The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design Michael S. Lynch Anthony J. Madonna Asssistant Professor Assistant Professor University of Kansas University of Georgia
[email protected] [email protected] September 3, 2010∗ ∗The authors would like to thank Scott H. Ainsworth, Stanley Bach, Richard A. Baker, Ryan Bakker, Richard S. Beth, Sarah A. Binder, Jamie L. Carson, Michael H. Crespin, Keith L. Dougherty, Trey Hood, Scott C. James, Andrew D. Martin, Ryan J. Owens, and Steven S. Smith for comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Madonna also thanks the University of Georgia American Political Development working group for support and comments, and Rachel Snyder for helpful research assistance. All errors remain the authors. Abstract The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate is a unique feature of the chamber. It places control over the Senate's rules and precedents under an individual who is not elected by the chamber and receives no direct benefits from the maintenance of its institutions. We argue that this feature has played an important role in the Senate's development. The vice president has frequently acted in a manner that conflicted with the wishes of chamber majorities. Consequently, senators have been reluctant to allow cham- ber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has prevented the Senate from allowing its chair to reduce dilatory action, as the House has done. Accordingly, delay via the filibuster, has become commonplace in the Senate. Such delay has reduced the Senate's efficiency, but has largely freed it from the potential influence of the executive branch.