- creates a completely new dimension of air sonic boost-glide warhead. Avangard is car- threat. This is because hypersonic weapons ried to its suborbital apogee of around 100 combine the speed of a ballistic missile with km by a ballistic missile. Once boosted to its the maneuvering capabilities of a cruise mis- suborbital apogee, the glide vehicle sepa- sile. In the opinion of the US military ana- rates from its rocket. It then cruises down to- lysts “while the designed speed of the hyper- wards its target through the atmosphere and sonic missile is faster than that of sound, its can reach speeds of up to Mach 20 (6.28 advantage lies in its enhanced maneuvera- km/s) and can maneuver (MDPA, 2019). bility and smooth flight path, which is much Therefore, Avangard's trajectory is unpre- harder to track than that of traditional mis- dictable and makes intercept attempts diffi- siles” (Osborn, 2017). It is also a weapon cult after its boost phase. which is specifically designed for increased Avangard, a hypersonic glider previously survivability against modern ballistic missile known as ‘Project 4202’ or ‘Yu-71’, or the defense systems. Additionally, for users, hy- Aerobalistic Hypersonic Warhead has been personic weapons have the advantage of be- tested multiple times since February 2015 ing the type of weapon whose “accuracy min- (Sputnik, 2016). Currently, warheads of this imizes the risk of collateral damage, that type are mounted on intercontinental

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Hypersonic Weapon as a New Challenge ballistic missiles UR-100NUTTH (SS-19 Sti- The KH-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger) missile letto). The first regiment of ICBMs, armed introduced in 2018 may therefore be a very with the newest, hypersonic Avangard sys- dangerous strike system, used to blackmail tem, achieved combat readiness in Decem- and "cut off" support for NATO's eastern ber 2019 (TVN24 BIS, 2019). By the end of flank far ahead of the potential conflict area, 2027, that regiment and one other are to or to perform quick, hard-to-repel strikes on have six Avangard systems each, for a total Poland or the Baltic countries (Palowski, of 12 systems (GMTFF, 2019). Ultimately , 2020a). It results from the possibilities of the hypersonic boost-glide vehicles (HGVs) this armament, presented in Figure 1. Avangard are intended to be mounted as an element of the Russia's RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X- 30) – the state-of-the-art heavy liquid-pro- pelled ICBM which are currently being developed for the Russian army. Another type of Russian hypersonic weapon is The Kinzhal (Dagger) system, which is essentially a combination of a KH- 47M2 heavy hypersonic rocket and a MiG- 31K fighter jet or Tu-22M3 carrier bomber (Global Security, n.d.). It is planned that it will be also carried by a new Su-57 stealthy multi-role fighters (Military Today 2020a, Figure 1. The potential operational range of The n.d.). The aeroballistics hypersonic missile Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger). Adopted from: Kinzhal (Dagger) has a “quasi-ballistic” “Hipersoniczny wyścig potęg [ANALIZA]” by M. Dąbrowski. Copyright 2020 by Defence24 flight path at altitudes from 35 to 50-80 or (Dąbrowski, 2020). more kilometers. The Kinzhal (Dagger) is a hypersonic missile, which, according to Rus- An air-launched KH-47M2 Kinzhal hy- sian data, has a range of about 1,500 to personic missile traveling at Mach 10 could 2,000 km (Palowski, 2020b). It is an air- hit Sofia, Bulgaria, about 2000 km to the launched ballistic missile (ALBM) (MDP, south, in 11 minutes from the Gulf of Fin- 2019) carried by a combat aircraft with land. Re-orienting the firing line to Russia’s speeds above 5 Ma (according to some western borders, a Kinzhal could reach Lon- sources, even 10 Ma) at certain stages of don, Paris, or Rome equally quickly. To put flight, on a similar basis as ballistic missiles it another way, hypersonic weapons mean launched from the ground. During the flight, that a hypothetical target 2000 km away has the missile maintains the ability to maneu- the same potential of being threatened as ver and correct its trajectory. According to those within roughly 150 km of a subsonic Russian doctrine, it is capable of carrying cruise missile. On the other hand, the Mach both conventional warheads (weighing 20 Avangard expands the threat umbrella to around 480 kg) and nuclear charges as well. cover ranges reportedly in excess of 6000 The Kinzhal (Dagger) missile has a simi- km with a flight time of around 20 minutes lar design to the Iskander-M missiles. How- (Cummings, 2019). Therefore, only those ever, its launch not from the ground, but systems that are capable of destroying ma- from an aircraft flying at more than twice the neuvering ballistic missiles may be able to speed of sound, in addition to high altitude, combat such threats as the KH-47M2 Kin- makes it a much greater air threat than the zhal (Dagger), provided that the threat is de- Iskander missile. Such a missile launched tected and classified early and can be tracked from an airplane does not have to use energy by fire control systems. to take off from the ground, thus it has The multi-purpose operational/tactical greater spatial possibilities in terms of veloc- hypersonic cruise missile 3M22 Tsirkon ity and range. (Global Security, 2019) has also been

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Safety & Defense Vol. 6(2) (2020) developed in Russia. HCM Zircon is mostly (...) Now we have seven types of missiles, or an antiship missile, but can also hit ground possibly more” (TASS, 2017). targets (Vavasseur, 2020). It will be used for Russia, however, does not stop at in- arming, among others, Kirov cruisers, mis- creasing the potential of the three indicated sile frigates, Husky ANNs and modified Tu- models, but having extensive experience in 160M bombers. During test shooting, this the field of missile technology, it is preparing HCM achieved a range of over 400 km and a further improved solutions for hypersonic speed corresponding to 5÷6 Ma (Dąbrowski, weapons launched from the air, water and 2020), although the Russians indicate that ground for various purposes. At the same that it can reach speeds of approximately time, it implements and constructs defensive Mach 9 and strike a target of more than weapon systems prepared to combat the en- 1,000 km away (SS-N- 33, 2019). This speed emy's hypersonic weapons. is achieved by a solid-fueled first phase, fol- lowed by a scramjet second phase. At the end of 2019, HCM Zircon was launched for the first time from a warship (Defense World, 3. Determinants of the operation of 2019). Although it has not yet been officially the anti-aircraft defense com- confirmed, this missile, in addition to the mand and control subsystem conventional variants, can be equipped with a nuclear warhead, similar to the American Tomahawk sea launched cruise missile. The operation of the command and con- Another Russian weapon that only par- trol subsystem is crucial for achieving the tially uses hypersonic speeds is the Iskander goal of anti-aircraft combat and performing system. Its missiles at the initial stretch of the tasks of the anti-aircraft defense system. the trajectory, the curve of which is not bal- Its effect, ensuring optimal information sup- listic and difficult to predict, develop a speed port and the reactions of other elements of of 2,100 m/s (OAS, 2016). Additionally, the system, especially the reconnaissance these missiles are controlled along the entire subsystem and the fire subsystem, deter- flight path. One of the versions of these mis- mines the speed of reaction to changes in the siles, designated as 9M723-1, was used to de- air situation and emerging air threats. The velop the high-precision hypersonic missile functioning of this subsystem also deter- KH-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger) (Global Secu- mines the efficiency of cooperation with rity, 2020). On the other hand, newer ver- other elements of air defense. It also influ- sions of the Iskander system weapons, which ences the outcome of the fight against the are cruise missiles, have lower speeds, but means of air attack that threaten protected can maneuver around the entire flight path. military facilities and groups of troops dur- Currently, a new type of cruise missile ing tactical operations, as well as self-de- 9M729 (MDF, 2020; Military Today, 2020b) fense (self-protection). has been introduced into combat use in A command and control subsystem, inte- 2017, the range of which can be up to 2,500 grating C2 organization, C2 process and C2 km (Military Today, 2020b). According to facilities within itself, should meet three Russian sources, the Iskander system is ca- basic requirements, i.e. ensure the imple- pable of eliminating such targets as multiple mentation of goals, be structurally stable, fa- rocket launchers, long-range artillery, com- cilitate adaptation to changes in external mand and communication centers and conditions (Kręcikij, and Wołejszo, 2007, p. planes and helicopters on the ground (TASS, 64). Its functionality, in all conditions of 2017). The equipment of this system will be anti-aircraft defense system operation, en- further modernized, as reported by the Rus- sures compliance with several basic criteria, sians, who indicate: “We are going ahead including: with further research and development to create new missiles for the Iskander system.

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Hypersonic Weapon as a New Challenge

− Adaptability to the high dynamics of ac- Tdc ≥ To + Td + Tz (1) tivities in the airspace. − Mobility combined with the ability to di- where: rect the actions of subordinate forces. − Tdc - target arrival time (from the mo- − Multifunctionality related to the needs of ment of detecting the source of the air at- cooperation with other subsystems and tack to its arrival to the border of the aer- contractors of tasks as well as elements ial target engage); supplying information. − To - delay of information on the basis of − Operational selectivity aimed at the coor- which the decision is made to engage an dination of various activities necessary for aerial target); the combat effectiveness and security of − Td - decision making time and handing it the air defense system. over to executors; − Centralization of planning and decentral- − Tz - the time from the moment of receiv- ization of task execution. ing the task by the anti-aircraft defense − Modularity that guarantees reconfigura- fire assets until the destruction of the aer- tion necessary to perform new tasks. ial target on the assigned task execution − Resistance to various disturbances in area). functioning (Rajchel, and Załęski, 2011, p. The time indicators related to the operation 235). of the command and control system are the At the same time, the operation of the com- components of the fire mission completion mand and control system is to ensure flexi- time, which can be significantly reduced by bility that allows the commander to operate the proper organization of the system and its freely and to react in various unforeseen sit- equipment. uations. It is also to guarantee efficiency, i.e. The anti-aircraft defense command and such a method of operation that allows to control system is to meet the presented cri- achieve better results with the same re- teria and requirements both in tactical com- sources and efficiency expressed in the pos- mand (combat control) and during fire com- sibility of quick decision-making and bring- mand (fire control), regardless of the type of ing them to contractors while maintaining air threat that appears in the airspace. This the requirement of secrecy (PP, 2009, p. is especially important in fire control, during 318-319). On the other hand, the require- which, thanks to the efficient cooperation of ments to achieve an appropriate level of the anti-aircraft defense subsystems, as well compatibility and interoperability in the as the cooperation with the air defense sys- course of cooperation in the Alliance struc- tem, an effective combat against the assets of tures mean that the anti-aircraft defense air attack of the potential enemy is ensured. command and control system must have the ability to cooperate with other allied or coa- lition air defense command systems. Significant requirements for the anti-air- 4. The influence of hypersonic weap- craft defense command and control system ons on the modernization of the are also related to its operational efficiency command system during the implementation of tasks, expressed in the speed of the information-decision cycle. This efficiency, defined by the In terms of effectiveness of the hyper- time dependence (OP, 1996, p. 60), pre- sonic weapons, the speed and altitude at sented below, is a set of indicators of the time which these vehicles fly significantly chal- capabilities of the command and control and lenge an adversary’s ability to detect, track, fire systems and a sine qua non condition for target and engage (Raytheon Missiles & De- engaging aerial targets. fense, 2020). Interception of a hypersonic missile or a warhead requires detection,

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Safety & Defense Vol. 6(2) (2020) tracking with high precision, calculating the aircraft missile systems and reconnaissance flight trajectory, accurate forecasts of its fur- measures as well as the importance of the ther heading and programming of anti-mis- command subsystem should not be over- siles. The later the target of an enemy's hy- looked, in the first place. Its development, personic weapon is detected, the less time is focused on the modernization or acquisition left for an effective response. For example, if of new automated elements, in general is to the opponent plans to strike the target ensure the reception, selection, analysis and within a 1,000-km range, a hypersonic mis- extrapolation of information from superior sile traveling at 10 Ma can cover that dis- command and control systems and autono- tance and reduce the response time to about mous and cooperating sources of reconnais- six minutes. In addition, in the case of hyper- sance. The need to improve the command sonic missiles, apart from high speed, we and control system in terms of the speed of also deal with maneuverability, which makes these actions is significantly determined by it very difficult or virtually impossible to pre- the multiplied possibilities of hypersonic dict the exact direction of the flight. At the weapons. Meeting the time requirements for same time, the closer to the potential target the operation of the command system re- of the attack, i.e. the protected object, the quires a significant shortening of automated predictability of the projectile's flight path analyzes and forecasts as well as the visuali- increases, but the time to react significantly zation of results and the selective acquisition decreases. of reliable and timely information enabling Due to the fact that the scope of anti-air- making optimal decisions about opening craft defense, depending on the scale and fire. A similar increase in efficiency should type of aerial threat, may be different, it can- take place in the way of delegating tasks to not be ruled out that in the near future it may their contractors, which is supposed to sig- be extended to combat this type of weapon nificantly minimize the time needed to make due to a significant increase in the potential a decision and transfer it to executors (Td). enemy's arsenal of hypersonic weapons. All At the same time, one should be aware that the more so because, according to some ex- the last variable, which is the time of mission perts, hypersonic weapons function more ef- execution by anti-aircraft fire assets (Tz), fectively against threats from strategic anti- has a constant value which cannot be re- missile systems than from operational-tacti- duced without replacement with more effi- cal ones (Dąbrowski, 2020). This approach cient anti-aircraft defense assets. The func- is also confirmed by theoretical assumptions tioning of command and systems in the era and modern hardware solutions indicating of hypersonic weapons should additionally, that the anti-aircraft defense goes beyond based on increased automation, reduce the the fight against enemy aviation and extends basic advantages of this weapon, resulting the scope of tasks to engage ballistic and from its speed and difficulties in predicting winged missiles, and even "ground-to- the flight trajectory, i.e. minimizing the in- ground" missiles (PP, 2009, p. 172). How- formation delay time (To) also thanks to co- ever, in the opinion of Simon Steven, analyst operation with various allied, including at the Quincy Institute, "No existing de- space, sources of reconnaissance. fenses can stop such weapons" (Simon, The transformations of the anti-aircraft 2020), which means that the currently func- defense command and control system in the tioning anti-aircraft defense systems must perspective of several years are unlikely to undergo deep modernization and reorgani- eliminate the human factor from the process zation to meet the challenge of the emer- of making decisions to fire. However, they gence of hypersonic weapons as an air threat are to optimize solutions and accelerate their to sheltered objects. creation based on a number of available data Although, as indicated by a number of and incoming information, so as to signifi- studies (Radomyski, 2015, p. 117), the quan- cantly support the action of the decision titative and qualitative potential of anti- maker. In perspective, however, it should be

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Hypersonic Weapon as a New Challenge assumed that due to the significant increase 5. Conclusion in the speed of some hypersonic strike systems, it is likely in the next generations of anti-aircraft defense command and control Highly maneuverable (in terms of head- systems that the decision-maker will be re- ing and altitude) and non-ballistic hyper- placed by artificial intelligence in the process sonic systems can be a difficult target for the of making decisions to fire. currently used anti-missile defense systems The increased risk of using hypersonic and anti-aircraft defense systems cooperat- weapons by a potential aggressor due to the ing with them. Although future strategic and significantly limited reaction time also operational anti-missile systems are indi- forces, in addition to the applied decentrali- cated as defensive systems against hyper- zation of command and control, a change in sonic weapons, the participation of the anti- the way of making decisions about the use of aircraft defense system in this project may anti-aircraft defense assets. The transfor- increase in the future. Therefore, the main mation of the anti-aircraft defense command direction of the development of the anti-air- and control system related to the decisions craft defense command and control subsys- made is to guarantee the performance of all tem, which was initiated by the LOWCZA the most labor-consuming and complex an- and REGA systems, is the further develop- alytical activities related to the features of ment of cooperation with other command the facilities being the subject of the deci- and control and reconnaissance systems and sion-making process. Then, supporting the reducing to a minimum the time needed for decision maker is to guarantee the genera- detailed analyzes and assessment of infor- tion of acceptable course of action and indi- mation necessary to optimize the planning of cation of optimal course of action among activities, as well as accelerate the decision- them, which will enable a rational decision. action cycle and ensuring higher-quality de- This applies in particular to analyzes related cisions to effectively engage aerial targets. to the possible directions of a potential ene- The facts collected in the course of the re- my's attacks, anti-aircraft fire assets for- search show that the anti-aircraft defense mation planning and the distribution of command and control system is facing an- tasks to sub-units. other challenge which is also its integration The anti-aircraft defense command and with the IBCS (Integrated Air and Missile control system in the face of the threat of Defense Battle Command System) providing combat troops and military facilities, such as reciprocal exchange of information with an hypersonic weapons, should under all condi- accuracy sufficient to direct the anti-aircraft tions play the role of an efficient and re- fire assets of both systems. The requirement sistant to interference integrator of complex for modernization or a new generation of the radiolocation and reconnaissance systems as anti-aircraft defense command and control well as anti-aircraft fire assets. Its operation subsystem is also the integration and back- is to ensure the effective creation of a multi- ward compatibility with all elements of the layer system of protection against air at- national anti-aircraft defense system (iden- tacks. At the same time, it is to guarantee ef- tification and control of anti-aircraft fire as- ficient cooperation with anti-missile defense sets of all types of armed forces), as well as a systems, which are and will continue to be multichannel function of higher level than the main executors of the missions of engag- before enabling simultaneous engaging of a ing hypersonic weapons of a potential en- larger number of aerial targets. Finally, one emy. should not forget about the issue of mobility, which allows for accompanying combat forces, and modularity ensuring the substi- tutability of the elements of the anti-aircraft defense command and control system.

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While summarizing the presented con- 3. Dąbrowski, M. (2020). Hipersoniczny siderations, however, it should be kept in wyścig potęg [ANALIZA]. Defence24.pl, mind that in the short term, mainly for eco- April 20, 2019. Retrieved from nomic reasons, it will be necessary to make https://www.defence24.pl/hiperson- an inevitable choice what kind of anti-air- iczny-wyscig-poteg-analiza, craft defense command and control system 08.06.2020. capability to introduce or modernize in the 4. Defense World (2019). Russia Likely to first place. On the other hand, in the next few Launch Zircon Hypersonic Rocket from years, it seems necessary to start work on the a Warship by Yearend. Defense- successors of the anti-aircraft defense com- World.net, March 14, 2019. Retrieved mand and control systems used so far, i.e. a from https://www.defense- new generation of them capable of compre- world.net/news/24458/Rus- hensive cooperation with other air defense sia_Likely_to_Launch_Zircon_Hyper- command systems and various reconnais- sonic_Rocket_from_a_War- sance sensors, as well as conducting autono- ship_by_Yearend#.X3MiZzbVI2w, mous or dispersed actions against advanced 18.06.2020. air threats. 5. Global Security (2019). SS-N-33: T3K22 Zircon/Tsircon/3M22 rocket. GlobalSe- curity.org. Available online https://www.globalsecurity.org/mili- Acknowledgement tary/world/russia/zircon.htm, 15.06.2020. 6. Global Security (2020). 9M730 Knizhal This article is an outcome of the research - Dagger / Product 75 / Product 715. project “Automation of air defense’s infor- Available online https://www.globalse- mation and decision making processes in the curity.org/wmd/world/rus- modelled environment of air threat to armed sia/9m730.htm, 15.06.2020. forces and critical infrastructure objects” 7. Hruby, J. (2019). Russia’s New Nuclear project, No GB/5/2018/209/2018/DA Weapon Delivery Systems: An Open- funded by the Polish Ministry of National Source Technical Review. Nuclear Defense in 2018 – 2022. Threat Initiative. Retrieved from https://media.nti.org/pdfs/NTI- Hruby_FINAL.PDF, 18.06.2020. 8. Kręcikij, J., and Wołejszo, J. (Eds.) References (2007). Podstawy dowodzenia. War- szawa: Wyd. AON. 9. MDF [Missile Defense Project] (2018). Kinzhal. Missile Threat. Center for 1. Brehm, M., and de Courcy Wheeler, A. Strategic and International Studies, (2019). Hypersonic Weapons. Arti- March 27, last modified June 23, 2020. cle36. Retrieved from https://www.re- Retrieved from https://mis- searchgate.net/publica- silethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/, tion/334050433_Hypersonic_Weap- 24.06.2020. ons, 15.06.2020. 10. MDF [Missile Defense Project] (2019). 2. Cummings, A. (2019). Hypersonic Avangard. Missile Threat. Center for weapons: Tactical uses and strategic Strategic and International Studies, goals. War on the Rocks. Retrieved January 3, last modified June 23, 2020. from https://waron- Retrieved from https://mis- therocks.com/2019/11/hypersonic- silethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/, weapons-tactical-uses-and-strategic- 24.06.2020. goals/, 15.06.2020.

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