23/2/18 2:04 PM JOURNAL OF THE JOURNAL FORCES ARMED SINGAPORE POINTER Vol. 44 No. 1 [2018] 44 No. Vol.

pointer Vol. 44 No. 1 [2018] THE JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES POINTER Armed Forces the Singapore of The Journal Features The Prospects for Building Maritime Security Co-operation the in IndianOcean Region – Are FreshInitiatives More Successful than Past Attempts? Wei Chung Chan by ME6 The Viability of Deterrence Strategies for Non-Nuclear States Kam Kai Qing by LTC Combating the Modern War Calvinby ME6 Seah Ser Thong Miitaries Security Non-Traditional Versus Threats by Su ME5 Juncun for Small States Power cance of Air The Strategic Signi by MAJ Jeffrey Ng Zhaohong ictsStabilisation Operations: Dealing with Asymmetric Con within FailedStates by MAJ Peng Jin Ho Understanding the Islamic State and the Threat Poses It by CPT Alvin Leow Boon Teck Pointer cover_Vol44No1.indd 1

Editorial Board

Advisor BG Chua Boon Keat

Chairman COL Simon Lee Wee Chek

Deputy Chairman COL(NS) Irvin Lim

Members COL(NS) Tan Swee Bock COL(NS) Benedict Ang Kheng Leong COL Victor Huang COL Kevin Goh COL Goh Tiong Cheng MAJ(NS) Charles Phua Chao Rong MS Melissa Ong MS Ho Ying Ting MR Kuldip Singh MR Daryl Lee Chin Siong MS Sonya Chan CWO Ng Siak Ping Professor Pascal Vennesson Assistant Professor Daniel Chua MR Eddie Lim

Editorial Team

Editor MS Helen Cheng

Assistant Editor MR Bille Tan

Research Specialists REC David Omar Ting REC Koo Yi Xian PTE Jasmond Oh

 The opinions and views expressed in this journal do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Ministry of Defence. The Editorial Board reserves the right to edit and publish selected articles according to its editorial requirements. Copyright© 2018 by the Government of the Republic of Singapore. All rights reserved. The articles in this journal are not to be reproduced in part or in whole without the consent of the Ministry of Defence.

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ISSN 2017-3956 Vol. 44 No. 1 [2018]

contents

iii EDITORIAL

FEATURES 01 The Prospects for Building Maritime Security Co-operation in the Indian Ocean Region — Are Fresh Initiatives More Successful than Past Attempts? by ME6 Chan Chung Wei

15 The Viability of Deterrence Strategies for Non-Nuclear States by LTC Kam Kai Qing

21 Combating the Modern War by ME6 Calvin Seah Ser Thong

33 Militaries Versus Non-Traditional Security Threats by ME5 Su Juncun

44 The Strategic Signi cance of Air Power for Small States by MAJ Jeffrey Ng Zhaohong

53 Stabilisation Operations: Dealing with Asymmetric Con icts within Failed States by MAJ Ho Jin Peng

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61 Understanding the Islamic State and the Threat It Poses by CPT Alvin Leow Boon Teck

BOOK REVIEW 69 Robert M. Neer, Napalm: An American Biography by Oliver Cheok

PERSONALITY PROFILE

75 Harold Gregory Moore, Jr by Joe Tan

QUOTABLE QUOTES

2016/2017 CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE ESSAY COMPETITION PRIZE WINNERS

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Editorial

Since our independence in 1965, we have understood security co-operation poses for the countries involved how important a safe and secure environment is for as well as the prospects achievable by pushing forward Singapore to thrive, progress and prosper. Indeed, while with this co-operation. Singapore has flourished in the past few decades, we must also recognise the current security threats that LTC Kam Kai Qing’s essay is entitled, ‘The Viability the world faces today. Second Minister for Defence, of Deterrence Strategies for Non-Nuclear States’. LTC Mr One Ye Kung at the dinner reception for the 6th Kam defines deterrence as methods and strategies International Institute of Strategic Studies Fullerton employed by a state to dissuade potential adversarial Forum: The Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting on states from initiating an attack against it. He highlights 29th January 18 highlighted four significant security that this can be done either through ‘deterrence by challenges: developments in the Korean Peninsula, punishment’, whereby the aggressor faces the threat the rise of terrorism, the deliberate spread of online of significant military retaliation were it to pursue any falsehoods, and the retreat of globalisation and the military action, or ‘deterrence by denial’, whereby the increase in states’ protectionist tendencies. Mr Ong states’ military capabilities are significant enough to called upon countries to have an ‘expanded toolkit neutralise any hostile attempts by the aggressor. LTC of solutions’ that went beyond effective military Kam also explains that nuclear deterrence is generally defences.1 more effective than conventional deterrence due to the threat of total annihilation. In conclusion however, he While Singapore continues to fight these threats in stresses that non-nuclear states will still find it in their strategic partnerships with its regional neighbours and best interests to pursue some form of conventional like-minded countries, it is also critical for her to be deterrence as war would prove catastrophic for these vigilant, adaptive and responsive, as can be seen in our smaller countries. He also adds that the non-nuclear efforts in the cyber arena where Mr Ong highlights that states employing deterrence strategies should take care “we are stepping up our efforts to train servicemen not to escalate diplomatic tensions or inadvertently in conducting urban battles and building up our cyber highlight their weaknesses in the process. defence capabilities.”2 ME6 Calvin Seah Ser Thong in his essay, ‘Combating The essays published in this issue cover a broad the Modern War’ explores the strength of the modern range of topics covering maritime co-operation in the conventional military forces and discusses whether Indian Ocean as well as the strategic significance of air they are equipped and trained to deal with the power for small states. There is also a discussion about threats of irregular warfare. In the essay, ME6 Seah the viability of deterrence strategies for non-nuclear emphasises that while wars in the past were almost states and militaries versus non-traditional security purely conventional, the nature of modern wars have threats. Other topics include a general discourse on shifted towards hybrid warfare, involving a mixture of understanding the Islamic state and the threat it poses both conventional and irregular strategies. The nature and combating the modern war. Finally, we also feature of the threats that militaries must address now range an analysis on stabilisation operations, dealing with across a spectrum, and are no longer constrained to asymmetric conflicts within failed states. direct military confrontations. Instead, especially The essay, ‘The Prospects for Building Maritime with regards to asymmetric wars with one military’s Co-operation in the Indian Ocean – Are Fresh Initiatives capabilities being far surpassed by another’s, smaller More Successful than Past Attempts?’ is written by ME6 militaries can achieve their strategic victories through Chan Chung Wei. According to ME6 Chan, the Indian employing tactics such as insurgency or small-scale Ocean Region consisting of 56 independent states, ambushes. This, according to ME6 Seah, enables them including the littoral and hinterland states as well as to inflict mass casualties while minimising their own small islands of external territorial states, is a region losses. ME6 Seah advocates that in order to combat such of importance for seaborne trade. However, with 60% hybrid warfare, militaries such as the Singapore Armed of failed states and 40% of conflicts in the world in Forces have and should continue to enhance leadership the region, the economy and social stability of trade competencies, intelligence-gathering capabilities, in the major sea route are threatened by the frequent integration of technology and bonds with the local occurrence of illegal activities such as maritime populace. They should also strengthen international terrorism and piracy. In the essay, ME6 Chan elaborates and interagency alliances as well as consider force on the complex and simple problems that maritime restructuring to deal specifically with hybrid warfare.

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The essay, ‘Militaries Versus Non-Traditional of a sovereign government no longer function properly. Security Threats’ by ME5 Su Juncun analyses the role Although stabilisation operations cover a wide of the military in dealing with non-traditional threats. spectrum ranging from peace to war, MAJ Ho’s focus In the past, the role of the military was limited to is primarily on stabilisation operations within failed conventional combat. However, in the light of changing states, both during a post-conflict scenario or as a security landscapes and technological climates, the result of political instability. MAJ Ho examines the scope of the military has extended to dealing with critical role that military forces play in stabilisation, non-traditional threats like that of cyber threats and analyses the development of stabilisation doctrine warfare. ME5 Su stresses that cyber warfare is an entirely employed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and discusses how new domain of warfare and while militaries have made important it is to engage in stabilisation operations progress in implementing security infrastructure, much when dealing with failed states in the region or during more has yet to be done. the post conflict phase in war. ME5 Su also looks at another area of concern – In the final essay on ‘Understanding the Islamic that of humanitarian disasters. According to MAJ Ng, State and the Threat It Poses’, CPT Alvin Leow Boon while much disaster relief has already been provided by Teck describes the menace the Islamic State of Iraq militaries in disasters around the world, historically, and Syria (ISIS) presents to the world. In particular, there have still been some major inefficiencies. He CPT Leow highlights that the emerging trend of cases feels that greater inter-military co-ordination is still of globally orchestrated terror attacks by radicalised required to solve these problems. individuals who identify with the extremist group, puts focus on their effective recruitment methods and the MAJ Jeffrey Ng Zhaohong, in his essay, ‘The Strategic threat they bring to global nations. He then elaborates Significance of Air Power for Small States’, highlights on how ISIS’s operational and recruitment methods that air power is an extremely effective capability and differ from that of Al Qaeda, the threat the extremist its strategic significance should not be overlooked, group brings to national security in Southeast Asia and especially by geo-strategically disadvantaged small the recommendations on how to prevent and combat states, for whom air support may be vital for survival. foreseeable terror attacks by ISIS. MAJ Ng stresses that air power can help small states solve their problem of a lack of strategic depth, whilst At this juncture, POINTER would like to bid farewell denying enemies the same advantage. While resource- to three key members of the POINTER Editorial Board. We heavy bombings are unrealistic for small nations, wish to thank Ms Deanne Tan Hui Ling, Mr Josiah Liang precision strikes could strategically be used to and ME6 Jason Lim and for their full support. POINTER considerably weaken the enemy as well. Nonetheless, has benefitted from their insightful observations on a MAJ Ng feels that air power is best employed when wide variety of subjects. in conjunction with land and maritime assets in an We would also like to bid a fond farewell to CFC integrated campaign. He also adds that air power also Macalino Minjoot, CFC Oliver Cheok and PTE Joe Tan. We serves as a strong international diplomatic tool during thank them for their contributions and wish them all humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations. MAJ Ng the very best in their future endeavours. concludes that overall, air power is a vital tool that Singapore should invest heavily in. POINTER would also like to extend a very warm welcome to Ms Melissa Ong and Ms Ho Ying Ting as they MAJ Ho Jin Peng presents his perspective on join the POINTER Editorial Board. We would also like to ‘Stabilisation Operations: Dealing with Asymmetric welcome as well, two members from the Rajaratnam Conflicts within Failed States’. MAJ Ho defines School of International Studies, Prof Pascal Vennesson stabilisation operations as military missions which and Assoc Prof Daniel Chua Wei Boon who bring their are aimed at creating stability in a certain area, with experience and professional expertise in regional no place for insurgents, terrorists and threats while a politics and strategic studies to POINTER. failed state is a political body that has deteriorated to a point where essential conditions and responsibilities The POINTER Editorial Team

ENDNOTES 1 https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2018/january/ 29jan18_speech 2 Ibid

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THE PROSPECTS FOR BUILDING MARITIME SECURITY CO-OPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION — ARE FRESH INITIATIVES MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN PAST ATTEMPTS? by ME6 Chan Chung Wei

Abstract:

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) consisting of 56 independent states, including the littoral and hinterland states as well as small islands of external territorial states, is a region of importance for seaborne trade. However, with 60% of failed states and 40% of conflicts in the world in the region, the economy and social stability of trade in the major sea route is threatened by the frequent occurrence of illegal activities such as maritime terrorism and piracy. In this essay, the author elaborates on the complex and simple problems that maritime security co-operation poses for the countries involved, as well as the prospects achievable by pushing forward with the co-operation.

Keywords: Seaborne Trade; Social Stability; Maritime Terrorism; Failed States; Maritime Security Co-operation

INTRODUCTION littoral states and island states in the Indian Ocean, as well as land-locked states that depend on the

2 “Great potential exists for the international Indian Ocean for trade and communications. The community and regional organisations to improve IOR is a heterogeneous region in many aspects that international co-operation, to strengthen security include culture, economy, social norms and politics. in the region, and to create a broad-based Indian It also contains some of the poorest nations and Ocean security strategy that is acceptable to all. 60% of failed states in the world. According to the This is certainly a difficult undertaking. In the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, 40% of the conflicts meantime, specifically in maritime security terms, in the world are in the IOR.3 Many of the threats the Indian Ocean has rough seas ahead.” to the IOR’s maritime security are linked to either -Potgieter, 2012 1 political instability or conflicts in the region. Within

Indeed, it is a formidable challenge to build the IOR, security co-operation has traditionally enduring maritime security co-operation that been organised at the sub-regional level, such as encompasses the entire Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa and the The IOR can be seen as a geopolitical construct of Persian Gulf. Due to the geostrategic importance of

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the IOR, there is a growing interest amongst nation- territories of external states. Some examples are states, including extra-regional ones, to focus on United Kingdom’s British Indian Ocean Territories, IOR’s maritime security in the 21st century. In spite or Chagos Archipelago and France’s Territory of of this growing interest, there is a dearth of region- French Southern and Antarctic Lands. In addition, wide platforms to tackle maritime security concerns two of the major global powers, the United States within the IOR. In order to secure safe seas in the (US) and China, have significant interests in the IOR IOR, collective efforts are required. However, there and have military presence in the region. The Indian needs to be an alignment of interests for nation Ocean provides the major sea routes connecting states to want and commit towards coming together East Asia, Middle East, Europe and North America and working on maritime security issues. via the choke points at Suez Canal, Ban-el-Mandeb, Straits of Hormuz and Straits of Malacca. This essay aims to determine the prospects for building maritime security co-operation in the IOR Due to the geostrategic importance of and to look for grounds where fresh initiatives the IOR, there is a growing interest might be more successful than past attempts. This essay will identify the openings and impediments amongst nation-states, including extra- to co-operation in the IOR through examining the regional ones, to focus on IOR’s maritime st geopolitics in the IOR and the threats to IOR’s security in the 21 century. maritime security. This essay is organised into three These choke points are strategic vulnerabilities parts. First, it will examine the geopolitics in the IOR. that could strangle the flow of seaborne trade and Second, the threats to the IOR’s maritime security are examined to find aligned interests amongst the hydrocarbon, of which 40% of the global oil exports 5 state actors in the IOR. Third, the prospects for co- pass through. As such, a common global interest is operation are analysed to find grounds for fresh to ensure freedom of navigation through the Indian initiatives towards building successful maritime Ocean’s sea lanes of communications (SLOC). security co-operation in the IOR. The success and Each of the IOR’s nation-states and external failure of existing co-operation initiatives will be powers has their respective national interests. This examined in the various sections. is due to their differing political perspective and GEOPOLITICS IN THE IOR ideology, as well as cultural, economic, social and

This section will look at the geopolitics in the IOR religious make-up. Each nation will act to secure to provide the basis for analysing and determining their national interests and define their relationships the prospects for maritime security co-operation in with other nations accordingly. In areas where there the IOR. Cordner defined the IOR as consisting of is an alignment of interests, nations will engage in ‘56 independent states, including the littoral and strategic co-operation with one another; conversely, hinterland states, most of which are developing in areas where their interest clashes, nations will countries.’4 There are also small islands that are the engage in strategic competition with one another.

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The Indian Ocean provides the major sea large diverse grouping than smaller sub-regions.

routes connecting East Asia, Middle East, Compared to other parts of the world, the IOR has Europe and North America via the choke the highest proportion of failed states and conflicts. points at Suez Canal, Ban-el-Mandeb, Failed states, such as Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are plagued with political instability or conflicts and Straits of Hormuz and Straits of Malacca. can be said to be sources of maritime security issues In Bouchard and Crumplin’s paper, ‘The IOR is that affect the global commons, especially on the perceived to be a disaggregated oceanic and littoral security of the seas along the maritime borders of region; more a collection of sub-regions than a these states. The IOR is also a simmering hotpot of single region.’6 Within the IOR, the Indian Ocean Rim rivalries between nation-states. Amongst the IOR Association (IORA) is thus far the only strategic-level states, the rivalries between Shia-ruled Iran and regional institution that had managed to achieve Sunni-ruled Arab states as well as Pakistan and India some modest success. However, it is also noted are potential flashpoints for inter-state conflicts in that only 20 out of the 48 Indian Ocean littoral the IOR. These instabilities and conflicts present both and island states are a member of the IORA. Other opportunities as well as impediments to co-operation similar platforms such as the Indian Ocean Maritime in the IOR. Affairs Co-operation (IOMAC) have even much lesser success. IORA still pales in comparison to some of The IOR states and external powers have the sub-regional institutions, such as the Association different conceptions of the region that of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional centre on their respective economic and Forum (ARF), Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and security interest. South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). While the highest political representation Beyond the IOR states, external states, including at IORA meetings is the foreign ministers, the summit the major powers, have various strategic interests in the IOR. Kaplan perceived ‘the Indian Ocean as meetings of the sub-regional institutions are attended another theatre for potential great rivalry between by the heads of government as well as external the US, China and India.’7 The US has considerable participants’ top political leadership. This reflects interest in the maritime domain in the IOR. The US the relative importance that the IOR nations place Navy has a significance presence in the Western Indian on the sub-regional institutions vis-à-vis regional Ocean as part of their war against terror. The Chinese institutions. The IOR states and external powers is growing their presence and exerting their influence have different conceptions of the region that centre in the IOR. A key Chinese concern is to secure the flow on their respective economic and security interest. of trade and oil that is used to power their economy.8 Although these interests might not be dissimilar, India, in response to the increased presence of the they are manifestations of the differing strategic Chinese in the Indian Ocean, is increasing efforts perspectives. Consequently, it is much more difficult to strengthen bilateral ties with other Indian Ocean to find common grounds for co-operation amongst a littorals.9 It is also seen to be taking a leading role

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in regional institutions such as the IORA and Indian to maritime security. There is no universal consensus Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Although the Sino-US on the definition of maritime security. While nations rivalry is likely to be played out mainly in the Pacific, have a consensus on illegal activities such as piracy the Indian Ocean might still witness some spill overs. and maritime terrorism, nations also differ in their In terms of Sino-Indian relations, although China has opinions to classify certain activities such as illegal stated its benign intentions in the Indian Ocean, fishery as maritime security issues. For the purpose there still exists competitive rivalry in trade and of this essay, a broader understanding of maritime power projection.10 As a whole, the geopolitics of security that is used by Klein, Mossop and Rothwell these major powers in the IOR is still evolving and – ‘the protection of a state’s land and maritime its development will certainly have an impact on territory, infrastructure, economy, environment and the evolvement of maritime security co-operation in society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea the region. is adopted.’11

THREATS TO IOR’S MARITIME SECURITY Maritime security issues in the IOR have come This section examines the threats to IOR's under the limelight in the 21st century. This is maritime security and assesses the potential for driven by global concerns that the conflicts in the state actors to co-operate. The assessment is Middle East and piracy originating from Somalia primarily based on whether there is an alignment will disrupt the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf of national interests amongst the state actors to and choke the global trade that are shipped through co-operate and the respective state’s capacity to the Indian Ocean SLOC. In addition, the sub- contribute to collective efforts to tackle the threats regions of the Middle East and South Asia are the MINDEF

Former Chief of Navy, Rear-Admiral Lai Chung Han speaking at the closing of the Maritime Information Sharing Exercise and the ASEAN Maritime Security Information Sharing Exercise held at the Changi Command and Control Centre in May 2017.

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centres of gravity for extremist and radical groups, Gulf of Aden. In addition, Sunni-ruled states fear such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that a victorious Shia-Houthis could threaten their and al-Qaeda, and the spread of their ideology safe passage through the Ban-el-Mandeb.13 While and terrorist activities are a cause of concern, the consequent maritime security threats arising especially for states in the Western world and South from these failed states can be considered as East Asia. Other than the threats of piracy and simple problems to solve, the core of the problem is maritime terrorism, there are other traditional and complex and challenging. non-traditional threats that threaten the maritime Another complex problem in the IOR is the security in the IOR. These include intra and inter- strategic competition between states. The IOR is state conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass the scene of several inter-state rivalries. Pakistan destruction, natural disasters, illegal fishing, and India are traditional rivals in the region and climate change and forced migration. Some of these have fought four wars since their independence. It threats are complex problems that are challenging should also be noted that both countries possess to resolve. These include the traditional threats of nuclear weapon capability and are building up their intra and inter-state conflicts, and keeping good naval nuclear forces.14 In the Middle East, inter-state order at sea. The remaining threats can be classified rivalries exist between the Shite-ruled Iran and the as simple security challenges where the solutions Sunni-ruled Arab States. The US also has strategic might not be easy but the problems and solutions interest in this rivalry. While the implementation of set can be clearly defined. the Iranian nuclear deal had led to improvement in Another complex problem in the IOR ties between Iran, US and her allies, it remains to be seen whether this will translate to a more secure is the strategic competition between maritime arena in the region. China is building up states. The IOR is the scene of several her presence in the Indian Ocean by increasing inter-state rivalries. her naval presence and has also developed a ‘string of pearls’ consisting of 4 ports in Gwadar, COMPLEX PROBLEMS Hambantota, Chittagong and Sittwe.15 While the The political instability in the IOR’s failed states Chinese had stated their benign intent in the Indian presents favourable conditions for illegal activities Ocean, nevertheless their strategic presence is still to fester and subsequently become a threat to the viewed with suspicions by their strategic rivals, global commons. The political instability in Northern the US and India. In Southeast Asia, Indonesian Iraq and Syria had given rise to ISIS. Similarly, president, Joko Widodo, had recently declared the civil war in Yemen had created opportunities his intent to transform Indonesia into a maritime for both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) power.16 While it remains unclear if Jokowi is able and an ISIS-affiliate in Yemen to exploit and carry to successfully implement his maritime policy, it is out attacks in Yemen.12 The ongoing concern is that certain that Indonesia will be more assertive in the these terror groups could then exploit the littorals maritime domain. As a whole, the existence of the to threaten the shipping through the Red Sea and major and regional powers in the IOR creates the potential for missteps between competing states as

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well as opportunities for co-operation on common attacks on USS Cole and MV Limburg in the Arabian interest areas. Sea and the 2008 Mumbai attack by the terrorist groups al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba respectively. SIMPLE PROBLEMS The problem is not only confined to the Middle Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has been grabbing East and South Asia regions, but also threatens the headlines of the press around the world. To the maritime security in Southeast Asia. In recent a lesser extent, piracy in the Malacca Straits years, these terror groups have become more and the South China Seas has also been headline creative in their modus operandi. For example, al news but nevertheless attracts equal attention -Qaeda militants had attempted to hijack a by states that have an interest in maintaining Pakistani warship in 2014 and the foiled operation freedom of navigation for seaborne trade. In order had reportedly included rouge Pakistani naval to counter the Somali pirates, some nations have officers.17 It is also a concern that piracy could banded together, such as joining the Combined become a conduit for terrorists to conduct their Task Force 151 (CTF151) under the US-led Combined activities. Within the IOR, the activities and Military Force (CMF), while some, such as Russia influence of these terrorist and extremist groups and China, have deployed independently to the Gulf are not only confined to the Middle East and South of Aden. In the Malacca Straits, there are various Asia, but also extended to Southeast Asia and East co-operative counter-piracy efforts such as the Africa. Hence, there would be common interests for Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) involving the littorals the IOR states to work together. No single nation and the Singapore-led International Fusion Centre has the capacity nor means to tackle the threat of (IFC). These various measures in the Gulf of Aden terrorism alone. A multi-lateral effort is required, and Malacca Straits have been largely successful especially in the sharing of intelligence. The in curtailing the pirates’ activities. In the Gulf of terrorist groups operate in a transnational domain Aden, it is unlikely for some of the independent and the sharing of intelligence between states will deployed forces, especially Russia and China, to join enable the build-up of a coherent picture of terrorist the coalition task forces due to strategic rivalries activities and allow enforcement agencies to thwart between these states and the US. their activities. Compared to the co-operation on No single nation has the capacity nor kinetic actions such as joint storming of a ship hijacked by terrorists, the sharing of information means to tackle the threat of terrorism does not physically infringe on a state’s sovereignty. alone. A multi-lateral effort is required, Under the current law of the sea regime, there are especially in the sharing of intelligence. no provisions for another state to unilaterally board a terrorist-held ship of another flag, unless there Maritime terrorism is a major security concern is agreement from the flag state. Having said this, in the IOR, as it could disrupt global shipping and there is still scope for physical co-operation to threaten the physical security of the littorals. Most maritime security. For example, both regional and of the notable maritime terrorist attacks had extra-regional states participate in the CMF’s CTF occurred in the Indian Ocean. These include the 150/152, which includes counter-terrorism as part

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Regional security challenges such as terrorism, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, and Maritime Security were discussed at the 2016 ASEAN-US Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting.

of their maritime security operations. In addition, foreign militaries had provided humanitarian the key to defeating such terror and extremist assistance and disaster relief (HADR) to the affected groups is in the land and ideology space to arrest countries. There is a growing consensus amongst the key perpetuators and counter the narratives nation-states that HADR is a benign platform for by these groups respectively. Effective counter- co-operation and that militaries, especially those terrorism mechanisms will require co-operation at with naval expeditionary capabilities can provide three levels of strategic, operational and tactical effective aid to the stricken state. At the operational amongst nation states. level, institutions such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the ASEAN Defence Minister’s The IOR has witnessed some of the most Meeting (ADMM-Plus) have included HADR as part devastating natural disasters in the last 25 years. of their agenda. In addition, naval forces in the Foremost is the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake IOR, such as the CMF, also regularly conduct HADR where the resultant tsunami led to wide-spread exercises. In 2014, Singapore had set-up the Changi devastation in several IOR’s states, including Regional HADR Co-ordination Centre (RHCC) under Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to support the 1991 Bangladesh tropical cyclone killed more than affected country’s military to co-ordinate foreign 135,000 and was described as one of the worst military responses. The RHCC was put into action disasters of the 20th century.18 In both disasters, in the 2014 Nepal Earthquake. These combined

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exercises and operational experiences from the to achieve a win-win outcome in the challenging numerous disasters in the region, including the maritime security environment. Traditionally, there Asia-Pacific, have provided states with a framework is a lack of recognition of the IOR as a conceptual to co-ordinate and co-operate when responding strategic area. Given the diverse make-up amongst to an affected state. There is common interest for the IOR states and external powers, co-operation is nation-states to provide assistance to affected possible where there is a convergence of interest. states and hence there is much scope for militaries This section examines the prospects for inter-states, in the IOR to expand their co-operation on HADR co-operation efforts in the IOR with emphasis on activities. the strategic and operational levels.

PROSPECTS FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE IOR At the strategic level, there is currently a lack of region-wide strategic platforms to discuss maritime Sam Bateman argued that an integrated approach security. Thus far, the largest platform is the IORA is needed to reconcile the differences in the Indian and its membership number is only a fraction of the Ocean.19 This entails taking a multi-dimensional IOR states. However, the IORA avoids the hard topic approach towards security whereby softer threats of maritime security and skirts around the issue. such as natural disasters are discussed alongside It was only during India’s turn as chairman that harder issues, such as the security of SLOCs. maritime security was added to IORA’s agenda in States need to realise that co-operation is needed MINDEF

Personnel from the Republic of Singapore Navy with personnel from the ADMM-Plus participating navies on board HMNZS Canterbury during the exercise.

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2011. In order for IORA to be an effective region-wide the regional and external states. These include the forum, it needs to beef up its membership. However, anti-piracy efforts in both the Arabian Sea and a prerequisite is to have meaningful conversations Malacca Straits, the maritime security operations by about maritime security on its agenda. When this the CMF and the HADR responses to major disasters. is done, other IOR states will then see the value of Although the co-operation is largely in small groups joining the IORA. Simple problems such as piracy rather than theatre-wide participation, they have and counter-terrorism that are common interests been largely successful in meeting their mission. A could be emphasised during the initial confidence- key success factor is due to the common interest building stage before more challenging issues are amongst the participating states. It is also noted weaved into the discussions. This will then create that nations, despite sharing common interests, will a self-reinforcing loop for successful co-operation. still decide to approach the problem independently due to overarching strategic reasons. Examples are The IORA could also invite the external powers with the Chinese and Russians in their counter-piracy an interest in the IOR to participate as observers. efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Noting the relative success of the sub-regional institutions such as ASEAN and GCC, the IORA could A key success factor is due to also learn from these institutions and apply the lessons learnt within IORA. the common interest amongst the participating states. At the operational level, the IONS is the only CONCLUSION region-wide platform for the regional navies and aims to increase the maritime co-operation among In conclusion, this essay had examined the the navies of the littoral states in the Indian geopolitics and threats to maritime security Ocean by providing an open and inclusive forum within the IOR. The success and failure of current for discussion of relevant maritime issues. In co-operation initiatives were also examined to order for the IONS to be more effective, it could determine the prospects for further co-operation. expand its agenda to include exercises, in addition Given that the IOR is a region made up of disparate to the current conference style. These exercises, states with each having its own national interests, whether in the form of table-top exercises or it is naturally difficult to have co-operation at the ground-deployment, serves as both a confidence- whole-of-region level. Nevertheless, there will be building measures and building up the co-operation common interests that will draw states together mechanism amongst the IONS’ navies. The theme of to co-operate and tackle the problem. Within the these exercises could be non-conventional security IOR, such common interests lie in the threats to threats, such as counter-piracy, counter-terrorism the global common of keeping the Indian Ocean’s and HADR. This approach is similar to that taken by SLOCs free for navigation. Hence, any prospects for ADMM-Plus. advancing co-operation in maritime security will lie in these common interest areas.  Beyond institution building, there are many instances of successful naval co-operation amongst

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ENDNOTES April 2009. Retrieved from http://www.ipcs.org/ seminar/navy/maritime-strategy-indian-and-american- 1. Potgieter, T. D. (2012, August). Maritime Security in the perspectives-476.html. Indian Ocean: Strategic Setting and Features. Institute for Security Studies Paper 236. Retrieved from http:// 11. Klein, N., Mossop, J. and Rothwell, D. R. (2010). www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf. “Australia, New Zealand and Maritime Security” in Klein, N., Mossop, J. and Rothwell, D. R. (eds), 2. Ibid. Maritime Security: International Law and Policy 3. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand. (2011). Conflict Barometer 2011. Heidelberg, Germany: Routledge, Oxford, 1 (8). HIIK. Retrieved Jun 09, 2015 from http://www.hiik.de/ 12. BBC News. (2015, Mar 26). Yemen Crisis: Who is Fighting en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2014.pdf. Whom? Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/ 4. Cordner, L. (2010). Maritime Security in the Indian world-middle-east-29319423. Ocean Region: Compelling and Convergent Agendas. Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 2(1), 13. Ibid. 16-27. 14. Gady, F. S., (2015). India and Pakistan Locked in Nuclear 5. Wagner, C. (2013). The Indian Ocean Rim – Association Armed Race. The Diplomat. Retrieved from http:// for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC): The Futile Quest thediplomat.com/2015/03/india-and-pakistan-locked- for Regionalism? Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, in-a-nuclear-naval-arms-race/. 9(1), 6-16. 15. Wagner, C. (2013). The Indian Ocean Rim – Association 6. Cordner, L. (2014). Indian Ocean Maritime Security for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC): The Futile Quest Cooperation Needs Coherent Indian Leadership. Journal for Regionalism? Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, of Defence Studies, 8(3), July–September 2014, 31–56. 9(1), 6-16. 7. Wagner, C. (2013). The Indian Ocean Rim – Association 16. Shekhar, V. and Liow, J. C. (2014). Indonesia as a for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC): The Futile Quest Maritime Power: Jokowi's Vision, Strategies, and for Regionalism? Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Obstacles Ahead. Retrieved from http://www.brookings. 9(1), 6-16. edu/research/articles/2014/11/indonesia-maritime- liow-shekhar. 8. Potgieter, T. D. (2012, August). Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Setting and Features. Institute 17. Hasan, S. S., Shah, S. and Gorman, S. (2014, Sept 6). Al for Security Studies Paper 236. Retrieved from http:// Qaeda Militants Tried to Seize Pakistan Navy Frigate. www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper236.pdf. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www. wsj.com/articles/al-qaeda-militants-tried-to-seize- 9. Rajan, D.S. (2014). China in the Indian Ocean: Competing pakistan-navy-frigate-1410884514. Priorities. The Maritime Great Game: India, China, US & The Indian Ocean. 195, 7-9. Retrieved from http:// 18. Cyclone Kills 135,000 in Bangladesh (2009). History. www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR150-IPCSSpecialFocus- Com. Retrieved from http://www.history.com/this-day- MaritimeGreatGame.pdf. in-history/cyclone-kills-135000-in-bangladesh. 10. Rai, R. (2009). Maritime Security: Indian and American 19. Bateman, S. and Bergin, A. (1995). Building Blocks for Perspectives. IPCS Report for Seminar Held on 30 Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean.

ME6 Chan Chung Wei is a Naval Warfare Systems Engineer by vocation and is currently the Commanding Officer of System Readiness Engineering Centre (Network & Sensors) in Naval Logistics Command. He also holds a Masters of Science in Electrical Engineering from Naval Postgraduate School, USA where he was presented the Space and Naval Warfare Command Award in Electronics Systems Engineering, and a Masters of Science in Defence Technology and Systems from National University of Singapore under the SAF Postgraduate Award. ME6 Chan graduated from the 46th Command and Staff Course, GKSCSC.

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THE VIABILITY OF DETERRENCE STRATEGIES FOR NON-NUCLEAR STATES by LTC Kam Kai Qing

Abstract:

Deterrence refers to methods and strategies employed by a state to dissuade potential adversarial states from initiating an attack against it. This can be done either through ‘deterrence by punishment’, whereby the aggressor faces the threat of significant military retaliation were it to pursue any military action, or ‘deterrence by denial’, whereby the states military capabilities are significant enough to neutralise any hostile attempts by the aggressor. Nuclear deterrence is generally more effective than conventional deterrence due to the threat of total annihilation. However, non-nuclear states would still find it in their best interests to pursue some form of conventional deterrence as war would prove catastrophic for these smaller countries. Furthermore, the non-nuclear states employing deterrence strategies should take care not to escalate diplomatic tensions or inadvertently highlight their weaknesses in the process.

Keywords: Deterrence; Nuclear; Conventional; Small States; Defence

INTRODUCTION nuclear war apocalypse that some had prophesied never materialised. The new security dynamics that emerged out of the Cold War however sparked fresh “Then it may well be that we shall by a process of questions with regard to the means and relevance of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story deterrence strategies. The prevailing desire of key where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” powers to reduce their reliance on the very weapons -Sir Winston Churchill1 that brought the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust has led security analysts to evaluate the extent to which the stability of nuclear deterrence The above proclamation, made in reference to can be replicated with conventional weaponry.2 nuclear proliferation during the Cold War, reflects

Churchill’s belief that the common fear of destructive This essay discusses the issue of conventional nuclear retaliation will paradoxically create a deterrence and specifically examines the viability of stable strategic environment where nuclear powers deterrence strategies for non-nuclear states. We will are deterred from initiating attacks against one first begin by explaining the concept of deterrence another. Churchill was proven right in this regard; and the key constituents of a deterrence strategy. the Cold War ended without direct military conflict Next, we will compare nuclear and conventional between the competing nuclear powers, and the deterrence strategies and demonstrate that the

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The USS George Washington (SSBN-598), lead ship of the US Navy’s first class of nuclear-armed submarines.

premises on which nuclear deterrence strategies We will make two important observations on are founded on cannot be readily applied in the deterrence theory. First, a fundamental assumption realm of conventional deterrence. Finally, we will of the theory is the rationality of state actors. This distil the challenges that non-nuclear states face means that a state must assume that its adversaries in adopting deterrence strategies and how they can are utility maximisers (i.e. make decisions based mitigate them. Through this, we argue that non- on expected utilities of the choices), in order for nuclear states can enjoy only limited success in their deterrence strategies to work as the theory their adoption of deterrence strategies because of predicts. This assumption has often been disputed the contestable nature of conventional deterrents. by case study analysts who argue that political decision makers do not typically carry out mental WHITHER DETERRENCE? calculations or even assign probabilities to outcomes.6 However, rational deterrence theory “[The United States needs] deterrent military power is about actors making decisions based on what such that the Soviet and Chinese leaders will have they think will best enhance their position and no doubt that an attack on the United States would responding to disincentives and incentives in ways surely be followed by their own destruction.” that we expect them to. It is ‘agnostic about the -John F. Kennedy3 actual calculations decision makers undertake.’7 For example, we say that an adversary is rational and As the subject of this essay necessitates us to do a can be deterred when it considers relative military comparative study between the deterrence strategies of nuclear and non-nuclear states, we will limit the scope strengths and what it is likely to achieve out of war; of our discussion specifically to the context of military it is not necessary that the aggressor calculates deterrence against state actors.4 We define deterrence actual probabilities of success. Understanding this in this regard as a state’s means to dissuade a potential concept helps us invalidate some of the criticisms adversarial state from ‘initiating an aggressive action’ against deterrence theory and the strategies that against it.5 are built on its premises.

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Second, it is not easy to find empirical support punishment’, where it threatens military retaliation for deterrence theories, and especially so in the in response to any defined provocations against it. case of conventional deterrence.8 While incidences In this case, the course of provocation would seem of wars can arguably be used as test cases where disproportionately costly and therefore unsound deterrence has failed, it is much harder to collect to the aggressor, regardless of the success of the data on deterrence successes. As Brodie puts it, initiating action.10 The late-President Kennedy’s ‘because avoidance not only of war but even of crises articulated deterrence strategy at the beginning hardly makes good copy for historians, we may infer of this section is one such example—the United that past [deterrence] successes… add up to much States (US) must threaten would-be aggressors with more than one would gather from a casual reading of retaliatory annihilation so as to dissuade countries history.’9 Researchers seeking to find data to support from initiating attacks against it. or discredit deterrence theories often also suffer Second, a state can employ ‘deterrence by from selective bias, as it is difficult to determine denial’, where it convinces its adversaries through in retrospect whether states in their selected case demonstration of its defensive capabilities that any studies had adopted deterrence strategies in the acts of aggression against it will have little or no first instance. Thus, for our purpose of studying the probability of success. The French construction of principles of deterrence, we will adopt the primary the Maginot Line during the inter-war years falls approach of deductive theorising, and apply case within this category. It sought to deter aggressors studies only for illumination and not for proof. not by threatening retaliatory punishment, but by To these ends, a successful deterrence denying their odds of success. strategy in practice must satisfy three To these ends, a successful deterrence strategy criteria: the deterring state must in practice must satisfy three criteria: the deterring (1) possess and demonstrate the state must (1) possess and demonstrate the military capability to repel or inflict disproportionate military capability to repel or inflict damage on the adversary; (2) convince the adversary disproportionate damage on the that it has the will to do so if threatened; and (3) is adversary; (2) convince the adversary able to communicate clearly to the adversary its ‘red that it has the will to do so if threatened; lines’ with regard to what it views as unacceptable behaviour against it.11 Specifically on the and (3) is able to communicate clearly communication of red lines, we accept that states to the adversary its ‘red lines’ with may employ deterrents to prevent other states from regard to what it views as unacceptable committing acts short of military provocation that behaviour against it. are nevertheless against its interest. For example, China has threatened the use of force to deter Taiwan Based on our assumption of rationality, there from declaring independence. These articulated are two broad categories of deterrence strategies ‘red lines’ and threatened responses must however by which states may dissuade aggressive actions appear credible to the adversary and be worth going against it. First, a state can adopt ‘deterrence by to war for in the event of deterrence failure.

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of advanced military equipment contributes to its ability to defend itself, as well as sends deterrent signals to its potential adversaries. While earlier scholars (particularly those who write during the Cold War era when nuclear deterrence dominated strategic thought) view deterrence and defence strategies as alternatives, they are more commonly recognised today as complements.13 It is often in states’ interests to deter against the heavy costs of war even if they are confident of self-defence. Thus, deterrence and defence strategies are not mutually exclusive, even though the underlying principles may differ.

In the following sections, we will apply this concept of deterrence to compare the efficacies of nuclear and conventional deterrence strategies. Wikipedia

American soldiers inspecting one of the 75mm gun batteries of the Maginot Line constructed by France during the CONVENTIONAL VS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE inter-war years. Conventional and nuclear deterrence differ not

It is opportune at this juncture to make the only in their destructive capabilities, but also distinction between deterrence and defence in the dynamics that they create in the strategies. While deterrence produces security communication of these capabilities as well as the by threat of retaliation or expectation of denial ‘red lines’ that trigger their use. This creates the before the initiating act of aggression, defence problem of ‘contestable costs’ for conventional does so through physical obstruction after the deterrence strategists.14 aggressor establishes its intent. Thus, defence Scholars and decision makers rarely dispute the is possible without deterrence and vice versa. A destructive potential of nuclear weapons. When state may be able to physically repel an invasion without prior communication of its ability to do nuclear weapons are employed against cities and so to its adversary. Similarly, a state can have the other strategic targets, it is not simply military wherewithal to credibly threaten retaliatory action defeat, physical property or even lives that are at against its adversary and yet be unable to prevent stake, but also the complete destruction of the its own destruction, as exemplified through the enemy as a viable society.15 Thus, in a ‘deterrence ‘mutually assured destruction’ strategies during the by punishment’ strategy, the possession of nuclear Cold War.12 This notwithstanding, a country’s means weapons in itself communicates a state’s ability to of pursuing deterrence and defence may often be inflict unacceptable costs on its adversaries, should complementary, particularly in deterrence by denial it choose to do so. Furthermore, there is to date no strategies. For instance, a country’s acquisition reliable defence against nuclear weapons, nor is there

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any means to mitigate its damage. Thus, the only directly threaten the deterring state’s survival. important variables that affect the credibility (and Conventional deterrence strategies are on the consequently stability) of a nuclear ‘deterrence by other hand less reliable because of the challenges punishment’ strategy are whether the deterring state that states face in communicating the credibility of is (1) capable of ordering a nuclear retaliation after their deterrents. First, it is difficult for the deterring absorbing the initiating attack; and (2) willing to do state to establish its ability to inflict punishment or as such.16 deny an aggressor, because conventional capabilities When nuclear weapons are employed are often highly dependent on intangible variables against cities and other strategic targets, such as the technical skills of their users, and the counter-capabilities that the aggressor possesses.20 it is not simply military defeat, physical The impact of conventional weapons is also less property or even lives that are at stake, immediate and therefore less salient in comparison but also the complete destruction of to nuclear forces. Thus, an adversary could regard a the enemy as a viable society. deterring state’s ability to retaliate or defend itself with some scepticism, and this would then have little The former variable is relatively easy to determine, impact on their cost-benefit calculus. based on the deterring state’s possession of second- strike capabilities. Such is its stabilising effect that Second, there is often also ambiguity in how mutual deterrence can be attained between two conventional deterrents would be employed, and this nuclear states even when power asymmetry exists. In creates room for miscalculations. In a conventional this regard, Thomas Schelling argues that ‘it is not deterrence environment, the will of a state in the balance—the sheer equality or symmetry in the exercising its threat should not be seen purely in situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is binary terms (i.e. in terms of whether it chooses to the stability of the balance.'17 The second variable, retaliate or not), but instead as a graduated scale of that of the deterring state’s will to conduct nuclear how it chooses to do so. This is unlike the case of retaliation, is harder to prove. Against a nuclear nuclear deterrence strategies, where the outcomes adversary, one’s nuclear retaliation in response to are more discrete (the state chooses either to punish conventional attacks is tantamount to suicide.18 There its adversary by obliterating its cities, or not). It are also moral and ethical dilemmas concerning actions is however much harder to predict the outcome in or ‘red lines’ that could legitimise a nuclear response. a conventional deterrence scenario, because the These notwithstanding, there is little disagreement deterring state can respond to a trigger in several over the credibility of nuclear states to exercise what different extents, depending on its deterrence scholars have termed as ‘basic deterrence’, that is, doctrine. It can for instance adopt a denial approach communicating the certainty of nuclear retaliation by neutralising the adversary, or a punishment if they are threatened with annihilation first.19 Thus, approach by retaliating or even annihilating the and as corroborated empirically, nuclear ‘deterrence adversary. Unless these doctrines are articulated by punishment’ strategies can at the minimum beforehand, the adversary can underestimate the dissuade adversaries from undertaking acts that degree of the deterring state’s response and its

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US Marines fighting in Seoul, Korea during the Korean War.

implied costs on the adversary, and this can lead to conventional deterrence strategies less robust. In deterrence failure. For example, scholars have argued the following section, we will examine the means that it was the US’ underestimation of the scale of that non-nuclear states can adopt to mitigate China’s military response to its attempt to reunify these challenges. Korea that led to the escalation of the Korean War.21 DETERRENCE STRATEGIES FOR NON-NUCLEAR STATES Notwithstanding conventional deterrence’s inherent deficiencies, it is still in many 'The mission of MINDEF and the Singapore Armed non-nuclear states’ interest to pursue Forces is to enhance Singapore’s peace and security deterrence strategies, particularly if we through deterrence and diplomacy, and should adopt a realist outlook. these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor.' Thus, conventional deterrence is a more delicate, -Ministry of Defence, Singapore22 dynamic and therefore unpredictable affair in comparison to nuclear deterrence. In a conventional Notwithstanding conventional deterrence’s deterrence setting, ambiguity over destructive inherent deficiencies, it is still in many non-nuclear capabilities and the deterrence doctrine guiding states’ interest to pursue deterrence strategies, their employment creates the problem of contestable particularly if we adopt a realist outlook. The costs. This can lead to deterrence failure through vast majority of non-nuclear states today do not miscalculations of outcomes, thereby making even qualify as regional or medium powers, and

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therefore have few diplomatic levers over their likely intended target adversaries and tailor the deterrence adversaries by which they can significantly enhance messages to specifically discredit the adversaries’ own their security with. This is compounded by the fact capabilities. The intent is to emphasise the deterring that many of the smaller non-nuclear states suffer state’s ability to overcome the adversary’s defensive from strategic vulnerabilities that make war costlier forces and wreck destruction in its home territories and more difficult to recover from. In such cases, (in ‘deterrence by punishment’ strategies), or to avoidance of war altogether is preferred even over dent the adversary’s expectation of military success military victory (as evident in MINDEF’s articulated (in ‘deterrence by denial’ strategies). Conversely, mission), and deterrence favoured over defence. This adopting a broad strategy of ‘general deterrence’ is especially given our earlier assertion that adopting against unspecified targets is much less likely to a primarily deterrence approach does not necessarily succeed in a conventional deterrence environment, compromise one’s ability to defend oneself. because the adversary is then left to its own For example, Singapore’s political leaders have often assessment of its comparative military advantages cited its lack of strategic depth and natural resources against the deterring state. This accentuates the as critical vulnerabilities that necessitate a strong problem of contestable cost. deterrent military force that would also serve as a defender of last resort.23 This dissuades adversaries The deterring state’s efforts in from exploiting its vulnerabilities and threatening its conveying the tactical strengths of its survival. It is therefore pertinent that we examine deterrents may unintentionally cause the means that non-nuclear states can undertake to its vulnerabilities to be revealed as well. enhance the viability of their deterrence strategies.

Second, the deterring state must also communicate As we have argued earlier, the root of conventional its likely actions to breaches of its ‘red lines’ within deterrence’s deficiencies lies in the problem of its deterrence doctrine, such that the adversary is contestable cost. Thus, addressing the contestable left with little doubt on the extent (and cost) of the nature of its deterrents is at the crux of a conventional deterring state’s response. Doing so averts the risk deterrence strategy.24 States may do so in two ways. of miscalculation arising from an underestimation First, the deterring state must bolster the credibility of the deterring state’s response. As an illustration of its military deterrent capability. In other words, of this, in the 1990s, then-Singapore Prime Minister it must convince its adversary that it can inflict the Lee Kuan Yew is reported to have warned his Malaysia threatened level of cost if it is provoked.25 In this counterpart, Dr Mahathir Mohamad that should water regard, and because of the dynamics of conventional shortage in Singapore become urgent as a result of a deterrence, it is necessary for the deterring state to breach of Malaysia’s Water Agreement with Singapore, convey some information on its military doctrines to Singapore would have to go into Johor to restore the demonstrate how it translates its Order of Battle into water flow, ‘forcibly if need be.’26 concrete losses for the adversary, taking into account any possible countermeasures that the adversary These measures however come with their may possess. One corollary is that an effective inherent risks. The deterring state’s efforts in conventional deterrence strategy must identify its conveying the tactical strengths of its deterrents

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may unintentionally cause its vulnerabilities to be misinterpreted Egypt’s deterrence posturing in the revealed as well. This paradoxically compromises lead-up as indications of its aggressive intent.28 the deterring state’s ability to defend itself or carry out its retaliatory threat should deterrence fail and Thus, conventional deterrence strategies can offer no guarantee of security for non-nuclear states. Even war breaks out. For example, Harknett argues that in its efforts to resolve the root problem of contestable Israel’s failure to deter Egypt from initiating war costs, states risk inadvertently creating conditions in 1973 was ironically because of the effectiveness that further destabilise its security environment. of Israel’s deterrent air and armour forces; once the Egyptians found tactical solutions that negated these CONCLUSION capabilities, they were able to exploit loopholes in In summary, conventional deterrence strategies the Israeli strategy.27 Similarly, in asserting its will to are founded on much weaker theoretical grounds retaliate militarily against breaches of its ‘red lines’, in comparison to nuclear deterrence. Because the deterring state could instead escalate diplomatic ‘conventional deterrence represents contestable tensions and provoke its adversary to undertake a costs,’ the outcomes of conventional deterrence pre-emptive war. This is especially so if the adversary are less predictable and more subjectable to the misinterprets the deterrent intent as sabre-rattling, adversary’s miscalculations.29 Thus, non-nuclear and becomes unsure of the deterring state’s desire states will find no panacea to their security to avoid war in the first instance. For example, some problems through deterrence strategies alone. scholars have posited that Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Egypt that sparked the 1967 Six-Day War was a This notwithstanding, we must appreciate consequence of such deterrence failure; Israel had that deterrence remains many non-nuclear states’ Wikipedia

Israeli Air Force officers next to an Egyptian MiG-21 destroyed during Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Egypt.

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best alternative to war. Given the deficiencies of Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (pp. 230-54). Cambridge: conventional deterrence strategies, it is perhaps Harvard University Press. apt for these states to regard their security with a Sheehan, M. (2013). Military Security. In A. Collins, healthy dose of paranoia.  Contemporary Security Studies (3rd ed., pp. 147-160). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Steinbruner, J. (1983). Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions. In K. Knorr (Ed.), Power, Achen, C. H., & Snidal, D. (1989). Rational Deterrence Strategy, and Security (pp. 103-25). Princeton: Princeton Theory and Comparative Case Studies. World Politics, 41(2), University Press. 143-169. Zelman, W. (1967). Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: Art, R. J. (1980). To What Ends Military Power? International A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence. Los Angeles: University Security(Spring), 3-35. of California. Betts, R. K. (1991). The Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar Era. Security Studies, 1(1), 25-36. ENDNOTES Brodie, B. (1958). The Anatomy of Deterrence. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation. 1. Churchill, 1955

Churchill, W. (1955, March 1). Never Despair. Speech 2. Friedberg, 1994 presented at the House of Commons, London, UK. 3. Coleman & Siracusa, 2006, p. 81 Cohen, R. (1988). Intercultural Communication Between 4. While we acknowledge that states may also adopt Israel and Egypt: Deterrence Failure Before the Six-Day War. deterrence strategies against non-state actors such as Review of International Studies. terrorist organisations, it is difficult to find evidence Coleman, D., & Siracusa, J. (2006). Real-World Nuclear that the efficacies of such strategies are in any Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy. Westport: way influenced by the state’s possession of nuclear Greenwood Publishing Group. weapons (or lack thereof). Thus, for the purpose of our Forge, J. (2013). Designed to Kill: The Case Against Weapons comparative study, we are focusing our discussion on Research. New York: Springer. deterrence against state actors alone.

Friedberg, A. (1994). The Future of American Power. 5. Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 14 Political Science Quarterly, 109(1), 1-22. 6. Steinbruner used the example of the Cuban missile Harknett, R. J. (1994). The Logic of Conventional Deterrence crisis to argue that Kennedy’s actions were not driven and the End of the Cold War. Security Studies, 4(1), 86-114. by rational calculations of the Soviet’s intentions, but rather by his fear of impeachment if he did nothing at Huxley, T. (2000). Defending the Lion City - The Armed all. Steinbruner, 1983, p. 110 Forces of Singapore. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin. 7. Achen & Snidal, 1989, p. 164 Lee, K. Y. (2000). From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965-2000. Singapore: The Straits Times Press and 8. While proponents of nuclear deterrence often point to Times Media Pte Ltd. the fact that no two nuclear states have gone to war against each other, this is drawing on a relatively much Mearsheimer, J. (1983). Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca, smaller sample size in comparison to conventional NY: Cornell University Press. deterrence. MINDEF. (n.d.). Mission. Retrieved March 21, 2015, from 9. Brodie, 1958, p. 4 Ministry of Defence, Singapore: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/ imindef/about_us/mission.html 10. Sheehan, 2013, p. 154-5

Schelling, T. (1980). Surprise Attack and Disarmament. In T. 11. Sheehan, 2013, p. 155

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12. Art, 1980, p. 7

13. Art writes that “a state that can defend itself from attack, moreover, will have little need to develop the wherewithal to deter… A state that cannot defend itself, however, will try to develop an effect deterrent if that be possible.” Art, 1980, p. 7.

Betts, 1991, pp. 34-5

14. Harknett, 1994, p. 89

15. Forge, 2013, p. 88

16. Harknett, 1994, p. 89

17. Schelling, 1980, p. 232

18. Sheehan, 2013, p. 155

19. Brodie, 1958, pp. 5-6

20. Harknett, 1994, pp. 88-9

21. Zelman, 1967; Harknett, 1994, pp. 94-5

22. MINDEF

23. Huxley, 2000, p. xix

24. Harknett, 1994, p. 92

25. Harknett, 1994, p. 95

26. Lee, 2000, p. 276

27. Harknett, 1994, pp. 98-9

28. Cohen, 1988

29. Harknett, 1994, p. 92(

LTC Kam Kai Qing is a helicopter pilot by vocation, and is presently the Commanding Officer of 126 SQN. He is a recipient of the Singapore Army Forces (SAF) Overseas Scholarship in 2003, and was the Top Air Force Graduate for the 46th Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff Course. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Mathematics and Economics from the University of Chicago.

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COMBATING THE MODERN WAR by ME6 Calvin Seah Ser Thong

Abstract:

While wars in the past were almost purely conventional, the nature of modern wars have shifted towards hybrid warfare, involving a mixture of both conventional and irregular strategies. The nature of the threats that militaries must address now range across a spectrum, and are no longer constrained to direct military confrontations. Instead, especially with regards to asymmetric wars with one military’s capabilities being far surpassed by another’s, smaller militaries can achieve their strategic victories through employing tactics such as insurgency or small- scale ambushes. This enables them to inflict mass casualties while minimising their own losses. To combat such hybrid warfare, militaries such as the Singapore Armed Forces have and should continue to improve their leader’s competencies, intelligence-gathering capabilities, integration of technology and bonds with the local populace. They should also strengthen international and inter-agency alliances as well as consider force restructurings to deal specifically with hybrid warfare.

Keywords: Modern War; Conventional; Irregular; Hybrid Warfare; Threats

INTRODUCTION but is that so? With modern conventional military forces looking to address the full continuum of threats, this essay explores if they are equipped and “Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting trained to deal with the threats of irregular warfare. conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The first section will provide the definitions for -Carl von Clausewitz, Military Theorist 1 conventional military forces as well as describe modern warfare. The next section will contrast Land forces have, over time, learned many hard conventional and irregular warfare. The last section lessons about the effectiveness of irregular warfare will present a comparison between conventional in conflict. In recent times, we have witnessed a and irregular wars before showing how conventional decrease in interstate conflicts (See Figure 1). military forces can meet the challenges of irregular Modern warfare has become characterised by warfare. Glimpses of how the Singapore Armed ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics which have been described Forces (SAF) has evolved to tackle such challenges as a complex variation of irregular warfare blending will also be illustrated. conventional and irregular approaches.2 As the focus CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES of conventional forces has traditionally been force- on-force military operations, they seem to be ill- So what are conventional military forces? The equipped and ill-trained for the modern battlefield, United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD)

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2 features Figure 1. Decreasing trends in Interstate conflicts 22

Figure 1: Decreasing trends in Interstate conflicts.3 CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES has designated that conventional forces provide the MODERN WARFARE bulk of the nation’s military power. They consist of So what are conventional military forces? The UnitedAs mentioned, States ( USmodern) Department warfare ofhas Defense become (DOD) combat and support elements from all four services, has designated that conventional forces provide the characterisedbulk of the bynation’s ‘hybrid warfare’military tactics power. which They blend consist excluding units dedicated to special operations and of combat and support elements from all four services,conventional excluding and units irregular dedicated approaches. to special While operations the nuclear deterrence. They provide the nation with and nuclear deterrence. They provide the nation withterm the ‘hybridability warfare’ to support has been its defence used to describe strategy, the which the ability to support its defence strategy, which focuses on shaping the international environment andstrategy responding used by theto aHezbollah full range in theof crises.2006 Lebanon To achieve focuses on shaping the international environment War, it has been recognised that hybrid warfare is this, conventionaland responding forcesto a full conduct range of crises.forward To achieve presence missions, engage in a range of smaller-scale not a new kind of warfare. Rather, it is 3a complex contingenciesthis, conventional and conduct forces combat conduct operationsforward presence up to, and including, major theatre wars. Conventional variation of irregular warfare.6 The North Atlantic militarymissions, forces areengage therefore in a rangepoised of tosmaller-scale carry out conventional warfare, which has been defined as Treaty Organisation (NATO) has chosen to define a interstatecontingencies warfare thatand conduct employs combat direct operations military upconfrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, hybrid threat as one that is not limited to a single to, and including, major theatre wars.4 Conventional destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seizeform or retainand dimension territory of warfare, in order thus to modern force warfarea change in military forces are therefore poised to carry out an adversary’s government or policies. The focus ofcould conventional be represented military by Figure operations 2.7 is normally an adversary’sconventional armed warfare, forces withwhich thehas objectivebeen defined of influencingas the adversary’s government.4 interstate warfare that employs direct military So, if hybrid warfare is a complex variation of confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed irregular warfare, what then is irregular warfare? The MODERNforces, destroy WARFARE an adversary’s war-making capacity, US DOD defines irregular warfare as a violent struggle or seize or retain territory in order to force a change among state and non-state actors for legitimacy inAs an aforementioned,adversary’s government modern or policies. warfa There focus has becomeand influence characterised over the by relevant‘hybrid warfarepopulations.’ tactics which blendof conventional conventional military and operations irregular isapproaches. normally WhileIt further the states term that ‘hybrid irregular warfare’ warfare favours has been indirect used to describean theadversary’s strategy armed used forces by thewith Hezbollahthe objective in ofthe and2006 asymmetric Lebanon approaches, War, it has though been it recognisedmay employ that 5 hybrid influencingwarfare is the not adversary’s a new kind government. of warfare. Rather, itthe is afull complex range of v ariationmilitary andof irregular other capabilities, warfare .5 The

North POINTER,Atlantic JOURNAL Treaty OF THE SINGAPOREOrganisation ARMED FORCES (NATO ) has chosen to define a hybrid threat as oneVOL.44 that NO.1 is not limited to a single form and dimension of warfare, thus modern warfare could be represented by Figure 2.6 21-34_ Combating the Modern War_1.1.indd 22 23/2/18 3:16 PM

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features 23 Figure 2. Hybrid threats encountered in Modern Warfare7 to an overmatch of capabilities.13 The advantage that irregular war fighters such as guerrillas have is that they ‘own the ground’ and are unconcerned with time. They do not seek a decisive battle, and prefer to engage in raids, skirmishes, and ambushes. This keeps their casualties down, while conversely frustrating and inflicting casualties on highly casualty-sensitive conventional military forces.

It has been postulated that various Figure 2: Hybrid threats encountered in Modern Warfare.8 adversaries of conventional military forces So, if hybrid warfare is a complex variation of irregular warfare, what then is irregular warfare? The US DOD definesin order irregular to warfareerode asan a violentadversary's struggle amongpower, state influence, and non-state actorshave for continued to embrace asymmetric legitimacy andand influence will. over9 Irregular the relevant warfare populations. can It furtherconsist state ofs that operations irregular warfare means favours due to their unwillingness to indirect and asymmetricsuch as approaches,counter-insurgency though it may operations, employ the full information range of military andcombat other conventional military forces 8 capabilities, inoperations, order to erode anpsychological adversary's power, influence,operations and will .as Irregular well warfare as candirectly consist due to technological and of operations suchcounter-terrorism as counterinsurgency operations. operations, information It is recognised operations, psychological as the operations as well as counterterrorism operations. It is recognised as the oldest form of warfare, andresource is a disadvantages. oldest form of warfare, and is a phenomenon that phenomenon that has gone by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, ‘little wars’, has gone by many names, including tribal warfare, CONTRASTING IRREGULAR AND and low intensity conflict.9 The purpose of irregular warfare, like all other forms of warfare, is to win. primitive warfare, ‘little wars’, and low intensity CONVENTIONAL WARFARE It is ultimately poised to achieve the strategic purpose of the war and involves the control of forces, conflict.10 The purpose of irregular warfare, likean all adversary’s forces or territory ( ). Ultimately, irregular warfare is a political populations and territory. The focus ofright conventional diagram, Figure 3 military operations struggle with violent and non-violent components. The struggle is for control or influence over, and other forms of warfare, is to win. It is ultimately is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the the support of, a relevant population. The foundation for irregular warfare is the centrality of the poised to achieve the strategic purpose of the But why resort to irregular warfare? It has been postulated that variousrelevant adversaries populationsobjective of to the of nature influencing of the conflict. the The partiesadversary’s to the conflict government seek to bolster their own conventional militarywar and forces involves have continued the tocontrol embrace asymmetricof forces, means populations due to legitimacytheir unwillingness and(see credibility Figure to exercise 3a). authorityIt is overgenerally the population assumed.13 that the to combat conventionaland territory. military forces directly due to technological and resource disadvantagesindigenous.10 populations within the operational Conventional military forces have the advantage of tremendous firepower, excellent strategic and Figure 3. Contrasting Irregular and Conventional Warfare But why resort to irregular warfare? It has been operational mobility, the discipline of professionals, massive logistic support and effective structures postulated that various adversaries of conventional to guide and control operations. In a stand-up fight in open terrain, they can destroy asymmetric forces easily.11military Irregular warfareforces has thushave been thecontinued panacea to an overmatchto embrace of capabilities .12 The advantage thatasymmetric irregular war fightersmeans such due as guerrillas to their have isunwillingness that they ‘own the toground ’ and are unconcerned withcombat time. Theyconventional do not seek a decisivemilitary battle, forcesand prefer directly to engage indue raids, skirmishes, and ambushes.to This technologicalkeeps their casualties anddown, whileresource conversely disadvantages. frustrating and inflicting11 casualties on highly casualtyConventional-sensitive conventional military military forces forces. have the advantage of tremendous firepower, excellent strategic and CONTRASTINGoperational IRREGULAR mobility, AND the CONVENTIONAL discipline of professionals, WARFARE massive logistic support and effective structures to The focusguide of conventional and control military operations. operations is normallyIn a anstand-up adversary’s fight armed forces with the objective ofin influencing open terrain, the adversary’s they governmentcan destroy (left diagram,asymmetric Figure 3 ).forces It generally assumes 'a' 'b'

that the indigenouseasily. populations12 Irregular within warfare the operational has thus area beenare non the-belligerents panacea and willFigure accept 3: Contrasting Irregular and Conventional Warfare. There are a number of dimensions across which conventional and irregular wars will differ. At least whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate nineor cannegotiate. be identified A and are contrasted in Table 1.14 However, while we contrast the two kinds of POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL.44 NO.1 fundamental militaryPOINTER, objective JOURNAL in OFconventional THE SINGAPORE military ARMED operations FORCES is to minimise civilianwarfare, interference. we need to be cognisant that future conflicts will likely be hybrid in natureVOL.44 rather NO.1 than simple In contrast, irregular warfare focuses on the control or influence of populations, notblack on -theor-white control characteris of ations of one form of warfare. Thus, instead of separate challengers with fundamentally different approaches (conventional, irregular, or terrorist); we can expect to face 15 21-34_ Combating the Modern War_1.1.indd 23 competitors who will employ all forms of war simultaneously. 23/2/18 3:16 PM 3 Table 1. Contrasting the Different Dimensions of War Dimensions Conventional War Irregular War Organisation Organised Informal Technology Advanced technology At-hand technology Logistics Logistics-dependent Logistics-independent Direction National direction Local direction Doctrine Coherent doctrine Ad hoc doctrine Type of Battle Decisive battle Raids and skirmishes Forces Soldiers Warriors Relationship among parties Allies Accomplices Relationship with Society Segregation Integration

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Conventional one form of warfare. Thus, instead of separate Dimensions Irregular War War challengers with fundamentally different approaches Organisation Organised Informal (conventional, irregular, or terrorist), we can expect Advanced At-hand to face competitors who will employ all forms of Technology technology technology 16 Logistics- Logistics- war simultaneously. Logistics dependent independent National WINNING THE IRREGULAR WAR Direction direction Local direction Coherent While the military cannot sacrifice its ability to Doctrine Ad hoc doctrine doctrine conduct major conventional combat operations, it Raids and can perform peripheral changes to its force design, Type of Battle Decisive battle skirmishes Forces Soldiers Warriors providing marginal enhancements to better its Relationship performance at stability operations without giving among parties Allies Accomplices up its ability to do what it does best—large scale Relationship Segregation Integration with Society conventional combat operations.17 It is thus about

Table 1: Contrasting the Different Dimensions of War. balance, as typified in Figure 4. The strategic area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever guidance provided in the 2005 US DOD National political outcome the belligerentWINNING governments THE IRREGULARDefence Strategy WAR identified that comprehensively impose, arbitrate or negotiate. A fundamental defeating irregular forces may require operations military objective in conventional Whilemilitary the militaryover cannotlonger sacrifice periods, its using ability many to conduct elements major of conventional national combat operations, operations is to minimise civilian interference.it can perform Inperipheral power. changes Such to operationsits force design, may providing require marginal changes enhancements to to better its contrast, irregular warfare focuses performanceon the control at stability the operations way that without militaries giving train, up its abilityequip toand do whatemploy it does best – large scale 16 or influence of populations, not onconventional the control combat of their operations forces.. 18 It is thus about balance, as typified in Figure 4. The strategic an adversary’s forces or territory (seeguidance Figure provided 3b). in the 2005 US DOD National Defence Strategy identified that comprehensively What about the SAF? In Singapore, the SAF’s Ultimately, irregular warfare is a politicaldefeating struggle irregular forces may require operations over longer periods, using many elements of primary role of assuring Singapore’s sovereignty with violent and non-violent components.national The strugglepower. Such operations may require changes to the way that militaries train, equip and has never been questioned. In fact, with the SAF’s is for control or influence over, andemp theloy support their forces of, .17 roots in learning from Israeli advisors and the a relevant population. The foundation for irregular US, it is already able to tackle forms of irregular warfare is the centrality of the relevant populations to Figure 4. Balancing the Military Force18 the nature of the conflict. The parties to the conflict seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over the population.14

There are a number of dimensions across which conventional and irregular wars will differ. At least nine can be identified and are contrasted in Table 1.15 However, while we contrast the two kinds of warfare, we need to be cognisant that future conflicts will likely be hybrid in nature rather than simple black-or-white characterisations of Figure 4: Balancing the Military Force.19

POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES What about the SAF? In Singapore, the SAF’s primary role of assuringVOL.44 NO.1 Singapore’s sovereignty has never been questioned. In fact, with the SAF’s roots in learning from the US, it is already able to tackle forms of irregular warfare as these militaries have historically faced irregular threats such as 21-34_ Combating the Modern War_1.1.indd 24 23/2/18 3:16 PM those of the Philippine-American and Vietnam Wars as well as insurgent attacks by the Palestinians, respectively.19 In 2004, we saw the SAF embark on a 3rd Generation transformation journey to address the increasing challenges posed by irregular security threats. This has transformed the SAF to one that is networked, integrated and able to operate across a full spectrum of operations. Besides its conventional role, the SAF is now able to respond flexibly to irregular threats. So, how can the conventional military counter the threats of irregular warfare? Through the earlier contrasting of conventional and irregular warfare, I will explore the tenets of Intelligence, Technology, Force Structure, Training, Alliances and Populace Integration in the proceeding paragraphs (See Figure 5).

5

Figure 5. Countering Irregular Warfare

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Figure 5: Countering Irregular Warfare. INTELLIGENCE warfare as these militaries have historically faced precise and timely information to enable actionable irregularWith the threats focus of such irregular as those warfare of theon the Philippine- population, operationsintelligence are such dispersed as targetingand require and precise striking. 21 Americanand timely and information Vietnam Warsto enable as well action asable insurgent intelligence Collecting, such as targeting analysing and and striking assimilating.20 Collecting, information attacksanalysing, by and the assimilating Palestinians, information respectively. is a formidable20 In challengeare formidable in environments challenges such in asenvironments Somalia and such as 21 2004,intelligence we saw failures the SAF can embark be disastrous on a 3, rdas Generation shown in Vietnam Somalia. As andsuch, intelligence intelligence failures is the Holy can Grailbe disastrous, in tackling the irregular challenge and integrating awareness and effects of the local, regional and global transformation journey to address the increasing as shown in Vietnam.22 As such, intelligence is the dynamics into the campaign design is necessary. Intelligence consists of both operational intelligence challenges posed by irregular security threats. Holy Grail in tackling the irregular challenge and as well as cultural intelligence in understanding the cultural landscape of the conflict zone and gaining This has transformed the SAF to one that is the ability to win the intelligence battle. integrating awareness and effects of the local, networked, integrated and able to operate across a regional and global dynamics into the campaign fullOPERATIONAL spectrum of operations. INTELLIGENCE Besides its conventional design is necessary. Intelligence consists of role, the SAF is now able to respond flexibly to both operational intelligence as well as cultural

irregular threats. So, how can the conventional The military must be able to collect and fuse informationintelligence from a wider in variety understanding of sources the and cultural establish landscape militarysystems counter to share the intelligence threats of across irregular services, warfare? the government,of the conflict and zonewith andpartners gaining. 22 In the the ability SAF, to win Throughsituational the awareness earlier contrasting is garnered fromof conventional a suite of sensors the whereas intelligence the sharing battle. of information can be andgarnered irregular from warfare, initiatives I will such explore as the theInformation tenets of Fusion Centre (IFC) that allows for the sharing of Operational Intelligence Intelligence,information withTechnology,, and between Force , Structure,international Training, security partners.23 Through this sharing of information, Alliances and Populace Integration in the coming The military must be able to collect and fuse paragraphs (See Figure 5). information from a wider variety of sources and 6 establish systems to share intelligence across

INTELLIGENCE services, the government, and with partners.23 With the focus of irregular warfare on the In the SAF, situational awareness is garnered Figure 4: Balancing the Military Force.19 population, operations are dispersed and require from a suite of sensors whereas the sharing of

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information can be garnered from initiatives such they allow us to work with Non-Governmental as the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) that allows Organisations (NGOs) and local governments in host for the sharing of information with, and between, countries, which are important in enabling credible international security partners.24 Through this and long-term solutions in foreign countries.28 The sharing of information, our intelligence net can be importance of developing a long-term relationship cast wider so that we can see both the macro and the with the locals cannot be overstated. micro views of our potential threat environment.25 TECHNOLOGY With the focus of irregular warfare on the The advent of unmanned systems can help reduce population, operations are dispersed and unnecessary risk to humans and therefore keep require precise and timely information personnel out of harm's way. Unmanned systems are able to reduce operational risks to soldiers such as to enable actionable intelligence such as in Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Explosive targeting and striking. our intelligence net can be cast wider so that we can see both the macro and the micro(CBRE) view smissions of our or in breaching obstacles under fire. potential threat environmentCultural .24Intelligence They can also help eliminate risk to pilots. They have now become ‘indispensable’ for tackling the dreaded Singapore participated in her maiden United CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE four D's of military missions—‘the dull, dirty, Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in 1989 with dangerous and demanding.’29 Unmanned systems can the deployment of officers to Namibia, Africa. Singapore participated in her maiden United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission inalso 1989 provide with the heightened situation awareness and are Singapore’s contributions to overseas deployments deployment of officers to Namibia, Africa. Singapore’s contributions to overseas deploymentssuitable havefor intelligence gathering. We have seen been positively reinforcedhave throughbeen positively media coverage reinforced.25 With increased through participation, media our soldiers will 26 an advancement of unmanned technologies that increase their culturalcoverage. awareness Withand intelligenceincreased both participation, from working in ourforeign countries and aid in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance interacting with foreignsoldiers counterparts will increase, as shown their in Figure cultural 6. Overseas awareness deployments and allow us to harness missions. An example is the achievement of Full the historical knowledge,intelligence expertise bothand experiences from working of our in coalition foreign partners. countries Furthermore, they allow Operational Capability status of the Republic of us to work with Nonand-Governmental interacting Organisations with foreign (NGOs) andcounterparts, local governments as in host countries, which are importanshownt in enabling in Figure credible 6. Overseas and long deployments-term solutions allow in foreign us countriesSingapore. 26 TheAir Force’s (RSAF) Hermes 450 Unmanned th importance of developingto harness a long- termthe historicalrelationship knowledge,with the locals expertise cannot be overand stated.Aerial Vehicle (UAV) on 30 March, 2015, to augment 30 experiences of our coalition partners. Furthermore, the SAF's battlefield surveillance capability. Figure 6. Build up of Cultural Capability with Time27 Technology Eco-system

However, having and being able to procure technology can only do so much. It is equally, or even more important, to be able to sustain and build game-changing technologies. As such, having a Defence Technology Community is important to build capabilities that can deal with any kind of warfare. The SAF can count on a team of capable defence scientists and engineers from the Defence Science Organisation (DSO) National Laboratories

27 (NL) and the Defence and Science Technology Agency Figure 6: Build up of Cultural Capability with Time.

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The advent of unmanned systems can help reduce unnecessary risk to humans and therefore keep personnel out of harm's way. Unmanned systems are able to reduce operational risks to soldiers 21-34_ Combating the Modern War_1.1.indd 26 23/2/18 3:16 PM such as in Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Explosive (CBRE) missions or in breaching obstacles under fire. They can also help eliminate risk to pilots. They have now become ‘indispensable’ for tackling the dreaded four D's of military missions—‘the dull, dirty, dangerous and demanding.’28 Unmanned systems can also provide heightened situation awareness and are suitable for intelligence gathering. We have seen an advancement of unmanned technologies that aid in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. An example is the achievement of Full Operational Capability status of the Republic of Singapore Air Force’s (RSAF) Hermes 450 UAV on 30 March 2015 to augment the SAF's battlefield surveillance capability.29

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(DSTA).31 Over the years, the Defence Technology Given that the primary threat in the irregular Community has been able to enhance the SAF’s warfare environment comes from decentralised operational capabilities through developing and organisations like local insurgencies, transnational customising technologies, such as in the Hermes terrorists and criminal groups, this ability to operate 450 UAV. without continual guidance is critical.33 Alongside this, innovation and creativity are important and FORCE STRUCTURE FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTATION have been continually fostered with the SAF’s efforts to cultivate innovation through Productivity To help win and keep popular approval, large and Innovation in Daily Effort (PRIDE). unit operations must be minimised and large firm bases not used. Under severe combat pressure, An important fact about the war in Vietnam that most irregular warfare combatants will devolve into deserves attention from those interested in military smaller units or cells or disperse for a period of innovation is that, contrary to the impression dormancy as a protective measure. At this point, the sometimes given, the US Army did learn and irregular warfare enemy is the most vulnerable. As innovate in Vietnam. It reorganised itself, deployed per the US DOD 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, new technology, took on new tasks and devised the short-term ‘decisive operation’ within the US new tactics. The Army deployed a new airmobile Army Campaign Plan ‘is the creation of modular, division to Vietnam and developed and refined combined arms manoeuvre brigade combat teams, air-mobile tactics with helicopters, an innovation or BCTs.’ The Army dismantled divisional support that combined new tactics by a new organisation units and created battalion and company level using new technology, the epitome of the type combat support and combat service support units of transformation that the US military today assigned directly to the brigade, while increasing hopes to create throughout its forces. It deployed the command and control capabilities of the brigade night vision sensors and developed and deployed task force. In doing so, the brigade is advertised communications technology that gave commanders as becoming a more ‘expeditionary force’, able to unprecedented connectivity to echelons of command deploy without additional resources.32 This concept above, below and beside them. The result of these enables flexible and strategic mobility. innovations was that ‘tactical operations in South Vietnam often bore little resemblance to those of Under severe combat pressure, most the past.’34

irregular warfare combatants will devolve Force Adaptation

into smaller units or cells or disperse for In the past, experts deemed that the terrorist a period of dormancy as a protective option of using chemical attacks to be unlikely. This measure. At this point, the irregular attitude changed after the two terrorist attacks warfare enemy is the most vulnerable. with chemical substances (Sarin nerve gas) by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan in 1995.35 In the SAF, A decentralised and de-layered command and the CBRE Defence Group was established in 2003 as control structure allows faster decision-making. part of the SAF’s on−going efforts in the build-up

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In the past, experts deemed that the terrorist option of using chemical attacks to be unlikely. This attitude changed after the two terrorist attacks with chemical substances (Sarin nerve gas) by the Aum cult in Japan in 1995.34 In the SAF, the CBRE Defence Group was established in 2003 as part of

thefeatures SAF’s ongoing effort in the build-up of a comprehensive counter-terrorism capability against28 conventional and non-conventional threats, and conducts Preventive and Response CBRE operations inof conjunction a comprehensive with Home counter-terrorism Team agencies capability on both theTRAINING domestic ANDand internationalEDUCATION fronts.35 against conventional and non-conventional threats, Investing in quality military forces through the and conducts Preventive and Response CBRE operations Cyber terrorism is currently being discussedconduct as a new of toughthreat and that realistic terrorists training may asbe well able as to in conjunction with Home Team agencies on both the pose via Internet. This includes cyber attacks such aseducating those madeofficers in to the be threeagile in-week complex wave situations of cyber domestic and international fronts.36 attacks against Estonia in April 2007. In the attacks,are enablersterrorists to swamhelp pedmilitary websites professionals of Estonian be organisCyberations, terrorism including is currently Estonian being parliament, discussed as banks, a adaptiveministries, to newspapersthe requirements and broadcastersof irregular threats..36 Back home,new threat the SAF that has terrorists set up a may centralis be ableed Cyberto pose Defence via Through Operations training Hub inin 2013different for more scenarios, robust officers defence ofInternet. the country's This includes military cyber networks. attacks Insuch announcing as those thecan establishment learn how to of be the flexible operations and hub,make Defencetough Mmadeinister in Drthe. Ngthree-week Eng Hen wave mentioned of cyber attacks that the against round -thedecisions.-clock operationsLeaders need hub a would stronger allow intellectual the SAF to buildEstonia up expertisein April 2007.to combat In the evolving attacks, cyber terrorists threats. 37education to confront the challenges of war, swamped web-sites of Estonian organisations, change and differing cultures in today’s world. including Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, In the US, National Security Action Memorandum TRAINING AND EDUCATION37 newspapers and broadcasters. Back home, the SAF 182 (24th August 1962), entitled ‘United States has set up a centralised Cyber Defence Operations Overseas Internal Defence Policy,’ instructed the Hub in Investing2013 for more in quality robust defencemilitary of forces the country's through theDepartment conduct toof worktough with and civilian realistic agencies training engaged as well military networks. In announcing the establishment of as educating officers to be agile in complex situationsin counter-insurgencyare enablers to help and, military in a reference professionals to the be the operations hub, Defence Minister Dr. Ng Eng Hen adaptive to the requirements of irregular threats. ThroughSpecial trainingForces, into different‘develop scenarios,language-trained officers and can mentioned that the round-the-clock operations hub learn how to be flexible and make tough decisions. Leadersarea-oriented need aUS stronger forces for intellectual possible employmenteducation to would allow the SAF to build up expertise to combat confront the challenges of war, change and differingin culturestraining, inor today’s providing world. operational In the US advice, National or evolving cyber threats.38 Security Action Memorandum 182 (August 24, 1962),operational entitled support ‘United to indigenous States Ov securityerseas forces.’ Internal39 DefenceEducation Policy,’ and instructed training themust Department extend toThe work leadership with competenciescivilian agencies such asengaged Creative in counterinsurgencybeyond traditional and, in a referencemilitary to theand Special and Forces, Critical to ‘thinkingdevelop languageunder the- trainedSAF Leadership and area - orientedgovernment US forces schools for possible to include employment the study in training, Competency or providing Model operational (See Figure advice7) are thus or operational necessary supportof history, to indigenous anthropology, security forces.’ economics,38 The leadership to be competencies imbued in our suchleaders, as Creativeso as to andmeet Critical the 40 thinkinggeopolitics, under theculture, SAF Leadership law, and Competency strategic Model varied (Figure demands. 7) are thus necessary to be imbued in 39 ourcommunications. leaders so as to meet This the could varied also demands include. Education and training must extend beyond cultural and language skills. traditional military and government schools Figure 7. SAF Leadership Competency Model

Figure 7: SAF Leadership Competency Model.

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to include the study of history, anthropology, of terrorist organisations through information economics, geopolitics, culture, law, and strategic sharing, increasing surveillance and promoting communications. This could also include cultural awareness among the public about the threat and language skills. Accordingly, the government of radicalism.43 should reach out to academia, think-tanks and advisors to develop this more holistic educational The military also needs to fuse all instruments of foundation.41 It is also necessary to learn from the powers, which can be done through fostering inter- past to make adapting easier and less costly. We agency approaches to challenges. One example of currently see such assimilation in courses such as this is the SAF’s participation in homeland security the Tri-service course and Command and Staff Course exercises such as the Northstar series of exercises. which are tied in with the S. Rajaratnam School An example is Exercise Northstar VII in which 15 of International Studies (RSIS) and the Nanyang agencies, including the Singapore Police Force Business School (NBS). In addition, lessons learned (SPF), Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) and the in the earlier-mentioned overseas deployments SAF, came together to test Singapore's readiness to 44 should be collected, discussed and passed on to deal with concurrent terrorist attacks. junior officers in formal Route of Advancement GOVERNMENT AND (ROA) courses.42 POPULATION INTEGRATION INTER-AGENCY AND As earlier discussed, irregular warfare is tilted INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES towards the government and population aspects

The military cannot work alone and requires defined in Clausewitz’s ‘paradoxical trinity.’ Thus, working with other militaries as well as other the eventual solution to deal with irregular warfare agencies so as to build upon its strengths. The cannot only consist of military interventions and SAF does this through its exercises with regional must also be undertaken at both of these aspects. partners as well as through formal meetings such as In Singapore, nation-building is an unceasing effort the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and national education starts in schools to cultivate Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). In the 9th ADMM a sense of belonging and emotional rootedness that was held on 16th March, 2015, defence ministers to Singapore in its young citizens. Furthermore, from the ASEAN member countries signed a Joint the people and government are intimately tied to Declaration which underscored their commitment how the SAF fights. This is possible through the to addressing common security challenges. At the build-up of the SAF through conscription. National meeting held in Langkawi, Malaysia, the ministers Service not only provides the main bulk of the SAF’s noted with serious concern the rise of violence and fighting force but also helps bind the SAF to the brutality committed by the Islamic State of Iraq fabric of Singapore society through the passing of and Syria (ISIS), and condemned all terrorist acts every Singaporean son through the National Service of destruction and violence carried out by radical rites of passage. It is therefore important that the groups. The ASEAN defence ministers pledged to SAF’s mission of Deterrence and Diplomacy remains co-operate in accordance with both domestic and relevant to the people and to Singapore. This is international law, including the ASEAN Convention why engagement efforts such as National Education on Counter Terrorism to counter the imminent threat and Total Defence remain relevant in strengthening

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Singaporeans’ sense of belonging and commitment ENDNOTES

to Singapore. 1. Carl Von Clausewitz, "On War." CONCLUSION 2. United States Government Accountability Office, “Hybrid Warfare - Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, From what we have learnt, irregular warfare Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee has existed historically and if we apply lessons of on Armed Services, House of Representatives,” 10 history, we can easily conclude that it is perhaps September 2010. not so irregular. We may need to adapt and learn 3. J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Ted Robert to apply existing methods in order to provide the Gurr, “Peace and Conflict 2012 Executive summary,” conventional warfighter with a better understanding Center for International Development and Conflict of how to defeat the threat we face in modern Management, University of Maryland. battlefields. In lieu of the earlier discussion, could 4. U.S. Department of Defence, “Conventional Force,” we instead shift the response to irregular warfare 2000 Annual Defense Report, Chapter 5, http://fas.org/ to other agencies such as the police force? There is man/docs/adr_00/chap5.htm. no police force capable of taking charge of a global 5. U.S. Department of Defense, “Irregular Warfare struggle and no likely candidate for such a role. Joint Operating Concept (JOC),” Version 1.0, 11 Sep Thus, it remains true that conventional military 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_ forces remain the only option to deal with irregular concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf. warfare. The SAF’s discussions to undertake the full 6. United States Government Accountability Office, “Hybrid spectrum of operations highlight our emphasis and Warfare - Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, support to ensure that it is a conventional military Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.” force that has the capability to deal effectively with irregular warfare. Together with a government 7. NATO, “Hybrid war – does it even exist?” NATO Review, and population that are integrated with the SAF’s 2015, http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also- in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/ purpose, the SAF is indeed one conventional EN/index.htm. military force that is ready to combat the modern war. I end with another of Clausewitz’s quotes that 8. United States Government Accountability Office, “Hybrid Warfare - Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, summarises how the conventional military force Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee needs to adapt to and understand the threats it on Armed Services, House of Representatives,” 10 faces in the battlefield.  September 2010, Figure 2.

9. U.S. Department of Defense, “Irregular Warfare Joint “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of Operating Concept (JOC).”

judgement that the statesman and the commander 10. Jeffrey B. White, “Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” have to make is to establish…the kind of war on Central Intelligence Agency, 14 Apr 2007, https://www. which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ nor trying to make it into something that is alien to csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/ iregular.htm. its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” 11. Kenneth J. Burgess, “Organizing for Irregular Warfare: Implications for the Brigade Combat Team,” Naval 45 -Carl von Clausewitz, Military Theorist Postgraduate School, Dec 2007.

12. Jeffrey B. White, “Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare.”

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13. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, “Decade of 7 Mar 2007, https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the- War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade force-of-fusion-working-together-to-protect-america. of Operations,” Bibliogov, 5 Feb 2013.13. Laurie R 26. The Straits Times, “SAF’s 41 years in Overseas Blank, “Cyberwar versus Cyber Attack,” 78-79. Operations, 26 Jan 2012. 14. U.S. Department of Defense, “Irregular Warfare Joint 27. David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver, Scott C. White, Operating Concept (JOC).” “Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate 15. Jeffrey B. White, “Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare.” School, Dec 2009.

16. T.X. Hammes, “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves Into 28. David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver, Scott C. White, a Fourth Generation,” Institute for National Strategic “Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Forum School, Dec 2009. No. 214, Jan 2005. 29. Anne Broache, “Singapore military officials embrace 17. Kenneth J. Burgess, “Organizing for Irregular Warfare: drone aircraft,” CNET, 7 Aug 2007, http://www.cnet. Implications for the Brigade Combat Team.” com/news/singapore-military-officials-embrace-drone- 18. U.S. Department of Defense, “The National aircraft/. Defense Strategy of the United States of America” 30. Matthew Neo, “RSAF's advanced H-450 UAV goes Mar 2005, http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/ operational,” Cyberpioneer, 30 Mar 2015, http://www. d20050318nds1.pdf. mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/ 19. Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing topics/articles/news/2015/mar/30mar15_news.html. the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,” Institute 31. Koh Eng Beng, “The Brains behind Defence,” Pioneer, for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Nov 2015. University, Strategic Forum No. 240, Apr 2009. 32. U.S. Department of Defense, “2004 Army Transformation 20. Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Miller, “Irregular Warfare - Roadmap,” The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Perhaps Not So "Irregular",” U.S. Army War College, 15 U.S. Army Operations, Army Transformation Office, Mar 2006. July, 2004. 21. Larson, Eric V., Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk and 33. David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver, Scott C. White, Thomas S. Szayna, “Assessing Irregular Warfare: “Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare.” A Framework for Intelligence Analysis,” RAND Corporation, 2008, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 34. David Tucker, “Confronting the unconventional: monographs/MG668.html. Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs,” The Strategic Studies Institute, Oct 2006. 22. Jeffrey B. White, “Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare.” W. R. Baker, “The Easter Offensive of 1972: 35. Kai Hirschmann, “The Changing Face of Terrorism,” A Failure to Use Intelligence,” Military Intelligence International Politics and Society 3/2000, 2000. Professional Bulletin, http://fas.org/irp/agency/army/ 36. MINDEF, “SAF CBRE Defence Group Exercises with Home tradoc/usaic/mipb/1998-1/BAKERfnl.htm. Team Agencies,” Cyberpioneer, 20 Jan 2006, http:// 23. Colonel Steven C. Williamson, “From Fourth Generation www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/press_room/ Warfare to Hybrid War,” Strategic Studies Institute, official_releases/nr/2006/jan/20jan06_nr.html. Strategy Research Project, 26 Mar 2009. 37. Ian Traynor, “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar 24. MINDEF, “Inauguration of the Information Fusion Centre to disable Estonia,” The Guardian, 17 May 2007, (IFC),” Official release, 27 Aug 2009, http://www.mindef. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/ gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2009/ topstories3.russia. apr/27apr09_nr.html. 38. Ellyne Phneah, “Singapore creates operations hub to 25. John S. Pistole, “The Force of Fusion: Working Together beef up cyberdefense,” ZDnet, 1 Jul 13, http://www. to Protect America,” National Fusion Center Conference, zdnet.com/singapore-creates-operations-hub-to-beef-

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up-cyberdefense-7000017521/. against terror threats,” Cyberpioneer, 16 Mar 2015, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/ 39. National Security Action Memorandum cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2015/ Number 182: Counterinsurgency Doctrine, August mar/16mar15_news.html. 24, 1962, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ ZwPjq2qEu02NamlIyfitoA.aspx. 44. Ong Hong Tat, “SAF special operations group participates in Exercise Northstar VII,” Cyberpioneer, 15 Jul 2009, 40. SAF, “SAF Leadership Competency Model,” LD Doctrine http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/ Directive 3/2004, Jul 2004. cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2009/July/15jul09_ 41. Colonel Steven C. Williamson, “From Fourth Generation news.html. Warfare to Hybrid War.” 45. Carl Von Clausewitz, "On War." 42. Seth McCormick Lynn, “Learning not to kick with our Achilles Heel: The case against a Counterinsurgency- focused Military,” Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Journal of Public and International Affairs Vol.21 Spring 2010, 2010, http:// www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2010/Learning- Not-to-Kick-with-our-Achilles-Heel.pdf.

43. Denise Goh, “ASEAN defence ministers take firm stand

ME6 Calvin Seah Ser Thong is currently on secondment to the Land Transport Authority. He is an Army Engineer by vocation and was previously a section head in HQ Maintenance and Engineering Support. ME6 Calvin holds a Bachelors of Engineering in Mechanical & Production Engineering from Nanyang Technological University (NTU), a Masters of Science in Industrial and Systems Engineering from the National University of Singapore (NUS) and a Master of Science in Defence Technology and Systems from NUS obtained under the SAF Postgraduate Award. He recently attained a Masters of Science in Human Capital Management from NTU under the SAF-NTU Continuing Education Master Programme and was placed on the Nanyang Business School’s Dean’s List. ME6 Calvin is a Business Excellence Assessor, National Innovation and Quality Circle Assessor and is also trained in Design Thinking and the facilitation of Make-A-Thons.

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MILITARIES VERSUS NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS by ME5 Su Juncun

Abstract:

In the past, the role of the military was limited to only war. However, in the light of changing security landscapes and technological climates, the scope of the military has extended to more non-traditional threats. One such aspect is that of cyber threats and warfare. Cyber warfare is an entirely new domain of warfare and while militaries have made progress in implementing security infrastructure, much more has yet to be done. Another aspect is that of humanitarian aid, with militaries contributing their resources to help provide relief. While much disaster relief has already been provided by militaries in disasters around the world, historically, there had still been some major inefficiencies. Greater inter-military co-ordination is still needed to solve these problems.

Keywords: Non-Traditional; Cyber; Humanitarian Aid; Disaster Relief; Technology

INTRODUCTION now have greater access to information and can sometimes even predict the entire scale of disasters Since the turn of the century, there have by tracking satellite data and weather data.3 been many key world events. Some of these have Although the traditional roles of the military does collectively changed the world, and an example is not include Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster the advancement of technology. Another one, of Relief (HADR), militaries have been increasingly great impact in particular, is the notion of security. involved in such disaster relief operations. It not only changed our lives but opened up new

realms of security concerns around the world as Security in the 21st century not only comprises 1 well. traditional characteristics such as inter-state war, it also entails non-traditional features such as Let us consider cyber threats. In 2007, a having to deal with cyber war and humanitarian computer worm called Stuxnet was used to retard disasters. This essay assesses the military’s success Iran’s nuclear-weapons programmes at Natanz. It in responding to non-traditional security in the 21st was the first documented case of cyber war intended century by first examining how militaries have coped to cause physical damage.2 specifically with cyber threats and humanitarian Another area of concern is humanitarian disasters, and then exploring some of the current disasters. With modern technology, nations limitations of militaries in these two realms.

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NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY: CYBER THREAT

Threats arising from a cyber war are not new and date back to the 1990s when five Netherlands hackers penetrated American military computer systems and gained access to military information in the Gulf region.4 This situation was worsened with Information Technological (IT) advancements, especially in the 21st century with the introduction and proliferation of digital devices to the masses. This increased global connectivity has also led to much concerns of an impending cyber war, which

could be launched in an instant, from anywhere in Wikipedia the world.5 This is evident as many conflicts in the Emblem of the United States Cyber Command world now have a cyber component. For example, as Palestinian rioters clashed with Israeli forces in the security. They developed unique inter-disciplinary fall of 2000, Arab and Israeli hackers took to cyber methodologies in a multi-disciplinary national space to participate in the action. Both fronts ‘cyber-ecosystem’ that integrates various agencies, hacked into each other’s web-sites aggressively and both military and civilian to form ‘a national cyber disrupted each other’s information flow.6 defensive envelope.’10 And at the core of Israel’s cyber capabilities is the selection, training, research The idea of cyber space as an additional realm of and development, skills and service experience of conflict (in addition to air, land, sea) has become ‘cyber defenders’ in the IDF.11 Within the IDF, units commonplace in the United States (US) military, to are highly specialised to deal with specific aspects the extent that a cyber command was established of cyber defence (and offence). For instance, the in 2010.7 The concerns were so stark that the US Intelligence Corps Unit 8200 deals with signal Pentagon introduced a ‘Strategy for Operating intelligence and code decryption and the Cyber in Cyber Space’ in 2011 to emphasise that the US Defence Division, responsible for preventing and military ‘will treat cyber space as an operational detecting infiltrations into military networks.12 domain to organise, train and equip so that the HOW SUCCESSFUL? Department of Defense can take full advantage of cyber space’s potential.’8 Other countries are In 2014, in the IDF Operation Protective Edge not far behind. South Korea also established an in Gaza, Israel faced large-scale cyber war on its independent cyber warfare command in 2010 to civilian communications infrastructure from both carry out planning, implementation, training, and state and non-state actors, traced to Qatar and 13 research and development.9 Iran. Cyber attackers also targeted the IDF’s web-sites and communications networks. Based Israel and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also on the Israeli Security Agency, these attacks were devised their unique strategy in coping with cyber contained and disruption was not achieved.14

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Protective Edge in Gaza, Israel faced depends on various factors such as how developed large-scale cyber war on its civilian the militaries are towards cyber security and how communications infrastructure from large scale the cyber attacks are. As a whole, the both state and non-state actors, developments of militaries worldwide towards traced to Qatar and Iran. cyber security seems to be in their infancy. Much more needs to be done. Analysts have observed that many countries are still grappling with the In addition to direct cyber attacks, espionage conceptual and doctrinal underpinnings of the role and hacking in the civilian sectors are also common. of the military in defending cyber space, albeit to Prominent espionage attacks include the theft different degrees.17 Even the military cyber defence of details about the F-35 fighter, the attack on in the European Union (EU) is considered to be at Google and 30 other technology companies, as well a relatively early stage of maturity.18 While this as GhostNet—a computer espionage conspiracy may allude to militaries being not capable enough that affected more than 1250 computers in 103 to respond to cyber war, there has not been a real countries.15 In March 2001, more than 1 million outbreak of cyber war launched to test this theory.19 credit card numbers were hacked from 40 US WHAT’S NEXT? computer systems associated with e-commerce and Much needs to be done in order for militaries e-banking companies in 20 states.16 to defend their countries against cyber war. This These examples suggest that militaries respond is challenging as cyber space is one operating and cope with cyber threats to varying extents. This theatre that cannot be easily defended. Even the MINDEF Dr Ng Eng Hen (fourth from right) and the other defence ministers linking hands in a show of co-operation and goodwill after the 2015 ADMM-Plus meeting.

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Clinton and Bush administrations acknowledged There is a need to grow and retain that defending cyber space is largely immune to cyber-trained personnel especially in a military solution and beyond the capabilities of government. The Bush administration has the military. hence delegated the responsibility to monitor In summary, most militaries are generally in and protect the cyber space to the private sector the initial phase in building capable cyber defence as well as state and local levels of government.20 systems. However, it may be unfair to conclude This reinforces the idea that a collaboration that militaries are inadequate in responding to between the government, the military and the cyber threats as there has never been a cyber war civilian sectors is required to defend against cyber to test their capabilities. It is generally recognised threats. A similar idea has already been adopted that much needs to be done to improve the current by Israel and the IDF. Singapore Defence Minister state of cyber defence. This includes collaboration, Dr Ng Eng Hen recently also urged for enhanced at different levels and between different agencies, collaboration among countries through multilateral both military and civilian, as well as the training and platforms like the Shangri-La Dialogue and ASEAN development of a group of capable cyber defenders. Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus grouping, to build confidence and mutual understanding as well as NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY: HADR prevent incidents from spiralling out of control on There has been increasing frequency of account of misunderstandings.21 This is necessary as reported natural disasters and humanitarian crises cyber war can be launched from anywhere and can in the 21st century. This is especially so in the affect anyone from the military and civilian sectors. Asia-Pacific area where 70% of all natural disasters Much needs to be done in order for occur.23 This section of the assessment is scoped towards how well militaries have coped with militaries to defend their countries supplying humanitarian efforts required in the Asia- against cyber war. This is challenging Pacific region. as cyber space is one operating theatre that cannot be easily defended. Militaries around the world have generally responded quickly to natural disasters in the region. The EU Cyber Security Strategy 2013 highlighted On 22nd February, 2011, Christchurch, New Zealand was that the European Defence Agency and member hit by a severe earthquake. In addition to the New states should collaborate on improving cyber Zealand Defence Force, the Royal Australian Air Force defence training. There is a need to grow and retain managed to despatch search and rescue personnel cyber-trained personnel especially in the military.22 and assets within hours.24 Members of the Singapore This is also in line with IDF’s focus of building quality Armed Forces (SAF) joined in shortly.25 On 8th cyber-defenders who are capable of defending their November, 2013, the Philippines was hit by Typhoon cyber space. Haiyan and was devastated by the strong winds and heavy storms.26 The US responded by deploying its aircraft carrier group and ordered it ‘to make best

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Loading of supplies onto rescue vessel MV Swift Rescue for its search for missing Malaysian Airlines fl ight MH370.

speed’ to the affected area to provide assistance.27 HOW SUCCESSFUL? Militaries from other countries such as China, Japan, While militaries have generally responded Indonesia and India also sent their personnel and Moving forward, there is a need to improve expeditiously to humanitarian disasters, the overall 28 the manner in which countries approach HADR assets to assist in the relief efforts. success of these HADR operations also hinges on other factors and the effi ciencies of other agencies operations, to establish and strengthen the linkages The search and locate operations for the missing involved, not just the operational readiness and between countries and militaries so that both the Malaysian Airline Flight MH370 and the AirAsia capabilities of the military. Just as Ong Yu Lin rightly militaries and civilian agencies can collectively Flight QZ8501 also involved militaries from regional pointed out, the ‘military is not a comprehensive respond successfully to HADR operations. countries such as Malaysia, Australia, China, India instrument to pit against non-traditional threats.’31 and the US.29 Of note, the SAF responded swiftly, HADR operations is one such example as they extend within 2 hours of activation even though it was beyond the military sphere to other governmental 30 the last weekend of the December holiday season. agencies. The recent deployment of the Singapore Other disasters such as Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar Civil Defence Force (SCDF), the Singapore Police Force and the Sichuan earthquake in China also saw the (SPF), the SAF and a team of 15 medical personnel involvement of militaries in the HADR operations. and staff from the Changi Regional HADR Co- These are all examples of militaries responding to ordination Centre (RHCC) to Nepal to provide aid in the humanitarian disaster swiftly. post-earthquake relief operations illustrates this.32

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The Changi RHCC supports the co-ordination and sharing of information between countries involved in regional disaster relief operations.

Moving forward, there is a need to that preparedness and co-ordination between different improve the manner in which countries parties are instrumental to the success of HADR efforts.34 approach HADR operations, to establish and strengthen the linkages between WHAT’S NEXT? countries and militaries so that both It is imperative that the militaries tweak the way they run such operations, especially in improving the militaries and civilian agencies can linkages with other military and civilian agencies so collectively respond successfully to HADR as to ensure the overall success in HADR operations. operations. “Evolving a military doctrine for non-traditional security threats… explains the set-up of regional Lessons learnt from the HADR efforts for Cyclone agencies such as the one that you are in, such as Nargis pointed out issues such as the military junta not the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and the Changi waiving visa requirements for western relief agencies RHCC,” says Singapore Defence Minister Dr Ng Eng 35 for entry to Burma, gifts from other governments Hen. The multi-national IFC has international Liaison Officers from 15 countries stationed arriving without labels and not matching the needs permanently and working together. They use data of the beneficiaries, instead causing congestion in analytics to analyse information from many agencies the warehouse.33 It goes to show that while militaries and countries to provide useful information to all may have responded to the best of their ability, HADR its partners. Similarly, the Changi RHCC, set up in operations can and have been thwarted by other September 2014, enhances military-to-military co- co-ordination related issues. Steele also concluded ordination in disaster response with many partner that humanitarian organisations must be aware countries in the Asia-Pacific region.36

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In summary, militaries have generally responded Military/2013/1112/Philippines-US-military-s-ships- and contributed well to HADR operations. However, aircraft-to-aid-in-typhoon-Haiyan-relief-video the overall success is also dependent on factors Andrew Buncombe, “Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370: Oil outside the defence domain. Moving forward, Slicks in South Chian Sea ‘Not Missing Jet’, Officials Say,” The Independent, 10 March 2014, http://www.independent. there is a need to improve the manner in which co.uk/news/world/asia/malaysia-airlines-flight-mh370- countries approach HADR operations, to establish search-teams-scramble-helicopters-and-ships-to- and strengthen the linkages between countries and investigate-sighting-of-possible-life-raft-9180759.html.

militaries so that both the militaries and civilian Anthony, Mely Caballero. Regional Security in Southeast agencies can collectively respond successfully to Asia beyond the ASEAN Way. Singapore: Institute of HADR operations. Southeast Asian Studies, 2005. Arientha Primanita, “Indonesia Sends $2M Typhoon Haiyan CONCLUSION aid To Philippines,” The Jakarta Globe, 13 Nov 2013, http:// All in all, this essay presented that militaries thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesia-sends- 2m-typhoon-haiyan-aid-to-philippines/. have only been successful in responding to cyber security and humanitarian disasters to a partial Berkowitz, Bruce D, “The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century,” New York: Free Press, 2003. extent. On one hand, militaries have reacted to cyber threats to varying degrees although they are Betz, David, and Tim Stevens. Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy for Cyber-power. London, U.K.: IISS, The generally in their infant stages. There is much yet International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011. to be done to improve the current state of cyber Brown, Michael E. Grave New World: Security Challenges in defence affairs. On the other hand, militaries the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University have generally responded and contributed well to Press, 2003. HADR operations. However, the overall success is Caitriona H. Heinl, “Enabling Better Multinational And dependent on factors outside the defence domain. International Military Cooperation For Cyber-Related Moving forward, there is a need to establish Matters Across Asia And Europe,” S. Rajaratnam School of the necessary linkages between countries and International Studies, March 2015. militaries so that more concerted operations can “Cyber Defence Fact Sheet,” European Defence Agency, last be executed.  updated 24 March 2014. Dannreuther, Roland, “International Security: The BIBLIOGRAPHY Contemporary Agenda. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013. “Aftershock rocks RAAF Hercules,” News.com.au, 23 Feb 2011, http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/aftershock- Denning, Dorothy Elizabeth Robling, “Information Warfare and Security,” New York: ACM Press, 1999. rocks-raaf-hercules/story-e6frfku0-1226010551250. Dr Ng Eng Hen, “Keynote Address by Minister for Defence, Amber Hildebrandt, “Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370: Dr Ng Eng Hen, at the World Humanitarian Summit Global ‘Mystery Compounded by Mystery’,” CBC News, 10 march Forum on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination 2015 on 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/malaysia-airlines- 13 Apr 2015,” MINDEF, 14 Apr 2015, http://www.mindef. flight-mh370-mystery-compounded-by-mystery-1.2566983. gov.sg/content/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ Anna Mulrine, “Philippines: US Military’s Ships, Aircraft sp/2015/13apr15_speech.html#.VTsrlSErLIU. To Aid In Typhoon Haiyan Relief,” The Christian Science “FBI warns companies about Russian Cyber Attack,” CNN, Monitor, 12 Nov 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ March 8, 2011.

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“Humanity Greater than Any Act of Nature,” Scoop Lin, Patrick. "Drone-Ethics Briefing: What a Leading Robot Independent News, 1 March 2011, http://www.scoop.co.nz/ Expert Told the CIA." The Atlantic. December 15, 2011. stories/PA1103/S00008/humanity-greater-than-any-act- Accessed April 3, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/ of-nature.htm. technology/archive/2011/12/drone-ethics-briefing-what- Hathaway, Robert M. New Security Challenges in Asia. a-leading-robot-expert-told-the-cia/250060/. Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Michael Raska, “Confronting Cybersecurity Challenges: Press, 2013. Israel’s Evolving Cyber Defence Strategy,” S. Rajaratnam “How Cyber War-fare Really Started – And Where It Will School of International Studies, Jan 2015, http://www.rsis. Lead,” The Economist, 13 Dec 2014, http://www.economist. edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/PR150108_-Israel_ com/news/books-and-arts/21635967-how-cyber-warfare- Evolving_Cyber_Strategy_WEB.pdf. really-startedand-where-it-will-lead-turning-worm. Neil Robinson, “EU Cyber-Defence: A Work In Progress,” IDF, “Hackers Beware: The IDF’s Digital Battleground,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief Issue IDF Blog, 2013, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2013/09/ 10, March 14. hackers-beware-idfs-digital-battleground/ Ng Wei-Jin, “Overcoming Digital Turbulences for the 3rd Ingersoll, Geoffrey,”The Best Tech School on Earth Is Israel Generation RSAF,” POINTER, 3 May 2010, http://www. Army Unit 8200,” Business Insider, 13 August 2013. mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/ journals/2009/v35n1/feature5.html. James Lewis, “Multilateral Agreements to Constrain Cyberconflict,” Arms Control Today, June 2010, http://www. Ong Yu Lin, Tan Cheng Kwee, Freddie Tan, “The Utility of armcontrol.org/act/2010_06/Lewis. Military Force Against Non-traditional Threats,” POINTER No. 3-4, 16 March 2011. “Japanese Troops Welcomed Back in Typhoon-hit Philippines,” Bangkok Post, 22 Nov 2013, http://www. Pamela Steele, “Disaster Preparedness: Lessons from bangkokpost.com/news/asia/381197/japanese-troops- Cyclone Nargis,” The Guardian, 16 July 2013, http:// welcomed-back-in-typhoon-hit-philippines. www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals- network/2013/jul/16/cyclone-nargis-burma-disaster- Jared Yeo, “SAF Troops Conclude Christchurch Quake Relief relief-aid. Efforts,” MINDEF, 17 March 2011, http://www.mindef.gov. sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/army/army_ “Philippines Typhoon Death Toll Jumps; US Helicopter Boost news/News_Archive/2011/Mar2011/Christchurch.html. Aid Effort,” Jagran Post, 15 Nov 2013, http://post.jagran. com/philippine-typhoon-death-toll-jumps-us-helicopters- Jermyn Chow, “Ng Eng Hen: Deeper Issues Beyond The ISIS boost-aid-effort-1384507284 Threat,” Straits Times, 27 January 2015. “QZ8501 Recovery Operations Called Off: Indonesian Katz, Yaakov,”First IDF Cyber Defenders Graduate,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 20 April 2012. Military,” Channel News Asia, 27 Jan 2015, http:// www.channelnewsasia.com/news/qz8501-recovery- Kirchner, Emil Joseph. Global Security Governance operation/1618784.html. Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century. London: New York :, 2007. Rogers, Paul. Losing Control Global Security in the Twenty- first Century. 2nd ed. London: Pluto Press, 2002. Lappin, Yaakov, “Iran Attempted Large-scale Cyber Attack on Israel, Senior Security Source Says,” The Jerusalem “SAF To Send 15 Medial Personnel to aid in Nepal Relief Post, 18 Aug 2014. Efforts,” Channel News Asia 26 Apr 2015, http://www. channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/saf-to-send-15- “Lessons From SAF’s Involvement in QZ8501 Search medical/1807698.html?cx_tag=similar#cxrecs_s. Efforts: Ng Eng Hen,” Channel News Asia, 19 Jan 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/specialreports/ “Typhoon Haiyan,” USAID, last updated 15 July 2014, parliament/news/lessons-from-saf-s/1624788.html?cx_ http://www.usaid.gov/haiyan. tag=similar#cxrecs_s. US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Strategy

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for Operating in Cyberspace,” July 2011, http://www. http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_ defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/ cyberstrategy/docs/DoD_Strategy_for_Operating_in_ docs/DoD_Strategy_for_Operating_in_Cyberspace_ Cyberspace_July_2011.pdf. July_2011.pdf. 9. Hathaway, Robert M, “New Security Challenges in Asia,” William Lynn, “Defending a new domain,” Foreign Affairs, Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins 89(5), 2010. University Press, 2013, 227.

Zhu Ningzhu, “China’s Peace Ark Departs for Typhoon- 10. IDF, “Hackers Beware: The IDF’s Digital Battleground,” hit Philippines,” Xinhuanet, 21 Nov 2013, http://news. IDF Blog, 2013, http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2013/09/ xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/21/c_132906957.htm hackers-beware-idfs-digital-battleground/

11. Ibid.

ENDNOTES 12. Ingersoll, Geoffrey,”The Best Tech School on Earth Is

1. Berkowitz, Bruce D, “The New Face of War: How War Will Israel Army Unit 8200,” Business Insider, 13 August Be Fought in the 21st Century,” New York: Free Press, 2013. 2003, 1 – 2. Katz, Yaakov,”First IDF Cyber Defenders Graduate,” 2. “How Cyber War-fare Really Started – And Where It Jane’s Defense Weekly, 20 April 2012. Will Lead,” The Economist, 13 Dec 2014, http://www. 13. Lappin, Yaakov, “Iran Attempted Large-scale Cyber economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21635967-how- Attack on Israel, Senior Security Source Says,” The cyber-warfare-really-startedand-where-it-will-lead- Jerusalem Post, 18 Aug 2014. turning-worm. 14. Michael Raska, “Confronting Cybersecurity Challenges: 3. Dr Ng Eng Hen, “Keynote Address by Minister for Israel’s Evolving Cyber Defence Strategy,” S. Rajaratnam Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, at the World Humanitarian School of International Studies, Jan 2015, http://www. Summit Global Forum on Humanitarian Civil-Military rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/PR150108_- Coordination 2015 on 13 Apr 2015,” MINDEF, 14 Apr Israel_Evolving_Cyber_Strategy_WEB.pdf. 2015, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/ press_room/official_releases/sp/2015/13apr15_ 15. Hathaway, Robert M. “New Security Challenges in Asia,” speech.html#.VTsrlSErLIU. Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, 229. 4. Denning, Dorothy Elizabeth Robling, “Information Warfare and Security,” New York: ACM Press, 1999, 3 - 4. 16. “FBI warns companies about Russian Cyber Attack,” CNN, March 8, 2011. 5. Ng Wei-Jin, “Overcoming Digital Turbulences for the 3rd Generation RSAF,” POINTER, 3 May 2010, http://www. 17. Neil Robinson, ”EU Cyber-Defence: A Work In Progress,” mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/ European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief journals/2009/v35n1/feature5.html. Issue 10, March 14, 2.

Denning, Dorothy Elizabeth Robling, “Information 18. “Cyber Defence Fact Sheet,” European Defence Agency, Warfare and Security,” New York: ACM Press, 1999, 17. last updated 24 March 2014, 2.

6. Brown, Michael E, “Grave New World: Security Challenges 19. James Lewis, “Multilateral Agreements to Constrain in the 21st Century,” Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Cyberconflict,” Arms Control Today, June 2010, http:// University Press, 2003, 95. www.armcontrol.org/act/2010_06/Lewis.

7. William Lynn, “Defending a new domain,” Foreign 20. Kirchner, Emil Joseph. Global Security Governance Affairs, 89(5), 2010, 101. Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century. 8. US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense London: New York :, 2007, 181 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” July 2011, 21. Jermyn Chow, “Ng Eng Hen: Deeper Issues Beyond The

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ISIS Threat,” Straits Times, 27 January 2015. Nov 2013, http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/ news/indonesia-sends-2m-typhoon-haiyan-aid-to- 22. Caitriona H. Heinl, “Enabling Better Multinational And philippines/. International Military Cooperation For Cyber-Related Matters Across Asia And Europe,” S. Rajaratnam School “Philippines Typhoon Death Toll Jumps; US Helicopter of International Studies, March 2015. Boost Aid Effort,” Jagran Post, 15 Nov 2013, http:// post.jagran.com/philippine-typhoon-death-toll-jumps- 23. Dr Ng Eng Hen, “Keynote Address by Minister for Defence, us-helicopters-boost-aid-effort-1384507284 Dr Ng Eng Hen, at the World Humanitarian Summit Global Forum on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination 2015 29. Amber Hildebrandt, “Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370: on 13 Apr 2015,” MINDEF, 14 Apr 2015, http://www. ‘Mystery Compounded by Mystery’,” CBC News, 10 mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/press_room/official_ march 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/malaysia- releases/sp/2015/13apr15_speech.html#.VTsrlSErLIU. airlines-flight-mh370-mystery-compounded-by- mystery-1.2566983. 24. “Humanity Greater than Any Act of Nature,” Scoop Independent News, 1 March 2011, http://www.scoop. Andrew Buncombe, “Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370: Oil co.nz/stories/PA1103/S00008/humanity-greater-than- Slicks in South Chian Sea ‘Not Missing Jet’, Officials Say,” The Independent, 10 March 2014, http://www. any-act-of-nature.htm. independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/malaysia-airlines- “Aftershock rocks RAAF Hercules,” News.com.au, flight-mh370-search-teams-scramble-helicopters- 23 Feb 2011, http://www.news.com.au/breaking- and-ships-to-investigate-sighting-of-possible-life- news/aftershock-rocks-raaf-hercules/story- raft-9180759.html. e6frfku0-1226010551250. “QZ8501 Recovery Operations Called Off: Indonesian 25. Jared Yeo, “SAF Troops Conclude Christchurch Quake Military,” Channel News Asia, 27 Jan 2015, http:// Relief Efforts,” MINDEF, 17 March 2011, http://www. www.channelnewsasia.com/news/qz8501-recovery- mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/ operation/1618784.html. army/army_news/News_Archive/2011/Mar2011/ 30. “Lessons From SAF’s Involvement in QZ8501 Search Christchurch.html. Efforts: Ng Eng Hen,” Channel News Asia, 19 26. “Typhoon Haiyan,” USAID, last updated 15 July 2014, Jan 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/ http://www.usaid.gov/haiyan. specialreports/parliament/news/lessons-from- saf-s/1624788.html?cx_tag=similar#cxrecs_s. 27. Anna Mulrine, “Philippines: US Military’s Ships, Aircraft To Aid In Typhoon Haiyan Relief,” The Christian Science 31. Ong Yu Lin, Tan Cheng Kwee, Fredie Tan, “The Utility Monitor, 12 Nov 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ of Military Force Against Non-traditional Threats,” Military/2013/1112/Philippines-US-military-s-ships- POINTER No. 3-4, 16 March 2011.

aircraft-to-aid-in-typhoon-Haiyan-relief-video 32. ”SAF To Send 15 Medical Personnel to aid in Nepal Relief 28. Zhu Ningzhu, “China’s Peace Ark Departs for Efforts,” Channel News Asia 26 Apr 2015, http://www. Typhoon-hit Philippines,” Xinhuanet, 21 Nov 2013, channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/saf-to-send-15- http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013- medical/1807698.html?cx_tag=similar#cxrecs_s. 11/21/c_132906957.htm. 33. Pamela Steele, “Disaster Preparedness: Lessons “Japanese Troops Welcomed Back in Typhoon-hit from Cyclone Nargis,” The Guardian, 16 July 2013, Philippines,” Bangkok Post, 22 Nov 2013, http://www. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development- bangkokpost.com/news/asia/381197/japanese-troops- professionals-network/2013/jul/16/cyclone-nargis- welcomed-back-in-typhoon-hit-philippines. burma-disaster-relief-aid.

Arientha Primanita, “Indonesia Sends $2M Typhoon 34. Ibid. Haiyan aid To Philippines,” The Jakarta Globe, 13 35. Dr Ng Eng Hen, “Keynote Address by Minister for

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Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, at the World Humanitarian Summit Global Forum on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination 2015 on 13 Apr 2015,” MINDEF, 14 Apr 2015, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/ press_room/official_releases/sp/2015/13apr15_ speech.html#.VTsrlSErLIU.

36. Ibid.

ME5 Su Juncun is an Air Force Engineer by vocation and is currently serving as an Officer Commanding in 806 Squadron, Air Power Generation Command. He was awarded the SAF Academic Scholarship (Local) and graduated with Honours (Second Class Upper) in Mechanical Engineering from the National University of Singapore. ME5 Su's previous appointments included two postings in 6 Air Engineering and Logistics Group and a staff appointment in Air Engineering and Logistics Department.

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THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF AIR POWER FOR SMALL STATES by MAJ Jeffrey Ng Zhaohong

Abstract:

Air power is an incredibly effective tool. Its strategic significance should not be overlooked—especially by geo-strategically disadvantaged small states, for whom air support may be vital for survival. Air power can help small states solve their problem of a lack of strategic depth, whilst denying enemies the same advantage. While resource-heavy bombings are unrealistic for small nations, precision strikes could strategically be used to considerably weaken the enemy as well. Nonetheless, according to the author, air power is best employed when in conjunction with land and maritime assets in an integrated campaign. Air power also serves as a strong international diplomatic tool during humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations. The author concludes that overall, air power is a vital tool that Singapore should invest heavily in.

Keywords: Air Power; Small States; Geo-strategic; Strategic Depth; Integrated Campaign

INTRODUCTION forces. It then argues that given their geo-strategic vulnerabilities, small states must fully exploit the Through the realist lens, the most fundamental attributes of airpower in order to achieve decisive interest of any nation state would be to ensure victories in conflicts. The author then argues that its own survival, safeguard its sovereignty and to beyond conflicts, the non-lethal aspects of airpower advance its interests through diplomatic, economic, are also strategically significant for small states in 1 and military means. The military, as theorised by preserving peace through projecting deterrence, Carl von Clausewitz, then serves as an instrument strengthening international standing and forging of national policy.2 Hence, a grounded perspective partnerships. As a cautionary note, the author on the strategic significance of airpower for small also highlights limitations and weaknesses in the armed forces should naturally take into account independent application of airpower, and suggests the geopolitical context shaping the small states' that especially for small armed forces, air power must defence needs and policies. be synergistically employed as part of an integrated campaign to achieve maximal effectiveness. In this essay, the geo-strategic realities confronting small states, such as Singapore, are first SMALL STATES AND THEIR GEO-STRATEGIC laid out to set the stage for a situated appreciation REALITIES of the significance of air power for small armed Sir Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary General

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of the Commonwealth, once likened small states Defence Minister Mr Teo Chee Hean, "with only to ‘small boats pushed out into a turbulent sea, 699 square kilometres... there is no natural buffer free in one sense to traverse it; but without oars between the core of our activities and critical or provisions, without compass or sails, free also infrastructure, and the external environment. to perish.’3 Indeed, as witnessed throughout the Without a hinterland, without strategic depth, history of conflicts, small states often face harsh we do not have the option of falling back and 7 realities, especially when they are ill-prepared to regrouping to come back from an attack" It is respond to the unique security challenges posed by therefore critical to small states' survival that they seize the initiative in creating strategic buffer, and their geo-strategic limitations and circumstances. bring the fight to the aggressor's territory. To ensure continued survival, small states have to

conscientiously examine their regional geo-political Another stark reality for small states is the environment and accordingly determine sensible lack of resources. Compared to big militaries, defence strategy and military force structure. In small armed forces can ill afford to be engaged in the case of Israel, a strong and credible Israeli attrition-based conflicts, as such warfare naturally Defence Force (IDF) was, and continues to be favours the side with abundant resources.8 Even in crucial in ensuring its survival as a sovereign nation the unlikely event that a small armed force emerges state surrounded by a hostile Arab neighbourhood victorious from such protracted attrition-based that is supposedly bent on ‘wiping Israel off the warfare, the fatalities and destruction suffered map.’4 On the other hand, a geo-politically benign would have a profoundly larger impact on the small environment permits even a relatively small state state's economic recovery. Hence, in any conflict, like New Zealand to do away with an offensive small armed forces must strive for swift, decisive and fighter force and instead take sanctuary in its precise outcomes aimed at forcing aggressors to the geographical isolation.5 negotiation table before protracted engagements dwindle their own resources.

To ensure continued survival, small states AIR POWER’S STRATEGIC have to conscientiously examine their SIGNIFICANCE IN CONFLICTS

regional geo-political environment and Air power, broadly defined as ‘the ability to accordingly determine sensible defence project military force from a platform in the third strategy and military force structure. dimension over the surface of the earth,’ has proven to be an effective military option for achieving Other than contending with regional geopolitics, operational objectives.9 Its traditional attributes small states are generally disadvantaged by their of speed, range, flexibility and elevation allow geography. As illustrated in the case of Kuwait, militaries to quickly overcome vast distances and geographical smallness and proximity to potential treacherous terrains and simultaneously wreak aggressors translate to little strategic depth, destruction on a wide range of airborne, land- leaving little room for manoeuvre and response based, as well as sea-faring targets deep within time in the event of a conflict.6 The same reality the enemy's territory. For small nation states, confronts Singapore. In the words of our former the effective exploitation of air power's unique

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that the conflict was all but over in just six days of fighting.11 The ability for air power to fundamentally surprise an enemy was also employed by Japan when it craftily attempted to obliterate the unsuspecting US Pacific Fleet in the infamous Pearl Harbour attack.12 The offensive nature of air power, coupled with elements of surprise, allows small armed forces to overcome their geo-strategic disadvantages to create a much needed strategic buffer, without Wikipedia

Photograph of eight United States battleships at the which small states would most certainly perish in a beginning of the 1941 Pearl Harbour attack. conflict with bigger aggressors.

attributes not only achieves operational success, For small nation states, the effective but is paramount to the very survival of the nation. exploitation of air power's unique

In the face of imminent conflict, small armed attributes not only achieves operational forces should logically seize the first initiative success, but is paramount to the very to bring the fight to the enemy. In the words of survival of the nation. Clausewitz, ‘Supposing that a minor state is in Other than creating strategic buffer, the speed conflict with a much more powerful one and expects and reach of air power allow small armed forces to its position to grow weaker every year. If war is deny geographically larger aggressors the sanctuary unavoidable, should it not make the most of its of depth. Before the rise of air power, wars proceeded opportunities before its position gets still worse? linearly, from close to deep battles with ground In short, it should attack.’10 Hence, for small armed troops taking months and years to traverse the forces, launching a pre-emptive surprise blow on its vast terrain.13 In such warfare, small armed forces enemy is not merely a military option, but arguably a would be destroyed before they could even engage defence strategy that is crucial to its own survival. forces in the depth to capture strategic objectives. Air power, with its flexibility, responsiveness, The induction of long range, precision strike speed and reach, can provide small armed forces capabilities, coupled with pervasive and penetrative with the ability to strike at a moment's notice at surveillance and reconnaissance air platforms such the enemy's strategic centre of gravity, catching as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have now the enemy by surprise and dislocating him. The enabled even small armed forces to accurately IDF demonstrated this strategic value of air power locate targets in the depth and neutralise them clearly in the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, during which at will. As witnessed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the IDF's pre-emptive air strikes against Egyptian the effective use of air power was able to rapidly airfields fundamentally surprised and virtually and accurately destroy Saddam Hussein's palaces, crippled the Egyptian Air Force, creating such security operations, intelligence services and Ba'ath favourable conditions for the Israeli ground forces party buildings, removing any protective screen

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around the Iraqi leader and ultimately precipitating The strategic significance of air power in conflict in his downfall.14 Although small armed forces will extends to the land and maritime domains when likely face resource constraints in conducting ‘shock it is employed as part of an integrated campaign. and awe’ strategic bombing, they can conduct With the attainment of air superiority, small armed surgical strikes at the heart of the enemy to rapidly forces could wield disproportionate influence over degrade his will and capability to fight. the land and maritime battles by increasing freedom of manoeuvre for their own forces through air This will force him to the negotiation table, projection capabilities, while effectively degrading thereby ensuring a swift and decisive victory the enemy's surface capabilities through battlefield and the aversion of attrition-based warfare. air interdiction and close air support. The clever use Under favourable conditions and with effective of air power to decisively shape and influence land orchestration, strategic strikes can even achieve battles was demonstrated in Germany's Luftwaffe's operational successes quickly with minimal air support for the German army invasion of fatalities, as demonstrated in Operation Allied Poland in the early days of World War II (WWII) Force in Kosovo.15 This aspect of air power provides and again in supporting the ground forces in their national leaders with additional latitudes for fight against the retreating Norwegians.16 With pursuing limited and calibrated actions to protect the command and control of air strikes carefully national interests and stave off more extensive and orchestrated in synergy with the land and maritime resource-draining engagements. campaigns, small armed forces can effectively MINDEF

Two C-130s and a KC-135R from the Republic of Singapore Air Force assisted in airlifting supplies and evacuating civilians out of Christchurch.

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achieve force-multiplying effects to overcome efforts in Afghanistan, the RSAF deployed its UAV numerical inferiority and quickly overwhelm the Task Group to provide aerial surveillance coverage larger opposing force by leveraging on the speed, for the Coalition forces in 2010.19 In December reach and firepower of air platforms. 2014, the RSAF simultaneously deployed to two operating theatres to assist in the Search and AIR POWER’S STRATEGIC VALUE IN PEACE Locate operations for the downed AirAsia QZ8501 Small states, with their limited economic and and to participate in the flood relief operations in geo-strategic buffer to absorb the toll inflicted Kelantan, Malaysia.20 Through these contributions, by conflicts, should strive to prevent wars and the RSAF has firmly planted Singapore's flag on the preserve the peace as its foremost defence strategy. international stage, gained credibility for the SAF In this regard, the non-lethal aspects of air power as a highly trained and professional armed forces are strategically significant for preserving a state's and also allowed the SAF to build strong defence interests. In the words of respected military relations with like-minded nations. Hence, it is analyst Carl Builder, "Air power must be more than evident that the strategic application of air power in force because the problems of the world must peace-time operations allows small armed forces to increasingly be addressed by the military with more achieve national objectives through both diplomacy than force."17 Indeed, the non-lethal application of and deterrence, which is crucial in the prevention air power in peace allows small armed forces, like of armed conflicts. the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), to avert potential conflict through projecting deterrence, The induction of long range, precision enhancing international standing and building strong defence relations. strike capabilities, coupled with pervasive and penetrative surveillance To build up political goodwill while demonstrating and reconnaissance air platforms such as operational readiness and effectiveness, small armed forces can leverage on their air forces to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have conduct peacetime missions such as Humanitarian now enabled even small armed forces to Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, accurately locate targets in the depth Peace Support and Peace Keeping Operations (PSO/ and neutralise them at will. PKO). In this aspect, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), in distinguishing itself in its A WORD OF CAUTION – LIMITATIONS OF AIR POWER contributions to regional and international peace and security, has successfully portrayed the SAF as a Yet, in spite of the allure of air power, military credible military not to be trifled with. For example, strategists and tacticians should be wary of the in the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake in limitations of air power when considering its February 2011, the RSAF was able to quickly deploy employment in conflict. Air power, despite its its C-130 transport aircraft and KC-135 Air Refuelling ability to bring massive destruction at short notice, tankers to assist in the disaster relief efforts.18 As needs to be complemented by ground forces to part of the stabilisation and post-war reconstruction occupy and hold territories. As witnessed in past

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F-16I Sufa of the Israeli Air Force’s 107th Squadron preparing for take-off during Operation Cast Lead.

and present conflicts, even large air forces like the Lebanon War where the Israeli Air Force provided United States Air Force, with their overwhelming firepower as a disjointed alternative to ground fires, air dominance and huge force size, could seldom ground commanders in Operation Cast Lead were able achieve the proclaimed strategic and military to synergistically employ UAVs, strike aircraft and successes with the sole application of air power attack helicopters as part of their brigade campaign alone. Time and again, from the Vietnam War to the plan to effectively neutralise fleeting targets.23 Korean War to the Second Lebanon War, air power Similarly, the SAF recognises that the independent alone has proven to be a necessary but insufficient employment of the Air Force would be ineffective and 21 condition for bringing about complete victory. The hence, as part of its 3rd Generation transformation, more recent long-drawn campaigns in Afghanistan, the SAF embraces network-centric warfare to fully Iraq and now against the Islamic State have also integrate its airborne, maritime and land-based underscored the limited effectiveness of air power sensors and shooters into system-of-systems for the in counter-insurgency operations.22 effective prosecution of air-land and sea-air battles.

Small armed forces, with their limited resources, CONCLUSION should thus take heed to maximise the effectiveness of their air power as part of an integrated warfare In peace and in war, air power offers strategic capability. Learning from the lessons of the Second significance for geo-strategically disadvantaged small Lebanon War, the IDF was able to restore the synergy states. In conflict, air power's unique attributes of in its application of air power to decisively shape speed, reach, flexibility, surprise and elevation allow and influence ground offensives during Operation small armed forces to seize the initiative, overcome Cast Lead against Hamas in 2008. Unlike the Second their lack of strategic depth and deny geographically

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larger enemies the sanctuary of depth. Modern air History. “Iraq Invades Kuwait.” Accessed September 24, power, with increased precision and accuracy, allows 2015. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/iraq- invades-kuwait. small armed forces to evolve from large-scale strategic Ho, Yung Peng, and Lim, Reuben. “Observations from the bombing to surgical strategic strikes that could 2006 Lebanon and 2008 Gaza Wars and Lessons for the quickly degrade the enemy's will and capability to RSAF.” Pointer 36 (2011): 30-8. fight, thereby averting protracted conflicts. Air power Ho, Yung Peng, and Teo, Cheng Hang. “Airpower in Operation employed synergistically with surface manoeuvres Iraqi Freedom.” Pointer 30 (2004).

confer small armed forces the much-needed force- Kessler, Glenn. “Did Ahmadinejad Really Say Israel Should multiplying effects. Despite its allure, small armed be ‘Wiped Off the Map’?” The Washington Post, October forces must be wary of air power's limitations and 5, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact- checker/post/did-ahmadinejad-really-say-israel-should-be- should strive to optimise its employment as part wiped-off-the-map/2011/10/04/gIQABJIKML_blog.html. of an integrated warfare capability. Arguably for MINDEF. “Lunch Talk on ‘Defending Singapore: Strategies small states, the non-lethal aspects of air power for a Small State’ by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean.” provide greater strategic significance in its value Accessed September 24, 2015. http://www.mindef. gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/ in preserving peace and averting conflicts. Through apr/21apr05_nr2.html. the participation of air elements in HADR and PSO/ MINDEF. “SAF Assists NZDF in Christchurch.” Accessed PKO missions, small armed forces can effectively September 24, 2015. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/ project deterrence, build strong defence relations press_room/official_releases/nr/2011/feb/23feb11_ with like-minded nations and strengthen their nr.html. standing as responsible and respected members of MINDEF. “SAF Assets Deployed in Response to Missing the international community. Taken together, small AirAsia Plane.” Accessed September 24, 2015. http:// armed forces like the SAF should continue to invest www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ nr/2014/dec/28dec14_nr2.html. judiciously in building up an effective Air Force that is operationally capable across the peace-to-war MINDEF. “SAF Completes Relief Efforts in Flood-Hit Kelantan.” Accessed September 24, 2015. http://www. continuum as part of an integrated force.  mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/ topics/articles/news/2015/jan/15jan15_news.html. BIBLIOGRAPHY MINDEF. “SAF Deploys Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Task Group Builder, Carl H. The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power and Institutional Trainers to Afghanistan.” Accessed Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force. New September 24, 2015. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/ Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1994. press_room/official_releases/nr/2010/aug/27aug10_ nr.html. Clausewitz, Carl Von. On Victory and Defeat: From On War. Translated by Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret. New Ollivant, Douglas. “Can Air Power Stop ISIS?” CNN, August Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011. 8, 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/opinion/ ollivant-air-power-iraq-isis/ Clodfelter, Mark. “Theory, Implementation, and the Future of Airpower.” Air & Space Power Journal 29 (2014): 118-27. Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. New York: Oxford University Han, Fook Kwang, Ibrahim, Zuraidah, Chua, Mui Hoong, Press, 2002. Lim, Lydia, Low, Ignatius, Lin, Rachel and Chan, Robin. Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going. Singapore: Siboni, Gabriel. “The Military Campaign in Lebanon.” In Straits Times Press, 2011. The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives, edited by

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Shlomo Brom and Meir Elran, 61-76. Israel: Institute for 8. Martin Van Creveld, The Age of Airpower (New York: National Security Studies (INSS), 2007. Public Affairs, 2011), 152.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “International Relations, 9. Mark Clodfelter, “Theory, Implementation, and the Principal Theories.” Princeton, September 26, 2011. Future of Airpower,” Air & Space Power Journal 29 http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_ (2014): 119. IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf. 10. Carl Von Clausewitz, On Victory and Defeat: From On Tan, Kian Seng, “The Strategic Merits of Airpower,” Pointer War, trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (New 41 (2015): 56-67. Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), 601.

Van Creveld, Martin. The Age of Airpower. New York: Public 11. Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Affairs, 2011. Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Yuhas, Alan. “Ukraine Crisis: An Essential Guide to Everything That's Happened so Far.” The Guardian, April 13, 12. Van Creveld, The Age of Airpower, 155. 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/ 13. Ibid, 93. ukraine-russia-crimea-sanctions-us-eu-guide-explainer. 14. Ho Yung Peng and Teo Cheng Hang, “Airpower in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Pointer 30 (2004). ENDNOTES 15. Tan Kian Seng, “The Strategic Merits of Airpower,” 1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Relations, Pointer 41 (2015): 61. Principal Theories,” Princeton, September 26, 2011, 16. Van Creveld, The Age of Airpower, 94-96. http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_ IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf. 17. Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air 2. Carl Von Clausewitz, On Victory and Defeat: From On Force (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1994). War, trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), 607. 18. “SAF Assists NZDF in Christchurch,” MINDEF, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/ 3. “Lunch Talk on ‘Defending Singapore: Strategies for a imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2011/ Small State’ by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean,” feb/23feb11_nr.html. MINDEF, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www. mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/ 19. “SAF Deploys Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Task Group nr/2005/apr/21apr05_nr2.html. and Institutional Trainers to Afghanistan,” MINDEF, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.mindef. 4. Glenn Kessler, “Did Ahmadinejad Really Say Israel gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2010/ Should be ‘Wiped Off the Map’?” The Washington aug/27aug10_nr.html. Post, October 5, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost. com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-ahmadinejad-really- 20. “SAF Assets Deployed in Response to Missing AirAsia say-israel-should-be-wiped-off-the-map/2011/10/04/ Plane,” MINDEF, accessed September 24, 2015, http:// gIQABJIKML_blog.html. www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_ releases/nr/2014/dec/28dec14_nr2.html. 5. Han, et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2011), 18. “SAF Completes Relief Efforts in Flood-Hit Kelantan,” MINDEF, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www. 6. “Iraq Invades Kuwait,” History, accessed September mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/ 24, 2015, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ topics/articles/news/2015/jan/15jan15_news.html. iraq-invades-kuwait.eration Desert Storm, http://www. uhistory.org/us/60a.asp 21. Van Creveld, The Age of Airpower, 281.

7. “Lunch Talk on ‘Defending Singapore: Strategies for a Gabriel Siboni, “The Military Campaign in Lebanon,” in Small State’ by Teo Chee Hean.” The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives, ed.

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Shlomo Brom and Meir Elran (Israel: INSS, 2007), 63.

22. Douglas Ollivant, “Can Air Power Stop ISIS?” CNN, August 8, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/ opinion/ollivant-air-power-iraq-isis/

23. Ho Yung Peng and Reuben Lim, “Observations from the 2006 Lebanon and 2008 Gaza Wars and Lessons for the RSAF,” Pointer 36 (2011): 35.

MAJ Jeffrey Ng is a qualified Heron 1 UAV Command Pilot and is currently the Officer Commanding, C Flight in 119 Squadron, UAV Command. Prior to this, he held the appointment of SO(UAV) in SAF UAV Office, Air Plans Department where he was involved in strategising future UAV developments for the SAF. MAJ Jeffrey is an SAF Merit Scholarship recipient and graduated from University College London with a 1st Class Honours in Psychology, and a Masters with Distinction in Performance Psychology from University of Edinburgh.

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STABILISATION OPERATIONS: DEALING WITH ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS WITHIN FAILED STATES by MAJ Ho Jin Peng

Abstract:

A failed state is a political body that has deteriorated to a point where essential conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly. Correspondingly, when a state weakens and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of total governmental collapse. Thus, the objectives of stabilisation operations focus on ensuring stability in a society and the deterrence of safety threatening organisations such as terrorist groups from usurping control over the state. In this essay, the writer elaborates on the spectrum that the process of stabilisation covers and the necessity for its operations in a post-conflict war environment.

Keywords: Governmental Collapse; Ensuring Stability; Safety Threatening Organisations; Post-conflict War Environment

INTRODUCTION peace to war, this essay will focus primarily on Stabilisation Operations when dealing with failed When the United States (US) military intervened states, both during a post-conflict scenario or as a in Afghanistan and Iraq under the pretext of the result of political instability. Global War on Terror, coalition commanders and soldiers found themselves unprepared for the ‘Long This essay will define the critical role that War’ that ensued for more than a decade.1 The military forces play in stabilisation, analyse the primary cause of the US’s prolonged involvement in development of stabilisation doctrine employed in Afghanistan and Iraq was her initial planning and Afghanistan and Iraq, and how important it is to inadequate preparation to quell local resistance. engage in Stabilisation Operations in the likelihood The solution was the eventual development of of dealing with failed states in the region or during Stabilisation Operations. the post conflict phase in war. Stabilisation Operations are defined as military THE PROBLEM OF FAILED STATES missions ‘aimed at creating stability in a certain area, stability meaning a stable, safe society with States are the prime entity within the border no place for insurgents, terrorists and other safety of a country to govern its citizens and provide undermining elements.’2 Although Stabilisation conditions for the stable functioning of their Operations cover a wide spectrum ranging from daily lives. Failed or failing states however, either

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lost its legitimacy to govern or see its power resulting in the overthrow of government or due to challenged by non-state parties. As a result, these the implosion of political stability within a country. states create a hotbed ripe for the emergence of For example, when the US military overthrew the insurgents and terrorists. regime of Saddam Hussein during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the new government failed to hold stable The definition of failed states can be explained in power during the initial years. Likewise, the Syrian two different aspects. Firstly, states can be defined civil war saw the Assad’s inability to quell the rebel in the abstract, as the entity that monopolises the parties. In both cases, the failing of existing state legitimate use of violence. Therefore, failed and governments provided conditions for the rise of failing states are entities that have their monopoly insurgents and terrorists. of violence challenged, unable to control and regulate activities within the national borders or Failed or failing states however, either project power without being challenged with the lost its legitimacy to govern or see threat of secession, civil war, or large scale internal struggle for control between the government and its power challenged by non-state non-state actors.3 Secondly, failed states can parties. As a result, these states create also be defined as the state’s inability to provide a hotbed ripe for the emergence of basic services such as personal security, economic insurgents and terrorists. stability and a functional bureaucratic and judicial system.4 As a result, influential criminal groups Failed and failing states are more will emerge amidst the widespread lawlessness to 'susceptible to transnational terrorist attacks and rival the government’s authority and gain citizen disproportionately contribute to transnational loyalties by providing a certain degree of these terrorism that targets other countries.’5 Three basic services. reasons contributed to this conclusion. Firstly, failed states lack the ability to project power There are generally two reasons for the emergence internally and have incompetent and corrupt law of failed states, either due to an external war enforcement capacities. Therefore, these states provide opportunities, and lower costs, for terrorist groups to organise, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications beyond those afforded by the network of safe houses in non- failed states. Terrorist groups can develop their own capabilities with little governmental interference and scrutiny.6 Secondly, these states "offer terrorist groups a larger pool of potential recruits because they contain large numbers of insecure, disaffected,

Wikipedia alienated, and disloyal citizens for whom political A US Marine Corps M1 Abrams tank patrols a Baghdad street violence is an accepted avenue of behaviour."7 Lastly, after its fall in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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failed states still maintain its status as a sovereign state in the international system. Therefore, this place legal limits on intervention by other states. In addition, government officials, who are often underpaid and highly corruptible, can provide terrorists with access to legal documentation, such as passports, visas and end-user certificates to import and export arms, in exchange for money,

8

political support or physical protection.” Wikipedia

Car bombings are a frequently used tactic by insurgents The end state of stabilisation include a in Iraq. safe and secure environment, established rule of law, social well-being, stable While traditional military operations focus on its lethal capabilities, stability operations employ, to governance, and a sustainable economy. a large extent, its constructive non-lethal aspects. Examples of stabilisation operations are as follows: That said, the purpose of Stabilisation Operations

is to address the insurgent and terrorist problem a) To support a partner nation during peacetime arising from a failed state. It describes activities military engagement; from an external party with the aim to develop a b) After a natural or man-made disaster as part political equilibrium that eliminates politically of a humanitarian-based limited intervention; motivated violence. c) During peace operations to enforce WHAT ARE STABILISATION OPERATIONS? international peace agreements;

Stabilisation Operations are defined as ‘military d) To support a legitimate host-nation missions that are aimed at creating stability in government during irregular warfare; a certain area, stability meaning a stable, safe e) During major combat operations to society with no place for insurgents, terrorists and establish conditions that facilitate post- other safety undermining elements.’9 This process conflict activities; of stabilisation involves both civil and military agencies working together to ensure conditions f) In a post-conflict environment following the are right for a long lasting peace. The end state of general cessation of organised hostilities. 11

stabilisation include a safe and secure environment, As seen from the examples, the process of established rule of law, social well-being, stable stabilisation encompasses a wide spectrum governance, and a sustainable economy.10 In ranging from peace to general war. As far as failed the pursuit of this aim, the military plays a states are concerned, Stabilisation Operations aims significant role which departs from its traditional to recover from the de-stabilising effects of low modus operandi. intensity conflicts or a full scale war.

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their expedition in Afghanistan and Iraq, a shift in military roles was essential for the success of the war effort. During the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom, US military leaders and soldiers believed in the doctrine of ‘shock and awe.’12 The war ‘was going to be the first war won by the new doctrine of ‘Rapid Dominance’, delivering devastating firepower to ‘shock and awe’ the government and people of an entire nation-state into submission within days.’13

Wikipedia Although the ‘shock and awe’ doctrine worked well

U.S. Marines with Explosive Ordnance Disposal destroy in rapidly defeating the Iraqi Army, it did little to an Improvised Explosive Device cache in Southern Shorsurak, Helmand province, Afghanistan in June 2010. quell insurgent attacks. In fact, attacks on coalition forces steadily increased to as much as 1,200 to 1,600 Firstly, Stabilisation Operations can be applied attacks per week in 2006.14 Three years into the war, to address the asymmetric nature of conflicts the US military moved away from the doctrine of within failed states. This can be done in support of a ‘shock and awe’ to embrace the doctrine of winning friendly host nation’s government to quell its internal 15 conflict and augment its own forces in an effort to ‘hearts and minds’. To aid soldiers and commanders, remedy the state’s failure in establishing the monopoly the US Department of Defense announced the term of arms. ‘Stability Operations’ in 2006 and published a Field Manual (FM 3-07) as a doctrinal guide for the Secondly, stabilisation can be applied post US Army. war, where governmental institutions and services are disrupted. Following a cessation of organised The issue with the initial doctrine of ‘shock and hostilities (i.e. military victory), Stabilisation awe’ was the ‘assumption that all opponents can Operations focuses on eliminating the remaining be beaten with mass and power and speed.’16 While adversary’s will to fight and to aid civil agencies these traditional military maxims worked well in in establishing a stable government. By doing so, friendly forces can prevent the existence of insurgents, the defeat of conventionally organised militants, it terrorists, and other security undermining elements. did little against an asymmetric war. In addition to finding their adversaries less defined, armies RE-EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS find their situation exacerbating with each combat OF LETHAL POWER operation. The US military subsequently realised However, the traditional institution of armed that the key to countering insurgency is the support forces as an instrument of war contradicts the of the local populace. fundamental aim of Stabilisation Operations. As the US Department of Defence learned though The population, being the insurgent’s centre of

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mass, provided the source of personnel, weapons, Following a cessation of organised intelligence, and supplies to the combatants. Whoever hostilities (i.e. military victory), gains the support of the population, will gain these resources.17 Unfortunately, conventional military Stabilisation Operations focuses on strategies contradict this effort. By focusing on the eliminating the remaining adversary’s lethal power of the armed force, it further alienates will to fight and to aid civil agencies in the population with destruction and unrest. In order establishing a stable government. to eliminate the insurgent’s source of support, the US military moved towards exercising her ‘soft power’ of THE NEED FOR STABILISATION OPERATIONS

winning ‘hearts and minds.’ By the end of 2006, ‘few The need for Stabilisation Operations is officers advocate bombing and shelling the enemies dependent on two political conditions created they encounter as a matter of course. They and their during war or during political instability within soldiers and marines seek to convince the Iraqi a country. The first condition is the existence people to support the newly elected government and of insurgent or terrorist groups that undermine its policies.’18 Ultimately, the US military found that national objectives or the safety of friendly forces. their best strategy towards a successful withdrawal is The second condition is the inability of the local to stabilise Afghanistan and Iraq. legitimate government to provide security and other Wikipedia

A US Army Special Forces medic in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan in September 2008.

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essential services. With these two conditions, the belligerents is to resort to asymmetric warfare. role of the military is to eliminate remaining threats Insurgency operations are low intensity in nature, and bolster the support of the local government. By targeting at the weaknesses of friendly armed forces and attempts to disrupt or negate the doing so, it will shape the political environment in legitimacy of the local state. Counter insurgency its favour. warfare has to be employed which typically involves In order to effectively ensure civil an extensive intelligence network, precision and security, troops need to learn to targeted attacks, and halting the support of these groups. differentiate between criminals and armed insurgents, depart from the The second role of the military is to fill in as ‘shoot at sight’ mentality and know armed police. The conditions of a failed state entails that pre-war civil security services (i.e. ‘how to respond to civil disturbances police, courts, etc.) are disrupted. The affected in populated areas, how to interact population will hence support the agency that with civilian leaders, and what can provide the much needed order and security. force options exist when trying to To gain that support, it is essential that friendly restore law and order. armed forces fill in as armed police. In Afghanistan, the US military found themselves in the initial years of the war to be inadequate in handling local riots In Marine General Charles Krulak’s description of and widespread organised violence.20 Although the ‘three-block war’, he suggested that on three constabulary and paramilitary organisations were contiguous city blocks, ‘one could simultaneously employed to handle the civil security void, high end find humanitarian aid being distributed, a civil military support and back up was still necessary.21 disturbance being quelled, and all-out combat being Unfortunately, when untrained soldiers become 19 fought.’ This statement encapsulated the role of cops, it complicated the political aim of the the military in Stabilisation Operations, which is to war effort. In order to effectively ensure civil security, troops need to learn to differentiate a) ensure the state’s monopoly of arms, between criminals and armed insurgents, depart b) establish civil security, and from the ‘shoot at sight’ mentality and know ‘how

c) provide essential humanitarian services. to respond to civil disturbances in populated areas, how to interact with civilian leaders, and what force The first priority of the armed forces is to ensure options exist when trying to restore law and order.’22 the local state’s monopoly of arms. Consolidation

of power and legitimacy is only possible with the Lastly, the armed forces are excellent tools suppression of all contesting combatants. Counter in providing and distributing humanitarian aid Insurgency is hence the primary form of ensuring to destabilised regions. Similar to providing the state’s monopoly of arms. With the lack of civil security, the aim of providing humanitarian an organised army, the only viable option for the aid is to gain the support and legitimacy of the

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populace. For example, the situation in post-Taliban Vol. 83, No. 5, 2004: 34-56.

Afghanistan consists of a central government Dobbins, James. "Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War." centre and fragmented regional power-holders.23 Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No.1, 2005: 16-25. Through providing essential services, such as roads, DoD. FM 3-07 Stability Operations. Headquarters power and water supplies, it convinced these power Department of the Army, 2008. holders to respect the Kabul administration.24 Ghufran, Nasreen. "Afghanistan in 2006: The Complication of Post-Conflict Transition." Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No.1, While humanitarian aid is predominantly provided 2007: 87-98. by donors and organised by civil agencies and Hehir, Aidan. "The Myth of the Failed State and the War on non-government organisations (NGO), the military Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom." Journal performs three essential functions. Firstly, it of Intervention and State Building 1 (3), 2007: 307 -332. ensures that these resources do not get looted by Lee, Kuan Yew. "The United States, Iraq, and the War on insurgents or rioters. Secondly, the military provide Terror: A Singaporean Perspective." Foreign Affair, Vol. 86, the logistical capability for large scale resources No. 1, 2007: 2-7. to reach inaccessible areas. Lastly, the military Lopez, Andrea M. "Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or provides a sign of power and legitimacy for the Losing? The Contradictions of Counterinsurgency Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq." Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No.2, central government it supports or represents. 2007: 245-260. CONCLUSION Marsden, Peter. "Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process." International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2003: 91-105. As seen from the US experience in Afghanistan Muggah, Robert. Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. and Iraq, Stabilisation Operations are an important New York: Routledge, 2009. and effective concept in an asymmetrically contested Ong, Weichong. S. Rajaratnam School of International area. Either at the request of a host nation, or after Studies. Jan 12, 2009. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/ a ‘swift and decisive’ victory against an organised Perspective/RSIS0052009.pdf (accessed Feb 17, 2014).

aggressor, Stabilisation Operations may be required Piazza, James A. "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing to deal with the asymmetric aspect of conflict within States Promote Transnational Terrorism?" International Studies Quarterly, Sep 2008: 469 - 488. a failed state.  Rotberg, Robert I. "Failed State, Collapsed, Weak States: BIBLIOGRAPHY Causes and Indicators." In State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, by Robert I Rotberg, 1-25. Washington, Berger, Mark T, and Douglas A. Borer. The Long War - D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States. New Saikal, Amin. "Afghanistan's Transition: ISAF's Stabilisation York: Routledge, 2008. Role?" Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2006: 525-534. Bronson, Rachel. "When Soldiers Become Cops." Foreign Sepp, Kalev I. "From 'shock and awe' to 'hearts and minds': Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, 2002: 122-132. the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Brookings. "Iraq Index." January 31, 2011. http://www. Iraq." Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007: 217-230. brookings.edu/~/media/Centers/saban/iraq%20index/ Sico, van der Meer. Factors for the Success or Failure of index20120131.PDF (accessed March 18, 2014). Stabilisation Operations. The Hague: Netherlands Institute Diamond, Larry. "What Went Wrong in Iraq." Foreign Affairs, of International Relations Clingendael, 2009.

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Ullman, Harlan K, and JP Wade. Shock and Awe: Achieving 10. DoD. FM 3-07 Stability Operations. Headquarters Rapid Dominance. Washington, DC: National Defense Department of the Army, 2008, p.1-16. University, 1996. 11. Ibid., p.1-3.

12. Ullman, Harlan K, and JP Wade. Shock and Awe: ENDNOTES Achieving Rapid Dominance. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996. 1. The “Long War” was used to characterise the prolonged presence of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (Berger 13. Sepp, Kalev I. "From 'shock and awe' to 'hearts and and Borer 2008). minds': the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq." Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2. Sico, van der Meer. Factors for the Success or Failure 2, 2007: 217-230, p. 21. of Stabilisation Operations. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009, 14. Brookings. "Iraq Index." January 31, 2011, http:// p.2. www.brookings.edu/~/media/Centers/saban/iraq%20 index/index20120131.PDF 3. Rotberg, Robert I. "Failed State, Collapsed, Weak States: Causes and Indicators." In State Failure and 15. Sepp, op. cit., p.22. State Weakness in a Time of Terror, by Robert I Rotberg, 16. Ibid, p32. 1-25. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003 17. Lopez, Andrea M. "Engaging or Withdrawing, Winning or Losing? The Contradictions of Counterinsurgency Policy 4. Hehir, Aidan. "The Myth of the Failed State and the War in Afghanistan and Iraq." Third World Quarterly, Vol. on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom." 28, No.2, 2007: 245-260, p.53-54. Journal of Intervention and State Building 1 (3), 2007: 307 -332 18. Sepp, op. cit., p.21.

5. Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed 19. Ibid., p.26. and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” 20. Bronson, Rachel. "When Soldiers Become Cops." Foreign International Studies Quarterly, Sep 2008: 483 Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, 2002: 122-132, p.122.

6. Ibid. p.471 21. Ibid., p.125.

7. Ibid. p.471-472 22. Ibid., p.129-130.

8. Ibid. p.472. 23. Marsden, Peter. "Afghanistan: The Reconstruction 9. Sico, op. cit., p.2. Process." International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2003: 91- 105, p.103.

24. Ibid., p.103-104.

MAJ Ho Jin Peng is a Helicopter Pilot by vocation and is currently a Staff Officer in Strategies and Concept Development Branch, Air Operations Department. MAJ Ho graduated from University College London with a Bachelors of Science in Economics (First Class Honours), and a Masters of Science in International Relations from London School of Economics and Political Science.

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UNDERSTANDING THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE THREAT IT POSES by CPT Alvin Leow Boon Teck

Abstract:

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) operational and recruitment methods are different compared to its counterpart, Al Qaeda. The emerging trend of cases of globally orchestrated terror attacks by radicalised individuals who identify with the extremist group, puts focus on their effective recruitment methods and the threat they bring to global nations. This essays elaborates on how ISIS’s operational and recruitment methods differ from that of Al Qaeda, the threat the extremist group brings to national security in Southeast Asia and the recommendations on how to prevent and combat foreseeable terror attacks by ISIS.

Keywords: Operational and Recruitment Methods; Orchestrated Terror Attacks; Radicalised Individuals; Extremist Group

INTRODUCTION radical group that originated in the Middle East, can pose a threat to Southeast Asian countries. With a The September 11 attack on the United States better understanding of the threat, it is hoped that (US) showed the world the destructive capability of the issue can be addressed more effectively. terrorist groups. As a result, the war on terrorism became increasingly important. Following the HISTORY OF ISIS attack, Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden became ISIS, also known as ISIL (Islamic State of the focus in the fight against terrorism. A series Levant), or IS (Islamic State), was founded in 1999 of retaliation attacks was launched by the US on by Jordanian extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.1 Afghanistan and Iraq. Although Osama was killed Capitalising on the political and social instability, and the entire Al-Qaeda network was crippled after Saddam Hussein was overthrown during the substantially, the war on terrorism is far from over. Second Gulf War, ISIS merged with Al-Qaeda in 2004 Those retaliation attacks by the US created and conducted their operations in Iraq. This merger an opportunity for the growth of another radical enabled Al Qaeda to establish its first terrorist Islamic group, ISIS. This essay will cover a brief network outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al- history of ISIS and how it differs from the infamous Zarqawi was then named the leader of the newly Al-Qaeda. The essay will also examine how ISIS, a formed branch in Iraq. Other than targeting US

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forces and its allies, al-Zarqawi also aimed to hinder COMPARISON BETWEEN ISIS AND AL-QAEDA the restoration and reconstruction efforts in Iraq ISIS, being an Islamic extremist group, shares by targeting similar ideology as Al-Qaeda.5 They treat all Western

1) government infrastructure and personnel, nations in particular, the US, and their allies as and enemies. In addition, they believe that all able- bodied Muslims have a duty to perform Jihad when 2) Iraqi civilian contractors and aid workers. the opportunity arises. To further de-stabilise the social environment, attacks were also directed against the Shi’ites Those who refuse or abstain from undertaking Muslims (who form the majority in Iraq) on the this sacred duty are deemed as having committed pretext that they were apostates and that they an act of hypocrisy. Both groups also frame their supported the US-led invasion into Iraq.2 ideology within the concept of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam, which believed that the current law and Although al-Zarqawi was killed in an air raid in governance adopted by society is not suitable for 2006, ISIS continued his tactic of targeting Shi’ites Islam as a religion. civilians and Shi’ites places of worship.3 This However, ISIS’s mode of operations, methods of received much criticism from Al Qaeda’s leadership recruitment methods and source of funds are vastly as they felt that the tactics used would dilute different from Al-Qaeda. the support from Iranians, resulting in increased difficulty for Al-Qaeda to spread their cause in Iran. As a result, the merger was dissolved in 2014.

Being free from Al-Qaeda, ISIS restructured their network. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed the role of Caliph and declared a Caliphate.4 The restructured ISIS had an organised, hierarchical model with different councils heading various aspects within ISIS.

The restructured ISIS also has some similarities as well as differences compared to its counterpart, Al-Qaeda. A comparison between ISIS and Al Qaeda is discussed in the following paragraphs.

Different from Al-Qaeda, ISIS seeks to

establish a Caliphate, which is to establish Wikipedia

a self-sustaining Islamic government led Mugshot of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi taken by US armed forces by a Caliph. while in detention at Camp Bucca in the vicinity of Umm Qasr, Iraq, in 2004.

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1. Employment of Tactics. Other than directing Different from Al-Qaeda, ISIS seeks to their attacks towards Shi’ite civilians as mentioned establish a Caliphate, which is to establish a self- above, ISIS also engages in medieval and rituals sustaining Islamic government led by a Caliph.7 punishments (which include the beheading and To do so, ISIS has to ensure that they are able to burning of hostages) to instill fear within the recruit not only militants, but also people from community. In addition, to establishing a Caliphate, all professions, including healthcare workers. ISIS needs to capture and control cities. This is also done mainly through the use of social media networks. 2. Method of Recruitment. In order to gain the attention of international media and to reach out to 3. Sources of Funding To ensure that the a larger audience, social media was used extensively. Caliphate is sustainable, ISIS needs to have a stable Videos of mass brutality were circulated in YouTube source of income. Similar to Al Qaeda, ISIS engages and were being accessed worldwide by people of in various criminal activities to generate funds, for all ages, including the younger audiences who are example, human trafficking, kidnapping and drugs. easily influenced or ‘brainwashed’ by ISIS.6 The However, through the strategic capturing of cities effective use of social media enabled ISIS to recruit with oil fields and refineries, ISIS is able gain foreign fighters who are attracted either to ISIS’s control of those resources. Oil from those captured ideology of creating a Caliphate or their brutal resources is then sold to neighboring countries. In punishment methods. addition to the income gained from oil smuggling,

Wikipedia

Map of Afghanistan showing the security situation by district and opium cultivation by province in the period 2007 to 2008. Map of Afghanistan showing the security situation by district and opium cultivation by province in the POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL.44 NO.1 POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL.44 NO.1 period 2007 to 2008. Source: Wikipedia 67-74_ Understanding the Islamic State and the Threat_1.1.indd 63 23/2/18 3:05 PM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opium_production_in_Afghanistan

ISIS THREAT LEVEL TO THE WORLD

With a different agenda compared to Al Qaeda, ISIS has been launching attacks outside of their controlled territories (Iran and Syria). The extensive use of social media allowed the ease of organising and co-ordinating such attacks.

1. Attack on Paris (13th Nov 2015). A series of co-ordinated attack on a concert hall, stadium, restaurants and bars was orchestrated by gunmen and suicide bombers. The attack resulted in 130 dead and hundreds injured. 9 Of the attackers identified, the majority were French and Belgians. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack the following day. The motive of launching the attack by ISIS was uploaded on their social media platforms (e.g. Twitter and Telegram) and distributed by ISIS followers.10

A mass shooting and hostage-taking incident by members of ISIS occurred at the Bataclan theatre on the boulevard Voltaire in the 11th arrondissement of Paris on the 13th of November, 2015.

Source: Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_2015_Paris_attacks

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ISIS also earns tax revenue from civilians in the cities that they control. The sale of oil and the implementation of taxation rules allowed ISIS to generate a more stable and sustainable source of income as compared to Al-Qaeda.8

ISIS THREAT LEVEL TO THE WORLD

With a different agenda compared to Al-Qaeda,

ISIS has been launching attacks outside of their Wikipedia

controlled territories (Iran and Syria). The extensive The suspect's vehicle involved in a shootout with the police, in use of social media allowed the ease of organising the 2015 San Bernardino shooting. and co-ordinating such attacks. 2. Attack on San Bernardino (2nd Dec 2015). 1. Attack on Paris (13th Nov 2015). A series Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, of co-ordinated attacks on a concert hall, stadium, went to the county’s health department holiday restaurants and bars was orchestrated by gunmen event and opened fire at the crowd with assault and suicide bombers. The attack resulted in 130 dead rifles and hand guns. The attack resulted in 14 and hundreds injured.9 Of the attackers identified, dead and 21 injured.11 It was surprising to learn the majority were French and Belgians. ISIS claimed that Farook, being born and raised in the US, and responsibility for the attack the following day. The had only travelled to Saudi Arabia twice, was one motive of launching the attack by ISIS was uploaded of the two shooters in the attack. Investigations on their social media platforms (e.g. Twitter and revealed the couple may be ‘radicalised’ to carry 10 Telegram) and distributed by ISIS followers. out the attacks. Farook had expressed his support for ISIS’s ideology of creating an Islamic Caliphate while Malik had posted a pledge of allegiance to ISIS’s leader on Facebook.12 Although ISIS did not officially claim that they were responsible for the attack, they recognised the couple as ‘martyrs’ in their propaganda channels.13

Through the use of social media or influence by other extremists, individuals can be ‘radicalised’. When that happens, lone wolf attacks by that individual or

Wikipedia group can occur. A mass shooting and hostage-taking incident by members of ISIS occurred at the Bataclan theatre on the boulevard From these two attacks, we are able to observe Voltaire in the 11th arrondissement of Paris on the 13th of November, 2015. the level of threat ISIS is capable of delivering

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to the world. The attack on Paris suggests that strength of ISIS’s fighters and degree of influence ISIS has the ability to plan and execute terrorist in the region to grow tremendously. attacks covertly. Using local born nationals (e.g. Following the call by ISIS to recruit foreign French and Belgians) compared to nationals from fighters, up to 700 Indonesians had travelled to the Middle East, ISIS is able to hide below the Syria to join ISIS in recent years. Some of those radar of security forces and ensure that the co- fighters, after receiving training in Syria, eventually ordination and preparations for the attacks remain returned to Indonesia to co-ordinate for future undetected. On the other hand, the San Bernardino attacks, recruit more extremists and/or assist ISIS violence shows that attacks may not originate from in establishing their Caliphate in the region. Hence, ISIS headquarters. Through the use of social media it is just a matter of time before an attack in the or influence by other extremists, individuals can be region will occur. This can be seen from the latest ‘radicalised’. When that happens, lone wolf attacks Jakarta attacks which are described below. by that individual or group can occur. Attack on Jakarta (14th Jan 2016) ISIS, through ISIS THREAT LEVEL TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES the use of gunmen and suicide bombers, executed a series of attacks in Indonesia’s capital. The targets With a large Muslim population in Southeast of the attack included a police station near a busy Asia, it is ideal for ISIS to spread its ideology. The shopping centre as well as a Starbucks café. The presence of existing extremist groups allows ISIS attack resulted in six dead and ten injured.17 to easily establish a foothold and execute attacks in the region. To overcome the language barrier While leaders from all over the world condemned and to appeal to the people in the region, ISIS’s the Jakarta attack, the attack serves as an alarm for Southeast Asia. The threat that ISIS brings to propaganda was translated into Bahasa Indonesia the region is real and is closer than what most can and Malay before being uploaded online. Subtitles imagine. Hence, it is timely for country leaders to in the local language were also included in YouTube take a step back and analyse the situation carefully videos that were in Arabic or English.14 so as to promulgate suitable measures to deal with According to the Australian Attorney General, the ISIS’s threat. George Brandis in a CNN report, Indonesia has been COMBATING ISIS identified by ISIS to be a distant Caliphate.15 This In order to address the threat posed by ISIS, could be due to the fact that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and to prevent any opportunity for such similar an extremist group in Indonesia, shares the same attacks to occur, it is important to ensure that both ideology as ISIS, which is to establish an Islamic preventive and detective measures are instituted. Caliphate. In addition, there are at least three extremist groups in the region who have pledged 1. Preventive Measures. Preventive measures their allegiance to ISIS. They are JI (in Indonesia), are measures taken to prevent individuals from Abu Sayyaf and Bangsomoro Islamic Freedom fighters being ‘radicalised’ and lured to join the extremist (both in Philippines).16 The alliance enabled the groups. These measures include educating 1) the

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public, especially the young, on the importance reduce the reaction time required to foil an attack. of social cohesion by government and community leaders; and 2) Muslims on the correct Islamic ROLE OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES teaching by religious leaders and scholars. With the The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) can play a correct education and knowledge, the probability of significant role in this war on terrorism, both in an individual being recruited or ‘radicalised’ will be preventive and detective measures. As part of reduced substantially. preventive measures, military assets are deployed to join the US-led campaign in the fight against Efforts to counter ISIS and to prevent ISIS.20 By directly addressing the ISIS threat in ISIS from extending its influence in the the Middle East, it will hinder the spread of ISIS’s region will require the collaboration influence and expansion plans in the region. between various country and religious Detective measures by the SAF will include the leaders, security forces and the vigilance continued collaboration with the police and other security agencies. Combined patrols by SAF soldiers of every individual. and police at key installations (e.g. airports) will

In addition, governments can also institute reduce the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack legislation to prevent extremists from planning and from occurring. executing attacks. One example would be the Internal CONCLUSION Security Act (ISA) in Singapore, which enables authorities to detain, without trial, individuals who The threat that ISIS brings to the world, including are deemed to be a threat to the nation’s security.18 Southeast Asia, is real. Given the difference in ISIS’s While in detention, individuals are then counselled operations and recruitment methods compared to to remove their radical mindsets. Individuals will Al-Qaeda, one cannot simply use the same methods only be released from detention when they are that were previously used to counter Al-Qaeda against deemed no longer ‘radicalised’. Such a measure will ISIS. In addition to military efforts by the SAF and not only prevent terrorist attacks from occurring, other collation forces to counter ISIS, education to it will also serve to guide individuals back to the the public and the Muslim community is also crucial. correct mindset. Efforts to counter ISIS and to prevent ISIS from extending its influence in the region will require the 2. Detective Measures. Detective measures are collaboration between various country and religious measures taken to prevent a successful terrorist leaders, security forces and the vigilance of every attack. These measures can include personnel and individual.  cyber space monitoring by intelligence and police agencies.19 The information gathered and processed

must not only be shared timely and accurately with ENDNOTES the various security forces within the country, it 1. "A Brief History of ISIS." Home. Accessed must also be shared with security forces in other February 5, 2016. http://chosenpeople.com/main/ countries. Having a good intelligence network will index.php/ministry-news/926-a-brief-history-of-isis.

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2. "Al-Zarqawi Declares War on Iraqi Shia - Al Jazeera English." .com." CNN. Last modified December 8, 2015. http:// Al Jazeera: Live News | Bold Perspectives | Exclusive edition.cnn.com/2015/12/07/us/san-bernardino- Films. Last modified September 14, 2005. http://www. shooting/. aljazeera.com/archive/2005/09/200849143727698709. 13. Under Islamic rules, ‘martyrs’ refers to those who died html. while conducting Jihad.

3. "Air Raid Kills Al-Zarqawi - World News - Mideast/N. Lizzie, Dearden. "San Bernardino Shooting: Attackers Africa - Conflict in Iraq | NBC News." Msnbc.com. Last Did Not Express Support for Isis on Social Media modified August 6, 2006. http://www.nbcnews.com/ and Were Not Part of Terror Cell | Americas | News." id/13195017/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/al- The Independent. Last modified December 17, 2015. qaida-iraqs-al-zarqawi-terminated/#.VqcU8Pl97IU. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ san-bernardino-shooting-attackers-did-not-express- 4. A Caliphate is an Islamic State under the rule of a support-for-isis-on-social-media-a6775731.html. Caliph. 14. "ISIS Deploys Malay Language in Push for SE Asian 5. "A Tale of Two Jihads: Comparing the Al-Qaeda and Recruits." TODAYonline. Last modified June 17, 2015. ISIS Narratives." IPI Global Observatory. Last modified http://tablet.todayonline.com/world/asia/isis- February 9, 2015. http://theglobalobservatory. deploys-malay-language-push-se-asian-recruits. org/2015/02/jihad-al-qaeda-isis-counternarrative/. 15. James, Griffiths. "Who Could Be Behind the Jakarta 6. 'Brainwashed' Teenager Holds Woman at Knifepoint Bombings? .com." CNN. Last modified January 14, 2016. in Malaysian Supermarket to Prove ISIS Membership, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/14/asia/indonesia- SE Asia News & Top Stories." The Straits Times. Last terror-suspect-groups/index.html. modified January 12, 2016. http://www.straitstimes. com/asia/se-asia/brainwashed-teenager-holds-woman- 16. Jay, Akbar. "ISIS Recruits Tens of Thousands to Its at-knifepoint-in-malaysian-supermarket-to-prove-isis. Cause in South-east Asia | Daily Mail Online." Mail Online. Last modified August 13, 2015. http://www. 7. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself as the Caliph. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3193971/The-terrifying- 8. Scott, Bronstein, and Griffin Drew. "How ISIS Makes rise-ISIS-East-Terror-horde-recruits-tens-thousands- Its Millions .com." CNN. Last modified October 7, 2014. sick-cause-south-east-Asia.html. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis- 17. Kathy, Quiano, Euan McKirdy, and Ed Payne. "Jakarta funding/. Attacks: Coordinated Attacks Hit Indonesian Capital 9. "Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night." BBC .com." CNN. Last modified January 14, 2016. http:// News. Last modified December 9, 2015. http://www. edition.cnn.com/2016/01/13/asia/jakarta-gunfire- bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994. explosions/.

10. Rukmini, Callimachi. "ISIS Claims Responsibility, 18. "Singapore Statutes Online - 143 - Internal Security Calling Paris Attacks First of the Storm - The New York Act." Singapore Statutes Online - Home. Last modified Times." The New York Times - Breaking News, World January 2, 2011. http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/ News & Multimedia. Last modified November 14, 2015. display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A5ba26ddb- http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/ fd4c-4e2e-8071-478c08941758%20Depth%3A0%20 isis-claims-responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling- Status%3Ainforce;rec=0. them-miracles.html?_r=0. 19. Personnel monitoring refers to individuals who exhibit 11. Faith, Karimi. "ISIS: San Bernardino Shooters Were a high risk of being radicalised. 'supporters' .com." CNN. Last modified December 6, 20. Koh, Eng Beng. "SAF to Join Coalition in Global 2015. http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san- Fight Against ISIS." MINDEF Singapore. Last modified bernardino-shooting/. November 3, 2014. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/ 12. Faith, Karimi, Shoichet E. Catherine, and Dana Ford. imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/ "San Bernardino Shooters Planned Attack, FBI Says news/2014/nov/03nov14_news.html#.VrzQ5LJ97IU.

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CPT Alvin Leow Boon Teck is a fighter pilot by vocation and is currently a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) in 130 SQN. CPT Leow holds a degree in Accountancy (High Merit) from Singapore Management University.

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Book Review Robert M. Neer, Napalm: An American Biography, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 2015, 352 pages.

By Oliver Cheok

Robert M. Neer, Napalm: An American Biography, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 2015, 352 pages.

By Oliver Cheok

INTRODUCTION history professor Robert M. Neer’s aptly named Napalm: An American Biography details its “Napalm was born a marvel controversial existence—from its but lives a pariah.” birth in World War Two (WWII) 1 -Robert M. Neer in US—to its condemnation and ultimate disarmament.

Discovered on Valentine’s Day in “Napalm was born a marvel but lives a pariah.” - Robert M. Neera1 secret Harvard laboratory in 1942 GREEK FIRE and decommissioned by ex-United INTRODUCTION The use of fire in warfare is by States (US) President Barrack Obama no means a modern phenomenon. Discovered on Valentine’s Day in a secret Harvard laboratory in 1942 and decommissioned by on his first day in office in 2008, ex-United States (US) President Barrack Obama on his first day in office in 2008, few inventions in The recorded use of thermal history have as notorious a reputation as napalm, the few incendiary inventions gel. The in name historyitself is have an as amalgamation of the names of two of its constituents: naphthenic and palmitic acids. Known to burn weaponry extends back millennia, at well over 1000°C and having the unusual property of being incredibly sticky, napalmnotorious a reputation has a notorious as napalm, in multiple cultures all over the and bloody history for its use as a combustible weapon. Since its creation, the incendiaryit has been used in most of gel. The name the world’s major military conflicts, making its death toll increasingly difficult to estimate. Columbia world. The Roman, Assyrian, University history professor Robert M. Neer’s aptly named itselfNapalm: An American Biography is an amalgamation details its of the controversial existence—from its birth in World War Two (WWII) in US—to its condemnation and Chinese and Indian civilisations ultimate disarmament. names of two of its constituents: naphthenic and palmitic acids. and empires all count themselves among these. Sun Tzu’s ancient 1 Known to burn at well over 1000°C and having the unusual property text Art of War, written around 500 of being incredibly sticky, napalm B.C., details five methods to fight has a notorious and bloody history using fire.2 The use of liquid fire in for its use as a combustible particular extends to as far back weapon. Since its creation, it has as the Hellenistic period. Its first been used in most of the world’s recorded use was in 69 B.C. when major military conflicts, making citizens of the city of Samosata its death toll increasingly difficult poured maltha, or flaming mud, on to estimate. Columbia University the Roman army of Consul Lucius

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Lucullus. The fiery material literally chemistry professor Louis Fieser, and combustible materials, Fieser cooked the legionnaires in their among other brilliant minds of the concocted what we now know as armour. The city however only fell time, including Harvard President napalm and reported his findings to in 72 A.D., more than a century James Bryan Conant, Massachusetts the NDRC. The day was Valentine’s later. Institute of Technology President Day, 1942.10 Karl Compton, and California Most prominent of the ancient Institute of Technology physicist The first field test of napalm thermal weapons was Greek fire, th Richard Tolman.6 The NDRC was took place on the 4 July of the the forerunner of napalm, used given the open-ended task of same year, when a 70-pound by Byzantine forces against napalm bomb was detonated in conducting scientific research that the Crusaders.3 This incendiary the Harvard College soccer field.11 would facilitate the ‘improvement material, or Ignis Graecus, in its The spectacular detonation was of instrumentalities, methods, and original Greek, could be delivered witnessed by many, from curious materials of warfare,’ to aid the through a number of different tennis players to nervous firemen. war effort in WWII.7 methods, enhancing its efficacy. The explosion created a massive From its use in large shipborne fireball which rose high over the An explosive industrial accident pumps to industrial trebuchets to campus, expanding into a cloud at Du Pont, a paint factory that man-portable hand-siphons, Greek of thick black smoke. Napalm’s worked with divinylacetylene and fire time and time again proved its lethal capabilities were made adhesive pigments, prompted ferocious lethality and flexibility. abundantly clear. Over time, fire became such an Conant to task Fieser with the integral part of warfare that potential military applications of EARLY TRIALS Jean Juvénal des Ursins famously these substances, a project also Despite its deadly test results, remarked: "War without fire is like known as ‘Anonymous Research the Army initially opted for a 8 sausages without mustard."4 These Project No. 4.’ Fieser and his separate incendiary compound for early uses of thermal weapons colleague, Emanuel Benjamin its firebomb needs, the original cemented fire’s place in battle Hershbeg, synthesised gels Du Pont concoction. However, the and foreshadowed the creation consisting of varying ratios of compound was quickly found to of napalm. the compounds, destroying them be unsuitable, as the combustible at the end of the day with a gasoline separated from the NATIONAL DEFENSE match. Rather than becoming fluid thickening agent during transport, RESEARCH COMMITTEE and losing their structure, the due to vibration. This meant that The National Defense Research gels retained their thick viscous the substance exploded rather than Committee (NDRC) was established consistency upon being set ablaze. combusted, making it useless as on 27th June, 1940 by then-US This phenomenon led Fieser to an incendiary agent, the purpose President Franklin D. Roosevelt conceptualise a bomb that would of which is to start fires.12 Napalm with a budget of approximately ‘scatter large burning gobs of was immune to this process, and so $100 million in modern US dollars.5 sticky gel.’9 After experimenting development of the compound as a On the committee resided Harvard with different adhesive agents weapon continued.

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To compare the efficacy of bombers. Despite the absurdity displacing more than 1 million napalm in a firebomb to thermite, of the idea, Roosevelt saw its others.19 Other estimates have the full-scale Japanese and German potential merit. The planning death toll going up to as high as towns were created and bombarded was eventually assigned to Fieser 200,000.20 The attack claimed even with thermite and napalm bombs after other scientific institutions more lives than either of the atomic in turn.13 The towns were rebuilt either failed to produce results or bombs dropped on Hiroshima and 16 and bombarded two more times for dismissed the idea. Fieser was Nagasaki and levelled well over a quarter of a million buildings. subsequent tests. Both towns were ultimately successful in designing Emergency workers took 25 days to situated in the Dugway Proving the delivery system, though two recover bodies from the debris. Ground testing area in Utah, and ill-fated trials quickly ensued. The first trial involved inadvertently were designed by Eric Mendelsohn killing all the bats and the Under the cover of night, and Antonin Raymond, experts on second saw the destruction of the 337 B-29 Superfortress strategic German and Japanese architecture Carlsbad Auxiliary Army Air Field bombers flew in file formation over respectively.14 The level of accuracy by napalm.17 the Pacific Ocean to their target, demanded was so high that the central Tokyo.21 Each bomber was Japanese homes were constructed A third trial at the Dugway armed with 10 tons’ worth of using traditional Japanese wooden site saw tremendous success, napalm bombs, packed into 1520 joinery rather than nails, and a with Fieser concluding that the M-69 bombs weighing 6 pounds special type of Russian timber delivery system was 3.7 times more each. The line of bombers over the was imported for its likeness to Pacific stretched back for hundreds destructive than traditional gravity Japanese Hinoki wood. The results of miles, each plane trailing the bombing.18 Ultimately, however, the one in front. of the bombings were staggering. plan was scrapped due to concerns Napalm was nearly three times about uncertainty of the behaviour ‘Their long, glinting wings, more destructive than thermite. of the bats. The total sunken cost sharp as blades, could be seen Fieser and his team promptly of the project equates to roughly through the oblique columns returned to Harvard to work on the $24 million in modern US dollars. of smoke rising from the city, design of napalm weapons. Nonetheless, the planning for a suddenly reflecting the fire large-scale bombing continued to from the furnace below, black INCENDIARY BATS make headway, albeit with more silhouettes gliding through the fiery sky to reappear further on, traditional vectors of delivery. One of the more remarkable and shining golden against the dark ambitious of the plans to employ roof of heaven or glittering napalm against the enemy was that BOMBING OF TOKYO blue, like meteors, in the of Pennsylvania dentist, aviator The 1945 Bombing of Tokyo on searchlight beams spraying the vault from horizon to horizon.’ and innovator Dr. Lytle S. Adams.15 9th March, 1945 , otherwise known After a visit to the bat-filled as Operation Meetinghouse or -French Journalist Carlsbad Caverns in New Mexico, Tōkyōdaikūshū, is regarded as the Robert Guillain22 Adams heard about the kamikaze single most destructive bombing attacks against Pearl Harbour. He raid in human history, and alone As the bombers flew overhead then formulated a plan to use bats caused over 80,000 deaths, Tokyo, they released 500-pound as napalm bomb-bearing suicide injuring an additional 40,000 and clusters of the M-69 bombs into

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the city. The firestorm that ensued most part, managed to slip under napalm explosion.27 The graphic engulfed the entire city; all of the radar. An estimated 32,500 depiction of napalm’s devastating central Tokyo was caught in a tons was dropped in Korea, yet it effect was the final nail in the rapidly-growing inferno. Even as the remained out of the purview of coffin that was its reputation. While city burned to the ground, bombers the public.25 This was all to change the bombing seen in the picture continued releasing their payloads come the Vietnam War. was not in fact conducted by US overhead. Amateur firefighters were personnel, napalm had become so powerless against the napalm, which The media coverage of the synonymous with American cruelty resisted attempts at extinguishing. Vietnam war was unprecedented that heavy international criticism Strong winds whipped the tens of in its thoroughness and began rolling in. thousands of individual fires into comprehensiveness. Media access one giant blaze that swallowed on the ground was at an all- FROM HERO TO HATED the city. About 690,000 pounds of time high, and improvements in Seemingly almost overnight, napalm was dropped on the city in technology and infrastructure only Fieser became the target of hate less than an hour.23 served to increase its pervasiveness. mail and moral outrage for the part Suddenly, everything was in the he played in napalm’s creation. Notwithstanding its awesome eye of the public; nothing escaped From being hailed as a hero for his destructive power, napalm is often 26 heavy scrutiny. The devastating work not just in weaponry but in overlooked in lieu of the atomic effects of napalm was made clear healthcare as well, Fieser became bombs. This is despite the fact that to the American people for the first the subject of considerable public it caused more damage in terms of time, and faces were given to what outcry.28 In defence of his work, casualties as well as infrastructure. were once nameless enemies. The Fieser had this to say: "I couldn’t As Neer writes in his book: "The campaign against napalm started foresee that this stuff was going Bomb got the press, but napalm did to gain traction after protests to be used against babies and 24 the work." Nevertheless, general against the chief producer Dow Buddhists. The person who makes cultural perceptions of the material Chemical Corporation blew up to a rifle… he isn’t responsible if it were mostly positive, due to its a national-scale. To critics of the is used to shoot the President."29 role it played in helping America Vietnam War, napalm came to be Indeed, although his creation was win the war. This attitude was not known as a symbol of the barbaric instrumental to America’s victory indicative of things to come. nature of war. and his research in healthcare was ground-breaking, napalm remained THE TERROR OF WAR The change in attitudes to a smear on his reputation until his Society’s positive stance napalm was cemented by Associated death on 28th July, 1977. 30 on napalm generally persisted Press photographer Huynh Cong throughout the years, even ‘Nick’ Ut’s photo ‘The Terror of War’, Similarly, Dow Chemical during its use in the Korean which won the 1973 World Press Corporation faced significant War. Condemnation of napalm’s Photo of the Year. The main subject backlash for its role as chief usage was sparse, if at all. While of the photo, nine-year-old girl producer of the substance. As Neer criticism of the atomic bombs was Phan Thị Kim Phúc, is seen running put it: "napalm’s identification with widespread, napalm had, for the naked and in pain away from a the horrors of the Vietnam War, and

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by extension Dow Chemical, was CONCLUSION layman alike. I highly recommend complete."31 The Dow brand suffered it to all interested in the morality When it comes to destructive irreparable damage, and protestors of scientific discovery, the perils of impact, few scientific discoveries took to the streets to campaign war, and the interwoven history of are in the same league as napalm. against it. In one instance in 1969, science and the military.  members the clergy broke into and Born in a time when its existence was imperative to an Allied Forces’ vandalised one of Dow’s offices, ENDNOTES victory, napalm fell from a position destroying their equipment. Neer 1. Neer, R. M. (2015). Napalm an suggests that Dow intentionally of glory to infamy. No other book American biography. Cambridge, put in a losing bid to renew the documents this fall from grace as Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.1. napalm contract to distance itself comprehensively and with as much 2. Ibid., 40. from the substance. detail as Napalm: An American Biography. The narrative style 3. Ibid., 4 4. PROTOCOL III which Neer employs to tell the 4. Bradbury, J. (1996). The medieval siege. Suffolk [u.a.]: The Boydell In 1980, realising the threat of story of napalm is truly reminiscent Press, p.170. of that of a biography, as per napalm to humanity, the United 5. The NDRC’s allocated budget was Nations adopted the Convention the title. This creative choice $6.5 million USD, the equivalent on Certain Conventional Weapons is a conscious decision by Neer of approximately $99 million USD in 2009. National Defense (CCW), an extension of the Geneva to chronicle the entire lifespan Research Committee. “Status Convention. Under Protocol III of of napalm. of Contract Funds.” Report of the convention, titled ‘Prohibitions the National Defense Research Committee 6/27/40-6/28/42. 30 or Restrictions on the Use of This biographical style June 1941: FDRLibrary.Marist.edu. Incendiary Weapons’, the use of personifies napalm and allows Current value of $6.5 million 1940 napalm against civilians is deemed dollars: United States Department the reader to clearly witness a war crime. Readers should note of Labor, Bureau of Labor its descent from heroism to Statistics. “Inflation Calculator.” that the convention made no villainy. It also makes the book 2009: BLS.gov. provision against napalm’s use incredibly readable; prospective 6. Neer, R. M. (2015). Napalm an against combatants. Currently, 107 American biography. Cambridge, readers need not be scared off by countries have agreed to abide by Mass.: Harvard University Press, this relatively thick volume. Au p.22. Protocol III. The US joined this contraire, Neer steers mostly clear 7. Ibid., 25. list in 2008, on ex-US President of jargon and takes great pains to Barrack Obama’s first day in office. 8. Ibid., 17. However, the US reserves the right ensure clarity and accessibility. Many of his explanations are 9. Fieser. The Scientific Method. 12. to use napalm against civilians See Louis F. Fieser. “Forward: War if such a scenario should arise supplemented with pictures and Projects — Volumes I-VI.” No Date: where the alternative would result diagrams to streamline the reader’s Fieser Papers. HUGFP 20.3. Box 1. Folder: “Louis Fieser — 32 understanding. Regardless, due in more injury. Thus concluded autobiographical accounts.”1. the 67-year shift of social and to its comprehensiveness and Folder: “Louis Fieser — international bearing on napalm attention to detail, this book has autobiographical accounts.” 10. Neer, R. M. (2015). Napalm an from reverence to revulsion. something to offer to the expert and

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American biography. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 31. Ibid., 142. p.72. 32. Ibid., 5. 11. Ibid., 18.

12. Ibid., 88.

13. Ibid., 92-97.

14. Ibid., 92-94.

15. Ibid., 101-103.

16. Ibid., 105.

17. Ibid., 113.

18. Ibid., 115.

19. Ibid., 130.

20. Tokyo Journal; Stoically, Japan Looks Back on the Flames of War. (1995, March 08). Retrieved July 05, 2017, from http://www. nytimes.com/1995/03/09/world/ tokyo-journal-stoically-japan- looks-back-on-the-flames-of-war. html.

21. Neer, R. M. (2015). Napalm an American biography. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.120.

22. Ibid., 119.

23. Ibid., 120.

24. Ibid., 86.

25. Ibid., 217.

26. Ibid., 4. 27. Ibid., 24.

28. Ibid., 282.

29. Ibid., 283. 30. Ibid., 285.

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HAROLD GREGORY ‘HAL’ MOORE JR by Joe Tan

INTRODUCTION

Hal Moore, a name whose Washington D.C. as he believed outstanding reputation reaches he would have better chances far and wide beyond borders, for the appointment if he was amongst those involved in the located in a more prominent military or otherwise, is well- city.2 Finishing high school and known for his indisputable skill in university while working in the leadership during one of history’s US Senate Warehouse, he was most recent brush with war. With offered an appointment to the a military career spanning across United States Naval Academy three wars, Hal Moore is best by Representative Ed Creal (4th recognised as the Lieutenant District, Kentucky).3 This was “Hate war, love the American Colonel in command of the 1st following President Franklin D. soldier.” Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, Roosevelt’s authorisation that HAROLD GREGORY ‘HAL’ MOORE- Harold G Moore JR1 at the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965, senators and representatives are during the Vietnam War. Following given additional appointments to “Hate war, love the American soldier.” the bestselling publication, We the military and naval academies. 1 Harold G Moore Were Soldiers Once… And Young, which he had co-written with Having no desire to attend INTRODUCTION famed war reporter, Joseph L. the Naval Academy, Creal agreed Galloway, Moore’s war experience to Moore’s proposal to trade his Hal Moore, a name whose outstanding reputation reaches far and wide beyond borders, amongst those involved in the military or otherwise, is well-known for his indisputable skill in was further immortalised by a film Naval Academy appointment for leadership during one of history’s most recent brush with war. With a military career spanning across adaptation of the aforementioned another congressman’s Military st th three wars, Hal Moore is best recognised as the lieutenant colonel in command of the 1 Battalion, 7book in 2002. Academy appointment if he was Cavalry Regiment, at the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965, during the Vietnam War. Following the bestselling able to find the opportunity. publication, We Were Soldiers Once… And Young, which he had co-written with famed war reporter, Joseph L. Galloway, Moore’s war experience was further immortalised by a film adaptation of the EARLY BEGINNINGS This led him to Representative aforementioned book in 2002. Hoping to attend the United Eugene Cox (2nd Congressional

States (US) Military Academy District, Georgia), who upon EARLY BEGINNINGS being impressed by Moore’s at West Point, New York, Moore Hoping to attend the United States (US) Military Academy at West Point, New York, Moore moved from his hometown tenacity, offered him the West moved from his hometown in Bardstown, Kentucky to Washington D.C. as he believed he would have in Bardstown, Kentucky to Point appointment.4 better chances for the appointment if he was located in a more prominent city.2 Finishing high school and university while working in the US Senate Warehouse, he was offered an appointment to the POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL.44 NO.1 United States Naval Academy by Representative Ed Creal (4th District, Kentucky).3 This was following President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s authorisation that senators and representatives are given additional appointments to the military and naval academies. 81-85_Harold Gregory Moore Jr_1.1.indd 75 23/2/18 3:11 PM Having no desire to attend the Naval Academy, Creal agreed to Moore’s proposal to trade his Naval Academy appointment for another congressman’s Military Academy appointment if he was able to find the opportunity. This led him to Representative Eugene Cox (2nd Congressional District, Georgia), who upon being impressed by Moore’s tenacity, offered him the West Point appointment.4

1

Personality Profile 76

WEST POINT was commissioned as a Second to Fort Benning to attend the MILITARY SERVICE Lieutenant in the infantry branch. Infantry Officer's Advanced Course. th Moore reported to the US As Captain of the 17 Infantry POST WORLD WAR II th Military Academy at West Point on Regiment of the 7 Infantry 15th July, 1942, shortly after the Upon graduation, Moore’s Division, he commanded a heavy US entered World War ll (WWII) first assignment was the Infantry mortar company in combat. He to attend the ‘Beast Barracks’ Officer Basic Course at Fort next served as regimental Assistant summer training held before the Benning, Georgia, where after Chief-of-Staff, Operations and 10 formal academic school term an unsuccessful application for Plans. Moore's promotion to Major began. He was reputedly the top the airborne jump school, was was put on hold by a policy of the th scorer in his company with the instead assigned to the three- 7 Division Commanding General M-1 Garand rifle during this phase week jump school held at the stating that no promotion to Major of military training.5 Following 11th Airborne Division in Tokyo, would be possible without command what he considered ‘an academic Japan.7 Thereafter, he went of an infantry company in combat. trip from hell’, Moore led a through a seven-month stint as The Division Commander personally lifestyle devoted to studying company commander with the assigned Moore to an infantry and participated sparingly in 187th Glider Infantry Regiment at company so that Moore could be extracurricular activities during Camp Crawford before assuming promoted to Major, and thus later his time at West Point, and the position of construction become divisional assistant Chief- just barely made it through his 11 officer in the same camp from of-Staff for operations. plebe year. 1945 until 1948.8 STATESIDE MILITARY Moore’s second year at the SERVICE In June 1948, he was Academy was spent receiving reassigned to the 82nd Airborne In 1954, Moore returned and training on several military Division, at Fort Bragg where served for three years at West vehicles and weapons as well as he volunteered for the Airborne Point as an instructor in infantry studying for complicated subjects Test Section, a specialised unit tactics, during which he took a such as thermodynamics and testing experimental parachutes. personal interest in the battles historic military campaigns. And, Over the course of his career, between the French Army forces his final year consisted of touring and the Viêt Minh at Điùn Biên US Army basic training centres he became a master parachutist . Phù in Vietnam.12 and studying military history and with over 300 jumps, with some tactics as the war wound down in 150 jumps made during his time 9 Europe. Also, unlike the expected at Fort Bragg. Moore was assigned to attend four years of academic training the year-long student course at at the Academy, the cohort SERVICE IN THE the Command and General Staff KOREAN WAR was informed that they would College at Fort Leavenworth, be graduating in three years In 1951, during the Korean Kansas in 1956. The course instead, because of the war.6 War, in preparation for him to prepared majors for the duties of On 5th June, 1945, Moore command a company or to serve on staff officers at the division and graduated from West Point and a battalion staff, he was ordered corps level. After school at Fort

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Leavenworth, Moore reported to 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry 7th Cavalry Regiment at the the Pentagon and the Office, Chief Division.15 The Brigade left Fort Battle of the Little Bighorn just of Research and Development Benning on 14th August, 1965 and under a century before.16 Unlike where his initiative and insights went to South Vietnam by way Moore however, General Custer were key to the development of the Panama Canal aboard the was decisively defeated when of new airborne equipment and United States Naval Ship (USNS) outnumbered by enemy forces. airborne/air assault tactics.13 General Maurice Rose, arriving at Upon graduation from the Armed the Division's An Khê Base Camp Moore was awarded the Forces Staff College at Norfolk, a month later. Distinguished Service Cross Virginia in 1960, Moore served a for extraordinary heroism at Ia Drang. After the Battle of three-year tour as North Atlantic VIETNAM WAR the Ia Drang Valley, Moore was Treaty Organisation (NATO) At the start of 14th November, promoted to colonel and took Plans Officer with Headquarters, 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Moore over the command of the 'Garry Allied Forces Northern Europe in led the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Owen' 3rd Brigade. Oslo, Norway.14 of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division in the week-long POST-VIETNAM WAR In 1964, now a Lieutenant Battle of Ia Drang. Encircled SERVICE Colonel, Moore completed the by enemy soldiers with no clear After his service in the course of study at the Naval War landing zone that would allow Vietnam War, Moore served at the College, while earning a master's them to leave, Moore managed Pentagon as the military liaison degree in International Relations to persevere despite being to the Assistant Secretary for significantly outnumbered by from George Washington International affairs in the Office North Vietnamese Army (NVA) University. Moore was transferred of the Under Secretary of Defence. forces that would go on to defeat to Fort Benning and commanded In his next assignment the Army the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry only 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry later sent him to Harvard University two-and-a-half miles away the to become a part of 11th Air where he completed his masters next day. Moore's dictum that Assault Division, undergoing air degree in International Relations ‘there is always one more thing assault and air mobility training in 1968. Having completed his you can do to increase your odds and tests. work at Harvard, Moore reported of success,’ and the courage of back to the Pentagon to work his entire command are credited On 28th July, 1965 President with the Deputy Chief-of-Staff with this outcome. for Operations.17 He then helped Lyndon Johnson announced that draft the Army plan for the he was sending ‘the Airmobile Blond haired Moore was withdrawal of two brigades of the Division to Vietnam.’ That same known as ‘Yellow Hair’ to his 9th Infantry Division to the US as month, the 11th Air Assault troops at the battle at Ia Drang, a part of the Vietnamisation of Division was re-designated the and as a tongue-in-cheek homage the war effort.18 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) referencing the legendary and alerted for deployment to General George Armstrong On 31st August, 1968, Moore Vietnam. Moore's battalion was Custer, who commanded as a was promoted to the rank of re-designated as 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel the same Brigadier General. In July 1969,

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he was appointed Assistant VOLAR (Project Volunteer Army) 87-year-old Moore attended the Chief-of-Staff, Operations and in preparation for the end of formal opening of the National Plans of the Eighth Army in conscription and the institution Infantry Museum in Columbus, South Korea where tensions were of the Modern Volunteer Army. Georgia. One of the featured elevated from incidents along exhibits of the museum is a life- the demilitarised zone and drug In August 1973, Moore was size diorama of LZ X-Ray from the use and racism among the Eighth appointed Commanding General, Battle of Ia Drang. Army troops were at an all-time US Army Military Personnel Centre high. Shortly after becoming (MILPERCEN), and in 1974 he was The Moores had five children, Commanding General of the 7th appointed Deputy Chief of Staff Greg Moore, Steve Moore, Julie Infantry Division, Moore was for Personnel, Department of the Moore Orlowski, Cecile Moore promoted to major general in Army—his last assignment before Rainey and David Moore, as well 1970 and he and his family moved 20 leaving the Army. He dealt with as 12 grandchildren. Two of their to Camp Casey, South Korea. Army recruiting issues after the sons are career US Army officers: termination of the draft as well one a retired Colonel and another He was charged by General as the orderly drawdown of forces a retired Lieutenant Colonel. John H. Michaelis, Commander, after the close of the Vietnam United States Forces Korea with War. Moore's next assignment Moore died on 10th February, cleaning up the drug abuse was to become the Commanding problem and the racial strife 2017, three days short of his General, US Army, Japan but he th that was prevalent at the time in 95 birthday. elected to retire instead. Moore the 7th Division. He established retired from the Army on 1st the Officer's Leadership School CONCLUSION August, 1977, after completing for company grade officers and 32 years of active service. Hal Moore became a symbol a Non-Commissioned Officers of extraordinary heroism during (NCO) Leadership School for staff PERSONAL LIFE the span of his military career as sergeants and below as well as well as a respected leader whose issuing an ‘Equal Opportunity While assigned to Fort Bragg, gallantry under intense war Policy.’19 He backed up the policy Moore met Julia B. Compton, the conditions was second to none. with the promise to punish those daughter of Colonel and Mrs. His vow as a leader to his troops: leaders who discriminated based Louis J. Compton. Julia was a “I’ll always be the first person on race, ethnicity or creed. As a student enrolled at the University on the battlefield, my boots part of the reformation of division of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, will be the first boots on it, and morale, he established several North Carolina and happened to I’ll be the last person off. I’ll different athletic programmes, be visiting her parents at Fort including football, basketball Bragg. They were married at the never leave a body,” earned him and boxing. As Commanding Fort Bragg main post chapel on immense trust and respect from General of the Army Training 22nd November, 1949. the men who fought adversaries Centre at Fort Ord, California under his command and order. in 1971–1973, he oversaw After his retirement in 1977, extensive experimentation in Moore served as the Executive Even in death, he remains a adapting basic and advanced President of the Crested Butte Ski prominent aspirational legacy in individual training under Project Area, Colorado. In June 2009, the military culture. 

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ENDNOTES 29, 2017. https://www.nytimes. com/2017/02/13/us/harold- 1. Harold G. Moore > Quotes. moore-dead-general-author-we- Retrieved August 25, 2017. https:// were-soldiers-once.html?mcubz=3 www.goodreads.com/author/ quotes/23897.Harold_G_Moore 17. Press, A. (2017, February 14). Lt. Gen. Hal Moore, portrayed by Mel 2. Guardia M. (2017, February 13). Gibson in 'We Were Soldiers', dies Remembering General Hal Moore. at 94. Retrieved August 29, 2017. Retrieved August 25, 2017. https:// http://www.latimes.com/local/ mikeguardia.com/2017/02/13/ obituaries/la-me-hal-moore- remembering-general-hal-moore/ 20170214-story.html 3. Ibid. 18. Vietnamization of the war was 4. Ibid. a policy of the Richard Nixon 5. Ibid. administration to end U.S. involvement in the Vietnam 6. 2003 DISTINGUISHED GRADUATE War through a programme to AWARD. Retrieved August 25, 2017. ‘expand, equip, and train South https://www.westpointaog.org/ Vietnam's forces and assign to them page.aspx?pid=576 an ever-increasing combat role, at 7. Ibid. the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat troops.’ 8. Ibid. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 9. Ibid. Vietnamization

10. Ibid. 19. 2003 DISTINGUISHED GRADUATE 11. Ibid. AWARD. Retrieved August 29, 2017. https://www.westpointaog. 12. Guardia M. (2017, February 13). org/page.aspx?pid=576 Remembering General Hal Moore. Retrieved August 25, 2017. https:// 20. Ibid. mikeguardia.com/2017/02/13/ remembering-general-hal-moore/

13. 2003 DISTINGUISHED GRADUATE AWARD. Retrieved August 25, 2017. https://www.westpointaog.org/ page.aspx?pid=576

14. Ibid.

15. Lab, D. S. The History Engine. Retrieved August 28, 2017. https://historyengine.richmond. edu/episodes/view/5269

16. Roberts, S. (2017, February 13). Lt. Gen. Harold Moore, Whose Vietnam Heroism Was Depicted in Film, Dies at 94. Retrieved August

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Quotable Quotes

Each generation must confront new challenges and overcome them, in new ways, but with the same indomitable spirit. – Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

Never give an order that can't be obeyed. - Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), American ve-star general and Field Marshal of the Philippine Army

Great leaders are almost always great simplifi ers, who can cut through argument, debate and doubt to offer a solution everybody can understand. - Colin Powell (b. 1937), American statesman and retired four-star general in the United States Army

Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak and esteem to all. - George Washington (1732-1799), American politician and soldier who served as the rst President of the United States

My own defi nition of leadership is this: the capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose and the character which inspires confi dence. - Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976), Senior British Army of cer who fought in both World Wars.

When you become a leader you give up the right to think about yourself. - Gerald Brooks (1905-1974), Anglican bishop

If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, you are a leader. - John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), American statesman who served as sixth President of the United States

Leaders must be seen to be up front, up to date, up to their job and up early in the morning. - Marcus Sieff (1913-2001), British businessman

We don’t rise to the level of our expectations, we fall to the level of our training. - Archilochus (680-645 BC), Greek lyric poet

True courage is not the brutal force of vulgar heroes, but the fi rm resolve of virtue and reason. - Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), English mathematician and philosopher

Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory. - George S. Patton (1885-1945), four-star general in the United States Army

Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers. - Harry Truman, American politician who served as the 33rd President of the United States

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86_QUOTABLE QUOTES V44N1_1.1.indd 80 23/2/18 3:13 PM CDFEC 2016-2017 Prize Winners

2016/2017 Chief of Defence Force Essay Competition Prize Winners

FIRST PRIZE Crowding Out the Lone Wolf — Crowdsourcing Intelligence to Prevent Lone Wolf Attacks MAJ Jeffrey Ng Zhaohong

SECOND PRIZE Survivability of a Smart Nation ME6 Calvin Seah Ser Thong

THIRD PRIZE The United States’ Rebalancing Strategy and its Maritime Dimension — A Critical Assessment MAJ Lee Jan

MERIT AWARDS Big Data and Systems Thinking: Implications for the SAF as a Learning Organisation MAJ Leong Tyng Wey

The Rejuvenation of China and a United States in Transition: Challenges and Recommendations for MINDEF/SAF ME5 Wong Chong Wai

Deterrence? What about Dissuasion? CPT Lim Guang He

Open Source Intelligence in the Digital Age MAJ Aaron Aubrey Ng Qibo

Swarm in Warfare & How SAF Could Accelerate Adoption of the Swarm Innovation LTC Leonard Wong Loong He, MAJ Teo Wei Keong, CPT Peter Alexandre Chua Li Young & LTA Joshua Ong Wee Tiong

Augmented Reality in the SAF ME6 Calvin Seah Ser Thong & ME4 Chai Chang Yu

The ‘Chinese Dream’ and How It Shaped China’s Foreign Policy LTC Eileen Chua

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87-88_CDF Prize Winners 2016- 2017_1.1.indd 81 23/2/18 3:15 PM CDFEC 2016-2017 Prize Winners

COMMENDATION AWARDS

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The 80-20 Rule in Action: A New Approach to Optimise Force Preparation for Third Generation Fighting Units LTA(NS) Philip Chan

Spirals of Fear and Hostility: The Danger of Threat Assessments Becoming Self-Fulfilling Prophecies ME5 Chareonsri Jomthip

Maritime Dimensions of the United States’ “Rebalancing Strategy” Stabilising or Escalatory MAJ Oliver Xu Chongzhi

From Yesterday to Tomorrow: Updates for Total Defence CPT Zech Tan & CPT Thia Shan Zhi

Can the Rabbit Roar? Concepts for Making every Soldier a Leader LTC(NS) Denzil Titt

The Proliferation of Small Drones: Trends, Implications and Recommendations for Singapore ME5 David Bey, CPT Sim Bao Chen & ME5 Ng Wei Rong

2035: The Year Unmanned Aircraft Will Dominate the Air MAJ Shewan Goh

Humans made Obsolete in Robotics Warfare ME6 Vincent Chan

Rethinking Military Aircraft Maintenance ME4 Nigel Chong Jia Wei

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87-88_CDF Prize Winners 2016- 2017_1.1.indd 82 23/2/18 3:15 PM 23/2/18 2:04 PM JOURNAL OF THE JOURNAL FORCES ARMED SINGAPORE POINTER Vol. 44 No. 1 [2018] 44 No. Vol.

pointer Vol. 44 No. 1 [2018] THE JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES POINTER Armed Forces the Singapore of The Journal Features The Prospects for Building Maritime Security Co-operation the in IndianOcean Region – Are FreshInitiatives More Successful than Past Attempts? Wei Chung Chan by ME6 The Viability of Deterrence Strategies for Non-Nuclear States Kam Kai Qing by LTC Combating the Modern War Calvinby ME6 Seah Ser Thong Miitaries Security Non-Traditional Versus Threats by Su ME5 Juncun for Small States Power cance of Air The Strategic Signi by MAJ Jeffrey Ng Zhaohong ictsStabilisation Operations: Dealing with Asymmetric Con within FailedStates by MAJ Peng Jin Ho Understanding the Islamic State and the Threat Poses It by CPT Alvin Leow Boon Teck Pointer cover_Vol44No1.indd 1