Performance Management and Local Government Administration in Ghana: the Case of the District Development Facility and the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool

Performance Management and Local Government Administration in Ghana: The Case of the District Development Facility and the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Manchester for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2014

Hamza Bukari Zakaria

Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM)

School of Environment, Education and Development

Table of Contents

List of Tables...... 8

List of Figures ...... 9

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ...... 10

Abstract ...... 12

Declaration ...... 13

Acknowledgement...... 14

Dedication ...... 15

Chapter 1: General introduction and research background ...... 16

1.1 Introduction ...... 16

1.2 Statement of the problem ...... 17

1.3 Aim of research ...... 19

1.4 Objectives and research questions ...... 19

1.5 Significance of the study ...... 20

1.6 Structure of the thesis ...... 21

1.7 Conclusion ...... 23

Chapter 2: Context of local government administration in Ghana ...... 24

2.1 Introduction ...... 24

2.2 An overview of the Ghanaian context ...... 24

2.2.1 National demographic characteristics ...... 25

2.2.2 The economy of Ghana ...... 26

2.3 The evolution of local government administration in Ghana...... 27 1

2.3.1 Current local government system in Ghana ...... 28

2.3.2 Constitutional foundations of local government administration in Ghana ...... 30

2.4 Structure of local government administration ...... 31

2.4.1 The ministry of local government and rural development ...... 31

2.4.2 Regional coordinating councils (RCCs) ...... 32

2.5 Tiers of local government authorities ...... 33

2.5.1 Functions and composition of local government authorities ...... 35

2.5.2 The general assembly ...... 36

2.5.3 Committees of local governments ...... 36

2.5.4 Public relations and complaints committee...... 37

2.5.5 The executive committee ...... 38

2.5.6 Decentralised departments of local governments in Ghana ...... 38

2.6 Study areas in context ...... 40

2.6.1 ‘A’ Metropolis ...... 42

2.6.1.1 Basic education in the ‘A’ metropolis ...... 43

2.6.1.2 Health, water and sanitation in the ‘A’ metropolis ...... 43

2.6.2 ‘B’ Municipality ...... 44

2.6.2.1 Basic education in the ‘B’ municipality ...... 45

2.6.2.3 Health, water and sanitation in the ‘B’ municipality ...... 46

2.6.3 ‘C’ District ...... 48

2.6.3.1 Basic education in the ‘C’ district ...... 48

2.6.3.2 Health, water and sanitation in the ‘C’ district ...... 49

2.7 Conclusion ...... 50

Chapter 3: Examining performance management of local governments: A literature review . 51 2

3.1 Introduction ...... 51

3.2 The antecedents and rise of performance management ...... 51

3.3 What is performance in the public sector? ...... 53

3.4 Theoretical perspectives for managing local government performance ...... 55

3.4.1 Economic perspective ...... 56

3.4.2 Accountability perspective ...... 56

3.4.3 Service quality perspective ...... 57

3.5 Levels and scope of performance ...... 58

3.5.1 Span of performance ...... 59

3.5.2 Depth of performance ...... 61

3.5.3 Individual performance ...... 61

3.5.4 Organisational performance ...... 63

3.5.5 Government performance...... 64

3.6 Shifting from performance measurement to performance management...... 66

3.6.1 What is a performance management system? ...... 67

3.6.2 Best practice or best fit performance management systems?...... 73

3.7 Local government administration and service delivery in sub-Sahara Africa ...... 75

3.7.1 Determinants of local government performance ...... 77

3.8 Performance management and service delivery: A public service motivation perspective...... 78

3.9 Exploring the failure of performance management systems ...... 79

3.10 Conclusion ...... 81

Chapter 4: Research framework ...... 82

4.1 Introduction ...... 82

4.2 First research objective and corresponding research questions ...... 82

4.3 Second research objective and corresponding research question ...... 83

4.4 Third research objective and corresponding research questions ...... 87

4.5 Conclusion ...... 90

Chapter 5: Research design and methodology ...... 91

5.1 Introduction ...... 91

5.2 Justifying the choice of qualitative approach ...... 91

5.3 Philosophical orientation of the study ...... 92

5.4 Research design ...... 95

5.4.1 Case study research strategy ...... 96

5.4.2 Unit of analysis, selection of cases and sampling procedure ...... 97

5.5 Data collection ...... 98

5.5.1 Pilot study ...... 99

5.5.2 Interview schedule ...... 100

5.5.3 Interviews ...... 101

5.5.4 Expert interviews ...... 102

5.5.5 The interview process ...... 102

5.5.6 Focus group discussions ...... 105

5.5.7 Observation ...... 106

5.5.8 Secondary data ...... 107

5.5.9 Document analysis ...... 107

5.6 Data analysis and interpretation ...... 108

5.6.1 Post field work data cleaning and transcription ...... 109

5.6.2 Coding and categorization of themes ...... 110 4

5.6.3 Thematic analysis of transcripts ...... 112

5.7 Ethical considerations ...... 115

5.8 Conclusion ...... 117

Chapter 6: Analysis and discussion of local government performance management practices...... 119

6.1 Introduction ...... 119

6.2 Understanding the mission of local government authorities and bureaucrat’s perception of performance ...... 120

6.3 Operationalising performance of local governments ...... 122

6.3.1 Formulation of performance indicators: Whose responsibility? ...... 123

6.3.2 Intersections between national development policy and local government performance...... 124

6.3.3 Medium term development plans at sub-national level ...... 125

6.4 Development priorities of local governments under the GSGDA: Whose priorities? ..... 130

6.5 Internal measures for managing local government performance ...... 139

6.6 External measures for managing local government performance ...... 141

6.6.1 Local government authorities and regional coordinating councils interface ...... 142

6.6.2 Local government authorities and the district assembly common fund interface ...... 144

6.6.3 Local government authorities and the ministry of local government interface ...... 146

6.7 Challenges with the implementation of plans and its implications for managing local government performance ...... 148

6.8 Conclusion ...... 150

Chapter 7: Exploring the scope of performance–enhancing policy: The case of the District Development Facility-Functional Organisational Assessment Tool...... 153

7.1 Introduction ...... 153

7.2 An overview of the district development facility and the functional organisational assessment tool ...... 153

7.3 Performance measures and performance-based grants ...... 160

7.4 Formulation of performance indicators under the DDF-FOAT, stakeholder expectation and perceptions...... 165

7.5 Analysis of DDF FOAT in managing local government performance in Ghana: A balance score card approach...... 167

7.5.1 Financial performance ...... 170

7.5.2 Internal process perspective ...... 179

7.5.3 Citizens perspective ...... 184

7.5.4 Learning and innovation ...... 188

7.6 Limitations of the FOAT for managing local government performance in Ghana...... 192

7.7 Conclusion ...... 193

Chapter 8: Impact of performance information and performance management practices on social service delivery ...... 198

8.1 Introduction ...... 198

8.2 Developing a performance culture ...... 199

8.3 Generation of performance information...... 201

8.4 Examining the use of performance information for service delivery ...... 203

8.4.1 Basic education ...... 210

8.4.2 Sanitation and waste management ...... 212

8.5 Citizens perspectives of local government performance ...... 215

8.5.1 Perceived quantity and quality of local government services ...... 216

8.5.2 Responsiveness to citizens’ demands...... 218

8.6 Understanding what drives the use of performance information ...... 220

8.6.1 Perceived importance of performance information...... 222

8.6.2 Commitment to central government’s priorities ...... 223

8.6.3 Adherence to project specific regulations ...... 224

8.6.4 Public service motivation ...... 225

8.7 Conclusion ...... 226

Chapter 9: Summary of findings and conclusion ...... 229

9.1 Introduction ...... 229

9.2 General overview of the study ...... 230

9.3 Summary of major findings ...... 232

9.3.1 Findings on mechanisms for managing local government performance ...... 232

9.3.2 Findings on the scope of performance indicators under the district development facility and the functional organisational assessment tool ...... 234

9.3.3 Findings on performance management practices, use of performance information and basic service delivery ...... 236

9.4 Contribution to knowledge and research conclusions ...... 240

9.5 Theoretical implications ...... 241

9.6 Implications for policy and practice ...... 242

9.7 Research limitations ...... 243

9.8 Final remarks and suggestions for future research ...... 244

References ...... 246

List of appendices ...... 259

List of Tables Chapter 2 Table 2. 1: Major income and revenue indicators for the period 2000-2013 ...... 26 Table 2. 2: Distribution of local government authorities by population ...... 30 Table 2. 3: Departments of local government authorities ...... 39 Table 2. 4: Performance of schools in BECE examination (2006-2009) ...... 43 Table 2. 5: Basic school enrolment in the ‘B’ municipality ...... 45 Table 2. 6: Health facilities ...... 46 Table 2. 7: Distribution of exam performance by sex ...... 49

Chapter 3 Table 3. 1: Rationale for measuring performance ...... 69 Table 3. 2: Reasons for performance measurement failure ...... 80

Chapter 5 Table 5. 1: Prerequisites for conducting qualitative interviews ...... 103 Table 5. 2: Distribution of interviewees ...... 105 Table 5. 3: The coding process ...... 112 Table 5. 4: Ethical factors and accompanying questions ...... 116

Chapter 6 Table 6. 1: Aligning development challenges to the national development policy (GSGDA: 2009-2013) ...... 132 Table 6. 2: Development priorities of local governments under the GSGDA (2009-2013) .. 135

Chapter 7 Table 7. 1: Minimum conditions and indicators under the FOAT ...... 156 Table 7. 2: Annual distribution of minimum conditions (2008-2013) ...... 158 Table 7. 3: Distribution of local governments’ fulfilment of MCs by region ...... 159 Table 7. 4: Performance measures under the DDF ...... 161 Table 7. 5: Distribution of performance measures (2008-2013) ...... 161 Table 7. 6: Common measures for dealing with financial performance of LGs ...... 172 Table 7. 7: Internally generated funds of selected local government authorities from 2006 to 2009 in cedis (¢) ...... 175 Table 7. 8: Measures to improve internal processes ...... 182 Table 7. 9: Measures to improve upon citizen perspective of LG performance ...... 186 Table 7. 10: LG strategies to improve learning and innovation ...... 190 Table 7. 11: Proposed features and functions of the FOAT ...... 196

Chapter 8 Table 8. 1: Distribution of projects by district ...... 208 Table 8. 2: Education spending and related projects (2005-2012)...... 212 Table 8. 3: Sanitation spending and related projects (2005-2012)...... 215 Table 8. 4: Perceived benefits and use of performance information...... 221

Chapter 9 Table 9. 1: Summary of key research findings ...... 237 8

List of Figures

Chapter 2 Figure 2. 1: Regional distribution of population in Ghana ...... 25 Figure 2. 2: Structures for local government administration in an inter-governmental framework ...... 34 Figure 2. 3: Committees of LGs and their sub-committees ...... 37 Figure 2. 4: Map of Ghana showing the study regions ...... 41

Chapter 3 Figure 3. 1: An integrated performance management model for public organisations ...... 71 Figure 3. 2: Elements of a performance management process ...... 73

Chapter 4 Figure 4. 1: The balance scorecard ...... 85 Figure 4. 2: Research framework ...... 89

Chapter 5 Figure 5. 1: Sources of data ...... 99

Chapter 6 Figure 6. 1: Cycle of local government planning process ...... 128 Figure 6. 2: Internal and external revenues of LGs ...... 145

Chapter 7 Figure 7. 1: Minimum conditions fulfilled by LG (2008-2013) ...... 158 Figure 7. 2: The balance scorecard approach ...... 169 Figure 7. 3: Targets of internally generated funds achieved between 2006 and 2006 ...... 176

List of Boxes

Chapter 5 Box 5. 1: List of hints from interview transcripts ...... 114

Chapter 6 Box 6. 1: Stakeholders at the local government level ...... 127

Chapter 7 Box 7. 1: Formula for disbursing funds under the DDF ...... 154

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Participant information sheet and informed consent ...... 259 Appendix 2: Schedule for focus group discussions ...... 264

Appendix 3: Details of minimum conditions and performance measures under the DDF- FOAT ...... 267 Appendix 4: List of conferences and workshops attended during PhD study ...... 286 Appendix 5: Skills training workshops attended ...... 288

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

BECE Basic Education Certificate Examination BG Basic Grant BOT Build, Operate and Transfer BSC Balanced Scorecard CAPs Community Action Plans CBG Capacity Building Grant CBOs Community-Based Organisation CBRDP Community Based Rural Development Programme CG Central Government CHPS Community Health Planning System CLOSAG Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana CPA Comprehensive Performance Assessment CPP Convention Peoples’ Party DACF District Assembly Common Fund DCDs District Coordinating Directors DCEs District Chief Executives DDF District Development Facility DHMT District Health Management Team DPCU District Planning and Coordinating Unit EU European Union EXECO Executive Committee FGDs Focus Group Discussions FOAT Functional Organisational Assessment Tool GDP Gross Domestic Product GES Ghana Education Service GETFUND Ghana Education Trust Fund GHS Ghana Health Service GIMPA Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration GNFS Ghana National Fire Service GPRA Government Performance and Results Act GPRS I Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy GPRS II Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy GSFP Ghana School Feeding Programme GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda GSOP Ghana Social Opportunities Programme HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome HRM Human Resource Management ICT Information Communication Technology IGF Internally Generated Funds ILGS Institute of Local Government Studies IMF International Monetary Fund 10

IOO Input-output-outcome JHS Junior High Schools KWIC Key Words in Contexts LESDEP Local Entrepreneurship and Skills Development Programme LG Local Government LGSS Local Government Service Secretariat LI Legislative Instrument LGWU Local Government Workers Union MCs Minimum Conditions MDAs Ministries, Departments and Agencies MDGs Millennium Development Goals MDPI Management Development and Productivity Institute MLGRD Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development MMDAs Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies MMDCEs Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives MPCU Metropolitan/Municipal Planning and Coordinating Unit MPs Members of Parliament MTDP Medium Term Development Plan NADMO National Disaster Management Organisation NCCE National Commission for Civic Education NDPC National Development Planning Commission NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NPM New Public Management NRCD National Redemption Council Decree OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PG Performance Grant PHC Population and Housing Census PMs Performance Measures PMS Performance measurement/management system PNP Peoples’ National Convention PRCC Public Relations and Complaints Committee PSM Public Service Motivation PTAs Parent Teachers Association RCC Regional Coordinating Council SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes SEND Social Enterprise Network for Development SERVQUAL Service quality SIF Social Investment Fund SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound SMC Supreme Military Council SMCs School Management Committees SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SSA Sub-Sahara Africa SSS Senior Secondary School UNDP United Nations Development Programme USD United States Dollar WB World Bank

Hamza Bukari Zakaria, August, 2014 The University of Manchester, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Performance Management and Local Government Administration in Ghana: The Case of the District Development Facility and the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool

Abstract For the past two decades, interest in the performance of local governments has become high in public management. The wave of performance consciousness has thus far diffused from developed countries to developing countries where decreasing public confidence and trust in government has made the implementation of performance management policies a way of improving public perception of government performance. Meanwhile, the implementation of such policies is often based on untested assumptions some of which constitute gaps in the literature. For instance, it is understood that performance management systems enable public organisations that provide services to satisfy citizens’ demand for services. It is also assumed that mechanisms for managing organisational performance recognise and address the interests of multiple stakeholders in an organisational environment and that once performance management systems generate performance information, decision makers are likely to use that information to advance the goals of their organisations. This study explores these assertions by investigating performance management practices of local government authorities in Ghana. It sets out to understand how local governments manage organisational performance and what shapes their performance. It also examines the scope of a performance enhancing policy to determine whether it addresses multiple perspectives of organisational performance and the extent to which local government managers use performance information to improve service delivery. The study adopts a qualitative research approach by using data from interviews, focus group discussions, observations and documents to construct and interpret research findings.

This research identified internal and external mechanisms for managing local government performance and found that central-local government relations allows the former to influence the latter’s priorities by imposing on them, the national development policy, in ways that define development planning, performance reporting and local government controls. Following Kaplan and Norton (1992), a Balanced Score Card framework was used to examine the scope of performance indicators used to assess the performance of local governments under the District Development Facility. The findings reveal that performance indicators tend to be skewed towards financial and internal organisational aspects of performance rather than incorporating citizens’ views about local government performance or promoting organisational learning, innovation and accountability. The findings offer insights for re-examining multiple principal-agent relationships at the local government level where the assessment of local government performance excludes the opinions of local residents and affects local governments’ accountability to citizens. Although developing a culture of performance emerged as a key factor for improving local government performance, the findings revealed that the use of performance information by local government managers to make decisions on service delivery depends on the importance of performance information, their commitment to central government’s priorities, reporting requirements of externally funded projects and public service motivation. This study concludes that the utilisation of performance information to improve service delivery is necessary but not sufficient without adopting an all-inclusive, citizen-centred approach woven into the formulation, implementation and evaluation of performance management systems in a developing country context. 12

Declaration

I, Hamza Bukari Zakaria, declare that no portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning

I. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

II. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

III. III. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

IV. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487) in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.

Acknowledgement

I am profoundly grateful to my supervisors, Dr. Aminu Mamman and Dr. Chris Rees, Joint-Directors for the Centre for Organisations in Development at the Institute for Development Policy and Management for their guidance, patience, helpful insights and constructive comments without which this study would be incomplete. To my entire supervisory team and academic staff at the Institute, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude for supporting me in diverse ways throughout my PhD.

Special appreciation also goes to the Ghana Education Trust Fund for sponsoring my studies. I am particularly indebted to Prof. Kwamena Ahwoi for his friendship and immense support to my academic progress. To Prof. Seidu Alhassan, Director of the Institute for Continuing Education and Interdisciplinary Research, University for Development Studies in Ghana, I am extremely grateful for his assistance before and during my PhD studies especially when I was in Ghana to collect data for my research.

I very much appreciate the invaluable support and cooperation of the Directors at the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the Local Government Service Secretariat, the Chief Executives, Coordinating Directors and Heads of Departments in all the local government authorities that I collected data from. I also thank the assembly members, school teachers, unit committee members and all those who participated in this study.

To my colleagues at IDPM, I sincerely thank Lawrence Ado-Kofie, Husrev Habak, Ameen Alharbi, Omar Alshehhi, Shaoheng Li and Foteini Kravariti for their friendship. I also express my sincere gratitude to my housemates at 42 Colliery Street whose warmth, support and encouragement helped me to persevere even in adversity. To Dr. Divine Banyubala, Lamisi Mbilah, Ishmeal Ayanoore and former housemates, Dr. Justice Bawole and Dr. Francis Sanyare, may God richly bless you all for your brotherliness, care and support. My special thanks go to Dr. Abdul-Razak Alhassan and Dr. Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai for all the encouragement.

Finally, words can hardly describe my appreciation to my wife, Nihad Abubakar, for her patience, understanding and endearing support without which my PhD experience could have lost its sparkle. For all the personal sacrifices she had to make for the sake of my studies, I am deeply and truly thankful.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Hajia Memunatu Zakaria and the late Mr Bukari Zakaria of blessed memory, for reasons words cannot describe.

Chapter 1: General introduction and research background

1.1 Introduction

The state of public sector performance in general, and local government administration in particular, has been a subject of concern for politicians, policy makers, academics and public management practitioners for many decades (Crook and Manor 1998). This concern is reinforced by persistent pressure on local governments to effectively provide services to citizens; a condition which often leads them to devise strategies for improving their performance (Sanger 2008;Demirkaya 2006). Meanwhile, measures that seek to improve local government performance cannot be taken for granted because their effectiveness depends on several factors, the most important of which is whether or not measures for improving performance satisfy the needs of all relevant stakeholders in a local government context. This makes it important to know the circumstances under which a performance management system (henceforth PMS) for a local government authority will be successful. Some experts have argued that performance management practices should generate and use quantitative and qualitative performance information that is capable of changing the attitude of public managers, elected officials and bureaucrats in serving the public (Bouckaert and Dooren 2002). However, this objective will be difficult to attain unless performance indicators are capable of producing vital information needed to achieve organisational goals. Yet, it is argued that the best ways of producing and using performance information in many organisational contexts is not known (Behn 1995).

In a local government (henceforth LG) environment, managing performance is expected to promote transparency as it provides the mechanism for measuring and reporting important aspects of what local governments seek to deliver (Halachmi 2002). It is argued that performance management systems have the potential to improve accountability and maximise the benefits of citizens’ engagement with local governments (Sanger 2008). In the same vein, the process of performance management (henceforth PM) may reveal obstacles that affect service delivery, thereby opening up discussions for redress. In developed countries, research has shown that performance information of local government and their service delivery record is sometimes used to restore trust between citizens and their elected representatives (Yang and Holzer 2006) but in most developing countries, performance information of local governments is rarely available to the general

16 public and whether or not, local government officials use performance information to make managerial decisions on service delivery is inconclusive (Ayee 1996;Therkildsen 2000).

Meanwhile, some experts have suggested that a number of conditions need to be met in order for LGs to fulfil increasing demand for better services (Tangen 2005). For instance, it is argued that an environment of change must be created and supported by a performance culture that emphasises the achievement of LG goals, outputs and outcomes. It is therefore crucial to ensure that indicators for shaping local level development are both measurable and aligned to local council priorities, including those of their constituents (Resnick 2009). Since performance information allows managers of local authorities and key stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of internal operations and service improvement over time, one would expect resource allocation and investment plans to be more effective and result oriented (Behn 2003). This is why it is important for researchers and policy makers to understand whether performance indicators capture key aspects of organisational performance and whether they are capable of addressing the interests of all relevant stakeholders. In addition to this, this research takes a step further to explore one of the ‘big questions’ for performance management by seeking to understand why LG managers use performance information (Moynihan and Pandey 2010). This is crucial because most of the literature on performance management at the local government level draws on European and American experiences where local councils are quite autonomous compared to their counterparts in developing countries where they operate as extensions of central government in ways that curtail their independence. It is within this context that this research examines the content, consequences and outcomes of local government performance management practices in Ghana.

1.2 Statement of the problem

In Ghana, the advent of structural adjustment in the 1980s was accompanied by political and administrative reforms that promoted decentralisation of power and authority from central government to local government authorities. The military government of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) at the time was convinced that decentralised local governance would be a viable strategy to improve its response to public demands, promote service delivery and empower citizens to participate in decision making processes (World Bank 1989;Oquaye 1995). This is why from the outset, Ghana’s decentralization policy sought to: (a) promote popular participation in decision making

17 processes; (b) promote responsive government at the local level; and (c) enhance efficiency and effectiveness of the entire government machinery by restructuring institutions [that are] responsible for service delivery for them to get closer and accountable to citizens (Ayee 2008: 234). Today, local governments are not only expected to deepen participatory democracy, they are also required to reduce poverty and coordinate local economic development in their areas of jurisdiction (Asante and Ayee 2008).

Yet, research evidence suggests that local government authorities in Ghana struggle to perform their core mandatory functions in terms of providing health and education infrastructure, potable water, sanitation, public transport and access roads (Awortwi and Helmsing 2007;Crook and Manor 1998). It has been observed that although decentralisation and local governance has achieved some success in political terms through the election of councillors, this very success paradoxically produces deep frustrations at the institutional level as it reflects in only marginal improvements in local level development (Crook 1994). Not even the introduction of citizens and service charters for local governments has been able to accelerate social service provision (World Bank 2000). According to Ayee (1997) the lack of tangible development results undermine the objective of creating a more legitimate and responsive form of government at the local level. There are claims that local governments have not made any significant difference in people’s lives due to their marginal performance which is often attributed to the absence of political direction and leadership of the bureaucracy, centralized nature of government and administration, lack of financial resources, poor calibre of personnel, the failure of local government authorities to maximize the revenue resources available to them, poor and erratic commitment to development and services as demonstrated by misplaced priorities and widespread corruption (Ayee 1994; Ayee 1995; Crook 1994).

Based on these issues, interest in the performance of local government authorities has become a priority for ordinary citizens and civil society organisations, local politicians and the central government in Ghana. Consequently, some measures have been put in place to assess how local governments perform their statutory functions to facilitate local level development. Yet, very little, if any academic research has been conducted to understand the nature of these practices and the scope of performance indicators used to manage local government performance in Ghana. In addition, performance management practices are expected to periodically generate performance information but it is unknown whether LG managers use the resultant performance information in making decisions on social service 18 delivery (Halachmi, 2008). This is a gap this thesis intends to fill. Since the researcher is motivated by calls for in-depth research on the implementation of performance management practices in a variety of contexts (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001;Wholey 1999) this study intends to contribute a developing country’s perspective on the subject to the public administration and public management literature.

1.3 Aim of research

The study aims at examining performance management practices of local governments in Ghana by drawing on the knowledge of local government officials and community groups to understand the nature of existing performance management processes, the scope of performance indicators, and the use of performance information to enhance service delivery.

1.4 Objectives and research questions

Based on the research aim outlined above, the study intends to achieve the following objectives.

1. Identify and explore the nature and role of performance management practices of local governments in Ghana to understand what influence organisational performance; 2. Analyse the District Development Facility; a recent performance enhancing policy initiative, to appreciate the extent to which performance indicators under the performance management framework cover multiple dimensions of local government performance as well constituents at the local level; and 3. Examine the impact of local government managers’ utilisation of performance information on social service delivery to understand factors that affect performance information use.

In order to achieve these objectives, the following research questions will guide the inquiry:

1. How do local government authorities evaluate and manage organisational performance in Ghana?

2. What core issues within the national policy space influence the management of local government performance?

3. In which way does performance enhancing policy address multiple perspectives of local government performance?

4. To what extent will local government managers use performance management practices to improve service delivery? and

5. What drives the use of performance information within local government authorities in Ghana?

Answers to these questions are significant because they should offer an interpretation of performance that goes beyond resource economy, efficiency and financial interpretations of organisational effectiveness. Also, this interpretation should broaden the understanding of official and non-official LG performance by incorporating citizens’ perceptions of LG performance in their capacity as legitimate beneficiaries of LG services.

1.5 Significance of the study

This research sought to contribute to existing literature by exploring performance management in a local government context. Even though a lot of studies have covered various aspects of decentralisation and local governance in the ‘global south’ (Awortwi 2011; Conyers 2007; Robinson 2007; Crawford 2004; Crook and Manor 1998), very few studies have examined the implementation of performance management systems within local government authorities in sub-Sahara Africa in general and Ghana in particular. In developing and transitional economies, mechanisms for managing organisational performance have become imperative because public sector organisations tend to perform below expectations due to administrative problems caused by poor leadership, inefficiency, corruption and weak accountability systems (Therkildsen 2006). Also when strategies are implemented to improve organisational performance, details about the types of performance indicators, the relevance of those indicators and the use of performance 20 information are often taken for granted (Boyne 2002). This study contributes to knowledge by exploring these issues in a local government context where multiple stakeholders often have a wide range of expectations and interests in relation to the performance of LGs but unfortunately may not play any direct role in managing the performance of their local authorities. Furthermore, the research explores the use of performance information to understand the effects of LG performance management practices on social service delivery. The use of performance information is considered as one of the big questions in performance management research (Moyhihan and Pandey 2010) since many studies presume that once performance information is produced, it will be automatically used to make managerial decisions. In sum, the findings of this research will offer lessons for local government policy makers to reflect over practical issues that affect the impact of performance management practices. These lessons could also be considered in future review of performance policies for local governments in particular and for other public sector organisations in general.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The study is structured into nine chapters. The first chapter sets the tone of the thesis by describing the research problem, research aim and objectives and specific research questions the study seeks to answer. Specific objectives and questions are stated to explore existing mechanisms for managing local government performance in Ghana; analyse the scope of a recent performance management policy initiative to understand the extent to which it covers multiple dimensions of LG performance; and to understand whether or not senior LG officials use performance information to facilitate social service delivery and what factors may account for the utilisation of performance information in the Ghanaian context.

Chapter two focuses on the study context which is essential because LG systems do vary from one country to another. The chapter offers a general overview of the research background which illuminates the national economic and demographic features of Ghana and the evolution of local government administration dating back to the period of British colonial administration. It further explains the legal and constitutional basis of local government administration in Ghana. Details of the research setting are also presented to put the study into context.

The third chapter is divided into two sections and presents a review of public sector performance literature within the domain of public administration and public management. It explores the concept of performance and discusses fundamental debates and theoretical perspectives for studying LG performance. The chapter also examines literature on local government administration in Sub Saharan Africa to highlight gaps that justify the advancement and inclusion of ordinary citizens in evaluating and managing LG performance. It also draws attention to research gaps in examining the use of performance information to deliver LG outputs and services as well as understanding fundamental reasons for which local government managers might use information for managerial decisions. Chapter four presents the framework that guides the research. It draws linkages between research questions and the key aspects of the study that will provide answers to achieve the objectives of the study. The fifth chapter explains the research methodology. It highlights the philosophical approach of the study and explains the rationale for using a qualitative approach and a case study research strategy. Techniques for data collection, sources of data as well as details of how interviews were conducted in the field and analysed is also explained in this chapter.

Chapter six presents the first data analysis and discussion of findings. It also addresses the first and second research questions by analysing internal and external mechanisms for managing local government performance. The chapter highlights the importance and influence of national development policy in the formulation and implementation of local government plans that guide LG performance. It also shows how inter-governmental relations influence performance reporting and routine performance monitoring in ways that affect performance management at the local government level. Chapter seven sought to answer the third research question which specifically analyses the District Development Facility (DDF) and Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT) – a nation-wide performance management strategy for LGs - to understand the scope and depth of performance indicators (Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures). Also, based on Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) conception of the Balanced Scorecard, a framework is developed to analyse performance indicators under the DDF-FOAT.

Chapter eight addresses the fourth and fifth research questions by presenting and discussing findings pertaining to the utilisation of performance information for decisions making. It primarily focuses on Chief Executives and the responses of senior LG officials to understand whether and how performance management practices facilitate the use of 22 performance information to deliver LG outputs. Also, attempt is made to understand factors that explain the use of performance information in a local government context. In addition, the chapter uses findings from focus group discussions to present citizens’ perspectives to understand their opinions about the performance of local government authorities with regard to the provision of basic education, sanitation and waste management services.

Last but not least, chapter nine presents a summary and conclusion of major findings that emerged from the research. It discusses emerging issues and calls for a critical re- examination of performance management initiatives that might otherwise be touted as best- practices. The chapter also discusses the contribution of the study and its implications for theory, policy and practice. Limitations of the research are recounted and final remarks and suggestions for future research presented.

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter sets the tone of the thesis by presenting a brief introduction and background of the research. It states the research problem, research aims and objectives as well as specific research questions the study seeks to answer. The research problem is defined in the context of performance management of local governments in Ghana. Also, two research gaps are identified from a review of the public administration and public management literature in relation to the implementation of performance management at the organisational level. The first gap relate to the assumption that a performance management system that is perceived as conforming to best practices aligns organisational goals to the expectations and aspiration of all stakeholders. For this reason, the study adapts the balanced scorecard concept (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) to examine the extent to which performance indicators for managing LG performance in Ghana cover multiple dimensions of examining organisational performance. The second research gap pertains to the utilisation of performance information by senior local government officials who take decisions on local governments’ provision of services. Furthermore, the outline of this thesis is described in this chapter to provide hints about the content of each of the nine chapters. The next chapter explains the context of local government administration in Ghana.

Chapter 2: Context of local government administration in Ghana

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents details of the study area so that findings that will emerge from the study to address research questions and objectives can be understood in the proper context. Explaining the study setting is imperative because local government systems vary across different countries. Therefore, this chapter reinforces the contextual value of the research and also reduces the tendency of viewing the phenomenon under study as universal or homogenous. It is important to note that in this chapter, local ‘government administration’ refers to a process involving formal institutions that are legally established to deliver a range of specified services to relatively small geographic jurisdictions. In the Ghanaian context, these institutions are Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies and their sub structures in which career civil servants are responsible for managing the affairs of the Assembly. The scope of this research does not extend to all aspects of ‘local governance’ which is a term that broadly refers to the organization and coordination of collective action at the local level through government hierarchies, private enterprises, voluntary and not- for-profit organisations and informal associations that may have links with a local government (Shah 2006).

This chapter attempts to put the study into perspective by tracing the political history of Ghana and presenting the structure of the country’s economy as well as important socio demographic features of the population. The chapter also explores the evolution of local government administration in the Ghanaian context and clarifies the nature and structure of local government authorities in Ghana. It concludes by presenting details of three local government authorities that were purposively selected for the study.

2.2 An overview of the Ghanaian context

Ghana is one of 16 countries in West Africa. It covers an area of 238, 533sq km and has a population of 24.6 million people [based on 2010 population census]. The country was a British colony from 1874-1957 during which time it was known as the Gold Coast. The emergence of native elites led to the formation of nationalists movements which mobilised support for political independence. In 1957, the Gold Coast was the first European colony in Sub-Sahara Africa to attain independence. Under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, 24 the Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP) formed the first native government which lasted for 9 years until it was toppled in a military coup that inspired similar uprisings in the sub region (See Gocking 2005).

2.2.1 National demographic characteristics

The 2010 population and housing census revealed that approximately 24,658,823 people live in Ghana. This represents a 30.4 percentage increase compared to 18,912,079 reported in the year 2000. The current population is 51.2% female and 48.8% male. The Ashanti region is the most populous region with about 4,780,280 people representing 19.7% followed by the Greater Accra region with a population of 4,010,054 representing 16.3% of the country’s population (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). Meanwhile, Accra is the most congested city with a density of approximately 1,236 persons per square kilometre compared to the national average of 103 persons per square kilometre. The least populated region is the Upper West region which has a population of 702,110 representing 2.8% of the total population.

The 2010 population and housing census shows that Ghana has a youthful population, comprising a large proportion of children under 15 years and a small proportion of elderly people, 65 years and older. This population structure is attributed to high fertility and decreasing mortality rates (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). Figure 2.1 below shows the regional population distribution in Ghana.

Figure 2. 1: Regional distribution of population in Ghana

Upper East Upper West Western 10% Northern 4% 3% Central 10% 9% Brong Ahafo 9% Greater Accra 16% Ashanti Volta 19% Eastern 9% 11%

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2012)

2.2.2 The economy of Ghana

Ghana has the second largest economy in West Africa’s after Nigeria (Africa Development Bank 2012). Until recently, the economy depended heavily on agriculture which employed not less than 60 per cent of the population. The country is endowed with vast arable land that supports food and livestock production even though agriculture is less modernised with farmers predominantly using simple tools and equipment. Apart from subsistence food crop production, the economy attracts foreign exchange through the export of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, oil palm, pineapple, shea nuts and rubber (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2008). Ghana is also endowed with natural resources such as gold, diamond, bauxite and timber. Recently, oil deposits in commercial quantities were found in the south western boundary along the south Atlantic coast. Oil production in the off shore fields which started in December 2010 is expected to significantly contribute to the economy (Government of Ghana 2014a). However, foreign exchange obtained from export commodities are severely declining due to low value addition.

With respect to the macro-economy, Ghana relies heavily on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to finance the national budget. This has often led to conditions for the government to down-size the public sector by freezing employment and public spending. Also, there is growing concern about graduate and youth unemployment in the public sector. Meanwhile, lack of credit opportunities makes it difficult for prospective entrepreneurs to start up small scale private businesses. Even though the Bank of Ghana has been trying to implement prudent monetary and fiscal policies to support commercial banks to encourage lending to large businesses and small enterprises, high interest rates continue to be a challenge. Table 2.1 presents selected economic indicators between 2009 and 2013.

Table 2. 1: Major income and revenue indicators for the period 2000-2013

Economic Indicator 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Population (millions) 23.1 23.7 24.3 24.9 25.6 GDP (Current USD in bn) 25.8 32.3 38.6 45.1 50.3 GDP Growth Rate (%) 4 7.7 13.5 7.3 6.1 GDP per Capita (Current USD) 1,116 1,363 1,587 1,810 1,966 Government Revenue (USD bn) 4.3 5.4 7.2 8.6 10 Government Expenditure (USD bn) 5.8 7.8 8.9 9.6 10.8 Source: Moss and Majerowicz (2012)

2.3 The evolution of local government administration in Ghana

Ghana was known as the British Gold Coast before independence in 1957. During that period, the colonial administration operated a system of indirect rule that relied on native authorities to uphold law and order rather than involve natives in real local government administration (Gocking 2005). Ahwoi (2010) argues that LGs at the time were undemocratic, corrupt and inefficient. Legislations such as the Municipal Councils Ordinance of 1859 were enacted to support local government administration in major coastal towns. And for the first time in the Gold Coast, native people were elected to local councils in Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi Takoradi and Kumasi. These councils were in charge of public health issues, security and maintenance of peace, law and order (Ahwoi, 2010).

Immediately after Ghana attained independence in 1957, the government of the CPP adopted a centralised system of public administration. A number of reason accounted for this. First, Nkrumah was pro-socialist, which saw his political ideals influence the introduction of policies that promoted the centralisation of power as opposed to decentralisation. The CPP government did not also promote local government administration due to fears of secession linked to Asante’s agitations for federalism. Even when the CPP government attempted to create five regional autonomous assemblies in the early days after independence, “local governance was generally weak and subject to the centralisation of power that was typical of the post-colonial state in Africa” (Crawford 2004 :6).

When the CPP government was overthrown in 1966, the Siriboe, Mills Odoe and Akufo- Addo commissions were formed to advise the government on local government administration. Busia’s government implemented the recommendations of these commissions by formulating a local administration act 1971 (act 357) which introduced a de-concentrated form of local administration. It also restored traditional leaders as members of LG councils, allowing them to take local level decisions alongside two thirds elected membership. Regional, district and local councils were established with powers to provide public services (Ahwoi, 2010). However, these reforms could not be sustained after the government was overthrown in 1972. The military government of the National Redemption Council that took over from Busia’s government amended act 357 in what became known as the local administration (amended) decree of 1974 (NRCD 258). The 27 decree created a four tier structure comprising regional councils, district councils, area, municipal, urban and local councils and; town/village development committees. These structures have survived up to date.

Unfortunately, the military government that introduced these reforms was overthrown on June 4th, 1979 by junior army officers led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings who formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The military junta handed over power to the Peoples’ National Party (PNP) which formed a civilian government under the leadership of Dr Hilla Limman upon winning presidential elections in 1980. In its 27 months in office, the PNP government passed a local government (amendment) act of 1980 (act 403) that subsequently led to the establishment of regional administrative units. The regional administrations were responsible for development planning and coordinating plans and programmes between district and regional levels (Ahwoi 2010). They were also in charge of initiating and implementing regional development programmes to ensure fair and equitable distribution of public services. But before most of the provisions under act 403 were tested, the PNP government was overthrown by Flt Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings in his second coup on 31st December, 1981. This marked the beginning of the current LG system in Ghana.

2.3.1 Current local government system in Ghana

Ghana is a unitary state and a constitutional republic with two major layers of government; a central government located in the capital city Accra, and 216 local government authorities (as at the time of writing this thesis in 2013/2014) dispersed across the country’s ten administrative regions. The head of state and government is the Executive President, who is directly elected by universal adult suffrage in competitive multi-party elections organised after every four years. Upon assuming office, the President appoints Ministers of State to manage various sectors out of which the Minister for Local Government and Rural Development is in charge of local government administration. This makes the local government system highly susceptible to considerable influence by central government. The root of the current LG system in Ghana originated from the decentralization policy that was introduced by the military government of the PNDC between 1981 and 1992. The policy was part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were implemented to reform the public sector of many developing countries in the 1980s (Ayee, 2008). Today, local government authorities are constitutionally 28 recognized as the highest political, administrative and planning authorities at the sub- national level. They perform deliberative, legislative and executive functions.

Local governments in Ghana are expected to facilitate development at the local level by performing a wide range of functions and supporting auxiliary agencies in providing vital services to local communities. These services include public health and disease control, primary and middle level education, water supply, waste management and sanitation, agricultural extension support, local power supply and rural electrification, town and country planning, road construction and maintenance of highways and public buildings. LGs are also in charge of managing market centres, community development, social welfare, disaster relief and management, traffic management, fire service, tourism and sport development.

Meanwhile, division of tasks and responsibilities between central government agencies and local government authorities have been categorised into de-concentrated, delegated and devolved public services (Appiah et al. 2000). Ayee (1999) suggests that some functions are de-concentrated especially when headquarters of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) at central government level transfer roles and resources to local administrative branches at the district level to perform. The Ghana Police Service, Fire, Customs, Immigration, Education and Internal Revenue Departments at the local level perform typical de-concentrated functions. Similarly, certain functions are delegated to LGs to implement in collaboration with other agencies. These include the provision of basic services such as primary health care in consultation with the Ministry of Health; water supply in conjunction with the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, public lighting and rural electrification projects with the support of the Electricity Company of Ghana to mention only a few. Lastly, LGs also perform devolved functions which imply that they exercise autonomous discretionary powers backed by legislation (though sometimes subject to the approval of the Ministry of Local Government). The most notable devolved functions include internal generation of revenue, planning and construction of public facilities such as schools, health centres, roads, parks, cemeteries and natural disaster relief among others. It is claimed that all the de-concentrated, delegated and devolved functions when combined results in LGs performing up to 86 specific functions (Crook and Manor, 1998). Table 2.2 shows the distribution and types of LGs in Ghana and regional population distribution.

Table 2. 2: Distribution of local government authorities by population

Region Metropolitan Municipal District Total no. of Local Population Assemblies Assemblies Assemblies Government (2010) Authorities Greater 2 9 5 16 4,010,054 Accra Ashanti 1 7 22 30 4,780,380 Central 1 6 13 20 2,201,863 Western 1 2 19 22 2,376,021 Northern 1 1 24 26 2,479,461 Eastern 8 18 26 2,633,154 Volta 5 20 25 2,118,252 Brong Ahafo 8 19 27 2,310,983 Upper East 2 11 13 1,046,545 Upper west 1 10 11 702,110 Total 6 49 161 216 24,658,823 Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2012)

2.3.2 Constitutional foundations of local government administration in Ghana

Local governments are backed by the 1992 Constitution. Chapter 20, article 240 (1) of the Constitution unequivocally states that ‘Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralized’ (Republic of Ghana 1992). Other important legislations have been enacted to clarify the scope and mandate of local government authorities in Ghana. These include the Civil Service Law 1993 (PNDCL 327), Local government Act 1993 (Act 462), Local Government Service Act 2003 (Act 656), National Development Planning (System) Act 1994 (Act 479), District Assembly Common Fund 1993 (Act 455), National Development Planning Commission Act 1994 (Act 480), the Institute of Local Government Studies Act 2003 (Act 647) and several legislative Instruments (Bochie 2000). For instance, the Civil Service Law defines central- local government relations by assigning policy planning, monitoring, coordination and evaluation duties to the former whilst making the latter responsible for implementing development projects and programmes at the local level (Ayee 2008:242). The Civil Service Law (PNDCL 327) provide a framework for implementing government policies through the office of the district assembly by defining roles and procedures for making the service more responsive to the development needs of Ghanaians.

Based on these legislations, local authorities are expected to exercise political and administrative authority that allows them to provide guidance, give direction to, and supervise other administrative authorities to manage development at the local level. By law, the National Development Planning Commission Act 1994 (Act 480) establishes and specifies the composition, roles, functions and authority of the National Development Planning Commission as the highest coordinating body in charge of development planning in Ghana while the District Assembly Common Fund Act 1993 (Act 455) defines the nature of inter-governmental fiscal transfers.

2.4 Structure of local government administration

In Ghana, local government authorities are known as Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). A Metropolitan Assembly is a local government for a defined geographic area with more than 250,000 people; a Municipal Assembly is a ‘one town assembly’ with population ranging from 95,000 and 250,000 people while a District Assembly is a local government authority for a group of settlements with a minimum population of 75,000 and a maximum of 95,000. Despite this classification, organisational structures that support local government administration at the sub-national level exist in three distinct vertical levels. Firstly, there is a Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) in each of the ten administrative regions responsible for monitoring and coordinating the performance of local government authorities in the regions even though the regional administrations themselves do not have the powers of local government authorities. Secondly, at the sub-regional level, there are 6 Metropolitan Assemblies, 49 Municipal Assemblies and 161 District Assemblies as shown in table 2.2. Thirdly, at the sub-district level, there are Sub-Metropolitan Councils, Urban, Town and Zonal Councils as well as Unit Committees at the lowest level.

2.4.1 The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) is the apex body that oversee local government administration in Ghana. It is responsible for the formulation of local government policy as well as coordinating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating reform policies and programmes aimed at consolidating democratic governance in Ghana. The Ministry has implemented a number of reforms in the past

31 geared towards making local government authorities effective players in local level development by promoting popular participation in local administration and formulating policies and programmes aimed at accelerating decentralisation and decelerating (re)centralisation.

As one of the important gate keepers to LGs in the country, the Ministry of Local Government and the Local Government Service Secretariat direct LG policy by initiating development projects, some of which have benefitted from donor support. For instance, in the last decade, LGs in the three northern regions received support from the European Union (EU) to implement micro projects. Other similar interventions include a community- based rural development programme and a village infrastructure project that led to the construction of schools and health facilities in a bid to improve infrastructure. Similarly, a number of pro poor development interventions such as the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP), Ghana Social Opportunities Programme (GSOP), Local Enterprise Skills Development Project (LESDEP) and the District Development Facility (DDF) have been implemented throughout the country. The Ministry therefore operates project support or coordinating units within the MLGRD to monitor the performance of LGs on these interventions.

2.4.2 Regional coordinating councils (RCCs)

In each of the ten administrative regions in Ghana, there is a Regional Coordinating Council (RCC). These Councils do not have the powers of local government authorities even though they facilitate local government administration. The President of Ghana appoints Regional Ministers to head the regional administrations and to chair the RCCs. Regional Ministers symbolize the face of central government as they are the chief representatives of the President. They are particularly responsible for co-ordinating and directing the administrative machinery in the region and perform any other functions delegated to them by the President. In addition to the Regional Ministers, the composition of the RCCs include Deputy Regional Minister(s), Presiding Members and Chief Executives of each LG within the regions, two traditional leaders elected by their peers to represent the Regional House of Chiefs and the regional heads of decentralized (de- concentrated) departments who have no voting rights during RCC meetings. According to the Local Government Act 462 of 1993, the Regional Co-ordinating Director is the secretary to the RCC. 32

2.5 Tiers of local government authorities

Even though LGs in Ghana can be categorized on the basis of population size, it is important to emphasise that Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies have equal powers under the local government law. Also, the President has the power to create additional LGs when there is an increase in urbanization and population size. Under the current democratic dispensation, the number of LGs has almost doubled between 1988 and 2012 when the number of LGs was increased from 110 to 216. All local authorities have similar internal structures and departments except that Metropolitan Assemblies, as shown in figure 2.2 have three tiers below them while Municipal and District Assemblies have two tiers at the sub-district level. Whereas the sub structures for Metropolitan Assemblies are Sub-metropolitan councils, Town Councils and Unit Committees; Municipal Assemblies have Zonal Councils and Unit Committees whilst District Assemblies have Area/urban Councils and Unit Committees. Unit Committees operate at the bottom of the structural hierarchy of local government authorities. Unfortunately, these committees have lost their relevance and do not even exist in many jurisdictions (Songore, 2011). This has intensified calls for their abolition. Figure 2.2 below shows the tiers of LGs showing central-local government linkages.

Figure 2. 2: Structures for local government administration in an inter-governmental framework

Office of the President of Ghana

National Development

Planning Commission

Cabinet of Ministers

Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development

Regional Coordinating Councils

Metropolitan Municipal Assemblies District Assemblies Assemblies

Sub-Metropolitan Councils

Town Councils Zonal Councils Area/Urban Councils

Unit Committees

Source: author’s construct, 2014

2.5.1 Functions and composition of local government authorities

The constitutional mandate given to LGs to perform deliberative, legislative and executive functions is translated into certain broad functional responsibilities prescribed by the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462). The law specifies that LGs would be:

(i) Responsible for the overall development of the district and shall ensure the preparation and submission through the Regional Co-ordinating Council:  of development plans of the district to the National Development Planning Commission for approval, and  of the budget of the district related to approved plans to the Minister responsible for finance for approval;

(ii) Shall formulate and execute plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation of resources necessary for the overall development of the district; (iii) Shall promote and support productive activity and social development in the district and remove any obstacles to initiative and development; (iv) Shall initiate programmes for the development of basic infrastructure and provide municipal works and services in the district; (v) Responsible for the development, improvement and management of human settlements and the environment in the district; (vi) Responsible for the maintenance of security and public safety in the district; and shall ensure ready access to law courts in the district for the promotion of justice.

Fulfilling these functions will depend on the performance of the total membership of the Assemblies. Administratively, LGs consist of a General Assembly, Public Relations and Complaints Committee, an Executive Committee and its Sub-Committees, a Coordinating Directorate and 22 decentralized Departments (Crawford, 2004). While these committees and units are composed of elected and appointed members, it is Chief Executives – political appointees similar to an executive mayor- that head the LGs. Apart from Chief Executives, the local government authority is steered by Coordinating Directors who advise the Chief Executives and coordinate the operations of various decentralised departments. It is important to emphasise that Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) are nominated by the President of Ghana and only assume office

35 after receiving electoral approval from at least two-thirds of Assembly members in a session convened for that purpose (Ahwoi 2010:68).

The legislative arm of LGs is made up of 70% members who are elected on a non-partisan basis to represent electoral areas whilst the remaining 30% are nominated by the president to represent certain interests groups. The unique non-partisan membership of local authorities in Ghana can be traced to section 248 of the 1992 constitution which states that “a candidate seeking election to a District Assembly or any other lower government unit shall present himself as an individual and shall not use any symbol associated with any political party”. Similarly, article 248 (2) states that “a political party shall not endorse, sponsor, and offer a platform to or in any way, campaign for or against a candidate seeking elections to a District Assembly or any lower local government unit”. Presidential Appointees on the other hand are expected to possess special skills and experience that could be useful to the LG. The rationale for having a combination of elected and appointed members in the Assemblies is to build consensus irrespective of the varied and sometimes competing interests of assembly members (councillors) in facilitating development of local communities. Members of Parliament (MPs) representing constituencies within the boundaries of a local government area are automatic members of the assembly albeit without voting rights.

2.5.2 The General Assembly

The highest decision-making body of LGs in Ghana is the General Assembly. It is chaired by a Presiding Member who is often an assembly member elected by his/her peers. Presiding Members must obtain two-thirds majority votes in order to assume office as the council’s chair. The General Assembly which operates like a parliament at the local level is required to convene at least three times in a year even though extra-ordinary sessions can be held as and when such meetings are deemed necessary. Decisions taken at General Assembly meetings are legally binding.

2.5.3 Committees of Local Government Authorities

An important feature of local governments’ decision making processes is the use of standing committees. The two main committees, as shown in figure 2.3 are the Public Relations and Complaints Committee and the Executive Committee popularly called the

EXECO. There are 5 sub-committees under the EXECO even though LGs are permitted to create additional sub-committees for specific projects and interventions that can be justified by law.

Figure 2. 3: Committees of LGs and their sub-committees

General Assembly

Public Relations and Executive Committee Complaints Committee

Finance and Development Social services Work Sub- Justice and Administration Planning Sub- Sub-Committee Committee Security Sub Sub-Committee Committee Committee

Source: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2010)

2.5.4 Public Relations and Complaints Committee

The Public Relations and Complaints Committee (PRCC) is a special standing committee that is independent of any other committee set up by any LG in Ghana. The PRCC exercises oversight duties, receives public complaints about the conduct of LG staff, investigates and makes appropriate recommendations to the District Assembly. The committee is chaired by the Presiding Member. Even though PRCCs are mostly inactive or invisible in many LGs, they can potentially promote openness and transparency in the operations of local governments. That Committee is by far the only avenue for citizens to

37 express their views about the conduct of local government officials and assembly members and to seek redress when aggrieved (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2010).

2.5.5 The Executive Committee

The Executive Committee (EXECO) is the most important committee of LGs in Ghana (Ayee 1993). Described as “the nerve centre of the DAs” this committee consists of not more than one-third of the total members of the assembly which performs executive functions under the chairmanship of the MMDCE (Ayee 1993: 30). Members of this committee are required to hold consultative meetings before General Assembly meetings are convened. Also, the committee implements decisions and resolutions the General Assembly makes and oversees the administration of the local authority. An Executive Committee of a Metropolitan Assembly is called a Metropolitan Authority and the Metropolitan Authority Sub-Committees are called Metropolitan Boards (Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung 2010). To facilitate checks and balances, the Presiding Member is not a member of the EXECO. As figure 2.3 showed, there are up to five Sub-Committees under the EXECO.

2.5.6 Decentralised Departments of Local Governments in Ghana

There are several departments that implement decisions agreed upon by the general assembly of every LG in Ghana. Officials working in decentralized departments perform a wide range of functions such as accounting, auditing, planning, and engineering among others. Under PNDCL 207, 22 departments were formed at the local government level to perform up to 86 functions (Crawford, 2004). With the introduction of LI 1961 (2009), decentralised departments have been re-structured such that Metropolitan Assemblies have 16 departments, Municipal Assemblies, 13 and District Assemblies, 11. These are described in table 2.3 below.

Table 2. 3: Departments of local government authorities

Metropolitan Assemblies Municipal Assemblies District Assemblies Central administration Central administration Central administration Finance department Finance department Finance department Education, youth and sports Education, youth and sports Education, youth and sports Metropolitan health Municipal health department District health department department Department of waste Environmental health Environmental health management Department of agriculture Department of agriculture Department of agriculture Physical planning Physical planning Physical planning department department department Social welfare and Social welfare and Social welfare and community development community development community development Natural resource Natural resource Natural resource conservation, forestry, game conservation, forestry, game conservation, forestry, game and wildlife division and wildlife division and wildlife division Works department Works department Works department Department of trade and Department of trade and Department of trade and industry industry industry Budget and rating department Legal department Transport department Transport department Disaster prevention Disaster prevention department department Urban roads Source: Republic of Ghana (2009)

It is important to note that career civil servants in the above mentioned departments are responsible for efficiently and effectively performing functions assigned to the above listed departments. These departments serve as the secretariat responsible for implementing LG plans and for providing performance information as and when necessary. Even though at the departmental level, the staff report to the heads of departments who are answerable to the Chief Executives through the Coordinating Director, there is always some amount of double allegiance or conflicting loyalty. This is because civil servants working in decentralised departments of LGs are directly employed by the central government and practically depend on their parent ministries for promotion and resources to operate (Crook and Manor, 1998; Ayee, 2004).

2.6 Study areas in context

This section describes the selected LG areas where data collection for this research took place. As the shaded regions from figure 2.4 shows, the 3 selected LGs were geographically dispersed. A Metropolitan Assembly was selected in the South, a Municipal Assembly in the middle zone and a District Assembly in the northern region. Having this diversity broadened the range of opinions from respondents given their different experiences in terms of the regions where they worked and the size of LGs they were associated with. The map of Ghana below shows the study areas.

Figure 2. 4: Map of Ghana showing the study regions

Source: Centre for Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems, University of Ghana.

2.6.1 ‘A’ Metropolis

The ‘A’ Metropolitan area is a coastal district located about 25 kms east of the national capital - Accra. It covers an area of 396 km2 and has a population of 402, 637; 193,334 (48%) males and 209,303 (52%) females (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The largest seaport in Ghana can be found in this metropolis which was built as a model commercial centre with industrial zones. Today, more than 500 factories operate in the metropolis which is seen as a major industrial hub for the production of agro-chemicals, consumer electronics and electrical equipment, refined petroleum products, steel and heavy machines.

The ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly was previously a municipal assembly until it was upgraded in 2007 upon the promulgation of Legislative Instrument (LI) 1929. Due to increasing urbanisation and population growth, one of its sub-metropolitan district councils was carved out of the metropolis and upgraded into a district assembly to improve development management and control. In terms of membership, the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly at the time of this research had 49 members; 32 of whom were elected by universal adult suffrage, 14 members appointed by the President of Ghana, 2 members of parliament as ex-officio members and a Metropolitan Chief Executive. The mission of the Metropolitan Assembly’s is:

‘to improve the quality of life of people in the metropolis through the provision of essential services and the creation of an enabling environment to ensure the total development of the metropolis’ (‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly, 2010).

In the same vein, the vision of the local government is

‘To become an international standard metropolis where its inhabitants will enjoy the full benefits of modernization and comfort on a peaceful, reliable and sustainable basis’ (ibid)

The Metropolitan Assembly has a development agenda that aims at improving the living standards of local residents, promoting good governance and reducing poverty through efficient revenue mobilisation, provision of quality basic social services, environmental sanitation and sustainable public private partnership. 42

2.6.1.1 Basic education in the ‘A’ metropolis

The provision of social services such as education is a major priority of the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly. Hence, the Metropolitan Directorates of Education collaborate with and the Assembly to support public schools in the metropolis. There are about 671 basic schools in the Metropolis; 229 public and 442 privately owned. The introduction of educational support programmes such as capitation grants, school feeding, free uniforms and text books has tremendously increased enrolment. It is believed that motivating pupils with incentives could further improve their performance in the basic school certificate examinations. Table 2.4 shows the performance of pupils in BECE examination between 2006 and 2009.

Table 2. 4: Performance of schools in BECE examination (2006-2009)

No. of No. of pupils with aggregate % No. of candidates passed Year schools registered 6 07-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 2006 62 4688 69 187 479 730 1006 907 72.46 2007 63 4783 88 200 454 806 961 882 71.45 2008 70 5245 129 206 461 763 1021 1133 71.24 2009 69 5544 102 198 491 800 1176 1203 72.1 Source: MTDP: ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly, 2010-2013

2.6.1.2 Health, water and sanitation in the ‘A’ metropolis

There are 67 public and 46 private health facilities in the ‘A’ metropolis. About 978 medical officers (657 public and 321 private) work in these health facilities with about 67% of them in the publicly managed facilities compared to 33% in private facilities. A doctor-patient ration of 1:7,420 and a nurse-patient ratio of 1: 729 indicate inadequate health professionals in health facilities. The most frequently reported case in these facilities is Malaria which is also a leading cause of infant mortality. The Metropolitan Assembly runs a health insurance scheme to reduce user fees for out-patients, pregnant women and emergencies. This is expected to eliminate the problem of ‘cash and carry’ - the situation where patients are expected to pay for their medical bills before receiving medical attention.

Records of the LG indicate that about 85.6% of households in the metropolis have access to treated pipe borne water while households without access purchase water from

43 commercial vendors and tanker operators. Water supply in the metropolis is irregular despite the fact that the metropolitan assembly has a water and sanitation unit. Management of household liquid waste is one of the major environmental problems facing the LG. With respect to solid waste, the metropolitan assembly has outsourced refuse collection, evacuation and disposal to private firms on franchise. This means that households directly pay user fees to a private company for the collection of their household waste. However, inadequate waste bins in communities and frequent delays in emptying them encourage indiscriminate disposal of waste (‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly MTDP, 2010-2013). Even though some self-styled waste collectors locally known as “boola-boola boys” use wheel barrows to operate door-to-door collection of solid waste, their operations are confined to affluent residential areas where people are willing to pay for waste collection. Another challenge the LG faces in tackling waste management problems is the absence of a permanent site for disposing waste in the metropolis. At the time of this research, an abandoned gravel pit was being used as the final disposal site even though the Metropolitan Assembly had planned to rehabilitate and convert an old landfill site into a new engineered sanitary landfill under an Urban Environmental Sanitation Project.

2.6.2 ‘B’ Municipality

The ‘B’ municipal area is in the Brong Ahafo Region where it shares boundaries with three other districts and one in the Ashanti Region. It is the second largest urban area in the region with about 64% of the total population living in urban settlements (‘B’ Municipal Assembly, 2010). The capital town of the municipality connects the southern and northern regions of Ghana. The ‘B’ Municipal Assembly was established by Legislative Instrument (LI 1472) in 1989 as a District Assembly and was later upgraded to the status of a Municipal Assembly in 2004 under LI 1799. Today, it is one of 29 LGs in the Brong Ahafo Region with 32 elected members and 12 government appointees, one Member of Parliament and a Municipal Chief Executive. The vision of the assembly is:

“To alleviate poverty and transform its local economy into a vibrant and developed enclave” (‘B’ Municipal Assembly)

In order to attain this vision, the Assembly’s mission is

“To improve the quality of life of people through effective mobilization and utilization of human and material resources by involving people in the provision of needed services” (MTDP: ‘B’ Municipal Assembly 2010).

2.6.2.1 Basic education in the ‘B’ municipality

The Ministry of Education directs its decentralised units at the local government level to increase access to educational facilities, attain gender parity in schools and improve the quality of teaching and learning (Ghana Education Service 2011). In the ‘B’ municipality, these objectives are aligned to the provision of free quality education to all children of school going age in line with the Millennium Development Goals. There are 165 kindergartens, 185 primary schools and 91 Junior High Schools (JHS) in the municipality. As shown in table 2.5, enrolment to public schools is higher than it is in private schools. This is often attributed to high fees charged in private schools. Table 2.5 shows enrolment to basic schools between 2007 and 2009.

Table 2. 5: Basic school enrolment in the ‘B’ municipality

Year Public/Mission Private Primary JSS Primary JSS Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 2007 42152 4350 2152 2144 4195 4330 1012 1014 2008 15127 14652 5835 5090 3840 31718 737 672 2009 15152 14987 6032 5332 4126 3208 505 492 Source: MTDP: ‘B’ Municipal Assembly (2010-2013)

It is important to emphasise that the Municipal Assembly provides financial sponsorship for teacher-trainees so that beneficiaries will teach in public schools within the municipality upon the completion of their training. This practice could mitigate the problem of untrained teachers in primary schools and enhance quality education. As at 2009, about 89.1% qualified teachers taught in primary schools while 93.2% taught in junior high schools throughout the area. Yet, the pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) of 35:1 and 19: 1 in primary and junior high schools within the municipality is higher than the national average of 32:1 and 15:1 respectively (Ministry of Education 2013). It reality, distribution of teachers tends to favour urban areas compared to rural schools which calls for a rather balanced allocation of qualified teachers amongst schools throughout the municipality. 45

To boost educational performance, capitation grants for basic schools and a school feeding programme is currently implemented in the municipality. These interventions have increased enrolment in public basic schools (2,689 pupils at kindergartens, 2,439 pupils in primary schools and 1,122 pupils in junior high schools). However, while the increase in enrolment is positive for the Municipality’s quest to promote formal education, it is causing overcrowding in classrooms due to limited space, furniture and requisite school infrastructure. This has consequences for the quality of teaching and learning. To avoid the growing spate of having classrooms under trees, the LG has made plans to construct school blocks to address the shortage of classrooms. This is expected to further improve upon the performance of pupils in the Basic Education Certificate Examination, 80.16% of whom passed their final exam in 2009; 91.05% in 2010, and 77.78% in 2011 (‘B’ Municipal Assembly, 2010).

2.6.2.3 Health, water and sanitation in the ‘B’ municipality

The municipality is divided into 10 health zones. The main objective of the municipal health directorate is to enhance efficiency in service delivery, increase access to health care services and improve access to safe water in rural and peri-urban communities. Altogether, there are 37 health care facilities in the municipality that consist of 2 mission hospitals (Holy family hospital and Ahamadiyya hospital), 24 Government Health Centres and CHPS compounds, 5 private maternity clinics and 6 private clinics. The CHPS concept is a mode of primary health care which makes basic healthcare available at the doorsteps of deprived rural communities. Table 2.6 below presents the number and location of health facilities in the municipality.

Table 2. 6: Health facilities

Type of facility number location Health Centres/Clinic 10 Municipal capital Functional CHPS 14 Zonal councils Private Health Facilities 6 Municipal capital Maternity Homes/Clinics 5 Municipal capital Mission Hospitals 2 Municipal capital Source: MTDP: ‘B’ Municipal Assembly (2010)

Within the Ghanaian context, the ‘B’ Municipality is relatively endowed in terms of health facilities and this appears to reflect in access to health care. Results from the 2003 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey (CWIQS) shows that 69.4% of households in the Municipality took less than 30 minutes to reach the nearest health facility as compared to regional and national averages of 53.85 and 57.6 minutes respectively. However, just like in the ‘X’ Metropolis, malaria is the most commonly reported illness at Out Patient Departments of health facilities whilst pneumonia is a major cause of mortality in the municipality. As at 2010, there were 8 medical doctors, 3 Specialists, 7 Medical Assistants, 62 Midwifes, 43 General Nurses, 4 Public Health Nurses and 47 Community Health Nurses. This culminated in a doctor-patient ratio of 1:21,363 and a nurse-patient ratio of 1:2,500 in the municipality (MTDP: ‘B’ Municipal Assembly 2010). Perhaps, this explains why the level of satisfaction with medical services is 74% - lower than the regional average of 82.3% (Ghana Statistical Service 2003). Apart from problems of access and quality of care, another serious challenge facing the health sector is the cost of health care especially for financially weak households despite the fact that the Municipal Assembly runs a mutual health insurance scheme to make health care affordable to the people.

In terms of water and sanitation, the distribution of potable water and sanitary facilities is relatively higher in urban settlements compared to small towns and villages. The main sources of water supply are pipe-borne water, boreholes, hand-dug wells and streams, yet, about 33% of households in rural areas do not have access to safe drinking water (‘B’ Municipal Assembly, 2010). In addition to this, another important concern relates to sanitation and waste management. Even though the LG constructed 35 public toilets in various communities, the management of household liquid and solid waste is still a huge problem. Many communities in the Municipality have grown beyond the capacity of the Municipal Assembly to deliver effective sanitation services. It is not uncommon to find open drains and gutters along the streets being used as dumping sites for different kinds of household waste. To control this from spreading, waste collection containers have been placed at strategic open spaces in communities for waste collection. Also, the Municipal Assembly has secured a site where haulage trucks dump household waste deposits. Zoomlion Company Limited, a private waste collection firm has been contracted to assist in sanitation and management of waste in the municipality.

2.6.3 ‘C’ District

The district is historically significant because it serves as the cradle of the Gonja Kingdom that was established in the 17th Century by Ndewura Jakpa. Nyange, the traditional capital of the Gonja people was located within the district until the creation of present day Sawla Tuna Kalba District in 2004 (MTDP: ‘C’ District Assembly 2010). The area is endowed with vast arable lands. The population of the district is estimated at about 95, 353, comprising 53% male and 47% females with a population growth rate of about 3. 6% per annum (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The mission of the ‘C’ District Assembly is

“To improve the living standards of people in the District through effective coordination of resources to provide quality services” (MTDP: ‘C’ District Assembly 2010).

2.6.3.1 Basic education in the ‘C’ district

There is only one Government Senior High School in the ‘C’ district, 25 junior high schools, 61 primary schools and 3 vocational schools. Out of 329 teachers in 2007, 142 were trained teachers compared to 187 untrained. In 2008, the number of teachers increased slightly to 345 (176 trained and 169 untrained) and then marginally to 386 (205 trained and 181 untrained) in 2009. This has not however improved upon the pupil-teacher ratio at the primary school level where the trend increased from 1: 47 to 1: 57 between 2007 and 2009. To meet the District Education Directorate’s aim of promoting education, 27 new public schools have been opened in the district since 2008. Even though school enrolment subsequently increased as a result, there are concerns about high drop-out rate amongst girls from primary to JHS, a problem that is attributed to poverty, teenage pregnancy and early marriage (MTDP: ‘C’ District Assembly 2010). Other problems affecting basic education in the district is the use of children of school going age as a source of cheap labour in restaurants and stone quarries. This has repercussions on the performance of pupils in the Basic Education Certificate Examination, which declined between 2007 and 2009 as shown in table 2.7 below.

Table 2. 7: Distribution of exam performance by sex

Year Number of candidates Number of candidates with Position on league presented less than aggregate 30 table (≤aggregate 30) Male Female Total Male Female total Total 2006/2007 261 164 425 181 95 276 63.95% 32nd 2007/2008 347 246 593 205 90 295 65% - 2008/2009 408 334 742 204 114 318 42.85% 109th Source: MTDP: ‘C’ District Assembly, 2010

2.6.3.2 Health, water and sanitation in the ‘C’ district

There is a District Health Management Team (DHMT) that implements national and regional health policies within the district. It operates under a decentralized department of the Ghana health service which provides curative and preventive health care in the district. The District Assembly has made quality health care delivery one of its priorities and therefore provides infrastructure for health facilities, support the training of medical assistants and immunization activities in the area. The LG is responsible for 14 health facilities which include a district hospital located in the capital, 6 smaller health centres and CHPs compounds in small villages. In terms of disease incidence, malaria continues to be a major cause of morbidity and mortality especially amongst children. From the top ten (10) most reported diseases at health facilities in the district, reported cases of malaria ranged from 59.9% in 2007, 62.6% in 2007 and 73.8% in 2008 (MTDP: ‘C’ District Assembly 2010). Other commonly reported cases are anaemia and respiratory tract infections. The district hospital serves as the highest referral point for patients in the area. Meanwhile, only two health facilities offer 24 hour services in the district due to lack of equipment and logistics to make them fully operational. Thus, some community based disease surveillance volunteers have been trained to assist in disease surveillance activities in the rural areas where health facilities are often lacking.

Apart from the district capital where people have access to pipe borne water from a small town water system, other localities only rely on boreholes and wells as their source of water supply. Even though about 68% of the population has access to safe and treated water, villages along the Black Volta are prone to water borne diseases. The ‘C’ District Assembly has an environmental health and sanitation department that is responsible for community hygiene and the enforcement of environmental bye-laws. Zoomlion; a private 49 waste management operator, has been contracted by the LG to sweep streets in major towns in the district and to evacuate and dispose household wastes to a landfill site. One major problem facing waste management is the attitude of people towards indiscriminate disposal of refuse- a situation partially caused by insufficient waste collection bins. Also, household wastes are mostly made up of non- degradable polythene bags and plastic materials which may have long term consequences on the environment if they are not recycled.

2.7 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is to present the context of the study and describe the case study districts. Since local government systems differ from country to country, it was imperative to explain and clarify the LG system in the Ghanaian context. The contextual overview of the study area suggests that the LG system in Ghana is not entirely unique especially in terms of central-local government relations. However, there are complex connections between structures of LGs and the central government and its ministries and agencies such as the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the National Development Planning Commission. Being a small unitary state of 25 million people, the two levels of government have been structurally enmeshed through different forms of decentralisation - deconcentration of power and authority to regional level agencies, devolution of power and service delivery responsibilities to LGs and delegation to sub- national structures.

The chapter highlights how Regional Coordinating Councils as intermediaries between the central government and the 216 local governments are dispersed throughout the ten regions of the country. All the structures at different levels of governments perform functions that have implications for the performance of LGs. Interestingly, the inter-governmental relations in the Ghanaian context treats LGs as an off-shoot of the centre and this has implications for accountability as discussed in subsequent chapters. Importantly, this chapter shows how the legitimacy of local government administration in Ghana has its roots in the 1992 constitution which provides the legal framework within which the local government Act, 1993 (Act 462) defines the functions of LGs. Outlining the functions and responsibilities of LGs is important because it helps us to determine the services they provide and the basis on which to analyse their performance.

Chapter 3: Examining performance management of local governments: A literature review

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to explore and review the public administration and public management literature to identify gaps peculiar to the implementation of performance management systems in public organisations. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first section examines the concept of ‘performance’, ‘performance management’ and the levels in which ‘performance’ could be studied. The evolution of performance management in the public sector is traced as well as the underlying reasons for managing organisational performance. Also, the ambiguity associated with the performance construct is explored, its multiple definitions and dimensions examined and the shifting emphasis from performance measurement to performance management described. The second section explores the local government literature in the context of Sub Sahara Africa to appreciate how performance is operationalised and identify key determinants of LG performance. From a developing country perspective, this section explores how LGs’ provision of municipal services is indicative of their performance.

3.2 The antecedents and rise of performance management

Performance is not only an age old concept, but measuring and managing it in the public sector has grown extensively in the last decades, spreading across sectors and countries (Talbot 1999;Williams 2003). The evolution of performance measurement and management span three distinct time periods; before the second world war through the 1950s and 1970s, up to the 1980s and beyond (Halligan et al. 2010). The first generation performance movement focused on cost accounting, scientific management and the science of administration. The purpose for measuring performance was to tackle corruption and government adhocracy because at that time, the demand for governments was to be honest and not necessarily efficient (ibid). Subsequently, the need to have better governments became imminent with policy makers advocating for efficiency of public agencies and a separation of politics from the scientific principle of public administration. The second wave of performance management gained momentum after the second world war with an emphasis on performance budgeting. It saw the introduction of Planning, Programming,

51 and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) which subsequently inspired what came to be known as ‘Management by Objectives’ and ‘Zero Based Budgeting’, both of which were less successful (Halligan et al. 2010:41). Policy makers turned to social indicators to measure changes in society by using data on government actions to understand education, health, crime and social welfare outcomes (Bulmer 2001). Even though the social indicator movement also run into difficulties because it failed to develop a system of indicators with a common measurement unit, this appears to be useful even today since indicators are crucial for any performance measurement or management process (ibid).

Some experts have argued that developments in performance management in public sector organisations have been influenced by the expansion of the welfare state which increased citizens expectations of government, thereby pushing performance on top of the agenda of development (Halligan et al. 2010). Others are of the view that economic and financial problems in many countries have created difficulties that require appropriate political and administrative reforms (Pollitt et al. 2005). Hence, the general appeal to restructure the public sector has culminated in the popularity of New Public Management which aims at improving efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organisations so that governments would work better and cost less (Hood 1991). In the UK for example, initiatives were introduced to measure outputs as well as performance of organisations by using performance indicators to measure public sector performance in ways that reflect the characteristics of the NPM (Halligan et al. 2010:43). No wonder from the 1980s throughout the 1990s, efficiency and effectiveness were key elements of public policy under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in the US and under the Best Value and Comprehensive Performance Assessment in the UK.

This suggests that performance measurement and management did not become popular automatically but was rather a response to persistent demand for accountability from public organizations and by extension, government (Talbot 1999;OECD 1997;Sanderson 2001). Yet, some sceptics are of the view that very little has changed in conceptualising performance from one phase to another (Williams 2003) because the evolutionary trend brought with it certain assumptions that underpin the adoption of performance management practices within and across different countries. For instance, the UK and New Zealand served as models of the NPM to other countries and throughout Europe, the performance movement received considerable political support of the OECD (OECD-

PUMA 1997). As a result, the NPM has not only accelerated performance consciousness but has pushed it into the inner circles of government business.

Perhaps, the most notable feature of managing performance in the last two decades, a period many people see as its international apogee, was the level of international commitment and interests in measuring performance. It was recognised that something unusual was happening in the 1990s with the “rise of performance as an issue of public sector theory and practice” (Talbot, 1999; Bouckaert, 2008: 11). By the mid- 1990s, the phenomenon was becoming ‘more intensive, more extensive and more external’ (Bourkaert, 1996). This trend continued in the 2000s with a noticeable momentum with ‘performance measurement and performance reporting becoming important within governments. According to Thomas (2003: 1), this culminated in a popular refrain that “if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it”. Today, public services seldom escape from the practice of performance management as evident in countless studies on the performance of a broad range of services (Askim 2007;Boyne 1999;Addicott and Ferlie 2006). Yet, what exactly do people mean when they talk about the concept of performance? This is explored in the next section.

3.3 What is performance in the public sector?

The public sector is entrusted with the delivery of essential public goods and services at various levels of government. However, there is considerable controversy associated with the meaning of performance in the public sector and this has affected how the concept is understood, analysed and researched. The concept of performance is multi-dimensional, complex, and sometimes ambiguous (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008;Talbot 2010). Despite its popularity in contemporary public administration and management literature, on-going debates suggest this field of study will remain contested and evolutionary due to the nature of the public sector which is characterised by multiple goals, most of which tend to be vague, unstable, controversial and sometimes conflicting, creating room for multi-faceted and subjective interpretation of performance (Brewer and Selden 2000;Thomas 2006;Halligan et al. 2010). Since organisations usually have multiple stakeholders, it makes it difficult to agree on a common definition of performance because different people have different interpretations of what performance entails (de Bruijn 2002a:7;Thomas 2006).

Despite the fact that performance management in public organisations is a subject of intense debate, it has grown rapidly in both public administration and management studies (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008;Forsythe 2001;Ingraham et al. 2003). Key points from these debates are as follows: firstly, it is believed that performance levels can be explained based on the effectiveness of organisational activities even though it is unclear ‘what makes performance management so attractive in theory, yet so difficult in practice?’(Thomas 2006: 1). A second concern draws attention to the limits of rationality and the likelihood of unintended consequences. To Christensen and Laegreid (2004), managers are often seen as functioning within the narrow parameters of managing performance in an imperfect world that is rationally defined. Hence, the presumption that a public organisation will be transformed by measuring or managing its performance needs to be contextualised. This contextualisation is even more necessary because performance measurement is further associated with an’ array of buzzwords such as reinventing government, new public management, performance management, results-based budgeting, and performance contracting among others (Thomas 2006:1). While these points to an obvious confusion of terminology, the resultant reality is that “measuring performance is like the weather; everyone talks about it but there is no consensus on how to do it” (Schick 2001).

Whereas public sector performance has no universal meaning due to the complex nature of political and administrative relationships in the public sphere, it is still an important area of research. It is argued that performance management encourages goal-driven performance when organisations keep track and focus on their strategies, targets and overall performance (Kaplan and Norton 1992; 2000). Apart from ensuring accountability and value for money in the utilisation of tax revenues, examining the performance of public organisations could optimise the public good by implementing projects and delivering services that satisfy government and citizens (Boyne et al. 2010). Meanwhile, how performance is assessed by the government and citizens is influenced by political versus pluralistic interests that raise questions about the suitability of using either ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ measures of performance or both. The former focuses on indicators of public sector performance that is viewed as accurately reflecting the real world and minimising discretion’ (Meier and Brudney 2002:19). According to this point of view, measures of performance need to be precise on a given dimension of performance it seeks to measure and involve external actors to verify its accuracy. In this sense, objective indicators are viewed to be impartial, independent, and detached from the unit of analyses. On the contrary, Brewer (2010) offers a fierce rebuttal to this perspective by arguing that all 54 measures of performance are subjective because organisational performance is a social construct. In line with this view, a subjective measure of performance must refer to a dimension of performance that is relevant and internal to the organisation, and based on which certain judgements are made either by members of the organisation such as managers or employees or by external stakeholders such as clients, consumers or inspectors employed by regulatory agencies (Boyne et al. 2010). Clearly, both objective and subjective measures of performance can provide complementary information since none of them is singularly superior for managing public sector organisations.

The foregoing discussion suggests that performance of a public organisation cannot be succinctly defined unless it is disaggregated into dimensions of performance. This is why some studies of performance have focused on inputs, processes, outputs or outcomes or a combination of these variables. However, there is no consensus as to whether organisational services that take the form of inputs, outputs and outcomes are agreed, acceptable and adequate definitions of performance (Bouckaert and Peters 2002;Boyne 2003;Talbot 2010). This view makes it even more difficult to discern the performance of organisations that play complementary roles in the provision of public services (Talbot 2010). With local governments increasingly contracting-out some of their traditional functions to the private sector, non-governmental and voluntary organisations, evaluating their performance poses significant challenges due to differences in the way each of these entities would assess performance (Lynn et al. 2000). Nonetheless, assessing and managing performance in a systematic way must be rooted in any one or a combination of the theoretical perspectives presented in the next section.

3.4 Theoretical perspectives for managing local government performance

Generally, there are quantitative and behavioural theories of performance, most of which involve processes or outputs and outcomes in the interpretation of performance (Sonnentag and Frese 2002). This means that several reasons can thus be advanced to explain the continued interests in assessing organisational performance. In developed and developing countries alike, performance management is seen as a response to unsatisfactory and often dysfunctional governance systems that manifests in various acts of corruption and rent- seeking, inappropriate allocation of resources which leads to waste, inefficient revenue systems, and weak delivery of vital public services (Shah 2006). This generic issue is connected to the rationale for managing performance within LGs as examined below. 55

3.4.1 Economic perspective

The literature on local government performance addresses issues of economy, efficiency and effectiveness which are directly linked to operational performance. Central to this perspective is the efficiency debate which focuses on how organisations optimally use their resources to produce units of outputs at the least cost (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008;Greiling 2006). To achieve value for money, this perspective plays a key role in countries confronted with declining finances and spending cuts which require expenditure decisions to be appropriate, efficient and expedient. At the LG level, there is pressure for authorities to do more with less to enhance operational efficiency in public service provision. This dimension of performance substantially influences citizen’s perceptions about local governments’ performance because the extent to which a LG performs its functions efficiently affects the availability and costs of services they provide.

3.4.2 Accountability perspective

Performance management is important for politicians, elected officials and citizens because it redefines the relationship and interactions between local residents, local governments and service providers when they collectively place performance on top of local governments’ agenda. From this relationship, performance information could be used to indicate how well services are provided and whether they reflect the needs and aspirations of all stakeholders. This way, Sanger (2008) claims that performance management provides valuable knowledge that restores citizens’ trust in government. It allows public services to be openly scrutinised, fostering transparency and value for money to tax payers (Yang and Holzer 2006). For example, there have been instances where performance management is implemented to mobilize support for the dual purpose of improving service delivery and increasing the legitimacy of local government authority (Ho 2003). For this reason, LGs that manage their performance to reflect citizens’ interests are able to strengthen democratic values for being accountable and responsive to citizen demands (Sanger 2008).

It is argued that performance management can be used to promote accountability especially when citizens are not merely seen as recipients of local government services but rather assume the status of “owners and evaluators of government” (Ho and Coates 2004:29). This form of political accountability reflects democratic values by ensuring that public

56 administrators pursue publicly valued goals that satisfy the legitimate expectations of the people they serve (Callahan 2007). This gives rise to public officials asking the fundamental question - whom do we represent and therefore to whom are we accountable? The answers to these questions are not only important for developing countries where accountability has been lacking for many decades, they also motivate the introduction of PMS into the bureaucracy of developing countries (Therkildsen 2006). Due to differences in context, using PM to restore political accountability needs caution as the case might be in Ghana (Ohemeng 2009).

3.4.3 Service quality perspective

Basically, quality relates to conforming to certain specifications. Meanwhile, the interpretation of service quality is subjective because it depends on an individuals’ experience in a service area (Van Ryzin 2004). This implies that people’s perception about local government services is influenced by the satisfaction they get from using a particular service within a defined geographic area. Just as customer satisfaction is secured through high-quality products or services provided in the private sector, public sector organizations and those operating in local government areas can face pressure from different quarters to improve customer service on a continuous basis (Gaster, 1999). Some of these pressures could arise internally within local authorities if managers genuinely wish to improve upon the quality of services to local residents and communities but in most cases, the demand for quality services from LG managers is influenced by external forces such as citizen’s charters or consumer activism (Wisniewski 1996).

One of the most important contributions to the study of service quality comes from the marketing literature, precisely from a framework developed by Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) who explained perceived service quality as the difference between people’s expectations of a service and their perceptions about that service. They argued that people’s expectations of a service is determined primarily by their personal needs, past experience with service providers, word-of-mouth communications and external communications which could either come from the service provider or elsewhere. It is important to note that Parasuraman and his colleagues (1985) identified 10 determinants of perceived service quality in their original framework which focused on the following: access, communication, competence, courtesy, credibility, reliability, responsiveness,

57 security, tangibles and understanding the customer. In a refined SERVQUAL model, Parasuraman et al., (1988) explained service quality based on the following criteria:

 Tangibles: such as physically verifiable facilities, equipment, personnel;  Reliability: the ability to perform the promised service dependably and accurately;  Responsiveness: willingness to provide appropriate services to help customers;  Assurance: knowledge and courtesy of employees and their ability to inspire trust and confidence;  Empathy: caring, individualised attention organizations are able to provide to their clients.

Thus, for service delivering organisations that seek to improve upon their performance, the elements of the SERQUAL model could be used as explicit objectives of their performance management system. Since the SERVQUAL model provides a checklist not only for assessing people’s views about service quality but also a yardstick of what service quality should entail, these qualities have often been embedded in formulating performance management systems that aim at improving quality of service delivery at the local government level (Wisniewski 1996;Gaster 1999).

3.5 Levels and scope of performance

As the preceding section indicated, performance is not a unitary concept that can be universally defined. That is why performance could be conceptualised using three widely known models (Amirkhanyan et al. 2014).

1) The goal attainment model 2) Competing values framework and 3) A multiple constituency model

The goal attainment model primarily examines performance in relation to how individuals, organisations and governments achieve their goals. However, this notion has been criticised for being overly simplistic because public organisations often have more than one goal to achieve. Secondly, the competing values framework combines the goal attainment model with theories of performance that highlight the ability to tap and utilise external resources and opportunities for the internal health of organisations. Lastly, the 58 multiple constituency perspective interprets performance of individuals and organisations based on who is examining performance rather than using a set of standards or objectively verifiable indicators to explain performance. This is similar to Brewer’s (2010) assertion that every notion of performance is subjective and liable to several interpretations. The multiple constituency model recognises that ‘organisational constituents have diverse needs and none of their perspectives are more “correct” than others’(Amirkhanyan et al. 2014:2). This implies that performance and its improvement can be conceived in different ways.

It is important to recognise that the goal attainment, competing values and multiple constituency models lay an important foundation for our understanding of performance. They are often implicitly embedded in the analysis of performance such as those that follow the simple production process in which inputs are transformed into outputs. This conventional approach is seen to be relevant for evaluating organisational performance because no performance management system can ignore how organisational processes and inputs are used to produce outputs and sometimes outcomes. Based on this normative production analogy, performance has often been defined in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness or some other loose extensions of these dimensions (Summermatter and Siegel 2009). These are discussed in the next sections.

3.5.1 Span of performance

In line with the simple logic of a production process, the span of performance refers to the qualitative and quantitative linear relationship that characterise organisations’ conversion of inputs through activities into outputs. To Bouckaert and Halligan (2008), the span of performance represents the process in which an organisation transforms its inputs to achieve dual objectives that include fulfilling organisational targets and citizen’s expectations. This linear process or relationship has been extended to include trust, even though admittedly, there are serious concerns of objectively verifying attribution (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). Nevertheless, it is assumed that organisations could earn the trust and confidence of clients and consumers based on the latter’s expectations regarding the quality of outputs and services delivered. In a local government context, one would expect the provision of services to be a means of achieving outcomes that could gain the trust of their clientele, a phenomenon that appears to be the ultimate goal of many public organisations. It is therefore legitimate for the objectives of LGs to be defined by 59 the needs and aspirations of citizens (Morgeson and Petrescu 2011). This explains the decisions of LGs to invest in vital projects that are relevant to, and desired by local communities. However, because community needs, preferences and expectations are less static but rather change quite frequently, one can expect fluctuating levels of satisfaction with respect to the quantity and quality of services delivered by LGs.

It is also possible to match and observe direct relationships between different stages of any service production process such as input-output-outcome process. Given that local governments are required to optimally spend limited resources to provide essential services, managers are often seen prioritizing operational efficiency and effectiveness; the former measured by input-output ratios whilst the latter is based on output-outcome relationships. Whilst this simplistic matching is not new to many organisations, the hypothetical relationship between outcomes and trust as proposed by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) is inconclusive and cannot be verified even though public sector management in general, and local government administration in particular aim at filling this gap. This implies that focusing on intra organisational processes such as economy, efficiency and effectiveness alone would limit the span of performance whilst the inclusion of outcomes and trust could broaden it (Bouckaert and Halligan 2006). Even though Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) claim that the span of performance can indicate citizens’ satisfaction of organisational performance based on organisational outcomes, its explanatory power for local governments is limited for two reasons. First, there is a blanket assumption that organisational deliverables (outputs and outcomes) are uniform and equal in value; meanwhile, there are mostly varying degrees of quantity and quality of outputs and outcomes. Secondly, performance outcomes are largely delivered by a range of organisations in co-production relationships whose activities may not logically have the linear relationship between the various stages of the service delivery chain. Thus, clarifying inter-organisational relationships and specific roles that different actors play within these relationships deepen our understanding of the span of performance especially when changes occur in the policy environment (Bouckaert and Halligan 2006).

3.5.2 Depth of performance

The second typology of performance proposed by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) describes performance in vertical levels. This way, performance potentially occurs at micro, meso and macro levels. Organisations whose activities directly affect individual citizens and other organisations is categorised under the micro level. Performance in the meso or intermediate level is analogous to sector-specific policy fields such as education, health and agriculture whilst the macro level is typical of government performance at the country level or supra national level such as the Eurozone, OECD and Africa Union (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). Based on this perspective, the depth of performance at LG level can be said to be micro because LGs and citizens directly interact based on their status as service providers and service users. Expectations play a major role in how they interact. Within any given depth of performance, individuals or organisations would be expected to satisfy the expectations of key stakeholders within each level of performance. This is anchored on the believe that organisations that design performance management systems for improving service delivery must focus on user expectations in order to satisfy them because expectations and perceptions influence peoples’ assessment of performance (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008).

3.5.3 Individual performance

Human resource management literature explicitly considers individual employees as the building blocks of organisations with the capacity of influencing overall performance outcomes (Safdar 2011;Boyne et al. 1999;Debrah 2001;Drucker 2009). This assertion draws a link between the potential contribution of human capital to both organisational success and failure (Carmeli and Tishler 2004). In the private sector for instance, the performance of individuals is crucial to the survival and continued competiveness of organisations (Atkinson and Shaw 2006). Since human capital endowment, competencies, and the capabilities of an organisation’s workforce are essential for creating such competitive advantage, performance management is said to play a key role in developing and optimizing such human capital (Tahvanainen 2000).

Important drivers of individual performance typically encompasses cognitive factors, quality of training, experience as well as opportunities for personal development and public service motivation (Alonso and Lewis 2001). However, considering the fact that 61 individual performance is not static but rather varies over time, attempts to understand it in organizational settings can take two forms; either by focusing on observable process factors (behaviour) or by concentrating on outcomes resulting from employees’ task performance (Roe 1999). The behavioural aspects examines the actions of individuals in the process of executing tasks while the outcome dimension refers to consequences or results of employee behaviour (Sonnentag and Frese 2002). This conceptualisation of performance recognises measurable actions and activities that are essential to individual performance and mainly focuses on behaviour that is related to the achievement of organisational goals (Motowildo et al. 1997). It also implies that performance is not only constructed, but defined by a judgemental and evaluative process. Hence, a criterion must be used to determine the degree to which an individual’s performance contributes to organisational goals since there might be practical challenges in trying to determine which behavioural patterns significantly have an impact on performance (Motowildo et al. 1997).

Apart from the distinction between behavioural and outcome dimensions, it is also possible to identify three perspectives in the literature on individual performance; an individual differences perspective which focuses on individual characteristics as sources of variation in performance, a situational perspective which considers contextual factors that either facilitate or impede performance, and a performance regulation perspective which describes the performance process itself (Sonnentag and Frese 2002). Social cognitive theorists such as Bandura (1997) argue that individuals who are oriented towards developing new skills will improve their level of competence, become effective at work, and achieve a sense of mastery. This view assumes there is a positive relationship between self-efficacy or high sense of goal achievement and performance mainly because differences in individual performance is due to variations in employee education, skills, interests, experience and motivation. Building on this assertion, Motowildo et al., (1997) argue that cognitive abilities influence task performance whereas personality traits influence contextual performance. They explain that task performance is defined as the contribution of employees to the organisations’ broader goals that are related to formal reward systems and usually specified in job descriptions while contextual performance refers to individual actions that are not formally specified by their job descriptions, but nonetheless, contribute to the achievement of organisational goals (Sonnentag et al. 2008).

Despite the distinction between task and contextual performance, some analysts are of the view that understanding individual performance within organisations will require some 62 amount of differentiation between human resource policy and human resource practice; the former being the organisation’s official intentions regarding human resources while the latter relates to observable activities as experienced by employees (Gould Williams 2010:125). This implies that how human resource management (HRM) practices are planned and implemented influences individual performance (Chenhall and Langfield- Smith 2007). Even though individual employee performance has been treated in its own right, relating human resource practices to broader organisational outcomes in the public sector is driven by the attempt to ‘open the black box’ which demands critical examination of the relationship between HRM and performance (Wright et al. 2003). Boselie and colleagues (2005) found an association between HRM and performance, even though their analysis neither established causation nor concretely explained why that association exist. In addition, behavioural models have been used to study perceptions of employees’ behavioural outcomes at work, group level performance and organisational outcomes (Gould Williams 2010;Wright et al. 2003).

3.5.4 Organisational performance

The literature has widely covered the assertion that public sector organisations often have several goals for which reason they are associated with multiple dimensions of performance (Boyne 2003;Halligan et al. 2010). It is even claimed that for organisational performance to be defined, conceptual frameworks of performance must be clearly specified so that there can be consensus amongst relevant stakeholders over what performance entails (Dess and Robinson 1984). However, Brewer and Selden (2000) claim that difficulties involved in defining and measuring organisational performance in the public sector is because most of the elements of performance are embroiled in serious political discourses that makes it difficult to agree on what organisational performance means. No wonder performance has become ubiquitous in discussions of organisational strategies, planning, learning and regulation among others and yet, a universal definition of the concept is lacking (Ashworth et al. 2010).

Consistent with the goal attainment model, organisational performance typically focuses on the extent to which public and private agencies are able to deliver on their core mandates by discharging appropriate administrative and operational functions in ways that seek to achieve both short and long term goals (Kim 2005). It is also possible to assess performance either internally or externally. Evaluating performance internally is often 63 based on appraising administrative processes such as employee performance of roles and tasks while external performance assessment captures the perceptions and aspirations of customers and stakeholders. Intra-organisational performance is often a feature of internal control systems involving periodic evaluation of performance standards and how operational objectives are achieved (Kloot and Martin 2000). Because different people have divergent expectations in relation to what an organisations should achieve, Brewer and Selden (2000) observe that such differences often result in disagreements amongst stakeholders with respect to the most important criteria for assessing organisational performance. This also influences perceptions about factors that drive organisational performance.

For instance, many studies on organisational performance focus on financial performance by assessing economy, efficiency and organisational effectiveness (Halligan et al., 2010). In an extended input-output-outcome model, Boyne (2002) categorised the dimensions of organisational performance into outputs, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and democratic outcomes such as equity and fairness. Meanwhile, each of these variables could be judged differently inside and outside public organisations depending on the interests of whoever is evaluating performance. But there are certain limitations in using only economy, efficiency, and effectiveness to explain organisational performance. For example, the pursuit of economy, defined as the minimum cost of inputs is inadequate as a measure of performance because organisational expenditure on staff, logistics and general administration (all of which are inputs) can hardly show the quantity, quality or standard of services delivered. In a LG context where outputs can be defined in terms of quantity and quality of services, and outcomes in terms of the impact, equity and distribution of services, it can be argued that neither the 3Es nor the Input-Output-Outcome (I-O-O) model is able to sufficiently explain performance since they ignore citizens’ opinions about performance in general and with regard to their satisfaction with service provision and demand for probity and accountability in particular.

3.5.5 Government performance

There are various definitions of government but Stoker (1998) claims the concept is often used to refer to institutional structures and formal processes that maintain public order and facilitate collective action either at the sub national, nation state or supra-national levels. Thus, how people feel about government performance depends on the level of government 64 at which they find themselves. This implies that citizens experience with agencies that constitute the government machinery at the local government level influence their perception of government performance (Morgeson and Petrescu 2011). Also, the status of public administration may reflect government performance because it serves as the medium through which the ‘social contract’ between government and citizens is mediated and expressed.

After the Second World War, there was a perception that democratically elected governments are likely to ‘perform’ better and in the interest of the citizenry. This led to the proliferation of and support for the notion of good governance throughout the world (Andrews 2008;Doornbos 2001). Advocates of ‘good governance’ maintain that it promotes proper management of public resources, meaningful public engagement and ultimately delivers outcomes that people cherish (Grindle 2007). Interests in government performance has grown to the extent that politicians, policy makers, academics, citizens, and aid agencies, including the World Bank have been working on indicators of government performance (Kaufmann et al. 1999). One of such initiatives is the Brookings Institution’s attempt to evaluate the performance of government institutions in the US which was influenced by the Bank’s 1997 World Development Report (World Bank 1997). Even though developing countries were encouraged to introduce assessment mechanisms to improve upon the performance of their governments, very few, if any at all, was able to undertake self-assessment (ibid). Today, most developing countries are battling with increasing levels of citizens’ expectations and persistent demand for transparency, accountability and improved municipal services from governments (World Bank 2003).

Some analysts contend that a proper analysis of government performance should focus on the extent to which political pledges are fulfilled especially in relation to government output (Yang and Rho 2007). However, the reality in many countries is that public opinion about government performance is declining amidst scepticisms about the efficiency and effectiveness of public organisations to deliver vital services. At the local level, the consequences have led to deteriorating government-citizen relations, marked by revolts which sometimes escalate into destructive political instability (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). To avoid this, attempts have been made in some countries to establish performance standards for local governments to promote the direct provision of services to citizens. In the UK for instance, citizens’ charters are used to hold local councils accountable for certain services. In addition, league tables have been used to rank the performance of local 65 authorities under what was known as ‘comprehensive performance assessment’ and ‘best value’ initiatives which provide information to the public about the status of their council’s performance compared to other councils (Boyne. 2002). Similar performance benchmarking initiatives in the US under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the Program Assessment and Rating Tool (PART) both published citizens perceptions about the federal government’s performance to promote transparency and accountability (Van Ryzin 2004). These mechanisms do create healthy competition amongst local councils, pushing them to deliver quality services to the public.

3.6 Shifting from performance measurement to performance management.

Many studies use both performance measurement and performance management interchangeably because performance measurement is fundamental to any performance management system (Fryer et al. 2009;Lemieux-Charles et al. 2003;de Bruijn 2002b). Meanwhile, some experts make a distinction between the two terms. For example, Radnor and Barnes (2007) differentiate performance measurement as the quantitative or qualitative assessment of inputs, outputs or outcomes of activities, events or processes from performance management which is seen as a systematic utilisation of performance information to improve organisational outcomes. This distinction implies that while performance measurement is geared towards the utilisation of resources, mostly with emphasis on efficiency, performance management appears much broader, offering a holistic view of organisational effectiveness.

Thomas (2006) defined performance measurement as the regular generation, collection, analysis, reporting and utilization of a range of data related to the operation of public organisations and public programs. This allows data to be compared with preferred performance norms and standards to determine whether an organization is moving in the right direction or not. The distinction between performance measurement and performance management is simplified by Lebas (1995) who claims that the former simply focuses on the past whilst the latter uses information to make decisions for the future. Placing emphasis on the utilisation of performance information, Bouckaert and Dooren (2002) report that performance management signifies action whilst performance measurement generates information. Hence, the collection of performance information is only a means to an end – to manage performance. How performance management systematically improves

66 evidence-based decision making, continuous organizational learning and accountability is something this study will explore.

From the foregoing discussion, two recurring themes resonate in the literature on performance management and performance measurement. The first one suggests that both performance management and performance measurement cannot be separated from activities and processes related to organisational goals, specific objectives and standards of performance. This supports the utilisation of performance indicators in performance management systems (Greiling 2006). The second theme suggests that a good definition of performance should entail both behavioural, technical, and procedural aspects of measuring performance (Sonnentag and Frese 2002). This is mostly evident in performance management systems as discussed in the next section.

3.6.1 What is a performance management system?

Performance management systems are information-based procedures used by individuals and organisations to improve, sustain or revise organizational activities to achieve desired objectives (de Waal 2006). Poister (2003) notes that performance management systems take different shapes and sizes depending on the purpose for which they are created. This ranges from those that monitor micro production processes or service delivery chains within a particular agency to those that broadly focus on macro measures at the regional or national level. It is believed that organisations that effectively implement performance management systems are likely to perform better than those that do not (Rheem 1996). This is because PMS can be designed to specifically improve upon productivity, quality of services, and clients’ satisfaction with service delivery (Poister 2003).

Meeting these objectives is however not simple. For instance, performance management systems, especially those developed under the guise of best-practice, are expected to be multi-dimensional and aspire to achieve strategic objectives that reflect the concerns of all stakeholders (Tangen 2005;Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). According to Carroll and Dewar (2002), users of a performance management system need to clarify the level at which performance is measured, evaluate the specific dimensions of performance, report, disseminate and use performance information to compare actual performance to desired levels. This is consistent with the core steps of a performance management system; measurement, incorporation and use (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). While performance 67 management systems are expected to satisfy at least one of these conditions if not all, the purpose of a PMS particularly in the public sector must be geared towards achieving goals and outcomes for both governments and the general public (Bouckaert and Halligan 2006). This is why a good performance management system (so called best-practice) is expected to contain a balanced set of factors that are critical for the success of the implementing agency (Elzinga et al. 2009). The extent to which performance management systems of LG in Ghana satisfy these requirements is something this study seeks to explore.

At the employee (micro) level, performance management systems could be designed to clarify organisational objectives; assist in the management of individual employee performance and plan relevant training and development programs. This means that PMS could be linked to both short and long term vision and mission of the organisation concerned. Briscoe and Claus (2008:15) conceive performance management systems as ‘instruments through which organisations set work goals, determine performance standards, assign and evaluate work (tasks), provide performance feedback, determine training and development needs and distribute rewards’. This ‘HRM’ notion of performance management system may provide relevant information that motivates appropriate professional conduct, encourage accountability, organizational learning and create possibilities for service improvements (Neely 1998). These features present performance management as a continuous process rather than a distinct event, reinforcing the need for organisations to modify their strategies to attain successful outcomes in an ever changing world (Bititci et al. 2006).

Indeed, several issues have been raised in the literature concerning how performance management systems should be designed to capture relevant information for improved performance. These debates are motivated and reinforced by opinions about the relative strengths of using quantitative indicators against qualitative measures (Boyne 2002:29;Taylor 2007). Associated with these debates is the concern that concentrating more on quantitative indicators at the expense of qualitative measures could undermine other equally important goals of service providers (Jarrar and Schiuma 2007). The value of using only quantitative indicators to boost the effectiveness of service organisations has been questioned by some analysts who claim that using quantitative indicators alone may focus on short term objectives to the neglect of long term organisational goals (Jarrar and Schiuma 2007). Since performance measurement is inherently an important part of performance management systems, it is expected that performance indicators would focus 68 on issues that enhance the attainment of organisational and individual aspirations. This will however need routine recording, analysis and utilisation of performance information (Fryer et al. 2009). Meanwhile, the process of measuring performance has technical, behavioural and procedural aspects that must be considered by management since they must take ultimate responsibility for the performance of their organisations. This implies that knowing the rationale for assessing performance and how performance information is collected and analysed are crucial for the effectiveness of performance management systems. Table 3.1 outlines some fundamental reasons for measuring performance.

Table 3. 1: Rationale for measuring performance

Purpose Questions for managers of public organisations Evaluate How well is my public agency performing? Control How can I ensure that my subordinates are doing the right thing? Budget On what programs, people, or projects should my agency spend the public's money? Motivate How can I motivate line staff, middle managers, non-profit and for-profit collaborators, stakeholders, and citizens to do the things necessary to improve performance? Promote How can I convince political superiors, legislators, stakeholders, journalists, and citizens that my agency is doing a good job? Celebrate What accomplishments are worthy of the important organizational ritual of celebrating success? Learn Why is something working or not working? Improve What exactly should be done differently to improve performance? Source: Adapted from Behn (2003:588)

One could argue by inferring from table 3.1 to support public managers’ attempt to improve performance at all organisational levels by systematically improving internal organisational processes and being transparent and accountable to all stakeholders. To focus on different organisational levels and stakeholders, Sole and Schiuma (2010) indicate that most public organisations operate at three levels. These are: 1) The strategic level 2) The operational level ; and 3) The team and individual level

In a typical local government context, it is expected that various stakeholders across these levels will have some interest in the use of performance measures. Stakeholders could range from supervisory agencies, politicians and their constituents, ordinary citizens and 69 local communities, labour unions, chief executives, managers and employees. To recognise and satisfy the interest of these stakeholders, Sole and Schiuma (2010) propose an integrated performance management framework that identifies outcomes (immediate, intermediate and long-term) at the strategic level by monitoring the extent to which the implementation of strategic initiatives is effective in producing desired results. It is assumed that outcome measures will allow politicians and elected officials to learn more about service delivery and whether they reflect the political demands and needs of their constituents. At the operational level, performance dimensions can be viewed in terms of internal operational efficiency using input, output, customer service or service quality indicators which can be produced and monitored regularly, sometimes on a monthly, weekly, or even daily basis (Sole and Schiuma 2010). Last but not least, the individual level focuses on the productivity of employees or teams. Feedback provided at this level is used to make decisions such as rewarding and motivating employees to perform at higher levels. It is expected that performance information that is produced out of an integrated performance management framework could be used at individual and organisational levels to promote transparency and to further improve performance as shown in figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3. 1: An integrated performance management model for public organisations

Strategic level Operational level Team and individual level

Performance measurement system

Performance Dimensions Performance Dimensions Performance Dimensions Performance • Long term outcomes • Output quality • Team and employee information • Intermediate outcomes • Efficiency productivity • Immediate outcomes • Productivity • Team and employee efficacy

Internal reporting and external accountability

External Internal External Internal External Internal Accountability Reporting Accountability Reporting Accountability Reporting - Executives - Citizens/communities - Executives Transparency - Citizens/communities - Executives - Citizens/communities - Managers - Politicians/legislators - Managers - Politicians/legislators - Managers - Politicians/legislators - Elected officials - Clients/ customers - Elected officials - Clients/ customers - Elected officials - Clients/ customers - Others - Others - Others - Others - Others - Others

Decision making Decision making (strategic Decision making (operational Decision making (HRM) planning) planning) Performance • Rewards • improvement Strategic objectives • Key process improvement • Training • Strategic initiatives • Budgeting • Recruitment • Budgeting • Resource requirements • Others • Others • Others

Source: Adapted from Sole and Schiuma (2010: 107)

Whereas the performance management framework shown in figure 3.1 may be applicable to different levels of an organisation, how to effectively implement a performance management system remains a challenge for many managers. Poister (2003:23) claims that having an effective PMS begins by securing the commitment of managers, clarifying the purpose of the system and identifying outcomes and performance criteria. Similarly, important factors to consider include ‘defining and evaluating indicators, developing data collection methods, specifying the frequency and channels of reporting, determining analytical and reporting formats and assigning responsibilities for maintaining and modifying the system if necessary. Fulfilling these preconditions is necessary for the effective utilisation, evaluation and modification of PMS over time.

An important contribution comes from Pollitt (2013) who proposes five elements to explain the components of a PMS as shown in figure 3.2. The first component which consists of the main object of the performance management effort could either be an activity or a set of activities, interventions, programmes or policies. The second component deals with measurement of one or more aspects of that activity. Thirdly, the measurement generates different types of data, both quantitative and qualitative in nature. Fourth, the data are interpreted and transformed into information to make them meaningful. Fifth and perhaps the most important stage is when the information is ready for use, mis-used or not- used by various stakeholders such as service delivery staff, managers, politicians, service users, the media and the general public. This conception of a PMS is meaningful because it highlights unavoidable decisions that must be considered while implementing a PMS (Pollitt, 2013). For instance, it must be clear which aspects of the organisation’s work are to be measured and which are not? Answering this question is important because it is widely believed that what is measured gets more attention than what is not and that ‘what is measured gets managed’(Smith 1995). In a local government context, it is even more difficult to determine who is responsible for assessing performance: is it service providers, their superiors, independent external evaluators or service users? Answers to these questions have different implications for the purpose of evaluating performance. For instance, if service providers assess themselves without recognising the opinions of service users, there would be obvious dangers of bias (Talbot 2010). Meanwhile, regardless of whose opinion counts, a performance management system is expected to have the components shown in figure 3.2 below.

Figure 3. 2: Elements of a performance management process

ACTIVITY MEASUREMENT DATA

Activities, Of selected aspects Numeric and Programmes or of activity/activities others Policies

USE INFORMATION APPLICATION OF CRITERIA Decision or Presentation, assessment of, or including Average, attitudes towards, aggregation, Standards or activity/activities composites or Targets etc weightings

Source: Pollitt (2013:349)

While figure 3.2 depicts a complete performance measurement cycle, Halachmi (2002; 2005) cautions against the blanket assumption that performance measurement processes will automatically lead to desired outcomes. He argues that in most cases, the cost of measuring performance is certain but its benefits are tentative. Yet, some experts are of the view that a performance management system need to have certain features and qualities to conform to best-practice management systems. This assertion, which has influenced the implementation of so called best- practice performance management practices however tends to downplay the impact of contextual factors in using performance management systems to improve organisational performance. The next section explores the literature as to whether performance management systems should follow best-practice or designed to fit the context within which they are implemented.

3.6.2 Best practice or best fit performance management systems?

The use of performance management systems to improve, sustain or revise organizational performance is well documented (de Waal 2006). However, difficulties involved in using 73

PMS to generate relevant and timely information for control and planning purposes have led some experts to advocate for the adoption of best practices of managing organisational performance (Tangen 2005). By aiming at highly preferred standards, targets and benchmarks, it is believed that an organisation can become aware of its problems, learn from them and set on the path to better performance (de Bruijn 2002a). The notion of performance management ‘best practice’ is based on the assumption that certain universal principles in developed countries can be mimicked by developing countries. This one-size fits all agenda has been widely criticised in economic policy reforms under structural adjustments in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) where ill-conceived policies have failed tremendously. In Ghana, the introduction and implementation of PMS supported by international donor agencies is described as a typical best practice PMS.

The features of a best practice PMS are numerous. For instance, Crawford and Cox (1990) have argued that performance must be assessed in ways that is easily understood by those whose performance is being evaluated while others are of the view that performance measures should be generated from strategic objectives of organisations to ensure that employees’ tasks are consistent with organisational goals. At the organisational level, a PMS that conforms to best practice is expected to provide timely, relevant and accurate information with feedback mechanisms and consist of both financial and non-financial measures (Kaplan and Norton 1992), express specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound (SMART) performance indicators as well as target short and long term results (Tangen 2004). This way, PMS would not only provide relevant information but would also support strategic, tactical and operational objectives (Tangen 2005). Advocates of best practice PMS are often inspired by the experiences of others and may strive to benchmark their performance against industry leaders or professional standards. While performance benchmarking in itself could enable an organisation to creatively stand on its feet and work towards greater heights, ‘benchmarking may degenerate into silly copying especially when a best practice is simply transplanted from another organization’ (de Bruijn 2002a: 24).

Yet, studies have shown that regardless of superiority in design, the adoption and implementation of PMS is not a panacea for organisational effectiveness (Halachmi 2005). Even though managing organisations through performance measures has been on the ascendancy, few studies especially in developing countries have explored the reasons why some public organisations have utilised PMS better than others in translating metrics into action (Taylor 2007;Therkildsen 2006). Driven by this gap in the literature, it is imperative 74 to examine the effects of a PMS at LG level in order to highlight the implications of failing to incorporate very important contextual factors into its implementation. Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) also make a case for best fit between organisations and their internal and external environment. Such a fit is crucial because variations in terms of service delivery, scope of policy, or level of government can be good reasons why performance management systems should be adapted to suit any given context. Adaptation theorists assume that because well-performing organisations adjust to their environment in order to survive, PMS also need to be flexible and adjustable to suit the organisational environment in order to have a lasting impact (Andrews 2010). This is crucial because many contingent factors such as corporate culture, availability of resources and motivation to change can undermine the usefulness of PMS (Tangen 2005).

Meanwhile, aligning PMS to achieve contextual fitness requires behavioural changes and technical considerations. Behn (2002:9) argues that ‘It requires a complete mental reorientation’. For instance, organisational norms and behaviours will be effective if it produces high quality management, efficient allocation and utilisations of resources and provide incentives that encourage a culture of performance. Also, technical factors concerning measurement issues, the robustness of data and its quality and reporting format must be considered. Integrating technical and behavioural issues into the PMS could create the right performance climate, set realistic indicators to meet realistic expectations, promote consensus in assessing performance and avoid perverse behaviour (Mayne 2007). In sum, the best fit perspective suggests that for a PMS to be effective, there must be sufficient degree of alignment of the PMS and the existing systems and strategies of the organisation driven by leadership commitment; stakeholder involvement; continuous monitoring, feedback, dissemination and learning from results (Wang and Berman 2001;de Waal 2006).

3.7 Local government administration and service delivery in sub-Sahara Africa

Advocates of decentralisation and local governance claim it promotes ordinary people’s participation in local development efforts (Robinson 2007). By off-loading responsibilities to lower levels of government, decentralisation is expected to create space for the participation of non- state actors, civil society and private businesses (Manor 1999). In some countries, local government projects are aimed at reducing poverty; an important goal that central government interventions have failed to achieve in most developing 75 countries (Manor 1999). It is also believed that not only will benefits in socio-economic development accrue from more responsive and accountable local governments but that relevant public services will be delivered to meet local needs (Awortwi 2011;Oyugi 2000).

However, studies on local governments’ contribution to the improvement of public service delivery in Sub Saharan Africa presents mixed results (Conyers 2007). Some scholars have argued that decentralisation has failed to provide the enabling environment for efficient and effective delivery of essential services (Oyugi 2000;Ribot 2003). For example, Fjeldstad (2001) found that majority of residents in local government areas in Tanzania were dissatisfied with service delivery. Crook and Manor (1998) also reported that 70 per cent of their respondents in Ghana claimed local governments failed to satisfy their social needs, with 54 per cent in Côte d’Ivoire expressing similar views. Even in Uganda, where local governance is perceived to be a shining example in Africa, its impact on service delivery is inconclusive because improvements in education, health infrastructure and social services, attributed to local councils have been challenged (Makara 2000). There are instances where local governments have only tried to increase the number of infrastructure to facilitate access to social services without addressing declining quality of services despite central government’s transfer of additional funds to local governments for health, education, agricultural extension, potable water and sanitation (Conyers 2007;Robinson 2007).

In many countries, the inability of local government to effectively provide public services has led to the adoption of alternative mechanisms such as developing partnerships with private sector agencies and non-governmental organizations to meet the needs of the general public. In what appears to be influenced by neo liberal market ideals embedded in the new public management discourse, these relationships aim at achieving effective service delivery through co-production, contracting/out-sourcing, franchising, or a combination of these. Yet, not all of these arrangements have produced positive results such as improving service delivery, efficiency and value for money (Awortwi 2004). This makes it imperative to understand fundamental conditions that explain the overall performance of local authorities. Some of these are discussed in the next section.

3.7.1 Determinants of local government performance

Several factors account for the performance of LGs but commonly cited ones often include but not limited to environmental factors, organisational structures, legal and regulatory regimes, leadership, vision, strategy, financial resources and culture (Crook and Manor 1998). Previous studies on the determinants of local government in sub Saharan Africa focused on contextual, environmental and political economy considerations. For example, Olowu and Smoke (1992) compared local governments in Lagos, Nigeria to another one in Gokwe, Zimbabwe and concluded that the size of local government authorities were crucial for their revenue generation capacity as well as general performance. They concluded that local governments in urban areas performed better than their rural counterparts due to substantial revenue mobilised from the local base; something rural municipalities could only match when they are endowed with natural resources.

In spite of these, one key factor that arguably has been identified for having an over bearing influence on how local governments perform their statutory functions is related to the clarity of the legal framework within which they operate. Whilst the legal framework define roles, powers and responsibilities of local government, it is expected, under ideal circumstances, to reduce central government’s interference in local affairs since central- local government relations that are progressive rather than predatory will be a prerequisite for the performance of local government authorities (Crook 2003).

In addition, there is consensus in the public management literature that management plays a central role in organisational performance, and that effective performance management systems require proactive organisational leadership that is committed to accomplishing organizational goals. Sangner (2008) argues that leadership that is empowering, flexible and decisive are key requirement for local government authorities that seek to improve upon their performance and accountability to citizens. Leadership is also found to be important for the establishment and sustenance of performance management systems (Melkers and Willoughby 2005). In some jurisdictions, sustained leadership and political commitment are linked to high levels of local government performance especially when those local authorities are led by proactive and result oriented managers who substitute rigid rules for flexibility, innovation and learn from experience (Moynihan and Ingraham 2003).

3.8 Performance management and service delivery: A public service motivation perspective

There are several definitions of Public Service Motivation (PSM). Perry and Wise (1990) originally defined PSM as “a predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public organizations” (p. 368). Based upon this concept, Perry (1996) developed a measurement process which measures PSM based on: people’s attraction to public policy-making, commitment to the public interest, compassion and self-sacrifice. Brewer and Selden (1998: 417) described PSM as “a motivational force that induces individuals to perform meaningful public service such as community or social service”. Rainey and Steinbauer (1999:20) refer to it as “a general, altruistic motivation to serve the interest of a community of people, a state, a nation or humankind”. Similarly, Vandenabeele (2007:549) refers to PSM as “the belief, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate”. Also, Perry and Hondeghem (2008) see PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to deliver services with a purpose to do good for others and society. Underpinning all these definitions is the view that certain incentives activate specific motives in people that guide their behaviour in a specific direction, especially in providing a public service.

Advocates of PSM argue it has a positive effect on organisational performance and that highly public service motivated individuals perform well because they work to provide services they perceive as meaningful for other people (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999). According to Moynihan and Pandey (2007), organizational factors such as the reduction of hierarchy, red tape and goal clarity have a positive effect on PSM. Some experts have hypothesized that people who feel motivated to serve the public value monetary incentives less compared to private sector employees (Houston 2000;Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007). However, Gabris und Simo (1995) are sceptical about this hypothesis because they found no difference between the motives of employees in the public and private sectors in their study. On the contrary, some analysts are cautions in making conclusive connections between PSM and organisational performance arguing that the relationship between PSM and performance is more complex than originally expected and that contextual factors need to be included in the PSM - performance analysis (Wright and Pandey 2008). For this reason, it would be imperative to explore how and what motivates LG managers and

78 bureaucrats to comply with the requirements of the DDF FOAT and whether their motives enhance other values when delivering basic services.

This is particularly important in a local government context where the ultimate goal of a performance management system is to facilitate the provision of services for the broader public good. However, in a critique to the presumption that public organizations provide sufficient opportunities to satisfy the motivation of staff to serve the public, Wright and Pandey (2008) observe that people do not necessarily activate such opportunities. This study attempts to further explain and understand public service motivation in the context of other parallel incentives. It does so in a performance management context, by exploring factors underlining how and why LG managers comply with eligibility requirements for performance based grants and the use of performance information before and after performance assessments. Since LGs are responsible for the total development of their areas of jurisdictions, the PSM will be important to understand whether services delivery is based upon public service values or on some other forms of rewards associated with the performance management system. Understanding these issues is important because of a number of interrelated reasons. For instance, exploring the existence or absence of PSM amongst LG managers and civil servants will be useful in identifying mechanisms needed to mainstream PSM into an organisation that has a constitutional mandate to serve the public good. This is especially important given the use of incentives to create and probably sustain a culture of performance in LGs in Ghana.

3.9 Exploring the failure of performance management systems

Contrary to the expectation that managing organisational performance would automatically yield desired results, some studies have shown the opposite with researchers claiming that 70% of performance measurement initiatives often fail (McCunn 1998). Failure of PMS can be categorised on the basis of organisational context, processes and content of managing performance systems (Bourne et al. 2002). There are however several cross- cutting reasons accounting for the failure of PMS. For example, shortcomings in the design of PMS such as failing to specify performance goals due to multiple and conflicting objectives could also be contextual in nature (Heinrich 2002). Similarly, contextual factors such as organisational climate and cultural values as well as general political and economic conditions may affect the implementation of performance management systems in both private and public sector organisations. Furthermore, high costs and the inability of 79

performance indicators to capture unquantifiable phenomenon that are essential to organisational performance could adversely affect the impact of PMS (Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Also, the level of leadership support for PMS can have serious implications for PMS in government agencies (Meekings, 1995). On the down side of implementing performance measures, Radnor (2008) cautions against overemphasis on performance targets by arguing that government officials obsessed with meeting performance targets tend to manipulate performance information, resulting in cheating and gaming of performance management systems. Thus, an effective PMS should be resistant to such perverse behaviour in order to restore credibility and guarantee the achievement of organisational goals. In table 3.2 below, a number of previous studies on the failure of performance management systems have been categorised on the basis of context, processes and content of PMS.

Table 3. 2: Reasons for performance measurement failure

Contextual issues Processual issues Content issues

The need for a highly Vision and strategy were not actionable Strategy was not linked to developed information (Kaplan and Norton 1996b) as there were department, team and system (Bierbusse and difficulties in evaluating the relative individual goals (Kaplan and Siesfeld 1997). importance of measures and the problems Norton 1996b; Bierbusse and of identifying true “drivers’’ of Siesfeld, 1997). performance (Schneiderman 1999). Time and cost Strategy was not linked to resource Large number of measures requirements (Bierbusse allocation (Meekings 1995) diluted the overall impact and Siesfeld (Bierbusse and Siesfeld, 1997;McCunn 1998). 1997). Lack of leadership and Goals were negotiated rather than based on Metrics were too poorly resistance to change stakeholder requirements (Schneiderman, defined (Schneiderman, (Meekings, 1995). 1999). 1999). Behavioural factors such State of the art improvement methods were The need to quantify results as symbolic use of not used (Schneiderman, 1999). in areas that are more performance data, qualitative in nature cheating or gaming (Bierbusse and Siesfeld, (Radnor 2008;Pollitt 1997). 2013) Striving for perfection undermined success Rachet effects and threshold (McCunn, 1998; Schneiderman, 1999). effects (Pollitt, 2013)

Source: Adapted from Bourne et al (2002)

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter explored relevant literature with the aim of identifying gaps in relation to local governments’ use of performance management practices to facilitate organisational performance. It began with a discussion of the evolution of performance management and what the concept of performance means in the context of public organisations. The chapter highlighted the multiple interpretations of performance and controversies associated with its interpretation. It also explored theoretical perspectives for managing local government performance as well as plausible levels and scope for analysing performance within the public sector. The review suggests that different perspectives such as the goal attainment model, competing values or multiple constituency models are embedded in managing organisational performance.

In this chapter, a distinction is made between performance measurement and performance management in the public sector. In typical service delivering organisations, the review suggests organisational performance can be analysed at strategic, operational and individual levels, each of which has its own reporting and accountability mechanisms and decision making outcomes. Yet, within an integrated performance management framework, it is important to understand how the interests of different stakeholders, especially service users, are integrated into the design and implementation of the performance management system. Also, and perhaps more importantly, it is imperative to understand whether and how performance information is used to perform the core functions of local governments. However, in the context of sub Saharan Africa, the chapter revealed that the performance of local governments leaves much to be desired given the extent of citizens’ dissatisfaction with local governments particularly due to poor service delivery. Clearly, while adopting and implementing performance management systems could be a step in the right direction, a lot is expected from LGs to harness and create the necessary factors such as results oriented and visionary leadership, effective organisational structures, workable strategies, performance culture and mobilise sufficient financial resources in order to perform to the satisfaction of their ‘constituents. The next chapter presents a research framework that defines the boundaries of this study.

Chapter 4: Research framework

4.1 Introduction

Without a research framework, researchers are at risk of describing the phenomenon under study without bringing out its deeper meaning (Hartley 1994). For this reason, this section presents the framework for the study by mapping out specific research questions to concepts derived from literature that would be explored further using primary data to achieve the objectives of the study. This implies that the research framework defines the boundaries of the study and raises key issues relating to specific research questions to explain and illustrate the linkages between questions and core components of the study. As illustrated in figure 4.2, the research framework also maps out the boundaries and key elements of this research.

4.2 First research objective and corresponding research questions

The first objective of the study seeks to identify and explore the nature and role of performance management practices of local governments in Ghana to understand what influence organisational performance. Two specific research questions are used to address this objective: (1) how do local government authorities evaluate and manage organisational performance in Ghana? and (2) what core issues within the national policy space influence the management of local government performance? It is important to note that the search for answers to these questions recognises the fact that local government authorities throughout the world are increasingly challenged to prove to citizens and the central government that their work is being done well. This requires LGs to showcase their performance with respect to internal organisational processes, service outputs and outcomes such that making performance information available to the public can help them become operationally effective, transparent and accountable to their constituents (Sanger 2008). Yet, there is no consensus on the best way of evaluating LG performance given that, “The task of measuring and assessing performance in local government depends very much on who you are, what you want and where you stand in the scheme of things” (Jackson 1984 : 25). This in part explains why in places where performance management systems have been used to improve organisational performance, there have been different approaches about the way such systems should be designed to achieve expected results

(Charbonneau 2011). Whilst some experts contend that performance management systems should follow best-practices borrowed from experiences in developed countries, others advocate for systems that best-fit in a particular environment (Mayne 2007). The popularity of best-practices has been influenced by national policy initiatives such as the American Governments’ Performance and Results Act and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (Radin 2006) and the United Kingdom’s Comprehensive Performance Assessment and Best Value regimes (Boyne et al. 2002b). In all these policy initiatives, central government played a significant role in formulating them even though they were implemented at local government level. The principles of these initiatives have influenced similar policy initiatives in developing countries without paying particular attention to the local context. In the case of Ghana, it would be of theoretical and practical interest to explore internal and external mechanisms for managing local government performance and determine whether national development policy influences performance management practices of local governments without focusing on local contextual factors that may affect perceived LG performance.

4.3 Second research objective and corresponding research question

The second research objective aims at analysing the District Development Facility; a recent performance enhancing policy initiative, to appreciate the extent to which performance indicators under this performance management framework cover multiple dimensions of local government performance as well constituents at the local level. In order to achieve this objective, the study attempts to answer a specific research question, notably; in which way does performance enhancing policy address multiple perspectives of local government performance? The objective and research questions are against the backdrop that any performance management system that seeks to improve organisational performance in the public sector must recognise multiple dimensions and stakeholders involved in evaluating organisational performance. This implies that such a system should encourage stakeholder involvement, continuous monitoring and learning from results (Thomas 2006). It is believed that a good performance management framework should be reliable, balanced and resistant to negative behaviour and perverse consequences such as gaming, cheating and falsification of performance information (Bouckaert and Peters 2002;Tangen 2005). Thus, widening the scope of assessing LG performance by incorporating the view of different constituents is said to have more utility when it

83 combines quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess service delivery targets (Verbeeten 2008).

With respect to the second objective of this study, Kaplan and Norton (1992) Balance Scorecard (BSC) concept is used as a guide to investigate the scope of performance indicators under the new performance enhancing policy. The BSC is relevant and appropriate given the inherent limitations of conventional models for conceptualising performance. For example, the 3 Es (economy, efficiency and effectiveness) and IOO (input-output-outcome) models are widely used to analyse organisational performance but they do not address non-financial dimensions of performance such as the responsiveness of organisations to public preferences. As Boyne (2002) noted, efficiency, economy and effectiveness can be achieved within public sector organisations but their value will be meaningless unless they meet public demands. Also, it is argued that since these models are not balanced, they less likely emphasise the interests of multiple stakeholders (Talbot 1999). To Boyne (2002) placing the interests of both internal and external stakeholders side by side is imperative because the satisfaction of the former could be a prerequisite for the latter’s satisfaction.

Using the Balance Scorecard to specifically analyse the scope of performance indicators in this research seeks to make an original contribution in terms of assessing organisational performance. This builds on the value of the BSC as a framework that has redefined the traditional view of interpreting organisational performance by combining financial and non-financial dimensions of performance. A typical BSC has four components: a financial perspective, an internal process perspective, client’s perspective and a learning and innovation perspective (Kaplan and Norton 1992; 2000). In its original form, the financial perspective is used to inform shareholders about the financial status of their organisations which might focus on profitability, sales or return on investments among others. The internal process perspective focuses on operational effectiveness, the customer perspective aims at improving clients’ satisfaction and last but not least, the learning and innovation perspective explores mechanisms for continuous improvement and value creation (Kaplan and Norton 1992). Figure 4.1 below illustrates the original BSC framework.

Figure 4. 1: The balance scorecard

Financial perspective objectives measures targets initiatives

Customer perspective Internal process perspective Vision objectives measures targets initiatives and objectives measures targets initiatives

strategy

Learning and innovation

objectives measures targets initiatives

Source: Kaplan and Norton (1992)

The BSC shown in figure 4.1 describes a typical performance measurement system for profit making companies that prioritise financial performance compared to other dimensions of performance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the BSC is a widely tried and tested framework that has become useful in the public sector as well. McAdam and O’Neill (1999) reviewed how it is implemented in public sector organisations and concluded that in contrast to traditional performance measurement approaches, the BSC had clear advantages for evaluating all aspects of organizations. Despite its origins in the private sector, the balance score card is increasingly used in public organisations where there have been calls to use multi-dimensional approaches to examine organisational performance (Kaplan 2001). It is also widely used in health, local government and education among others (Coop 2006;Sharma and Gadenne 2011;Guthrie and Farneti 2008). Askim (2004) found that government organisations that delivered a range of services to the public were more likely to operate as learning organisations by adopting the balance scorecard framework. In a comparative case study of local governments in Italy and Australia, Guthrie and Farneti (2008) reported how the BSC was used to control and

85 manage internal processes. Coop (2006) in a BSC study on mental health service in New Zealand observed that performance indicators for each component was central to the quality of clinical outcomes and productivity among others, while managers that implemented the BSC achieved better results by demonstrating and implementing principles and initiatives of change management. Moreso, these studies suggest that the most important incentive for organisations to adopt the BSC transcend its capacity as an instrument for implementing strategy. This is because organisations are more likely to be motivated by the potential of the score card to clarify their mission and to narrow the gap between abstract aspirations and performance strategies with their daily operational activities (Kaplan and Norton 2001b;Kaplan and Norton 2001c).

Today, the BSC has evolved from being a mere performance measurement tool to a performance management framework that is extensively used across different disciplines and professional fields (Kaplan and Norton 2001b). Advocates of the BSC believe the practical relevance of the framework is maximised by its success as a performance management framework and as a method for implementing strategy (Kaplan 2001;Kaplan and Norton 2001b;Kaplan and Norton 2001c). Kaplan (2001) has further argued that using the BSC to assess non-profit or governmental organisations can help managers to:

1. Clarify and translate vision and strategy; 2. Communicate and link strategic objectives and measures; 3. Plan, set targets, and align strategic initiatives; and 4. Enhance strategic feedback and learning

As shown in figure 4.1 above, the BSC can be used as a strategic management tool because it puts strategy and vision, rather than control at the heart of the performance management system (Kaplan and Norton 1992). Even though local governments in Ghana are not known for implementing Kaplan and Norton’s balance scorecard, the theory of the BSC is applied to establish the extent to which local government performance management broadly considers multiple dimensions of organisational performance. The BSC is adapted in such a way that the original clients’ perspective is replaced by citizens’ perspective which is placed above other perspectives because local government’s core business is to serve the general public (see figure 7.2, page 169). Given the underlying mission-driven logic of the BSC, performance indicators would be expected to reflect each of the four

86 perspectives in order to contribute to the achievement of local government mission while at the same time, satisfying citizen’s needs and expectations. In a local government context, there are several reasons why an understanding of public opinion about LG performance is important. Ho and Coates (2004) observe significant changes in the perception of local government officials in relation to departmental procedures, organisational norms and managerial practices because the PMS fully incorporated citizens’ views. They also found that when local government officials’ collaborated with citizens to develop performance indicators, it gave political credibility to the performance management regime and increased the likelihood of using performance information for strategic decision making. A typical example is the best value performance management framework for local governments in the United Kingdom which emphasises local choice, local accountability and seek to create an environment for promoting continuous improvement (Rashid 1999). If the performance management system in Ghana is to challenge old ways of assessing performance, then it must be effective at individual, service and organizational levels. Therefore, it will be of theoretical and practical interest to determine whether performance indicators under the recent performance enhancing policy, (the District development facility and the functional organisational assessment tool) broadly addresses multiple perspectives of evaluating organisational performance.

4.4 Third research objective and corresponding research questions

The third objective of this study is to examine how local government managers utilise performance information to improve social service delivery and to understand factors that affect performance information use. Two specific questions are stated to find answers that will help achieve this objective. They are as follows: (1) To what extent will local government managers use performance management practices to improve service delivery? and (2) what drives the use of performance information within local government authorities in Ghana? Previous studies have shown that understanding the rationale for generating performance information is as important as knowing why such information is used or not used since the importance of any PMS depends on its decision making value to its users (Taylor 2011). According to Ammons (2002), a good performance management system inspires managerial thinking by providing performance information that cannot be ignored. It is therefore essential to know how and why LGs translate performance information to satisfy short and long term objectives as well as reasons that might affect the effectiveness of their PMS. Given that studies have identified factors such as 87 organisational culture, internal capabilities, resources and motivation as affecting the use of performance information, it will be imperative to understand the reasons for which LG officials use performance information and how that facilitates service delivery in the Ghanaian context. According to Lancer Julnes and Holzer, (2001) in order to confirm whether appropriate use of performance measurement has the potential to support better decision making, it is vital to systematically inquire into the patterns of performance- measurement use and into the factors that affect the utilization of performance information. These issues have not been given sufficient attention by researchers and much of what is known is based on anecdotal accounts (Fountain 1997 cited in de Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001). For this reason, it would be important to determine whether operational decisions of LG managers on service delivery are based on performance information and whether there are other factors that account for the utilisation of performance information for that purpose.

Figure 4. 2: Research framework

RQ 1: Understand Based on local government functions how LGs manage

performance Internal mechanisms of managing performance External mechanisms of managing performance RQ2: Examine how

national policy affects The role of national development policy performance management of local

governments

Based on the District Development Facility-Functional

RQ 3: Analyse the Organisational Assessment Tool

scope of performance Financial perspective indicators under the Internal process perspective performance enhancing policy Citizens’ perspective

initiative Learning and innovation

RQ 4: Examine how Based on perspectives of LG Managers and FGDs LG managers use performance Performance culture information to improve Determinants of performance information use service delivery Citizens’ perceptions of LG performance RQ5: Identify factors  Basic education that influence the use of performance  Sanitation and waste management information

Authors’ construct, 2014

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the research framework for the study. It outlined three (3) specific research objectives and five (5) research questions that are used to guide the study. For example, in order to achieve the first research objective of identifying and exploring mechanisms for managing local government performance in Ghana, and to understand whether there are contextual factors within the national policy field that influence LGs’ performance management practices, emphasis would be placed on internal and external mechanisms that shape performance management practices of local government authorities by recognising the impact of national development policy in this regard. With respect to the second research objective of examining the scope of performance indicators under a recent performance enhancing policy, Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) influential balance scorecard framework would be adapted to analyse the extent to which performance indicators cover multiple dimensions of local government performance. It is anticipated that using the principles of the balance scorecard to scrutinise performance indicators would significantly illuminate a new and better way of evaluating LG performance in Ghana. Last but not least, the research framework shows that answers to the fourth and fifth research questions that aim at achieving the third research objective would be based on the perspectives of local government managers who play a key role in allocating resources and influencing decisions on social service delivery in particular and local level development in general.

Chapter 5: Research design and methodology

5.1 Introduction

This chapter broadly presents the methodology used in the study. It explains the underlying reasons for adopting a qualitative approach. It also discusses the philosophical foundations of the study and the research design which explains the research strategy and specific methods employed to collect data. Furthermore, the details of field work carried out in Ghana are elaborated to provide insights into the data collection process. The chapter also explains how data was analysed to generate research findings as well as ethical concerns that guided the study.

5.2 Justifying the choice of qualitative approach

Understanding empirical phenomenon is often influenced by philosophical and methodologically preferences of researchers in their attempt to advance knowledge. These preferences govern their underlying philosophies about truth and reality. Some of these philosophies are expressed in, and reinforced by broad debates about quantitative versus qualitative approaches to research. Even though this dichotomy means different things to different people, it is believed that quantitative approaches are characterised by principles that support the existence of an objective reality which can be dissociated from the researcher’s own values. On the other hand, qualitative research paradigm acknowledges the value laden nature of social inquiry and stresses that reality is socially constructed. Advocates of qualitative research are convinced that knowledge production should be flexible and sensitive to the social context within which data are generated rather than relying on rigid, remote and inferential methods (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).

For this reason, qualitative research strategies capitalise on the relationship developed between researchers and their subjects of study to understand the meaning individuals and groups ascribe to social phenomenon and social problems (Punch 2005). It is therefore somewhat ironic that whereas quantitative researchers tend to challenge their qualitative colleagues for being overly dependent on impressionistic data that can neither produce objective nor reliable knowledge, the persistent growth and proliferation of qualitative research is seen by its proponents as a response to the weaknesses of traditional

91 quantitative approaches that have dominated many social science disciplines until the past few decades (Sandberg 2005). This view is supported by arguments that have emerged amongst quantitative researchers themselves, whereby some ‘post-positivists’ have cast doubts on the traditional notion of absolute truth of knowledge particularly in the study of social phenomenon and human behaviour (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). It is therefore difficult to think of a field of study in contemporary social science that has not been influenced by the ‘qualitative wave’ of thinking.

Hence, it is less surprising that management and organisational research which produces knowledge about human action within and between organisational structures and how they affect society has not been able to escape from the influence of these two dominant strands of research. While this observation is quite true, qualitative research has further gained ground on the basis that traditional positivist claims to objective knowledge have severe theoretical limitations that do not allow deeper understanding of human behaviour and organisational phenomenon (Lincoln and Denzin 2003;Prasad and Prasad 2002). To overcome this weaknesses, proponents of interpretive approaches contend that research on organisations should consider the ‘lived experiences’ of individual members of organisations or their clients as the basis of empirical knowledge (McCormack 2000;Prasad and Prasad 2002). As a result, this study is built on the knowledge of local government officials, elected representatives, heads of departments as well as participants of focus group discussions in the selected local government authorities. Given the complexity and multidimensional nature of organisational performance, the information generated from officials would be triangulated with the perspectives of service users in local communities. Analysing the information generated from these interactions will make it possible to interpret local government performance as conceived by the research participants.

5.3 Philosophical orientation of the study

There is consensus that producing knowledge through research has philosophical underpinnings. In organisational studies just as any typical social science discipline, there are different perspectives to creating knowledge and for understanding reality. These are often referred to as philosophical paradigms (Lincoln and Guba 2000). To Kuhn (1970), a paradigm refers to a collection of underlying beliefs, values, and techniques shared by members of a given community. Kuhn’s notion of paradigms is so influential that some 92 scholars argue that social science researchers must emphasise their choice of research paradigm over research methods since the former influences the latter (Lincoln and Guba 2000). Paradigms are useful because of the assumptions they make about ontology, epistemology and methodology (Jacobs and Manzi 2000). To Denzin and Lincoln (2005), ontology refers to fundamental assumptions about reality whilst epistemology relates to the forms, nature and origin of knowledge that also clarifies how knowledge is produced. More generally, methodology refers to the constellation of coherent assumptions expressed in the form of specific methods or procedures that are employed to understand a phenomenon. These perspectives shape people’s understanding of social phenomena and their worldviews. As the foundation of knowledge, paradigms justify how researchers interpret reality. This has often led to unending debates about whether an objective reality exists or whether reality is only constructed and derived through social interpretations (Tronvoll et al. 2011).

Four broad paradigms are dominant in organisational studies. These are functionalist, interpretivist, radical structuralist and radical humanists perspectives (Burrell and Morgan 1979). According to Hardy and Clegg (1997), the popular paradigms are either normative, interpretive, critical or postmodern approaches to organisational studies. To Alvesson and Deetz (1996), the normative approach in organizational studies maintains a harmonious relationship with the existing social order that is geared towards establishing law-like relations between phenomena under study. The approach also emphasises ‘scientific, neutral and objective styles of doing research often associated with the method of positivism and the assumptions of normal science’ (Hardy and Clegg 1997:7). These features are also inherent in Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) explanation of the functionalist perspective which assumes that organisational performance depends on rational decision making processes. Yet, in practice, rationality is neither an automatic feature of organisational processes nor an intrinsic contributor to organisational performance.

From an organizational perspective, interpretive approaches mostly utilise hermeneutics and ethnography to study the social aspects of organizational life (Alvesson and Deetz 2006). This helps researchers to explain how organizational realities are socially constructed, negotiated, affirmed, maintained or changed (Karataş-Özkan and Murphy 2010). For instance, constructionists are convinced that knowledge and truth are enacted and expressed in a variety of symbols and language systems (Lincoln and Guba 2000). They contend that organizations are culturally, historically and socially unique spaces 93 where members are collectively involved in the construction of social reality. Conversely, critical theorists see organizations as socially and historically created within contexts of struggle and conflict while postmodernists focus on unequal power relations in organisational settings (Alvesson and Deetz 2006;Karataş-Özkan and Murphy 2010).

Situating this research within the context of public administration and public management, it can argued that organisational performance could both be ‘real’ and socially constructed (Boyne et al. 2010). Advocating for a realist approach to analysing organisational performance, Talbot (2010) argues that the utilisation of quantifiable resources in the production of outputs and outcomes affect social reality in very pragmatic ways to justify a realist philosophical interpretation of organisational performance. However, one could argue that measuring performance of local governments is complex because what constitutes performance and how performance is measured and managed, may neither follow an objective process nor involve objectively verifiable standards but would rather be socially constructed by different stakeholders. Stakeholders in this context refer to persons, groups, and institutions that have an interest in the activities of LGs. Therefore, the assumption that performance is an objective phenomenon that could be known through a set of quantifiable measures or indicators might be limited given the multiple constituencies in the public sector and the variety of values attached to what constitutes performance. More so, the apparent lack of a universal definition of performance reinforces the assertion that performance is socially constructed, subjective, complex, and particularly difficult to measure in the public sector (Brewer and Selden 2000). It is further seen as a normative construct that is mostly used in relation to value laden concepts such as improvement, success, progress, and sometimes excellence (Summermatter and Siegel 2009). Thus organisational performance would be viewed in this study as a social construct that is based upon people’s understanding and interpretation of performance within local government authorities, sector departments and interaction between these institutions and communities that benefit from the services of LGs.

It is important to recognise that the growing acceptance and utilisation of social constructivist and interpretive research techniques in public management and organisational analysis cannot be underestimated. The utility of this perspective is evident in the wide range of benefits it offers to researchers. For example, it allows for a critical examination of assumptions related to public management practice that would have been overlooked or even ignored by other approaches (Jacobs and Manzi 2000). Furthermore, 94 interpretive analysis resolves one central problem of positivism by contesting the basis of factual knowledge. While positivists assume that research can be pre-determined, value free and neutral, constructivists contend that the basis of social facts and how the world is understood depends on human interactions, life experiences and how they interpret those experiences. Research based on the latter’s principles are relativistic. Ontologically, they assume that reality is not a unitary concept and within the context of research, it is a construct that has multiple interpretations in which the researcher and the phenomenon under study can be interactively linked, influence each other, and eventually become inseparable (Lincoln and Guba 2000). It is believed that since both the researcher and their participants engage in a dialogue, it makes understanding only possible through interpretation by allowing varying constructions to be compared, contrasted, and eventually understood through dialogical relationships.

5.4 Research design

According to Punch (2005), research design situates the researcher in the empirical world and connects research questions to data. It serves as a plan which does not only provide practical details of a study but also clarify vital aspects of the research process. For instance, it can be used to explain the strategy adopted for a study, the unit of analysis and tools and techniques used to collect and analyse data (Punch, 2005). In translating research questions into data, a research design asks certain fundamental questions as shown below.

Data collected and analysed:

Research Questions (i) From whom will data be collected? Data (iii) Following what strategy?

Answers to these questions clarify the research design. In the next section, the research strategy and unit of analysis will be explained further.

5.4.1 Case study research strategy

The case study strategy is relevant in social science research because it facilitates in-depth understanding of phenomenon in their real natural environment (Yin 2009). Case studies can serve a dual purpose, both as a research strategy and as a research method (Punch 2005;Yin 2009). Yin (2009:18) affirms that case studies are suitable for ‘investigating contemporary phenomena into detail and within real-life contexts especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’. The case study strategy has become popular in organisation and management studies due to growing confidence in it as a rigorous research strategy in its own right (Hartley 1994;Yin 2009). In addition to these advantages, case studies are not only bounded systems that focus on specific phenomenon; they also seek to preserve the wholeness and integrity of the case or cases under study; and may include data from different sources (individuals, specific groups, organisations and sometimes communities) as well as multiple methods (Punch 2005).

Stake (2000) classifies case studies into intrinsic, instrumental, and collective case studies. He explains that intrinsic cases are conducted to gain deeper understanding of specific issues whilst instrumental case studies are used to clarify a particular phenomenon or to further advance theoretical knowledge. Lastly, and as the name suggests, collective case studies consists of two or more cases that allows for the examination and comparison of different contexts. It is argued that multiple cases strengthen research results by replicating pattern matching, thus increasing confidence in the robustness of data and theory (Yin, 2009). In this study, the case study strategy was suitable because studies on the performance of LGs in Ghana is limited and the few studies that attempt to look at performance focused on poverty reduction and issues of political participation that had no linkages to the prevailing performance management framework (See Crook 1994;Crook and Manor 1998;Yankson 2007;Crawford 2008). Hence, three LGs were purposively selected based on their sizes and geographic location. They included a Metropolitan Assembly in the Greater Accra region, a Municipal Assembly in the Brong Ahafo region and a District Assembly in the Northern region. From these local government authorities, the implementation of performance management practice and the performance enhancing policy would be considered as part of an intrinsic case.

5.4.2 Unit of analysis, selection of cases and sampling procedure

Out of a total number of 216 LGs in Ghana, 3 were purposively selected as the unit of analysis because time and resource constraints associated with the PhD project made it impractical to cover all LGs in the 10 regions of Ghana. The selected LGs comprised a Metropolitan Assembly in the South of the country, a Municipal Assembly in the middle zone and a District Assembly in the Northern region. The study infers from these LGs because primary data were collected from their officials and from communities that fall under their jurisdictions. The diversity offered by different LG authorities addresses an often cited limitation of having a single geographic case, especially in terms of generalizing research findings and decreasing the possibility of bias (Eisenhardt 1989). One way to avoid a single case bias is to adopt a multiple case-study approach. It is argued that: “Multiple cases augment external validity and help guard against observer biases. Moreover, multi-case sampling adds confidence to findings. By looking at a range of similar and contrasting cases, we can understand a single-case finding, grounding it by specifying how and where and, if possible, why it behaves as it does” (Miles and Huberman 1994).

Unlike quantitative sampling which primarily seeks to achieve representativeness of the study population, the overarching aim of qualitative sampling is to obtain rich information by selecting cases purposefully rather than randomly (Meyer 2001). Hence, an appropriate sample size is one that adequately answers the research question regardless of whether it is a single digit number or made up of several sampled units (Marshall 1996). I therefore selected 3 regions in order to keep the cases to a manageable size. Given the nature of qualitative research, the number of required respondents becomes obvious to the researcher as the study progresses, until data saturation point is reached when new categories, themes or explanations cease to emerge from the data (Marshall 1996). In this study, the selection of research participants was exclusively based on the need to engage the most suitable persons who had the requisite knowledge to answer my research questions. Participants were contacted ahead of the interviews to book appointments. Subsequently, interviews were conducted at locations that were convenient to the respondents such as their offices, and in rare cases, at their residence. In all, 41 interviews were completed in the three local government areas while 6 senior officers were interviewed in central government departments in Accra. In addition, 6 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held, 2 in each region. Participants of the FGDs were drawn from the Ghana Education Service and Unit

Committees in the study districts. Clearly, since research participants were selected on the basis of their knowledge and experience of local government performance, the heterogeneity of respondents provided valuable data because participants offered varied opinions. Furthermore, useful insights were obtained by passively participating in two general assembly meetings in the Brong Ahafo and Greater Accra regions where I observed proceedings of the highest decision making body of the LGs. This increased my understanding of the research context and the dynamics involved in managing local government performance. From this cross-section of data sources, a lot of information was gathered to answer the research questions. The next section presents details of the data collection phase of the research.

5.5 Data collection

The study used primary data obtained from selected local government authorities in addition to central government ministries, departments and agencies that have relevant information concerning the performance of LGs in Ghana. Primary data was supplemented with [quantitative] secondary data obtained from these organisations during my field work in Ghana from September 2012 to March 2013 and afterwards when it was necessary to obtain additional data. Apart from these, I widely used published and unpublished materials such as local government policies, legislative instruments, development plans and technical reports. Figure 5.1 summarises the main sources of data used in this study and highlight the unit of analysis. It also identifies participants for interviews and provides clues about secondary sources of data.

Figure 5. 1: Sources of data

Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies; Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Local Government Service Secretariat

Primary data Secondary data

Interviews with Chief Policy documents, medium Executives, Coordinating Exploratory desk term development plans,

Directors, selected heads study: Literature statutes, performance of departments review reports, minutes of meetings

Focus Group Transcribe Discussions interviews and analyse data

Author’s construct, 2014

5.5.1 Pilot study

A pilot study refers to a mini version of a full-scale study that specifically aims at pre- testing a research instrument such as a questionnaire or an interview schedule. Even though carrying out a pilot study does not automatically guarantee success in the main study, it helps researchers in their field work in many ways (van Teijlingen and Hundley 2001). Researcher(s) use pilot studies to assess the acceptability and appropriateness of data collection protocols (Perry 2001) and to self-evaluate personal readiness, capability, and commitment to carry out research (Beebe 2007). Pilot studies can also be used to train qualitative researchers to enhance the credibility of qualitative studies (Padgett 2008). For these reasons, incorporating pilot studies have become important components of a good study design capable of providing valuable insights into the research process. Through pilot studies, researchers can uncover cultural and local political issues that may affect the research process (van Teijlingen and Hundley 2001). In this study, a pilot data collection exercise was undertaken in the Upper West region of Ghana to identify practical issues that could potentially emerge during the research process. It allowed me to pre-test my time 99 management skills as I recorded and compared the duration of each interview; checked the quality of tape recordings and modified the words and sequence of some questions where appropriate. In the end, it was obvious that a pilot study can be “time-consuming, frustrating, and fraught with unanticipated problems, but it is better to deal with them before investing a great deal of time, money, and effort in the full study” (Mason and Zuercher 1995).

5.5.2 Interview schedule

A semi structured interview schedule was used to guide face to face interaction with respondents during data collection in the field. This was needed because the structure and content of interview protocols shape the kind of knowledge generated in primary research in ways consistent with the objectives of the study (Dilley 2004). The choice of semi structured interviews was appropriate because unstructured interviews can produce data that is unrelated to the performance of LGs in Ghana whilst structured questions alone may not permit further exploration of relevant issues that fall outside the domain of the research topic. Seidman (2012) emphasizes the importance of the structure of interview protocols by arguing that consciously sequencing questions in a logical order attracts the attention of respondents and engages them effectively. Whereas Seidman (2012) highlights the significance of the structure of interview protocols in particular and the interview process in general, Rubin and Rubin (2005) argue that a different set of skills - the art of hearing data - are necessary in qualitative interviewing because it allows researchers to find out what others feel and think about their own immediate ‘worlds’. The flexibility of the semi structured interview schedule made it possible to obtain insights into issues and themes that were not explicitly included in the list of interview questions. The interview instrument facilitated my understanding of events in which I neither personally participated in, nor directly experienced prior to this research. Therefore, in an attempt to achieve my research objectives, interview questions were consciously worded to elicit multifaceted information that would be ‘factual’, descriptive, and provide background information and insights into the performance of LGs in Ghana.

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5.5.3 Interviews

In qualitative studies, interviews have become a widely used technique for data collection (Heyink and Tymstra 1993). While an interview simply refers to the act of asking questions and receiving answers, there is much more to it in an academic qualitative inquiry. Planning an interview can be time consuming especially when the researcher strives to avoid mistakes in order to achieve a successful outcome. Apart from preparing adequately for the interviews, there are a number of factors worth considering right from the onset. These range from being aware of and getting prepared for unexpected behaviour of research participants and unforeseen problems associated with the interview environment, intrusion of own biases and expectations, maintaining focus by constructing and delivering the right questions, dealing with sensitive topics and transcription of recorded interviews (Roulston et al. 2003). Despite these plausible challenges, the strength of using interviews to collect data lies in its flexibility which allows the researcher to go back and forth, to probe, seek clarification and ask questions based on what has already been said (Marvasti 2010). Thus, the interview technique was appropriate for this research because the most reliable way of understanding the performance of LGs is through engaging and interacting with individual members of local government authorities or other people who have deeper insights into local government performance. This was also the most appropriate step towards understanding research participants’ construction of reality in their own contexts (Punch 2005). In line with Jones (1985: 46) :

‘in order to understand other persons’ construction of reality, we would do well to ask them…and to ask them in such a way that they can tell us in their terms (rather than those imposed rigidly and a priori by ourselves) and in a depth which addresses the rich context that is the substance of their meaning’.

Hence, in order to understand the details of performance management practices of local government authorities, face to face interviews were conducted with a wide range of participants to understand the state of local government performance. Before starting an interview, I officially introduced myself and explained the purpose of my research. In addition, research questions and objectives were explained to participants for them to know why they were selected to participate in the study. They were also informed about the research instruments used, ethical issues and the time frame for each interview. For all

101 interviewees and participants of focus group discussions, these formalities were instrumental in building rapport with them and gaining confidence and trust throughout the data collection process.

5.5.4 Expert interviews

Six interviews were held with local government experts and practitioners from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Local Government Service Secretariat, Institute of Local Government Studies and the Development Partners Sector group on Decentralisation and Local Government. Given the knowledge of these interviewees concerning the implementation of local government policy, they offered important perspectives about evaluating the performance of local governments in Ghana. This category of interviewees supplied relevant information that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain at the local government level.

5.5.5 The interview process

Before interviews were conducted, an introductory letter issued by the University of Manchester was submitted to the Local Government Service Secretariat; the official gate keepers in charge of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies in Ghana. This was a mandatory procedure for facilitating access to prospective research participants within local government authorities. Yet, there was no guarantee that the entire interview process would be successful. Even though there is still no universally accepted criterion for conducting successful interviews, the researcher was attentive to certain conditions that could affect the outcome of qualitative interviews. These factors have been summarised by Kvale (1996) and expanded by Bryman (2008: 455) as indicated in table 5.1 below.

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Table 5. 1: Prerequisites for conducting qualitative interviews

Knowledge Interviewer has extensive knowledge and familiar with the focus of the interview; pilot interviews can be useful Define purpose of the interview; show order of questions; check whether Structuring interviewees have questions to ask and know when to exit interview Ask simple, easy, short and unambiguous questions; speak distinctly and Clear understandably; avoid using academic or professional jargon Do not rush, give respondents time to think; let them finish what they are Gentle saying and tolerate pauses Listen attentively to what is said and how it is said; identify nuances in the Sensitive meaning of answers given; be empathetic in dealing with interviewees Respond to what is important to interviewees and be flexible to the Open introduction of new dimensions to the discussion and follow them up The researcher should know what to find out, and how to achieve that; Steering interrupt interviewees politely when they deviate from the discussion Seek clarification especially when there are inconsistencies in interviewees’ Critical responses Retain what participants have said in the interview and relate what is said to Remembering what has been said already Clarify and extend meanings of interviewee’s statements without imposing Interpreting meaning on them Do not talk too much in a way that makes the interviewee passive and do not Balanced talk too little to let the respondent think they are off-track Ethically Ensure that interviewees appreciate what the research is about, its purposes, sensitive and that their responses will be treated confidentially Source: Bryman (2008: 455)

Guided by these fundamental issues, each interview began with a personal introduction of the researcher and a brief overview of the study and its objectives. Respondents were also given an information sheet that summarised the study and an accompanying statement of informed consent was issued to them to sign before any interview was held. Prior to that, certain practical issues had to be dealt with. These included getting access to the top hierarchy of the LGs especially the Chief Executives (mayors), making contact with

103 prospective respondents, securing appointments and deciding on the number of data collection times. These issues were addressed by making phone calls to potential respondents and when necessary, undertaking reconnaissance visits to the study districts.

Throughout the data collection process, field work practices that are widely linked to successful research outcomes were adopted. For instance, all research participants were assured that the interviews would be tape recorded, their responses treated confidentially and their identities anonymised. In addition, field notes were often written when new perspectives that were hitherto, not thought about, were revealed. These notes were useful for personal reflections during the fieldwork and showed pointers towards issues that required to be followed up immediately. Clearly, recording interviews on tape facilitated the organisation of analytical ideas that were generated during and after the field work. To Hughes (1994), the quality or adequacy of a research project is not only the result of the questions asked or concepts used; it is also the result of keeping rigorous field notes. Hence, field notes were taken immediately after every interview to summarise key topics and issues that were raised in the interview to properly capture the respondent’s perspective. Using these notes as a memo became a vital tool for refreshing my memory throughout the field work. To Hammersley and Atkinson (1983), recording field data constitute[s] a central research activity that should be carried out with much care and self- consciousness as possible.

Indeed, the interview sessions were flexible because the semi-structured interview guide allowed me to probe further whenever respondents did not answer a question satisfactorily. Probing entailed stimulating further discussions with respondents to uncover and get a better understanding of what they meant while answering a question. This technique was used to perform two functions. First, it motivated respondents to clarify answers they gave and encouraged them to offer plausible reasons to support those answers and secondly, it enabled me to steer the interview and focus the conversation on issues that relate to the performance of LGs in the Ghanaian context. Even though my knowledge of local governance in Ghana enabled me to ask the right questions, a conscious attempt was made to limit bias on my part as a researcher and on the part of the interviewees who participated in the study. I involved as many respondents as possible in order not to have a one sided view of local government performance. For example, not only did I engage local government officials from different hierarchical levels, departments, and locations, I also interacted with a wide range of highly knowledgeable respondents (both senior and junior

104 officials) at central and local government levels because they provided diverse perspectives on local government performance. Table 5.2 presents the number of interviewees who took part in the study as well as their professional roles.

Table 5. 2: Distribution of interviewees

Title of respondent Sample prior to No of participants field work interviewed Chief Executives 3 3 Coordinating directors 3 3 Presiding members (Chairs) 3 2 Finance officers 3 3 Planning officers 3 3 Budget officers 3 3 Works engineers 3 3 Internal auditors 3 2 Directors of sanitation/ waste management 3 3 Head of personnel (HR) 3 2 Directors of education 3 2 Head teachers of primary schools 6 2 Elected assembly members 10 5 Sub-committee chairpersons 6 3 PTA chairpersons/ representatives 6 2 Total number of interviewees 51 (expected) 41 (80.4% response rate) Author’s construct, 2014

5.5.6 Focus group discussions

Focus group discussions were conducted to elicit the opinions, perceptions and everyday experiences of local residents regarding services their LGs provide. In each of the selected districts, focus group discussions (FGDS) were organised with members of unit committees to understand their perception of local government performance. It must be recalled that unit committees are the lowest sub district structure that operate at the community level with elected and appointed members. In addition, separate focus group

105 discussions were held with school management committees and parent-teacher associations in selected public basic schools at the district level. These were homogenous groups with similar features but with sufficient variations amongst participants to allow contrasting opinions (Denzin and Lincoln 2005;Ruff et al. 2005). Opinions that emerged from the focus group discussions were crucial because they represented the voice of people who live in localities where the daily lives of people are affected by local governments’ performance. In all, six (6) focus group discussions, two in each local government area was organised.

To ensure that these discussions generated relevant data, certain principles were adhered to. For instance, the researcher moderated each session by managing participants’ expectations during the discussions and paid special attention to the nature and format of questions, group size and the amount of time allocated to each session (Ruff et al. 2005). Participants of focus group discussions ranged from 6 to 10 people. For example, 6 unit committee members and 7 people representing a parent-teacher association of a primary school in the ‘A’ Metropolis participated in separate FGDs. Also, 6 unit committee members and 8 members of a PTA took part in FGDs in the ‘B’ Municipality while in the ‘C’ district, 6 unit committee members and 9 members of a school management committee participated in two separate FGDs. Combining data from FGDs with interview data reduces individual bias since a variety of opinions from group interactions complemented interview data. By allowing respondents to consult each other during discussions, the knowledge and experience shared by participants significantly contributed to our understanding of local government performance in the Ghanaian context.

5.5.7 Observation

Observing individual behaviour and organisational processes has a long tradition in qualitative research (Bryman 2008). In a naturalistic observation, the researcher neither manipulates nor stimulates the behaviour of research participants in contrast to some other data collection techniques (Punch 2005). In this study, some events, activities and projects were observed to confirm the views of research participants. The researcher participated in general assembly meetings of two local government authorities where key deliberative and legislative procedures were observed and recorded. It also helped the interpretation of data in relation to questions that were asked during the field work. In addition to focusing on internal local government administrative practices, observation was used as a triangulation 106 device to verify claims of physical infrastructure and social services provided in local communities. Observed behaviours and unexpected incidents that occurred during individual interviews and focus group discussions were also documented in field memos. Apart from complementing other sources of data, ‘observational data’ were helpful in describing, analysing and interpreting the findings of the study.

5.5.8 Secondary data

Secondary data in this study refers to data generated by government ministries, departments and agencies that exist independent of this research. Found in quantitative and qualitative forms, such data are often produced for purposes of management, planning and evaluation (Cowton 1998). The main advantage of using secondary data is because it requires less time to collect given that they already exist prior to collecting primary data. More often, secondary data complements primary data, making up for the shortfalls of the other or providing confirmation. This complementarity is seen as data ‘triangulation’ with a potential of increasing the credibility of research findings (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2007). For these reasons, several official documents such as policy statements, legislative instruments, operational manuals, reports and planning guidelines were obtained from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development in Ghana, the Institute of Local Government Studies and from the Local Government Service Secretariat. In addition to these, development plans, budgets and performance review reports of the 3 selected local government authorities that participated in this study were collected and analysed.

5.5.9 Document analysis

There are two perspectives concerning the use of documents in qualitative research. The first perspective assumes that documents can reveal an underlying social reality within a given context. In this sense, it is presumed that documents produced by organisations such as minutes of meetings, mission statements, organisational charts, newsletters and annual reports represent the reality of that organisation because they reveal what goes on within an organisation and may give hints about the culture, values and ethos of organisations. According to this perspective, documents are ‘windows onto social and organisational realities (Bryman 2008: 526). On the contrary, Atkinson and Coffey (2010) contend that documents should be viewed as having a distinct reality in their own right. They argue that documents should be examined within the context in which they were written and with

107 regard to their readership. This implies that documents are significant only when they accomplish the purpose for which they were produced. Atkinson and Coffey (2010) emphasise that ‘inter-textuality’ or connections between documents should be made to gain a better understanding of their content.

In this research, archival resources consisting of official records and documents were analysed to understand how LGs in Ghana manage their performance. These materials were used as secondary data sources since they provided data that were not specifically gathered for this thesis. Silverman (2011) has provided a catalogue of documents as consisting of files, statistical records, records of official proceedings and images. Guba and Lincoln (1992) however make a distinction between documents and records. They define records as written statements prepared by an individual or an agency to account for or proof the occurrence of an event. Examples of records in this sense include business registration permits issued by local government authorities, minutes of meetings, and speeches of chief executives during general assembly meetings, and audit reports among others. According to Guba and Lincoln (1992), a document refers to any written material other than a record that was not prepared specifically in response to some request from the researcher. In the context of this study, these include publications - both academic and non- academic- as well as policy related documents of local government authorities such as medium term development plans, proposals for the development and transformation of urban areas, service and public infrastructure contracts that have implications on the performance of local government authorities but were not prepared purposely for this research. These documents were collated from key central government agencies that exercise oversight responsibilities over local government authorities while others were obtained from the selected local government authorities involved in this study.

5.6 Data analysis and interpretation

This section presents how data was analysed to address the research questions. Analysing and interpreting qualitative data can be a challenge because qualitative research generates vast database due to its reliance on research participant’s lived experiences expressed in field notes, interview transcripts and documents (Bryman 2008:538). To Miles (1975), qualitative data is an ‘attractive nuisance’ because despite the attractiveness of its richness, it can be difficult to find analytic paths through that richness. Thus, I tried to guard against being captivated by the richness of data at the expense of showing the broader significance 108 of the data that was collected from the field. To Lincoln and Guba (1985), this stage of the research process is crucial because it produces and illuminates respondents’ realities. Denzin (1994:502) describes data analysis and interpretation in qualitative research as:

“An art; [that] is not formulaic or mechanical [but] can be learned, like any form of storytelling only through doing . . . Fieldworkers can neither make sense of nor understand what has been learned until they sit down and write the interpretive text, telling the story first to themselves, and then to their significant others, and then to the public”.

Taking this quotation into consideration and to find an analytical path for this study, some immediate steps were taken after field work to lay the foundation for data analysis. For instance, interview tapes were transcribed and coded using a template to structure and organise the data in a manner that answered certain basic questions by clarifying who said what, why they said what was said, how it was said, where and when a particular response was made. Grouping the data in this format was a necessary step for generating themes, interpreting and understanding the data within the context of the study. Details of post field work data management procedures are presented in the ensuing sections.

5.6.1 Post field work data cleaning and transcription

Upon the completion of field work, the first analytic activity was to immerse myself in the data by critically listening to each interview tape while transcribing alongside. Data were transcribed and organized according to the description and status of research participants and grouped on the basis of their responses to questions during the semi-structured interviews. This way, the views of different interviewees such as Chief Executives, heads of departments, assembly members (councillors) and opinions that emerged from focus group discussions were organised and analysed in their own right. Transcripts for focus group discussions were however separated from interview transcripts. As Mergenthaler and Stinson (1992:129-30) advised, certain guiding principles were followed throughout the transcription process that were meant to:

1) Preserve the morphologic naturalness of transcripts: By keeping word forms and commentaries as close as possible to speech and ensure they are consistent with what is typically acceptable in written text.

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2) Preserve the naturalness of transcript structure: Keeping text clearly structured by speech markers. 3) Made transcripts an exact reproduction of speech: Generating a verbatim account rather than prematurely reducing text. 4) Transcription rules were universal and complete: Transcripts could be used manually or with a computer and were written in non-technical everyday language.

Adhering to these considerations during the transcription phase was important for two reasons. Firstly, it made it possible for me to ‘engross’ myself into the data. Secondly, I acquired a better contextual understanding of respondents’ perspectives about local government performance. Respondents’ views were critically examined to identify significant statements, phrases, sentences, or paragraphs that related directly to their perception and knowledge of performance. Transcription of interviews was both thematic and dynamic (Kvale 1996). Thematic in the sense that answers that were given to each question was classified using a specific theme and dynamic because both explicit and remote connections between responses were drawn using simple and clear words. The next section presents how data were analysed and interpreted.

5.6.2 Coding and categorization of themes

Coding was used to start off analysing data but the procedure went on throughout the period of data analysis. It is considered as ‘the fundamental analytic process used by the researcher (Corbin and Strauss 1990 : 12). This phase of the study was crucial because it served as the intersection for translating interview transcripts into meaningful forms. Computer assisted qualitative analysis software, Nvivo 9 was used to code and subsequently organise the data. Coding was both descriptive and inferential. Codes were used as tags to label pieces of data during the early phase of the analysis and to form specific groups of themes based on patterns inferred from the descriptive codes. Labels were assigned to pieces of data to give them meaning and to provide a basis for storing and retrieving the views of respondents. It also enhanced higher level coding by pulling together themes and recognising patterns and generating sub headings (Punch 2005).

Open coding was done in the early stages of data analysis. This involved reading and examining interview transcripts to identify and label specific words and phrases that 110 pointed to specific questions asked during the interviews. Responses were then compared for similarities and differences. The frequency of code occurrence and their connections with others were identified. This way, categories and sub categories were created and assembled. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), open coding is the part of analysis that pertains specifically to the naming and categorising of phenomena through close examination of data, and that during open coding, the data are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined, compared for similarities and differences, and the following questions are asked :

1) What is this piece of data an example of? 2) What does the data stand for or represent? 3) What category or property of a category does this piece of data indicate?

Asking these questions continuously facilitated the concurrent use of memos to record and sort out ideas emerging from the analysis. To Miles and Huberman (1994:72), memos consist of writing up ideas and their relationship as they strike the analyst while coding…it can be a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages whereas Punch (2005) argues that memoing could be theoretical, methodological or even personal and can point out new patterns emerging from the data analysis. Memoing in this study followed Miles and Huberman’s perspective by providing additional information about activities, strategies, events, projects, and relationships to unearth the underlying meaning of participants’ responses.

At the initial stages of data analysis, many small pieces of data were labelled provisionally until a stable view of the central issues was established. An important feature of the coding process was to make constant comparisons while asking the 3 questions enumerated above to raise the conceptual level of the analysis. This yielded concepts which were later grouped into loose categories (Bryman 2008). Using what Strauss and Corbin described as axial coding, data were regrouped and reorganised by making connections between categories (1990: 96). This was achieved by linking codes to real world phenomena such as procedures involved in managing LG performance, the formulation of performance indicators and development plans and the use of performance information. This way, patterns of interactions emerging from the categories, their consequences and potential causes were observed (Bryman 2008). An important stage was reached in the analysis when focused coding was done by selecting core categories and systematically relating them to other categories, validating emerging relationships and filling categories that 111 needed further refinement (Strauss and Corbin 1990). The aim at this stage was to identify central issues after integrating other categories to create what Strauss and Corbin refer to as ‘a story line that frames an account’. To Chamaz (2006), focused coding allows a qualitative analyst to generate new ideas by being open minded as possible. Because focused coding highlights and puts emphasis on the most common codes or those that are seen to be more revealing about the data, some initial codes were dropped as illustrated in table 5.3. This was necessary because the interpretive nature of the study required the researcher to constantly ‘make sense’ of the data. The process of reducing data through coding is depicted in table 5.3 below.

Table 5. 3: The coding process

Initial Identify specific Label text to Reduce overlap Identify patterns reading of text segments create (Nvivo coding) and emergent transcripts related to categories themes objectives

Many pages Many segments 10 to 15 5 to 10 3 to 5 categories of text of text categories categories Adapted from Creswell (2002)

5.6.3 Thematic analysis of transcripts

Qualitative researchers produce loads of data which can sometimes be difficult for them to construct ‘a meaningful story’ (Ellis 1995). There have been instances where researchers feel ‘overwhelmed and terrified’ without knowing where and how to begin analysing data they have collected (Kiesinger 1998:84). To avoid this situation, broad themes were initially generated from the transcripts to allow meaningful analysis and interpretation of data. Thematic analysis is a ‘tried and tested’ method of analysis in qualitative research largely as a result of its appeal in capturing the complexities of meaning within textual data sets. To Ryan and Bernard (2003:86) ‘themes are only visible through the manifestation of expressions in data’. This expression, according to McCormack (2000) requires viewing interview transcripts through multiple lenses which involves:

1) Immersing oneself in the manuscript through a process of active listening; 2) Identifying the narrative processes used by the respondent; 3) Paying attention to the language of the text; 112

4) Acknowledging the context in which the text was produced; and 5) Identifying moments in the text where something unexpected is happening.

Meanwhile, it is not straight forward to robustly analyse interview transcripts because themes may appear to be abstract or fuzzy constructs. To Ryan and Bernard (2003:87), a researcher will know a theme when they are able to answer the questions, ‘what is this expression an example of’? Answering this question involved looking for broad themes and constructs that linked different expressions in a meaningful way. Ryan and Bernard (2003:88) have argued that “themes can be derived from different sources, notably from raw data or from the researcher’s prior theoretical understanding of the subject under investigation”. This means that the former refers to themes that originate from data and may have an empirical basis while the latter involves professional definitions found in literature reviews or from local, common-sense constructs and from researcher’s values, theoretical orientations, and personal experiences. In the words of Strauss and Corbin (1990), this is called ‘theoretical sensitivity’. In this study, the generation of themes had two main origins the first of which was influenced by the existing literature on organisational performance whilst the second was directly drawn from interview data. Because interviews were tape recorded and transcribed, generating themes from multiple sources laid a solid foundation while at the same time, it allowed some flexibility to thoroughly analyse and interpret data beyond respondents’ answers to interview questions. Ryan and Bernard (2003:88-94) have noted that looking for themes in interview transcripts and other written materials involves more than just reading repetitively and marking with coloured ink but also looking out for the factors outlined in box 5. 1.

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Box 5. 1: List of hints from interview transcripts

Repetitions : Topics that occur and recur or are 'recurring regularities'

Indigenous typologies: Local terms and expressions that sound unfamiliar or are used in unfamiliar ways. Such 'indigenous typologies' can be contrasted with 'analyst typologies'

Metaphor and analogies: Analyse text by looking for metaphors even when they are used rhetorically and deduce themes to understand those metaphors.

Transitions: Naturally occurring shifts in content of respondent's opinions occasioned by pauses in speech, changes in mood and tone of voice.

Similarities and differences: Making systematic comparisons across units of data by asking, what is this sentence about and how similar to or different is it from the preceding or following statements? Is there any difference in degree or in kind that might lead to sub- themes? Comparing answers to questions across people, space and time by asking, what does this remind me of?

Linguistic connections: Examining connections between words by focusing on words like ‘because’, 'since', and 'as a result of' which often point to causal connections in the minds of respondents. Words and phrases such as 'if' or 'then', 'rather than' and 'instead of' often signify conditional relations. Time oriented relationships are expressed with words such as 'before', 'after', 'then' and 'next' among others.

Missing data: By asking questions about what interviewees may have omitted in their answers to questions and reflecting and scrutinising expressions in the data that are not already associated with a theme.

Theory-related material: Examining the context and respondents' perspectives using social scientific concepts as a springboard for themes.

Source: Ryan and Bernard (2003: 88-94)

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To process the data, a simple template was developed to determine who said what, why they said it and within what context (Silverman 2010). Word lists and Key Words in Contexts (KWIC) technique was used to count various responses to questions and issues that emerged from the transcripts (Bernard and Ryan 2010). The aim was to create themes using data labels and descriptors that are linked to the study’s objectives. The data labels and categories were then sorted in the form of themes and sub-headings to answer the research questions. These were further analysed, expanded, interpreted and presented in the form of headings and sub headings in the empirical chapters. Hence, the process of analysing and interpreting data was driven by the data itself. It is important to emphasise that field notes and memos were useful for the analysis of data because points that were written down during the data collection phase served as filters for determining themes worthy of examining and interpreting.

5.7 Ethical considerations

It is important to be mindful of ethical issues while conducting research in organisational studies because data collection involves human beings who are often required to share information that may intrude into their personal lives or expose ‘organisational secrets’. Thus, researchers are increasingly required to adhere to ethical standards in data collection and reporting, especially in qualitative studies because such studies often focus on sensitive, intimate and innermost aspects of peoples’ lives. To Punch (2005: 276), ethical issues in social science disciplines can be categorised into 2 main types. The first one relates to codes of professional and ethical conduct for research assignments laid down by universities or research institutions such as the University of Manchester, the European Social Science Research Council (ESRC) or the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) amongst others. The second category refers to conventions and research best practices found in the literature especially those that offer commentaries and recommendations for social science research in general or specific disciplines as covered in Miles and Huberman (1994) and Denzin and Lincoln (2011) to mention a few.

It is expected that ethical guidelines will enable researchers to deal with issues that concern the rights and welfare of research participants and remind researchers about obligations to their respondents. Being ethically sensitive helped me to prepare against issues that could arise at any stage of the research process with ethical implications. Therefore, in order to

115 situate the study on a sound ethical foundation, I duly obtained ethical approval from the School Ethics Advisory Group (SEAG) after my application was reviewed in accordance with the University of Manchester’s requirements for ethically-sensitive research. Potential risk factors associated with the study were assessed and the techniques and research protocols approved. It is important to state that respondents were informed and assured that participating in the study was entirely voluntary and their involvement would not expose them to physical injury, harm, or invasion of privacy. They were also assured that the views they expressed and the LGs they were affiliated with shall be anonymised. The assurance to uphold high levels of confidentiality by preserving the identities of respondents was necessary to build trust throughout the data collection process. Hence, conscious effort was made to avoid incidents that could have adverse ethical implications at any given stage of the research process. As shown in table 5.4, Miles and Huberman’s (1994) criteria for evaluating the ethical status of research projects was used as a checklist. This checklist raises fundamental questions that could have ethical repercussions at different stages of the research process. Table 5.4 shows an illustration.

Table 5. 4: Ethical factors and accompanying questions

Before field work Ethical questions Is the study worth doing? Will it contribute in some significant Worth of the research way (policy, publication opportunities, and my career?) Do I have the expertise to carry out a study of good quality Competence boundaries and am I prepared to study, to be supervised, trained or consulted, to get that expertise? And is such help available? Do the people I want to study have full information about Informed consent what the study is about, and what it involves? Is their consent to participate freely given? Is there a hierarchy of consent? Benefits, costs, What will each party in the study gain from taking part in the reciprocity study? Do they have to invest time, energy or money? During field work What might this study do to hurt the people involved? How Harm and risk likely is it that such harm will occur? What is my relationship with the people that I want to study? Honesty and trust Am I telling the truth and do we trust each other? Privacy, confidentiality In what ways will the study intrude, or come closer to people

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and anonymity than they want? How will information be guarded and how identifiable are the individuals and organisations studied? What do I do when I see a harmful, illegal or wrongful Intervention and behaviour by others during a study? Should I speak for advocacy anyone’s interests besides my own and whose interest do I advocate? After field work Is my study being conducted carefully, thoughtfully and Research integrity and correctly in terms of some reasonable set of standards and quality under supervision? Who owns my field notes and analyses; me, my university or Ownership of data and my sponsors? And once my thesis is written and completed, conclusions who controls its diffusion? Do I have the obligation to help my findings to be used Use and misuse of results appropriately? What if they are used harmfully or wrongly?

Source: Miles and Huberman (1994)

It is important to admit that resolving the questions that accompany the ethical issues above is not simple. Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that any attempt to address these ethical issues typically involve dilemmas and conflicts, and that negotiated trade-offs are often needed rather than the applications of strict rules. In this study, a heightened awareness of these issues made the whole research exercise ethically sensitive and a major source of academic confidence.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter outlines the study’s methodology. It presents the philosophical orientation of the study and the rationale for adopting a qualitative approach. Even though qualitative and non-probabilistic methods were used, quantitative secondary data are instrumental in this study. The research takes a constructivist and interpretivist philosophical position because local government performance can mean different things to different people. This is further justified by the fact that performance cannot be universally defined a priori but rather depends on the context in which it is socially constructed (Brewer 2010). This is often the

117 case in the public sector. Therefore, this research was not influenced by the assumptions of positivists that research can be pre-determined, value free and neutral because a constructivist approach assumes that realities are multiple and relies on human interactions, life experiences of research participants and how the researcher interprets those experiences.

Furthermore, the chapter outlined the research design which is based on a case study strategy. It involves 3 selected local government authorities from three geographically dispersed regions, notably a Metropolitan Assembly in the Greater Accra region, a Municipal Assembly in the Brong Ahafo region and a District Assembly in the northern region. Thus, LGs are the unit of analyses in this study. The chapter also presents primary sources of data such as interviews and focus group discussions as well as secondary sources of data. Details of activities such as ethical clearance and pilot studies that preceded the actual field work are also described. This is followed by a description and presentation of activities after the field work of the study was completed. The next chapter tackles the first objective of the study by examining performance management practices of local government authorities in Ghana and to understand how the national development policy environment shapes the management of LG performance.

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Chapter 6: Analysis and discussion of local government performance management practices

“The task of measuring and assessing performance in local government depends very much on who you are, what you want and where you stand in the scheme of things” (Jackson, 1984:25)

6.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the first research objective which seeks to understand how local government authorities evaluate and manage organisational performance in Ghana and what shapes their performance. It begins by examining the mission of local government authorities and LG officials’ multiple interpretations of performance. Understanding practitioners’ perspectives indicates that LG performance could be interpreted in terms of departmental roles as well as LG activities, services and projects that have been prioritised and set out for implementation in Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs). The formulation of performance indicators, medium term development plans and the intersection between national development policy and local government performance are analysed in this chapter. Development plans of LGs are analysed in detail to understand their performance management practices and the extent to which LG priorities are influenced by the national development policy framework.

From the analyses of data, performance management practices of LGs are grouped into two categories. The first consists of internal administrative practices such as management meetings used to discuss LG policy where heads of departments update LG managers on the status of work such as the implementation of projects and also deliberate on strategies to improve upon organisational performance. The second category involves external agencies such as the RCCs, NDPC, MLGRD and the DACF secretariat that supervise local government authorities. It was evident that intergovernmental relations between central and LGs did shape how LGs manage their performance in contrast to the expectation of LG autonomy. The ensuing sections analyses and discusses mechanisms for managing local government performance in Ghana but it starts by exploring the local government’s interpretations of performance.

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6.2 Understanding the mission of local government authorities and bureaucrats’ perception of performance

Analysing the performance of local governments in Ghana anchors on statutory functions assigned to them under the 1992 constitution. These functions are expressed in broad goals - mission and vision statements - that outline their expectations for the future. According to goal theorists, organisations that clarify their goals are likely to create a common vision amongst employees, management and other stakeholders (Senko et al. 2011). It is believed that since a well-managed local authority should know what it wants to achieve and when it is successful, its performance management processes should be linked to the authority’s aims and should show whether, and how these aims are being met (Audit Commission and IDeA 2002). To Rainey and Steinbauer (1999), external stakeholders and members of an organisation should interactively establish the organisation’s mission by connecting its purpose to its goals. In a local government context, it is ideal to build consensus by integrating and aligning the aspirations of various constituencies into the mission of LGs so that assessing the process of organisational performance can be harmonised. This is however not the case in Ghana because the mission and vision statements of LGs are embedded in the local government law 1993 (Act 462). Thus, mission statements of all the LGs in this study, as indicated in chapter 2, explicitly focused on improving the public good. Yet, because local communities whom LGs serve do not have a role in formulating these mission statements, it affects ordinary people’s knowledge about LG’s obligations to them and weakens citizens’ demand for accountability as discussed in this chapter and subsequent chapters.

Whereas the local government law in Ghana defines the functions of LGs based on which organisational performance could be interpreted, technocrats at the national level understood performance as the contribution of their directorates to the goals of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. This view was expected because respondents were subject to the Public Service Performance Management Policy that was introduced in 1997. The policy had a component for assessing the performance of senior staff of the civil service such as Chief Directors for government ministries as well as Directors at the RCCs. Similar views were expressed at the district level where local government officials described performance as the contribution of individual employees to the achievement of departmental goals and how this ultimately translates into the achievement of organisational goals. In practice, Chief Directors and Coordinating

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Directors, who are usually the most senior civil servants within the local government bureaucracy, assign tasks and performance targets to their subordinates. Yet, monitoring employee performance is irregular and less documented. Even for Coordinating Directors and Chief Executives who sign performance agreements with regional ministers, enforcing such agreements has been ineffective due to weak monitoring systems (Adei and Boachie- Danquah 2003). This affects the performance culture within local government authorities.

Ironically, signing performance agreements was an integral part of the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme introduced in the 1990s but its impact on LGs was minimal compared to central government ministries and State Owned Enterprises (Ayee 2001;Ohemeng 2009). When staff of the LGs were asked to explain the frequency of their performance assessments, it was surprising that they could not recall the last time they participated in a performance appraisal. No wonder a recent study concluded that employee performance appraisal in Ghana is ineffective to improve the attitudes and productivity of civil servants (Bawole et al. 2013). Nonetheless, LG officials acknowledged that individual performance assessments are only necessary for employee promotion rather than ascertaining how they impact upon organisational performance. A research participant noted that:

“Members of staff are aware that the performance appraisal system is used during promotion interviews and not to determine their everyday performance which is impossible for the Chief Executives and the Directors to do. People are mostly busy and it is assumed that whatever they do is part of their job description” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘C’ District Assembly]

Indeed, the above quotation suggests the need to undertake individual performance appraisal on a regular basis. This is particularly important because LG officials presume that their work automatically fall under their official tasks and for that reason do not warrant routine assessment. It is difficult to sustain such assumptions in a public organisation where less supervision increases the possibility of carrying out activities that may not be professionally acceptable nor approved by management (Antwi and Analoui 2008).

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When elected Assembly members and Chief Executives were asked about their own performance, they avoided being ‘judges in their own courts’ and refrained from talking about their own performance; a function they felt should be left to citizens or residents in their communities to determine. In their view, the performance of LG is the extent to which decisions made during General Assembly meetings are implemented effectively. Assembly Members and Chief Executives who were serving their full tenure in office indicated that any assessment of their performance needs to cover a period of four years - consistent with their tenure of office. This realistically makes it possible to confirm whether campaign pledges Assembly Members and Chief Executives made before serving in public office had been fulfilled. It therefore comes as no surprise that many LGs strive to provide physical development facilities to fill infrastructure gaps in local communities since such tangible projects are easy for the electorate to verify. Provision of services by the local authorities have therefore become the commonest way of determining whether they perform their functions or not.

Whereas respondents’ opinions about performance covered both individual and organisational spheres, this study focuses on organisational performance and not individual performance. This is because organisational performance is the focus of local government policy in Ghana. It is therefore vital to identify and analyse mechanisms LGs employ to manage organisational performance. According to the National Development Planning Commission (2009), LG performance assessment should reflect the extent to which proposed programmes, projects and activities have been implemented to determine whether they were fully implemented, partially implemented, on-going or not implemented at all. And that performance assessment should focus on the extent to which set goals, objectives and targets have been achieved and indicate reasons for any deviation or failure and if possible, identify measures and actions that have been taken to address implementation problems. Verifying the extent to which these conditions are met require detail analysis of how LG set goals and performance indicators since they form the basis for managing organisational performance.

6.3 Operationalising performance of local governments

It is intuitive to analyse the performance of LGs on the basis of their statutory functions. Performance can also be studied by focusing on internal operations such as financial performance and revenue mobilisation as well as local government outputs (Crook and 122

Manor, 1998: 8). This implies that evaluating local government performance goes beyond intra organisational processes and capabilities by attempting to show whether the transfer of authority, resources, and responsibility work in ways that meet local priorities (Smoke and Oluwu, 1992). In the Ghanaian context, the analysis of LG performance is done within the scope of statutory functions assigned to LGs. However, because it is impractical to capture all the functions of LGS in one study, the analysis of performance management practices in this thesis is done in two layers; the first one is limited to administrative roles (processes) LGs perform while the second layer focuses on substantive performance with respect to service delivery. The first category, which focuses on internal administrative procedures, involves supervisory agencies and activities that may not have a direct effect on local communities. It thus highlights “how” LGs operate. On the other hand, the substantive performance category describes “what” LGs have done in terms of projects and programmes that have a direct impact on citizens. These tangible outputs and services include activities such as the maintenance of roads, construction of schools, market places and the provision of water and sanitary services. But even before these process and substantive approaches to analysing LG performance can be harnessed, it is important to understand the fundamental issues that explain the performance of LGs.

6.3.1 Formulation of performance indicators: Whose responsibility?

The analysis of LGs performance in Ghana can be approached from two perspectives. The first one considers LGs as an extension of central government and the second views LGs as servants of citizens in local communities. This implies that LGs as agents have more than one principal to serve. Contrary to the underlying logic of decentralisation, LGs appear to be an offshoot of the central government rather than being an autonomous unit that serve the general public. The influence of central government (CG) over LGs cannot be underestimated given that Chief Executives (the equivalent of mayors) and 30% of LG councillors are nominated and appointed by the President of the Republic of Ghana. In addition, the over reliance of LGs on central government grants creates a relationship that makes it difficult for local communities and ordinary citizens to set performance targets for their LGs. As people who directly benefit from and are affected by the work of LGs, one would have expected that at least, their elected representatives to the LGs would have had a voice in formulating performance indicators for LGs to fulfil. On the contrary, indicators that guide the performance of LGs are not locally generated as they are shaped by guidelines developed and disseminated by the NDPC to all LGs throughout the country. 123

6.3.2 Intersections between national development policy and local government performance

The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) is constitutionally mandated to advise the President on matters of development planning, policy and strategy. It also issues planning guidelines to sector Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) including LGs for every planning cycle. Since the NDPC was established in 1995, it has developed four (4) different national development policies each of which aspired to transform Ghana into a middle income country. The first national development strategy the commission prepared was known as the Ghana Vision 2020. This was subsequently replaced by the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) in 2003. The aim of the strategy was ‘to ensure sustainable equitable growth, accelerate poverty reduction and protect the vulnerable and the excluded within a decentralized, democratic environment’ (NDPC 2003).

In 2005, the GPRS I was modified into a Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II). The focus of the second strategy was “to accelerate economic growth and achieve the status of a middle-income country within a measurable planning period”(NDPC 2005: I). Despite claims that Ghana has become a low middle income country (Moss and Majerowicz 2012) , the current government of Ghana upon assuming office after the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections formulated a new national development policy framework known as the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) to advance its ‘Better Ghana Agenda’. Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies at the national level, RCCs at the regional level as well as Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) nationwide are required to implement this policy by initiating and supporting projects and programmes consistent with the themes and priorities of the national development blueprint. The GSGDA (2010-2013) represents the first phase of a coordinated programme which forms the basis for the preparation of development plans and annual budgets at the sector and district levels throughout the country (NDPC 2010).

Just like previous medium term development frameworks, the current national development policy contains macro and micro level goals that require LGs to align their plans in accordance with the themes of the policy. For example, LG plans are expected to focus on, but not limited to enhancing private sector competitiveness; agricultural modernization and natural resource management; infrastructure, energy and human settlements development; human development, employment and productivity and promote 124 transparent and accountable governance. But in practice, translating these national policy objectives at the LG level involves activities such as creating an enabling environment for small scale businesses to operate, expanding access to basic needs such as potable water, heath, education and sanitation facilities, reducing geographic disparities in the distribution of infrastructure and improving transparency and accountability in the use of public funds. While these ideals are undoubtedly vital, persistent calls for LGs to comply with the directives and guidelines of the NDPC undermines the essence of adopting a bottom up approach to development planning at the LG level. How this affects goal setting in development planning processes of local government authorities is discussed in the next section.

6.3.3 Medium term development plans at sub-national level

Mainstreaming development planning into local government administration is believed to have a positive effect on organisational outcomes (Bochie 2000). In Ghana, LGs are the highest planning authorities at the sub national level. Thus, LGs use guidelines from the NDPC to formulate their Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs) which have a lifespan of 3-4 years. Aligning these plans to the national development policy framework appears to limit the extent to which the MTDPs are grounded on local needs but policy makers are of the view that adhering to the NDPC’s guidelines ensures harmony and uniformity in LG’s attempt to meet national development targets. It is also perceived that adopting similar guidelines makes it easier to evaluate and compare performance.

In practice, the extent to which LGs implement activities, projects and programmes from their plans is crucial for understanding their performance. This view was reiterated by development planning officers who claimed that MTDPs are a product of development needs and aspirations of local communities. Obviously, plans had accompanying budgets that outlined the objectives of LGs and provided the basis for allocating resources to achieve certain objectives. Additionally, the use of plans enabled LG managers to take decisions between alternative options on the basis of information rather than relying on intuition alone (Boyne 2010). In the Ghanaian context, MTDPs are formulated by a Development Planning and Coordinating Unit (DPCU) which is headed by a Coordinating Director and a Development Planning Officer serving as Secretary. Across the study areas, it was found that different heads of decentralised departments constituted the DPCU. This is intended to encouraged team work, harmony and inter-sectoral coordination. The need to 125 build consensus amongst different stakeholders in formulating LG plans and budgets is widely noted (Ayee, 2008; Mensah, 2005; Yankson, 2007).

Meanwhile, it is important to indicate that in complying with the NDPC’s planning guidelines, LGs attempt in varying degrees to promote bottom up decision making by incorporating Community Action Plans into Area Council Plans which are then infused into the Medium Term Development Plans of LGs. However, this bottom up approach to planning faces serious setbacks due to the absence of sub-district structures, particularly area/zonal, town councils and unit committees in many districts. In the few places where these sub-structures exist, they are unable to function properly for lack of funds (Yankson 2007). For these reasons, residents of local communities do not feel motivated to develop Community Action Plans (CAPs) because they have no hope such plans will bring about any meaningful development to their communities. There is also a perception that managers of LGs are unwilling to listen to local sentiments about development needs and priorities. Apathy towards community level consultations in particular and decentralised planning process in general is affirmed by Ayee (2004) who observes that public hearings neither stimulate discussions that directly concern local communities nor generate debate on issues understood by the public. This results in a sense of disinterest and lack of ownership amongst local residents when public hearings are held. In the northern regions of Ghana, it was noted that pilot projects have been implemented in the ‘C’ district to strengthen sub-district structures to address this problem by facilitating effective development planning; yet, such initiatives could not be sustained after donor funds run out1.

Respondents were explicit that stakeholder dialogues such as community fora and town hall meetings are encouraged; yet, these consultations are more likely to be used to elicit simple community needs rather than collect inputs into LG plans and budgets. Focus group discussions revealed that budget hearings were rarely held in local communities and this further raises doubt about local governments’ commitment to transparency and accountability in financial management. It was reported that officials of LGs selected secondary towns to organise community meetings to the neglect of remote villages. It was also confirmed that community consultations were rarely held in the district capitals

1 The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development introduced the Northern Region Poverty Reduction Programme (NORPREP) and the Community Based Rural Development Programme (CBRDP) to support local governments to prepare action plans based on local community priorities (MTDP:‘C’ District Assembly).

126 because officials who often lived in those ‘urban’ settlements claimed to know more about development problems in those areas. Development planning officers attributed LG’s inability to organise broad based citizen’s consultations to inadequate funds downplaying the fact that continued failure to facilitate LG-citizens dialogue could undermine transparent and accountable governance at the local level. Given the range of potential stakeholders at the local government level as shown in box 6.1 below, one would expect that holding regular and continuous consultations will not only promote consensus but will also enrich the quality of debate and decision making to support LG performance.

Box 6. 1: Stakeholders at the local government level

Category Stakeholders Assembly employees including heads of departments Members of the Executive Committee Internal Members of sub-committees Planning and Coordinating Unit The General Assembly including the Presiding Member RCC and NDPC/ Central government where necessary The Private Sector (such as Transport Unions) Donor Agencies External NGOs and CBOs The media Traditional authorities Traders and market women groups The general public Source: author, based on data compiled from MTDPs.

Indeed, external stakeholders would have to be involved in LG planning processes to ensure that LG priorities represent a wider constituency. This is necessary because in practice, the MTDPs play a central role in LG planning processes. This can be conceived as an iterative process as illustrated in figure 6.2. For instance, based on the national development framework, it is conceived that LGs are placed on a strategic path defined by the central government since the MTDPs serve as instruments through which LGs contribute to the attainment of national policy goals. Even though in practice these plans are supposed to be the cornerstones for continuous performance improvement, LG officials emphasised the implementation of projects outlined in their development plans without explicitly having a clear plan for performance improvement. Figure 6.1 illustrates linkages between the GSGDA and LG plans and shows how they shape LG planning and interpretation of organisational performance.

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Figure 6. 1: Cycle of local government planning process

Continuous improvement Goal setting at the national level (GSGDA)

How do we intend to do better? What do we want to achieve or change?

Plans, monitoring and performance review

How will we know how we are doing?

LG plans and strategies

How do we intend to do this?

Source: author’s construct, 2014

Figure 6.1 illustrates that goal setting by LGs is influenced by broader goals prescribed under the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDS). It also shows that at the centre of the interaction between national and local level policy making, LGs undertake routine planning and review of performance to identify development problems and revise performance objectives accordingly. For example, LGs conduct quarterly performance reviews which are documented and reported to the RCCs to be submitted at the national level. Complying with this kind of administrative reporting provides evidence on the number of planned LG projects that have been implemented. However, it was found that reporting the status of project implementation masks some important constraints that confront LGs in implementing the MTDP. For instance, Development planning officers believed that successful LG performance will depend on the quality and depth of MTDPs, availability of funds and the extent to which plans are implemented effectively. An interviewee in the Brong Ahafo region indicated that:

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“We assess ourselves based on the plans that we draw up; and then at the end of the year, we prepare something we call annual progress report or annual performance report to see whether we have achieved our targets or not. By doing this, we review our strategies and plough back lessons into future strategies” [Field data; interview transcript from ‘B’ Municipality].

This statement confirms that development planning has become widely accepted and mainstreamed into local government administration. A review of MTDPs revealed that LG performance indicators were generally progressive and futuristic in nature in a way that focused more on inputs and outputs compared to outcomes. While focusing on performance outcome would require the incorporation of peoples’ expectations into LG plans, the views from focus group discussions concerning the de-emphasis of LG outcomes in MTDPs was contrary to the opinions of local government officials. For instance, LG officials claimed that adherence to MTDPs represented their commitment to the improvement of LG delivery of social services. However, this was completely rejected by a unit committee member who reiterated that:

“We do not even know the content of their plans and this is mostly the case when you are not a member of the assembly. So when they say they plan to improve basic services, we will challenge them because they do what they like with the money they receive [presumably from external sources]. Since they do not come to tell us what they have done [achieved], how can we know whether they are working to please us”? [Field data: FGD transcript from ‘C’ District].

This rhetorical question indicates the divergent interpretation of citizens and local government bureaucrats’ understanding of the relevance of MTDPs. Indeed, the MTDPs of LGs were reviewed to examine the extent to which their content was influenced by the national development policy framework (tables 6.1 and 6.2). The MTDPs explicitly outline baseline information about the local authorities, the problems they face and the priorities they have for implementing development projects in local communities. This is why the MTDPs are a useful source of data for analysing the extent to which planned activities had been carried out efficiently, effectively and to ascertain whether they were responsive to meet the needs and demands of local communities. These planned interventions were more often tangible and intangible projects. The former consist of activities that can be physically verified after they have been implemented while the latter comprised intangible 129 projects such as those often described as “capacity building” initiatives that may not be visible even after they have been implemented. Even though tangible and intangible projects are complementary rather than substitutes, it can be argued that high levels of poverty and infrastructure deficits in Ghana is a crucial reason why local governments tend to prioritise projects that are visible and physically verifiable. In the words of a participant from one of the focus group discussions:

“We will not know how the Assembly is doing (this is interpreted as performance) if we do not see around us, projects they have constructed for people in local communities” [Field data, FGD transcript, ‘B’ Municipality].

It is therefore less surprising that most local governments’ priorities outlined in their development plans tend to be physical infrastructure projects such as education, health, roads and electrification projects. The emphasis on physical verification of LG projects to exercise judgement of performance reinforces the focus on output performance which consequently leads to generating performance information on output indicators rather than desired performance outcomes. To further understand the fundamental aspects of LG performance is to explore how LG determine organisational priorities and whose interest such priorities serve.

6.4 Development priorities of local governments under the GSGDA: Whose priorities?

Due to resource constraints, LGs prioritise local development problems because they are unable to address them all at once. Meanwhile, priority development needs that emerge from performance reviews and stakeholders’ consultations are given immediate attention. Interviews with LG officials affirmed that members of the district planning and coordinating units (DPCUs) select priority projects by using a pair-wise ranking procedure that takes into account, the most serious development problems identified during community consultations and matching these issues against themes of the Ghana shared growth and development agenda (GSGDA). A weighting scheme is used to rank development priorities after tallying them individually with the themes of the GSGDA. For example, any matching pair of a local development problem and a theme of the GSGDA is assigned a score of 2 if it is perceived as having a strong impact within a local government

130 area; a score of 1 if it is considered to have a weak impact and a score of 0 if it is considered to have no impact.

An important reason for matching development needs and aspirations emerging from local communities to the GSGDA is to ensure that local government plans are able to:  Meet basic human needs;  Impact on a large proportion of citizens especially the poor and the vulnerable;  Have a multiplier effect on the local economy by creating an enabling environment to attract small and medium scale enterprises, create jobs and increase incomes and earnings;  Reduce rural-urban disparities in access to public goods and services; and  Tackle cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and any other emerging issues (Government of Ghana 2010).

These objectives are laudable because local governments’ MTDPs tend to achieve both local and national level development goals. Hence, an attempt was made to examine the extent to which LG priorities are consistent with the GSGDA. Meanwhile, since LG determine their priorities based on local development challenges, the problems that confront LGs were first and foremost identified and categorised according to the GSGDA focal areas in order to ascertain whether the priorities are in anyway related to perceived local needs. As illustrated in table 6.1 below, identifying development problems was important because it served as a reference point for comparing and checking whether development priorities of LGs were consistent with local development needs.

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Table 6. 1: Aligning development challenges to the national development policy (GSGDA: 2009-2013)

Themes of the GSGDA Development problems prioritised by LGs ‘A’ Metropolis ‘B’ Municipality ‘C’ District Ensuring and sustaining  High rate of youth unemployment macro-economic stability Enhancing  Poor state of market  Limited opportunities for  Lack of financial institutions; competitiveness of infrastructure; entrepreneurship;  Limited access to credit Ghana’s private sector  Lack of financial support for  High cost of agriculture and food especially for female small scale businesses; production; entrepreneurs;  Inadequate policies for private  Inadequate post-harvest facilities;  Inadequate job opportunities; sector development.  Unfavourable business  Prevalence of illegal commercial environment. sex work in the district;  Undeveloped domestic tourist sites. Modernization of  Declining food crop production;  Acute seasonal variations in food  Low agricultural output due to agriculture and natural  Indiscriminate livestock rearing supplies and increases in food erratic rainfall; resource management (free range); prices;  High incidence of pests and  Declining livestock production.  Women lack of access to land diseases;  Inadequate post-production  Over-reliance on traditional infrastructure (i.e. storage, methods of farming ; processing, transport etc);  Cattle rustling;  Low agricultural productivity and  Lack of access to credit and land output. especially for women. Infrastructure, energy  Poor condition of roads  Congestion in the central business  Bad road network and poor road and human settlements  Proliferation of slums and district maintenance culture; development unauthorised shops due to  Inadequate public toilets and  Low access to electricity; urbanization; spread of slums;  Deforestation and environmental  Lack of physical planning  Lack of street lights; degradation due to indiscriminate

schemes;  Deteriorating sanitation and charcoal burning  Indiscriminate defecation, management of solid waste  Lack of internet connectivity and spillage of effluent and negative  Haphazard development of poor quality of telephone attitudes towards waste human settlements services management;  Choked drains and roadside gutters. Oil and gas development Human development,  High youth unemployment;  Lack of ICT facilities in basic  Inadequate school infrastructure; employment and  Poor school performance; schools;  Poor enrolment and retention in productivity  Overcrowding in classrooms;  Lack of public and school basic schools;  Encroachment of school lands; libraries;  Lack of library facilities;  Inadequate water supply in  Inadequate health facilities in  Low female enrolment with high schools; rural communities; dropout rate;  Lack of public libraries.  Youth unemployment;  Lack of teacher motivation;  Lack of credit facilities.  Inadequate teaching staff. Transparent and  Poor grassroots participation  Low participation of women in  Over dependence on external accountable governance  Revenue losses; local government activities; grants;  Weak communication  Poor revenue generation,  Land/chieftaincy disputes; systems/poor information flow to dishonest revenue collectors and  Inactive and poor functioning of the public; lack of transparency in managing district sub structures;  Election related violence. revenue;  Low level of tax education.  Low use of ICT in local revenue mobilization. Source: author, based on MTDPs and interviews

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Aligning priority development problems that LGs face to the themes of the GSGDA is seen as a starting point for outlining measures and strategies to tackle them. Even though every LG in Ghana adheres to the GSGDA, they employed different strategies based on the most pressing needs in their localities. This is not surprising because the problems of LG are not homogenous in nature. For instance in ‘A’ Metropolis, the LG set out to increase food production in the area by 30% between 2009 and 2013; create a harmonious environment for economic and social activities; and provide opportunities to equip unemployed youth with employable skills. In ‘B’ Municipality, the LG sought to involve the private sector in a public private partnership to construct public toilets that will be managed under a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) arrangement whereas in the ‘C’ District, the focus was to support ‘zoomlion’, a private waste management company, to improve upon its operations in the district. The LG also aims to improve access to electricity and to construct roads in rural communities to enable farmers transport their farm produce to market centres. Meanwhile, it is important to note that matching the most pressing development problems confronting LGs to the themes of the GSGDA is only a means to an end since that should ultimately enable local authorities to identify measures of priority to address the problems enumerated in table 6.1. In other words, some of the measures as shown in table 6.2 are intended to resolve the issues outlined in table 6.1. Details of LG’s development priorities are presented in table 6.2 below.

Table 6. 2: Development priorities of local governments under the GSGDA (2009-2013)

Themes of the GSGDA Development priorities of LGs ‘A’ Metropolis ‘B’ Municipality ‘C’ District Ensuring and  Privatize collection of selected  Open a rural bank in the district. sustaining macro- revenue items; economic stability  Update data on all rateable properties in the municipality and revaluate them. Enhancing  Construct additional market  Establish 2 serviced sites for  To establish a desk for purposes of competitiveness of centres to increase 50% physical SMEs/Industrial Centre for all handling issues concerning the Ghana’s private sector access of small scale enterprises SMEs; development of the private sector; and assist them to register for  Rehabilitate 2 markets;  To train and equip at least 250-450 loans/credit;  Repair central traffic lights; unemployed people with employable  Promote trade exhibitions;  Identify and name streets in the skills on a yearly basis;  Encourage dialogue between municipality;  To reduce unemployment in the private and public sector  Register SME’s in the district from present level of 70% to operators to minimise conflicts. municipality. 50% by the end of the plan period. Modernization of  Promote mechanised farming to  Re-afforestation programme;  Increase agriculture production in the agriculture and increase crop yield by 25%;  Complete 3 irrigation projects; district from the present capacity of natural resource  Support ranches with improved  Encourage farmers to use 35% to 70% by the end of the plan management breeds of livestock to increase improved planting materials; period; production by 30%;  Promote soya bean, groundnut,  Increase the processing of agricultural  Promote access to credit mango and cashew produce from present level of 15% to facilities; production; 40% by the end of the plan period;  Reduce by 50% the number of  Supply cassava processing  Increase the number of field visits reported cases of crop farms machines to 21 agro-based co- undertaken by extension officers from destroyed by stray animals. operative societies; 1500 to 2800 per year.  Organize municipal farmers’ day celebration annually;

 Recruit, train and establish 20 farmers each in bee-keeping, grass-cutter rearing and snail rearing;  Establish a cashew/ mango processing factory. Infrastructure, energy  Increase the length of good roads  Initiate a rural electrification  Establish a rural bank in the district; and human settlements by 50% at end of 2013; project;  Expand small town water system ; development  Increase number of public  Connect 20 communities to the  Construct feeder roads and transport infrastructure by 20% at national electricity grid; rehabilitate existing roads; the end of 2013;  Rehabilitate and extend  Construct irrigation dams ;  Establish database for public streetlights to suburbs;  Increase the number of market transport operators to enhance  Install 4 new traffic lights and centres from 7 to 15 in order to boost revenue collection; 40 road signs; the local economy.  Curtail the expansion of slums by  Monitor the construction of 50% and demolish unauthorised new residential buildings to structures by 15% by end of ensure compliance with 2013; building regulations;  Increase regular waste collection  Equip the spatial planning, to achieve a target of 80-100% works and building collection rate; inspectorate of the municipal  Reduce indiscriminate defecation council; by 50% at the end of 2013.  Enforce building regulations and development control;  Prepare planning schemes for new settlements. Oil and gas  Not applicable  Not applicable  Not applicable development Human development,  Motivate teachers to increase the  Construct 11 classroom blocks  To increase school enrolment, employment and number of pupils who qualify for for JHS (3-unit) and 13 improve and provide infrastructure at 136 productivity admission into senior secondary classroom blocks (6-unit) for all levels from present status of 55% schools; primary schools; to 78% by the end of 2013;  Increase the construction and  Rehabilitate 6 dilapidated basic  To improve quality teaching and maintenance of classroom school buildings (3-unit); learning from the present 59% blocks;  Expand school feeding coverage to 75% by the end of 2013;  Reduce the number of schools programme to 15 additional  To improve quality and efficiency in practising the shift system from schools; delivery of education services from 46 to 12 by end of 2013;  Provide water and sanitation present capacity of 58% to 85% by  Reduce the average size of a facilities to 20 basic schools; the end of 2013 ; classroom from 50 to 30;  Extend scholarship to 500  To promote science and technical  Provide potable water and water needy but brilliant students; education at all levels in the district storage facilities for public  Provide 3,500 dual desks for from present level of 55% to 70% by schools; primary schools; Provide 2,000 the end of 2013;  Promote the construction of toilet single desks for junior high  To promote compulsory education for facilities in public schools; schools; children especially girls from the  Construct additional health care  Establish 5 ICT centres for present level of 60% to 80% by the facilities in rural areas to reduce basic schools; end of 2013; travel time to health care  Support for mock  To improve the quality of health care facilities; examinations/best teacher delivery in the communities from  Create awareness on the award; present 55% to 70% by the end of the consequences of not renewing  Support and expand school plan period; expired NHIS cards. feeding programme;  To reduce the incidence/prevalence of  Construct 4 bedroom semi- HIV/AIDS in the District from detached staff quarters for present cumulative value of more health personnel; than 200 to less than 100 by the end  Supply 5,000 residential of 2013; houses with refuse bins;  To improve access to and utilization  De-silting of major primary of family planning services from drains and streams within the current acceptance level of 45% to Municipality; 70% by the end of 2013. 137

 Fumigation of final solid waste disposal site  Evacuation of heaped refuse dumps to final disposal site  Construction of public toilets at 13 satellite markets Transparent and  Increase the number of  Support civic education;  Encourage the participation of civic accountable community hearings and civic  Monitoring and evaluation of unions and civil society groups in governance participation in LG by 20%; programmes/projects; LG;  Increase internally generated  Performance review of MTDP  Undertake annual budget hearing and funds by 10%; (2010-2013); fee fixing resolutions;  Step up monitoring to prevent  Rehabilitation of 2 police  Develop the capacity of the district financial leakages. stations offices; sub structures;  Completion of law court  Protect rights under the rule of law; project.  Ensure public safety and security;  Improve resource mobilization. Source: author, based on MTDPs and interviews

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Even though the above tables have highlighted problems that confront local government authorities and measures that have been proposed to address them, some of the proposals appeared to be vague. Nonetheless, LG officials maintained that these measures were relevant because they fit into the GSGDA. While the NDPC’s guidelines obviously influences the way LGs use the GSGDA to plan and identify their development priorities, there are certain practical observations worth mentioning. Firstly, LG officials in ‘A’ Metropolitan and ‘B’ Municipal Assemblies were unsure about how they could contribute to a generic objective such as macro- economic stability. It was also unclear how their MTDPs could be used to assess progress with respect to that objective. Secondly, the issue of oil and gas development specifically requires local governments to plan towards developing oil and gas infrastructure in their respective areas although not every region in Ghana is endowed with oil and gas resources. It is therefore impractical for LGs to propose projects under these 2 sub themes given the inherent difficulties involved. This does not however stop LGs from attempting to measure and manage their performance in other operational areas. The next sections present mechanisms involved in managing local government performance in Ghana.

6.5 Internal measures for managing local government performance

It was found that LGs carried out certain administrative procedures to keep track of organisational performance. These procedures involved convening weekly or monthly management meetings to closely monitor the performance of various departments under the local authority. For instance, management meetings were steered by the Coordinating Directors and the Chief Executives, with the latter as chair. Heads of departments and senior officers who participated in these meetings discussed pertinent policy issues bothering on the Assemblies’ performance. Through such meetings, heads of departments are able to give updates concerning ongoing activities, projects and programmes that are being implemented by their respective departments. Among other things, participants of management meetings are able to explain whether milestones and targets have been achieved and discuss any challenges that constrain project implementation. The use of management meetings to routinely review performance enable LGs to track progress and revise targets that have been set with respect to internal revenue generation, infrastructure projects completion rates, waste management and sanitation targets among others. In addition, management meetings have become a platform for monitoring the implementation of administrative reforms. For example, it was affirmed that LG officials are

able to share ideas on the warrant system; a new arrangement which require the approval of three or more officers before money is released for departmental expenses.

Apart from these management meetings, LGs in Ghana use the committee system to deliberate on issues and take decisions that become central to local government performance. Interviewees indicated that Sub-Committees of the Executive Committee (EXECO) were required to take decisions which were then forwarded to the Executive Committee. This way, the actions of the Sub-Committees defined the agenda of the EXECO where the chairperson of each subcommittee is also a member. The committee system has become embedded into the management of LGs to the extent that by effectively adhering to the operations and standing orders of the EXECO and its sub-committees legitimises the administrative practices of LGs. To encourage regular executive meetings, an indicator that specifically focuses on the frequency of these meetings is included into the FOAT assessment framework (see appendix 4). While this is aimed at motivating local governments to organise regular EXECO meetings prior to general assembly meetings, it is a common secret that most LGs convene General Assembly meetings without first holding an EXECO meeting. In the northern region, an interviewee indicated that:

“The assembly owe us [assembly members] sitting allowances from our previous meetings. Sitting allowances for sub-committee meetings are in arrears of more than three sittings. This has made it difficult for the assembly to convene an Executive Committee meeting because all the chairpersons of the sub-committees who are also automatic members of the Executive Committee have unanimously agreed to press for the payment of our arrears. Even though we [assembly members] were recently invited to a General Assembly meeting, the Executive Committee failed to sit before the General Assembly met” [field data, interview transcript, ‘C’ District].

This response reveals how local government authorities occasionally circumvented their own laid down procedures (model standing orders) despite the consequences that may follow. Yet, local government administrators rely on these internal performance monitoring practices to keep local officials informed and up to date with regard to the work of the local authority. Hence, these internal mechanisms are crucial for identifying issues that deserve the attention of the Executive Committees of the Assemblies. However, the exclusion of local government councillors, both appointed and elected, from these meetings tends to make management of LG the preoccupation of bureaucrats alone. It is therefore less surprising that bureaucratic capture has become entrenched in the management of LGs. This is supported by previous research findings which revealed “that some sub-committees had only one meeting per year while others 140 had no meetings at all. Inadequate meetings were attributed to the lack of schedules for meetings and the lack of funding. Almost three-quarters (73 per cent) of the sub-committees were described by the district coordinating directors (DCDs) as ineffective, mostly because the majority of the members had little knowledge for discussing substantive issues and had poor understanding of the tenets of the local government system. The Assemblies also had limited funds to finance regular meetings so they often relied on decisions taken by the heads of decentralised departments, the executive committees and the presiding members” (Mensah, 2005: 258).

In addition to the administrative processes described above, an important component of managing LGs is rooted in the formulation and implementation of medium term development plans (MTDPs). Ideally, these plans are supposed to be the result of a combination and harmonisation of various community action plans, area level plans and sectoral plans. The MTDPs of LGs and their accompanying budgets are implemented after they have been discussed and adopted by the General Assembly. Meanwhile, because all the activities captured in plans cannot be carried out at once due to resource constraints, local government authorities, through their DPCUs, develop annual action plans which are spread over a three year period for implementation. In addition to this, planning officers prepare quarterly, mid-year and annual performance progress reports that serve as a reference document for evaluating LG performance. These reports are prepared using data collated from various departments based on activities they have undertaken or services that have been delivered. By consciously keeping record of activities and projects that have been implemented, local government officials are able to gather performance information by comparing targets with actual achievements. The use of such information by LGs themselves or by external supervisory agencies is vital for managing LG performance. Hence, the plans of LG play a crucial role in providing performance information. The ensuing section examines modalities through which LGs manage their performance based on inter-organisational relations involving supervisory agencies.

6.6 External measures for managing local government performance

Local government’s performance management practices goes beyond the use of internal organisational structures and performance monitoring procedures. It also involves external supervisory agencies that exercise oversight over LGs. These agencies include the Regional Coordinating Councils and the National Development Planning Commission, the office of the District Assembly Common Fund Administrator and the Ministry of Local Government. The 141 specific ways in which these agencies institutionalise performance management at LG level is examined below.

6.6.1 Local government authorities and regional coordinating councils interface

The oldest approach to managing LG performance in Ghana involves monitoring the performance of LGs by the RCCs. This mechanism is enshrined in Article 142 (1) of the Local Government Act (1993) Act 462 which requires RCCs to monitor, co-ordinate and evaluate the performance of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies in the regions; monitor the use of funds allocated to LGs by central government agencies; and to review and co-ordinate public services in the regions.

In a typical bottom-up approach to performance reporting, it was found that LGs did prepare and submit performance reports to the NDPC through the RCCs to fulfil the above statutory performance management requirement. The purpose for reporting LG performance is to ascertain whether planned projects and services earmarked for communities have been implemented or not and to identify relevant issues associated with such projects. Thus, the RCCs are strategic intermediaries between central and local governments due to the role they play in disseminating performance information to the centre. There have been instances where RCCs requested LGs to modify their plans to conform to NDPC planning guidelines for the purpose of uniformity. Some LG managers view the interaction between the RCCs and LGs as crucial especially when the outcome of monitoring LG performance affects disbursement of their share of the DACF. For example, it was indicated that DACF allocation for the ‘A’ Metropolis was withheld in 2008 because the RCC detected the authority’s failure to invest previous DACF allocations as specified in their plans and budgets. The impact of the DACF delay however had very little impact on the Metropolitan Authority’s operations because they relied on their huge IGF base.

Another important outcome of RCC supervision of LG performance culminates in the collation of MTDPs of LGs at the regional level into a composite regional plan which is submitted to the NDPC and MLGRD at the central government level. Yet, there are certain issues that affect the efficacy of the RCCs in managing LG performance. Firstly, the RCC is perceived by some elected Assembly members as an off-shoot of central government that unnecessarily interferes with LG affairs. Secondly, the Regional Coordinating Councils and their Regional Planning and Coordinating Units neither have the powers of local governments nor sufficient resources to

142 undertake regular performance monitoring. Even though the RCCs often report the performance of LGs to the NDPC based on the implementation of MTDPs, there are certain concerns that need to be redressed. A study on LGs’ implementation of MTDPs in Ghana noted that even though:

“The NDPC conduct spot-checks on a regular basis...the NDPC and RPCUs [only] harmonised the plans [of LGs] without monitoring plan implementation. Such lapses allowed the DAs to put aside the plans and act according to the whims and caprices of the few powerful people in the districts” (Mensah 2005:266).

While this assertion may hold true for many LGs in Ghana, it appears the close proximity of the RCCs to Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies is not being used to prevent this from happening. Despite their supervisory powers, the RCCs could not directly influence the performance of LGs beyond encouraging them to stick to priorities in their MTDPs. Yet, some research participants were critical about the role of the RCCs in managing LG performance to reflect national policy objectives. An interviewee emphatically stated that:

“The NDPC does not properly monitor how the assemblies are implementing the national policy framework. The policy framework is always one year late because we have to wait for them [NDPC] to finalise the policy before we formulate our plans accordingly. This is affecting our performance as an assembly so I think the NDPC should organise a stakeholders’ forum to see what is happening on the ground” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly].

Implicit in the above quotation is an affirmation that managing LG performance is inextricably linked to the overall national development policy framework. Yet, growing concern amongst LG officials about the role of national policy and actual LG performance needs attention. Pragmatic measures are therefore needed to strengthen the RCCs role in managing LG performance in order to reverse the perception that performance reporting to the RCCs and the NDPC amount to a mere bureaucratic procedure as the RCCs are not able to provide adequate information about the status of LG performance in the regions.

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6.6.2 Local government authorities and the district assembly common fund interface

Local governments face financial constraints in fulfilling their expenditure functions and assignments. To ensure that finance follows functions, the 1992 Constitution under article 252 established a District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), a common-pool fund set aside to receive and disburse not less than 5% of total government revenues to LGs. Subsequently, a District Assemblies Common Fund Act 1993 (act 455) defined total revenues of Ghana as “all revenue collected by or accruing to the central government other than foreign loans, grants, non- tax revenue and revenues already collected by or for DAs under any enactment in force”. The fund is allocated to all LGs on the basis of a formula approved by Parliament and should ideally be disbursed in quarterly instalments by the DACF Administrator (Banful 2011). The DACF share of government expenditure was increased to 7.5% in 2007 and has become the most significant source of funds to LGs compared to the share of Internally Generated Funds (IGF), that is, the funds that LGs themselves raise from local fees and taxes (SEND, Foundation, 2013). Thus, LGs depend almost entirely on the district assembly common fund and other external sources for funds even though this undermines their independence (Crook and Manor, 1998; Ayee, 2008). And because the DACF is used to fund most LG capital budgets, its utilisation is closely monitored by the Office of the DACF Administrator, and integrated into LG performance management system. An interviewee in the northern region affirmed that:

“Without the DACF, the Assembly cannot exist because if we compare the DACF to IGF, it tells us that the Assembly cannot survive without the DACF” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘C’ District Assembly].

From figure 6.2 below, it is obvious that LGs have not been able to generate revenue to match increasing external funds. Some experts have attributed declining locally generated funds to the increasing trend of central government funds and the fact that DACF disbursement are sometimes politically motivated and not tied to specific performance criteria (Mogues et al. 2010;Banful 2011). In fact, disbursement of the DACF has become infamous for persistent delays, being irregular and unpredictable in ways that adversely affect the accuracy of financial forecasts, development planning, and budgeting and overall local government performance.

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Figure 6. 2: Internal and external revenues of LGs

Source: Mogues et al. (2010)

Clearly, while figure 6.2 illustrates the disproportionate allocation of the DACF compared to IGF of LGs, it is important to note that local governments exercise limited discretion in utilising the DACF to perform their core tasks by strictly following spending guidelines. LG officials explained that projects that are financed with the DACF are closely monitored to ensure that funds are spent on planned and budgeted activities only. The outcome of these monitoring activities plays a crucial role in subsequent DACF allocations to LGs. An interviewee reiterated that:

“The Common Fund Administrator periodically evaluates the fiscal performance of our assembly because most of our development projects are financed with the DACF. So the Assembly tries to complete DACF projects before officers from Accra come to supervise them. But we are disturbed that certain deductions are made from the Common Fund at source and this affects the number of projects we are able to finance” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly].

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Despite the fact that LG officials conceive routine evaluation of DACF sponsored projects as part of their performance management practices, problems with the utilisation of the DACF has implications on the performance of LGs. For instance, there are accounts on Assembly members’ dissatisfaction for lack of transparency in disbursing the DACF and utilising it efficiently (Ministry of Local Government 2007). This suggests that people are likely to be dissatisfied with LGs’ use of the DACF despite the expectation that close monitoring of DACF projects might increase citizen’s satisfaction with LG performance. No wonder there are reports of misappropriation and mismanagement in deductions from the DACF (SEND Foundation 2013).

According to SEND Foundation, managing the performance of LGs in relation to the implementation of DACF projects is a mere bureaucratic exercise that is unable to stop unnecessary deductions from LGs’ share of the DACF. For instance, SEND Foundation (2013) revealed that in 2008, out of ¢910,332.33 allocated to the ‘C’ District Assembly as its DACF, ¢646,847.74 representing 71% was deducted from its DACF allocation, leaving the Assembly with a net amount of ¢263,484.59 while ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly was allocated ¢1,715,861.75 but only received a net amount of ¢799,475.41 after ¢916,386.34 (53.41%) of the allocated sum was deducted at source. The practice was repeated in 2009 where ¢438,065.30 representing 50.48% was deducted from ¢867,784.71 allocated to the ‘C’ District Assembly whilst ¢843,016.97 (51.86%) was deducted from ¢1,625,639.08 in the ‘A’ Metropolis. Apart from these deductions, the Auditor General’s report (2005) reveal instances where various sums of monies, including those from the DACF, were paid to individuals and companies for the provision of services and supplies but were neither properly executed nor accounted for (Ghana Audit Service 2005). Despite the importance of these concerns, it does not appear the DACF Secretariat’s emphasis on ensuring that LGs complied with financial administration regulations have the solution to these problems.

6.6.3 Local government authorities and the Ministry of Local Government interface

An important feature of central- local government relations in Ghana is their shared vision to facilitate local level development. Apart from LGs implementing pro poor development interventions on behalf of the Ministry of Local Government, some mechanisms have been put in place to manage local government performance by focusing on the extent to which sector-wide development policies are translated into LG projects and programmes. Such projects were included in the MTDPs of LGs under a separate reporting format. Notable among those projects are the Community Based Rural Development Programme (CBRD), the Ghana Social 146

Opportunities Programme (GSOP), the Urban Poverty Reduction Programme (UPRP), School Feeding Programme (FSP), Food Security Programme (FSP), and the Ghana Urban Management Programme. All these projects fall within the remit of the Ministry of Local Government but co- financed by donors and the government of Ghana. Most of the projects also tend to concentrate more on the economically impoverished northern regions compared to urban areas in the South. For example, EU funded micro projects and village infrastructure projects have increased access to basic services upon the construction of schools and health facilities in the three northern regions. Donor funded projects have enabled LGs to implement local economic development projects, provide public infrastructure and sponsor training workshops to build organisational capacity. An interviewee indicated that:

“Project coordinators from the Ministry [of Local Government] come here to observe how the Assembly is performing in terms of implementing activities in relation to specific projects whether under the CBRDP or GSOP [sic]. It is discomforting when we have nothing to show during such trips, therefore, we strive to ensure that our activity schedules are up to date” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘C’ District Assembly].

Indeed, periodic field trips by officers from project coordinating units at the Ministry of Local Government are used to ‘put local officials on their toes’, thereby promoting a sense of timeliness in project completion rates. Similar to the findings related to the RCCs, the submission of ‘quarterly progress reports’ to the MLGRD is conceived as an administrative necessity particularly when LG inspectors from the Ministry fail to verify whether the contents of plans are visible on the ground. Research participants claimed the MLGRD focuses on verifying the implementation of LG projects funded by the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFUND), Social Investment Fund (SIF), and the District Development Facility (DDF). Nonetheless, officials at the Ministry of LG proclaimed that physical verification of performance through field trips has been useful, especially when documentary record of project status differ from the reality. Yet, there are no rewards or sanctions for LGs or officials that either meet or fail to meet performance targets associated with certain specific projects.

It is important to emphasise that officials who participated in this research unanimously agreed that LGs manage their performance through the aforementioned interfaces. Opinions however varied about the extent to which each of these performance management practices impacted on LG performance. For instance, LGs received no direct benefit in terms of performance-based

147 rewards nor suffered any consequences from performance-based sanctions. This could render the performance management regime ineffective contrary to what pertains in other countries where publication of star ratings could expose managers of public service organisations to ‘naming and shaming’ and increase the risk of getting sacked as a result of poor organisational performance (Bevan and Hood 2006). At the centre of all the above performance management arrangements is the analysis and evaluation of LG plans to determine whether performance targets have been achieved or not. This practice is consistent with the goal attainment model of managing performance in which an organisation’s achievements are examined against set goals. Yet in practice, there have been several instances where plans have not yielded the anticipated performance outcomes (Mensah 2005). In this research, problems that affected effective implementation of LG plans were linked to several factors some of which are discussed in the next section.

6.7 Challenges with the implementation of plans and its implications for managing local government performance

The implementation of MTDPs was fraught with obstacles that were predominantly administrative, structural, political and financial in nature. Administratively, there were, as there are today, serious lapses in terms of coordination within and between departments of LGs and their satellite offices at the regional and national levels. Parallel and sometimes conflicting reporting mechanisms between decentralised departments and their parent offices did create confusion. For example, the Electricity Company of Ghana, the Ghana Police Service and the Ghana Water Company Limited, three very crucial service agencies continue to report to their regional offices in ways that do not enhance collaborative monitoring of performance. An interviewee lamented that the situation is particularly worse when contracts for public projects are awarded at the central government level without consulting local authorities only for them to be pleasantly surprised about the existence of such ‘ghost’ projects later on. In the words of a Coordinating Director:

“Sometimes, contractors working in this district bump into the District Engineer’s office to sign their certificate (cheques) for them when the engineer has no clue about the nature and quality of work done. As beneficiaries, we (LG officials) expect more coordination with Accra. This can simply mean giving us detail information about projects initiated on our behalf; it is difficult to ensure value for money without proper coordination” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘B’ Municipal Assembly].

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Also, given that MTDPs serves as the menu for implementing specific activities and projects at the local level, they are crucial for examining the performance of LGs. Yet, detailed analysis of quarterly, mid-year and annual performance review reports revealed that goals and targets were mostly combined and vaguely stated; making it difficult to compare output performance. In addition, planned projects were often diverted to locations that were not stated in development plans of large urban LGs; and only few of the agencies identified as collaborators for the implementation of LG projects were actively engaged. These constrained LGs from implementing pre-planned projects within stipulated time frames. Throughout the study areas, projects that failed or delayed to take off were often attributed to insufficient funds owing to poor internal revenue generation and erratic disbursement of the DACF. Widening financing gaps, worsened by resource wastage and poor monitoring and control systems often impeded the implementation of development plans (GOG, 2010). There were consequences arising from local government officials blaming their ‘lean-budgets’ on arbitrary deductions from the DACF. For this reason, experienced contractors avoid bidding for DACF funded projects because irregular flow of funds for such projects frustrates their businesses. LGs therefore pay the price when infrastructure projects are awarded to inexperienced contractors- a phenomenon which often ends up in poorly executed projects of substandard quality.

Another problem affecting the implementation of MTDPs with implications on the performance of LGs relate to instances where Chief Executives interfered with the planning process by influencing the implementation of projects that were not pre-planned. Within the ‘A’ Metropolis, only 40% of planned projects were implemented from the MTDP in 2008 compared to 60% unplanned projects. Because such variance implies that priority projects were abandoned for unplanned and unbudgeted projects, the Metropolitan Assembly had its DACF withheld. Even though it survived on its extensive pool of IGF, the situation would have been unbearable for smaller rural LGs that barely have any IGF and only depend on the DACF to survive. It can thus be argued that political manipulation of LG plans are bound to recur as long as partisan interests continue to influence decisions taken at Executive Committees meetings since that is where the agenda is set for General Assembly meetings.

Furthermore, it was found that lack of interest in, and support to the DPCU had implications for the effectiveness of plans and their impact on the performance of LGs. In all the regions, the DPCUs had insufficient funds and basic office equipment such as computers and printers to work with. Also, many LG officials complained about the absence of vehicles to undertake community visits and organise public hearings to consult communities on their development

149 priorities. Interestingly, in local communities that have powerful traditional leaders, tension between LG officials and paramount chiefs create obstacles for effective implementation of plans. As custodians of the land, traditional leaders often demand a proportion of LG revenues (about 20% in the ‘B’ municipality for any land required for development projects) but low IGF makes such payments unsustainable. In the ‘B’ municipality for instance, LG managers organise periodic cultural durbars at the paramount chief’s palace to inform and update the populace about progress and challenges they face in developing local communities. Such platforms are used, albeit less frequently, to mobilise support and continued cooperation from community leaders to foster greater development. This is intended to improve current low levels of community awareness of LG development projects, increase public interest in the work of LGs, and dissuade persistent political partisanship in LG decision making.

6.8 Conclusion

The study found that LG’s attempts to manage organisational performance are internally and externally driven. Managing LG performance internally is based on the vibrancy and effectiveness of management committees; executive committees and its sub-committees. In addition to these internal mechanisms, the span of managing LG performance extends to, and involves external supervisory agencies such as the Regional Coordinating Councils and the National Development Planning Commission, the Ministry of Local Government and the Administrator of the DACF who routinely inspect and evaluate LG’s adherence to legal and administrative regulations to ensure that LGs comply with NDPC guidelines, financial administration regulations and project monitoring guidelines among others. This finding is consistent with the goal attainment model as it reveals the significance of comparing LG goals outlined in MTDPs to actual performance information documented in annual performance reports. It must be emphasised that both internal measures of monitoring performance and the evaluation of LG performance by external supervisory agencies enhances what Hostefe (1981) describes as ‘political’ and ‘managerial’ controls. But does the inspection of LGs show whether they do things right and do the right things? Answering this question is important given that external performance reporting to principals (politicians, clients or citizens) can create pressure on an organisation to reform internally particularly when it is performing poorly (Moynihan 2008). However, as elaborated in subsequent chapters, it could be misleading to assume that “the possession and submission of performance information symbolises (and demonstrates) the ability and legitimacy of decision makers (LG managers) to resolve substantive uncertainties [when in practice], decision makers gather information and do not use it” (Pollitt, 2013: 354). 150

With respect to the role of national development policy on how local governments manage their performance, this chapter explored and discussed how performance management practices of LGs are interwoven into the national development policy framework through planning and reporting procedures. It was evident that while the formulation of MTDP is expected to follow a bottom up participatory process, LG plans were unfortunately formulated with very minimal input from local communities because community hearings were seldom held (Crawford 2009; Ayee 2004). Indeed, contrary to the core values of decentralisation which encourages giving power to people in local communities, the entire plan formulation process is rather characterised by considerable bureaucratic capture. Even though this could be attributed to low level of education and influence amongst elected Assembly members, the impact of the GSGDA in shaping the content of LG plans and the work of LGs in Ghana cannot be underestimated and this has serious implications for the independence of LGs.

For instance, LGs rarely developed their own unique performance management systems since they look up the central government to assess their performance. Therefore, the criteria for assessing LG performance is determined by, and satisfies only central government agencies rather than local communities; the supposed principals of local government authorities anywhere in the world. Clearly, these findings show that while the existing mechanisms for managing LG performance have been mainstreamed into the management of LGs in Ghana, they have not been able to provide clear linkages beyond LG’s compliance to performance guidelines imposed by the central government. Thus, LGs continue to produce and submit performance information to central government agencies without the latter scrutinizing how that represents actual performance on the ground. This has consequently led to the institutionalisation of upward accountability compared to downward accountability which further weakens the position of local communities from holding their LGs accountable. Therefore, it can be concluded that the consequences of reporting LG performance to supervisory agencies has a disempowering effect on assembly members and the general public to genuinely set LG priorities in ways that reflect local circumstances and demand for accountability from LG officials.

In sum, this chapter highlights the importance of development plans for managing LG performance at the organisational level. This is why assessing LG performance in Ghana involves the analysis of MTDPs, which is not only widely institutionalised, but also supported and recognised by central government and local stakeholders, at least in official terms, as the acceptable way of managing the performance of local government authorities. Meanwhile, the successful implementation of LG plans is not always guaranteed due to poor inter-organisational 151 coordination, financial constraints, ineffective monitoring of projects and political interference in LG performance. The findings in this chapter suggests that it is not enough for LGs to abide by performance reporting procedures without having any incentive to motivate effective plan implementation or sanction LG managers who indulge in impropriety without recourse to legal and regulatory requirements. This inherent weakness of the mechanisms for managing LG performance as discussed in this chapter has in part necessitated the introduction of a performance-enhancing policy initiative which is often touted as a best-practice performance management system. This is explored in the next chapters.

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Chapter 7: Exploring the scope of performance–enhancing policy: The case of the District Development Facility-Functional Organisational Assessment Tool

“A performance management system that seeks to improve organisational performance in the public sector must recognise and involve multiple dimensions and stakeholders” (Kaplan and Norton 2001b).

7.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to examine the extent to which performance indicators under the performance management regime cover multiple dimensions of local government performance. The chapter specifically focuses on minimum conditions and performance measures under the District Development Facility (DDF) and the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT) to understand whether and how they holistically evaluate LG performance in ways that serve the interests of different stakeholders at the local level. To achieve this objective, the BSC is used to analyse the extent to which MCs and PMs under the DDF FOAT assess LG performance from a financial perspective, internal processes, learning and innovation and citizens’ perspectives. Since the DDF-FOAT is a strategy for improving LG performance in Ghana, applying the principles of the BSC is appropriate and significant because it is widely recognised as a valuable tool not only for measuring organisational performance, but also for implementing performance management systems; one that can help organizations to improve upon the implementation of strategy (Kaplan and Norton 1992;Kaplan and Norton 1996a;Kaplan and Norton 2001a). Thus, a critical analysis of the DDF-FOAT initiative will reveal whether existing mechanisms for evaluating LG performance is balanced, efficient and effective; and whether the framework promotes service delivery and puts value on results for LG employees and local communities.

7.2 An overview of the district development facility and the functional organisational assessment tool

To deal with performance related problems of LGs in Ghana, the government in collaboration with four development partners; Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA); the German Development Bank (KfW); and the French Development Agency (AfD) introduced a District Development Facility (DDF) to improve LG performance. The initiative is aimed at motivating local authorities to comply with existing legal and acceptable administrative procedures by awarding performance-based grants

153 to local authorities aimed at supplementing traditional sources of development finance. Allocation of funds under the DDF is categorised into three components: a Basic Grant (BG) consisting of 20% of the total amount of funds in a given fiscal year, a 68% Performance Grant (PG) and a 12% Capacity Building Grant (CBG). The rationale for linking financial reward to organisational performance is to support and enhance the provision of basic infrastructure services, promote efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability in local government administration (Government of Ghana 2012). Furthermore, it aims at integrating performance assessment into a harmonised system of providing investment funds and capacity building support for LGs to improve upon the implementation of medium term development plans. The primary goal of the policy is to inspire LGs to efficiently and satisfactorily provide social services while complying with stipulated administrative rules and regulations that govern how they discharge their responsibilities (Government of Ghana 2012). Hence, the DDF does not only encourage LGs to compete for additional funds, it is also meant to enable them address core issues such as insufficient funds, lack of incentives to improve performance and weak institutional structures at the LG level. Meanwhile, the formula for allocating funds under the DDF, as shown in box 7.1 has been revised due to inherent difficulties in determining the accurate land size of LGs following the arbitrary creation of new districts in Ghana. This is illustrated below:

Box 7. 1: Formula for disbursing funds under the DDF

Basic Grant (20%) of which:

 Equal share. 30 % to (37.50 %)  Pop. Share: 25 % to (31.25 %)  Poverty: 25 % to (31.25 %)  Land size: 20% to (0%)* Performance Grant (68%) component:

 Weighting against Basic Grant Capacity Building Grant (12%) - CB component:

 60% demand-driven CB Grant payable to LGs  40% generic CB component allocated to the DDF Secretariat, LGSS and the ILGS Source: Government of Ghana, 2014

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Given the fact that evaluating the performance of LGs under the DDF focuses on statutory functions prescribed under the Local Government Act (1993), indicators against which performance is assessed are directly linked to political, administrative and financial aspects of LG operations. Therefore, for a LG to become eligible for the DDF grant, an instrument known as the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT) is used to determine the appropriateness of administrative procedures of LGs and their compliance to regulatory requirements in performing their functions. This kind of inspection appears to be a movement towards a ‘regulatory state’ or an ‘audit society’ as though LGs “cannot be trusted to regulate themselves effectively, but must be monitored, checked, scrutinised and held accountable by external agencies” (Boyne et al. 2002a:1198). Today, the FOAT represents a systematic process for examining LGs as it attempts to create a shared understanding amongst LGs and the Ministry of Local government about issues that are critical to the successful achievement of organisational objectives. This is why it will be significant to explore whether using the FOAT to examine LG’s compliance to administrative and regulatory conditions can be linked to performance in terms of service delivery.

In practice, the FOAT consist of indicators broadly defined as Minimum Conditions (MCs) and Performance Measures (PMs). These conditions and indicators are intended to measure the basic capacity of LGs to perform their core functions and thus, form the basis for assigning performance scores and allocating financial reward to local government authorities. In order to qualify for the performance-based grant, a set of pre-determined indicators are used to assess LGs to identify those that are performing well. Table 7.1 describes the minimum conditions under the DDF FOAT.

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Table 7. 1: Minimum conditions and indicators under the FOAT

Minimum Condition Indicators Functional Capacity in  Establish functional district planning coordinating units Development Planning based on operational guidelines for the DPCUs & RPCUs

 Formulate annual action plans on the basis of MTDPs Functional Capacity in  Prepare and submit annual statement of accounts according Financial Management to the Financial Administration Regulation LI 1802/ and Accounting Financial Administration Act, 654  Audit reports of LGs should be clean and devoid of adverse comments bordering on dishonesty  Prepare and submit monthly financial reports to the Controller and Accountant General’s Department (CAGD) Functional Capacity in  Prepare and implement district procurement plans based on Procurement public procurement authority guidelines and the Public Procurement Act 663 of 2003 Functional Capacity of  Assembly holds at least 3 meetings according to the the Assembly minimum requirement Plan Implementation  Prepare performance progress reports on the Capacity implementation of activities in the annual action plan Source: Government of Ghana (2013).

Even though the DDF is co-financed by the Government of Ghana and four (4) donor partners, management and ownership of the initiative appears to rest with the Government of Ghana. Administratively, the Ministry of Local Government, through the DDF Secretariat is responsible for organising and overseeing the evaluation of LG performance throughout the country. A steering committee is set up within the DDF Secretariat as the apex body in charge of managing and implementing the DDF and the FOAT. The Committee is chaired by the Minister of Local Government, with other members of the committee drawn from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the National Development Planning Commission, the Local Government Service Secretariat, the Institute of Local Government Studies, and the National Association of Local Authorities of Ghana. Representatives of the Controller and Accountant General’s Department, the Ghana Audit Service and the donors are ex-officio members of the committee (Government of Ghana 2012). The aim of bringing these actors together is to tap from their competencies and expertise in providing overall policy guidance to the implementation of the initiative. In the words of a central government bureaucrat:

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Central government provides the framework while the actual implementation is the responsibility of the DAs. The intention is to improve local governance and to improve service delivery. Governments create the incentive to raise standards that encourage LGs to perform their statutory functions [Field data; interview transcript from the MLGRD].

In an attempt to improve upon LG performance as indicated in the above quotation, the assessment of LG performance under the DDF involves three phases; a pre- assessment phase, the actual assessment and post-assessment phase. The first phase involves the recruitment of independent consultants while the actual assessment takes place when the assessment teams visit LGs they have been assigned to in the regions and this could takes 2 or 3 working days to complete depending on the size of the LGs involved. Activities in the post- assessment phase involves the verification of assessment decisions, consolidating and reporting the performance scores of various LGs, compiling capacity building needs and disseminating the results of the assessment. One important post assessment activity is how the Ministry of Local Government handles complaints of LGs that challenge the results of the assessment.

An analysis of performance results of LGs since the maiden performance assessment in 2008 reveals some improvement in their fulfilment of the MCs. For example, 50 (36.2%) LGs out of 138 LGs in 2008 met all MCs compared to majority 88 (63.7%) that could not. For this reason, only a handful (36.2%) of LGs qualified for the performance grant while 63.7% of LGs were ineligible and could only access the CBG. In the second round of assessment in 2009, 32 new LGs were created, making the total number of LGs 170 out of which 134 fulfilled all the MCs. This means that 35 LGs that were assessed failed to fulfil the MCs and this made them only eligible for the CBG (Government of Ghana 2014b). Between 2008 and 2011, Biakoye district Assembly in the Volta region could not be assessed due to legal issues. But in 2011 when all the 170 LGs participated in the assessment, 164 LGs (96%) including Biakoye district fulfilled all the 5 MCs. Altogether, the trend shows some level of improvement in LG’s fulfilment of MCs from an average of 36% in 2008 to 95% in 2012. Table 7.2 and figure 7.1 illustrates the trend in LGs achievement of the MCs between 2008 and 2012.

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Table 7. 2: Annual distribution of minimum conditions (2008-2013)

Round of Base Assessment Total No. of No. of No. of LG % of LGs assessment year period no. of LGs LGs that that that fulfilled LGs in assessed failed to fulfilled MCs (out of Ghana fulfil MCs those MCs assessed) 1 2006 2008 138 138 88 50 36% 2 2008 2009 170 169* 35 134 79% 3 2009 2010 170 169* 10 159 94% 4 2010 2011 170 169* 5 164 97% 5 2011 2012 170 170 6 164 96%

6 2012 2013 216 216 11 205 95%

Source: author, based on data from MLGRD. * Biakoye DA not assessed due to legal issues

Figure 7. 1: Minimum conditions fulfilled by LG (2008-2013)

Local governments that fulfilled MCs

250

200

150

100

Number governments loal Number of 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 LGs that fulfilled MCs 50 134 159 164 164 205

Source: author, based on data from MLGRD.

Even though both table 7.2 and figure 7.1 illustrates a positive trend in the fulfilment of MCs, they do not reveal regional variations. In-depth analysis of data shows that whilst 91% of LGs in the Upper East region and 81% of LGs in the Northern region fulfilled all MCs in 2008, none of the 10 LGs in the Greater Accra region fulfilled the MCs during that same period. The general performance of Assemblies in achieving the MCs in the Greater Accra region was attributed to fundamental errors in documenting performance information; a common problem that was

158 identified in all the LGs. It would seem that difficulties in record keeping was probably due to the large size of most of the Assemblies in the region that were also lacking databases and effective registries to store performance information. The general outlook however improved remarkably in 2010 when all the LGs in the Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra, Northern and Upper West regions achieved 100% in achieving all the MCs compared to only one (Upper east region) having the same record in the previous year (2009). This trend became stabilised in the Greater Accra region where all the 10 LGs fulfilled the MCs in succession between 2010 and 2012. It can be argued that the two Upper regions are the most relatively successful ones in this regard because LGs in those areas have consistently fulfilled the MCs despite the creation of new local authorities between 2008 and 2013. Details of the regional variation in fulfilling the MC are presented in table 7.3 below.

Table 7. 3: Distribution of local governments’ fulfilment of MCs by region

Region Number and percentage of LGs fulfilling all MCs 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Ashanti 9(43%) 22(81%) 25(93%) 25 (93%) 27(100%) 29(97%) Brong Ahafo 10(53%) 8(36%) 22(100%) 22(100%) 21(95%) 27(100%) Central 2(15%) 16(94%) 13(76%) 15(88%) 16(94%) 20(100%) Eastern 7(41%) 14(67%) 19(90%) 21(100%) 18(86%) 25(96%) Greater 0 (0%) 9(90%) 10(100%) 10(100%) 10(100%) 14(88%) Accra Northern 6(33%) 17(85%) 20(100%) 20(100%) 20(100%) 23(88%) Upper East 4(50%) 9(100%) 8(89%) 9(100%) 9(100%) 13(100%) Upper West 4(50%) 8(89%) 9(100%) 9(100%) 9(100%) 11(100%) Volta 5(33%) 14(78%) 17(94%) 17(94%) 18(100%) 22(88%) Western 3(23%) 17(100%) 16(94%) 16(94%) 16(94%) 22(100%) Total 50 (36%) 134(79%) 159(94%) 164(97%) 164(97%) 206(95%)

Source: author, based on data from MLGRD.

Several reasons account for the variations and shifts in LG’s ability to fulfil MCs across board. Whereas specific MCs such as those related to frequency of assembly meetings, plan implementation capacity and functionality of DPCUs were more likely to be accomplished, there

159 were serious problems with record keeping that became obvious because LGs had to show documentary proof of their performance - something they fumbled to justify. Also, it seems the MC on financial management and accounting in general and auditing in particular is a huge challenge for LGs. While the situation appears to be improving, some LGs still fail to prepare and submit crucial documents such as audit reports to show the extent to which financial and procurement rules and regulations have been followed. While this could genuinely reflect the reality on the ground, the consequences have been enormous given that failure to achieve the MCs can deprive LGs from accessing the basic grant and the performance grant under the DDF.

For instance, none of the 88 LGs that failed to fulfil the MCs in 2008 received additional funds under the DDF beyond the CBG (Kenya, 2011). This however improved in the second and third rounds of assessment when 35 and 10 LGs were unable to meet the MCs in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Since the highest number of LGs that fulfilled the MCs was in 2011, the trend in subsequent years was expected to improve. For example, out of 170 LGs, only 5 of them failed to achieve all the MCs in 2011 compared to 10 in the 2010 (see table 7.2). In addition, 4 out of the 6 LGs that did not fulfil all MCs in 2011 were municipal assemblies, 2 of which were newly created while the remaining 2 were district assemblies. What these fluctuations clearly suggest is that there is no guarantee for LGs to automatically repeat their performance in fulfilling all MCs in one particular year having done the same in the previous year. There have been instances where LGs failed to fulfil MCs in a particular year despite fulfilling them in the previous year.

7.3 Performance measures and performance-based grants

Under the LG performance enhancing policy initiative, performance measures are made up of 9 themes which are used to determine each LG’s allocation of performance grant under the DDF. As indicated earlier, the performance-based grant, which represents 68% of the overall DDF pool is accessible to LGs that are awarded the Basic Grant for fulfilling all MCs. The amount of performance-based grant allocated to each LG is the ratio of its score under the PMs to the total score of LGs that met all MCs and weighted with the basic grant score. This implies that a higher performance score arising from the performance measures leads to a relatively bigger investment grant. Even though the themes of the PMs have remained the same since 2008, the number of indicators and maximum weights of the themes have been revised. This is shown in table 7.4 below:

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Table 7. 4: Performance measures under the DDF

Thematic Area 2008-2011 2012-2013 No. of Max. No. of Max. Indicators Score indicators Score 1 Management and organisation 6 10 5 9 2 Transparency and accountability 6 12 6 12 3 Planning system 10 16 13 18 4 Human resource management 3 7 5 6 5 Relationship with sub-district structures 2 6 2 3 6 Financial management and auditing 9 16 8 18 7 Fiscal capacity 6 15 6 21 8 Procurement 5 12 4 5 9 Environmental sanitation management 3 6 5 8 Total 50 100 54 100 Source: Government of Ghana (2014b).

All LGs that fulfilled the MCs between 2008 and 2013 were also eligible for the PBG even though the amounts allocated to them differed markedly as a result of variations in performance scores. The overall performance of LGs was seen to be poor in 2008 when the national average for performance measures was only 47.38%. Conversely, except for the most recent assessment in 2013 when the national average score for PM reached its peak, none of the LGs prior to that assessment had managed to obtain the highest performance score. The trend of PMs is illustrated in Table 7.5 below.

Table 7. 5: Distribution of performance measures (2008-2013)

Round of Base Assessment No. of No. of No. of LG Performance National assessment year period LGs in LGs that met measures (%) average of Ghana assessed MCs PMs (%) Max Min

1 2006 2008 138 138 50 73 25 47.38

2 2008 2009 170 169 134 91 38 61.95

3 2009 2010 170 169 159 96 20 73.71

4 2010 2011 170 169 164 97 59 83.56

5 2011 2012 170 170 164 97 49 82.44

6 2012 2013 216 216 205 100 55 86.36

Source: Government of Ghana (2014b).

In order to understand how relevant LG officials think about the performance measures under the DDF, the views of respondents at the district levels as well as officials who were interviewed at

161 the Local Government Ministry and other allied agencies were analysed. It was emphasised that certain administrative procedures had to be met before LGs are assessed and awarded with grants. Meeting the conditions set for qualifying for performance grants reinforce the perception amongst LG bureaucrats that the DDF symbolises best-practice performance management framework. Also, it was explained that independent consultants who are employed by the MLGRD to conduct the assessment in the regions were given the assignment based on their technical and professional competence. Hence, the recruitment of consultants is publicly advertised2 and successful candidates are given a special training to effectively carry out the assignment. Evaluators are required to be neutral and independent in discharging their duties by using the FOAT to examine the extent to which LGs fulfil the MCs and PMs. Particular attention is therefore focused on how LGs perform their political, administrative and financial obligations to enable assessment teams determine whether internal processes and service delivery record have been improving. In addition, the evaluation teams are expected to identify performance bottlenecks and capacity gaps that must be addressed to strengthen local government performance.

Evidently, the most attractive incentive for which LGs would strive to fulfil MCs and PMs was to obtain the PBG under the DDF. After the first round of LG assessment in 2008, a total amount of US$ 31.9 million was allocated and disbursed to LGs that met the performance criterion (Kenya 2011). Since LGs that could not meet the MCs were eligible for capacity building grants, ‘A’ Metropolitan and the ‘C’ district Assemblies received a capacity building grant of ¢19,683.53 each while the ‘B’ Municipal Assembly received an amount of ¢534,149.82 as its share of PBG. The situation improved slightly during the second round of assessment in 2009 because with a performance score of 59%, the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly received ¢598,601.37; ‘B’ Municipal Assembly with a score of 66% received ¢622,935.61 compared to ¢535, 793.16 awarded to ‘C’ District for having scored 61%. The total amount of funds under the DDF also increased by 43.4% with a total allocation of $56.4 million disbursed to LGs.

In 2013, an amount of US$60.8 million was set aside for LGs that fulfilled the MCs and PMs. This amounted to GH¢145.9 million based on an exchange rate of GH¢2.40 to US$1.00 and categorised as follows:

2 Recruitment of independent consultants through a competitive process in line with the Public Procurement Law is expected to reduce perverse incentives in the sense that no single consultancy firm is certain of getting hired, thereby reducing the risk of collision, favouritism and other forms of corruption that may arise between the consultants and the LGs that are assessed.

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 Investment Grant comprising:  Basic Grant (20%) GH¢29,184,000.00  Performance Grant (68%) GH¢99,225,600.00  Capacity Building (12%) GH¢17, 510,400.00.

As shown in table 7.5 above, 205 out of a total of 216 LGs met the Minimum Conditions in 2013 whilst only 3 out of the 46 newly created districts failed to meet the Minimum conditions. LG officials see this as satisfactory. In addition, the national average in terms of local governments’ fulfilment of Performance Measures (PMs) significantly increased from 47.4 in 2008 to 86.4% in 2013. Disbursement of performance grants indicated that the Accra Metropolitan Assembly received the highest allocation (GH¢3,558,006) followed by Kumasi metropolitan Assembly (GH¢3,216,976) whilst Adenta Municipal Assembly received the lowest allocation (GH¢381,315.00) throughout the country.

Apart from the monetary incentive which has been a key motivating factor for LGs to achieve performance indicators under the DDF FOAT, the initiative appears to have an impact on the behaviour of LG officials in performing their duties. For instance, the employees of local authorities feel under pressure to fulfil minimum conditions and performance measures set out in the FOAT. This is particularly true for staffs that are directly responsible for preparing documents and providing information required for the assessment. A Chief Executive emphasised that:

“No officer wants the assembly (LG) to lose additional development funds because they fail to perform their duty. But there are some officers who sometimes hold the whole assembly to ransom by failing to prepare and submit reports we need to score high marks during the assessment. Under such circumstances, the department responsible for providing that information should be prepared to take the blame but the heads of departments are usually not ready to take responsibility” [Field data, interview transcript from ‘B’ municipality].

In reality, the concern expressed above has serious implications for the conduct of performance assessment. It reflects deep seated intra organisational issues such as conflict between bureaucrats and the political heads of the LGs. This was confirmed by a head of department who reiterated that:

“The politician does not appreciate our contribution to the performance score we get as well as the funds we receive as a 163

result. Why then should I “kill” myself for the Assembly when the Chief Executive thinks he’s the one responsible for our performance? They have been calling me to come and I refused because I have been posted to a different district where my work will be appreciated” [Field data, interview transcript from ‘B’ Municipality].

Discontent and dissatisfaction as expressed by the interviewee above is quite common and often result in perverse behaviours. There were several instances where heads of departments lacked cordial working relations with their political superiors and this adversely affected their commitment to the LG. To facilitate the fulfilment of MCs and PMs, some LGs surreptitiously generated documents for activities and projects that were non-existent. Such impropriety and dishonesty in an attempt to score higher performance scores was endorsed by the leadership of some LGs who sometimes feigned ignorant of the practice. Interestingly, some of these concocted documents were also used by the assemblies to balance their financial statements to meet auditing purposes.

In spite of these practical realities that went unnoticed by the assessment teams, the DDF FOAT was perceived by LG officials as a useful source of building their organisational capacities. Unlike the DACF that has become notoriously infamous for its incessant delays, funds awarded under the DDF can be predicted accurately in ways that fulfil the forecasts of LGs. Moreover, compelling local authorities to spend their DDF allocations on ‘community benefiting’ projects is seen as one of the best-practice values of the initiative. In the words of a Chief Executive:

“One good thing about the DDF is that right from the top it is being monitored and the Assembly can only use the money to fund projects on its shopping list. We strictly follow the codes of expenditure that insist on physical structures. For instance you cannot use DDF money to buy equipment for the office; you cannot use DDF money to build an office. They have their priority, and they insist on community and so any expenditure that is not community benefiting is not allowed” [Field data; interview transcript from ‘C’ district].

From an organisational development perspective, one could argue that perhaps the most important aspect of the DDF is the attempt to strengthen LGs which allows consultants to identify organisational capacity gaps and to prescribe recommendations for action3. From the

3 Capacity building needs encompass skills development, logistics and organisational needs such as establishing a database, effective accounting and revenue mobilisation systems.

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CBG component of the DDF, 60% is allocated to LGs on a demand-driven basis and 40% is allocated to the DDF Secretariat at the Ministry of Local Government, the LGSS and the ILGS to run the DDF Secretariat and carry out activities related to the performance enhancing policy such as organising LG assessments, recruiting, training and paying consultants. In 2013, the total capacity building grant component amounted to GH¢17,510,400.00 of which 60% (GH¢10,506,240.00) was allocated for demand-driven activities at the LG level and 40% (GH¢7,004,160.00) allocated to the DDF secretariat for generic capacity building activities.

7.4 Formulation of performance indicators under the DDF-FOAT, stakeholder expectation and perceptions

The role of performance indicators (PIs) in assessing organisational performance cannot be underestimated. Even though the use of performance indicators is often seen as a technical issue, perception about their impact in politically charged contexts are worth analysing due to potential doubts about their neutrality. The situation is not different in Ghana given that LGs are political organisations where varying and competing interests characterise the agenda of LGs. It was therefore imperative to understand people’s perceptions of the functional organisational assessment tool which is used to allocate performance based grants under the DDF. It emerged that research participants had different views with regard to the origin and significance of PIs under the DDF. Respondents at the LG level saw the MCs and PMs as pre-packaged bureaucratic requirements imposed on them by donors and the CG in a top-down manner. This claim implies that central government agencies that oversee the policy are more influential in determining what counts as a MC or a PM compared to the target beneficiaries at the community level. Indeed, the exclusion of local communities in defining performance indicators for LGs can only widen existing unequal balance of power and influence over the choice of performance indicators despite the fact that ordinary citizens in local communities are better placed to determine whether LGs are performing in accordance with their expectation and priorities or not.

Interestingly, not all the research participants had equal knowledge about the DDF due to their different levels of involvement in managing LG performance. For instance, civil servants tended to know more about the performance management system compared to elected assembly members and community groups. Since discussions at General Assembly meetings cover a wide range of issues including financial inflows to the assemblies, knowledge on the DDF was

165 expected to be high but this was not the case. Perhaps, this confirms the assertion that policy discussions within LG are abstract and deliberated in a language that makes it difficult for ordinary Assembly members to comprehend (Crook and Manor 1998). No wonder some elected Assembly members who participated in this study even attempted to dismiss the DDF as performance management framework; a position that could be attributed to inadequate knowledge about the initiative. In contrast, not only is there consensus amongst LG officials that DDF-FOAT assessment constitutes the most formalised performance management framework for LGs in Ghana, it is further touted by officials of the MLGRD and the donor agencies as a best practice performance management system aimed at motivating and raising standards of LGs performance. Perhaps, contrary to views about the FOAT as the ‘Holy Grail’ for improving the performance of LGs in Ghana, one could hypothesise that involving civil society in the implementation of the DDF FOAT and in managing the performance of LGs could activate citizens’ concerns and aspirations in relation to the performance of their LGs (Ho and Coates 2004;Melkers and John Clayton 1998). It is argued that “engaging the public in administrative decision making is normatively desirable and can bring about important educative and empowering benefits to citizens and communities” (Neshkova and Guo 2012). Hence, more education on the significance of the DDF is probably needed in local communities before its objective of enhancing accountability can be realised.

Nevertheless, it was noticed that whereas LG officials recognised the DDF FOAT as a mechanism for exerting pressure on them to perform their functions, popular expectation about the initiative was rather mixed between interviewees at central and local government levels. According to civil servants at the CG level, the performance-enhancing policy must be seen as an incentive for encouraging LGs to satisfactorily follow appropriate administrative procedure rather than a viewing it as a framework for measuring the success of service delivery. In the words of an officer at the Ministry of Local Government:

“The DDF is not a measurement of service delivery; it is an assessment to distribute money, to provide an incentive to local governments. But it is not created to measure the extent of success in terms of service delivery” [Field data; interview transcript, MLGRD].

There is an implicit assumption that the mechanism examines the extent to which LGs follow laid down administrative and regulatory procedures in performing their functions which by

166 extension, connects to the development of local communities. Hence, by assessing LG performance using MCs and PMs, CG does not only supervise the performance of LGs but also demand higher performance from LGs on behalf of citizens. Ironically, the views of unit committee members about the DDF were not entirely different from those of elected assembly members. To confirm their limited knowledge about the initiative, participants of FGDs were generally not sure about the way the DDF operates, how much their LGs had been awarded, how the funds have been used and in most cases, they were unaware whether their communities had benefited from the DDF or not. Obviously, there seem to have been no community sensitisation prior to the introduction of the DDF and since performance grants are expected to be spent on community development projects, it was unclear how residents of beneficiary communities could demand value for money from LG officials without knowing much about the district development facility. In the following section, the extent to which the DDF FOAT is able to address the multiple aspects and or dimensions of LG performance is examined.

7.5 Analysis of DDF FOAT in managing local government performance in Ghana: A balance score card approach

In the previous section, the DDF-FOAT was analysed to demonstrate how the system operates in allocating performance-based incentives to LGs in Ghana. It also explored interviewees’ perceptions about the formulation of performance indicators under the policy initiative. This section builds on that by critically examining the extent to which the DDF FOAT captures multiple dimensions of LG performance consistent with the underlying principles of balance scorecard (BSC) concept (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). The BSC is appropriate not only because it provides generic inter-related perspectives that are carefully chosen to provide information for better management but also because it provides a methodological framework for assessing managerial decisions and for gauging performance improvements (McAdam and Walker 2003). The value added for applying the BSC in this study does not only further our understanding of the scope of the DDF-FOAT as a strategy for promoting LG performance; it could also reveal the limitations of a top-down approach to managing LG performance.

As illustrated in figure 7.2 below, the BSC is adapted by categorising the most important and recurrent themes in the data under each of its 4 perspectives. In view of the fact that the DDF FOAT is a performance management system, it is placed at the centre of the BSC as a strategy for LG performance. Thus, the FOAT is analysed to unravel the extent to which it targets, enhances or ignore the various factors identified under each component of the framework

167 proposed for the analysis. Importantly, the mission of LGs is conceived as containing the overarching goal of LGs, one which drives them to satisfy the citizenry and beneficiaries of LG services. This analogy follows the presumption that LGs, as public organisations, do not typically focus on making profits but rather seek to serve the public good. For this reason, the citizens’ perspective is considered as the most crucial of all the four (4) perspectives as conceived in this study.

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Figure 7. 2: The balance scorecard approach

Mission / vision of local governments

Citizen’s perspective

 Community participation

 Satisfaction with LG performance

Internal process Financial perspective perspective  The effectiveness of  Leadership style of LGs budgeting LG managers DDF FOAT as a  Expenditure and strategy for local  Effectiveness of investments development government planning and performance  Revenue generation

 Human resource capacity and team work

Learning and innovation perspective

 Knowledge Management

 Use of ICTs

Author’s construct, adapted from Kaplan and Norton (1992)

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7.5.1 Financial performance

Even though the bottom line for LG performance is not to make profit, local authorities are expected to efficiently and effectively utilise their limited financial resources to provide basic services. Meanwhile, Olowu and Smoke (1992) argue that many LGs in Africa have a low record of financial performance, and for which reason, the analysis of [financial] performance must focus on the following:

i) The budget balance sheet: based on the assumption that a successful local government should have surpluses than deficits within a period of 5 years; ii) Major local revenue sources (direct local taxes, user charges and intergovernmental transfers) should generally increase over time; and iii) Local expenditures, both recurrent and capital, should support a range of significant social and infrastructural services and grow at a reasonable rate.

This view is important in the Ghanaian context where LGs’ ability to productively invest in development projects and generate sufficient revenue give important hints about their performance. Even though the central government, donor agencies and sometimes non- governmental organisations provide funds to LGs to specifically implement priority projects and programmes, the DACF was evidently by far the major source of financial inflows to LGs but was inadequate to address all their financial needs. Furthermore, internally generated funds was found to be abysmally low in smaller districts where the absence of viable commercial activities limited the revenue base of local government authorities compared to urban areas where the operation of numerous businesses widens the revenue base of LGs.

To determine whether the DDF-FOAT mechanism assesses local government’s financial performance, three important themes emerged from the data as the most important variables of financial performance. These were then analysed to understand whether or not, the financial indicators of the FOAT addresses them. They are as follows:

1) The effectiveness of LGs budgeting; 2) Expenditure and investments; 3) Revenue generation.

To operationalise the themes enumerated above, it is conceived that a LG runs an effective budget if that budget is directly linked to the MTDP and up to 75% of it is implemented as planned. Also, expenditures and investments of LGs are required to be development oriented by prioritizing physical infrastructure projects and social services. Furthermore, internally generated funds, such as revenue from basic rates, royalties, property rates; fees, licenses and permits should be sufficient to cater for recurrent expenses. It was however observed that none of these issues was explicitly targeted by the FOAT’s indicators but are rather treated broadly at different levels. One would have expected the MCs on financial management, accounting and public procurement to have a direct link with these issues but that appears not to be the case.

How does the FOAT then assist LGs to improve upon their performance in the areas enumerated above? To answer this question, it was obvious that LGs had to submit documents to the independent consultants to justify how they had complied with the legal and regulatory frameworks in performing their functions. For example, independent consultants had to scrutinise monthly financial statements such as trial balances of LGs that had been submitted to the office of the Controller and Accountant General and then verify that management letters accompanying financial audit reports did not highlight financial irregularities. These are checked to ensure that budgets are effectively followed as planned. On capital investments, acceptable procurement procedures must be followed to avoid financial malpractices and corruption. This means that LGs that fulfilled the MC on procurement prepared procurement plans based on which procurement decisions were made. But from the nature of the assessment process, one could argue that regardless of how significant it is for LGs to effectively implement their budgets, generate reasonable revenue and invest in critical social infrastructure, the MCs of the FOAT alone seems to be insufficient to stimulate financial performance of LGs. This is supported by the fact that fulfilling the MCs is entirely based on financial records that may not necessarily represent the actual reality on the ground. There have been instances where financial records have been subjectively interpreted by assessment teams and their decisions challenged by LG officials. Such disagreements can be attributed to the absence of weights assigned to MC in awarding performance scores.

In contrast to the MCs, PMs on financial management and auditing, fiscal capacity and procurement appear to focus on the financial performance of LGs. To fulfil the indicators under these performance measures, LG managers had to show that budget committees 171

were functional and complied with budgetary provisions and procedures in disbursing funds. Thus, in the local authorities that were able to meet this performance measure, it suggests that LG managers sought budgetary approval from the General Assembly, estimated revenue targets and were responsive to both internal and external audit queries. It also means that for LGs to demonstrate their fiscal capacity, they did not only have to raise a significant amount of Internally Generated Funds (IGF) but had to draw plans on how to improve upon their IGF situation. Also, LGs that could mobilise their own revenue to fund development activities were awarded an extra mark to their performance scores. Despite the presumption that LGs that have a good IGF record are able to cater for their recurrent expenditures, the evidence suggested otherwise in the ‘A’ Metropolis, which had an enviable record of IGF and yet, operation and maintenance expenses were excessively costly to the extent that allocating IGF to development projects was almost impossible. Nonetheless, the MTDPs and performance review reports of LGs were analysed to understand how these issues are being tackled. Table 7.6 presents the objectives and measures that LGs have proposed to improve upon their financial performance.

Table 7. 6: Common measures for dealing with financial performance of LGs

Performance Objective(s) Initiatives issue Budget Ensure fiscal Strengthen budget committees; harmonise LG Effectiveness prudence in budgets with MTDPs; organise periodic budget financing local briefings and awareness campaigns. level development Procurement, Improve public Develop more effective data collection methods for expenditures and expenditure monitoring public expenditure; comply with investments management contract management and procurement procedures; develop and implement asset management systems. Revenue Improve resource Minimize revenue collection leakages by re- generation mobilization constituting revenue collection teams (including market management committees); implement daily payment of revenue collected and return of used/completed copies of tickets issued for inspection before new ones are issued; setting competitive revenue targets for revenue staff.

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Source: author, based on MTDPs of LGs

The objectives and strategies presented in table 7.6 were needed for a number of reasons. Firstly, the relevance of budget and rating departments of LGs appears to be diminishing because Chief Executives often ignore development plans and budgets by misapplying funds on projects that were neither pre-planned nor budgeted for. Secondly, and related to the first point, Chief Executives of LGs are too powerful and often utilise funds without recourse to the interest of the general public. Thirdly, LG’s ability to meet revenue targets has become a daunting task due to leakages along the chain of revenue mobilisation even though in some cases, low income generation is attributed to the creation of new districts which often spark boundary disputes between LGs with consequences on revenue generation prospects but in other cases, LG officials did not follow stipulated regulations on financial management. To buttress how LG managers flout financial regulations, a finance officer remarked:

“Can you imagine that sometimes, the political head announces at a meeting that the Assembly will be buying streetlights? Even though this huge expenditure item may not be in the Assembly’s budget, in that situation what do you do? To please him, you have to find a way of bringing it on board. To avoid a situation like this, we advise him to include his priority projects in the plan so that we can budget for it” [Field data; interview transcript from ‘B’ Municipality]

The above quotation confirm reports that personal interests of LG managers and their involvement in unacceptable contract management and procurement procedures has often led to corruption at the LG level (Ghana Audit Service 2010). Meanwhile, due to the importance of local revenue mobilisation to the financial performance of LGs, data on major revenue heads were compared to understand the extent to which targets were met. Table 7.7 presents revenue targets and actual revenue collected between 2006 -2009 and shows important disparities in LG’s revenue generation capacities. For example in 2006, ‘A’ metro exceeded most of its revenue targets by collecting 120% of rates, 112% in fees and fines, 112% in licenses/business operating permits and 104% from its investments including rent from stores. However, the Assembly could not maintain that trend in 2007 when it failed to meet most of its targets even though it achieved targets for land (100%) and business operating permits (111%). In 2006, the ‘B’ municipality exceeded its targets for permits on land (107%) business operating permits (124%) and investments (139%)

173 compared to its revenue performance on rates (50%) and rent (64%) that were not met. The ‘C’ district also exceeded its targets on land permits by 765% in 2007, 125% in 2008 and 156% in 2009. Even though none of the district’s IGF targets was met in 2006, the ‘C’ district assembly exceeded three targets in 2009, making it the period within which most of its IGF targets were realised.

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Table 7. 7: Internally generated funds of selected local government authorities from 2006 to 2009 in cedis (¢)

Revenue MMDA 2006 2007 2008 2009 Item Estimated Actual % of Estimated Actual % of Estimated Actual % of Estimated Actual % of (¢) (¢) target (¢) (¢) target (¢) (¢) target (¢) (¢) target ‘A’ Metro 1,127,0 30 1,350,302 120 972,000 965,195 99 1,350,000 1,395,907 103 1,390,000 1,194,653 86 Rates ‘B’ Municipal 77,934 38,741 50 78,441 41,060 52 123,480 90,468 73 164,201 137,437 84 ‘C’ District 22,260 9,577 43 22,260 7,281 33 22,260 17,349 78 40,000 31,241 78 ‘A’ Metro - - 12,607 12,607 100 13,000 - 13,000 - Permits ‘B’ Municipal 10,500 11,246 107 15,375 13,165 86 14,640 10,768 74 15,545 13,540 87 (lands) ‘C’ District 1,530 1,219 80 1,530 11,700 765 1,530 1,915 125 30,000 46,912 156 ‘A’ Metro 1,208,317 1,350,819 112 1,603,928 1,440,539 90 1,789,149 1,696,904 95 1,909,020 1,671,722 88 Fees and ‘B’ Municipal 322,278 277,736 86 354,668 322,050 91 413,220 299,688 73 310,050 297,457 96 fines ‘C’ District 28,800 13,542 47 28,800 14,383 50 28,800 11,000 38 28,800 23,845 83 ‘A’ Metro 80,469 89,952 112 1,071,862 1,190,996 111 1,138,144 1,175,084 103 1,297,567 1,243,030 96 Licenses ‘B’ Municipal 53,327 66,595 125 82,153 59,769 73 105,070 53,287 51 70,000 64,610 92 (BOP) ‘C’ District 4,756 2,037 43 4,756 4,614 97 4,756 1,618 34 4,858 3,182 66 ‘A’ Metro 5,700 4,646 82 5,000 7,019 140 21,500 17,909 83 14,000 11,674 83 Rent ‘B’ Municipal 10,848 6,975 64 11,076 17,661 159 20,740 9,279 45 10,000 8,959 90 income ‘C’ District 3,500 1,773 51 3,150 2,649 84 3,150 1,597 51 3,150 5,022 159 ‘A’ Metro 5,500 5,746 104 4,500 2,965 66 2,000 1,562 78 15,000 60,972 406 ‘B’ Municipal 400 554 139 1,000 206 21 400 2,684 671 3,350 2,957 88 Investment ‘C’ District 2,460 456 19 2,460 1,544 63 2,460 1,304 53 3,000 3,579 119 ‘A’ Metro 2,427,016 2,801,465 (115.4%) 3,669,897 3,619,321 (98.6%) 4,313,793 4,287,366 (99.4%) 4,638,587 4,182,051 (90.2%) Total ‘B’ Municipal 475,287 401,847 (84.5%) 542,713 453,911 (83.6%) 677,550 466,174 (68.8%) 573,146 524,960 (91.6) ‘C’ District 63,306 28,604 (45.2%) 62,956 42,171 (67%) 62,956 34,783 (55.2%) 109,808 113,781 (104%) Source: authors, based on data from selected local governments

Despite the fact that some revenue targets were exceeded as shown from table 7.7, both ‘B’ Municipal Assembly and ‘C’ District were unable to meet their overall annual IGF targets compared to ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly during the period under review. In fact, the collection of rates, land permits, licenses, fees and fines were significantly lower in ‘B’ municipality compared to both ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘C’ Districts despite its vibrant commercial centre. One would expect rent obtained from market stores to have been higher than the 64% and 45% of the targets recorded in 2006 and 2008 respectively. Comparatively, revenue in the ‘A’ Metropolis is one of the highest in Ghana, sometimes, higher than their share of the District Assembly Common Fund; the major central government grant to local authorities. Also, revenue is relatively higher in the ‘A’ Metropolis not only because of urbanisation and the operation of heavy factories and industries that pay the LGs property rates and fees for permits but also because the metropolitan assembly has an effective revenue task force. It is unlikely that LGs in the ‘B’ Municipality and ‘C’ Districts would be able to raise similar revenues without having the potentials and institutional structures that enable the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly to mobilise such huge sums of money as its IGF. Figure 7.3 shows the relative revenue performance of the 3 Assemblies.

Figure 7. 3: Targets of internally generated funds achieved between 2006 and 2006

Percentage of internally generated funds (2006-2009)

120 100 80 60 40 20

Internal revenue target achieved target revenue Internal 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 A Metropolitan Assembly 115.4 98.6 99.4 90.2 B Municipal Assembly 84.5 83.6 68.8 91.6 C District Assembly 45.2 67 55.2 104

Source: author, based on data from selected local governments.

As indicated above, the notable revenue record in ‘A’ Metropolis can be attributed to the formation of a proactive revenue task force which is given high targets to meet. The budget and rating office is headed by an experienced officer whose vision is to widen the revenue basket by ensuring that the LG generates funds from marriage registrations, vehicle licensing, housing and building permits, business operating permits and permits for outdoor advertisements. These sources of revenue, which are also available to the ‘B’ Municipal Assembly and the ‘C’ district, are yet to be taken seriously. This is crucial for LGs since the mobilisation of low revenue weakens their financial status and adversely affects their capacity to facilitate local level development. Meanwhile, because local governments do not have control over the timing and the amount of funds they receive from central government and donor agencies, one would expect local councils to generate more funds internally especially to cater for their recurrent expenditure. This is however not the case for a number of reasons.

First, the revenue base is weak and small in less urbanised areas and database on potential sources of revenue is often lacking. Secondly, revenue targets are often ambitious despite the fact that LGs may not be proactive in their attempt to achieve those targets. Thirdly, there are reports of serious leakages in the revenue mobilisation process driven by unprofessional conduct of some revenue collectors who either fail to collect revenues from people with whom they have close interpersonal relations or sometimes even when funds are collected, they are unaccounted for. Thus, financial records of most LG raise concerns about the accuracy of IGF since revenue may not truly reflect the exact amount of funds collected. Also, political impropriety in the management of LG finances is an open secret in most LGs in Ghana and these concerns lend legitimacy to demand for transparency and accountability in the management of local government finances. Furthermore, a remote but important obstacle to revenue mobilisation relates to the inability of LGs to enforce their own byelaws. This is exacerbated by frustration associated with slow legal processes which tend to undermine LGs’ ability to prosecute people, including staffs that defy financial management laws. Interviewees felt this emboldens potential lawbreakers due to the perception that when people fail to pay their property rates or any other revenue due the Assemblies, nothing can be done to them.

Ultimately, the consequences of inadequate funds and poor financial managements create a situation where LG are unable to perform their functions effectively. Probably worse than what Olowu and Smoke (1992) found in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the situation even 177 becomes worse when ordinary and basic administrative processes grind to a halt due to lack of funds. In the Brong Ahafo and Northern regions where IGF is very low, LGs face problems in holding General Assembly meetings. A senior official expressed concern that:

“If we organise an assembly meeting now and there is no money to pay the sitting allowance of the assembly members, there will be a stalemate because they will hound us and put pressure on management to find money to pay them. Meanwhile, the IGF is supposed to be used for recurrent expenditure but our low revenue base makes it difficult for us to pay them” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘B’ Municipal Assembly].

As the highest decision making body, General Assembly meetings are extremely important and for that reason, LGs struggle to convene a minimum of at least 3 meetings in every fiscal year. The quotation above further reinforces claims about different motives behind General Assembly meetings. For instance, LG managers did not only convene General Assembly meetings to obtain dejure approval to implement development projects and programmes, such meetings were also used to boost their performance score under the DDF FOAT. On the contrary, the main incentive for Assembly members (councillors) to participate in General Assembly meetings was largely driven by financial gains associated with these meetings. According to an elected member of the ‘C’ District Assembly:

“The work of the assembly member is voluntary and we are not paid a salary. It is only through assembly meetings that we get something small and can you imagine that we (assembly members) have met two times without the assembly paying our sitting allowance and that is why we will boycott the upcoming General Assembly meeting until all outstanding allowances are paid” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘C’ District].

As indicated above, the fact that Assembly members (councillors) are unremunerated is a problem LGs have to contend with but it does not appear many LGs have the solution to this problem due to the low revenues they generate. Certainly, the persistence of this problem is perceived by LG officials and elected assembly members as a serious affront to the performance of LGs. In sum, one could argue that the strategies outlined above could boost the effective mobilisation and utilisation of funds in accordance with statutory arrangements with the expectation that it will deepen transparency and accountability to 178 local communities. This is particularly useful given that numerous studies have reported the lack of accountability in disclosing LG finances and how it is used (Ayee 2004;Ayee 2008;Crawford 2009;Crook and Manor 1998;Crook 1994). Thanks to the DDF FOAT for making the disclosure of financial records a performance indicator. Even though LGs have been encouraged to disclose their finances to civil society and the general public by publishing their financial statements on notice boards within their premises this practice is often ignored until performance assessment is underway.

7.5.2 Internal process perspective

This dimension refers to intra-organisational features that significantly drive organisational performance. Underpinning this perspective of the BSC is the assumption that managers can look within the internal processes of an organisation to identify factors in which they must excel to meet the expectations of clients (Kaplan and Norton 1992). In the context of this study, the opinions of research participants tended to highlight factors they felt were crucial for the internal health of LGs. Even though they mentioned several issues as vital for the effectiveness of LGs, the data reduction process led to the following themes:

1) The leadership style of LG managers 2) Effectiveness of development planning and 3) Human resource capacity and team work

In order to examine the scope of the DDF FOAT with respect to these themes, the analysis focused on the degree to which the MCs and PMs address these themes in the evaluation of LG performance. It was found that while the MCs did not explicitly prescribe a preferred leadership style for the management of LGs, they did not also define parameters for HR capacity but 3 out of the 5 MCs were focused on planning related functions such as the functional capacity of development planning, plan implementation capacity and the functional capacity of the General Assembly. Thus, LGs that fulfilled these performance indicators had to demonstrate that key stakeholders such as project beneficiaries in local communities were consulted and that Assembly members and service providers were involved in formulating, implementing and monitoring development plans4. Similarly, the FOAT also encourages quick project completion rates, harmonizing budgets with plans,

4 Minutes of meetings and records are crossed checked to verify whether 80-100% of the non-physical programmes involved the participation of key stakeholders. A score of 1 is awarded if participation was promoted and if there was no evidence of participation then a score of 0 is given. 179 internal monitoring and evaluation of projects and initiating projects to support poor and vulnerable populations to minimise existing inequalities. Meanwhile, it was found that while plans were often harmonised with budgets (both main and supplementary budgets), LG managers took their leadership styles and their staff for granted since the MCs do not cover these issues in assessing LG performance.

With respect to PMs, ‘human resource capacity’, ‘planning system’ as well as ‘management and organisation’ are treated as independent performance measures with different weights which ranks planning functions as more important compared to management and human resource issues 5. Meanwhile, the human resource policy of the Local Government Service of Ghana recognises the need to recruit highly qualified and motivated staff that will be committed to facilitating local government performance (LGSS 2009). It is believed that the right combination of knowledge, skills, experience and attitudes are necessary for meeting increased demand for quality services. As one would expect, the FOAT’s performance measure on HRM assesses staff vacancies of LGs, as well as training and skills development needs. In practice, LGs had to update their staff ledger every three months to reflect the numerical status of their employees to show staff vacancy levels and to prove that training need assessments have been conducted and implemented. In addition, they were also required to demonstrate that job applications made to fill available vacancies have been acted upon. Beyond these conditions, performance indicators did not set targets to assess individual work output and had no provisions for rewarding or sanctioning employees in accordance with their performance output.

Nonetheless, since an in-depth assessment of the internal processes can help managers identify issues or concerns than can be changed or reformed to make citizens more satisfied with LG performance, the opinions of research participants on these internal drivers of LG performance were sought to explain how they impacted on LG performance. Understanding their views was necessary to interpret the strategies LG have planned to improve upon their internal processes. For instance, there was consensus amongst respondents that the status of LG performance primarily depended on the vision and style of Chief Executives and the Coordinating Directors who manage the local government

5 The maximum scores are now 6 for human resource management (used to be 7), 9 for organisational management (used to be 10), and 18 for development planning (used to be 16). This suggests that HRM and organisational management have lost weight/value to development planning.

180 authorities. Meanwhile, the objectives set by the political leadership of local authorities appeared to be a microcosm of the political goal of the central government, which is to create a ‘better Ghana’. It is important to emphasise that this overarching vision of LGs in Ghana turn out to be vague based on claims about the role of LG managers in facilitating organisational performance. The controversy stems from the perception amongst many LG staff and Assembly Members that the political heads frustrate rather than enable local level development. This has become a major cause of apathy and dissatisfaction among LG staff. This perception had earlier on caught the attention of Ayee (1997) who believe that frustration at the institutional level is the result of LGs’ inability to improve development performance whilst Crook (1994) further claim the lack of tangible development results has undermined the creation of a more legitimate and responsive form of government at the local level in Ghana. To Ayee (1997:41) “the marginal performance of LGs can be attributed to the absence of political direction and leadership of the bureaucracy, centralized nature of government and administration, lack of financial resources, poor calibre of personnel, the failure of the DAs themselves to maximize the revenue resources available to them and a poor and erratic commitment to development and services as demonstrated by their actual expenditure patterns and widespread corruption”.

While LG managers who were interviewed in this study did not share these views, a fair assessment of LG leadership should be critical of the FOAT’s quest to improve LG performance especially when indicators do not seem to improve the managerial qualities of Chief Executives, Coordinating Directors and members of staff. For example, instead of explicitly making LG managers the target, it is surprising that the performance measures on organisational management only seek to confirm the existence and functioning of Executive Committees of LGs and their sub-committees and whether public buildings are fit for use by people with physical disabilities. Thus, the presumption that LG managers will automatically offer the type of leadership that will have ripple effects on other issues such as getting the right calibre of staff into the local authority and facilitating effective planning outcomes was inconclusive. However, it was observed that the style of leadership had implications for staff commitment and team spirit within LGs. For instance, in the ‘C’ District where the Chief Executive appeared to be visionary and transformational in his management style, the mood of his subordinates was positive and cooperative compared to ‘B’ Municipality where staff were generally dissatisfied because they felt the Chief Executive was autocratic and divisive. Yet, there were no indicators to gauge the level of staff morale and team work even though LG officials who participated in this study felt 181 these attributes were essential for job satisfaction and ultimately for organisational performance. Given the inability of performance indicators to cover issues that emerged as crucial for operational performance of the LGs in this research, it was important to examine how they were positioning themselves to improve upon their internal processes in order to satisfy the general public. Hence in table 7.8, key objectives and strategies outlined in the MTDPs of LGs to fulfil key drivers of internal processes are presented.

Table 7. 8: Measures to improve internal processes

Performance Objective Initiatives issue Leadership style To accelerate Organise regular public dialogue (town of LG managers development under ‘the hall meetings); follow up and review better Ghana Agenda’ milestones of key departments of the Assembly; promote collaboration with traditional authorities, etc. Effectiveness of Encourage effective Activate district sub-structures; undertake development participatory frequent community hearings and planning community sensitization programmes on community development action planning; encourage participatory monitoring and evaluation of projects Human resource To recruit and retain Staff training (demand driven); encourage the right staff to deliver capacity and team staff participation at capacity building quality services to the work people and to achieve workshops; promote training of trainers; LG targets. freedom to join labour unions (LGWU and CLOSAG) Source: author, based on MTDPs of LGs

Arguably, the objectives and strategies outlined in the MTDPs of LG manifested differently in the 3 regions. For example, town hall meetings were rarely held as such, but events such as cultural festivals and durbars were considered and recorded in LG documents as town hall meetings even though such meetings were not used to collate citizens’ opinions about LG performance. The inability to hold community hearings was attributed to lack of funds. At the organisational level, it was noticed that apart from the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly where there was a department in charge of HR, the other LGs

182 only had relatively smaller personnel offices that kept staff files and distributed salary/pay- slips. In all the LGs, human resource plans showed how LG officials seem to be obsessed with ‘capacity building’ a phrase that loosely refers to training6. It is quite obvious from table 7.8 that the strategies on human resource management focused more on training and staff development even though performance indicators under the DDF-FOAT focuses on staff vacancies, LG plans did not show how personnel vacancies could be addressed. This is not surprising because local government authorities in Ghana do not directly recruit staff but rather depend on the Office of the Head of Civil Service and the Local Government Service Secretariat for staff recruitment and posting (Bukari Zakaria and Mamman 2014;Awortwi 2011). Hence, the performance indicator on staff vacancies appears irrelevant because it is beyond the control of LGs in spite of the fact that LGs need to have qualified personnel to function effectively.

In terms of training, a distinction is made between those organised by other organisations that invite LG officials to participate and those that are planned and budgeted for by LGs and implemented in-house. It was found that all the LGs prepared capacity building plans that were at various stages of implementation. In the ‘A’ Metropolis, an amount of GH¢59, 649 was set aside for these trainings compared to GH¢34,500 in the ‘C’ District in 2011 alone. The location of training workshops was important for LG officials. It was obvious that LG officials preferred to attend workshops in Accra or in the regional capitals. Workshops in Accra were considered to be superior because it often involves attractive travelling allowances and provided opportunities for networking. It was confirmed that the MLGRD has a partnership with the Institute of Local Government Studies, Management Development and Productivity Institute and the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration to develop leadership skills of newly appointed LG managers (DCEs, Coordinating Directors and Presiding Members) for every session of the Assembly. And yet, under the CB component of the DDF, LG managers’ tended to disproportionately benefit from capacity building budgets compared to chairmen of sub-committees and officials in charge of Finance, Planning, Budget, Audit and Engineering departments. It is therefore imperative for LG managers to recognise that in order for staff to be equipped with requisite knowledge and new ideas related to their field, it is important to draw beneficiaries of capacity building workshops from different departments in order to

6 This has its origin in donor assistance dating back to the 1980s when public sector reforms were introduced to address ‘capacity challenges of weak institutions’. Currently, the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly and the ‘C’ District Assembly are part of 50 LGs benefiting from a joint EU-Government of Ghana fund to set up HRM units (LGSS, 2009).

183 improve competences in financial management, budgeting and auditing, procurement and contract management, project management, monitoring and evaluation, administrative skills, records management, as well plan preparation, revenue mobilisation and gender mainstreaming into the work of LGs.

This is important because research participants were in favour of expanding and supporting junior officers to upgrade their skills because the overall performance score of LGs depended on the output and accuracy of documents and performance information for each department. For this reason, selecting administrative staff from LG registries for training was seen as a priority because it strengthens their capacity to keep up to date information on organisational performance. Nonetheless, in the ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘C’ Districts, it was revealed that the registry’s ability to collate performance information also depended on the supply of performance information by decentralised departments for filing. Meanwhile, there were instances when lack of coordination between different departments undermined the sharing of performance information and this had consequences on team spirit within the LG.

In sum, two issues from the foregoing discussion are worth mentioning. First, it is evident from the findings that LGs will have to tackle a host of issues if the expectations of their constituents have to be met. This implies that conscious attempts must be made to identify public preferences in terms of service delivery or ideals such as open and transparent LG administration. Secondly, applying the internal process perspective of the BSC to analyse performance indicators under the DDF FOAT provides counterfactual evidence which revealed certain limitations of the performance policy initiative in targeting what LGs themselves perceive as the most important factors for operational excellence. Hence, performance indicators that seek to improve upon LG processes and operational performance need to be aligned to priorities outlined in MTDPs of LGs that have the same objective. Without such alignment, the value of the DDF FOAT to enable LGs meet the expectations of the citizenry will be difficult if not impossible. The next section examines the performance enhancing policy from a citizens’ perspective.

7.5.3 Citizens perspective

The adaptability of the BSC in non-profit organisations is one of its strengths especially when the mission of the organisation is regarded as a top priority (Kaplan and Norton, 184

2001). In this study, the citizens perspective of LG performance is conceived as the most important factor to consider in managing LG performance because the mission of LGs are often directed towards society’s needs and the improvement of public welfare (Boyne, 2002). In the context of using the BSC to explain the scope of performance indicators under the DDF FOAT, it is imperative to examine whether or not the policy initiative creates space for citizens’ participation in assessing LG performance and whether performance indicators target broader goals and aspirations of citizens. Some experts believe that considering citizens as customers and getting them involved in designing, implementing and evaluating performance management systems help to improve service delivery (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).

In the case of Ghana, citizen’s participation in local governance tends to be superficial because elected members of the Assembly who represent local communities have minimal influence in steering the affairs of LGs (Crook and Manor, 1998). Even though previous research has noted local governments’ ambivalence to promote citizens’ participation in local government administration (Ayee 2004;Crawford 2009), it appears the DDF FOAT is missing the opportunity to address this concern. This is particularly problematic because none of the MCs and PMs explicitly targets citizens’ assessment of LG performance. Even though MCs on the functional capacity of the general assembly requires elected assembly members representing local communities to participate in general assembly meetings, the purpose of these meetings is neither to assess nor review the performance of local authorities. However, it is worth noting that the performance measure on planning system encourages LG managers to involve project beneficiaries and service providers in formulating community action plans. Similarly, in order to promote transparency and accountability, there is a performance measure which requires LGs to disseminate performance information and organisational achievements to the general public but in most cases, these possibilities for mobilising citizens’ interests, aspirations and expectations at the LG level leaves much to be desired. This can be attributed to a number of reasons.

First, it can be argued that 70% of the elected assembly members rarely represent the views of their constituents because mechanisms for receiving memoranda and problems facing local communities are not activated 7 . Secondly, the Development Planning and

7Assembly members are unable to organise debriefing meetings with opinion leaders within their communities before and after General Assembly meetings due to a plethora of reasons (mostly financial and apathy); a situation which is caused and reinforced by persistent bureaucratic capture within local government authorities.

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Coordinating Units (DPCUs) of LGs operate with limited budgets which makes it difficult for them to organise community fora to collate citizen’s needs and aspirations. In fact, the specific requirement of the FOAT for LGs to publish financial records on notice boards is mostly done in preparation for performance assessment rather than based upon a genuine commitment to supply the public with performance information. Within this context, the FOAT’s inability to examine LG performance from a citizen perspective does not only reveal its limitation in helping LGs to address people’s expectations, but also weakens their ability to effectively demand for accountability in terms of public services. On the basis of these findings, MTDPs of local government authorities were analysed to see whether they attempt to mobilise people’s perspectives about LG performance and if they do, try to understand the extent to which such efforts are effective. Table 7.9 presents some strategies of LGs that seek to improve upon citizens’ consultations.

Table 7. 9: Measures to improve upon citizen perspective of LG performance

Performance Objective Initiatives issue Citizen’s To mobilize Promote dialogue and feedback on the participation community support performance of the Assembly through regular for the community hearings; involve local community implementation of leaders in project monitoring and evaluation; MTDPs encourage the formulation of community action plans; revitalise sub-structures of the Assemblies. Citizen’s Manage public Establish public complaints desks and put public satisfaction with expectations on relations and complaints units into operation; service delivery service delivery Develop and implement communication strategies as prescribed under the GSGDA (eg, use of local media); collaborate with advocacy- oriented NGOs to carry out service satisfaction surveys; and encourage the establishment of consumer protection associations within the regions. Source: author, based on MTDPs of LGs

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It was found that all the LGs had plans of carrying out community hearings as part of their community engagement and development planning process. In the ‘C’ District for example, activities outlined to be undertaken by Unit Committees and Area Councils were budgeted for. It is important to emphasise that the ‘C’ District Assembly was the only local authority that could implement community participation activities between 2009 and 2012 because it received funding under the Northern Region Poverty Reduction Programme (NORPREP) to strengthen its sub-structures and for that reason, did not have to squeeze its lean budget to implement such activities. In the ‘B’ Municipality, only one out of three Zonal Councils was active because it had a chairman who was proactive and committed to keeping the Zonal Council in operation compared to the other two Zonal Councils whose members were discouraged for lack of funds to cater for operational costs. Throughout the three regions, LG managers recognised the need to interact more with citizens but were ironically hesitant in approving funds for such activities. An official bluntly expressed his views as follows:

“The truth is that our leaders do not like approving funds for us to organise community fora and consult ordinary people in this district. It is frustrating when an officer has to keep on reminding the Coordinating Director to approve a simple budget. My brother, last year, I had to put pressure on him [Coordinating Director] before he reluctantly approved funds for community sensitization and project monitoring” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘B’ Municipal Assembly]

Interestingly, even in the ‘C’ District where LG officials frequently organised community consultations to collate and incorporate citizen’s needs and development priorities into the LG’s MTDP, there were no mechanisms for people to know whether their views were used or not. Obviously, there have been many instances where people complained about delays in the completion of projects in their communities but all their cries fell on deaf ears. Therefore, if the intention to open public complaints units within local government authorities will not end up being a mere rhetoric or public relations propaganda, they could be a significant turning point for LGs in Ghana especially in terms of receiving complaints and views from the general public. For this to be effective, one would expect LGs to implement service charters that were introduced in Ghana under the Kufour led government (Ohemeng 2010) or develop their own charters to serve as the basis on which citizens and service users would assess local government authorities.

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Based on the fact that performance indicators did not have a direct focus on citizens’ views of local government performance, it will be inconsequential to expect the evaluation of LG performance to reflect people’s perceptions of, and expectations from LGs. In this research, it was observed that the procedures and actors involved in formulating performance indicators under the DDF FOAT showed which of the principals of local government authorities was more powerful. For instance, the outright exclusion of local residents, community groups and service users in formulating performance indicators and from expressing their views about LG performance in meaningful ways implies that local governments will continue to satisfy their principals at the central government level (including donor agencies) at the expense of the actual beneficiaries of local government services. Under the prevailing circumstances in Ghana, measures are needed to ensure that ‘when citizens are engaged in defining results that matter, [it] becomes the standard for performance reporting and for achieving accountability’ (Sanger 2008: 581).

7.5.4 Learning and innovation

This perspective of the BSC focused on factors that are important for the continued success of an organisation. Kaplan and Norton (1992) note that since targets for outstanding performance keep changing, organisations are required to make continual improvements to their existing products and processes which largely depends on their ability to learn and to be innovative. This is why shifting from a bureaucratic to an innovative paradigm is crucial for organisational learning (Senge 2006) but ironically, it “is the very area in which performance measurement and management is weakest in local government” (Kloot and Martin 2000: 243). In the context of this study, it was therefore imperative to explore whether and how the DDF FOAT assists LGs to develop and sustain the ability to change, learn, adopt innovation and improve upon performance? Essentially, plausible answers to this question require lessons from all the other three perspectives since they highlight issues relating to personnel, technology, procedures and systems that LGs will need to develop in order to be successful (Quinlivan 2000).

Meanwhile, two important themes that emerged from the analysis of data as crucial for local governments’ learning and growth potentials were knowledge management and the adoption of innovative practices. In the context of this study, ‘knowledge management’ refers to ‘capacity building’, a term loosely used in the Ghanaian context to describe staff

188 training, provision of basic office equipment and logistics. It could also describe the ability to mainstream lessons learned through routine operations. And ‘innovation’ refers to a process through which new ideas, objects and practices are created, developed or reinvented and which are new and novel to the unit of adoption (Walker, 2006). In this research, it was observed that local government officials’ realisation of these aspirations would depend on the level of support they received both from within their organisation and from other organisations in the external environment. But does the DDF FOAT per se strategically help LGs to create a supportive climate that facilitate learning, innovation and growth? On the contrary, it turned out that the performance-enhancing policy does not explicitly have any performance indicators on learning or continuous improvement; neither does it focus on knowledge management and innovation. But indirectly, and based upon the diagnostic application of the FOAT, it can be argued that some form of what Argyris (2006) called ‘single loop learning’ is plausible whereby problems hindering LG performance can be identified and measures proposed to solve them rather than ‘double loop learning’; which refers to learning that produces a significant change in the assumptions and theories that people hold about cause and effect relationships.

For instance, in both ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘C’ District where the LGs could not fulfil the MCs under the FOAT in 2008, the evaluators identified certain problems relating to handling of performance information. Consequently, recommendations were made for the LGs to train their staff on record keeping to avoid a recurrence of performance information loss. Thus, it can be argued that initiatives that were taken to avoid failure in subsequent assessments were part and parcel of LG’s learning process. Similar lessons were drawn by LGs from implementing plans and submitting progress reports to the RCCs and other supervisory agencies at the central government level. These lessons did reveal key issues that needed to be changed for them to continue improving upon performance but the FOAT per se did not intrinsically change the values and goals of LG managers. In spite of this finding, MTDPs of LGs were analysed to understand measures identified to improve knowledge management and use of innovation. These are presented in table 7.10 below.

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Table 7. 10: LG strategies to improve learning and innovation

Performance issue Objective Initiatives Knowledge To build organisational Establish internal performance management knowledge through controls; participatory project knowledge transfer and monitoring and evaluation; retention implement training of trainers; mainstream de-briefing of staff on transfer and induction of new staff at the local level; train senior staff on Human Resource Management Information System Adoption of To scale-up the use of Equip decentralised departments with innovation computers for local computers and replace outmoded government processes typewriters, train LG officials to use modern ICT systems to facilitate revenue mobilisation; revitalise LG registries to shift from paper filing systems to digital systems; implement street naming and property addressing system. Source: author, based on MTDPs of LGs

The strategies outlined in table 7.10 reflect LGs’ response to issues such as high staff turnover and limited skills transfer amongst LG officials which has implications for ‘organisational memory’ (Bukari Zakaria and Mamman 2014). Lack of proper mechanisms such as databases for storing and retrieving performance information has implications for knowledge management within local government authorities. Unfortunately, the FOAT does not seem to have a solution to this problem. Interviewees also recognised that LGs continued reliance on conventional labour intensive methods rather than modern technology of mobilising revenue and valuing taxable properties has denied them huge sums of revenue. Only in urban LGs were there plans to introduce innovative methods of managing waste such as setting up a recycling plant which will be a significant shift from traditional open refuse disposal and dumping practices. Even though LG officials confirmed their support for innovative practices that could improve their response to

190 community needs, the reality is that LG operations are stuck to bureaucratic rigidities. For example, Town and Country Planning Departments in all the study districts did not have accurate topographical maps of the physical landscape, and this was cited as the prime cause of multiple sale of land and associated conflicts linked to land ownership.

It is important to emphasise that many offices within the LGs in this study did not have computers and offices were not connected to the internet. In fact, the main reason why LGs are not innovative in social service delivery is due to poor ICT infrastructure in Ghana which makes it almost impossible to implement e-governance initiatives. Given the low access to internet connectivity, people living in local communities are unable to submit service requests to LGs via the internet contrary to the status quo in developed countries where innovation allows people to contact their LGs to either submit complaints or demand for services needed in local neighbourhoods (Calista et al. 2010). The adoption of e-governance initiatives, although wished by LG officials in Ghana, is not a top priority at the sub-national level because LGs are neither connected to the internet nor have their own websites with opportunities to interact with the public.

At a broader level, previous assessment of LG performance, especially by supervisory agencies including the Auditor General has raised concerns about the incapacity of LGs to learn from their own organisational practices. Most of these issues have recurred in successive reports of the Auditor General. For example in 2012, the Auditor General expressed grave concerns about the inability of LGs to learn from previous audit reports by stating that:

“Outstanding and unresolved issues [pertaining to financial management] are attributable to deficiencies and weaknesses in internal controls in the operations of the audited Assemblies. Weaknesses such as non-compliance with existing legislative framework and instruments, managerial lapses and weak monitoring procedures at both the ministerial, legislative and administrative levels of the Assemblies were pervasive as evidenced in my management letters. The deficiencies noted in the operations of the Assemblies created avenues for some officials to mismanage the funds and resources of the Assemblies to a financial value of approximately GH¢48,435,279.59 during the year under review. The lapses and deficiencies were identified in transactions such as cash management which repeatedly recorded payment cycle irregularities, unsubstantiated payments, misapplication of funds, unauthorised payments 191

and unaccounted payments. I [the Auditor General] also noted procurement, store and contract irregularities in the transactions of some Assemblies as well as tax irregularities. This sordid state of affairs in the management of resources by the MMDAs is primarily the result of the lack of interest and dedication to duties and responsibilities exhibited by both the Ministry of Local Government and management of the MMDAs towards the implementation and enforcement of my audit recommendations” (p, 3)

The perennial recurrence of passages like the above quotation in the Auditor General’s report highlight serious weaknesses in the management of LGs as well as central government’s inability to implement recommendations of the Auditor General. This further raises concerns as to whether LGs learn from these observations.

7.6 Limitations of the FOAT for managing local government performance in Ghana

From the foregoing discussion in this chapter, the DDF FOAT is examined as a strategy or a policy initiative for enhancing LG performance in Ghana. The framework encourages LGs to document organisational processes, activities and achievements to know whether performance indicators have been fulfilled or not. Financial rewards accompanying the fulfilment of indicators aim at motivating and institutionalising practices that promote LG’s compliance to legal and regulatory requirements. While this has been proclaimed as a best-practice performance management system, the evidence reveals certain inherent limitations. Using Kaplan and Norton (1992) BSC to analyse factors that research participants perceive as critical for LG performance, the results show how the DDF FOAT can enhance LG performance from financial and internal process perspectives of the BSC. It was obvious that whilst the FOAT focuses on the fiscal capacity of LG and their compliance to budgetary as well as financial management and auditing procedures, it does not help independent performance evaluators to determine the efficient and effective utilisation of funds by LGs. Furthermore, the FOAT was not found to be citizen-centred nor people-led since it has no provisions for incorporating the views of citizens regarding LG performance (Zakaria 2013). More so, mechanisms for continuous improvement of LG performance are unclear due to over-dependence on lag performance indicators that neither aim at organisational learning, nor innovation and growth. These could undermine people’s demand for accountability from LGs especially when the performance management

192 process has no inbuilt mechanisms for knowing the preferences and expectations of local communities and service users. Arguably, the powerful role of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and donor agencies in implementing the DDF FOAT is in part, the reason why performance indicators are imposed on local authorities in a top down manner. Indeed, the depth of donor involvement raises concerns about ownership and sustainability of the DDF. In addition, the implementation of the FOAT extremely relies on documents that LGs submit to prove that appropriate procedures were followed in performing their functions and to verify projects and programmes that have been implemented. This makes it an inspection and a “desk-based review of existing documents and data” (Boyne et al. 2002a). Since a central criterion for assessing performance indicators is whether they correspond with important dimensions of organizational performance (Boyne, 2005), the FOAT would have more value if it focuses on LG output performance, in addition to focusing on LG processes as it does at the moment. In practice, there were claims that the inability of performance evaluators to confirm the existence of what LGs claim to have achieved reinforces the fabrication of documents in ways that do not adhere to the rules of the game (Radnor 2008). Failure to put in place sufficient checks and balances leads to gaming of the system whereby undeserving LGs receive performance rewards because they are perceived as leading performers as per the official performance assessment criteria when in reality they may be worse in discharging their core functions in fulfilling the needs of their constituents. In sum, the DDF FOAT has the potential of stimulating organisational performance if it is not just used to assess LG’s compliance with stipulated rules and procedures. In other words, the mechanism could be used to evaluate LG outputs and outcomes rather than processes alone. The strict compliance to pre-determined indicators that are known by LGs has called the robustness of the FOAT into question particularly when LGs are often pre-informed about the assessment dates and may conduct their own trial assessment prior to the officially recognised assessment.

7.7 Conclusion

The chapter set out to analyse the scope of MCs and PMs under the DDF FOAT using the concept of the BSC. It began with a discussion of how the initiative promotes ‘governance by targets’ in which performance indicators are used to assess and award LGs with development funds. An overview of the DDF FOAT shows that performance indicators are specified in advance such that performance information of LGs can be used to determine 193 the extent to which they meet prior specifications. Also, a feedback mechanism in the form of performance incentives is allocated to LGs on the basis of the assessment team’s interpretation of performance using the MCs and PMs. Despite the fact that the DDF FOAT is being touted as a model of performance management best-practice, the modified BSC framework developed in this chapter and associated findings that emerged suggest that performance indicators (MCs and PMs) are not comprehensive enough to incorporate other critical factors that could add value to the evaluation of LG performance in the Ghanaian context.

For example, indicators on financial performance do not target LG’s efficient nor effective utilisation of funds even though LG plans recognise budget effectiveness as well as revenue and investments as key drivers of financial performance. Similarly, indicators on organisational management focus on whether LG structures such as the general assembly, executive and management committees exist and operate or not. Beyond the existence and operation of these management units, one would have expected the policy to help create transformational and visionary leadership, which is arguably the most important factor needed to steer LGs on the path of high performance. Furthermore, the fact that no specific indicators are used to determine LG’s capabilities to learn from organisational practices also point to the limited scope of the DDF FOAT. Based on these findings, a number of conclusions can be made.

First, the findings have established that MCs and PMs focus more on internal processes and financial aspects of organisational performance compared to citizens, learning and innovation perspectives. Secondly, in terms of design, the DDF FOAT was driven by the central government with significant donor influence. This explains why performance indicators used for assessing LG performance specifically target compliance with regulations of administrative processes that supervisory bodies seek to enforce rather than actual performance outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, since only ‘official’ performance information is used to assess and allocate performance grants to LGs, the basis on which performance scores are given deliberately excludes what citizen’s think about LG performance. The implications for not having a citizens’ perspective in the assessment of LGs are manifold. For example, it creates the possibility of a ‘performance paradox’ caused by a “weak relationship between actual performance and what the performance measures show” (Pollitt 2013 : 353;Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Under the current practice where details of the DDF FOAT assessment can be accurately predicted, the risk of

194 performance paradox could be minimised by considering the following measures. For instance, it is important to frequently revise and update the MCs and PMs to reflect practical realities on the ground since indicators may become obsolete over time. This will also minimise the tendency to cheat and game the assessment process since LG officials would not expect a repetition of the same indicators over time. Thus, the DDF FOAT could reflect the real performance of LGs if independent evaluators make unannounced visits to assess the performance of local authorities as Pollitt (2013) suggests.

Based on the findings discussed in this chapter, it is clear that an effective performance management regime at the local government level requires visionary leadership and consensus between LG managers, assembly members, heads of departments and civil servants. More importantly, there should be opportunities for citizens’ involvement in the formulation and use of performance indicators. This implies that for performance indicators to reflect LG priorities in a balanced manner there should be a link between LG objectives and citizen’s aspirations. This could involve the use of outcome and output indicators for Chief Executives and elected assembly members and process indicators for heads of departments to track progress towards meeting their respective targets. Importantly, systems should be put in place to ensure that performance data are accurate and reliable. Lessons could also be drawn from modern performance management practices in advanced countries where innovative ways of collecting and analysing data optimises performance management outcomes (Calista et al. 2010). Thus, local government authorities in Ghana could develop information systems that would allow them set ambitious but achievable targets with a focus on improving service delivery. Also, copies of performance reports submitted to supervisory agencies should be accessible by ordinary citizens, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations that might be interested in the performance of local authorities.

In a typical multi-stakeholder environment, the scope of performance indicators should enable local government authorities to produce factual and credible performance information with which they could provide reasons for any performance that is off target and specify actions that will be taken to get back on track. To achieve this objective, there must be clear roles for different stakeholders to monitor LG performance so that lessons that can be used to further drive improvement would be known to all stakeholders. In the context of this study, one would advocate for a re-examination of performance indicators under the DDF FOAT to ensure that they could have a lasting impact not only on LG

195 processes but also on local government performance outcomes in local communities. This is necessary if the policy objective of promoting efficient, effective and accountable local government administration has to be achieved. As table 7.11 indicates, due to the multi- stakeholder environment within which LGs operate, it would have been more relevant for policy makers to set out clear but necessary conditions under the DDF FOAT before the initiative was introduced, so that it will pave the way to develop and sustain desirable features through implementation and build consensus on the functions and outcomes of the initiative. Such an approach would require local government practitioners to align performance indicators to address the most important functions of LGs in the Ghanaian context rather than promoting it as a best-practice.

Table 7. 11: Proposed features and functions of the FOAT

A successful FOAT must Develop and sustain and enhance

 Begin with a clear  Systems of learning  A continuous purpose learning environment  Understand  Accessible  Accountability at citizens’ needs and information systems different levels expectations (political and professional)  Represent a shared  Stakeholder buy-in  Early warning signs vision of LG with regard to the to identify project stakeholders formulation of implementation performance problems indicators and participating in performance assessment  Align to the needs  The use of process  Communicate of other and outcome perceptions of service departments within performance satisfaction the organisational indicators environment Source: author’s construct, 2014

In sum, this chapter makes an important contribution by showing how the BSC could be used to evaluate the scope of performance indicators under a performance management regime in a local government context. Two important recommendations can be made from using the BSC as a guide for analysing performance indicators under the DDF FOAT. First, LGs in Ghana could consider adopting the principles of the BSC to broaden the dimensions of evaluating LG performance in ways that would improve financial

196 performance, internal processes, learning and innovation and more importantly, encourage conscious and deliberate targeting of citizens’ priorities. In other words, policy makers could maximise the benefits of the DDF FOAT by taking a citizen-centred approach in the formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation of LG performance in Ghana. Second, the findings in this chapter call for a clarification of the relationship between LGs, central government and residents of local communities. From a principal-agent perspective, it is unclear who the principals of LGs are; whether it is central government or citizens in local communities who benefit from the services of LGs. While the DDF FOAT was introduced with the aim of improving efficiency, transparency and accountability at local government level, the findings in this chapter have suggested that it appears to have been introduced to legitimize the ‘institutional environment’ instead of stimulating organisational learning, change and service improvement (McKevitt and Lawton 1996). Nonetheless, it is imperative to explore and understand the relevance and impact of performance management processes of local authorities by focusing on how performance information is used to improve service delivery. The next chapter explores this issue in detail.

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Chapter 8: Impact of performance information and performance management practices on social service delivery

‘Understanding the use of performance information is perhaps the most pressing challenge for scholarship on performance management’ (Moynihan and Pandey 2010: 849)

8.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to understand how local government authorities use performance management practices to improve social service delivery and to examine reasons why and how LG managers utilise performance information to enhance service delivery. In order to achieve this objective, the chapter attempts to answer two inter related research questions. The first question looks at the extent to which local government authorities use both internally and externally driven performance management practices to deliver primary education and waste management services. The second question attempts to unearth factors that explain local government managers’ utilisation of performance information to achieve local government goals. In other words, the chapter seeks to find out whether or not, LG managers use performance information within the performance management context to deliver LG services. It further examines the perceptions of local residents about primary education and waste management services. Findings that emerge to fulfil the objective of this chapter are vital because some experts have argued that the utilisation of performance information is probably the most difficult challenge that managers face in implementing performance management systems (Halachmi, 2006; De Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001). Given the mandate of LGs in providing social infrastructure and basic services, it is imperative to understand how performance management practices facilitate managerial decisions on social service provisioning in general and the reasons why LG officials may use performance information in particular.

The chapter is structured into seven (7) parts including this introductory section. Section 8.2 examines research participants’ understanding of performance culture and how it is expressed within local government authorities. Section 8.3 explores how LGs generate performance information while section 8.4 analyses the way performance management practices; including the DDF FOAT enable LGs to provide basic education, sanitation and waste management services. Citizen’s opinions about LG performance is presented in

198 section 8.5 while section 8.6 presents key issues that account for the use of performance information to improve service delivery. Section 8.7 presents a conclusion for the chapter.

8.2 Developing a performance culture

There are opposing debates about the significance of performance culture. On one hand, it is argued that having a ‘culture of performance’ is a necessary condition for organisational effectiveness especially if it promotes the use of performance indicators and targets to achieve organisational objectives (Boyne and Chen 2007). For instance, Henri (2006) found a positive relationship between culture and the utilization of performance information for decision making, and reiterated the need for managers to be conscious of dominant values within their organizations when implementing performance measurement systems because cultural traits could affect a performance management system and organisational performance. On the other hand, the counter argument is that performance management systems may not necessarily lead to improved organisational performance until behaviours and attitude positively supports its effective utilization (Elzinga et al. 2009). This makes it important to develop and if possible, institutionalise cultural traits that facilitate the achievement of key performance indicators so as to make performance management systems effective and sustainable. Even though culture remains a very broad concept with multiple interpretations, much of the management literature suggest there is a positive relationship between organisational culture and performance (Ashworth 2010) and that organizations that have a mission-driven culture are likely to perform better in the public’s interest compared to those that lack these features (Brewer and Selden 2000;Moynihan and Pandey 2005).

In this study, respondents’ interpretation of performance culture revolved around administrative processes, ‘involving shared values and believes about appropriate behaviours and actions’ (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999: 17). For instance, heads of departments conceived performance culture as the values of hard work and commitment which employees require for promotion during performance appraisals. Meanwhile, Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors described performance culture as the mind-set of staff in performing their official duties in general and especially in preparing for performance evaluation under the DDF FOAT. In both cases, respondents perceived performance culture as part of normative practices of assessing LG performance. However, none of the LG managers consciously attempted to identify the prevailing culture of

199 performance in their respective organisations but rather expected heads of departments to have a positive performance culture which is conducive for team work within and between departments of the LGs. In their view, every official of the LGs is required to have values that are consistent with the vision of the political leadership even though in most cases, the individual vision of the DCE was not known as it was always an off-shoot of the central government’s vision. Meanwhile, it is important to note that Chief Executives made pledges by spelling out their vision and expectations during their inaugural addresses to members and staff of the Assemblies, but none of these pledges was traceable after three years in office. From the 3 local authorities, these performance pledges appeared to be insignificant especially in the ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipalities where the mayors were busily campaigning for votes ahead of parliamentary elections. In the words of one official:

“We are technocrats and use our expertise to serve any government in power so it depends on any new political head to inject a high performance spirit into the assembly in line with his/her vision. If the Chief fails to build a team and transmit his work ethic into the assembly then everyone will relax and the assembly will perform poorly” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly].

The above quotation implies that LG managers were expected to inculcate into their staff, a culture of performance. As duty bearers, there is perception that the vision of LG managers, which plays a key role in facilitating local level development, is in part influenced by their performance culture. Some LG officials were of the view that a successful manager is one who constantly met with his or her support staff to understand what issues ought to be supported in order to know if managerial decisions are required to make them happen. It was therefore not surprising that local civil servants claimed their performance depended on the direction, vision and effectiveness of Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors, the only people capable of keeping officers on their toes. An interviewee emphasised that:

“Those who are at the top - the Director and the DCE – play an instrumental role in the performance of the Assembly. If they are up and doing, there is no way you will fail but if they are not performing well, definitely those under them will not also perform [Field data, interview transcript, ‘C’ District Assembly].

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The concern raised in the above quotation recurred in the views of most interviewees particularly in the ‘A’ metropolis and ‘B’ Municipality where the Chief Executives where contesting in parliamentary elections during field work for this study and LG officials were mostly dissatisfied with them for prioritizing political campaigns at the expense of LG business. Consequently, this significantly slowed down internal administrative processes and even halted the implementation of projects in some cases. For example, while the dominant culture in ‘C’ district was to prioritise and commit to the implementation of projects in their MTDPs, the situation was different in the urban LGs where projects in development plans could easily be pushed aside for those projects to be replaced with unplanned ones. An important distinction between the LG in ‘C’ District and its counterparts in ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipality was that managers in the former usually monitored targets set for departments and maintained clear lines of communication between the central administration and the various decentralised departments in that district. This was absent in ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipalities because Chief Executives were preoccupied with personal political ambitions which competed for their time to fully concentrate on the details of activities and projects of various departments.

Within this context, performance culture was understood as a reflection of LG managers’ commitment to the mission and vision statements of their authorities to, and the extent to which they have tried to realise those aspirations. Though LGs had unambiguously worded mission and vision statements (see section 2.6), it was obvious that managers of the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly and ‘B’ Municipal Assemblies took them for granted compared to the manager of the ‘C’ District where development projects and LG activities were consciously geared towards achieving the vision of the Assembly. This suggests that having a clear organisational vision alone would not be enough to create a progressive performance culture unless LG managers are able to translate their thirst for goal achievement to improve organisation performance (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001). This means that embedding a culture of performance into LG activities would be significant if it is able to improve organisational processes as well as change the attitudes of the people who adopt it.

8.3 Generation of performance information

To Pollitt (2006a : 39) “performance information refers to systematic information which describes outputs and outcomes of public programmes and organisations whether intended 201 or otherwise – generated by systems or processes intended to produce such information”. In this study, it was found that not only did various decentralised departments generate information about their performance, the implementation of action plans and the outcomes of DDF FOAT assessments also provided relevant performance information. These included records of daily activities and projects LGs have implemented from their plans which are subsequently used to prepare quarterly performance reports submitted to the RCCs. Within the LG setup, information was produced from direct services such as issuing of business operating permits, building permits, licenses, and marriage certificates in the urban LGs compared to the rural areas where the ineffectiveness of LGs in providing these services has affected their internally generated revenues. It was found that routine generation, collation and communication of performance information contributed to LG decision making processes and perceived organisational performance. Since the introduction of the DDF, LG officials are encouraged to keep performance information on key LG outputs because the provision of documentary proof of organisational performance play a crucial role in the performance scores that LGs obtain during performance assessments. It was found that LGs that accurately prepared and stored performance information on a regular basis were likely to qualify for funds under the DDF. For example, 88 out of a total of 138 LGs that did not qualify for the DDF grants in 2008 missed out because they could not provide requisite performance information. Hence, project documents and performance review reports serve as an important source of performance information and this was affirmed by most LG officials who indicated that purposeful documentation of performance information was improving their performance consciousness. Post-performance assessment reports prepared by independent assessment teams are also an important source of performance information.

At the individual level, it was indicated that communication between employees, heads of departments and management play a key role in the availability of performance information. For instance, LG managers got information both from their own observations and from formal and informal interactions with colleagues from other districts, their subordinates, and more importantly from performance reports. In all the LGs that participated in this study, performance reports of various departments were collated by development planning officers into composite plans of the LGs. Essentially, the MTDPs of LGs is an important repository of baseline information not only because it is a compilation of district level data on different sectors such as agriculture, education, health and the local economy among others, but also because these plans give an overview of LGs’ past 202 achievements as well as priorities for the future. There have been instances, albeit on ad hoc basis, where central government Ministries, Departments and Agencies requested LGs to submit performance information on budgets and project outputs and outcomes to help monitor the status of projects such as the school feeding programme, health insurance and other development interventions being implemented at the LG level.

Whereas the LGs in this study did not classify performance information based on the key descriptors of organisational performance, the analysis and interpretation of data highlight important aspects of LG performance such as output quantity and quality, efficiency and effectiveness of outputs, responsiveness and equity of outputs, all of which shape citizens’ satisfaction. These factors are significant because they describe respondent’s understanding of LG performance beyond sheer number of projects; which is rather common in the Ghanaian context. In the ensuing section, the way LGs use performance information is discussed by highlighting the sort of projects they prioritise, the departments responsible for implementing those projects and the status of such projects. As Behn (2003) pointed out, producing performance information as part of a performance measurement or management system is not an end in itself until someone uses them to accomplish something. This is why the study sought to understand how and why performance information is used to advance LG performance including the provision of basic service. Meanwhile, since it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all LG services, the next section presents and discusses findings on the utilisation of performance information and performance grants under the DDF FOAT with a focus on two selected services.

8.4 Examining the use of performance information for service delivery

There are a number of ways for analysing performance information use. This can involve “a comparison of performance information at current levels with past performance (all- time highs and historical averages), normative standards (expected levels set by the organization itself and by others such as national and international bodies), and the performance of other organizations (comparative statistics) (Askim 2007: 455). In this study, all these approaches are combined by focusing on the past performance of the selected LGs involved in this study, expectations of their performance and a comparison of these. Also, based on the fact that Chief Executives (mayors), as representatives of the president of Ghana, are the most powerful officials whose decisions affect the performance of LGs (Crawford, 2009), this section specifically focuses on how these senior officials 203 used performance information to make managerial decisions. Focusing on Chief Executives of LGs is important because some scholars have argued that ‘knowledge about whether and how politicians use performance information is limited’ and that politicians rarely make direct instrumental use of performance information (Poister and Streib 1999;Askim 2007;de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001). For example, Pollitt (2006b: 41) analyses the implementation of performance management across policy sectors in European countries and concluded that measuring and managing performance has become universal but that “politicians do not take much interest [in it] unless and until disasters, scandals or breakdowns come along….; and that performance measurement and performance management remain activities conducted chiefly by and for managers”. The scepticism about politicians’ use of performance information suggests that even when they attempt to use performance information, there is a tendency for such information to be used opportunistically as a rhetorical device and to support pre-existing policy or achievements rather than break new grounds. Within this context, Pollitt (2006b) further claims that politicians are likely to discredit or reject performance information that contradicts their policy position or undermines their record.

In this research, it emerged that the attempt to use performance information depended upon several factors which included but not limited to the type of information, how it was produced and used by whom and for what purpose. As already mentioned, performance information was often generated through internal administrative processes and from the implementation of MTDPs and the preparation of quarterly performance review and annual reports. In this study, the direct usage of information by local politicians was subtle even though LGs had to generate and submit performance information to higher supervisory bodies such as the RCCs, NDPC and the MLGRD to fulfil formal reporting requirements. It was observed that performance information was occasionally used to monitor employee performance to determine whether tasks assigned to them had been accomplished or not. Hence, routine production of information was used at strategic and operational levels within LG organisations and not very much at the employee level. This also helped Chief Executives to identify problems that needed attention and created opportunities for learning and improving upon performance.

In the urban areas where the revenue base was wide, LGs ensured that departments that were instrumental in bringing in revenues frequently recorded and reported their performance to the leadership of the LG. For instance, information on the financial 204 performance of local authorities, especially with respect to revenue generation helped LG managers in making budgetary allocations for activities and development projects. Chief Executives of local authorities also relied on available information on the status of project implementation and services in making decisions on the distribution of infrastructure projects and services to local communities. Furthermore, it was found that performance information from the DDF process also provided relevant information with which LG could improve upon their activities. Meanwhile, the way Chief Executives used performance information can be described as circumstantial because the use of information was varied in degree, depth and based on different circumstances. In the ‘B’ Municipality, the Chief could not recall how performance information influenced his decision on the rehabilitation of a leisure park even though one of his subordinates, the head of planning in particular admitted supplying information on the said project to the Chief Executive.

Furthermore, this research found little evidence of Chief Executives using performance information outside decentralised departments of local government authorities. This means that LG managers rarely communicated their work to the general public and service users despite the fact that information helped them in making decisions on service delivery. This exacerbates the perception that LGs are paranoid in sharing financial information with civil society organisations; a situation which undermines accountability at the local level. This issue substantiates findings of previous studies which indicated that access to LG budgets, financial statements and other important documents to the general public is lacking. For example, a study commissioned by an NGO in Ghana reported that 89% of respondents in a survey admitted to not having access to local governments’ plans, budgets and financial statement and that request for these documents is often associated with suspicion and intense bureaucratic procedures (SEND Foundation 2013). In the context of this research, it can be argued that the inability of Chief Executives to use performance data to specifically promote accountability to local citizens raise concerns as to whether performance management is worth the effort in practice. This concern is a valid one because without knowing why LGs in Ghana cannot exercise their accountability functions, it will be difficult to establish performance management success with certainty (Moynihan and Pandey, 2010).

Nevertheless, almost all interviewees in this study felt it was the responsibility of LGs to create an enabling environment for local level development. It was therefore not surprising that medium term development plans and annual action plans of LGs were replete with 205 information on infrastructure projects such as school buildings, roads, public health facilities, waste management, electricity and local market centres. Analysing information on these services helped LG officials to identify underserved communities and the kind of services they needed. It also helped the central administration of LGs to monitor the performance of its decentralised departments. It was found that using performance information to allocate projects and services was vital for local politicians especially Chief Executives who saw the construction of physical projects as a fulfilment of their pledges to improve living conditions in their areas of jurisdiction.

This assertion was further supported by local government officials and members of the Assemblies who equated tangible and physically verifiable projects in their communities to signs of “development”. This implies that popular perception of LG performance is influenced by people’s interpretation of development at the local level which is often linked to the construction of physical infrastructure projects, widely considered as a reflection of local governments’ commitment to development. For instance, 35% of respondents in a survey mentioned new school blocks built in their communities while 31.6% pointed to the rehabilitation of basic schools by the LG when they were asked to identify the achievements of their local authorities (Yankson, 2007). The notion of LG outputs as signs of “development” was also affirmed by participants of FGDs who claimed that LG managers who made physical projects their priority were “development oriented”. However, participants in FGDs expressed doubts about the use of performance management practices to improve upon service delivery. In the words of a participant in one of the FGDs:

“As typical Ghanaians, what we see is what we believe! If the Assembly (LG) is doing well, how can we verify that? We can verify that only when many school children pass their exam and further their education, when doctor-patient ratios reduce or when many teachers are posted to primary schools to reduce pupil-teacher ratios. If doctors and nurses are trained, CHPs compounds should be constructed in villages and health personnel posted to these facilities. This is how we can assess the Assembly. If the Assembly claims that development is improving, then “per capita” access to social amenities should be increasing rather than decreasing” [Field data, transcript from FGD, ‘B’ Municipality].

Concerns raised in the above quotation demonstrate how people prefer to participate in assessing the performance of their LGs. And under prevailing performance management

206 arrangements, significant progress has been made, at least in terms of implementing projects and providing services funded from the DDF. Prior to the DDF, LGs had to rely on meagre resources, mostly from the DACF and donor agencies to fund their budgets and provide services (Ayee, 2008). This is changing under the DDF because performance awards that LGs receive are often channelled into important projects while at the same time, information from post assessment reports are useful for improving organisational performance. The latter helped the LG in the ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘C’ District to subsequently qualify for performance grants after failing to meet MCs and PMs in 2008. By specifically focusing on infrastructure projects and ‘capacity building’ (training) projects, the impact of the DDF is quite evident from table 8.1. In the ‘A’ Metropolis, it was found that 604 projects (391 physical projects and 213 non-physical) were completed between 2005 and 2008 compared to 1,474 projects (920 physical projects and 554 non- physical) completed between 2009 and 2012. This represented a 59% increase in project completion rate. Also, 600 projects completed in the ‘B’ Municipality between 2009 and 2012 represented 39% of planned projects for that period. Although this was slightly more than the 407 projects that were completed between 2005 and 2008 in the same municipality, many projects were halted due to financial setbacks and delays in contractor’s execution of projects. In the ‘C’ district, the Assembly used the DDF to finance 981 completed projects compared to 432 projects that were completed between 2005 and 2008 when the DDF had not been introduced. These are shown in table 8.1 below.

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Table 8. 1: Distribution of projects by district

Name of LG Priority projects Departments involved No. of projects completed Status at end of year (year) (2012) 2005-2008 2009-2012 ‘A’ Metropolitan Education, health, urban roads Metropolitan education and 161 ongoing and 48 not Assembly and transport, physical planning, health directorates, waste 604 1474 started environmental health management, NCCE, social welfare, NADMO, library board, information service department

Municipal education, health ‘B’ Municipal Education and health, waste directorate and agric directorates, Assembly management, community NADMO, information service 407 600 334 ongoing and 70 not development, water and department, NCCE, MPCU, started

sanitation works department, finance, etc

‘C’ District Education, health, feeder roads, GES, GHS and district agric 40 ongoing and 25 not

agric extension and community directorates, NCCE, NADMO, started 432 981 development, water and GNFS etc

sanitation, environmental health

Total 1,636 2,862 Source: compiled from MTDPs and annual performance reports of LGs

From table 8.1 above, a number of factors explain the relative gains in the ‘C’ District. Firstly, management of the LG resolved to strictly adhere to their development plans as the main reference document for information on service delivery. Being one of the 88 LGs to have failed the 2008 performance assessment, officials of the Assembly had decided to stick to regulations by storing performance information and solely using them for decision making. Obviously, the DDF has had a profound impact not only on the ability of LGs to generate performance information but also to initiate new development projects and sometimes continue with unfinished ones. Given that local authorities can only finance allowable expenditure which tends to be service infrastructure, it was found that LG managers had to be stubborn to divert DDF funds from providing services they are allocated for. In districts where funds were diverted, it was observed that the Chief Executive was more likely to have an ambition of becoming a parliamentarian as was the case in the ‘A’ Metropolis and the ‘B’ Municipality where both Chief Executives were busily campaigning for votes during the field work for this study. Funds were often misapplied and sometimes spent on unplanned projects intended to please the electorate. Interestingly, the Chief Executive of ‘A’ Metropolis had a nickname: “Mr Asphalt”, in order to appeal to voters for his obsession in constructing asphalt-coated roads in the metropolis. Even though he managed to upgrade some un-tarred roads in selected communities with asphalt, some focus group participants believed those projects were politically motivated and not based a genuine passion to improve upon infrastructure.

Even though the DDF is facilitating the use of information to allocate LG outputs, the findings of this study suggests that sustaining the ability to use performance information to deliver basic services depends on the commitment of LG managers to prioritise physically verifiable projects in order to be seen as development oriented leaders. This is not entirely surprising. It is obvious that LGs in Ghana are under pressure to increase their development expenditures to meet peoples demand for services (Crook and Manor, 1998; Ayee. 2008). Within this context and based on ‘official’ performance information from the three districts involved in this study, the next section presents LG performance with regards to basic education, sanitation and waste management. These services were selected not just because LGs have a direct responsibility to make them accessible but because demand for them has driven LGs to make them a priority throughout the country (Awortwi and Helmsing 2007).

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8.4.1 Basic education

Improving access to education is one of the most important priorities of LGs in Ghana. Apart from constructing schools and teacher’s accommodation, all the LGs in this research collaborated with their district directorates of education to implement interventions such as capitation grant, school feeding, free school uniforms and text books scheme, elimination of schools under trees and the provision of classroom furniture. It is important to note that performance information concerning education targets and related interventions were fully captured in the plans and performance reports of the Ghana Education service and those of the Assemblies. In 2011 for instance, the LGs in the ‘B’ Municipality and ‘C’ District tackled the perennial shortage of teachers by cooperating with the Ghana Education Service and the Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship programme to recruit and post untrained teachers (87 in ‘B’ Municipality and 60 in ‘C’ District) to remote villages that lacked teachers. In addition , focus group discussions with school teachers and members of the Parents and Teachers Association confirmed that LGs did sponsor some teacher trainees within the district and also sponsored other events such as the best teacher award as well as ‘my first day in school’ for kids who are attending school for the first time. In the C district, the director of Education was satisfied with the Assembly’s support for brilliant but needy children as well as teacher trainees from the area even though only 20 people got sponsored between 2011 and 2012. More so, it emerged from the FGDs that support to teachers and trainee nurses was characterised by nepotism, making it difficult for deserving individuals to benefit from the sponsorship schemes. A participant rhetorically asked that:

“If they claim to sponsor 30 teachers every year and there are still empty classrooms without teachers, where are the teachers then?” [Field data, transcript from FGD, ‘C’ District]

It was obvious that many teachers and parents were dissatisfied with LGs performance on basic education and got infuriated when the Assemblies claim to have initiated projects or supported education activities that could not be traced. A teacher in one of the focus group discussions retorted quite emphatically that:

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“But for the PTA [parents- teachers association] of this school, there would be no electricity in this school”. The LG does not have a maintenance culture and toilets in many schools are broken and locked up because the old asbestos pipes in the city have not been replaced so children cannot use the toilets in the schools. Do you expect the PTAs to change pipes/drains in the city? In this regards, the performance of the assembly is nil” [Field data, transcript from FGD, ‘A’ Metropolis]

Similar remarks were often made by members of the PTAs and SMCs due to deteriorating schools blocks and school facilities in local communities. Meanwhile, the role of PTA was acknowledged in the ‘B’ Municipality where the Chief Executive, in his address to the General Assembly reported that

“I am happy to inform you that there was a remarkable improvement in the BECE results released by the West African Examination Council this year. The total score for the Municipality was 64% and we owe this to the partnership between the Assembly, the Ghana Education Service and the various Parent-Teacher associations for the wonderful collaboration that gave us this result”.

Apparently, the LG decided to sponsor mock examination for exam candidates prior to the final examination. Nevertheless, there were certain genuine obstacles which confronted LGs attempts to improve basic education and most of them persist up to date. They include but not limited to lack of adequate funds to satisfactorily supply schools with teaching and learning materials, deterioration of school buildings as a result of shoddy work by contractors coupled with a poor maintenance culture and ineffective supervision of pupils by teachers. Nonetheless, given that budgetary allocation for education under the DDF has increased considerably, the expectation is for LGs to correspondingly distribute educational projects to geographically disadvantaged locations. Table 8.2 shows key LG objectives on basic education and budgetary allocations before and after the DDF was introduced.

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Table 8. 2: Education spending and related projects (2005-2012)

Location Education budget (% of Specific projects and programmes total LG spending) implemented

(2005-2008 (2009-2012) Increased enrolment in primary schools by 70% in 2012; constructed and refurbished ‘A’ Metropolis 36% 41% primary and junior high schools; provided decent accommodation for teachers and financial sponsorship for needy girls. Construction of 15 primary schools and 10 classroom block JHS; completed 6 unit ‘B’ Municipality 39% 50% teachers’ accommodation; over 100 students awarded scholarship; extended school feeding programme to 14 schools. Construction of 10 teachers’ quarters and 17 classroom blocks in rural areas;120 dual ‘C’ District 43% 55% desks supplied to selected schools; 27 teacher trainees sponsored; piloted school feeding programme in two schools.

Source: compiled from financial statements and MTDPs of LGs

8.4.2 Sanitation and waste management

It is estimated that 3 million tons of solid waste generated by households in Ghana costs the economy GH¢420 million per annum, equivalent to US$290 million or 1.6% of GDP (Mensah and Larbi 2005). As the authorities in charge of sanitation, LGs are bound to incur these costs due to high population growth and migration to urban areas. In the ‘A’ Metropolis and the ‘B’ Municipality, these issues have created more sanitation and waste management problems compared to their rural counterparts. In the study areas, the problem of sanitation was multifaceted and required regular sweeping of streets, collection, evacuation and disposal of solid and liquid household wastes, construction and management of abattoirs, public toilets and cemeteries to mention a few. Thus, the performance of LGs on sanitation depended upon the effectiveness of activities and interventions that were devised by waste management departments in Metropolitan assemblies and environmental health sanitation units in the municipal and district assemblies to tackle these problems. Performance information on how these

212 projects were implemented can be grouped into household or community level interventions and institutional level ones.

For instance, at the community level, most houses, including some in the district capital towns, are built without toilets or water closets. While this clearly contravenes building regulations, some observers attribute it to the irregular flow of water in those areas or poverty which forces inhabitants in local communities to defecate in the bush or on refuse dumps (Yankson 2007). To address these problems, some LGs support households to construct latrines and organise public education programmes to improve upon sanitation in local communities. In the ‘C’ District, about 98 bins were distributed to households and another 150 homes were assisted with inputs to construct simple household latrines between 2010 and 2011. Progress reports of these projects were used to identify households and communities that had benefited and to select beneficiaries in other communities yet to be covered. While the availability of information helped LGs to support sanitation projects, resource constraints undermined their performance in terms of scaling-up coverage. For instance, households in the ‘B’ Municipality were asked to submit requests for household latrines under a World Bank Community Water and Sanitation Programme in 2010. In all, 1,453 requests were submitted but the LG could not fulfil these requests and rather constructed 26 public toilets in disadvantaged communities. Similarly, 24 new public toilets were constructed in 2011 even though the Assembly received 1,115 requests from local residents. At the institutional level, all the LGs involved in this research ensured that new public buildings, especially schools and health centres were fitted with modern toilets. In places where sanitation problems were discussed on the radio, as was the case in ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipality, Chief Executives and their environmental health officers were under pressure to improve waste management within communities compared to rural areas where such issues did not attract media attention.

Furthermore, through the Ministry of Local Government, a private company; Zoomlion Ghana Limited has been contracted to keep the streets of major towns clean, provide sanitary containers and dispose refuse from collection points. The company operates in all the 10 regions of Ghana with most of their employees recruited under the government’s youth employment programme implemented at the LG level. However, most research participants were not satisfied with the output of Zoomlion, questioning

213 why sanitation was deteriorating whilst the company was in operation at the LG’s expense. In the words of one research participant:

“Zoomlion has 102 workers in this district trying to manage the sanitation situation, but they need to be well equipped to enable them work better. Much needs to be done in terms of providing more refuse containers and to manage final disposal sites. Polythene materials have become a major problem since they are not easily degradable and recycling them could be a better option and assistance is needed in this area” [Field data, interview transcript, ‘C’ District Assembly]

The need for creative solutions in managing all forms of household waste is obvious but neither LGs themselves nor the private sanitation and waste management companies have proposed any solutions as yet, probably due to capacity challenges. In both ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipalities where the LGs have contracted other private companies besides ‘zoomlion’ to collect and dispose household waste, scarcity of land has been a major problem for the final disposal of refuse. All the LGs involved in this study acquired private lands to be used as sanitary landfill sites at very huge costs. This corroborates the findings of Awortwi (2004) that LGs in Ghana are unable to make cost savings in solid waste collection even when they enter into public private partnerships aimed at reducing costs. On the contrary, table 8.3 suggests that LG spending and budgetary allocation for sanitation related projects increased in all the 3 regions between 2009 and 2012 compared to 2005-2008. Local government officials also affirmed that monies from the DDF enhanced their ability to increase spending on waste management. In urban areas such as ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipality, the enormity and scale of the sanitation issue is huge such that LG managers have procured heavy equipment for the evacuation and disposal of solid and liquid wastes. However, the gradual return to in-house delivery of sanitation and waste management functions needs careful planning, both in terms of costs and engineering capability for routine maintenance, if the aspirations of LG managers to develop engineered landfill sites in future would be realised.

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Table 8. 3: Sanitation spending and related projects (2005-2012)

Location Sanitation budget (% of Specific projects and programmes total LG spending) implemented

(2005-2008) (2009-2012) Installed mobile toilets at vantage points in the municipality; ‘A’ Metropolis 14% 21% rehabilitated water pumps and central city sewer lines; drains desilted and green areas maintained; trained environmental health officers on sanitation management. 10 large garbage containers procured and distributed within the ‘B’ Municipality 11% 19% municipality; landfill site rehabilitated; 4 public toilets rehabilitated and new ones built. 10 boreholes constructed; district abattoir renovated; 20 seater aqua- ‘C’ District 3% 7% privy toilets, 12 seater WC toilets and KVIPs constructed; inspected more than 8000 houses to enforce sanitary regulations Source: compiled from financial statements and MTDPs of LGs

8.5 Citizens perspectives of local government performance

It is argued that public opinion about LG performance can equip local authorities with information that clarifies public aspirations and expectations which the LGs could use to sharpen their processes, policies and programmes and improve upon services in general (Roch and Poister 2006). This section analyses data from 6 FGDs involving unit committees and parent teacher associations in the Greater Accra, Brong Ahafo and Northern regions of Ghana. Even though local residents were not expected to have data on the exact number of LG services, their perceptions significantly illuminated their opinions in terms of whether LG performance in their communities were improving or not. It was however difficult to relate their responses to LG performance management practices in general or the DDF in particular because only a handful of them knew something about the DDF.

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8.5.1 Perceived quantity and quality of local government services

The performance of LGs in terms of quantity and quality of basic education and waste management is examined in two ways. Firstly, participants of FGDs were asked to rate, in their own words, LG performance with respect to basic education and waste collection functions. In terms of basic education, they specifically made reference to the availability of infrastructure and logistics such as school blocks, text books and furniture; the qualification of teachers; and final exam performance or the likelihood that pupils completing basic schools will be qualified for senior secondary schools. With respect to waste collection, service quality was conceived as the reliability of waste collection and evacuation by the LG or private companies contracted to manage waste collection, perceptions about general sanitary conditions at community bin location sites and how quick LGs responded to people’s complaints about waste piles and unsanitary conditions.

In all the 3 regions, local residents did acknowledge the efforts of their LGs in trying to improve the infrastructure of primary schools. There were however differences between the views of unit committee members and those from the PTA FGDs. Participants in the former group generally felt LGs seem to prioritise support for education, citing ongoing projects as evidence to back their claims. However, members of the PTAs were relatively unimpressed compared to participants of the unit committees claiming that most of their requests to the local authorities for support ‘fell on deaf ears’. In addition, there were claims that LG managers often paid lip service to education. In all the study areas, teachers were concerned about falling standards of education; a situation often attributed to increased enrolment without commensurate increase in the number of teachers and classroom blocks. This has led to many schools resorting to a rotating shift system in the ‘A’ Metropolis. It was emphasised that LG’s construction of schools and provision of classroom furniture would be meaningless unless the performance of pupils is improved accordingly. In the ‘B’ Municipality and ‘C’ District, many schools lacked libraries while schools located outside the district capitals had inadequate qualified teachers, all of which adversely affected the quality of teaching and learning. Participants of FGDs were unanimous in their call for schools in their localities to benefit from government’s school feeding programmes as well as free textbooks and uniforms regardless of partisan political interests and allegiances.

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In terms of sanitation and waste management, it was noted that Zoomlion operated in all the regions but focused their work in city centres rather than residential neighbourhoods. Yet, participants of the FGDs were generally dissatisfied with chocked drains and limited waste containers in urban areas and sanitary conditions in market squares. In the ‘A’ Metropolis, residents claimed the LG was failing to rid the city of filth as evidenced by heaps of rubbish containers and chocked drains and roadside gutters. Placing the responsibility squarely on the political head of the Metropolitan Assembly, participants of a FGD in the ‘A’ Metropolis emphasised that:

“Previous assembly members organised self-help activities for members of the community to clean their surroundings but the new MCE has monetised cleaning of the drains by paying the party youth (job for the boys) to desilt the drains. This has made it difficult for any assembly man to organise voluntary self-help initiatives” [Field data, transcript from FGD, ‘A’ Metropolis].

Clearly, while residents were quick to absolve themselves from the sanitation woes in their communities, it was obvious that sprawling slums were hindering the management of waste in the metropolis. Similarly, local residents expressed doubts about Chief Executives’ estimates on sanitation spending in the Greater Accra and Brong Ahafo regions. It must be emphasised that in the urban areas, collection and disposal of waste from affluent neighbourhoods were irregular and unreliable despite the fact that private companies in the waste management business had increased waste collection charges without a corresponding improvement in their responses to user complaints about poor services (Awortwi 2004). This suggests that investments of LGs on sanitation, including the privatisation of waste management have not sufficiently addressed problems associated with sanitation in Ghana. Thus an important lesson could be drawn from Crook and Manor (1998) who have argued that it is not sufficient to examine quantities of LG outputs and pattern of resource allocation without asking whether the products of these expenditures were valued by citizens; that is, whether they were reasonably congruent with popular conceptions of development priorities. Therefore, an attempt was made to understand citizen’s opinions about local government’s response to the service needs of communities. These are discussed in the next section.

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8.5.2 Responsiveness to citizens’ demands

Data from focus group discussions was analysed to understand how LGs were responsive to local community needs. Responsiveness in this context refers to the congruence between community preferences and LG policy choices. It also describes the extent to which LG services match the preferences of community members who may directly or indirectly use such services (Boyne, 2005). Even though community preferences can be either latent or explicitly known, it is assumed that responsive LGs in the context of this study will devise policies to reflect and address community aspirations such that citizens would be aware if their LGs are taking care of their interests or not (Yankson 2007). Based on the knowledge and experience of research participants with respect to LG’s performance on waste management and basic education services in their localities, questions were asked to understand their perceptions about equity or fairness in the geographical distribution of LG outputs since it is assumed that LGs allocate services on a criterion of need rather than ability to pay (Boyne, 2002).

In all the regions, the priority of FGDs participants was to see some improvement in primary school buildings and student performance, tarred roads within and between communities, expansion of markets and facilities, regular collection of solid waste and cleaning of road side gutters among other things. Yet, they were less positive about LG’s response to requests of elected assembly members on behalf of their communities. However, a distinction was made between LG response to ordinary requests and those made during emergencies and natural disasters such as rainstorms and flooding, as is often the case in Ghana. For instance, LGs did collaborate with the National Disaster Management Organisation to supply schools with roofing sheets and building materials when primary schools were hit by a rainstorm but in some cases, the response was said to be low and inadequate. This implies that any information available to LG managers under such circumstances would be susceptible to what some experts have referred to as ‘clean up use’ of performance data (Ingraham 2005; Pollitt, 2006).

It is important to emphasise that participants of FGDs believed that how quick their LGs responded to development needs of local communities depended on the availability and accessibility of Chief Executives to coordinate and expedite LG response. In the ‘C’ District for instance, the DCE was easily accessible and for this reason, assembly members felt they could directly consult the Chief Executive when submitting requests 218 for development projects and complaints to their LGs compared to the ‘A’ Metropolitan Assembly and ‘B’ Municipalities where the DCEs were scarcely seen in their offices. It was observed that Chief Executives who were unavailable tended to use their positions as a spring board to launch their parliamentary ambitions. It must be recalled that the Chief Executives in the ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipality were both contesting in the 2012 parliamentary elections and could hardly expedite action on simple requests such as refilling pot-holes, fixing broken bridges, streetlights and boreholes in rural communities. Yet, in those two local authorities, the Chief Executives downplayed the potential impact of their political activities on the internal controls and day to day administration of their Assemblies. In order to ensure that LGs are accessible to their constituents, assembly members in the ‘A’ Metropolis have decided to only confirm nominees for the position of MCE on condition that they shall not contest parliamentary elections in future. This condition was justified on the grounds that most Chief Executives contested the parliamentary elections which made them too busy and unavailable in the office to interact with elected assembly members and to respond to their concerns. This was seen as reneging on the call to serve the people, contrary to the pledges they often make upon getting nominated for that high office. While these views appear to be legitimate, it clearly exposes the illusion of non- partisan politics at the LG level in Ghana. It was emphasised that:

Some people and some communities will never be satisfied with the performance of the LGs because of their political orientation. Political interests have made it difficult for assembly members to make meaningful contributions at the General Assembly meetings and this affects the work of the LG [Field data, transcript from FGD, ‘B’ Municipality].

Views such as the one in the above quotation does not only show how partisan politics may affect the ability of assembly members to effectively discharge their duties, it also shows how LG performance can be interpreted on the basis of political interests and affiliation since party loyalist will give positive ratings to the performance of the Chief Executives compared to persons from opposition parties.

It is worth mentioning that people’s opinions about LG responsiveness in this research confirm the findings of some previous studies. For instance, Crook and Manor (1998) 219 found that LG’s ‘response to popular needs, particularly in rural areas was poor where 70% of survey respondents felt that the district assemblies did not respond to their needs and only 22% felt it was better than the previous (unelected) district councils in Ghana. In the same vein, Ayee (1994) reports that complaints to solve problems in local communities such as sanitation and waste management, road infrastructure, water supply, schools and electricity often fall on deaf ears in the local council because of perceived competing partisan interests between the leadership of the assemblies and some elected representatives. Similar findings from a case study showed that ‘community- level aspirations were completely ignored’ in LG planning processes (Schiewer 1995) while a survey of residents in Kumasi revealed that majority of respondents ‘strongly disagreed that the City Council was sensitive to residents’ needs (Kessey 1995: 157). In this study, it was interesting that even under the current LG performance management regime; residents of local communities have not seen improvement in their LG’s response to service needs. It will therefore be significant for researchers to explore and consider how LGs could use their PM practices to improve their response to local service needs.

8.6 Understanding what drives the use of performance information

This section interprets the views of LG managers to understand their reasons for purposively using performance information. It comes on the heels of Pollitt (2006c) who summarised up 20 years of research on performance measurement and concluded that there are only a few analyses of what elected politicians do with performance information. In this study, Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors were first and foremost asked to explain their views about LG performance management practices. This was intended to establish whether LG officials viewed such practices as being part of their management philosophy or an imposition from central government.

The response to this question in all the 3 regions recognised that various kinds of supervision, performance monitoring and assessments have an impact on decision making. Yet, none of the Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors interviewed explicitly proclaimed performance management as their management philosophy. They did not also see the fulfilment of performance indicators as an intrusion and imposition of regulations by central government agencies. In fact, Coordinating Directors did not actually see the importance of making such a distinction because as trained career civil 220 servants, they viewed themselves as working for the government and people of Ghana, and try to perform their duties with the aim of achieving valuable results. Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors were generally emphatic that the use of performance information was inherently embedded in the performance of their official functions. As table 8.4 shows, LG managers were generally positive about the way information was used within the Assemblies. It was indicated that performance information could be used to achieve purely internal and external targets such as budgeting, goal clarification, project execution and completion as well as internal and external accountability, even though each of these might involve different data requirements. Also, since LG managers were generally optimistic about the impact of their performance management practices and their use of performance information, it is expected that they would be able to learn about what works and what does not, and could improve upon administrative processes if they were to satisfy their constituents. Table 8.4 presents the views of LG managers regarding the use of performance information.

Table 8. 4: Perceived benefits and use of performance information

Perceived benefits of How do you view performance management using performance practices in your LG? information ‘A’ Metropolis ‘B’ Municipality ‘C’ District Improved performance positive positive positive monitoring Internal accountability positive positive positive Clarified goals affirmative indifferent positive Improved team work positive constructive encouraging Project completion useful positive positive Greater external positive positive positive accountability Improved budgeting helpful positive positive Improved service delivery positive Positive positive Source: author’s construct, 2014

Based on these findings, it could be argued that production and use of performance information, especially under the DDF represents a change process in which developing a shared performance culture enhances the capabilities of LGs in fulfilling the eligibility criteria for performance-based grants. LG officials agreed that team work enhances their chances of ‘qualifying’ for performance grants since informational needs for the assessments cannot be met by only one department but rather depends on the collation 221 of performance information of different departments. Given that prior to the DDF, performance management practices were still evolving and not linked to an incentive scheme that could motivate higher organisational performance, today, this has changed under the DDF because LGs submit their performance information for analysis before they are awarded performance based grants. Whist financial rewards under the DDF could easily pass as a key incentive for using performance information to make managerial decisions; the analysis of data further revealed other reasons that could explain why LG managers use performance information. These are discussed in the next sections.

8.6.1 Perceived importance of performance information

As table 8.4 showed, respondents were asked about the perceived benefits of performance information within the assemblies to understand whether and how their views influenced performance information use for decision making. Taylor (2011) reports that managers are likely to integrate performance information into decision- making process if they are convinced it will benefit their agency and vice versa. But in this study whilst all the LG officials who were interviewed claimed to have confidence in using performance information, Coordinating Directors were particularly keen on making reference to information in taking decisions compared to Chief Executives. The former were meticulous in using performance records on LG activities when advising their Chief Executives. Although Chief Executives also claimed to have confidence in the use of performance information, their subordinates, especially heads of decentralised departments believed Chief Executives were less committed to the use of performance information despite the fact that such information was readily provided to them when requested. In the words of an interviewee:

We feel pleased whenever management decisions are based on performance records and facts. But because the DCEs have excessive power and lots of political interests, they often ignore information available to them and do what they like. Any time this happens, the consequences are sometimes huge because mistakes are repeated [Field data, interview transcript, ‘A’ Metropolis].

Apparently, the above quotation reflects instances where contractors that were infamous for not completing projects on time somehow kept on wining LG projects despite

222 repeated warning to the hierarchy of the Assemblies to refrain from offering such companies contracts. It was obvious that DPCUs and planning officers were instrumental in the preparation of performance reports and thus, backed the use of data and performance information for making decisions since that enhanced the implementation of pre-planned activities and projects. Not only did this enhance their prospects of qualifying for grants under the DDF, it was also seen as a way of protecting their reputation against failing the performance assessment.

Meanwhile, differences in the way departments approached the performance information question is worth mentioning. For instance, the nature of operations of some units such as the finance, budgeting and rating departments meant that day to day documentation of financial records served as a useful tool for making decision and for auditing purposes compared to dormant departments such as the registries, cooperatives, and the birth and death registries that barely produce reliable performance information. In the ‘A’ Metropolis and ‘B’ Municipality, there were doubts about the commitment of LG managers to use performance information for accountability, despite persistent civil society demand for transparency and accountability especially in relation to LG finances. It was observed that despite decades of producing and collating performance information in the form of MTDPs, local government officials were still grappling with building reliable databases for managing performance information effectively.

8.6.2 Commitment to central government’s priorities

Across the study regions, it was found that Chief Executives felt obliged to implement policies, projects and programmes that were prioritised by the central government under the ‘better Ghana agenda’. For this reason, all the Chief Executives had to sign performance agreements with their regional ministers to whom they reported the performance of their local authorities. Performance reporting in this context referred to specific interventions that were mostly the ruling party’s manifesto promises such as increasing the number of people under the national health insurance scheme, reduction of schools under trees or the distribution of free textbooks and school uniforms in deprived communities. In the ‘A’ Metropolis, the Assembly had accomplished most of its performance indicators on access roads after it had tarred and paved about 55 kms stretch of principal streets and provided street lighting along them. Another central

223 government priority was the shift towards rural electrification. In an address to mark the second ordinary session of the ‘B’ Municipality, the Chief Executive announced that:

“As part of government’s determination to make electricity accessible to as many communities as possible, the Assembly has procured 150 high tension electricity poles (pylons) for distribution to various communities at a cost of GH¢ 50,000.00. Government has identified and approved 34 communities for rural electrification and work has commenced in 17 communities whereas work in the remaining 17 communities will soon commence”.

In the Ghanaian context, LG’s implementation of central government’s priority projects diminishes the independence of the former, making them appear as mere extensions of the latter. For instance, in the ‘C’ district too, rural electrification was high on the LG’s development agenda and yet, none of the basic schools in that district was connected to electricity even though it is fair to state that management had indicated their intention to embark upon a district-wide school electrification programme. In addition to rural electrification, the LG policy in the ‘B’ Municipality also supported youth employment and skills training for people with disabilities. It was found that in the first half of 2012 alone, 200 beneficiaries were recruited and trained in computer and mobile phone assembling and repairs under the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Programme. Based on performance information on a 100% completion rate in the first 6 months of 2012, management accordingly distributed start-up kits to the beneficiaries and recruited another batch of 300 young people to receive training in the second half of the year under the same initiative. In sum, Chief Executives who use performance information this way intended to show their commitment to the implementation of these initiatives and to demonstrate their loyalty to the centre rather than to their constituents.

8.6.3 Adherence to project specific regulations

There were a number of donor funded development projects implemented by LGs all of which had separate budgeting arrangements, accounting systems and performance reporting procedures. Projects such as the Community Based Rural Development Programme, Urban Poverty Reduction Program, the Ghana Social Opportunities Programme, the District-wide Support Programme and the Food Security Programmes among others required beneficiary LGs to keep separate performance information with respect to the implementation of these projects to track progress and avoid duplication. 224

Research participants indicated that development partners such as the UNDP, WB, the EU Commission and NGOs who funded some of these projects at the local government level encourage evidence based project implementation, part of which require regular data collection, analysis, and reporting of performance information. From the beneficiaries’ perspective, using performance information to satisfy donors was crucial for the continued funding of donor supported projects at the sub national level even though it may as well serve as a means of demanding accountability from LGs in the use of project funds.

8.6.4 Public service motivation

The views of LG managers regarding the use of performance information to make decisions was somewhat stimulated by their willingness to serve the general public. In addition to repeated claims of being public servants, research participants in the LGs ensured that managerial decisions led to useful outcomes with the aim of serving the public. Even though participants of focus group discussions did not entirely agree to this claim, it is not uncommon for Chief Executives and their Coordinating Directors to explicitly portray themselves as serving the public interest. To examine the public service motives of LG officials in relation to the use of performance information, the three theoretical elements of PSM were drawn from Perry and Wise (1990) namely; rational, norm-based, and affective motives. Rational motives maximize the utility of individuals that might influence them to take certain decisions, which in the context of this study would be to use performance information proactively or show commitment to LG priorities. Based on the rational motives, it was evident that LG officials had to comply with official performance reporting procedures if they were to prove how well they performed their functions or achieved their set targets as discussed in section 8.4.

Norm-based motives are often linked to a desire to serve the public interest, no matter how the public interest is defined (Schott et al. 2014). And in this regard, LG managers claimed that the ultimate aim of using performance information was to serve the general public which is often inspired by unacceptable levels of poverty, illiteracy and unequal development between cities, small towns and villages. It is however important to note that identifying actions which are congruent with the public interest is difficult because the concept of public interests is vague and contested and scholars do not agree on an

225 exact definition of the term (Downs 1967, 101–2; Rainey 1982, 298). In this study, the tendency of local politicians to serve the public was not neutral as Chief Executives were sometimes influenced by political loyalties of local communities in allocating development projects. Lastly, affective motives are based on human emotion such as the desire and willingness to help others, being altruistic, having empathy based on moral conviction and other pro-social interests (Brewer et al. 2000). Within this context, local government support to vulnerable groups such as people living with disabilities and HIV/AIDS falls under the affective category but it was unclear whether the actions of LG managers’ use of information to assist vulnerable, poor and needy people was by virtue of their roles within the local government authority or as a result of some other values external to their professional identity. Nonetheless, it was apparent that claims of being motivated to use performance information to serve the public implies that LG managers are inspired by values that are relevant in serving the public good even though in the Ghanaian context, such claims could be used as a decoy to indulge in corrupt self- serving behaviours.

8.7 Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to examine how LG managers use performance information to improve service delivery and to identify factors for and reasons why LG managers use performance information to attain organisational targets. Findings in this chapter shows that performance information is produced for management control purposes and did appear in budgets, development plans, annual action plans of various decentralised departments, performance monitoring documents and annual LG reports. Although performance information is often generated through internal administrative processes, they are not only used internally but also by external agencies. For instance, it was found that individual performance reports of LGs submitted to the RCCs were compiled into regional composite reports to inform the Ministry of Local Government and the NDPC about LG performance. And within local government authorities, performance information is used for administrative purposes in various departments such as budgeting, supervision of tasks, internal controls as well as allocating and monitoring development projects within and between local communities. The availability of performance information enables LG officials to make informative inputs and contributions to policy discussions during management meetings. This practice has

226 become institutionalised to the extent that the use of performance information can be interpreted as a form of organizational behaviour that is embedded in LG performance management practices. This assertion corroborates Bouckaert and Halligan’s (2008) view that an organisation’s ability to functionally use performance information depends in part, on its capacity to institutionalise mechanisms used to generate performance data in addition to its capacity to incorporate performance information into organisational procedures and decision making.

In this study, it was obvious that Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors, in consultation with heads of departments, relied on MTDPs, annual action plans and budgets in making managerial decisions even though in some cases, appropriate formal procedures were not followed by these same senior officials. Yet, routine performance reporting within LGs and between LGs and higher supervisory bodies still had a significant influence on the perception and attitude of LG officials in terms of how they value, evaluate, interpret and use performance information. Meanwhile, citizen’s perception of service delivery in their communities was influenced by the availability of performance information at the local government authority even though such information is often inaccessible. While performance information helps LG managers to budget properly and improve upon internal controls, it will be imperative for them to also use performance information to deepen accountability to residents of local communities.

The findings have shown that based on performance information, LG managers increased allocations for basic education, sanitation and waste management across the three regions. Although in practice, Chief Executives’ use of performance information tended to be ad hoc and partial, but it did serve very important purposes. For example, information enabled LG managers to learn about measures and activities that worked and those that did not. Routine monitoring of LG performance meant that practical lessons could be learned to improve upon LG performance in terms of project planning and implementation. It does not however imply that the use of performance information met all the 8 managerial uses proposed by Behn (2003). For instance, it can be argued that performance management practices particularly under the DDF has enabled LGs to evaluate, control, budget and sometimes motivate compliance to appropriate administrative regulations and processes aimed at promoting LG performance. Yet,

227 there was little evidence that internal and external mechanisms for managing LG performance helped Chief Executives, Coordinating Directors and heads of departments to learn from, improve upon or even celebrate their performance if they were successful. For example, performance incentives under the DDF did motivate LG officials in their attempt to create progressive performance cultures by encouraging regular production, storage and use of performance information at the LG level. However, it was unclear how they learned and improved upon their performance apart from using the performance grants their LGs received to increase the number of development projects within their areas of jurisdiction. No wonder participants of community level FGDs were generally dissatisfied with LG performance in terms of the quantity, quality and responsiveness of the Assemblies in providing primary education, sanitation and waste management services.

Furthermore, findings in this chapter have addressed the 4th and 5th research questions by examining the extent to which LG managers use performance management practices in making decisions on service delivery and identifying the underlying reasons for which LG managers use performance information. It was evident that developing a progressive performance oriented culture is crucial for local governments’ delivery of basic social services. This is more vital under the DDF because LGs require a performance culture that tests their capacities to produce and use performance information in fulfilling the eligibility criteria for performance-based grants. The findings have also established that the ability of LG managers to use performance information to make decisions depended upon their perceptions about the importance of information, their commitment to central government’s priorities, fulfilling project specific reporting requirements and demonstrating a sense of public service motivation. These findings have implications for the provision of local government services and the overall performance of local authorities in Ghana.

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Chapter 9: Summary of findings and conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This research focused on performance management and local government administration to understand how local governments in Ghana manage their performance; and the extent to which the implementation of a performance management policy covers multiple dimensions and constituencies in evaluating local government performance. In addition, the study further sought to understand whether and how LG managers use performance management procedures to improve upon service delivery and the reasons that drive the use of performance information. The study used a qualitative research approach to answer research questions in order to achieve the objectives of the study. The research findings that emerged from the study offer lessons that could fill important gaps in the literature on performance management at the sub- national level. For instance, the study shows how a performance management policy that is described by policy makers as uniquely designed in line with best practices has certain serious shortcomings. This underscores the need for policy makers to get the fundamentals right by way of integrating key stakeholders in similar policy initiatives and using performance indicators that will require data on service delivery rather than examining LG’s compliance to administrative procedures. These concerns must take centre stage when performance management interventions are designed in developing countries.

This concluding chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, a general overview of the study is presented to highlight key aspects of the study as well as the content of each chapter. In addition, the major findings of the research are summarised and how they have addressed specific research questions are discussed. The contribution of the study to existing knowledge is also outlined. Finally, theoretical and practical implications of the study are presented and proposed areas for further research identified.

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9.2 General overview of the study

The first chapter laid the foundation of the study by defining the research problem, research aim and objectives and specific research questions that study sought to answer. It also outlined the structure of the thesis. The second chapter described the context of local government administration in Ghana. This was necessary because local government systems are neither universal nor homogenous in nature and thus, explaining the various LG structures, their functions and inter-governmental relations was intended to put the study in a proper context. The evolution of local government administration in Ghana is explored in this chapter as well as the legal and constitutional foundation on which the local government system operates.

The third chapter reviewed public administration and public management literature to highlight the complexity and ambiguity associated with the concept of performance in the public sector. It also explored the theoretical foundations of managing organisational performance as well as the scope and levels for studying performance. Furthermore, the review explored the impact of local government administration in sub Saharan Africa on perceptions of service delivery. From the literature review, the study attempted to respond to the clarion call of scholars who have called for research to be conducted from a non-western perspective, to investigate the scope of performance management frameworks in a multi-stakeholder environment. The fourth chapter presented the research framework that guided the study. It drew linkages between specific research objectives and research questions and other key issues that were explored further in this research.

Chapter five explained the research methodology. It highlighted the philosophical orientation of the study and justified the rationale for using a qualitative approach. The case study strategy is elaborated as the strategy adopted for this research. Also, the chapter presented how primary data was gathered from a Metropolitan Assembly in the Greater Accra region, a Municipal Assembly in the Brong Ahafo region and a District Assembly in the Northern region. Altogether, 41 interviews were completed with LG officials in addition to 6 Focus Group Discussions consisting of unit committees operating within local communities as well as Parent Teacher Associations and School Management Committees in the three regions.

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The sixth chapter presented analysis of data and discussion of findings in relation to the first research objective. The aim of the chapter was to explore and identify performance management practices of LGs in Ghana and how the national policy environment influenced performance management arrangements at LG level. It was found that LGs performance management practices were internally and externally driven. Based on the findings of this chapter, it can be concluded that development planning and routine performance monitoring are inherent in managing LG performance in Ghana. Furthermore, chapter seven adopted a case study strategy to examine the scope of performance indicators under the performance management policy which is also known as the District Development Facility. This chapter is inspired by claims in the literature about the utility of best-practice performance management systems that often overlook the fact that performance assessment of public organisations are bound to be associated with competing interests (amongst public managers, staff, service users and citizens) whose interpretation of performance reflect their support for or rejection of performance measurement and management, the objects to be measured, and how performance information should be collected and used (Ashworth et al. 2010). The findings demonstrate that using the DDF FOAT to manage LG performance tend to focus on compliance of pre-determined indicators that do not prioritise core service delivery functions of LGs. Even though LGs receive performance-based grants, this study highlighted the possibilities of having a performance paradox due to the exclusion of local residents in evaluating LG performance. By applying the balanced scorecard concept to analyse the performance indicators used to implement the DDF FOAT, the study found certain limitations in using the performance management framework to promote accountability due to the fact that ordinary citizens are not included in the evaluation of LGs. Furthermore, it does not encourage the production of ratio data and this makes it impossible to assess LGs on the efficient and effective utilisation of financial resources. The DDF FOAT does not also focus on developing the leadership qualities of LG managers. Even though, the policy appears to have the potential of harnessing learning and innovation capabilities of LGs, this potential is yet to be activated and lastly, it does not recognise nor seek to incorporate the perception of citizens’ about LG performance. This blurs the type and form of principal-agent relationships between local communities, local governments and the central government.

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Chapter eight was the final data analysis and discussion chapter. It examined the intersections between LG performance management practices and how that affect the provision of basic services. Data from FGDs was analysed to understand citizen’s perspectives of LG performance. The chapter also analysed the use of performance information by senior local government officials, including Chief Executives to understand factors that influence the utilisation of information for the purpose of delivering LG outputs. The findings offer insights into the importance of having a distinctive culture of performance that is progressive as well as recognising the interplay of internally and externally driven factors in using performance information for allocating LG services. Chapter nine summarises the major research findings as well as contribution and implications of the research for both theory and practice. This chapter concludes the study.

9.3 Summary of major findings

The study was set out to answer the following research questions: (1) How do local government authorities evaluate and manage organisational performance in Ghana? (2) What core issues within the national policy space influence the management of local government performance? (3) In which way does performance enhancing policy address multiple perspectives of local government performance? (4) To what extent will local government managers use performance management practices to improve service delivery? and (5) What drives the use of performance information within local government authorities in Ghana? Major findings that emerged from this research to address these questions are discussed in the next sections and summarised in table 9.1.

9.3.1 Findings on mechanisms for managing local government performance

In this research, it is shown that performance of local governments is rooted in their statutory functions part of which is expressed in broad goals and mission statements. Thus, LG performance in this study is analysed by focusing on intra organisational processes to establish whether the transfer of authority, resources, and responsibility enable LGs to meet local priorities. With respect to performance management practices, it emerged that mechanisms for managing LG performance were either internally or

232 externally driven. The study established that internal mechanisms for managing LG performance were the task of management committees and executive committees. These committees were used to regularly review departmental goals and achievements, identify performance trajectories and take appropriate corrective action whenever challenges were observed. On the other hand, it was found that externally driven performance management practices involved processes in which LG performance was monitored and inspected by supervisory agencies such as the RCCs and the NDPC, the Ministry of Local Government and the office of the District Assembly Common Fund Administrator. Findings with respect to performance management practices have shown that development plans, performance monitoring and reporting of LG achievements in terms of project implementation and service delivery play a key role in managing LG performance because what actually counts as performance is based on documented achievement of set targets.

Another important finding that emerged from this research is the role of the national development policy framework in shaping the content of LG plans and directing their priorities and performance. The study revealed that thematic areas of LG plans are shaped by the priorities of central government as outlined in the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (2010-2013). As the highest planning authorities responsible for enhancing infrastructure development in local communities, LGs are required to use bottom up approaches in identifying development priorities. In contrast, it was found that stakeholder dialogues such as community fora and town hall meetings which could be used for that purpose were rarely held. Although previous studies have often focused on size, location, resource capabilities among other things to explain LG performance (Crook and Manor, 1998), they have often overlooked the impact of the national policy environment. Importantly, this study has shown that supporting LGs to manage their performance by imposing planning and performance guidelines on them has consequences such as weakening downward accountability; something performance management should be geared towards achieving. It can thus be concluded based on the findings of this study that reporting LG performance to supervisory agencies has a disempowering effect on assembly members and the general public to genuinely set LG agendas in ways that reflect local circumstances and enhance the demand for accountability from LG officials. Therefore, institutionalised forms of performance reporting must be re-examined so that LG managers can use performance information

233 generated from their performance management practices to communicate with residents of local communities, civil society organisations, NGOs and the general public.

9.3.2 Findings on the scope of performance indicators under the district development facility and the functional organisational assessment tool

The study found that government’s attempt to improve upon LG performance through the DDF FOAT is creating some form of performance consciousness amongst LG officials even though responsibility of developing a performance culture was placed on the shoulders of Chief Executives, whose vision was expected to provide direction for the performance of each local authority. It was found that a progressive performance culture was necessary for LGs to fulfil conditions for performance grants under the DDF. The DDF FOAT has become instrumental in providing supplementary funds to LGs based on their performance, tightening internal organisational control and complying with legal and regulatory procedures in performing LG functions. As a result, advocates of the policy mainly from the Ministry of Local Government and its donor partners claim it symbolises best practices in terms of managing organisational performance. Yet, some fundamental shortcomings are worth mentioning.

For instance, this research revealed that all the performance indicators under the FOAT were pre-determined by the central government and its donor partners without inputs from local communities. Thus, the performance assessment criterion under the DDF promotes compliance to indicators that are not sufficiently aligned to the expectations and aspiration of people living in local communities. And because performance indicators are determined by central authorities, there is an emphasis on following administrative procedures rather than focusing on issues of service delivery or other enablers of socio economic development at the local level which is the main reason why LGs exist. Findings of this study reinforce the importance of using performance indicators that do not only focus on the statutory functions of LGs, but thos which emphasises service delivery (quantity, quality and LG responsiveness). Also, the performance enhancing policy could also make provision for ordinary citizens in evaluating LG performance because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of LG services.

Since LGs operate in a complex environment where the interpretation of organisational performance could be varied, the BSC was used to examine whether the DDF FOAT 234 cover multiple dimensions and perspectives of performance. It was established that only certain aspects of operational performance were highlighted which did not include popular dimensions of performance such as efficiency and effectiveness. This is because performance indicators do not focus on ratio variables. For instance, not even did we find indicators on financial performance targeting LG’s efficient or effective utilisation of funds even though LG plans did recognise budget effectiveness, revenue and investments as key drivers of financial performance. Similarly, it was found that indicators on organisational management only sought to verify the existence and operation of specific LG structures such as the Executive Committees and its sub- committees as well as the security committee. Beyond these, one would have expected the performance management system to help create what is arguably the most important factor (transformational and visionary leadership) needed to steer LGs to improve upon their performance. Furthermore, the fact that no specific indicators are used to determine LG’s capabilities to learn from practice points to the limited scope of the DDF FOAT.

Based on these findings, a number of conclusions can be made. First, because policy makers refer to the DDF FOAT as a performance management best practice due to the fact that LGs that fulfil MCs and PMs receive performance grants; there is no genuine commitment amongst LG officials to improve upon organisational performance to better serve their constituents because it appears their main incentive is the financial reward. Second, there are signs of a ‘performance paradox’ in the Ghanaian context where LGs could be adjudged to be performing well when in reality, there is a dissonance between ‘official’ performance and actual or acceptable levels of performance (Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Third, even though LGs are supposed to be serving multiple principals, this research has shown that reporting and accountability tend to be geared toward the centre rather than local communities. This blurs principal- agent relationships between local communities, local governments and the central government and adversely affect collective action, accountability and citizen’s satisfaction; values that a LG performance management should enhance.

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9.3.3 Findings on performance management practices, use of performance information and basic service delivery

Specific findings that relate to the impact of performance management practices, performance information use and its impact on service delivery were quite mixed. As the literature indicates (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Talbot, 2010), there were competing perspectives in respondent’s perception and knowledge about how internal and external mechanisms for managing LG performance enhanced service delivery. Similarly, LG bureaucrats and elected assembly members, unit committee members, teachers and parents who participated in this study had different views about performance management practices and the use of performance information to facilitate service delivery. In spite of these varied opinions, it was clear that performance monitoring had a positive influence on LG officials’ compliance to legally acceptable administrative procedures that are linked to the performance of their official duties. The fact that Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors were supportive and positive about the impact of performance information on performance improvements, budgeting, team work as well as improving internal and external accountability is significant because leadership commitment is key to the successful implementation of performance management systems (Andrews et al. 2006). Yet, based on the findings of this study, it would be relevant for LG managers to use performance information such that ordinary citizens would be aware of how it affects basic services that LGs provide. This implies that LGs would certainly have to improve upon the availability of their performance information to the general public.

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Table 9. 1: Summary of key research findings

Research questions Summary of findings

RQ1. How do local government  Evaluating the performance of LG focuses on their core mandatory functions as enshrined in the authorities evaluate and manage local government law of 1993, Act 462. organisational performance in Ghana?  There are internal and external mechanisms for managing LG performance. Internal measures involve routine performance monitoring within decentralised departments, the use of management committees, Executive Committees and their sub-committees; analysis and use of performance information contained in MTDPs, project progress reports and performance reviews.

 External measures of managing LG performance entail periodic performance reporting to supervisory agencies such as the Regional Coordinating Councils, the National Development Planning Commission, Ministry of Local Government, and the Office of the District Assembly Common Fund. It also includes routine monitoring and evaluation of project implementation at the local government level.

 Government priorities outlined in the overall national development policy framework (GPRS I&II and now the GSGDA) significantly shapes the content of LG plans which implicitly influences their performance. RQ2. What core issues within the national policy space influence the  Top-down, instead of a bottom-up approach to development planning adversely affects LG priorities management of local government and goal setting in ways that undermine the autonomy of LGs. performance?

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RQ3. In which way does the  The District Development Facility and Functional Organisational Assessment Tool is the only performance enhancing policy mechanism for performance-based financing of local governments in Ghana. The DDF has had a initiative address multiple profound impact not only on the ability of LGs to generate performance information but also to perspectives of local government initiate new development projects and sometimes continue with unfinished ones. It is also projected performance? as a best practice performance management framework.

 In terms of design, the DDF performance management regime is largely driven by central government with significant donor influence. Also, formulation of performance indicators under the DDF is entirely determined from the centre and this explains why MCs and PMs specifically target compliance to regulations of administrative procedures that supervisory agencies try to enforce rather than actual LG performance outputs and outcomes.

 Local governments’ fulfilment of performance indicators (PMs and MCs), which also signifies their performance, has improved between 2008 and 2013. Even though LGs receive performance-based grants to motivate organisational performance, this study highlighted the possibilities of having a performance paradox whereby the exclusion of local residents in evaluating LG performance would create disparities in the interpretation of performance.

 Meanwhile, performance indicators under the DDF-FOAT cannot enable LGs to generate quantitative data for ratio analysis. For instance, the FOAT examines the financial performance of LGs by focusing on their fiscal capacity and their compliance with budgetary as well as financial management and auditing procedures. This makes it impossible for evaluators to determine the efficient and effective utilisation of funds by LGs.

 Based on the application of the BSC, it was found that MCs and PMs under the FOAT focus on internal processes and financial dimensions of performance compared to citizens, learning and innovation perspectives. Therefore, the FOAT is neither people-centred nor people-led since it has not made provisions for incorporating the views of citizens about LG performance. Also, feedback mechanisms and learning processes are ineffective to enhance and sustain improved performance. The use of lagged performance information makes it reactive rather than proactive and forward 238

looking.

 It is therefore important to re-examine the objectives of the FOAT by broadening its scope in ways that will have a lasting impact not only on LG processes but also on local communities if the FOAT’s aim of promoting efficient, effective and accountable local government administration has to be achieved. RQ4. LG To what extent will local  The study found that developing a progressive performance culture is crucial for LG delivery of government managers use services. Meanwhile, such a culture may depend on the vision of Chief Executives (mayors). performance management practices to improve service delivery?  Also, routine performance reporting within LGs and between LGs and supervisory agencies influence the way LG officials’ value, evaluate, interpret and use performance information. Also, the use of performance information was embedded in the performance of statutory functions of LGs which implies that information was purposive and goal oriented.

RQ5. What drives the use of  Performance information linked to financial rewards under the DDF had an effect on the provision performance information within of infrastructure for primary schools as well as implementing sanitation and waste management local government authorities in projects/initiatives. Ghana?  Within LGs, performance information is used to make a range of decisions some of which affect service delivery. Primarily, the study found that the use of information within decentralised departments as well as communities facilitated budgeting, supervision of tasks, internal controls and the allocation of development projects in local government areas.

 A combination of factors influenced LG managers’ use of performance information. They include perceptions about the importance of information, commitment to central government’s priorities, adherence to project specific reporting requirements and a sense of public service motivation. Author’s construct, 2014

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9.4 Contribution to knowledge and research conclusions

This thesis attempts to fill two research gaps that directly relate to managing organisational performance. First and foremost, it investigates the presumption that a good performance management system would use a balanced set of performance indicators (qualitative and qualitative) to satisfy and address the interests of every key stakeholder. Secondly, it also examines the assumption that once performance information is produced, it will automatically be used to influence managerial decisions. Therefore, this research contributes to knowledge by attempting to fill these gaps based on findings drawn from the management of local government performance in Ghana. Theoretically, applying the BSC framework to analyse the scope of performance indicators (MCs and PMs) provides important insights for interpreting in diverse ways, the impact of the performance enhancing policy as a strategy used to improve organisational performance. The findings also contribute to our understanding of how the exclusion of local residents from the formulation of performance indicators shapes power relations at the local level. In other words, the ability of central government and donors to influence performance indicators for LGs has consequences on the independence of the latter and who they account to. This also has important implications for principal-agent relations at the local level where ordinary citizens are disempowered to hold their local authorities accountable because of their exclusion from participating in formulating performance indicators, defining focal areas for development plans and evaluating LG performance. The study shows how performance information asymmetries also affect citizens’ perceptions and interpretation of LG performance. Furthermore, this research contributes to our understanding of performance information use amongst power brokers in a local government context. It established the importance of developing a ‘performance culture’ for stimulating the use of performance information for the purpose of achieving LG goals.

This thesis also contributes significantly to existing public administration and public management literature in the sub-Saharan African context. Even though decentralisation and local government experience in Africa is widely documented, there are few studies, if any at all, that focus on the implementation of organisational performance management practices at the sub national level. Since research on performance management at the local government level is an emerging field of research in Ghana, this study hopefully makes some contribution to the public administration literature in the Ghanaian context. For

240 instance, in the course of the PhD research, some contribution has been made in terms of publications that have appeared in peer-reviewed journals. Some of the research papers are enlisted as follows:

1. Bukari, H. (2013). Looking back, moving forward: Towards improving local governments' performance in Ghana. Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance. 13(14).

2. Bawole, J., Hossain, F., Domfeh, K., Bukari, H., & Sanyare, F. (2013) Performance Appraisal or Praising Performance? The Culture of Rhetoric in Performance Management in Ghana Civil Service, International Journal of Public Administration, 36 (13) 953-962.

3. Bukari, H., and Mamman, A. (2014) Where is the organisational memory? A tale of local government employees in Ghana. Public Organisation Review. Springer.

4. Bukari, H., Ohemeng, F., and Mamman, A. (forthcoming) Best practice or best fit? Making sense of local governments’ performance assessment in Ghana. Submitted to Pubic Administration and Development.

5. Ohemeng, F. and Bukari, H. (forthcoming). Performance Appraisal and its use for Individual and Organizational Improvement in the Civil Service of Ghana: The Case of Much Ado about Nothing? Submitted to Pubic Administration and Development.

9.5 Theoretical implications

There is no universal theory of performance and this study did not intend to develop a theory of performance. However, the findings do have significant theoretical implications. For example, findings of the study shows how mechanisms for prioritising development interventions and goal setting in local government planning processes reverse the ideals of ‘giving power to the people’ (Ayee 2004;Ayee 2008). Based on goal setting theory, it is expected that organisations will focus on their ‘bottom-line’ which in the case of local government authorities, entail the provision of social services to people in local

241 communities. Meanwhile, the imposition of the national development policy framework on LGs development plans and strategies significantly increases central government’s influence over LGs. And since performance indicators exclude citizen’s expectations of LG performance, it is difficult for local authorities to target the actual needs of local communities and satisfy their interests. Clearly, adapting the BSC as used in this research, has provided new insights for re-examining the multiple principal-agent relationship at the local government level where the assessment of LG performance excludes the opinions and perceptions of local residents but rather serves the whims and caprices of central government and donor agencies. It can be concluded that using performance indicators to assess compliance to regulatory processes alone is not enough to enable local governments satisfy their constituents and neither will it strengthen accountability to their constituents and ‘real principals’ in local communities. Throughout this research, the dominance of external supervisory agencies representing the central government was obvious and this even affected the use of performance information within local government authorities but nonetheless, the lessons offer useful insights for understanding the dynamics of performance management systems and service delivery within the context of local government administration.

9.6 Implications for policy and practice

Important lessons can be learned from the implementation of performance management practices which include a performance enhancing policy initiative aimed at improving local government performance in Ghana. This research has showed how the performance of local government is shaped by national level policy because central government priorities determine the content of local government development plans. Similarly, the study has showed the limitations in designing performance management systems and formulating performance indicators at the central government level when implementation would take place at the sub national level. Furthermore, the study has showed that the ability of stakeholders to participate in formulating performance indicators affects their influence in demanding for accountability, and has implications on unequal balance of power. The extent of elite capture in the management of local government performance further hampers the availability of performance information to the general public as reported in this study. Although LG managers did use performance information for a variety of reasons, failure to communicate and disseminate performance information made it difficult for people to know whether their LGs were performing well or not and this has 242 consequences on citizens’ perceptions and satisfaction with local government performance and could affect trust in local politicians and local authorities. In the long run, public dissatisfaction will local government provision of basic services could even affect the willingness to pay taxes to local authorities and this can adversely affect performance in terms of service delivery.

9.7 Research limitations

Methodologically, studies on organisational performance often focus on financial data to explain the efficiency and effectiveness of organisational performance. However, these traditional approaches to analysing performance are irrelevant in public organisations whose success is not contingent on making profit. Therefore, this study did not seek to interpret performance based on financial indicators alone even though there is nothing wrong with understanding how LGs use tax payers’ money. Despite the researcher’s curiosity and interest in the management of local government finances in Ghana, it was impractical to focus on financial efficiency of local authorities because LGs do not generate the kind of performance data that is appropriate for ratio analysis.

In addition, field work for this study was fraught with serious financial and time constraints due to the dispersion of the study areas across three geo-political regions. Also, the timing of the field work coincided with the 2012 national presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana and this made some respondents to postpone their interview appointments several times. For instance, Chief Executives for LGs in the Greater Accra and Brong Ahafo regions who participated in this research as well as the Presiding member for the ‘B’ Municipal Assembly were all parliamentary candidates in the elections and this made it difficult to interview them as planned. It was also quite difficult to organise community level unit committees at the peak of the political campaign as most of the members were busily involved in grass-root political activities. Thus, some interviews were recorded at the residence of respondents who were unavailable in their offices during working hours due to their political activities in the run up to the elections. The researcher was mindful and critical of the political rhetoric in the responses of interviewees especially amongst local politicians who superlatively described the performance of their local authorities. This made the FGDs extremely useful for checking

243 this limitation. Furthermore, every attempt was made not to allow any of these limitations to compromise the quality of the outcome of the research.

9.8 Final remarks and suggestions for future research

The findings of this research underscore the need to re-examine the formulation and implementation of systems and practices for managing local government performance. Evidence from this research suggests that the utility of a LG performance management framework depends on the scope of its performance indicators in addressing the interests of multiple stakeholders at the local level. The adapted Balance Scorecard developed in this study calls for LGs to focus on performing their core functions in an attempt to satisfy residents of local communities. In an environment with multiple-stakeholders, performance indicators (MCs and PMs) should be reviewed to focus beyond intra organisational processes and LGs’ compliance with acceptable administrative procedures to explicitly focus on addressing citizen’s perspectives of performance. It appears the financial reward package under the performance enhancing policy affect the commitment of LG officials to better serve and satisfy their constituents. Hence, there is a risk of creating a ‘performance paradox’ where LGs could be adjudged to be performing creditably when in reality; users of local government services think otherwise.

In this study, it was interesting that even under the current LG performance management regime; residents of local communities have not seen improvement in their LG’s response to service needs. It will therefore be significant for researchers to explore and consider how LGs could use their PM practices to improve their response to local service needs. In relation to the impact of LG performance management practices on service delivery, the routine and systematic use of performance information suggests that duty bearers were following due process in performing their tasks most of which showed different levels of external pressure. Yet, it can be concluded that while performance information was used to support certain useful decisions, managers of local government authorities rarely took responsibility for performance lapses as there are neither sanctions nor punitive measures against dysfunctional use of performance information that fail to meet expected performance targets.

In sum, since these findings are based on an examination of LG performance management practices in Ghana, there is need for further research within the Ghanaian context and if 244 possible, a comparative study could be conducted between Ghana and other sub-Saharan African countries to establish whether and to what extent these findings can be obtained. In the Ghanaian context, further research could focus on citizens’ surveys to understand popular perceptions about LG performance in order to compare with official performance record and to test the ‘performance paradox thesis’. Since this study focused on systematic information use, a plausible area of future research could look at the unsystematic use of performance information to see whether the factors that emerged in this research could be verified. Last but not least, previous studies in some sub-Saharan African countries such as Cote d’ Ivoire, Tanzania and Uganda have highlighted LGs inability to satisfactorily provide services to their constitutes and for which reason, various donor led projects, similar to the DDF in Ghana, have been introduced to assist LGs deliver on their mandates (Fjelstad, 2001; Conyers, 2007; Robinson, 2007). For instance, in Uganda, a District Development Project is used to explore ways of empowering local governments and communities to identify, deliver and sustain locally determined investment priorities. In Tanzania, there is a local government capital development grant system; a basket-funding arrangement supported by donors while in Kenya; a local authority transfer fund is being used to serve a similar purpose. A comparative study on these country cases will undoubtedly make an immense contribution to our knowledge of performance management policies and practices at local government level in sub- Sahara Africa.

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Zakaria, H. B. (2013). Looking back, moving forward: Towards improving local governments' performance in Ghana. Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, (13/14).

List of appendices

Appendix 1: Participant information sheet and informed consent

As a potential participant, the information below explains your role and rights if you offer to partake in this study. After reading through this information sheet, any questions or concerns you may need to be clarified to allow you make an informed decision are readily welcome as I will be delighted to address them. You are kindly reminded that it is not a bother to ask me questions. Your decision to agree or refuse to participate in this study will be highly respected and you are not obliged to participate by merely reading this document. I will be very grateful however, if you decide to participate. Thank you for your time.

Who will conduct the research?

The study will be carried out by Hamza Bukari Zakaria, PhD Candidate at the Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM); School of Environment, Education and 259

Development (SEED), University of Manchester under the supervision of Dr. Aminu Mamman and Dr. Chris Rees.

Title and aim of research

Performance Management and Local Government Administration in Ghana: The Case of the District Development Facility and the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool. The study aims at examining performance management practices of local governments in Ghana by drawing on the knowledge of local government officials and community groups to understand the nature of existing performance management processes, the scope of performance indicators, and the use of performance information to enhance service delivery.

Why you have been chosen?

You are selected to participate in this study because you meet the requirements for this research. This is reinforced by virtue of your position, knowledge, experience and role in the selected local government authority. We assume your opinions about local government performance would be relevant in achieving the objectives of the study.

What will happen if I agree to participate in this research?

You will be agreeing to grant an interview to the principal researcher for a period of not more than 2 hours or participate in a focus group discussion not exceeding 2 hours.

What happens to the data collected?

The conversation during the interviews and focus group discussions will be tape-recorded and transcribed for analysis. The results will be presented as part of a thesis to the University of Manchester for the award of PhD Degree. Other parts of this may be published in peer-review journals. You are reminded that all the data gathered by the researcher will be secured, properly protected and anonymised to prevent your identity from being disclosed.

How is confidentiality maintained?

Neither the names of participants nor the institutions they work for will be mentioned in the thesis that will be written with the data. All identifiers will be ignored and data access will be restricted to the principal investigator and the supervisory team. In addition, all data and related reports will be password protected and kept under lock and key. Data will be destroyed within a period of ten years.

What happens if you do not want to take part or if you change your mind?

Your participation is entirely voluntary and so, you are entitled to change your mind and exercise the right to decline participation at any time even if you do not want to give reasons. Your right will be respected and at your request, all data collected from you will be destroyed.

Will you be paid for participating in the research? 260

The study does not include the payment of allowances to participants. However, respondents could indirectly derive satisfaction from the interaction since the issues to be discussed will reflect their practical experiences, most of which are important for the development of Ghana.

What is the duration of the research?

The research is expected to take 3 years to complete but the data collection is expected to take up to 5 -7 months but your participation is limited to not more than 2 hours.

Where will the research be conducted?

In three Assemblies in the Greater Accra, Brong Ahafo and Northern regions but the names of selected local governments cannot be disclosed to other participants outside the jurisdiction of selected LG organisations.

What if something goes wrong?

If during the research process, there are issues, concerns, questions or if you want to make a formal complaint about the conduct of the research do please contact the Head of the Research Office, Christie Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL.

Contact for further information

I can be reached at the following address: Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) School of Environment, Education and Development, The Arthur Lewis Building, (1st floor), University of Manchester, United Kingdom M13 9PL Email: [email protected]

Consent Form

If you are completely satisfied with the above information and willing to participate in this study, kindly complete and sign this consent form.

I confirm that I have read and understood the attached information sheet on the study and have been offered the opportunity to ask any questions.

I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to any service

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I understand that the interviews will be audio-recorded

I agree to the use of anonymous quotes

I agree to take part in the above project

Name of participant Date Signature

Name of person taking Date Signature consent

Appendix 2: Interview schedule for local government officials

1. How do you conceptualize local government performance? In other words, how do you evaluate performance as a local government authority and what mechanisms do you have in place to manage organisational performance? Probe 2. How do you formulate your key performance indicators? From your point of view, what are the most important measures or indicators? Have there been any significant recent changes in the way in which performance is thought about here? Probe. 3. Who determines what the current set of performance measures should be? Do you set your own indicators or, alternatively, how far are indicators imposed on from outside? 4. How far, by whom, and for what purpose is performance information used? 5. What do you expect from the performance management system and have these expectations been met?

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6. Has the performance management system been able to address the core functions of your local government authority? Please explain how. Do you think local residents are satisfied with your performance as a local government authority? 7. What do you think are the drivers and impediments of organisational performance? In other words, what do you think contributes to the performance of your MMDA under the current performance regime? Which of the items identified above do you think account for the achievement of your performance targets? 8. What are the outcomes of the prevailing performance management system? In other words, what would you identify as the deliverables of existing performance management practices? How does it relate to service delivery? Could you elaborate on how it affects basic education, sanitation and waste management services? 9. Are performance data much discussed within the local authority, and who makes the most use of them inside the local government? 10. Who (if anyone) makes the most use of them outside the agency? Can you please give an example of their use? 11. As a local government functionary, are you satisfied with the implementation and outcomes of the performance management system? Probe 12. What factors inhibit the implementation of the performance management system? In other words, what challenges do you encounter in implementing the PMS? 13. What lessons have you learned from the implementation of the performance management system? In what ways do you think the system could be improved?

Schedule for in depth interviews with Directors of Education

1. What is the total number of educational institutions under your directorate? Categorize them according to hierarchical levels of education (general condition of educational infrastructure; population of teachers; population of students/pupils; teacher-pupil ratio, etc) 2. What are local government’s plans for the development of basic education in your metropolis, municipality or district? Are these plans consistent with the needs of basic education at the local level? Probe 3. How is the performance of basic education delivery measured and managed? How is performance indicators formulated and measured for the delivery of basic education? 4. How is the delivery of basic education influenced by local government’s performance management practices? Probe 5. What do you expect from local government performance management practices? 6. Given what you may consider as the performance of basic education in your district, have your expectations been met? Could you explain why or why not? 7. Is the staff of the Ghana Education Service satisfied with the local government performance management system, and why? 8. How would the performance management regime enhance the delivery of basic education? 9. What are the results, outcomes, lessons and challenges associated with the prevailing performance management regime? 263

Questions for directors of sanitation and waste management departments

1. What are local government’s plans for the development of waste management in your metropolis, municipality or district? 2. Are these plans consistent with the sanitation needs at the local level? Probe 3. How is the delivery of waste management services influenced by local government’s performance management practices? Probe 4. How is the performance of waste management services measured and managed? 5. How is performance indicators formulated and measured for the delivery of waste management services? 6. Given what you may consider as the performance of sanitary services in your district, have your expectations been met? Could you explain why or why not? 7. How would the performance management regime improve the sanitation and waste management in your district?

Questions for local government managers on the use of performance information for decision making

1. How do you view performance management practices in your LG? Do you see it as a management philosophy or an imposition from central government? Please explain. 2. How far do you think the performance data reﬂects the really important aspects of the LG’s ‘real’ performance? 3. What are the main external inﬂuences on how well the agency performs? 4. To what extent to you link LG goals, desired outcome or objectives to the type of performance information you produce. In other words, will performance information measure what they are meant to measure? And do they meet your performance information needs. 5. How often do you subject conduct performance audits and reviews? 6. To what extent do you allow performance information to influence your decisions, including those on service delivery? Please elaborate 7. Has performance management brought more advantages than disadvantages to your outfit? Please elaborate 8. How often are you concerned about making performance information accessible to CSOs, NGOs and the media?

Appendix 2: Schedule for focus group discussions

1. How is ‘‘Performance’’ conceived of and measured in the local government context? If I say to you ‘‘the performance of your Assembly’’ what are the ﬁrst things that come to mind? 2. What do you expect from your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly and how do you think these expectations will be met? 264

3. What are your expectations of local government efforts on basic education development/sanitation and waste management? 4. How responsive is your local government authority to demands for quality basic education/ sanitation and waste management? 5. Considering the amount of resources available to your LG, do you think that basic education provided by your local government authority should be excellent?

All of the time Most of the Some of the Rarely Never Do not know time time

6. Considering the amount of resources available to your LG, do you think you should have an excellent quality household and city refuse collection service?

All of the time Most of the Some of the Rarely Never Do not know time time

7. Considering the amount of resources available to your LG, do you think that the overall services provided by your local authority should be of excellent quality?

All of the time Most of the Some of the Rarely Never Do not know time time

8. How do you form your opinion about local government performance? And what is your opinion about the performance of your local government? Could you please elaborate? Probe 9. How satisfied are you with the performance of your local authority in terms of developing basic education?

Very dissatisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Very satisfied Do not know

10. How satisfied are you with the performance of your local authority’s household refuse collection services?

Very dissatisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Very satisfied Do not know

11. How satisfied are you with the performance of your local authority’s overall services? 265

Very dissatisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Very satisfied Do not know

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Appendix 3: Details of minimum conditions and performance measures under the DDF-FOAT

Minimum Indicators of Minimum Information Source and Assessment Procedure Condition Condition

Functional Establishment of a DPCU based From the District Coordinating Director (DCD) obtain information on membership and Capacity in on the Guidelines for the signed minutes of the quarterly meetings as well as dated invitation letters to members Development Operationalisation of DPCUs & of the DPCU. Planning RPCUs, 2004 If minimum of 80% of members have attended each meeting and minutes duly recorded and signed by the Secretary and the Chairman, the MC is fulfilled.

(Section 2.2 of Guideline for Operationalisation of DPCUs & RPCUs)

Annual Action Plan has been From DCD receive a copy of the 2010 approved Annual Action Plan (AAP) prepared formulated on the basis of the for implementation of the 2010-13 MTDP to verify link between MTDP and the AAP. MTDP If AAP is prepared and 80% of the number of programmes and projects in the AAP conform to MTDP, the MC is fulfilled.

(Section 7.10 of Draft NDPC Guidelines on the preparation of the MTDP)

Functional Annual Statement of Accounts From the DCD obtain information on whether the Annual Statement of Accounts for Capacity in prepared and submitted according 2010 has been prepared and submitted by the 31st March 2011. Financial to the Financial Administration If this has been done, the MC is fulfilled. Management and Act, 654, Financial Administration Accounting Regulation LI1802/ and Financial (Financial Administration Regulation and the Financial Administration Act) Memorandum

No adverse comments bordering From the DCD receive a copy of the Auditor General’s Audit report for 2009 and the Management Letter for 2010. If no adverse comments in the management letter

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on dishonesty in the Audit Report. bordering on dishonesty have been reported, the MC is fulfilled. ***

Preparation and submission of From DCD obtain and review copies of monthly financial reports prepared and monthly financial reports to submitted to CAGD. CAGD If all twelve monthly financial reports for 2010 were prepared and submitted to CAGD by 15 January 2011 and at least 9 reports were submitted within 15 days after the month to which they relate, the MC is fulfilled

(FAR LI 1802, section 189)

Functional District procurement plan From the DCD receive information on the preparation and approval of the 2010 Capacity in available and prepared based on Procurement Plan by 30th November 2009 and obtain quarterly updated plans on the Procurement Public Procurement Act (PPA) procurement plan for 2010. 663 of 2003 and the Guidelines If the plan and the review reports follow the PPA and guidelines, then MC is fulfilled.

(Part III Section 21, Sub section 1, PPA 663, 2003 on the preparation of procurement plan)

Functional Assembly meeting according to From the DCD receive a copy of invitation letters and signed minutes of meetings of the Capacity of minimum demands General Assembly held in 2010. Assembly If the assembly has met at least three times and minutes duly recorded and signed by PM and DCD in 2010, the MC is fulfilled.

(Section 18 of Local Government Act, Act 462)

Plan Progress Reports on the From the DCD obtain information whether the MMDA has submitted quarterly and Implementation implementation of activities in the annual progress reports on the implementation of the 2010 Annual Action Plan to the Capacity Annual Action Plan Regional Coordinating Council (RCC).

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If the quarterly reports for 2010 have been prepared and submitted by the 15th of April, 15th of July and 15th of October and the annual report prepared and submitted before the 28 of February 2011, the MC is fulfilled.

(NDPC District M&E guideline 2009)

***Examples bordering on dishonesty are embezzlement, misappropriation, over invoicing for purchasing, inflation of contract sums, etc

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DDF PERFORMANCE MEASURES (PMs)

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

Management Meetings of the political From the DCD receive and review the composition, attendance and and structure: minutes of the meetings: Organisation Executive If at least a meeting of the EC/A was held prior to each of the three Committee/Authority (EC/A) mandated General Assembly meetings in 2010 and minutes duly recorded and signed by DCD and DCE respectively, score 2, else score 0 Total Score - 10 2

(Section 19 of the Local Government Act, Act 462)

Sub-committees of the If each of the 5 Statutory Sub-committees held at least one meeting prior to

Assembly each of the three meetings of the EC/A in 2010 and minutes are recorded and signed, score 2, else score 0 2

(Section 24 of the Local Government Act, Act 462 District Security Committee If District Security Committee held quarterly meetings in 2010 and 1 minutes duly recorded, score 1, else score 0

Accessibility of public places From the DCD receive information on plans and efforts that have been put to the physically challenged in place (plans and progress reports) to enhance access for the physically 1 challenged to offices, new construction or renovation of classroom blocks,

sanitation facilities, water points, and markets etc. in 2010.

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If there is evidence of provision of access or efforts to provide access to the physically challenged for all projects, score 1 else score 0.

Regular management From the DCD, receive copies of duly recorded and signed minutes of

meetings management (Departments of the District Assembly + DA core staff) meetings held in 2010.

If management meetings were held at least quarterly and duly attended by at least 80% of heads of departments of the District Assembly, score 1, else score 0. 2

If 2 of these quarterly meetings were held under the chairmanship of the Chief Executive score an additional 1, else score 0.

(Departments of the District Assembly as stated under schedule 1 of LI 1961 (2009)

Follow up to management From the DCD, receive signed minutes of meetings and review it against meetings implementation reports on decisions taken in 2010.

If at least 75% or more of decisions have been implemented score 2, if 50- 2 74% score 1, below 50% score 0.

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

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Transparency, Establishment and From the DCD receive information on the establishment (secretariat functionality of the Public with staff) and operationalization, list of empanelled for the purpose of Openness and Relations and Complaints complaints received, complaints received and actions taken. Accountability Committee (PRCC) If there is a secretariat/desk with staff, score 1 2

If files/records are available on complaints , score an additional 1 Total score - 12 (Section 27 of the Local Government Act, Act 462)

Information to the Public From the DCD receive information on evidence of dissemination of the

Assembly’s activities to the public (e.g. public hearings, consultations, publications, available newsletters, letters of notice boards, receipt for 1 radio discussions and announcements).

If evidence of dissemination to public exist score 1, else score 0.

Publication of annual From the DCD receive documentation of publication of the 2010 annual statement of accounts statement of accounts which should include the following: (LGA Section 125) Balance sheet

Revenue and expenditure statement

cash flow statement 3

Notes to the account

If copies of 2010 statement of accounts have been given to DA members, score 1, and if published on notice board score an additional

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2. If not, score 0.

Availability of the External From DCD receive a copy of the external auditor’s report, review the Auditor’s Report report and establish actions taken on the issues raised in the report.

If the latest audit report has been made available to the public (notice 2

board, website or in other ways) score 2, else score 0.

(Section 125 of the Local Government Act, Act 462)

Publication of draft Annual From DCD receive documentation of publication of draft annual Budget budget.

If the 2010 draft Budget was made available to DA members (despatch book) two weeks before Assembly meeting, score 1, if not score 0. 1 (Part V, Section 40 of the Financial Memoranda, 2004 of the MLGRD)

Submission of Monthly From DCD receive documentation on submission of monthly financial Financial Statement. statements. (I.e. trial balance, revenue & expenditure statement and balance sheet)

If 12 monthly financial statements for 2010 have been submitted to the 3 F&A Sub-committee within 15 days after the month to which they relate, score 3, else score 0.

(Part VII, Section 75 of the Financial Memoranda, 2004 of the MLGRD)

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PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

Planning Involvement of key From DCD receive and review implementation reports on key system stakeholders in plan stakeholders’ participation in non-physical programmes (e.g. implementation and sensitisation, capacity building and extension services) identified in the monitoring 2010 Annual Action Plan. 1 Total score - 16 If minutes or records exist for participation by key stakeholders (beneficiaries, DA members and service providers) in 80-100% of the non-physical programmes exist for 2010, score 1, else score 0.

(Section 5 of NDPC M&E Guideline 2009)

From DCD receive monitoring reports on physical projects identified in the Annual Action Plan.

If minutes or records of participation by key stakeholders (beneficiaries, 1 DA staff and contractor and other stakeholders depending on the nature

of the project) exist for more than 75% of the monitoring undertaken in 2009, score 1, else score 0.

Level of plan From DCD obtain information on projects in the Annual Action Plan for implementation 2010.

If 75% or more of the total number of projects in the Annual Action 2 Plan have been implemented or are being implemented, score 2. If 50%- 74% score 1, If less than 50% score 0. Internal monitoring and From DCD receive minutes of quarterly M&E meetings (district 2 evaluation of plan

274 implementation administration and departments of the District Assembly).

If review meetings have been held within the framework of the M&E system with 4 meeting minutes duly recorded and signed and submitted to NDPC within 15 days, score 2, if 3 meeting minutes score 1, if less than 3 meetings score 0.

(Section 3.3 of NDPC M&E Guideline 2009)

Linkage between planning From DCD obtain information on the annual plan and budget for 2010 and budgeting and establish the linkage between the two documents. 1 If 80% or more of investment budgetary estimates conforms to the annual plan score 1, else score 0.

Work planning by From the DCD receive copy of departments of the District Assembly’s’ departments of the District annual action plans and review these in line with the 2010-13 MTDP. Assembly If 90% or more of departments of the District Assembly’ projects and 2 programmes are integrated into the AAP score 2, if 80-89% score 1, else score 0.

Socio economic data From DCD receive information about databank of the Assembly collection and management If there is a consolidated databank (2006-2009) of sex disaggregated data of the district for revenue potential and data from health, education, 2 roads, water and sanitation and agriculture departments exists score 2, if not score 0.

Support to the poor and From DCD receive information on programmes for the poor and 2 vulnerable (Women, Children, Aged, Disabled and People Living with

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vulnerable HIV/AIDS).

If 20% or more of the projects in the AAP focus specifically on the poor and vulnerable score 2, if between 10-19%, score 1, if less than 10%, score 0.

Climate change From DCD receive information on climate change and disaster risk interventions reduction (CC-DRR) programmes in the District. 1 If 5% or more of the projects in the AAP focus specifically on CC-DRR issues score 1, if not score 0

Gender Mainstreaming From the DCD find out if the assembly has initiated or implemented programmes aimed at bridging gaps between males and females.

Score 1 for indications of interventions related to promoting women’s and marginalised groups’ advancement into public office and leadership 2 development.

Score an additional 1 for the availability of a district plan based on a gender profile demonstrating use/analysis of sex disaggregated data from databank for programme formulation and implementation.

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

Human Overall vacancy level From DCD receive a copy of the actual staff ledger of the Assembly’s 2 Resource central administration and the departments of the District Assembly for

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Management 2010. If the ledger is available and has been revised quarterly, score 1.

Total max. If evidence of efforts (letters) to fill all vacancies has been taken within score 7 a month also exist, score an additional score 1.

(Office of Head of Civil Service Guidelines)

Staff development From DCD receive copy of training needs assessment for the Assembly’s central administration and heads of departments of the District Assembly. 1 If training needs assessment was done for 2010, score 1, else score 0.

(Office of Head of Civil Service Guidelines)

Training and capacity From the DCD receive a copy of the staff capacity building plan building prepared for implementation in 2010 and accompanying implementation capacity building reports.

If the staff capacity building plan (including those identified from FOAT) is available and based on TNA score 2, else score 0. 4 If 60% or more of programmes in the plan has been implemented, score an additional 1

If all quarterly reports on DDF capacity building activities has been submitted to LGSS, score an additional 1

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring

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Score

Relationshi Revenue sharing between Assembly From the DCD, obtain information (payment voucher/receipts) on transfer p with sub and sub structures (transfer to sub- or remittance of 50% of revenue collected to sub structures on behalf of the structures districts 50% of ceded revenues District Assembly. collected in sub structures) 3 If the MMDA has evidence on remittance of funds to 50% or more of sub structures score 3, else score 0. Total max. score 6 (Legislative Instrument 1967)

Extent to which sub district structures From the DCD receive (quarterly??) progress report for 2010 from the sub- have been mandated to perform structures on the implementation of their mandated functions, and the extent

functions outlined in LI 1967 to which these functions are being performed. 3 If at least one quarterly report for 2010 is available from at least 50% of the sub-structures, score 3

(Legislative Instrument 1967)

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

Financial Functionality of Budget From the DCD receive information on the composition and functionality of the Management Committee Budget Committee. 1 and Auditing If Budget Committee is functional and duly recorded and signed minutes of 4 meetings of 75% of members are available and demonstrate consideration and

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decision /recommendation on all mandated items, score 1 or else score 0.

Total max. (Section 150 Financial Administration Regulations LI 1802) score 16 Compliance with From the DCD obtain information on the annual expenditure returns of the budgetary provisions. Assembly.

If annual expenditure returns are kept within budget approvals, AND expenditures 2 returns relate to items in the approved budget, score 2

(Financial Memoranda issued by MLGRD 2004)

Procedure for funds From the DCD obtain information on the process of disbursing funds for IGF,

disbursement DACF, HIPC, Health Fund, DDF, GETFund and Donor Funds for specific projects.

If ALL disbursements have been done according to procedures for utilisation of IGF, 1 HIPC, DACF, Health Fund, GETFund, DDF and Donor Funds score 1, else score 0.

(Guidelines from Administrators of various funds )

Approval of the budget From the DCD obtain minutes of Assembly meetings for the approval of the 2010 budget.

If the budget was presented by the Executive committee to the General Assembly for 2 approval in time (latest by 30th November 2009), score 2 else score 0.

(Section 11 of the Local Government Act, Act 462)

Estimation of revenue From the DCD obtain information on the basis for estimation of revenue from fees from fees and licences and licences (data on target group e.g. chop bars, drinking bars etc.) 1 If estimation was based on data provided score 1, else score 0.

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(Schedule 6 and Section 86 of the Local Government Act, Act 462) (Financial Memoranda issued by MLGRD 2004).

Board of Survey From the DCD, obtain report of the Board of Survey for 2010 on both stores and funds.

If Board of Survey was conducted not later than 31st December 2010, signed and 2 dated report available, score 2, else score 0

(Section 30 of Part X and Section 50 of Part XII of Financial Memorandum issued by MLGRD 2004)

Prompt responsiveness to From DCD obtain evidence on queries from the management letter for 2009 on the external audit queries external audit and whether the report was submitted to the Audit Report Implementation Committee within the specified period and actions taken on the queries.

If the management letter was submitted to ARIC within 30 days of receipt of management letter, score 1 3 If the management letter has been responded to (status report) within 30 days by the district management, score an additional 2

(Section 121 of the Local Government Act, Act 462, 1993)

(Part 3, section 29 of Audit Service Act , Act 584, 2000)

Functionality of Internal From the DCD obtain quarterly internal audit reports submitted to the Presiding Audit Unit Member of the Assembly. 2 If this has been done on a quarterly basis score 2, else score 0.

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( Section 120 of the Local Government Act, Act 462)

Responsiveness to the From the DCD obtain evidence on ARIC’s comments to the internal audit reports for internal audit 2010 and DA management’s implementation of these recommendations observations

2 If the Chief Executive has acted on the recommendations in the 4 internal audit reports score 2, else score 0.

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

Fiscal Capacity; Absolute Size of IGF From the DCD obtain information on average annual growth in IGF between 2009 and 2010.

If growth has been higher than 20%, score 3 Total max. 3 score 15 If growth has been 10% - 19%, score 2

Or else score 0.

(Please show basis for calculation in the report)

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Efforts to improve From the DCD obtain a copy of the Revenue Improvement Action Plan. Internally Generated Fund (IGF) If the plan is available score 2. If 75% of the activities in the plan for 2010 have been implemented accordingly and an average annual growth 4 rate of 20% has been realized, score an additional 2.

Collection cost of Internally From the DCD obtain information on the collection cost of IGF. If the Generated Fund (IGF) collection cost of IGF is less than 30% of the total IGF score 2, else score 0.

Observe the following and sum up to arrive at the cost of revenue collection: 2 Salaries of revenue staff on central government payroll

Commission received by revenue collectors

Cost of value books used

Share of Internally From the DCD obtain information from the trial balance on the use of Generated Fund (IGF) used the IGF for development (investment) and maintenance from the for Development Assembly’s internal revenue sources. Expenditure 2

If at least 15% or more of the IGF was spent on investment and maintenance in 2010, score 2. If 10%-14%, score 1, else score 0.

Operation and maintenance From the DCD obtain information on the percentage of the approved 2

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plan budget for operation and maintenance as against capital budget.

If there is a plan for O&M and activities are captured in the annual budget, score 1. If the percentage for O&M is 10% or higher, score an additional 1.

Preparation of Asset From the DCD obtain a copy of the Asset Register. Registers If the Register is available score 1, if it has been updated annually in 2 2010, score an additional 1.

(Financial Memoranda 2004, Part XII Section 64)

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

Procurement; Meetings of Procurement From the DCD obtain information on minutes of meetings of the Tender Entities Committee.

If the Tender Committee met as required by law and have duly recorded 3 Total max. and signed minutes, score 3, else score 0. score 12 (Section 17-20 of Public Procurement Act, Act 663)

Record on procurement From the DCD obtain information on the record of procurement

proceedings proceedings 3 If done according to the Act, score 3, else score 0.

(Section 28 of Public Procurement Act, Act 663).

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Contract Mobilisation From the DCD obtain information on all contract mobilisation paid in 2010.

If mobilisation payments are within 15% of the contract sum and 2 appropriate and redeemable bonds have been secured score 2, else score 0

(Part IX Section 69 and 70 of the Financial Memoranda)

Contract management Obtain from the DCD the percentage of projects completed on schedule for 2010. (Examine contracts file or register)

If 80% or more projects have been completed on schedule or on-going in 2010 score 3. If 60-79% have been completed score 1. If less score 0. 3

Contract Retention From the DCD obtain information on contracts completed in 2010.

If the minimum of 10% retention was withheld on EACH and fully released after the defect liability period (normally not less the six 1

months) on ALL contracts score 1, else score 0.

(Part IX Section 72 of the Financial Memoranda)

PMs Indicators Information source, Assessment basis and Scoring Max Scoring Score

Environmental Development of From the DCD obtain a copy of the DESSAP and annual action plan on 2 Sanitation Environmental Sanitation

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Management Sub-Sector Strategy and its implementation Action Plan (DESSAP) If provision was made for 2010 activities in the Assembly’s 2010 Annual Env. Sanitation Plan and Annual Work Plan and approved Total Max. Budget for the implementation, score 1. If 75% of the activities (by Score 6 number) were implemented, score an additional 1.

(National Environmental Sanitation Policy 1999)

Data on environmental From the DCD find out if data exist on environmental facilities facilities (latrines, dumping sites, urinal, butcheries etc.). 1 If data on the facilities exist and was updated in 2010, score 1,

(National Environmental Sanitation Policy 1999)

Market Facilities From the DCD obtain information on available market facilities i.e. place of convenience (latrines and urinals), solid waste disposal facilities (waste containers and litter bins) in the main market.

If a place of convenience exists in the market and can be confirmed to 3 be functioning and usable, score 1. If containers and litter-bins are in place for solid waste disposal in the market, score an additional 2.

(National Environmental Sanitation Policy 1999)

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Appendix 4: List of conferences and workshops attended during PhD study

1. Africa Research Group Workshop, Nottingham Business School. University of Nottingham. 24th October, 2011. Nottingham, United Kingdom.

2. Discourse Analysis Workshop. 17th May, 2012. Samuel Alexander Building, University of Manchester.

3. School of Environment and Development (SED) Post Graduate Research Conference held at the Humanities Bridgeford Street Building, University of Manchester, UK. May 14th, 2012.

4. London Centre for Social Studies PhD Conference 2013 Methodological Choices and Challenges. Friday 19 April 2013 King’s College London, Strand London.

5. SEED Postgraduate Research Conference 2013 School of Education, Environment and Development (SEED) held at the Humanities Bridgeford Street Building, University of Manchester, UK. Wednesday, 1st May, 2013.

6. Commonwealth Local Government Forum Research Colloquium, 13-14th May, 2013. Uganda Management Institute (UMI), Kampala.

7. 7th Commonwealth Local Government Conference, Developmental Local Government: Putting Local Government at the heart of Development. 14-17th May, 2013, Kampala, Uganda.

8. 3rd International Conference on Management in Africa. Hosted by the Centre for Organizations in Development, Manchester University Africa Research Group and, Nottingham University Business School. 5-6th September 2013, Humanities Bridgeford Street, University of Manchester.

Seminar and conference presentations

1. Centre for Continuing Education and Inter-disciplinary Research (CCEIR), Internal Quarterly Seminars, 30th October, 2012, University for Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana. Paper Presented: Towards A Reflexive Approach to Interviewing in Organizational Research.

2. Centre for Continuing Education and Inter-disciplinary Research (CCEIR), Internal Quarterly Seminars, 31st October, 2012, University for Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana. Paper Presented: Performance Appraisal or Praising Performance? The Culture of Rhetoric in Performance Management in Ghana Civil Service

3. Bawole J, Hossain F, Mamman A, Bukari H & Sanyare F. Does promotion come from above? Superstition and Spirituality in workplace promotion in Ghana Civil Service. Paper presented at the Second International Conference on HRM and the Management of Organizations in Africa. Nottingham, UK. 6-7th September, 2012.

4. Commonwealth Local Government Forum Research Colloquium, 13-14th May, 2013. Uganda Management Institute (UMI), Kampala. Title of Paper Presented: Looking back, moving forward: Towards Local Government Performance Improvement in Ghana.

5. 3rd International Conference on Management in Africa. Hosted by the Centre for Organizations in Development, Manchester University Africa Research Group and, Nottingham University Business School. 5-6th September 2013, Humanities Bridgeford Street, University of Manchester. Titles of papers: Where is the Institutional Memory? A tale of Local Government Employees in Ghana and Looking Back, Moving Forward: Towards local government performance improvement in Ghana.

6. 18th Annual International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM) Conference, 9th -11th April, 2014, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. Paper presented: Performance assessment of local government authorities: perspectives from Ghana.

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Appendix 5: Skills training workshops attended

Unit Code Title Event Date Event Venue

Methods in Transcription & SAHC81011 Conversation Analysis 21/02/2013 Mansfield Cooper 2.04

Beginners Reference Management with Endnote: Faculty of Blue 4 Teaching Suite, Main LBRYS0130 Humanities 17/04/2012 Library

HUMNS8880 Preparing for Your Review Panel 13/03/2012 Roscoe 3.9

Beginners Reference Management with Endnote: Faculty of Blue 4 Teaching Suite, Main LBRYS0130 Humanities 05/03/2012 Library

Graduate Teaching Assistant STDU Training Suite, TTL10 Training 24/01/2012 Humanities Bridgeford Street

HUMNS8340 Presenting a Research Poster 14/12/2011 Roscoe 3.1

Blue 4 Teaching Suite, Main LBRYS0110 Keeping up to Date 25/11/2011 Library

Searching the literature with Blue 4 Teaching Suite, Main RSCHS0070 Scopus 23/11/2011 Library

Graduate Teaching Assistant STDU, Humanities Bridgeford HUMNS8800 (GTA) Training 21/11/2011 Street (2nd Floor

HUMNS8070 Academic Writing 4 15/11/2011 Simon 4A (4.63)

Lunchbite: keeping up to date with Blue 4 Teaching Suite, Main LBRYS0170 RSS feeds 10/11/2011 Library

HUMNS8060 Academic Writing 3 08/11/2011 Simon 4A (4.63)

HUMNS8050 Academic Writing 2 01/11/2011 Simon 4A (4.63)

HUMNS8760 Presentation Skills for Beginners 27/10/2011 Simon 2(2.39)

HUMNS8040 Academic Writing 1 25/10/2011 Simon 4A (4.63)

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