MARINA MCCOY | 49 In reading a Platonic dialogue, we know the Perspectivism and old saying: quot lectores, tot Platones. the Philosophical There are probably as many Platos as there are readers of him. Perhaps it will be a surprise, Rhetoric of the then, for a commentator to begin by saying that Dialogue Form I share a basic agreement with Gonzalez’s per- spectivist approach to the Platonic dialogues. This kind of an approach to the dialogues has guided much of my own teaching and writ- ing about them. The dialogues presuppose an objective truth toward which we are meant to strive, and yet acknowledge that we as seek- ers of this truth are always partial in what we Marina McCoy grasp of its nature. I find this perspectivist ap- Boston College proach warranted by the sorts of examples that [email protected] Gonzalez offers on how topics such as the soul or the forms are treated across dialogues. To this, I would add that perspectivism fits well with the way that the dialogues often treat the ABSTRACT human person as “in between”. The Sympo- sium presents a vision of the human being as In this paper, I support the perspectivist read- “in between” poverty and plenty (Symp. 203 ing of the Platonic dialogues. The dialogues b-204 a). In the Apology, Socrates claims a deep assert an objective truth toward which we are commitment to seeking the truth, coupled with meant to strive, and yet acknowledge that we an equally strong belief that his wisdom is a as seekers of this truth are always partial in human wisdom, one that is better than other what we grasp of its nature. They are written claims to wisdom insofar as he knows that he in a way to encourage the development of does not know (Apol. 20 d; 21 d). The Meno philosophical practice in their readers, where and Phaedrus alike claim that we are both be- “philosophical” means not only having an epis- ings of forgetting and of learning, of ascent temic state in between the total possession of and descent (Men. 81 b-e; Phaedr. 246 c-e). The truth and its absence, but also growing in self- Phaedrus describes souls on the philosophi- knowledge as being that kind of a being. I take cal path, the best of all possible paths that can up three particular qualities of the dialogue: be taken, as those who can have only a faint they are multilayered, multivocal, and mimetic. recollection of the forms that they pursue, but Devices such as Platonic irony, multiple char- who nonetheless are in a state of ascent to- acters’ voices, and a reformulated notion of wards those same objects of our deepest desires mimesis that encourages the development of (Phaedr. 247 b-248 d). Perspectivism captures rationality and autonomy are central to Platonic the multiple ways in which Plato describes the rhetoric and philosophy. human soul, as that which is neither divine nor animal, but always en route, in a state of Keywords: Plato, dialogue, rhetoric, mimesis, becoming. Moreover, a perspectivist approach irony, self-knowledge, perspectivism, image. https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_16_4 50 | Perspectivism and the Philosophical Rhetoric of the Dialogue Form to how to read the dialogues in relationship to Socrates, recognizes the partial and perspec- one another also fits well with what I under- tival nature of her own knowledge. stand to be the relationship between language In contrast with many other forms of and Platonic ontology. If the forms of justice, rhetoric and poetry among his contemporar- beauty, and so on are not reducible to verbal ies, Plato’s dialogues engage in a rhetoric of definitions of justice, beauty, and the like, activity rather than passivity.3 It is not a form then all statements that we make about them of philosophy that simply transmits knowledge will be limited. Although I cannot argue this to an otherwise passive audience but rather point here, I would argue that Platonic argu- one that asks its audience to become seekers ment frequently proceeds by way of images, and along with Socrates and other seekers of truth that such imagery is appropriate when there in the dialogues. In the Republic, Socrates says is a gap between the nature of being itself and that education is not a process of pouring true language as a tool for talking about being. If knowledge into an empty soul, or putting sight the forms exceed what we can say about them, into blind eyes, but rather a turning around then various images of the forms both capture of the soul in order to make an ascent (Rep. something of that which they describe and are 518 c). In the Symposium, Socrates says that it limited in their vision.1 would be a wonderful thing if wisdom could In my response today, I will take up the flow between two people the way that water can topic of the rhetoric and poetic form of the flow from one cup to another, through a piece Platonic dialogue as a development of perspec- of yarn, but (alas for poor Agathon) this is not tivism. The dialogues do not simply present the case (Symp. 175 d). Socrates never claims to a view, or even many views, to their readers. teach anyone through the direct transmission Instead, they are written in a way to encourage of knowledge. It would be surprising, then, if the development of philosophical practice in Plato as author of these words understood his their readers. Although others have argued for own practice differently, as a process of writing a pedagogical value of one dialogue for another that he undertook in order simply to transmit (as is the case with Kahn’s proleptic reading),2 I his ideas to us, the readers. Instead, I want to want to argue that the very construction of each argue, that the perspectivism of the dialogues is single dialogue as a dramatic work encourages accompanied by a dialogical, rhetorical practice the development of the notion of philosophy as that actively encourages us as readers to be- an ascent, as erotic, as perspectival, through come philosophical— where “philosophical” is its very dialogical construction. The reader’s understood to be not only having an epistemic philosophical development is not merely ac- state in between the total possession of truth complished through the development of spe- and its absence, but also becoming increasingly cific content that Plato hopes for the reader to self-consciously aware of oneself as being that hold as his own belief by the time that the dia- kind of a being. The forms exceed what can be logue is read. Rather, the dialogue form engages fully grasped through language; beauty itself in a form of poetics that leads its readers on is always more than anything that we can say the perspectival journey. Plato as author asks about the beautiful or about beautiful things.4 his reader to undertake particular practices in To practice philosophy, then, always requires the course of reading or listening to a dialogue that I seek with the virtues of courage and that form her into a lover of wisdom who, like humility: where humility is an awareness of MARINA MCCOY | 51 both what I know and what I do not know, Protagoras, where the question of whether vir- and where courage leads me to continue the tue can be taught is not resolved, we as readers pursuit without fear despite my own limits of still have learned a great deal about what the knowledge. How does the construction of the relevant issues are; for example, we might leave dialogues encourage this to take place? the dialogue with a sense that knowledge is cen- If Socrates is a torpedo fish that numbs tral to the practice of virtue, but that the kind (Men. 80 a-b), or a midwife who tests our ideas of knowledge that is requisite to virtue is not to see if they are only wind eggs (Theaet. 149 taught in the same way that either traditional a-151 d), then the Platonic dialogue can be un- poets or sophists taught their students. In the derstood as a text that invites us into our own Theaetetus, the role of judgment in relation to process of philosophical midwifery, whereby knowledge ought to be clearer than before we the dialogue and reader engage in a mutual read the dialogue. The dialogues problematize process of exploring its central philosophical philosophical problems in a way that empha- questions. The Platonic dialogues are read most sizes the lack of finality and comprehensive- fruitfully when we read them not as texts that ness to the problem at hand, whether in an report a Platonic truth to us, for us to absorb, aporetic or non-aporetic dialogue. There is no accept, or reject, but rather as texts that take finality because the process of inquiry always us through an ongoing dialectical movement continues, both in other Platonic works, and in between making claims and then problematiz- our conversations as communities of readers.6 ing the claims made. Within each dialogue, we I propose that three elements of a dialogue frequently find that Socrates makes a claim ought especially to be attended to as we seek and then shows why the claim that he is made fruitful approaches to interpret them: the dia- is problematic. For example, the Protagoras logues are multilayered, multivocal, and mimetic. features Socrates and Protagoras who begin Let me take up each of these qualities in turn. with certain views as to whether virtue can be On the multi-layered nature of the dialogue: taught, and find at the end of their conversation in reading any Platonic dialogue, there are po- that their positions seem to have been reversed tentially as many as four layers to each dialogue (Prot.