TIPPING POINT? PALESTINIANS AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW STRATEGY Middle East Report N°95 – 26 April 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. GETTING TO NO: A VERY LONG DISENCHANTMENT....................................... 2 A. THE OLMERT-ABBAS NEGOTIATIONS ..........................................................................................3 B. 2009: OBAMA AND THE MIRACLE THAT NEVER WAS ..................................................................5 C. CAN PALESTINIANS TRUST THE U.S.?........................................................................................14 III. THE PALESTINIAN QUEST FOR LEVERAGE....................................................... 17 A. “INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY” ................................................................................................17 B. STATE BUILDING .......................................................................................................................21 C. POPULAR RESISTANCE ...............................................................................................................25 IV. ISRAEL’S QUANDARY ................................................................................................ 31 V. THE LATEST U.S.-ISRAELI DISPUTE...................................................................... 34 VI. CONCLUSION: A CRISIS IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY.................................... 38 APPENDICES A. MAP OF ISRAEL AND WEST BANK/GAZA STRIP ................................................................................41 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................42 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2007 ...43 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................44 Middle East Report N°95 26 April 2010 TIPPING POINT? PALESTINIANS AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW STRATEGY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY To those familiar with the rhythms of Israeli-Palestinian But it would be wrong – and, to Palestinians, profoundly negotiation, this has been a year of surprises. Palestinians, misguided – to see in the leadership’s current attitude a suffering most from the status quo, so most in need of a matter of mere personal frustration or political apprehen- resolution, balk at resuming talks even as Israel expresses sion. If the political manifestation of the diplomatic pa- eagerness. In Obama, they have a president more willing ralysis is of recent vintage, its roots run deep. Abbas is to engage and to confront Israel, yet they have denied him among the last among his people to arrive at the point he the chance to advance talks. Seventeen years after Oslo, has reached; he is the restrained and belated expression the best he can do is get the parties to talk indirectly – and of a visceral and deep popular disillusionment with the even then, not without overcoming huge Palestinian re- peace process as they have grown to know it. There is luctance. What is going on? The Palestinian approach equal disillusion with the U.S., a reflection not so much may seem tactically suspect or politically self-defeating of the new administration but of a broader historical ex- but is not without logic. It is rooted in almost two decades perience with Washington. That Obama has had to bear of unsuccessful U.S.-sponsored bilateral negotiations and the brunt of Palestinian disenchantment is but one of the manifested in embryonic efforts to change the balance of conflict’s many ironies. power with Israel. It is premature to speak of a new Pales- tinian strategy but not to respond and rectify past flaws. Neither the PLO nor its leadership has given up on nego- After an often perplexing, ineffective start, the U.S. seems tiations. They have invested in them too much for too poised for a more fundamental policy review involving long, and their power depends too heavily on the process the presentation of American ideas to resolve the conflict. to accommodate a swift and radical shift. Nor have they Done right and at the right time, it would be welcome. deeply reflected about, let alone developed, realistic sub- stitute strategies. Still, they have begun to give them some To many, the biggest shock has been President Mahmoud thought. They are focusing on three forms of action to in- Abbas’s resistance to return to the negotiating table. In a crease their leverage and reduce their dual dependency: striking turnabout for a leader who built his political life on Israel to end the occupation of its own volition and on around engagement with Israelis, close ties to the U.S. the U.S. to pressure Israel to do so. and faith in a negotiated two-state settlement, he has re- fused to resume direct talks despite American pressure A first idea making headway is to turn to the international until Israel agrees to both a comprehensive settlement arena, where the balance of power tilts more in the Pales- freeze and clear terms of reference. He has obvious, im- tinians’ favour. The suggestion of a UN Security Council mediate motives. Since late 2008, indignities have been resolution either endorsing the contours of a final settle- piled upon him: the Gaza war, to which he was a passive ment or recognising a Palestinian state on the 1967 bor- spectator; the election of a right-wing Israeli government; ders is a prime example. Israelis resent or fear others as the U.S. change of heart on a settlement freeze; and his well, including Palestinian recourse to international legal own ill-inspired decision to postpone a UN vote on the bodies or boycott of settlement products. Prime Minister Goldstone Report – condemning both Israel and Hamas Salam Fayyad wishes to go about the goal of statehood in for war crimes – which unleashed a wave of Palestinian a different way: painstakingly building institutions from and Arab criticism. More broadly, the Ramallah-based the ground up to prompt both international recognition leadership feels vulnerable, challenged by Hamas, con- and pressure on Israel to end the occupation. A newly stituencies within Fatah and large segments of public re-politicised civil society in the West Bank, backed to a opinion. Those hardly form propitious circumstances for degree by the Palestinian Authority (PA), is pushing a risk-taking. Awaiting somebody else’s next move seems range of hostile but largely non-violent initiatives directed the surer bet. at Israel as a path between the two dominant (and so far failed) paradigms of the past – peaceful negotiations and armed resistance. Tipping Point? Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy Crisis Group Middle East Report N°95, 26 April 2010 Page ii Something is brewing, though so far there is less of a Some of these should take place before any proposal is strategy than meets the eye; instead, one sees tentative unveiled – repairing strained relations between Washing- steps of a leadership playing catch-up with a population ton and Jerusalem without backing down from U.S. core whose faith in negotiations withered long ago. This ad hoc principles; adopting a more flexible policy toward inter- set of approaches also suffers from internal limitations and nal Palestinian reconciliation; reaching out to typically contradictions. Each of these contemplated roads – whether ignored constituencies such as refugees, settlers and reli- going to the UN to pressure Israel; building and seeking gious groups; deepening engagement with Damascus and recognition of a state; intensifying acts of resistance or a efforts to restart its negotiations with Israel so that the combination of the above – involves Palestinians openly peace proposed is truly comprehensive. A distrustful Israel, challenging Israel even as they need its everyday coop- split Palestinian entity and divided Arab world hardly eration in the West Bank; indeed, in the case of state provide the ideal context for a successful U.S. initiative. building, success depends directly on Israeli goodwill. Other steps involve the campaign that would have to fol- low U.S. articulation of its views: a broad international That will be no easy balancing act. Circumventing nego- effort, chiefly involving Arab states, to provide political tiations to gain statehood would meet only certain Pales- backing to the Palestinians and the genuine pay-off of re- tinian aspirations and perhaps not the main ones. Most of gional recognition and normalisation to Israel. Assuming the West Bank would remain occupied; Jerusalem would it is done, putting forward an American vision should be not become that state’s capital; there would be no satis- neither the beginning nor the end of the process. Instead, factory resolution for the refugees. Fayyad’s institution it can only be the midpoint: the culmination of one ener- building – should it prove successful – paradoxically getic diplomatic effort and the launching pad for another. could diminish the urgency of international efforts and leave Palestinians with a mini-state in parts of the West Ramallah/Jerusalem/Washington/Brussels, Bank. Popular forms of resistance still have far to go be- 26 April 2010 fore they can become an effective mass movement, and they face the recurrent risk of slipping into violence. Till now, Israel’s reaction to