An Evaluation of the Results of the Duma Elections

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An Evaluation of the Results of the Duma Elections RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 108, 6 February 2012 2 Analysis An evaluation of the Results of the Duma elections By Arkady Lyubarev, Moscow Abstract The Duma elections were first and foremost a contest between the state executive, which made use of all administrative resources, and various societal groups forming the opposition. Ultimately, United Russia was able to win a majority, but the number of protest votes nevertheless increased significantly. Considerable variation in the results could be observed from region to region and even within individual regions. This can partly be attributed to the varying level of falsification in different areas. Overall, by falsifying the result of the vote, it is probable that United Russia was given 15 million extra votes, so that the true result for the party can be seen to stand at around 34% and not 49%. executive Government as an election ted by election day; following election day the number Campaigner of reports rose to 7,800. The main peculiarity of the 2011 election to the State Duma was to be found in the fact that the central contest The election Result did not take place between the seven registered parties. The following table shows the official results of the -par Instead, one of the competing sides was the authorities ties and a comparison with the 2007 Duma elections. at all levels, who threw all their resources into support- According to official figures, United Russia received ing United Russia. just under 50% of the vote and was able to command The candidate list of United Russia was headed by an outright majority of the mandates. By comparison the president. Additionally, it also bore the names of with the last Duma elections, the party, however, lost the head of the presidential administration, 8 members over 12 million votes (over 15%) and 77 mandates (See of the central government and 54 governors. The pres- table and figures on pp. 8 and 9). idential administration assigned the regional adminis- The CPRF and A Just Russia were able to improve trations with the task of making sure that a high pro- their results from 2007 by over 50%, whilst Yabloko portion of the vote went to United Russia. The heads of more than doubled its share of the vote. The result for the regional governments, in turn, called their subordi- the LDPR was also noticeably better, and was their best nates and their dependent officials and business leaders since 1993. This should, however, in the opinion of many together, and issued corresponding assignments which experts, not be considered a success of the party, but as included falsifying the elections. The same practice was the result of a significant number of protest voters who continued at lower levels, which ultimately resulted in voted against United Russia. direct pressure being put on the voters. The results for the Patriots of Russia and Right Cause remained little more than background noise. The Patri- Resistance From society ots of Russia were able to only marginally improve on The other side in the contest was made up of those sec- their 2007 result. In 2011, Right Cause received fewer tions of society which wished for a change of power. votes than two of the three parties, from which this It was no coincidence that Alexei Navalny, who pub- party has emerged (Civilian Power and Union of Right licly branded United Russia the “Party of swindlers and Forces), received on their own at the 2007 elections. thieves” (this turn of phrase was used by practically all opposition parties in the election campaign) and who Regional Variation had called for people to vote for any party so long as it The election results have become more regionally differ- was not United Russia, became the most important ide- entiated. Although United Russia retained the top posi- ological leader of the election campaign. tion in all regions, the results vary considerably, namely Many citizens reported violations of the electoral between 29.0% in Yaroslavl Oblast and 99.5% in the code being carried out by representatives of the adminis- Chechen Republic. The results for United Russia also trations and documented their illegal actions in the elec- varied in the regions with populations predominantly tion campaign with audio and video recordings. These made up of ethnic Russians. Tambov Oblast heads up materials have been uploaded on the internet and passed these regions with 66.7%. on to the media. On the Map of violations, a joint proj- United Russia received less than 35% in 15 regions, ect run by GOLOS and the internet publication Gazeta. between 35% and 40% in 17 regions, between 50% and ru, more than 5,000 reports of violations were submit- 60% in 10 regions, between 60% and 70% in 9 regions RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 108, 6 February 2012 3 (including 6 Russian Oblasts), between 70% and 90% in at a total of 41.25% and in the 30 largest cities (each 7 regions (five Republics and two Autonomous Okrugs), with an electorate population of over 415,000) at a total and over 90% in the four Republics: Ingushetia, Dages- of 39.66%. The opposition parties achieved their best tan, Mordovia and Chechnya. These regional differences results in the large cities, which was particularly evident can not so much be traced back to a corresponding will in the case of Yabloko—the party received 6.76% of the of the electorate as to the level of use of administrative vote in the 30 largest cities. resources, including direct election falsification. Of the regional capitals and the 30 largest cities, the The CPRF attained its best result in Oryol Oblast worst result for United Russia could be found in Vladivo- (32.0%), A Just Russia its best in Novgorod Oblast stok (22.69%) and in cities with over 100,000 residents, (28.1%), the LDPR in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous the worst result was in Korolyov, near Moscow, (22.11%). Okrug (22.5%) and Yabloko in St. Petersburg (11.6%). Even worse were the results in several small science towns At the same time, United Russia retained its support in the Moscow hinterland. Thus, the party received just primarily in the north-western regions of the country, 17.72% of the vote in Chernogolovka, where several lead- whilst the heartlands of the LDPR lie in Siberia and ing physics and chemistry institutes are located. the Far East. It is worth noting here that the election United Russia had to concede its leading position results in these regions were those which suffered the to the CPRF in the cities of Vladivostok, Voronezh, least influence from manipulation. Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Kostroma, Novosibirsk, Omsk, The situation for the CPRF is less clear. In the 1990s, Orenburg, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Angarsk the communists found most support in the agricultural (Irkutsk Oblast), Dzerzhinsk (Nizhny Novgorod Oblast), regions of Southern Russia, in the central black-earth Kolomna, Korolyov, Serpukhov (Moscow Region) and region, in southern Siberia and in the Volga region, i.e. Tolyatti (Samara Oblast), to A Just Russia in the cities in the so-called red belt. In the first decade of the 21st of Yekaterinburg, Novgorod and Rybinsk (Yaroslavl century this pattern saw some decline, but nevertheless Oblast), and to the LDPR in Khanty-Mansiysk. remained intact. In 2007, the following regions still represented the ten strongest CPRF heartlands: The Regional Centres and the Regional Altai Region, the Oblasts Belgorod, Bryansk, Volgo- periphery grad, Voronezh, Novosibirsk, Oryol, Ryazan, Samara Also of interest are the differences in the results for the and Tambov. At the most recent elections, only Oryol leading parties between the regions as a whole and their and Novosibirsk Oblasts were amongst the top ten. A capital cities. For United Russia there is, almost every- broad range of areas can now be found amongst the where, an imbalance of support concentrated in the out- regions with the highest support for the communists: skirts and away from the capital. In 2007, there was only the Moscow Region and the Oblasts of Irkutsk, Kalin- one exception here, which was the Republic of Dages- ingrad, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, Orenburg tan. In 2011, there were already more: Alongside Dages- and Pskov, demonstrating an unmistakeable drift to the tan were four other Caucasian Republics (Ingushetia, north. This is partly due to the fact that the regions in Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania and Chech- the south were most severely affected by manipulation. nya), as well as the Komi Republic, Stavropol Region The Patriots of Russia and Right Cause failed to and the Oblasts of Astrakhan and Samara. As Syktyvkar, achieve more than three percent in any region. The best Stavropol, Astrakhan and Samara are, according to our result for the Patriots of Russia came in the Republic data, amongst the regions most severely affected by vio- of Ingushetia (2.54%) and the best for Right Cause in lations of the electoral code during the voting and vote- Sverdlovsk Oblast (2.07%), which can be explained by counting processes, we can confidently assume that the the specific party structures in those regions. results there can be put down to acts of falsification. In most regional capitals, United Russia received Voter Behaviour in the Cities fewer votes than in each region as a whole, with a dif- Of particular interest are the election results in the large ference of more than 10% in 27 regions. For the CPRF cities, where a trend has long since developed: In most and A Just Russia, the results in the capitals of most regions, United Russia receives its best results on the regions (70 for CPRF, 65 for A Just Russia) were bet- agricultural outskirts and its poorest in the capital cit- ter than in the outskirts.
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