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Old challenges put to the test: the Greek Orthodox flock and the Church of in an era of global – and local – change

Maria Efthymiou

University of

The late 20 th century witnessed a profound change in the demographic and social realities of Greece. In less than a decade – and especially in the years immediately after 1989 and the collapse of Communism in central, south-eastern and eastern Europe – hundreds of thousands of immigrants crossed the borders into Greece, many of them illegally. Although they settled in most of the towns and villages of Greece, it was Thessaloniki and Athens that received the bulk of the new-arrivals. At the turn of the 21st century, there were 762,191 registered immigrants in Greece, of whom the clear majority (438,036) were from Albania, the rest being divided among over a hundred nations, including Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Russia, the Philippines, Iraq, Pakistan, India, , and the states of sub-Saharan Africa. 1

Several aspects of these developments have no precedent in the history of Modern Greece. Perhaps most importantly, Greece had for a long time been a land of emigrants rather than immigrants. In a country where the memory of family members leaving the devastation of post-war Greece in search of a job in the US, Germany, or was still fresh 2, the influx of so many foreign would-be-workers came as something of a surprise. Of course, the arrival of almost one million immigrants (if we include those living in Greece illegally) – and in such a short period of time – would

1 National Statistical Service of Greece, census of March 18, 2001, Table 7. See also . , “ ” [Kontis, A., “Greece, a recipient of immigrants”] in . ω – . , 21 [Konstantinidis, S.– Pelagidis, T., Hellenism in the 21st century ], Papazisis Publications, Athens, 2000, pp.292–324. 2 ω , [National Centre for Social Research, Living Abroad ], Athens 1972, which contains information pertaining to Greek communities, schools, and Greek Orthodox churches in some 180 countries. See also Social Science Centre, Essays on Greek Migration , Athens, 1967. 2 entail enormous changes in any country with a population of under eleven million 3. For a country like Greece, these changes were to be especially profound.

Greece is no stranger to abrupt demographic changes. For centuries, Greeks had lived in larger or smaller numbers around the coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor, the Balkans, and the Black Sea, i.e. in places long under Ottoman and Russian rule. Consequently, the dissolution of these empires and the formation of nation-states during the second half of the 19 th and first half of the 20 century was to have serious repercussions on their communities. Forced by circumstances or national governments, hundreds of thousands of Greeks left their ‘homelands’ to seek shelter in Greece, which had been officially established as an independent national state in 1830. 4

The most dramatic of all these changes occurred during the third decade of the twentieth century, following the peace treaty signed in the aftermath of the 1919-1922 war between Greece and Turkey. Defining nationality along religious lines – Orthodox Christians being considered Greek, and Muslims Turkish – almost the entire Greek population of Turkey were forced to migrate to Greece and virtually the entire Turkish population of Greece to Turkey. Just short of half a million Turks and roughly one and a half million Greeks were uprooted in a population exchange unprecedented in European – let alone regional – history. 5

These events, along with a smaller population exchange between Bulgaria and Greece 6, forced the Greek state to seek urgent solutions to the problem of providing accommodation for so many people at short notice during the 1920s and 1930s. However, it also made Greek society into something of a human laboratory, creating

3 National Statistical Service of Greece, Greece in figures , Athens 2003. According to the 2001 census, Greece had a population of 10,964,020. 4 ω . , [Chasiotis, I., A survey of the Modern ], Vanias Publications, Thessaloniki, 1993. See also Clogg, R., (ed), The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century , Palgrave, 2001, and chiefly Clogg’s own article in the same, “The Greek Diaspora: the Historical Context”, pp.1-23. 5 Ladas, S.P., The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey , The MacMillan Company, New York, 1932. See also Pentzopoulos, D., The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece , Mouton and Co., Paris 1962. 6 See previous footnote. 3 an almost purely national state, 94% of whose inhabitants shared a common language, and a staggering 97% the same religion: Greek Orthodoxy. 7

Thus the influx of immigrants during the last decade of the 20 th century brought almost seven decades of a unique religious homogeneity to an end, since only a minority of the immigrants come from Christian Orthodox countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Russia. The great majority come from primarily Muslim countries, such as Albania, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and most of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Some tens of thousands of Polish and Filipino Roman Catholics, plus some thousands of Indian Hindus, complete the variegated picture. 8

To date, Greek society has paid little attention to the religious aspect of the immigrant issue, for the simple reason that these impoverished and desperate people came to Greece as financial immigrants, without the least intention of promoting or drawing attention to their religious beliefs and dogmas. That said, however, the change in Greece’s religious backdrop is already a reality. And by an ironic twist of fate, it is the Muslim and Roman Catholic faiths – with which Greece has, historically, had the most complex and fraught relations – that Greek society is required to cope with at the turn of the 21st century.

The relationship between the Greek Orthodox and Muslim faiths has a long and turbulent history. Centuries of Ottoman Muslim rule in the past, plus a number of unresolved issues with the Turkish state today have led to a degree of bitterness— expressed in Greek textbooks, historical works, and newspaper articles—towards matters related to the Muslim faith, the Ottomans, and the Turks. That said, the Greeks do have a history of peaceful coexistence with Muslims in various countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Egypt. A large, dynamic, flourishing Greek community played a key role in Egypt’s economic, financial and social life from its base in during the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20 th century, until Nasser expelled all foreigners from the country in the 1950s. Having

7 See Dimitri Pentzopoulos, op. cit, pp.125f. See also , « . · . . » [Skordylis, K., “Minorities and propaganda in Northern Greece between the wars: a report by G.T. Fessopoulos”], ω [Histor] 7 (1994), 43. 8 See footnote 1. 4 lived in a position of social superiority over the Arabs, Greeks look back on this shining chapter in their modern history with nostalgia, and on the Muslim faith – at least in connection with the – with neutral memories and feeling. 9

In fact, the mass immigration of the 1990s did not put the Greeks’ feelings towards the Muslim faith to the test, for the simple reason that the Iraqi, Pakistani, Egyptian, Black African and Kurdish immigrants are both few in number 10 and generally calm people who work in the fields and city markets. Moreover, the Greeks are sympathetic towards the Kurds, whom they view as victims of Turkish oppression and Turkey’s violent assimilatory policy. 11

The situation is different with the Albanians, who constitute the great majority of all Greece’s immigrants, both legal and illegal. The majority of Albanian immigrants are Muslim, only a small minority – mainly those from the south of Albania, many of whom are, in many cases, of Greek origin – being Christian Orthodox. There is also a small Roman Catholic minority from the North of the country. 12 If the large numbers of Muslim Albanian immigrants were ardent devotees of their faith, the situation might well be different. However, the Albanians have never been rigid in religious

9 On the Greeks of Egypt, their economic and social situation, see Kitroeff, Al., The Greeks in Egypt, 1919–1937: Ethnicity and Class , Ithaca Press, London, 1989. See also Karanasou, F., “The Greeks in Egypt; from Mohammed Ali to Nasser, 1805–1961”, in R. Clogg (ed), op.cit, pp.24-57. 10 See footnote 1. On the feelings of the Greeks towards the Muslim and Roman Catholic immigrants see . , , .., : [Michalopoulou, A., Tsartas, P. et al, Macedonia and the Balkans: xenophobia and development ], Alexandreia Publications, Athens, 1998, pp.179-191. 11 On the immigrants and their relations with Greek society, see Kontis, ., op. cit. See also , « “ ” . » [Triantafyllidou, A., “The ‘others’ among us. Greek national identity and positions on the immigrants] in ω , ω ω [Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation, Social inequalities and social exclusion ], Athens, 1998, pp.488-498. This issue is also given extensive coverage in Michalopoulos, A., Tsartas, P. et al, op. cit., which provides useful and comprehensive statistics as well as thorough analysis. 12 See footnote 19. 5 matters, taking a similar attitude to the various religions they have adopted down the centuries.13

Given the Albanians’ loose and pragmatic approach to their faith, a new social phenomenon – sometimes serious, sometimes less so – made an appearance when thousands of Albanians started to make the perilous and illegal crossing into Greece to settle in Greek cities and villages in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At that point in time, thousands of individual Greeks proved eager to offer these new-arrivals social assistance and religious catechism which often ended in baptism. Group baptism became a frequent phenomenon, receiving considerable media attention at the time.

This missionary zeal on the part of the Greeks was driven as much by patriotism as it was by religion. Albania was a strictly atheistic, Communist regime for several decades after World War Two, and it was well known in Greece that the Greek minority in Southern Albania had been prevented from performing their religious duties; a ban that had put a very important element of their Greek identity at risk.14 A

13 On the lax religious sentiments of the Albanians see, ω , « – » [Stamatis Georgoulis, “Orthodoxy in the modern Albanian state—a historical perspective”], in . , . , . ( ), [T. Veremis, T. Kouloumbis, I. Nikolakopoulos (eds.), The Greeks of Albania ], University of Athens, , . Sideris Publications, Athens 1995, p.148. See also , [a Greek translation of the work by Marc Mazower, The Balkans , Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 2000], Patakis Publications, Athens 2001, pp.134, 135. In Alexandre Popovic, L’ Islam Balkanique. Les Musulmans du Sudest européen dans la periode post Ottomane , Osteuropa Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, Berlin 1986, we read on page 62 that “La situation albanaise est en effet assez exceptionnelle en Europe; c’ est le seul état dont la majorité de la population s’est convertié á l’ Islam, mais paradoxalement, c’ est sans doute l’ état où la religion a joué le rôle le moins important dans la formation et le maintien de l’identité culturelle et nationale”. 14 On the factors that played a formative role in the Greek national identity, see . ( .), [D. Tsaousis (ed.), Hellenism and Greekness ], Hestia Publications, Athens 1983. See also . ( .), [T. Veremis (ed.), National identity and nationalism in contemporary Greece ], Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, Athens, 1997, especially the articles by . , « 6 good number of the Albanians who flooded into Greece in the 1990s were actually of Greek origin, and eager to practice the oppressed religion of their forebears. In such cases, the needs of both sides coincided happily, which gave the religious ceremonies a sense of authenticity and genuine emotionality.

However, this was not always the case with other Albanians, who — as lapsed Muslims with an atheistic past living the insecure life of an illegal immigrant — sometimes saw baptism as an opportunity to acquire an indigenous Greek protector, who, as their godfather or godmother, could protect them from the police and other problems arising from their lack of legal status. Their religious laxity allowed these Albanians to follow a simple course of action: pretending to be Greeks from Southern Albania – or, in the most sincere cases, simple Albanians who wished to convert to Christian Orthodoxy – they would find a Greek godmother or godfather to baptize them. This course of action was satisfactory for all the parties involved: the Greeks were happy to have had done their patriotic and religious duty, and the Albanians were pleased to have established a protective network in their new place of settlement; a network that in no way prevented them from behaving as Muslims during visits to their homeland.15

Things are different in the case of Roman Catholics. If Greeks harbor ambivalent feelings towards the Muslim religion, their views of Roman Catholicism are cut and dried: Greek society and the view Roman Catholicism as a hostile religion; a repulsive religion which has always sought to absorb, dissolve, and insult the Eastern Greek Orthodox Church. The reciprocal feelings are used by F.

» [P. Kitromilidis, “Imagined communities and the birth of the national issue in the Balkans”], pp.53-131 and . ω , « 19 20 » [E. Kofos, “National heritage and national identity in Macedonia in the 19th and 20th century”], pp. 199 – 269. 15 On immigrants adopting “fake identities” in order to be more easily accepted by Greek society, see , : ω ω ω [Iordanis Psimmenos, Immigration and work in Europe: the creation of new social spheres ], Athens University, Athens, 1999, esp. pp.116, 117, 150. See also Anna Triantafyllidou, op. cit., pp.488-498. 7

Braudel in his Grammaire des civilizations as an example of enduring hatred in human history.16

It was this solidified hatred that proved the primary obstacle to Roman Catholic penetration into Greek society, despite the serious attempts made by the Vatican during the 16 th and 17 th centuries. 17 Indeed, the emotional gap was always so profound that it prohibited the Greek-speaking Catholic inhabitants of the Aegean islands from considering themselves Hellenes at even the most crucial moments in the early history of modern Greece. For example, during the Greek Revolution of 1821, Greek Catholics sympathized more with the Turks than the Greeks, to whom they expressed reserve or even open hostility. 18

Although there are no more than 50,000 Greek Roman Catholics in Greece today— the majority of whom live in Athens, several small islands in the Central Aegean, Patras, and Thessaloniki—the influx of immigrants has upset this stable reality, too. Indeed, there are now some 200,000 Roman Catholic living in Greece—roughly 40,000 of whom are Poles, and some 45,000 Filipino—and Catholic places of worship have become both more numerous and wide-spread.19

16 F. Braudel, ω , [Greek translation of F. Braudel, Grammaire des civilizations , Flammarion, Paris, 1993], Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, Athens 2001, pp. 85,86 On the general position of Catholicism in the Ottoman Empire, see Charles Frazee, Catholics and Sultans; the church and the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1923 , Cambridge University Press 1983, and especially pp.110-126, which are devoted to Greece. For the local implications of the coexistence of the Greek Orthodox Christians and Catholics, see Philip Argenti, The Religious Minorities of ; Jews and Roman Catholics , Cambridge University Press 1970, pp.205f, and esp. pp.359-364. See, also, footnote 21. 17 . , [A. Vakalopoulos, History of Modern Hellenism ], Thessaloniki 1973, vol. IV, pp.112-156. 18 Spyridon Trikoupis, the historian of the Greek Revolution, in which he also fought, bitterly describes the hostile feelings of the Greek Roman Catholics of the Aegean islands towards the Greek Revolution and the Greek Revolutionaries of 1821 in his ω [History of the Greek Revolution ], vol. I, pp.124-125. 19 The data on the Greek, Filipino, Polish, and Albanian Roman Catholics in Greece are taken from the leaflet published by the Catholic Archdiocese of Athens, Catholic Church of 8

These are resounding changes, which have inevitably forced Greek society to reassess itself and to express – both explicitly and implicitly – the confusing feelings that have arisen from this abrupt change in religious and national realities that had remained constant for several decades. It was these new realities, and their inevitable impact, that made the discussion on whether permission should be granted for the building of a mosque and a Muslim religious institution in Athens so heated since the 1990s. 20 And it was these same realities—and the sharp changes that have taken place in Greek society since the late 20 th century—that made the debate on whether religion should be noted on official Greek identity cards such a central issue in 2000 and 2001: indeed, the Church of Greece went so far as to organize a ‘crusade’ against the Government’s position, which resulted in 3,000,000 signatures being collected from Greeks who supported its position that citizens should be free to choose whether to include their religion on their ID cards. And it was these same realities that saw the Pope’s visit to Greece in May 2001 provoke such a furious reaction, with thousand of religious Greeks and priests taking to the streets to demonstrate against the Pope, the Roman Catholic Church, Europe, and its Enlightenment tradition. 21

Greece , which includes data current for 2001. On the feelings of the Greeks towards the Roman Catholic immigrants, see A. Michalopoulou, Paris Tsartas et al., op. cit. pp.179f, esp. pp.190-191. The author concludes that the Greeks react more negatively towards Catholicism than other faiths and denominations, see pp.190, 191. 20 See, for example, the KATHIMERINI (Greek daily, 3/09/03, p.7) on the reaction of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece to the plan to build a mosque and a religious Muslim school in Spata, near Athens’ international airport. The Holy Synod univocally decided to request that: “the mosque…be built in an area which neither offends the religious feelings of Orthodox Greeks, nor is so located as to give the impression to foreign visitors entering Greece, and especially Athens, that our country is a Muslim one…”, while on the subject of the religious Muslim school, the Holy Synod notes that “…it is impossible for a Christian country, 98% of whose citizens believe in Orthodox eastern Christianity to be transformed into a place for turning out Muslim clergymen…”. 21 On the identity card issue, see the detailed publication from the ω ω , ( 9 – 12 ω 2001) · ω [Communicational and Educational Service of the Church of Greece, The regular assembly of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of the Church of Greece (Athens 9-12 9

Greek society and the Church of Greece – the country’s religious stronghold – face a profound religious, cultural and social challenge at the beginning of the 21st century; a challenge faced by many countries in a world that is changing so rapidly and on such a global scale. As always, the future will show the results of all these challenges and changes.

October 2001); addresses and announcements ], Athens 2001. See also the , [Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, The Church and Identity Cards], Athens, 2000, which contains an article by the leading intellectual, clergyman, and university professor, Head Priest . , entitled “ ω ω ω ” [Georgios D. Metallinos, The European Enlightenment and Hellenism], pp. 295, 307. Father Metallinos, an eminent scholar, continues the long anti-Western tradition of the Eastern Orthodox Church. As early as 1994, in an article entitled “ ω ” [The Nation after the Fall of Constantinople] in . ( .), ω [Chrysos, E., ed., The Fall of Constantinople], Akritas Publications, pp. 309-329 and 385-389, Father Metallinos argues that the Greek Orthodox Christians retained their faith and sense of identity under the Ottomans, but are in danger of losing both in the late 20th century as they are incorporated, as part of the EU, into a Europe of Enlightenment traditions. See similar addresses made by Archbishop Christodoulos to students and the media (“ ” [AVGI, daily] 21/05/00, p.11; “ ” [VIMA, daily] 4/05/2000, p. 3 ) and elsewhere. On the post-dictatorship period and relations between the Church of Greece and the nation’s dominant political powers, see Prodromou, E., “Democratization and Religious Transformation in Greece: an under-appreciated theoretical and empirical primer”, in Kirtomilides, P. – Veremis Th., (eds.), The Orthodox Church in a changing World , Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, 1998, pp. 99-153.