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Motivation, Threat, and Defense: Perspective From Experimental Social

Xiaowen Xu & Ian McGregor

To cite this article: Xiaowen Xu & Ian McGregor (2018) Motivation, Threat, and Defense: Perspective From Experimental , Psychological Inquiry, 29:1, 32-37, DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2018.1435640 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2018.1435640

Published online: 21 Mar 2018.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=hpli20 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 2018, VOL. 29, NO. 1, 32–37 https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2018.1435640

COMMENTARIES Motivation, Threat, and Defense: Perspective From Experimental Social Psychology

Xiaowen Xua and Ian McGregorb aDepartment of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; bDepartment of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Threat and Defense in Social Psychology . This insight is consistent with the most recently proposed motivational process theories revolving around discrepancy Target article authors March, Gaertner, and Olson (this issue) and conflict, that parsimoniously integrate the threat and define threat as pertaining specifically to stimuli that can cause defense literature in social psychology (Jonas et al., 2014; “immediate bodily harm” (p. 3). In social psychology, however, Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Before describing the the application of the term “threat” is much broader and refers contemporary manifestation of Lewin’s insight, and how it to the presence of any or predicament that might casts doubt on the dual implicit process model (DIPM), we undermine either physical (i.e., bodily harm) or psychological review how research in experimental social psychology was well-being (i.e., self-esteem loss, relationship rejection or ostra- similarly drawn, from the 1980s through the 2000s, to the idea cism, loss of control, , etc.; see Jonas et al., that there might be different threat-processing systems for sur- 2014, for a recent review). In the decades of social psychological vival-based versus merely negative stimuli. research on threat, the main criterion to determine whether a After the flurry of attention to how conflict was related to stimulus was threatening has been its capacity to elicit seem- threat, beginning with work by Lewin and Festinger through to ingly irrational defensive responses. That is, if a stimulus results the 1970s, research on threat and defense in the 1980s to 2000s in an irrational response that appears to provide some form of began to gravitate back to ideas reminiscent of the old ego- defense against a deficit or vulnerability highlighted by the defense and compensation view, that threats are particularly stimulus, then the stimulus is considered to be an experiential threatening when they undermine some form of critical, general threat. intrapsychic resource. Along these lines, the notion of “fluid This guiding assumption echoes psychodynamic notions of compensation” often came up in these general resource theories, ego-defensiveness in response to anxiety-provoking experiences as increasing evidence suggested that the defenses for various (Freud, 1967;Horney,1945). Support for the experiential, nonra- threats need not be in the same domain as the threat itself tional nature of threat and defense processing has come from evi- (Allport, 1943; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Horney, 1950; dence showing that participants generally are unaware that their Randles, Inzlicht, Proulx, Tullett, & Heine, 2015; Steele, 1988). A defensive responses are due to the anxiety-provoking stimulus multitude of theories proposed different forms of general and that their defensive responses diminish if given the chance to resources as the critical psychological resource to account for misattribute the source of their anxiety (Kay, Moscovitch, & the apparent, interchangeable diversity of threats and compen- Laurin, 2010; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). satory defenses, for example, symbolic immortality (Greenberg, This defensiveness criterion toward threat was most fully Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), self-esteem (Tesser, 2000), integrated into social psychology with Festinger’s(1957) cogni- meaning (Heine et al., 2006; Peterson, 1999), control (Kay, tive dissonance reduction findings, showing that people become Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008), certainty (McGregor, more extreme and self-serving in their opinions after experi- Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Van den Bos, 2009), and so mentally engineered cognitive conflicts. This work was an on. The premises of these models were highly similar, intuitive, extension of the work by Festinger’s advisor, and reminiscent of the old ego-defense ideas. The main area of (1935), whose work showed that conflicts cause defensively disagreement was identifying the precise motivational resource extreme reactions, for example, authoritarianism, aggression, that people were motivated to defend so reflexively. Was it self- and flight to fantasy. Lewin’s(1935) main insight was that goal esteem, meaning, control, certainty, or was it a more directly conflicts (or what he referred to as conflicting fields of force) survival-related concern that motivated defenses? result in anxious (what he referred to as tension) that can lead people to go to defensive extremes for relief. Lewin took relatively vague psychodynamic ideas about ego defense Terror Theory and translated them into motivation and goal-related language and operationalizations that were testable in the lab. From his One of the most prominent theories in the threat and defense perspective, all threats were motivational threats that essentially literature—terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg et al., involved one (or more) salient goal(s) being blocked by other 1997)—argued for a position similar to that being made by the

CONTACT Xiaowen Xu [email protected] Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, 4th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, Canada. © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC COMMENTARIES 33 target authors about implicit 1 (i1). TMT states that threats outcomes as mortality salience, and that these outcomes were related to mortality and death are especially fundamental and mediated by the extent to which the participants felt uncertain consequential, as we are evolutionarily motivated by their rele- (McGregor et al., 2001). Van den Bos and colleagues (2005), vance to survival. More than 35 years of research in TMT have similarly, found that writing about personal uncertainties of found that mortality salience (via writing manipula- high personal importance caused defensive moral affirmation tion, subliminal stimulus presentation, incidental exposure, and hostility responses similar to those aroused by mortality etc.) elicited greater defensive responses than reminders of salience. Perhaps critically, in both the personal uncertainty other negative, aversive experiences (e.g., physical injury or and mortality salience conditions, the defensive responses were pain, worries about upcoming exams). Mortality salience can mediated by experienced aversive uncertainty (Van den Bos lead to a variety of defensive responses, including increased et al., 2005).1 aggression, higher for moral transgressions, greater Similarly, research on experimentally induced perceptual biases toward in-group worldviews, and increased self- conflicts and discrepancies also suggests that mortality con- enhancement on worldview relevant dimensions (see Burke, cerns may not be particularly special in terms of threat process- Martens, & Faucher, 2010, for a review). A second line of rele- ing. Even simple absurdities, uncanny stimuli, and nonsense vant TMT research showed that when people’s worldviews are word-pairings can cause similar defensive reactions as to mor- threatened, thoughts related to death became uniquely salient, tality salience, presumably because such discrepancies create an compared to other negative and unpleasant thoughts (see unexpected juxtaposition of a previously familiar and predict- Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010, for review). Thus, able environment, which may then hinder (Proulx based on these findings, TMT researchers argue that there is a & Heine, 2008, 2009; Proulx, Heine, & Vohs, 2010; Randles, module specifically emphasizing survival that has a particularly Proulx, & Heine, 2011). For example, repeated exposure to powerful (implicit) effect on attention, judgment, motivation, semantic conflicts (e.g., a series of nonsense word pairings like and . quickly and blueberry being presented together) caused the As such, TMT could accordingly be seen as a mature same amount of moral outrage as mortality salience and was research program on the cognitive, conative, and behavioral mediated by the same kind of distress that mediates mortality consequences of i1 processing. Early research on TMT did not salience effects (Randles et al., 2011). involve neural and physiological measures. Arguments for an i1 system were thus primarily based on (defensive) cognitive, conative, and behavioral consequences. Behavioural Inhibition System, Anxiety, and Reactive Approach Motivation Challenges to TMT: The Role of Conflict This rediscovery of Lewin’s insight that conflict is the funda- mental cause of defensive responses to threat (Festinger, 1957; However, challenges to the TMT account soon emerged, as Lewin, 1935) led to an integration of threat and defense increasing evidence suggests that there were other forms of research in social psychology with basic motivational systems negative stimuli that caused similar defensive responses as mor- related to anxiety and approach/avoidance (Gray & tality salience (e.g., Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Kay et al., McNaughton, 2000; Jonas et al., 2014). Extending beyond 2008; McGregor et al., 2001). It began to become clear that the behavioral research, and beyond merely assuming a hydraulic effects found in TMT research were not necessarily due to compensation to shore up some threatened psychological com- dynamics of a special, dedicated survival system but rather to modity, the newer models focused on basic processes related to what mortality salience has in common with the other negative “ ”— fl anxiety and the behavioral inhibition system (BIS; Corr, 2008; threats con ict. That is, mortality salience may indeed be a Gray & McNaughton; 2000). powerful threat because it is the ultimate goal blocker. As fl Work by different theorists has arrived at similar conclu- reviewed next, the basic motivational system that tracks con ict sions suggesting that threats to essential goals and the implicit of various kinds causes heightened implicit vigilance and atten- beliefs that guide and order them (e.g., certainty and meaning tion toward conflict-related stimuli. fl maintenance) create feelings of anxiety and distress (Hirsh, Personal uncertainty is a form of con ict that has been Mar, & Peterson, 2012; Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Flanders, found to cause similar defensive reactions as mortality salience 2002; Plaks & Stecher, 2007; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; Proulx (e.g., McGregor et al., 2001; Van den Bos, 2009; Van den Bos, et al., 2012). This anxiety is believed to stem from the BIS, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005). For exam- which is activated in response to stimuli that indicate goal ple, after being asked to deliberate about instances of uncer- tainty arising from conflict about real-life personal dilemmas 1 and values, participants defensively turned to extremes of con- Dutch to English language translation issues may undermine the Van den Bos et al. (2005) studies’ highlight of motivational relevance of threats. The Dutch viction and commitment in other self-relevant values and word used for uncertainty in the threat conditions translates more closely to a worldviews, for example, ideological and religious beliefs type of personal insecurity-related uncertainty, which has clear implications (McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008; McGregor, Nash, about uncertainty for important goals. Furthermore, recent research examining this potential translation issue (McGregor et al., 2009) found that when uncer- Mann, & Phills, 2010). Important to note, personal uncertainty tainty threat was phrased as general informational uncertainty, it did not elicit caused the same degree of defensive responses as mortality defensive responses. However, when uncertainty was phrased as personal and salience (McGregor, 2006; McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2009; related to insecurities (which more closely resembles the Dutch word used), it elicited similar levels of defensive responses as mortality salience primes. These McGregor et al., 2001). Motivationally relevant uncertainties results further highlight how potential goal conflicts created by uncertainty manipulated in different ways led to similar worldview defense threat are what elicit the defensive responses. 34 COMMENTARIES conflict (Corr, DeYoung, & McNaughton, 2013; Gray & core theories (Burton & Plaks, 2013; Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, McNaughton, 2000). The BIS is believed to be neurally rooted 2005; Plaks & Stecher, 2007). For example, when entity theo- in the septohippocampal system, which is involved in the proc- rists (people who believe that traits are unchangeable) were essing of detected uncertainties or conflicts between two or informed that their performance on a task had changed over a more competing goals (e.g., approach–approach, approach– training period, they reported feeling greater levels of anxiety, avoidance, avoidance–avoidance). The BIS responds to uncer- even when they received about showing tainty and conflict with suppression (or inhibition) of behavior, improvement (Plaks & Stecher, 2007). In contrast, incremental increased attention to novel (or threat) stimulus, and increasing theorists (who believe that traits are malleable) reported greater levels of (anxious) arousal (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Hirsh feelings of anxiety when told that their performance showed no et al., 2012). Further evidence for the link between anxiety and change following a training period (Plaks & Stecher, 2007). In the BIS comes from recent work in this case, then, whether a stimulus is perceived as a threat showing that traits commonly associated with negative emo- depends on whether it would conflict with people’s beliefs tionality (i.e., Neuroticism) are also positively related to BIS about behavior. activation (Cunningham, Arbuckle, Jahn, Mowrer, & Abdulja- As reviewed in Jonas et al. (2014), these results bring threat lil, 2010; DeYoung & Gray, 2009). Instead of engaging in poten- research back to its motivational conflict roots with work by tial fight-flight-or-freeze (which may then indicate response to Lewin and Festinger. Stimuli are perceived as threatening, and the threat stimulus itself), the activation of anxiety and the BIS activate anxiety-related responses, only when they create con- further highlight that it is the conflict aspect of threat that elic- flict and impede salient goals. its defensive responses (Hirsh et al., 2012; Jonas et al., 2014). Misattribution of anxiety. Studies incorporating misattri- To manage this conflict, people are then motivated to engage bution of arousal paradigms provide another line of evidence in any reactive pattern of thinking or acting capable of reducing suggesting that people are motivated to defend against the con- the distress. Embracing enthusiastic goals, beliefs, or even angry flict and anxiety elicited by threats rather than the threatening thoughts activates the approach-oriented behavioral activation stimulus itself. When given the opportunity to misattribute the system, which mutes the BIS and its anxiety (Corr, 2008; Nash, source of their anxiety to something other than the threat stim- Inzlicht, & McGregor, 2012). This process-based understanding ulus, people showed diminished defensive responses following parsimoniously eliminates need to posit a critical intrapsychic a wide range of threats (e.g., cognitive dissonance, control resource being defended, with a dedicated psychological mod- threats, perceptual anomalies, goal conflicts; Kay et al., 2008; ule devoted to its defense. The evolutionarily-old anxiety/BIS Nash et al., 2011; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Zanna & Cooper, system focuses on conflict and discrepancy relevant to salient 1974). In one study, for example, following the threat of an goals. Even relatively trivial discrepancies and perceptual experimentally induced goal, participants were either given the anomalies can activate this system (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; opportunity to misattribute their anxiety to a difference source Proulx et al., 2012), presumably because goals require a predict- (i.e., discomfort with providing information online) or not. The able and nonchaotic environment for confident implementa- researchers found that participants who were able to misattrib- tion (Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015). ute their anxiety showed significantly less defensive conviction than those who did not have the misattribution opportunity (Nash et al., 2011). Another study found that giving partici- Evidence From Social Psychology pants acetaminophen (which in part acts to reduce pain and Evidence that motivational and goal conflicts represented by anxiety) eliminated defensive responses following mortality threat, rather than the threatening stimulus itself, are the criti- salience and expectancy threats (Randles, Heine, & Santos, cal components for the arousal of this anxiety system and the 2013). Thus, these results support the notion that defensive resulting defensiveness, comes from research in which various responses are elicited not by the threat stimulus itself but rather threats were paired with relevant or irrelevant goal primes by the anxiety and conflict it causes. (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013; Nash, McGregor, & Pren- tice, 2011). In that research, achievement performance threats Evidence From Social Neuroscience (i.e., manipulated confusion about an academic task) caused anxious arousal and worldview defenses only when achieve- Further support for the links between threat, anxiety, and BIS ment goals had first been primed but not when relationships comes from recently emerging work in social neuroscience. goals had been primed. Similarly, relationship threats (i.e., Various studies have linked anxiety/BIS with activity in the manipulated uncertainty about relationship stability) caused anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which has been proposed to anxious arousal and worldview defense only when relationship be part of the ’s conflict detection system (Botvinick, goals had first been primed but not when achievement goals Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; had been primed. Important to note, mortality salience was Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The ACC communicates found to elicit defensive responses only when goals were with the amygdala, which recent work has suggested to be criti- primed but not when a neutral topic was primed (McGregor cal in the processing of goal-relevant and motivationally rele- et al., 2013). vant stimuli, including threatening, but also novel, ambiguous, Related research on the threat to people’s implicit theories and even positive, stimuli (Cunningham & Brosch, 2012). Peo- (i.e., fundamental beliefs that people have about human behav- ple with genetic predispositions toward poorly functioning ior) found similar results, in that people exhibited feelings of serotonin systems, who are sensitive to anxiety, show fMRI evi- anxiety only toward threats that are directly relevant to their dence of dysfunctional activity in both the amygdala and the COMMENTARIES 35

ACC in response to fear stimuli (Hariri et al., 2002; Pezawas Methodological and Theoretical Questions About the et al., 2005). DIPM One well-studied waveform thought to originate in the ACC Based on the points outlined thus far, it seems less plausible is the error-related negativity (ERN), which is believed to reflect that there exist two distinct systems for processing specifically a key neural system for performance monitoring as well as the survival-related threat versus other aversive stimuli. However, detection and monitoring of conflict and uncertainty March et al. (this issue) described experimental findings in sup- (Botvinick et al., 2001; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Gehr- port of their model. So how, then, can our stance be reconciled ing, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Yeung et al., 2004). with the research findings that suggest increased and earlier Increased ERN activity has been associated with a wide range reactivity to i1 than implicit 2 (i2) threats? Given our general of anxiety-related symptoms and defensive responses (Hajcak process understanding of threat and defense, we looked for pos- & Foti, 2008; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003, 2004). sible methodological confounds that might account for the i1 Heightened ERN amplitude can result from the various threats versus i2 results. that have caused irrational defenses in experimental social psy- One possible confound we wondered about concerns the chology, including mortality salience and other non-death- stimuli used in the empirical studies that support the DIPM related threats, such as cognitive dissonance (Proulx et al., (March et al., this issue). It was not clear to us whether the 2012). Support for the anxiety-to-reactive approach motivation threatening and negative stimuli used in the studies were view of threat and defense comes from evidence that experi- matched for ease of recognition, processing, and so on. The mentally induced motivational conflicts heighten neural markers of approach motivation (e.g., left prefrontal asymme- only stated matching criteria were luminescence and red value. try), which are inversely related to ERN responses (McGregor, The sample images provided in the empirical paper (March, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009; Nash et al., 2012). Gaertner, & Olson, 2017) did not relieve our concern in this The ERN is not the only waveform linked to threat regard. A wolf baring its teeth was used as an i1 threat stimulus, detection in social psychological research on threat. Aspects and a seemingly dead puppy was an i2 negative stimulus. The ofthelatepositivepotentialhavealsobeenfoundto image of the growling wolf was easy for us to recognize and respond to threats related to death, as well as other motiva- process as threatening (sharp white teeth against dark fur), but fi tionally relevant goals unrelated to death or survival such as the dead puppy was more ambiguous. At rst glance, it control deprivation (Klackl, Jonas, & Fritsche, in press). appeared that it may simply be a sleeping or resting puppy, and More evidence that threat-detection and threat-defense only after prolonged inspection did it become clear that it was reactions are closely linked to motivation comes from meant to be a negative image. Although we did not have access research showing that personality moderates the extent to to the full list of stimuli, the differences between the examples which threats heighten markers of vigilance. For example, given left us wondering whether the results that the DIPM is mortality salience increases P3a amplitude after odd-ball built upon might be artifacts of the specific of stimuli. exposure only among people who have personality traits We also wondered about the coding system used to classify related to vulnerability (low self-esteem), for whom security the stimuli. To be categorized as a negative stimulus, the images goals and mortality salience would be especially motivation- only had to be greater than 3 on a 7-point negativity scale, ally relevant (Sharpinskyi & McGregor, in prep). which implies that some neutral stimuli (i.e., a rating of 4) Another waveform originating from the ACC is the feed- could have been categorized as negative. In contrast, to be cate- back-related negativity (FRN). Whereas the ERN is elicited by gorized as a threat stimulus, the image had to be higher than specific responses, the FRN is generally elicited by negative the neutral point of 4 on a 7-point threatening rating scale. (as well as positive) feedback (Holroyd & Coles, 2002;Luu, Thus, this inconsistency in the coding criteria appears to give Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003; Yeung et al., greater priority to the threatening stimuli over the negative 2004). Initial evidence suggests that the FRN may also be a stimuli, which again would suggest that the stimuli on which relevant waveform to threat responses and anxiety/BIS. In the effects were found might not have been optimally matched. one study (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008), researchers provided par- Theoretically, it is also not clear how a specific survival- ticipants with positive, negative, and uncertain feedback dur- related evaluative process would have evolved. The concepts of ing a cognitive task. They found that, consistent with “life” and “survival” require abstract thought to consider, which previous work, people tended to produce larger FRN means that a survival-related module would have had the rela- responses to negative feedback compared to positive feedback. tively short time of hominid evolution to evolve. Given the pro- Of interest, however, individuals who scored higher in trait posed links to “low-road” motivational structures that evolved Neuroticism actually produced larger FRN amplitudes in before the capacity to think abstractly, a survival-specific module response to uncertain feedback, compared to negative feed- seems unlikely. The types of threat stimuli that the authors con- back (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008). These results provide prelimi- sider as i1 (e.g., knives, guns, dangerous animals) versus i2 (e.g., nary support that for some people an uncertainty threat may dead animals, feces, rotten teeth, vomit) raised further theoreti- be even more aversive (as indicated by neural activities) than cal concerns as well, insofar as the i2 stimuli all appear to be dis- general negative threats. In conjunction with the social psy- gust inducing or related to the of disgust. Research on chological research on threat, the emerging social neurosci- the evolutionary role of disgust in survival would suggest that ence findings converge on the idea that neural and behavioral people should allocate similar vigilance and attention to these i2 responses to stimuli are more a function of motivational rele- stimuli, as they are sources of contamination and pathogens, vance and conflictthanofstimulusproperties. which can lead to illness and even death if unattended to (Haidt, 36 COMMENTARIES

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