The 1970 Safeguards Committee of Ghana Were Designated As Vice Chairmen
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Chairman of the 1970 IAEA Safeguards Committee was Mr Kurt Waldheim, now President of Austria. Director General of the IAEA at the time, Dr Sigvard Eklund, is at left. The 1970 Safeguards Committee of Ghana were designated as Vice Chairmen. The Committee was open to representation to any Member State. All told, delegations from 50 Mem- In April 1970, the IAEA Board of Governors ber States participated in one or more meetings of adopted a resolution calling for establishment of a the Committee: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Safeguards Committee to formulate guidelines for Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, safeguards agreements in connection with the Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear (United Arab Republic), Finland, France, Federal Weapons (NPT), which had been opened for signa- Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, ture in 1968 and whose entry into force was immi- India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, nent. The Treaty assigns to the IAEA the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, responsibility of applying safeguards to nuclear Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por- material in all nuclear facilities in States that tugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, become NPT parties for the exclusive purpose of Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, United verification of the fulfillment of their obligations Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet under the Treaty. Once the NPT has entered into Nam, and Yugoslavia. Members of State delega- force for a State, it is required to start negotiations tions included Dr Hans Blix (Sweden), who in 1981 on a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within would succeed Dr Sigvard Eklund of Sweden as 180 days. Director General of the IAEA; Mr Jon Jennekens As Chairman of the Safeguards Committee, the (Canada), currently the IAEA Deputy Director Board designated Mr Kurt Waldheim of Austria, General for Safeguards; and Mr D.L. Siazon, Jr. who would later become Secretary-General of (Philippines), currently Director General of the the United Nations and President of Austria. United Nations Industrial Development Organiza- Mr F.B. Straub of Hungary and Mr J.A.K. Quartey tion (UNIDO). IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1990 Features IAEA safeguards: A look at 1970-1990 and future prospects Political, financial, and technological developments continue to influence directions and change by Jon Jennekens JT ears that nuclear weapons would spread to many closed-circuit television systems have also been devel- countries have fortunately not come true. To an impor- oped and tested. Additionally, there have been signifi- tant degree, the application of international safe- cant improvements in the accuracy, reliability, and ease guards has furthered this reality. For the IAEA, the of use of instruments for non-destructive measurement operation of an effective worldwide safeguards system is of the composition of nuclear material. a great responsibility, one that has been carried out over This article reviews some of the important develop- the past quarter century. ments influencing the evolution of the IAEA's safe- Even after 25 years, new challenges arise: Compli- guards implementation over the past 20 years, since the cated installations are built that handle large quantities of entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation fissionable material which have to be safeguarded. of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 which has signifi- Verification techniques which were once satisfactory cantly influenced safeguards activities. Areas specifi- become obsolete. Today's political developments as cally addressed include safeguards procedures, well — for example, the discussion of disarmament on equipment, analytical measurements, and inspection many fronts — have opened up a much greater general reporting systems and evaluations. readiness to accept verification than was true when the safeguards system began in the 1960s. IAEA safeguards Safeguards agreements and procedures will benefit both in cost efficiency and credibility if they are allowed to keep up with the advances made in other In 1970, the IAEA's "Safeguards Committee" was verification schemes. established to elaborate guidelines for use by the Direc- Over the past decade, these developments, coupled tor General in concluding safeguards agreements with financial limitations, have seriously tested the envisaged in Article III of the NPT. (See box.) Before IAEA's capability to carry out effective safeguards oper- then, the safeguards "system" was largely based on the ations. Necessarily, the Agency has undertaken a num- acceptance of safeguards by States receiving nuclear ber of steps to increase the overall effectiveness of its material or equipment from other States for specific safeguards work. New diversion scenarios and safe- projects. Prior to 1970, the scope of safeguards guards concepts for larger and more complex nuclear implementation was largely limited to individual nuclear facilities have been defined, for example, and safeguards installations involving specific quantities of nuclear at such plants have been updated. A safeguards informa- material and materials and equipment especially tion system has been introduced for the computerization designed or adapted for use in nuclear research, of all safeguards data, which has greatly improved development, and industrial activities. record handling and evaluation activities. Simultaneous In contrast, the safeguards required by the NPT apply inspection of all facilities in certain countries has been to all source or special fissionable material in all peace- developed to the point of routine application. This ful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. The procedure has resulted in improvements in safeguards entry into force of the NPT thus brought about an impor- effectiveness. tant change in the demands placed upon the Agency. Other steps have been taken through safeguards sup- Other changes also affected the Agency's safeguards port programmes of Member States. These include activities. Before 1970, the nuclear materials subject to improvements in the reliability and performance of film IAEA safeguards were either highly enriched uranium cameras for surveillance of nuclear facilities. Advanced (HEU) in the form of fuel elements for research reac- tors, or relatively small quantities of natural uranium Mr Jennekens is Deputy Director General and Head of the IAEA intended for use in research and development facilities Department of Safeguards. and "pilot" production facilities. Other than a dozen or IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1990 Features so industrialized States with fledgling nuclear power information it might receive. Emphasis was placed on programmes, there were only 10 or 12 developing coun- the importance of national accounting and control sys- tries pursuing nuclear research and development pro- tems and their role between the Agency and plant opera- grammes. As a result, there were only isolated instances tors as a means of expediting and simplifying the of international traffic in nuclear materials and equip- application of safeguards. ment. The optimism of the participants of the first The expectation at the time of the 18 Nation Disarma- Geneva Conference in 1955 on the peaceful uses of ment Committee which drafted the NPT was that most nuclear energy had long since been tempered by the hard States would ratify the NPT and therefore enter into realities of economics and, more generally, geopolitics. INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements with the The Safeguards Committee's report entitled "The Agency. This expectation has been largely realized, Structure and Content of Agreements between the although a handful of States with significant nuclear Agency and States Required in Connection with the research, development, and industrial programmes have Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons declined to ratify the Treaty for a variety of reasons. (NPT)", documented as INFCIRC/153, recommended Facility attachments. The first facility attachments the incorporation of provisions in safeguards agreements negotiated in accordance with the terms of INFCIRC/ which were largely but not entirely acceptable to both 153-type safeguards agreements included provisions industrialized and developing States. The recommenda- relating to plant location, design information, and record tions were intended to provide the Agency with the and report systems only. Later versions were expanded verification possibilities required by the NPT and, at the to include provisions concerning verification of physical same time, to avoid undue interference in nuclear indus- inventories. Since the facilities in the early 1970s were try or research activities. basically "item" facilities, (i.e. power and research The Committee's recommendations constituted sig- reactors), the provisions guiding the implementation of nificant progress in the evolutionary development of the safeguards at them were quite simple in comparison with legal and technical aspects of the Agency's safeguards present day, very complex facilities. The inspection policies, practices, and procedures. According to the activities conducted in 1970 included examination of Committee, the primary objectives of IAEA safeguards records, verification of their consistency with reports, are the timely detection of the diversion of significant application of C/S measures, and verification of the quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear fresh fuel