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$75 Million a Year: the Cost of New York City Marijuana Possession

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$75 Million a Year: the Cost of New York City Marijuana Possession $75 Million a Year The Cost of New York City's Marijuana Possession Arrests InNewYorkState,carryingasmallamountofmarijuanainapocket,backpackorpurse isaviolation,likeatrafficviolation,andisnotacrime.Nonetheless,in2010theNew YorkPoliceDepartmentmade50,300arrestsformarijuanapossession–morethanfor anyotheroffenseandoneoutofsevenarrestsinNewYorkCity. Overthelast15years,asinglearrestformarijuanapossession,includingallpoliceand courtexpenses,hascostfrom$1,000to$2,000ormore,conservativelyestimated. In2010,NewYorkCityspent$75millionarrestingandjailingmostlyyoungpeople simplyforpossessingsmallamountsofmarijuana. From1997through2010theNYPDmade536,000arrestsformarijuanapossession. Thishascosttaxpayers$500milliontoover$1billion. Marijuanapossessionarrestsalsohaveserioushumancostsandconsequences.They createpermanentcriminalrecordsthatcanbeeasilyfoundontheInternetby employers,landlords,schools,creditagencies,licensingboards,andbanks. Governmenthealthsurveysfindthatyoungwhitesusemarijuanaathigherratesthan youngblacksandLatinos.ButtheNYPDarrestsblacksformarijuanapossessionat seventimestherateofwhitesandLatinosatnearlyfourtimestherateofwhites. Drug Policy Alliance 70 West 36th Street, 16th Floor New York, NY 10018 www.drugpolicy.org March 2011 About: "$75MillionAYear"waspreparedbyHarryG.LevineandLorenSiegeloftheMarijuanaArrest ResearchProject.HarryG.Levine,PhD,isaprofessorofsociologyatQueensCollege,City UniversityofNewYork.Heistheauthorofnumerousworksondrugpolicyandmarijuana arrests.LorenSiegel,JD,wasformanyyearsthedirectorofpubliceducationfortheAmerican CivilLibertiesUnion.Sheisacommunicationsconsultantforprominentmediaandadvocacy organizations.In2010,Levine,SiegelandcriminaljusticeresearcherJonGettmanissueda seriesofreportsfortheDrugPolicyAllianceandtheNAACPaboutraciallybiasedmarijuana arrestsinCalifornia. TheDrugPolicyAlliance(DPA)isthenation'sleadingorganizationpromotingalternativestothe drugwarthataregroundedinscience,compassion,healthandhumanrights. Contact:GabrielSayegh,StateDirector,NewYork,DrugPolicyAlliance. [email protected]|212.613.8048 70W.36thStreet,16thFloor,NewYork,NY10018 www.drugpolicy.org ______________________________________________________________________________________ 2 30YearsofMarijuanaPossessionArrests inNewYorkCity,19811995&19962010 550,000 500,000 536,322 450,000 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 33,775 19811995 19962010 MarijuanaPossessionArrestsinNewYorkCity,19782010 55,000 50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Source:NewYorkStateDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices,ComputerizedCriminalHistorySystem(Feb2011).Includesall fingerprintablemisdemeanorarrestsforNYSPenalLawArticle221.10asthemostseriouschargeinanarrestevent.Ages 16andolder.Thesetablesshowonlythelowestlevelmisdemeanormarijuanapossessionarrestsandcharges. HarryG.Levine,SociologyDepartment,QueensCollegeandtheGraduateCenter,CityUniversityofNewYork.Feb2011 3 _________________________________________________________________________ TheCostofNewYorkCity's MarijuanaPossessionArrests Inrecentyearsreportsbyacademics,researchers,andjournalistshavedocumentedthe largenumberofarrestsforpossessionofmarijuanamadebypoliceinNewYorkCity.TheNYPD made46,400ofthesemisdemeanorarrestsin2009,and50,300ofthemin2010–thetwomost recentyearsinthecity'sfifteenyearmarijuanaarrestcrusade.1 Forcomparison,from1981to1995,underthreedifferentmayors,NewYorkCitymadea totalof33,700marijuanapossessionarrests,averagingonly2,300peryear.Forthepastfifteen years,however,NewYorkaveraged36,000marijuanapossessionarrestsayear.In2010theNYPD arrestedpeopleformarijuanapossessionatnearlysixteentimestherateofearlieryears. Theseareallarrestswherethehighestoronlychargewaspossessingasmallamountof marijuana,usuallyatinybagoracigarette(ajointorblunt).Thosearrestedwereoverwhelmingly teenagersandyoungpeopleintheirtwenties,and87%ofthemwereblackorLatino. InNewYorkState,possessinglessthananounceofmarijuanaisnotacrimeforwhich someonecanbearrestedandfingerprinted.Itisonlyacrimeifthemarijuanaisopenly displayedorsmoked,whichwasnotthecaseformostpeoplearrested.Therefore,Inorderto makethesepossessionarrests,thepoliceusuallyhadtotrickorintimidateyoungpeopleinto revealingtheirmarijuana,orsearchtheperson'spocketsandpossessions,oftenillegally.2 Thepeoplearrestedwerehandcuffed,takentothepolicestation,fingerprinted, photographed,andtheirinformationwaspermanentlyenteredintocriminaldatabases.They werethentakentothecentralbookingjailatoneofthecity'scriminalcourts.After24ormore hoursincustody,theyfinallyappearedinarraignmentcourtwheretheircaseswerehandledby assistantdistrictattorneys,publicdefenders,criminalcourtjudges,andothercourtpersonnel.3 In2010,oneoutofeverysevenarrestsforalloffensesinNewYorkCity,andoneoutof fiveofallmisdemeanorarrests,wasalowestlevelmarijuanapossessionarrest.Since BloombergbecameMayorin2002,theNYPDhasmade350,000ofthesearrests,morethan underMayorsKoch,DinkinsandGiulianicombined.4 HowmuchmoneydoesitcostNewYorkCitytomakeandprocessallthesearrests? Nooneknows.Otherthanthetopmanagersofthepolicedepartmentandthemayor’soffice,no onehasaccesstotheinformationandtherearelimitedwaystoobtainit.Asadistrictattorney fromanotherlargecitysuggestedtous,theNewYorkCityCouncilorStateLegislature,orboth, couldholdhearingsandrequiretheNYPDandothercriminaljusticeagenciestodisclosethese costs.Or,awellfundedteamofexperiencedinvestigatorscouldgothroughpublicrecords,sue foraccesstoothers,andusethatinformationtoestimatethecostsofthecity'smarijuana possessionarrests.Atpresent,theinformationneededtopreciselycalculatethecostofNew YorkCity'stensofthousandsofannualmarijuanaarrestsishiddenandinaccessible. 4 _________________________________________________________________________ Inordertodeterminethecostsofbothcrimeandenforcement,manyresearchershave soughttomeasurevariouscriminaljusticecosts.Muchofthatworkhasfocusedonprison expensesandthefinancialcostoflostpropertyandliferesultingfromseriousfelonies. Howeverinthelasttwentyyearsanumberofresearchershavestudiedpoliceandcourtcostsin differentstatesandcitiesinordertodeterminethecostsofparticulartypesofcrimes.These estimatesvary,withcostsgenerallyincreasingeverywhereovertime.Butthereisconsiderable agreementandthestudiesconvergeonaminimalpoliceandcourtcostrangeof$1,000to $2,000ormoreforabasic,custodialmisdemeanorarrestandcourtarraignment. MarkA.Cohen,aneconomistandveterancriminaljusticeresearcheratVanderbilt University,whoseworkhasbeenpublishedbytheU.S.NationalInstituteofJustice,hasbeen examiningthecostsofcrimeandofthecriminaljusticesystemsincetheearly1990s.Aspartof astudyfortheNationalResearchCouncil,Cohenandothersuseddatafromseveral jurisdictionsandcalculatedallpoliceandcourtcoststobeabout$2,000forarapearrest,about $1,100forarobberyarrest,andabout$1,200foranaggravatedassaultarrest–in1987dollars.5 Severalotherstudieshaveproducedroughlycomparablefigures.Inevaluatingcriminal justiceandmandatorysentencingcostsinCaliforniafortheRandCorporation,Greenwoodand hiscoauthorsestimated$624inpolicecostsand$1,100intotalcourtcostsperarrest–in1993 dollars.6AstudybyMasseyaboutcontrollingillegalimmigrationfoundthecostofonearrestat thebordertobe$1,700in2002.7ArecentdetailedstudyofdiversionprogramsintheSan Antoniometropolitanarea,byTheResearchTriangleInstitute,reportedthecostofanarrest from"theinitialpeaceofficerinteractionthroughbooking"tobe$2,860in2007dollars.8 Thepremierstudyofthecostsofarrestsandprosecutionsisa180pagereport,The ComparativeCostsAndBenefitsOfProgramsToReduceCrime.Itwaspreparedin2001byAos, Phipps,Barnoski,andLiebfortheWashingtonStateInstituteforPublicPolicy.Thestudy calculatedaveragepoliceandcourtcostsperarrestforanumberofcrimecategoriesinall jurisdictionsinthestateofWashington.9Thecostofonearrestformurderwasthemost expensivefollowed,indecliningorder,byarrestsforrape,robbery,aggravatedassault, propertycrime,drugcrime,andmisdemeanors.Aosandhisteamfoundthatthetotalpolice costsforapropertycrimeordrugcrimewere$1,890anarrest,andthecourtcostswere$1,670 –equaling$3,560totalcostsperarrest(excludingjailandprisonexpenses). Foramisdemeanorarrest,suchasamarijuanapossessionarrest,policecostswere $764andthecourtcostswere$336,foratotalof$1,100–in1995dollars.(SeeAppendixfora copyofthecoststablefromthereport.)Thiswouldbeover$1,500in2010dollarsin WashingtonState.SincethecostoflivingishigherinNewYorkCity,itseemsreasonableto concludethatthepoliceandcourtcostsforasinglemisdemeanormarijuanaarrestinNewYork Cityisbynowatleast$1,500toover$2,000.Thiscoversallpolicetimeincludingovertimepay forarrestingofficersandsupervisors,allprearraignmentjailcosts,andallcourtexpenses.10For 2010thisworksouttoatleast$75million. 5 _________________________________________________________________________ Usingthreedifferentcostfiguresproducesthefollowingrangeofestimatesforthe 50,300marijuanapossessionarreststheNYPDmadein2010: $1,000anarrestX50,300arrests=$50,300,000 $1,500anarrestX50,300arrests=$75,450,000 $2,000anarrestX50,300arrests=$100,600,000 ItisfairtosaythatNewYorkiscurrentlyspendingfrom$50milliontoover$100millionayear toarrestandprocesspeoplesimplyforpossessingsmallamountsofmarijuana.11 Inthelastfifteenyears,from1996through2010,NewYorkCitymadeatotalof 536,0000arrestsforpossessingsmallamountsofmarijuana.Usingtheabovefiguresproduces thefollowingrange: $1,000perarrestX536,000arrests=$536,000,000 $1,500perarrestX536,000arrests=$804,000,000 $2,000perarrestX536,000arrests=$1,072,000,000 Sofar,NewYorkCity’smarijuanaarrestcrusadehascostfromfivehundredmillionto
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