Holodomor – Was It a Genocide?
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Launching an Effective Anti- Corruption Court: Lessons from Ukraine
U4 Practice Insight 2021:1 Launching an effective anti- corruption court: Lessons from Ukraine By David Vaughn and Olha Nikolaieva Series editor: Sofie Arjon Schütte Disclaimer All views in this text are the author(s)’, and may differ from the U4 partner agencies’ policies. Partner agencies German Corporation for International Cooperation – GIZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – BMZ Global Affairs Canada Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark / Danish International Development Assistance – Danida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad UK Aid – Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office About U4 U4 is a team of anti-corruption advisers working to share research and evidence to help international development actors get sustainable results. The work involves dialogue, publications, online training, workshops, helpdesk, and innovation. U4 is a permanent centre at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway. CMI is a non-profit, multi-disciplinary research institute with social scientists specialising in development studies. www.U4.no [email protected] Cover photo High Anti-Corruption Court (CC copyrighted) Keywords justice sector - anti-corruption courts - judges - vetting - Ukraine - Eastern Europe Publication type U4 Practice Insight Creative commons This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court was created in response to immense public demand to hold government officials and judges accountable for corruption. Making the court operational, however, required more than adopting legislation. It meant selecting and preparing judges, recruiting qualified court personnel, and setting up administrative and organisational structures, including courthouse facilities, security, IT infrastructure, and communications systems. -
Development Partnership Forum Joint Statement 8 October 2020
Development Partnership Forum Joint Statement 8 October 2020 Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and Heads of Missions and Heads of Cooperation met 8 October 2020, in Kyiv, Ukraine, in the framework of the Development Partnership Forum, which was established as a part of the three-tier coordination mechanism between the Government of Ukraine (GOU) and the international Development Partners (DPs) in line with the Paris Declaration on Improving the Effectiveness of External Assistance. This meeting builds upon the successful Development Partnership Forum held in January 2020 and the Ukraine Reform Conferences (URC) held in London, Copenhagen, and Toronto. It is also a key milestone in preparing for the next URC expected to be held in Vilnius, Lithuania in 2021. Development cooperation takes place in Ukraine across multiple sectors and areas and is being provided by 24 countries, IFIs and the EU with total grant assistance of roughly USD 5.7 billion since the Revolution of Dignity. Cooperation between Ukraine and DPs is based on common interests and shared values and aims to support national reforms promoting an inclusive, independent, democratic, prosperous, and healthy Ukraine united around core European values. Both sides underscored that their shared aim is to achieve a tangible impact for all Ukrainian citizens, including its most vulnerable, based on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The GOU continues to be committed to reforms aimed at restoring economic growth and bringing the country closer to the European future. Development Partners stand ready to support the GOU to realise the potential of the Ukrainian economy through systemic changes to improve its business climate, increase investment attractiveness and to develop trade and human capital. -
Title of Thesis: ABSTRACT CLASSIFYING BIAS
ABSTRACT Title of Thesis: CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis Directed By: Dr. David Zajic, Ph.D. Our project extends previous algorithmic approaches to finding bias in large text corpora. We used multilingual topic modeling to examine language-specific bias in the English, Spanish, and Russian versions of Wikipedia. In particular, we placed Spanish articles discussing the Cold War on a Russian-English viewpoint spectrum based on similarity in topic distribution. We then crowdsourced human annotations of Spanish Wikipedia articles for comparison to the topic model. Our hypothesis was that human annotators and topic modeling algorithms would provide correlated results for bias. However, that was not the case. Our annotators indicated that humans were more perceptive of sentiment in article text than topic distribution, which suggests that our classifier provides a different perspective on a text’s bias. CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Gemstone Honors Program, University of Maryland, 2018 Advisory Committee: Dr. David Zajic, Chair Dr. Brian Butler Dr. Marine Carpuat Dr. Melanie Kill Dr. Philip Resnik Mr. Ed Summers © Copyright by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang 2018 Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincerest gratitude to our mentor, Dr. -
Digital Government Factsheet Ukraine
Digital Government Factsheet 2019 Ukraine ISA2 Digital Government Factsheets - Ukraine Table of Contents Country Profile .................................................................................................. 3 Digital Government Highlights ............................................................................. 5 Digital Government Political Communications ........................................................ 6 Digital Government Legislation ............................................................................ 9 Digital Government Governance .........................................................................13 Digital Government Infrastructure ......................................................................16 Digital Government Services for Citizens .............................................................21 Digital Government Services for Businesses .........................................................24 2 2 Digital Government Factsheets - Ukraine Country Profile Basic data Population: 42 122 657 (2019) GDP at market prices: UAH 1 048 023 (2019) GDP per inhabitant in PPS (Purchasing Power Standard EU 28=100): N/A GDP growth rate: 3.4% (IV quarter of 2018 compared to IV quarter of 2017) Inflation rate: 9.8%* (2018) General government gross debt (Percentage of GDP): 63%* General government deficit/surplus (Percentage of GDP): 1.66%* Area: 603 628 km2 Capital city: Kyiv Official EU language: Ukrainian Currency: UAH 2 Source: UkrStat, *Ukrainian Ministry of Finance 3 Digital Government Factsheets -
The Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Dnipro River Refugium
Victor Ostapchuk The Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Dnipro River Refugium Aside from considerations of global history, there are good reasons for includ- ing the Black Sea basin in a conference and volume dedicated to Mediterranean rivers and river communities. The two seas are physically connected, and throughout much of their history there was close connectivity between them thanks to projection of political power and colonization, as well as commer- cial and cultural interaction. If we consider Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Italian, and Ottoman presences in the Black Sea and its coastal areas, it can be said that more often than not it was within the orbit of the Mediterranean rath- er than a region apart. On the other hand, control of the northern Black Sea coast by these powers was always limited, if not precarious, in the face of no- madic or semi-nomadic powers that ruled the Pontic steppe – for example, the Scythians, Sarmatians, Pechenegs, Polovtsians-Qipchaqs, and Mongols. Even the presence of the Ottomans in the northern Black Sea did not extend far beyond the coast into the steppes to the north, despite their suzerainty over the Crimean Khanate, a Tatar successor state to the Golden Horde ruled by a Chinggisid dynasty, whose dominions did extend beyond the Crimean penin- sula into these steppes. Leaving aside physical and human connections between the two seas, their basins are vastly different in their physical geography. There are superficial similarities – approximately half of the Mediterranean basin (western North Africa and most of the northern side) and half of the Black Sea basin (Anatolia, Caucasus, southern coast of Crimea) have a mainly rugged even mountain- ous coastal area. -
AN ANALYSIS of the CRISIS in UKRAINE, and ITS THREE CONFLICTS (21 of NOVEMBER 2013, THROUGH 23 of MAY 2014)* Cristián Faundes**
REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 11 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 137 rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur.11(2):137-159,2016 AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE, AND ITS THREE CONFLICTS (21 OF NOVEMBER 2013, THROUGH 23 OF MAY 2014)* Cristián Faundes** ABSTRACT This paper presents the results of a study of the crisis in Ukraine, guided by the following question: which is the intensity of the crisis in Ukraine between November 2013 and May 2014? The information collected for this research involves 293 events evaluated and translated into quantitative data by the author with the objective to elaborate a curve reflecting the intensity of the conflict. Considering that the situation under scrutiny involves several conflicts, Revista de one curve of intensity was not enough to follow the course of events, but three were needed to track the (2). pp.137-159. DOI: (2). pp.137-159. 11 * . This paper is the result of a research study on the Crisis in Ukraine held at the Center for Strategic Studies of the Chilean Army’s War College. Project number: CEEAG-01-2014. ** Investigador académico en temas de seguridad y defensa. Sus líneas de trabajo incluyen la teoría de conflictos y las relaciones entre los países del Cono Sur. Se ha especializado en la problemática de los recursos naturales y el estudio del agua dulce como factor de conflictos. Ha presentado sus investigaciones en congresos internacionales y cátedras de postgrado. Se desempeña como Investigador asociado en la Jefatura de Estudios de la Academia de Guerra del Ejército. Periodista, licenciado en información social. -
Leadership Conference in Washington Focuses on Ukraine's
INSIDE:• UCCA elects new president — page 3. • Kuchma and Putin discuss gas supplies — page 3. • Help Us Help the Children organizes summer camps — page 13. Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association Vol. LXVIII HE No.KRAINIAN 43 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2000 EEKLY$1/$2 in Ukraine Medvid denied tourist visa LeadershipT ConferenceU in Washington focuses W for visit to United States on Ukraine’s integration into global community by Yaro Bihun the fact that the people are dissatisfied, by Roman Woronowycz to the United States. Special to The Ukrainian Weekly he said. Kyiv Press Bureau The Public Affairs section of the U.S. As for fears about the establishment of Embassy issued a terse statement in WASHINGTON – The Washington a new dividing line in Europe after the KYIV – Almost exactly 15 years after response to efforts by The Weekly to obtain Group, the largest Ukrainian American first group of East European countries Myroslav Medvid – then a 25-year-old more details about the Medvid decision. professionals’ association in the United joins the European Union, he said, that Ukrainian sailor and today a clergyman – The statement said: “The applicant was States, on October 6-8 held its annual line exists and has always existed in the swam to the shores of New Orleans to plead denied a visa because he was unable to Leadership Conference which this year eyes of Western Europeans, who differ- for political asylum only to be escorted back overcome the presumption of intending focused on the issue of Ukraine’s integra- entiate between Eastern European coun- to his Soviet grain trawler by U.S. -
Chapter 6 the UKRAINIAN FAMINE by Lyman H. Legters
Chapter 6 THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE by Lyman H. Legters On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, European In the mind of Stalin, the problem of the Social Democrats, including their Russian branch, held Ukrainian peasants who resisted collectivization generally to two items of received doctrinal wisdom was linked with the problem of Ukrainian that would bear ultimately on the calamity of the early nationalism. Collectivization was imposed on the 1930s in the Ukraine. One of these was the belief that Ukraine much faster than it was on other parts the rural agricultural economy, along with its associated of the Soviet Union. The resulting hardship in social order, was to undergo capitalist kinds of develop the Ukraine was deliberately intensified by a ment as a necessary prelude to the introduction of policy of unrelenting grain procurement. It was socialism in the countryside. That expectation could this procurement policy that transformed be traced directly back to Marx and Engels. The other hardship into catastrophe. Famine by itself is not belief had been fashioned more recently in the multina genocide, but the consequences of the policy were tional empires of Habsburg and Romanov and taught known and remedies were available. The that ethnic diversity, presumed to be a vestigial social evidence is quite powerful that the famine could fact that would eventually disappear, might be accom have been avoided, hence the argument turns on modated in a centralized political system by permitting, Stalin's intentions. perhaps even encouraging, cultural autonomy. 1 In the Russian case, the first of these propositions was confounded initially in two ways. -
Bitter Harvest
Soviets Cover-up Ukrainian Starvation 0. Soviets Cover-up Ukrainian Starvation - Story Preface 1. Holodomor - Roots of a Man-Made Disaster 2. Resurgence of Ukrainian Nationalism 3. Stalin Cracks Down on Ukraine 4. Ukrainians Lose Their Farms 5. Ukrainians Lose Their Crops 6. Ukrainians Starve 7. Ukrainians Die from Hunger 8. Soviets Cover-up Ukrainian Starvation 9. Russia Acknowledges the Holodomor O. Bily created this political poster, entitled "From Genocide of Culture to Genocide of Nation." It is part of the collection "Holodomor; Through the Eyes of Ukrainian Artists," initiated by Founder/Trustee E. Morgan Williams. The image is online via Holdomor Research & Education Consortium. A journalist working for the New York Times—Walter Duranty—takes a different approach than Malcolm Muggeridge in his reports about famine in the Ukraine. Denying that any famine exists, Duranty’s articles extol the Soviets’ progress. Muggeridge tells us that he could never figure-out how Duranty’s articles were so wrong and so disgraceful. Duranty wrote things like: The writer has just completed a 200-miles auto trip through the heart of the Ukraine and can say positively that the harvest is splendid and all talk of famine now is ridiculous. Yet, in private documents, Duranty writes that “as many as 10 million people” have died. And ... in private conversations ... Duranty tells colleagues, and at least one British official (William Strang, the charge d'affaires working in Moscow), that he estimates 10 million have died. (See, for example, footnote 46 in Marco Carynnyk’s article, “The New York Times and the Great Famine,” published in The Ukrainian Weekly, September 25, 1983, No. -
The Great Famine in Soviet Ukraine: Toward New Avenues Of
THE GREAT FAMINE IN SOVIET UKRAINE: TOWARD NEW AVENUES OF INQUIRY INTO THE HOLODOMOR A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the North Dakota State University of Agriculture and Applied Science By Troy Philip Reisenauer In Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Major Department: History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies June 2014 Fargo, North Dakota North Dakota State University Graduate School Title THE GREAT FAMINE IN SOVIET UKRAINE: TOWARD NEW AVENUES OF INQUIRY INTO THE HOLODOMOR By Troy Philip Reisenauer The Supervisory Committee certifies that this disquisition complies with North Dakota State University’s regulations and meets the accepted standards for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. John K. Cox Chair Dr. Tracy Barrett Dr. Dragan Miljkovic Approved: July 10, 2014 Dr. John K. Cox Date Department Chair ABSTRACT Famine spread across the Union of Social Soviet Republics in 1932 and 1933, a deadly though unanticipated consequence of Joseph Stalin’s attempt in 1928 to build socialism in one country through massive industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture known as the first Five-Year Plan. This study uses published documents, collections, correspondence, memoirs, secondary sources and new insight to analyze the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine and other Soviet republics. It presents the major scholarly works on the famine, research that often mirrors the diverse views and bitter public disagreement over the issue of intentionality and the ultimate culpability of Soviet leadership. The original contribution of this study is in the analysis of newly published primary documents of the 1920s and 1930s from the Russian Presidential Archives, especially vis-à-vis the role of Stalin and his chief lieutenants at the center of power and the various representatives at the republic-level periphery. -
THE DEVELOPMENT of BANDURA MUSIC ART BETWEEN the 1920S and 1940S
Journal of Ethnology and Folkloristics 14 (2): 44–66 DOI: 10.2478/jef-2020-0015 THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANDURA MUSIC ART BETWEEN THE 1920s A N D 1940s MARYNA BEREZUTSKA Associate professor Department of Folk Instruments M. Glinka Dnipropetrovsk Academy of Music Lyvarna street 10, 49044 Dnipro, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT Bandura art is a unique phenomenon of Ukrainian culture, inextricably linked with the history of the Ukrainian people. The study is dedicated to one of the most tragic periods in the history of bandura art, that of the 1920s–1940s, during which the Bolsheviks were creating, expanding and strengthening the Soviet Union. Art in a multinational state at this time was supposed to be national by form and socialist by content in accordance with the concept of Bolshevik cultural policy; it also had to serve Soviet propaganda. Bandura art has always been national by its content, and professional by its form, so conflict was inevitable. The Bolsheviks embodied their cultural policy through administrative and power methods: they created numerous bandurist ensembles and imposed a repertoire that glorified the Communist Party and the Soviet system. As a result, the development of bandura art stagnated significantly, although it did not die completely. At the same time, in the post-war years this policy provoked the emigration of many professional bandurists to the USA and Canada, thus promoting the active spread of bandura art in the Ukrainian Diaspora. KEYWORDS: bandura art • bandurists • kobzars INTRODUCTION The bandura is a unique Ukrainian folk instrument whose history is closely connected with the Ukrainian nation’s history. -
Stanislav Kulchytsky the Ukrainian Holodomor Against the Background
Stanislav Kulchytsky The Ukrainian Holodomor against the Background of the Communist Onslaught, 1929–1938 Thirty years ago Ukrainians in North America devoted a great deal of effort to publicizing the famine of 1932–33, which had been covered up in the Soviet Union. An important result of those efforts was the creation of the US Congressional Commission on the Ukraine Famine in October 1984. In the fall of 1986 the commission’s executive director, James Mace, issued its first report.1 The policy of perestroika, announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, helped the leaders of the Communist Party of Ukraine realize that the Stalinist ban on information about the famine had lost its validity. In a jubilee address delivered in the Kremlin on 2 November 1987 Gorbachev himself touched upon the “excesses” that had taken place during collectivization but said nothing about the famine.2 But on 25 December 1987, in a jubilee address dedicated to the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of Soviet rule in Ukraine, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, acknowledged that a famine, supposedly caused by a poor harvest, had taken place. There can be no doubt that this admission was made with the agreement of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, of which Shcherbytsky was a member. Ukrainian scholars were then permitted to research the famine, and they took full advantage of this opportunity. In the last twenty-five years, thousands of publications have appeared on this topic. In November 2006, when the draft law “On the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine” was introduced in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, scholars at the Institute of 1 See Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, 1932–1933: First interim report of meetings and hearings of and before the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, held in 1986 (Washington, DC, 1987).