Peirce Knew Why Abduction Isn't IBE—A Scheme and Critical Questions
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Defeasibility from the Perspective of Informal Logic
University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10 May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM Defeasibility from the perspective of informal logic Ralph H. Johnson University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Johnson, Ralph H., "Defeasibility from the perspective of informal logic" (2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 84. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/84 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Defeasibility from the perspective of informal logic RALPH H. JOHNSON Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric University of Windsor 401 Sunset Ave, Windsor, Ontario Canada [email protected] ABSTRACT: The notions of defeasibility and defeasible reasoning have generated a great deal of interest in various research communities. Here I want to focus on their use in logic and argumentation studies. I will approach these topics from the perspective of an informal logician who finds himself struggling with some issues that surround the idea of and the deployment of the concept of defeasibility. My intention is to make those struggles as clear as I can. KEYWORDS: deductive, defeasible, defeasibility, Pollock, undercutting defeater, rebutting defeater, Informal Logic Initiative 1. INTRODUCTION The notions of defeasibility and defeasible reasoning have generated a great deal of interest in various research communities. -
299 Abelson, RP, 66 Abductive Argument Argumentation Scheme For
Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-03930-8 - Methods of Argumentation Douglas Walton Index More information Index Abelson, R.P., 66 Anchored narrative, 137 , 163 Abductive argument Appeal to authority, 216–17 argumentation scheme for, 162 Appeal to expert opinion, 216 , 221 critical questions for, 162 Appeal to the people, see Fallacy of Abductive reasoning, 111 , 160 , 187–88 argument from popular opinion argumentation scheme for, 84 , 206 Araucaria, 15 , 16 , 99 critical questions for, 84 compared, 19–20 modeling with, 160–61 described, 12–13 Abortion case, 143–44 , 148 ArguMed, 16 , 17 Abstract argumentation framework, comparison, 20 35–36 Argument defi ned, 33 attack, 27 , 42 , 53 , 55 , 78 Action-based alternating transition back and forth exchange, 92 system, 156 composition, 46 , 48 , 90 ACTOS example, 1 , 20 defi nition, 48 , 88 , 89 critical questions, 15–16 defeasible, 7 , 30 , 227 , 229 , 246–47 explained, 14 open-ended, 238 Ad hominem argument, 50 , 159 , 234 evaluated, 33 defi ned, 96 identifying, 94–97 requirements of, 97 requirements for identifying, 89–90 types of, 118 Argument diagram, 72 , 255–56 , 259 Ad hominem attack, 235 composition of, 10 Ad verecundiam fallacy, 274 Argument from analogy, 42 , 114 , 139 , Affi davit example, 44–45 143 , 146 Agent argumentation scheme for, 122 , 145 described, 101 core, 126 , 130–31 , 149 desires and beliefs, 5 derived scheme, 130–31 Aiken, S., 281 simplest, 126 , 147–49 , 151–52 Airline fl ight schedule, 244 single respect scheme, 128 , 149–50 Ali, S., 104 version 1 , 141 , 142 -
Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, Anda Priorijustification
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES Philosophical Perspectives, 24, Epistemology, 2010 BOOTSTRAPPING, DEFEASIBLE REASONING, AND APRIORIJUSTIFICATION Stewart Cohen The University of Arizona What is the relationship between (rationally) justified perceptual belief and (rationally) justified belief in the reliability of perception? A familiar argument has it that this relationship makes perceptual justification impossible. For on the one hand, pre-theoretically it seems reasonable to suppose: (1) We cannot have justified perceptual beliefs without having a prior justified belief that perception is reliable. If we are not justified in believing perception is reliable, then how can we trust its deliverances? On the other hand, it seems reasonable to suppose: (2) We cannot be justified in believing perception is reliable without having prior justified perceptual beliefs. It is a contingent matter whether perception is reliable. So how else could we be justified in believing perception is reliable other than by empirical investigation?1 Combining these two suppositions yields the disastrous result that we need justified perceptual beliefs prior to having justified perceptual beliefs. Unless we are content with a skeptical result, these two suppositions need to be reconsidered. Some theorists have elected to retain (1) and deny (2), by arguing that we have apriorijustification for believing perception is reliable.2 Others have elected to retain (2) and deny (1), allowing that we can have justified perceptual beliefs without having justification for believing perception is reliable.3 Denying (1) yields what I will call “basic justification” or “basic justified beliefs” — justified beliefs that are obtained without prior justification for believing that the processes that produces them are reliable. -
Understanding Students' Reasoning
Understanding Students’ Reasoning: Argumentation Schemes as an Interpretation Method in Science Education Aikaterini Konstantinidou & Fabrizio Macagno Science & Education Contributions from History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science and Mathematics ISSN 0926-7220 Sci & Educ DOI 10.1007/s11191-012-9564-3 1 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self- archived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your work, please use the accepted author’s version for posting to your own website or your institution’s repository. You may further deposit the accepted author’s version on a funder’s repository at a funder’s request, provided it is not made publicly available until 12 months after publication. 1 23 Author's personal copy Sci & Educ DOI 10.1007/s11191-012-9564-3 Understanding Students’ Reasoning: Argumentation Schemes as an Interpretation Method in Science Education Aikaterini Konstantinidou • Fabrizio Macagno Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012 Abstract The purpose of this paper is to investigate the argumentative structure of students’ arguments using argumentation schemes as an instrument for reconstructing the missing premises underlying their reasoning. Building on the recent literature in science education, in order for an explanation to be persuasive and achieve a conceptual change it needs to proceed from the interlocutor’s background knowledge to the analysis of the unknown or wrongly interpreted phenomena. Argumentation schemes represent the abstract forms of the most used and common forms of human reasoning, combining logical principles with semantic concepts. -
From Logic to Rhetoric: a Contextualized Pedagogy for Fallacies
Current Issue From the Editors Weblog Editorial Board Editorial Policy Submissions Archives Accessibility Search Composition Forum 32, Fall 2015 From Logic to Rhetoric: A Contextualized Pedagogy for Fallacies Anne-Marie Womack Abstract: This article reenvisions fallacies for composition classrooms by situating them within rhetorical practices. Fallacies are not formal errors in logic but rather persuasive failures in rhetoric. I argue fallacies are directly linked to successful rhetorical strategies and pose the visual organizer of the Venn diagram to demonstrate that claims can achieve both success and failure based on audience and context. For example, strong analogy overlaps false analogy and useful appeal to pathos overlaps manipulative emotional appeal. To advance this argument, I examine recent changes in fallacies theory, critique a-rhetorical textbook approaches, contextualize fallacies within the history and theory of rhetoric, and describe a methodology for rhetorically reclaiming these terms. Today, fallacy instruction in the teaching of written argument largely follows two paths: teachers elevate fallacies as almost mathematical formulas for errors or exclude them because they don’t fit into rhetorical curriculum. Both responses place fallacies outside the realm of rhetorical inquiry. Fallacies, though, are not as clear-cut as the current practice of spotting them might suggest. Instead, they rely on the rhetorical situation. Just as it is an argument to create a fallacy, it is an argument to name a fallacy. This article describes an approach in which students must justify naming claims as successful strategies and/or fallacies, a process that demands writing about contexts and audiences rather than simply linking terms to obviously weak statements. -
Evidence Graphs: Supporting Transparent and FAIR Computation, with Defeasible Reasoning on Data, Methods and Results
bioRxiv preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.03.29.437561; this version posted March 30, 2021. The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not certified by peer review) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. It is made available under aCC-BY 4.0 International license. Evidence Graphs: Supporting Transparent and FAIR Computation, with Defeasible Reasoning on Data, Methods and Results Sadnan Al Manir1 [0000-0003-4647-3877], Justin Niestroy1 [0000-0002-1103-3882], Maxwell Adam Levinson1 [0000-0003-0384-8499], and Timothy Clark1,2 [0000-0003-4060-7360]* 1 University of Virginia, School of Medicine, Charlottesville VA USA 2 University of Virginia, School of Data Science, Charlottesville VA USA [email protected] *Corresponding author: [email protected] Abstract. Introduction: Transparency of computation is a requirement for assessing the va- lidity of computed results and research claims based upon them; and it is essential for access to, assessment, and reuse of computational components. These com- ponents may be subject to methodological or other challenges over time. While reference to archived software and/or data is increasingly common in publica- tions, a single machine-interpretable, integrative representation of how results were derived, that supports defeasible reasoning, has been absent. Methods: We developed the Evidence Graph Ontology, EVI, in OWL 2, with a set of inference rules, to provide deep representations of supporting and challeng- ing evidence for computations, services, software, data, and results, across arbi- trarily deep networks of computations, in connected or fully distinct processes. EVI integrates FAIR practices on data and software, with important concepts from provenance models, and argumentation theory. -
1 Argumentation in the Framework of Deliberation
1 ARGUMENTATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF DELIBERATION DIALOGUE Douglas Walton, Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon, Adam Wyner and Dan Cartwright According to argumentation theory, reasoning takes place in different types of dialogue: persuasion dialogue, negotiation, deliberation, information-seeking dialogue, inquiry, and eristic dialogue. These different dialogue types may be nested within one another. Current research in artificial intelligence is building formal models corresponding to each of these types of dialogue and showing how they can be implemented in, for example, multi-agent communications systems. In this paper, we (1) clarify the distinction between deliberation dialogue and persuasion dialogue, (2) survey some recent research in artificial intelligence studying formal properties of deliberation dialogue, (3) present a model of argumentation in deliberation dialogue that has proved to be useful in electronic democracy, and (4) argue that this model provides an attractive alternative to the dominant cost-benefit model of rational argumentation traditionally accepted in economics and other fields as the basis for evaluating argumentation of the kind used in policy decision making. One of the most important lessons of argumentation theory has been that arguments need to be analyzed and evaluated not only by identifying the logical form of an argument in abstraction from its context of use, but also by paying attention to the purpose for which an argument was supposedly used in a conversational setting. In particular, as we will show in this paper, it is vitally important to distinguish between two different types of conversational frameworks called persuasion dialogue and deliberation dialogue. As we will show, logical fallacies can easily be committed in the most common kinds of everyday reasoning by failing to take this distinction into account. -
Discourse Relations and Defeasible Knowledge`
DISCOURSE RELATIONS AND DEFEASIBLE KNOWLEDGE* Alex Lascarides t Nicholas Asher Human Communication Research Centre Center for Cognitive Science University of Edinburgh University of Texas 2 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9LW Austin, Texas 78712 Scotland USA alex@uk, ac. ed. cogsc£ asher@sygmund, cgs. utexas, edu Abstract of the event described in a, i.e. fl's event is part of the preparatory phase of a's: 2 This paper presents a formal account of the temporal interpretation of text. The distinct nat- (2) The council built the bridge. The architect ural interpretations of texts with similar syntax drew up the plans. are explained in terms of defeasible rules charac- terising causal laws and Gricean-style pragmatic Explanation(a, fl): For example the event de- maxims. Intuitively compelling patterns of defea,- scribed in clause fl caused the event described in sible entailment that are supported by the logic clause a: in which the theory is expressed are shown to un- derly temporal interpretation. (3) Max fell. John pushed him. Background(a, fl): For example the state de- The Problem scribed in fl is the 'backdrop' or circumstances under which the event in a occurred (so the event and state temporally overlap): The temporal interpretation of text involves an account of how the events described are related (4) Max opened the door. The room was pitch to each other. These relations follow from the dark. discourse relations that are central to temporal import. 1 Some of these are listed below, where Result(a, fl): The event described in a caused the clause a appears in the text before fl: the event or state described in fl: Narration(a,fl): The event described in fl is a consequence of (but not necessarily caused by) (5) Max switched off the light. -
1 a Tale of Two Interpretations
Notes 1 A Tale of Two Interpretations 1. As Georges Dicker puts it, “Hume’s influence on contemporary epistemology and metaphysics is second to none ... ” (1998, ix). Note, too, that Hume’s impact extends beyond philosophy. For consider the following passage from Einstein’s letter to Moritz Schlick: Your representations that the theory of rel. [relativity] suggests itself in positivism, yet without requiring it, are also very right. In this also you saw correctly that this line of thought had a great influence on my efforts, and more specifically, E. Mach, and even more so Hume, whose Treatise of Human Nature I had studied avidly and with admiration shortly before discovering the theory of relativity. It is very possible that without these philosophical studies I would not have arrived at the solution (Einstein 1998, 161). 2. For a brief overview of Hume’s connection to naturalized epistemology, see Morris (2008, 472–3). 3. For the sake of convenience, I sometimes refer to the “traditional reading of Hume as a sceptic” as, e.g., “the sceptical reading of Hume” or simply “the sceptical reading”. Moreover, I often refer to those who read Hume as a sceptic as, e.g., “the sceptical interpreters of Hume” or “the sceptical inter- preters”. By the same token, I sometimes refer to those who read Hume as a naturalist as, e.g., “the naturalist interpreters of Hume” or simply “the natu- ralist interpreters”. And the reading that the naturalist interpreters support I refer to as, e.g., “the naturalist reading” or “the naturalist interpretation”. 4. This is not to say, though, that dissenting voices were entirely absent. -
On a Flexible Representation for Defeasible Reasoning Variants
Session 27: Argumentation AAMAS 2018, July 10-15, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden On a Flexible Representation for Defeasible Reasoning Variants Abdelraouf Hecham Pierre Bisquert Madalina Croitoru University of Montpellier IATE, INRA University of Montpellier Montpellier, France Montpellier, France Montpellier, France [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT Table 1: Defeasible features supported by tools. We propose Statement Graphs (SG), a new logical formalism for Tool Blocking Propagating Team Defeat No Team Defeat defeasible reasoning based on argumentation. Using a flexible label- ASPIC+ - X - X ing function, SGs can capture the variants of defeasible reasoning DEFT - X - X DeLP - X - X (ambiguity blocking or propagating, with or without team defeat, DR-DEVICE X - X - and circular reasoning). We evaluate our approach with respect Flora-2 X - X - to human reasoning and propose a working first order defeasible reasoning tool that, compared to the state of the art, has richer expressivity at no added computational cost. Such tool could be of great practical use in decision making projects such as H2020 Existing literature has established the link between argumenta- NoAW. tion and defeasible reasoning via grounded semantics [13, 28] and Dialectical Trees [14]. Such approaches only allow for ambiguity KEYWORDS propagation without team defeat [16, 26]. In this paper we propose a new logical formalism called State- Defeasible Reasoning; Defeasible Logics; Existential Rules ment Graph (SGs) that captures all features showed in Table 1 via ACM Reference Format: a flexible labelling function. The SG can be seen as a generalisa- Abdelraouf Hecham, Pierre Bisquert, and Madalina Croitoru. 2018. On a tion of Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADF) [8] that enrich ADF Flexible Representation for Defeasible Reasoning Variants. -
Justification of Argumentation Schemes
Justification of Argumentation Schemes D W U W W,M 3 29, C [email protected] Received by Greg Restall Published July 8, 2005 http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2005 c 2005 Douglas Walton Abstract: Argumentation schemes are forms of argument that capture stereotypical patterns of human reasoning, especially defeasible ones like argument from expert opinion, that have proved troublesome to view deductively or inductively. Much practical work has already been done on argumentation schemes, proving their worth in [19], but more pre- cise investigations are needed to formalize their structures. The problem posed in this paper is what form justification of a given scheme, as hav- ing a certain precise structure of inference, should take. It is argued that defeasible argumentation schemes require both a systematic and a prag- matic justification, of a kind that can only be provided by the case study method of collecting key examples of arguments of the types tradition- ally classified as fallacies, and subjecting them to comparative examina- tion and analysis. By this method, postulated structures for schemes can be formulated as hypotheses to solve three kinds of problems: (1) how to classify such arguments into different types, (2) how to identify their premises and conclusions, and (3) how to formulate the critical questions used to evaluate each type of argument. 1 On September 19, 2004, I gave a lecture on informal logic and argumentation to the graduate students of the Institute of Logic and Cognition at Sun Yat- sen University in Guangzhou, China.1 The subject of the lecture included an account of argumentation schemes representing common forms of argument that are neither deductive nor inductive. -
Applications of Argumentation Schemes Chris Reed University of Dundee
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Scholarship at UWindsor University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 4 May 17th, 9:00 AM - May 19th, 5:00 PM Applications of Argumentation Schemes Chris Reed University of Dundee Doug Walton University of Winnipeg Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Reed, Chris and Walton, Doug, "Applications of Argumentation Schemes" (2001). OSSA Conference Archive. 97. http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA4/papersandcommentaries/97 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Title: Applications of Argumentation Schemes Authors: Chris Reed, and Doug Walton Response to this paper by: Leo Groarke © 2001 Chris Reed, and Doug Walton ABSTRACT. Argumentation schemes capture common, stereotypical patterns of reasoning which are nondeductive and nonmonotonic. As interest in understanding these schemes from a theoretical point of view grows, so too does an awareness within computational work that these schemes might yield powerful techniques in a range of domains. This paper aims to perform two functions. First, to briefly review the literature on argumentation schemes, including the key works by Hastings, Walton and Kienpointner, and to set it in a broader context, adducing concerns from deductivism and presumptive, nonmonotonic reasoning. The second is to consider the various roles argumentation schemes might play in Artificial Intelligence, and in particular to consider (i) how schemes might be characterized as planning operators in domains such as natural language generation, with operationalized schemes representing means of achieving specific (e.g.