Secularism in Turkey As a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam: the Ban on the Call to Prayer in Arabic (1932-1950)
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Umut Azak * Secularism in Turkey as a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam: The Ban on the Call to Prayer in Arabic (1932-1950) Résumé. Laïcité en Turquie ou la visée nationaliste d’un islam vernaculaire : l’interdiction de faire l’appel à la prière en arabe (1932-1950). Cet article analyse une réforme du régime kémaliste qui, dans les années 1933-1950, a imposé la récitation de l’appel à la prière en turc et a interdit la version arabe originelle. Cette réforme reflétait la pression nationaliste visant à créer un islam national non affecté par la langue et les traditions culturelles arabes. L’interdiction de l’appel à la prière en arabe faisait partie d’un programme nationaliste plus vaste qui visait à turquifier tous les domaines culturels y compris la religion, et à promouvoir un islam vernaculaire purifié de tout élément étranger. Cette intervention allait dans le sens de la laïcité officielle, car cette dernière ne signifiait pas l’exclusion totale de l’islam de la sphère publique, mais plutôt son contrôle et son soutien tant qu’il demeurait loyal vis-à-vis de l’État moderniste. * 2008/2009 Fellow of'Europe in the Middle East - The Middle East in Europe', a Research Programm of the Berlin Brandenburgishe Akademie der Wissenschaften, the Fritz Thyssen Schiftung and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. REMMM 124, 161-179 162 / Umut Azak Abstract. This article analyzes one of the reforms of the Kemalist state which imposed the recitation of the Turkish translation of the call to prayer and banned its original Arabic version between 1932 and 1950. This reform reflected the nationalist urge to create an Islam unaffected by the Arabic language and Arab cultural traditions. The ban on the call to prayer in Arabic was part of a wider nationalist program which aimed to Turkify all cultural fields including religion and to promote a local vernacular Islam. This intervention was in line with official secularism, because the latter did not mean the total exclusion of Islam from the public sphere, but its control and even its endorsement as long as it remained loyal to the modernist state. Secularism in Turkey is marked by the state’s control over religion rather than a complete institutional separation between the two (Dâver, 1955; Toprak, 1981; Parla and Davison, 2004: 104). Although the republican state, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), rejected Islam as the basis of its legitimacy and radically secularized the legal, political and cultural spheres in the 1920s, it has never had a neutral position vis-à-vis different faiths. The Kemalist regime not only wanted to control religion, but also promoted a national and Sunni Islam rendered compatible with the modern nation-state. In this respect, Kemalists were heirs to the Ottoman Young Turks’ instrumentalist and reformist approach to Islam. They adopted their predecessors’ dream of a pure, Turkish Islam, which was redefined as a matter of individual conscience (vicdan) and hence made congruous with the westernization project (Davison, 1998: 134-88; Parla and Davison, 2004: 108). The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) has been the main official instrument for disseminating this “state Islam” throughout the country. As an organization under direct supervision of the Prime Minister, it appointed imams, preachers and supervised müftüs (muftis) as well as distributing the Friday sermons to the mosques throughout the country (Usta, 2005). In Turkey, secularism (lâiklik > from French laïcité) has been in continuity with the Ottoman tradition of integrating and subordinating Islam to the requirements of the state. As in other Muslim-majority nations of the Middle East, Kemalists accommodated Islam into their nationalist ideology instead of replacing it (Bozarslan, 2000; Asad, 2003). What appeared to be a secular bias was in fact the redefinition and instrumentalization of religion by secular nationalism. Kemalist secularism attempted to reconstruct Islam as a national, rational and individual religion. This “reformist” discourse was reflected clearly in the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, for instance when he explained the rationale for the abolition of the Caliphate in his Speech in 1927: “The faith of Islam should be purified and raised from the political situation in which it has been put for centuries” (Parla and Davison, 2004 : 108). Or during a speech he made in İzmir in January 1923: “Our religion is a most reasonable and most natural religion, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been the last religion. In order for a religion to be natural, it should conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our religion is totally compatible with these (ibid: 110)”. Secularism in Turkey as a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam: The Ban… / 163 As also shown by Parla and Davison, the dichotomy, that is the “distinction made between ‘pure’ Islam and impure Islam tainted by its entanglement in political affairs” is crucial for Kemalist secularism (ibid: 109). The reform of Turkifying the call to prayer in 1932-1933 projected this will to a “pure”, vernacular Islam. The call to prayer (ezan or Ar. adhân), the standard announcement for the call to the service on Friday and the five daily ritual prayers (namaz, or Ar. s. alât) has always been recited in Turkey and everywhere in the world in Arabic (Juynboll, 1987). However, in the 1930s and 1940s, the Kemalist regime in Turkey was committed to end this tradition. The recitation of the call to prayer was in Turkish until June 16, 1950 when the National Assembly amended the law which banned its performance in Arabic. With this amendment, the Turkish call to prayer (ezan) ceased to be compulsory and the original Arabic one was no longer subject to legal penalty. Defenders of Kemalist secularism have since referred to the year 1950 as the beginning of the period of regression. In other words, rather than the content of the reform, its ending has been emblematic for Kemalists as the beginning of secularism’s period of decay and its retreat from the Kemalist principles. It is regarded as the first concession to the anti-secularist counter-revolutionary forces. For instance, on July 18, 1996, the Society for Kemalist Thought issued a press release to commemorate the 66th anniversary of the termination of the Turkish call to prayer (ezan), as “the first reform which became the victim of fanaticism”. More recently, the Commander of Naval Forces, during a speech he made in September 2006 for the opening ceremony of the Military Naval Academy in Tuzla, Istanbul, mourned for this forgotten Kemalist reform. The Commander Vice Admiral Yener Karahanoğlu stated to military students that the Muslim-Turkish nation could read and understand the Koran in its own language only thanks to the Kemalist secular regime, and that the “Turkish ezan was a concession given to counter-revolutionaries”. It is difficult not only for an outside observer but also for an ordinary citizen in today’s Turkey to grasp the relationship between these statements about the call to prayer in Turkish and secularism. The following pages explore the historical roots and the ideological package behind the ban on the Arabic call to prayer, and shed light on the significance of this reform for Kemalist secularism. The pre-republican background The issue of the Turkish call to prayer can be understood in the context of the earlier and larger debate on the language of worship in Islam. There was no 1 Quoted in Erdoğan, 2001: 256. 2 Milliyet, September 29, 2006. REMMM 124, 161-179 164 / Umut Azak parallel in Islamic countries to the reformation movements in Europe which led to the replacement of Latin by vernacular languages. The language of worship in Islam has remained, at least generally, Arabic, which is the unifying language of the Islamic community (ümmet). Among Turks who mostly adopted the Sunni school of thought, the original Arabic text of the Koran has been used during ritual worship. The use of Turkish was limited to Mevlid, which is a famous poem by Süleyman Çelebi (1351-1422) on the Prophet’s birth and life, recited especially on the birthday of the Prophet, as well as on other religious days, and at circumcisions, marriages and memorial ceremonies. This did not mean that the Koran was inaccessible to Turks who could not read Arabic. The first translation of the Koran was made in the first half of the eleventh century in Western Turkistan (İnan, 1961: 8). The Koran was translated into Turkish in the form of exegeses (meâl) or commentaries (tefsir), though not as a substitute for the original text. After 1908, two commentaries on the Koran were published by Şeyhülislam Musa Kâzım (1858-1920) and İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (1869-1946), although they could be published only in part. İslâm Mecmuası (Islam Magazine), the Islamic magazine funded by the Young Turk government from 1914 onwards for promoting the reform of Islam, published translations of the Koran at the top of the first page of every issue (Arai, 1992: 82, 90). Besides, Mehmet Âkif [Ersoy] (1873-1936), a writer and poet with Islamist inclination whose poem was to be chosen as the text of the national anthem in 1921, also wrote articles in the magazine Sebilürreşad (Fountain of the Right Path) where he interpreted some verses of the Koran (Düzdağ, 1987: 278). However, the use of the Turkish translation in worship was another issue. As Islam began to be seen as a mobilizing ideology, the language used during worship gained a special significance. The demands for using Turkish in worship began to be expressed already in the 19th century with the gradual spread of printing presses. Ali Suavi (1839-1878), a Tanzimat intellectual whose ideas can be depicted as proto-nationalism imbued with Islamism, was the first person to publicly defend the use of Turkish in worship (Ülken, 1999: 79-80; Mardin, 1962: 374; cf.