RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 108, 6 February 2012 2

Analysis

An Evaluation of the Results of the Duma Elections By Arkady Lyubarev, Abstract The Duma elections were first and foremost a contest between the state executive, which made use of all administrative resources, and various societal groups forming the opposition. Ultimately, United was able to win a majority, but the number of protest votes nevertheless increased significantly. Considerable variation in the results could be observed from region to region and even within individual regions. This can partly be attributed to the varying level of falsification in different areas. Overall, by falsifying the result of the vote, it is probable that United Russia was given 15 million extra votes, so that the true result for the party can be seen to stand at around 34% and not 49%.

Executive Government as an Election ted by election day; following election day the number Campaigner of reports rose to 7,800. The main peculiarity of the 2011 election to the State Duma was to be found in the fact that the central contest The Election Result did not take place between the seven registered parties. The following table shows the official results of the -par Instead, one of the competing sides was the authorities ties and a comparison with the 2007 Duma elections. at all levels, who threw all their resources into support- According to official figures, United Russia received ing United Russia. just under 50% of the vote and was able to command The candidate list of United Russia was headed by an outright majority of the mandates. By comparison the president. Additionally, it also bore the names of with the last Duma elections, the party, however, lost the head of the presidential administration, 8 members over 12 million votes (over 15%) and 77 mandates (See of the central government and 54 governors. The pres- table and figures on pp. 8 and 9). idential administration assigned the regional adminis- The CPRF and A Just Russia were able to improve trations with the task of making sure that a high pro- their results from 2007 by over 50%, whilst Yabloko portion of the vote went to United Russia. The heads of more than doubled its share of the vote. The result for the regional governments, in turn, called their subordi- the LDPR was also noticeably better, and was their best nates and their dependent officials and business leaders since 1993. This should, however, in the opinion of many together, and issued corresponding assignments which experts, not be considered a success of the party, but as included falsifying the elections. The same practice was the result of a significant number of protest voters who continued at lower levels, which ultimately resulted in voted against United Russia. direct pressure being put on the voters. The results for the Patriots of Russia and Right Cause remained little more than background noise. The Patri- Resistance From Society ots of Russia were able to only marginally improve on The other side in the contest was made up of those sec- their 2007 result. In 2011, Right Cause received fewer tions of society which wished for a change of power. votes than two of the three parties, from which this It was no coincidence that Alexei Navalny, who pub- party has emerged (Civilian Power and Union of Right licly branded United Russia the “Party of swindlers and Forces), received on their own at the 2007 elections. thieves” (this turn of phrase was used by practically all opposition parties in the election campaign) and who Regional Variation had called for people to vote for any party so long as it The election results have become more regionally differ- was not United Russia, became the most important ide- entiated. Although United Russia retained the top posi- ological leader of the election campaign. tion in all regions, the results vary considerably, namely Many citizens reported violations of the electoral between 29.0% in Yaroslavl and 99.5% in the code being carried out by representatives of the adminis- Chechen Republic. The results for United Russia also trations and documented their illegal actions in the elec- varied in the regions with populations predominantly tion campaign with audio and video recordings. These made up of ethnic . Oblast heads up materials have been uploaded on the internet and passed these regions with 66.7%. on to the media. On the Map of violations, a joint proj- United Russia received less than 35% in 15 regions, ect run by GOLOS and the internet publication Gazeta. between 35% and 40% in 17 regions, between 50% and ru, more than 5,000 reports of violations were submit- 60% in 10 regions, between 60% and 70% in 9 regions RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 108, 6 February 2012 3

(including 6 Russian ), between 70% and 90% in at a total of 41.25% and in the 30 largest cities (each 7 regions (five Republics and two Autonomous Okrugs), with an electorate population of over 415,000) at a total and over 90% in the four Republics: , Dages- of 39.66%. The opposition parties achieved their best tan, and . These regional differences results in the large cities, which was particularly evident can not so much be traced back to a corresponding will in the case of Yabloko—the party received 6.76% of the of the electorate as to the level of use of administrative vote in the 30 largest cities. resources, including direct election falsification. Of the regional capitals and the 30 largest cities, the The CPRF attained its best result in Oblast worst result for United Russia could be found in Vladivo- (32.0%), A Just Russia its best in stok (22.69%) and in cities with over 100,000 residents, (28.1%), the LDPR in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous the worst result was in Korolyov, near Moscow, (22.11%). Okrug (22.5%) and Yabloko in St. Petersburg (11.6%). Even worse were the results in several small science towns At the same time, United Russia retained its support in the Moscow hinterland. Thus, the party received just primarily in the north-western regions of the country, 17.72% of the vote in Chernogolovka, where several lead- whilst the heartlands of the LDPR lie in Siberia and ing physics and chemistry institutes are located. the Far East. It is worth noting here that the election United Russia had to concede its leading position results in these regions were those which suffered the to the CPRF in the cities of Vladivostok, Voronezh, least influence from manipulation. Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Kostroma, Novosibirsk, Omsk, The situation for the CPRF is less clear. In the 1990s, Orenburg, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Angarsk the communists found most support in the agricultural (), Dzerzhinsk (), regions of , in the central black-earth , Korolyov, (Moscow Region) and region, in southern Siberia and in the region, i.e. Tolyatti (), to A Just Russia in the cities in the so-called red belt. In the first decade of the 21st of Yekaterinburg, Novgorod and Rybinsk (Yaroslavl century this pattern saw some decline, but nevertheless Oblast), and to the LDPR in Khanty-Mansiysk. remained intact. In 2007, the following regions still represented the ten strongest CPRF heartlands: The Regional Centres and the Regional Altai Region, the Oblasts Belgorod, , Volgo- Periphery grad, Voronezh, Novosibirsk, Oryol, Ryazan, Samara Also of interest are the differences in the results for the and Tambov. At the most recent elections, only Oryol leading parties between the regions as a whole and their and Novosibirsk Oblasts were amongst the top ten. A capital cities. For United Russia there is, almost every- broad range of areas can now be found amongst the where, an imbalance of support concentrated in the out- regions with the highest support for the communists: skirts and away from the capital. In 2007, there was only the Moscow Region and the Oblasts of Irkutsk, Kalin- one exception here, which was the Republic of Dages- ingrad, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, Orenburg tan. In 2011, there were already more: Alongside Dages- and Pskov, demonstrating an unmistakeable drift to the tan were four other Caucasian Republics (Ingushetia, north. This is partly due to the fact that the regions in Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania and Chech- the south were most severely affected by manipulation. nya), as well as the , Stavropol Region The Patriots of Russia and Right Cause failed to and the Oblasts of Astrakhan and Samara. As Syktyvkar, achieve more than three percent in any region. The best Stavropol, Astrakhan and Samara are, according to our result for the Patriots of Russia came in the Republic data, amongst the regions most severely affected by vio- of Ingushetia (2.54%) and the best for Right Cause in lations of the electoral code during the voting and vote- (2.07%), which can be explained by counting processes, we can confidently assume that the the specific party structures in those regions. results there can be put down to acts of falsification. In most regional capitals, United Russia received Voter Behaviour in the Cities fewer votes than in each region as a whole, with a dif- Of particular interest are the election results in the large ference of more than 10% in 27 regions. For the CPRF cities, where a trend has long since developed: In most and A Just Russia, the results in the capitals of most regions, United Russia receives its best results on the regions (70 for CPRF, 65 for A Just Russia) were bet- agricultural outskirts and its poorest in the capital cit- ter than in the outskirts. The results for the CPRF fol- ies. At the 2011 election, this trend was maintained, but lowed this pattern in 48 regions. now with several exceptions. Thus, the result for United Russia in 79 regional cap- The Extent of Election Falsification itals (with the obvious exceptions of Moscow, St. Peters- The fact that the vote and vote-counting processes were burg, and the Moscow and Leningrad Regions) stood accompanied by widespread falsifications is proven both RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 108, 6 February 2012 4

by reports from citizens (members of the election com- being given to United Russia, meaning that their real missions, election observers, media representatives and total of the vote should be around 34 %.1 ordinary voters) who were witness to ballot stuffing and The extent of falsifications varies enormously from repeated voting, as well as by discrepancies between the region to region. The region most severely affected by copies of election protocols from the voting precincts election falsifications was Moscow, where United Russia and the official results for these precincts. Statistical received 46.6% according to official figures, although, analyses also come to this conclusion. according to Shpilkin’s calculations, the real figure was By mid-January, the association GOLOS had just 30.3% (several other projections also show the real received certified copies of election protocols from 476 share of the vote for United Russia to be little over 30%). election precincts, which showed results different from The number of extra votes added to ballot boxes in the those given by the official election results. In these pre- capital is estimated at a million. By comparison, the cincts, United Russia were given 125,149 extra votes (an extent of falsifications in the Regions of Altai, Kras- average of 263 votes per precinct), whilst A Just Russia noyarsk and Perm, as well as the Oblasts of Arkhangelsk, had 22,792 votes taken away, the LDPR 15,443, Yabloko Vologda and Yaroslavl, and the Leningrad and Sverd- 10,108 and the CPRF 9,461. The election turnout had lovsk Oblasts, stands at 1% of voters and therefore lies 66,209 extra voters added to it. According to our estima- within the statistical margin for error. tions, the real scale of the election falsifications, which These events have led to widespread mistrust in the took place during the transcription of the election pro- election results and the electoral system on the whole tocols, is considerably larger. amongst citizens, which expressed itself in the protest The extent to which extra votes were stuffed into actions that took place in December throughout the ballot boxes can be observed with a statistical analysis. country. The President’s Council for the Development Such an analysis has been carried out by various inde- of Civil Society and Human Rights even passed a reso- pendent researchers. Most interesting is the work con- lution on 23rd December, which discredits the moral and ducted by Sergei Shpilkin, who had already developed political basis of the electoral system and the lower house an original method in 2008, with which the scale of fal- of parliament formed on the basis thereof; its demands sifications can be determined. According to Shpilkin’s include ensuring that new election laws are passed as calculations, the artificial increase of the turnout alone soon as possible, in order to allow holding early parlia- (that is, without votes which were shifted around to the mentary elections. detriment of other parties) meant 15 million extra votes Translation: Stephen Bench-Capon

About the Author Arkady Lyubarev is doctor of jurisprudence and leading expert at GOLOS. The present text is a result of the coopera- tion between the Russian NGO “The Association of Non-Profit Organizations ‘In Defense of Voters’ Rights’ GOLOS” and the European Exchange in Berlin for the purpose of observing the Russian Duma elections 2011, supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

Table 1: Results of the Election by Party Lists 2011 2007 Number of Share of the Number of Number of Share of the Number of Party votes vote mandates votes vote mandates United Russia 32,379,135 49.32% 238 44,714,241 64.30% 315 CPRF* 12,599,507 19.19% 92 8,046,886 11.57% 57 A Just Russia 8,695,522 13.24% 64 5,383,639 7.74% 38 LDPR** 7,664,570 11.67% 56 5,660,823 8.14% 40 Yabloko 2,252,403 3.43% – 1,108,985 1.59% – Patriots of Russia 639,119 0.97% – 615,417 0.89% – Right Cause 392,806 0.60% – – – – * = Communist Party of the Russian Federation, ** = Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

1 Shpilkin, S. ‘Matematika vyborov’. in: Troitsky variant, No. 25 (94), 20.12.2011. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 108, 6 February 2012 5

Figure 1: share of the Vote of the Parties Represented in the Duma in the Duma Elections 2007 and 2011

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

64.30% United Russia 49.32%

11.57% CPRF* 2007 19.19% 2011

7.74% A Just Russia 13.24%

8.14% LDPR** 11.67%

* = Communist Party of the Russian Federation, ** = Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

Figure 2: number of Mandates of the Parties Represented in the Duma after the Duma Elec- tions 2007 and 2011

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

315 United Russia 238

57 CPRF* 2007 92 2011

38 A Just Russia 64

40 LDPR** 56

* = Communist Party of the Russian Federation, ** = Liberal Democratic Party of Russia