Chapter 3 Section 3.15 Waterfront Toronto stakeholders come second to the public’s best 1.0 Summary interest. These oversight entities were given much greater authority than was given to Waterfront Toronto, making it possible for them to implement In 2002, the federal, provincial and Toronto muni- such measures as restricting building heights, creat- cipal governments established Waterfront Toronto ing large public spaces, providing public access to “to oversee all aspects of revitalization of Toronto’s the water’s edge and expropriating land in cases waterfront.” With the land along the waterfront where the intended use was not consistent with the being held by a variety of public- and private-sector overall revitalization plans. landowners, it was widely accepted that the water- Another key responsibility of an effective over- front could only be successfully revitalized if a co- seer is to watch over all work being done to ensure ordinated, well-planned approach was undertaken. it is done right, cost-effectively and on time. Water- This required that some entity be put in charge Chapter 3 • VFM Section 3.15 front Toronto never established all of the necessary to ensure that the needs of the public would be processes to do this. This may have been partly put first and foremost, so that the full potential of because it never had any real authority to stop pro- Canada’s largest city—a city by the lake—could be jects it believed were not consistent with its vision realized. That entity was Waterfront Toronto. of a world-class transformation of Toronto’s water- Successful oversight requires that the overseer front. It tended to take a more hands-off approach has the authority to ensure the job is done right. when it came to project implementation. Unfortunately, Waterfront Toronto was never given From day one, Waterfront Toronto was well this authority, and as a result, the development of aware of the constraints that it operated under, and Toronto’s waterfront lands has largely continued its concerns about this were confirmed in a 2004 to be driven by historical practices, the existing consultant report to the Board. Waterfront Toronto, bylaws, and other regulations governing com- on several occasions, informed the three levels of mercial and residential development. Waterfront government of the constraints, but few changes Toronto has been able to rezone just over 150 were made. Waterfront Toronto’s communications acres of land from industrial to mixed commercial- to the public gave the impression that it was playing residential use. an irreplaceable role in the world-class transforma- Other cities have established entities similar to tion of Toronto’s waterfront, a total of 2,840 acres. Waterfront Toronto to ensure that the competing This was not our conclusion. development interests of landowners and other 648 Waterfront Toronto 649 Waterfront Toronto’s purchase of Quayside land levels of government could still request a review of between 2007 and 2009 created an opportunity Waterfront Toronto to be done three months before for Waterfront Toronto to develop land in the way the 20-year anniversary date in 2021 to determine it sees fit. This will be Waterfront Toronto’s first whether the corporation should continue until development of its own land. It will now be up to 2028. Sidewalk Labs’ provision of $50 million Waterfront Toronto to determine how to develop to further explore the development in Quayside the Quayside without any current financial commit- was contingent on the three levels of government ment from the three levels of government. It was providing this $1.25 billion toward Port Lands flood proactive of Waterfront Toronto to seek out inter- protection. A second agreement with Sidewalk Labs ested parties to procure an innovation and funding called the Plan Development Agreement, signed in partner for Quayside. This in effect gives Water- July 2018, replaces the initial Framework Agree- front Toronto the autonomy that would have been ment and potentially opens the door to expand the beneficial for it to have had over the last 15 years. Sidewalk Labs’ project to the approximately 600 However, its new agreement with Sidewalk Labs acres of land in the Port Lands. Waterfront Toronto raises concerns in areas such as consumer protec- does not have the authority to grant rights to lands tion, data collection, security, privacy, governance, beyond what it owns in Quayside. antitrust and ownership of intellectual property. In the following, we explain some of our specific These are areas with long-term and wide-ranging concerns: impacts that the provincial government, along with the City of Toronto, needs to address from a policy Mandate framework perspective to protect the public interest Waterfront Toronto was not given owner- before this initiative proceeds further. • ship over the lands it was tasked to revital- As well, we noted that the Board of Waterfront ize, and therefore the visions of those Toronto was given just a weekend to discuss and with ownership controlled the decisions understand the implications of the initial Frame- over waterfront development. Waterfront work Agreement before being asked to approve it. Chapter 3 • VFM Section 3.15 Toronto was given ownership and control The Intergovernmental Steering Committee also of 1% of the land it was tasked to revital- expressed concern about the lack of sufficient time ize. While the three governments and the given to the Board and the governments to review Toronto and Region Conservation Authority the initial Framework Agreement. The committee own 75% of the developable waterfront itself was only made aware of the name of the area, they did not transfer ownership to successful bidder five days before the October 17, Waterfront Toronto. Waterfront Toronto also 2017, public announcement, which involved the did not have the authority to expropriate the Prime Minister, the Premier of Ontario, the Mayor 24% of private land that was available for of Toronto, Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs. development. Under a protocol with the City Sidewalk Labs was selected by Waterfront Toronto of Toronto, Waterfront Toronto must ask the as the successful bidder on September 12, 2017. City to expropriate on its behalf. In 2002, in In addition, we noted that by May 2018, the fed- an attempt to exert greater independence to eral, provincial and city governments had further regulate building heights and the use of land committed to providing $1.25 billion to Waterfront in the waterfront, Waterfront Toronto’s Board Toronto to cover the cost of flood protection of the of Directors asked its founding governments Port Lands. This also extended Waterfront Toronto’s to first consult with the Intergovernmental operation to 2028 without the benefit of an oper- Steering Committee and Waterfront Toronto ational review of Waterfront Toronto. The three 650 before approving development on both neighbourhood plan to create a beach park public and private land. However, Waterfront (which became Sugar Beach) and Toronto Toronto informed us that the governments Economic Development Corporation’s (now did not approve this arrangement, and there- CreateTO) plan to build an office complex fore Waterfront Toronto had to follow the (the Corus building). Waterfront Toronto and plans of others. the City negotiated for two years before reach- • Waterfront Toronto did not pursue more ing a compromise—both had to reconfigure large-scale planning of the entire water- their projects to accommodate the other. front development. The Province did not give Waterfront Toronto the authority to con- Use of Government Funding duct the planning and zoning of lands. Under Governments provided funding on a the Planning Act, the City of Toronto has the • project-by-project basis through complex authority to conduct the planning and zoning funding agreements. These agreements of lands. Waterfront Toronto used the City’s set out the funding contributions among the Central Waterfront Secondary Plan as a guide three governments, which were done on a for revitalization rather than creating its project-by-project basis. From its inception own master plan or large-scale vision. Such until 2017, Waterfront Toronto signed 93 a plan could have established areas allocated funding agreements with the three govern- to parks, condominiums, cultural sites and ments. This funding method focused on businesses over the entire waterfront area individual projects as opposed to the broader and used those targets as a measure of Water- revitalization mandate and expected long- front Toronto’s progress. Waterfront Toronto term deliverables and results. conducted its planning on a neighbourhood- The governments redirected $700 million by-neighbourhood basis and any plans Water- • (approximately 47%) of their original front Toronto did make had to be approved by $1.5 billion in funding commitments to Chapter 3 • VFM Section 3.15 the City. We found that neighbourhood plans other agencies for other projects. The by Waterfront Toronto were similar to the governments directed Waterfront Toronto City’s, focusing on mixed-use development to provide government funding of about rather than public spaces, which would have $313 million it had already received, and benefitted all waterfront visitors as intended $383 million the governments initially com- under the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization mitted to provide to Waterfront Toronto, to Corporation Act, 2002. other agencies for other projects. In their Waterfront Toronto’s development man- • public announcements of funding, the date overlaps with other entities, which governments generally did not disclose that can cause development delays and duplica- some of the funding they provided for these tion of effort. Waterfront Toronto’s mandate projects was already part of their earlier overlaps with the mandates of other entities, commitment to Waterfront Toronto. These such as CreateTO; Infrastructure Ontario; projects included an expansion of GO Transit, the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Sport; the Union Station second subway platform and Ontario Place Corporation.