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Joinder Notes/Examples from Th., Sept 17 Class and Wed., Sept 23 Joinder Notes/Examples from Th., Sept 17 class and Wed., Sept 23 1. Rule 18 (joinder of claims) and common law preclusion doctrine P v D Property damage to my car as a result of car accident Assume P wins and after case is over, she brings a new case for personal injuries resulting from same car accident Rule 18 makes it appear that the choice is up to P. However, preclusion law would bar her from later asserting the personal injury claim because it’s a related claim that she didn’t bring in the original case. Preclusion law bars claims splitting of related claims. 2. Rule 13 (counterclaims) Example from Compass Exploration v. B-E Drilling: Dallas County B-E v. Compass (wins after trial) B-E sues C for failure to pay (breach of contract) (C does not bring any counterclaims) Leon County Compass v. B-E Before Dallas County suit decided, C brings suit in Leon County for its own damages, alleging B-E breached the contract and was negligent Court holds C’s claims for its own damages are barred because they were transactionally-related counterclaims barred by the state counterclaim rule [equivalent to FRCP 13(a)] Note: if C had sued B-E for some completely unrelated claim, that claim would not have been barred. Unrelated counterclaims can be brought, but do not have to be asserted. Rule 13(a)’s policy justifications: 1. Efficiency- if a counterclaim is very closely related to the P’s claim, we want them to be decided at the same time becuase it’s really efficient. 2. Helps reduce the risk of inconsistent judgments A v. B B v. A Although we can’t always be efficient and can’t always avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments, Rule 13(a)’s compulsory counterclaim rule helps ameliorate these risks. 3. Rule 20 (joinder of parties) P v D1 D2 Claims must arise from same/series of t/o, and there’s at least one common question of law or fact P1 v D P2 Rule 20’s policy justifications: 1. efficiency 2. we can always split them up later-and usually, that’s a no harm no foul mess up if we were wrong. 4. Rule 13(g) (cross-claims) P v D1 The yellow claim is a cross-claim because it is brought by one party against a co-party. Co-parties refers to folks who have been joined together by a common opponent who have not asserted any claims against one another yet. D2 P v D1 The red claim would be a counterclaim, not a cross-claim. Do you see why? And note that if it is a transactionally-related counterclaim, then D1 must bring it or they will be forever barred from asserting it. If it is an unrelated counterclaim, it’s up to D1 whether they want to assert it or not. D2 5. Rule 14 (impleader) Plaintiff v. Owner of car (“Defendant”/ “Third Party Plaintiff”) Rule 14 (must be an “is or may be liable” claim) Driver who borrowed O’s car (“Third Party Defendant”) Plaintiff v. Owner of car (“Defendant”/ “Third Party Plaintiff”) The claim in red is a Rule 13(a) or (b) claim, not a 13(g) claim. Can you explain why? Also look at Rule 14(a)(2)(B) Driver who borrowed O’s car (“Third Party Defendant”) Plaintiff v. Owner of car (“Defendant”/ “Third Party Plaintiff”) Driver who borrowed O’s car (“Third Party Defendant”) Here, the claim in red is a Rule 14(a)(2)(D) claim by the TPD against the P that may be asserted Plaintiff v. Owner of car (“Defendant”/ “Third Party Plaintiff”) Driver who borrowed O’s car (“Third Party Defendant”) Here, the claim in red is a Rule 14(a)(3) claim by the P against the TPD that may be asserted Plaintiff v. Owner of car (“Defendant”/ “Third Party Plaintiff”) Driver who borrowed O’s car (“Third Party Defendant”) Here, the claim in black is a Rule 13(a) or (b) counterclaim by the TPD against the P. See also Rule 14(a)(3). 6. Distinguishing Rule 20 from Rule 23 (class action rule) Rule 20 P1 v. D P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 Rule 23 (Taylor). v Hoffman Named Plaintiff Absent class members Katie Chelsea Kaley Relationship Tests Less strict Stricter Rule 20 Rule 23(a)(2),(3) Rule 23(b)(3) Rule 13(a) Preclusion law Rule 15(c)(1)(B) .
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