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Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Gintis, Herbert Working Paper Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality Working Paper, No. 2000-02 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Suggested Citation: Gintis, Herbert (2000) : Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality, Working Paper, No. 2000-02, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, Amherst, MA This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105717 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality∗ Herbert Gintis Department of Economics University of Massachusetts, Amherst Phone: 413-586-7756 Fax: 413-586-6014 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/˜gintis Running Head: Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality March 11, 2000 Abstract Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. The behavioral basis of this sociality remains in doubt. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifi- able form of prosocial behavior in humans, which we call ‘strong reciprocity,’ that may in part explain human sociality. A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of extended kinship or reciprocal altruism. We present a simple model, stylized but plausible, of the evolutionary emergence of strong reciprocity. 1 Introduction Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. Three types of explanation have been offered for this phe- nomenon: reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), cultural group selection (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985) and genetically-based altruism (Lumsden and Wilson 1981, Simon 1993, Wilson and Dugatkin 1997). These approaches are of course not incompatible. Reciprocal ∗ I would like to thank Lee Alan Dugatkin, Ernst Fehr, David Sloan Wilson, and the referees of this Journal for helpful comments, Samuel Bowles and Robert Boyd for many extended discussions of these issues, and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support. This paper is dedicated to the memory of W. D. Hamilton. 1 Strong Reciprocity 2 altruism is almost certainly a very important part of human sociality, and if altru- ism has a genetic basis, it would almost necessarily follow that there has been a coevolutionary development of genes and culture. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in humans that fits neither the extended kinship and or reciprocal altruism frameworks, and probably has a significant genetic component. We call this ‘strong reciprocity.’ A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of self-interest or extended kinship. We present a simple yet plausible model of the evolutionary emergence of strong reciprocity. 2 The Conditions for Sustaining Cooperation A group of n individuals faces in each time period a ‘public goods game’ in which each member, by sacrificing an amount c>0, contributes an amount b>cshared equally by the other members of the group (all costs and benefits are in fitness units).1 If all members cooperate, each receives a net payoff of b − c>0. However the only Nash equilibrium in this game is universal defection, in which no member contributes, and all members have baseline fitness zero (an arbitrary constant can be added to all fitnesses to account for the growth rate of the overall population). We also assume an individual not in a cooperating group has baseline fitness zero. While cooperation is not an equilibrium outcome in a single play of this public goods game, it can be sustained under appropriate conditions if the game is repeated. Specifically, suppose a members’s contribution is publicly observable, and in any period a player who fails to contribute c is ostracized from the group. Suppose also that group disbands spontaneously at the end of a given period (due to war, pestilence, climate change, and the like) with probability 1−δ. Let π be a member’s total expected fitness when contributing, assuming all other members contribute. Then π can be determined by noting that the current period net fitness gain is b − c, plus with probability δ the game is continued and again has value π in the next 1For a review of the evidence concerning cooperation in nonhuman species see Dugatkin (1997). For a review of cooperation in the two-player public goods game (usually called the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma), see Dugatkin (1998). Following Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), most models deal with repeated two-person interactions, although Boyd and Richerson (1988,1992) and a few others deal with larger groups. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) is close to this paper in modeling endogenous punishment in a public goods game, but their model predicts a zero level of strong reciprocators in equilibrium. March 11, 2000 Strong Reciprocity 3 period. Therefore we have π = b − c + δπ, which gives 2 b − c π = . (1) 1 − δ A player will contribute, then, as long as (b − c)/(1 − δ)>b, since by not con- tributing, the member earns b during the current period, but is ostracized at the end of the period. Rearranging terms in this inequality, we get Theorem 1. Suppose c be the fitness cost to a group member of cooperating, b is the fitness gain to others in the group when a member cooperates, and δ is a discount factor representing the probability that the group will remain constituted for at least one more period.3 Then cooperation can be sustained in the repeated public goods game if and only if c ≤ δ. b Theorem 1 is of course a completely standard result. With n = 2 is analo- gous to William Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness criterion (where δ represents the degree of relatedness), Robert Triver’s (1971) reciprocal altruism mechanism (where δ = 1), and Robert Axelrod’s (1984) condition for cooperation in the re- peated prisoner’s dilemma. However, the explicit presence of the discount factor δ in Theorem 1 makes it clear that however great the net benefits of cooperation, if groups disband with high probability, then cooperation among self-interested agents cannot be sustained.4 Moreover, periodic social crises are not implausible, since population contractions were likely common in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens (Boone and Kessler 1999). The very low rate of growth of the human pop- ulation over the whole prehistoric period, plus the high rate of human population growth in even poor contemporary foraging societies in good times (Keckler 1997), suggests periodic crises occurred in the past. Moreover, flattened mortality profiles of prehistoric skeletal populations indicate population crashes ranging from 10% to n 2Equation (1) can also be derived by noting that (b − c)δ is the expected return in period n,so π = (b − c)(1 + δ + δ2 + ...)= (b − c)/(1 − δ). 3In general the discount factor δ is the ratio of the contribution to fitness of a unit payoff in the next period to a unit payoff in the current period. In addition to the probability of group dissolution, this ratio generally depends, among other things, on an individual’s age and health. We abstract from these factors in this paper. 4To my knowledge, endogenous variation in the discount factor δ, central to explaining a high frequency of strong reciprocators in this paper, has not previously been modeled. Nor has the rela- tionship between group longevity and the prevalence of reciprocal altruism in nonhuman species been subjected to systematic empirical investigation. See however Dugatkin and Alfieri (1992). March 11, 2000 Strong Reciprocity 4 54% at a mean rate of once per thirty years (Keckler 1997). Finally, optimal forag- ing models of hunter-gatherer societies often predict stable limit cycles (Belovsky 1988). In contrast to the self-interested agents assumed in Theorem 1, a strong recip- rocator cooperates and punishes noncooperators without considering the value of δ; i.e., even when the probability of future interactions is low. As we shall see, when δ is low, the presence of strong reciprocators can allow the group to secure the benefits of cooperation. However strong reciprocators are altruists, since they bear surveillance and punishment costs not borne by self-interested group members, so they can
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