Inflation and Monetary Policy in the Twentieth Century

Inflation and monetary policy in the twentieth century Lawrence J. Christiano and Terry J. Fitzgerald Introduction and summary the early part of the century behave quite differently Economists continue to debate the causes of inflation. in many ways from the data we are accustomed to study- One reason for this is that bad economic outcomes are ing. In particular, we emphasize four differences be- 4 frequently accompanied by anomalous inflation behav- tween the pre- and post-war data: ior. The worst economic performance in the U.S. in the ■ Inflation is much more volatile, and less persistent, twentieth century occurred during the Great Depression in the first half of the twentieth century. of the 1930s, and there was a pronounced deflation at ■ Average inflation is lower in the first half of the that time. Economic performance in the U.S. in the century. 1970s was also weak, and that was associated with a pronounced inflation. ■ Money growth and inflation are coincident in the So, what is it that makes inflation sometimes high first half of the century, while inflation lags money and sometimes low? In one sense, there is widespread by about two years in the second half. agreement. Most economists think that inflation cannot ■ Finally, inflation and unemployment are strongly be unusually high or low for long, without the fuel of negatively related in the first half of the century, high or low money growth.1 But, this just shifts the ques- while in the second half a positive relationship tion back one level. What accounts for the anomalous emerges, at least in the lower frequency components behavior of money growth? of the data. Academic economists attempting to understand These shifts in the behavior of inflation constitute the dynamics of inflation pursue a particular strategy. potentially valuable input in the quest for a good model. They start by studying the dynamic characteristics of The outline of our article is as follows. To set the inflation data, as well as of related variables. These char- background, we begin with a brief, very selective, over- acteristics represent a key input into building and review of existing theories about inflation. We divide the fining a model of the macroeconomy. The economist’s set of theories into two groups: those that focus on model must not only do a good job in capturing the be- “people” and those that focus on “institutions.” We havior of the private economy, but it must also explain describe the very different implications that each group the behavior of monetary authorities. The hoped-for final of theories has for policy. We then turn to documenting product of this research is a model that fits the facts the facts listed above. After that, we review the implica- well. Implicit in such a model is an “explanation” of tions of the facts for theories. We focus in particular the behavior of inflation, as well as a prescription for on the institution view. According to this view, what what is to be done to produce better outcomes.2 To date, much research has focused on data from the period since World War II. For example, considerable Lawrence J. Christiano is a professor of economics at attention and controversy have been focused on the Northwestern University, a research fellow at the National apparent inflation “inertia” in these data: the fact that Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. He acknowledges inflation seems to respond only with an extensive delay support from a National Science Foundation grant to the to exogenous shifts in monetary policy.3 We argue that NBER. Terry J. Fitzgerald is a professor of economics at much can be learned by incorporating data from the St. Olaf College and a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. first half of the century into the analysis. The data from 22 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives is crucial to achieving good inflation outcomes is the Another explanation of the high inflation of the proper design of monetary policy institutions. Our dis- 1970s that falls into what we call the people category cussion reviews ideas initially advanced by Kydland appears in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). They char- and Prescott (1977) and later developed further by Barro acterize monetary policy using a framework advocated and Gordon (1983a, b), who constructed a beautifully by Taylor (1993): Fed policy implements a “Taylor rule” simple model for expositing the ideas. We show that under which it raises interest rates when expected in- the Barro–Gordon model does very well at understand- flation is high, and lowers them when expected infla- ing the second and fourth facts above concerning in- tion is low. According to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, flation in the twentieth century.5 We also discuss the the Fed’s mistake in the 1970s was to implement a ver- well-known fact that that model has some difficulty sion of the Taylor rule in which interest rates were in addressing the disinflation that occurred in the U.S. moved too little in response to movements in expected in the 1980s. This and other considerations motivate inflation. They argue that this type of mistake can ac- us to turn to modern representations of the ideas of count for the inflation take-off that occurred in the U.S. Kydland–Prescott and Barro–Gordon. While this work in the 1970s.6 In effect the root of the problem in the is at an early stage, it does contain some surprises and 1970s lay in a bad Taylor rule. According to the insti- may lead to improved theories that provide a better tution view, limitations on central bankers’ technical explanation of the inflation facts. knowledge about the mechanics of avoiding high inflation are not the key reason for the bad inflation out- Ideas about inflation: People versus comes that have occurred in the past. This view institutions implicitly assumes that achieving a given inflation Economists are currently pursuing several theories target over the medium run is not a problem from a for understanding inflation behavior. However, the technical standpoint. The problem, according to this theories are still in their infancy and are best thought view, has to do with central bankers’ incentives to keep of as “prototypes”: They are too simple to be credibly inflation on track and the role of government institu- thought of as fitting the facts well. Although these re- tions in shaping those incentives. search programs are still at an early stage, it is possible to The institution view—initiated by Kydland and see two visions emerging. Each has different implications Prescott (1977) and further developed by Barro and for what needs to be done to achieve better inflation out- Gordon (1983a, b)—focuses on a particular vulnera- comes. To understand what is at stake in this research, bility of central banks in democratic societies (see it is interesting to sketch the different visions. Our loose figure 1). If people expect inflation to be high (A), they names for the competing visions are the people vision may take protective actions (B), which have the effect on the one hand and the institution vision on the other. of placing the central bank in a dilemma. On the one Although it is not the case that all research neatly falls hand, it can accommodate the inflationary expectations into one or the other of these categories, they are never- with high money growth (C). This has the cost of pro- theless useful for spelling out the issues. ducing inflation, but the advantage of avoiding a re- Under the people vision, bad inflation outcomes cession. On the other hand, the central bank can keep of the past reflect the honest mistakes of well-mean- money growth low and prevent the inflation that people ing central bankers trying to do what is inherently a expect from occurring (D). This has the cost of pro- very difficult job. For example, Orphanides (1999) ducing a recession, but the benefit that inflation does has argued that the high inflation of the 1970s reflects not increase. Central bankers in a democratic society that policymakers viewed the low output of the time will be tempted to accommodate (that is, choose C) as a cyclical phenomenon, something monetary poli- when confronted with this dilemma. If people think cy could and should correct. However, in retrospect this is the sort of central bank they have, this increas- we now know that the poor economic performance of es the likelihood that A will occur in the first place. the time reflected a basic productivity slowdown that So, what is at stake in these two visions, the people was beyond the power of the central bank to control. vision versus the institution vision? Each has different According to Orphanides, real-time policymakers under implications for what should or should not be done to a mistaken impression about the sources of the slow- prevent bad inflation outcomes in the future. The people down did their best to heat up the economy with high vision implies that more and better research is need- money growth. To their chagrin, they got only high ed to reduce the likelihood of repeating past mistakes. inflation and no particular improvement to the econ- This research focuses more on the technical, opera- omy. From this perspective, the high inflation of the tional aspect of monetary policy. For example, research 1970s was a blunder. motivated by the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler argument Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 23 FIGURE 1 Central banker in a democratic society Accommodate inflation expectations with high money growth: Get inflation, but avoid recession (C) Private They take Central individuals protective bank expect inflation actions (B) faces to rise (A) dilemma Do not accommodate inflation expectations: Avoid inflation, but produce recession (D) focuses on improvements in the design of the Taylor rule the dataset into the periods before and after 1960.

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